Mumbai Terrorist Attack-News stories and timeline

Anujan · Post by **Anujan** » 21 Dec 2009 22:54

surinder wrote: we should allow his siblings, mother, father to come to India to meet him. There should be maximum coverage & air time of details of what his Mom/Dad are going through. It is a disencentive to future Muj's & their sad sorry parents.

You underestimate pakis. His mom/dad/sis/wife will come over and say "Jeeehaaard on kuffars !!! AoA !!!" and go back. Instead, just lock him up for eternity.

nithish · Post by **nithish** » 22 Dec 2009 19:31

not sure if it's a repost but Hindu has a pdf of the first dossier presented to Pakistan..

The Hindu

George J · Post by **George J** » 22 Dec 2009 22:56

According to the Panwallah:

IB Intelligence briefs sent to each state are like SPAM.

After the 1993 blasts its almost daily SPAM as far as Mumbai is concerned. It is ALWAYS vague and unspecified and the least bit helpful.

It's not that state does not act on it...but the signal to noise ratio is so high that if IB wants anything "acted upon" they will call up the principal players. And when they call they actually provide specifics. So if there is no call from IB its treated as advisory or SPAM.

If you are a Mumbaikar then you would have experienced "nakabandi" which suddenly pops up and then after a day it disappears...that is based on actionable inputs from IB.

From the IB's POV they are covering the @ss by sending out this spam every day. That way they can ALWAYS claim "we warned them they did not act upon it" and they "leak" the memo to prove their point. The state then gets raked over the coals.

There are four aspects to an al-keeda attack:
1) Prior ACTIONABLE intel collected from central agencies that are communicated to the state in a timely manner (no such thing existed for 26/11).

2) Prior intel from city/state informer network that the city police has an extensive network and according to all reports there was no buzz about 26/11 on this network (and in the case of the 1993 blast it was totally missed...but it was greately improved upon since then)

3) If 1 and 2 are missed the actions taken DURING the event:
i) The city police failed because there was no precedence but other resources (MARCOS) did an EXCELLENT job...a job they were not even tasked to do but were simply brilliant.
ii) The center failed to relieve the MARCOS for almost 9 hours............but eventually got it under control.

4) If 1 and 2 are missed the actions taken AFTER the event:
i) The City Police captured an al-keeda alive and that is why we even know him as "Kasab" in case you kids forgot, when the first Sebastian De'Souza photos of Kasab were published, this very forum referred to him as "Girly Boy" and probably he would have just one of the 10 if he died in the actional.
ii) We now have Force1, NSG Hub and QRT and all kinds of fancy jingo stuff.

So don't start another storm in a tea cup by deluding yourself into believing that IB communications are anything more than @ss saving SPAM.

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 22 Dec 2009 23:31

He has a wife? She visits him daily? Was she given a visa to come to India?

Probably Indian, of the Admire-Arundhati tribes. He's a Mumbai Celebrity after all, been on National TV and CNN and all, hain?

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 23 Dec 2009 08:07

surinder wrote: Althought the possibility is small, but we would be in a tight spot if an episode like Kandahar hijacking is used to get him out? The chances of that are small, because TSP typically doesn't care for foot soldiers, they only get fat cats out of India. But that possibility cannot be entirely eliminated.

Knowing that India might do such things I would expect TSP to do one of two things

1) Denial and disallowing of access to relatives
2) Bumping off those relatives.

Either way - as long as TSP is torturing or killing its own citizens - it is good for us. While I hate to admit it - looking at those terrorist handler recordings it is clear to me that the terrorists were well trained and well motivated. Most of them made sure that they were killed and it was only a policeman's heroism kept him alive.

It is clear that all those anti-India, anti kafir types in Pakistan are equally highly motivated to survive anything that India throws at them and still create trouble for India in India. The only way out of this is removal of all softness and sentiment wrt to Pakistan and a single minded resolve to use our superior size and strength to gradually undermine the support system that they have built for themselves in Pakistan. To my mind this not only means deliberately undermining Islam every time Pakistanis use it for terror against India, but also undermining US ability to support Pakistan and an encouragement of jihad in Xinjiang.

Avinash R · Post by **Avinash R** » 23 Dec 2009 09:49

Kudos for Maria, rap for former police chief
Shailendra Mohan, Hindustan Times
Mumbai, December 22, 2009

He claimed four of his officers refused to join the anti-terror effort on 26/11.

But when the Ram Pradhan Committee report became public on Monday, it was former police commissioner Hasan Gafoor who was at the receiving end.

The report has criticised Gafoor for not staying at the control room as the attack progressed.

“On [the] occasion of a crisis such as Mumbai faced, the CP should have been in the command centre in the control room,” the report states, adding that this might have helped prevent the chaos and duplication of efforts as various police units struggled to respond to the crisis.

Gafoor, no longer head of the Mumbai police force, was shunted to the post of director general (Housing) two months after the attack.

Citing Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), the report states that the joint commissioner for Law & Order should have been in the control room while the joint commissioner for Crime and of the Anti-Terrorism Squad should have worked together to control the attacks.

This did not happen… SOP was not followed, the report states.

The two-member committee of former Union Home secretary Ram Pradhan and former intelligence officer V. Balachandran also spoke to former police commissioners, who said Gafoor should undoubtedly have remained in the control room to enable him to assess the situation better, stay abreast of developments and marshal his forces.

The report, meanwhile, was all praise for Joint Commissioner of Police (Crime) Rakesh Maria for “handling the crisis situation effectively”.

“It has been noted with appreciation the role played by Rakesh Maria in the C/R [control room] in handling a very serious crisis situation extending over three days,” the report states.

Maria in his deposition has defended Gafoor, saying the police chief had faced a difficult choice: Stay in the control room and be accused of trying to shield himself from danger or rush to the scenes of the attacks to boost morale.

Maria said he did not want to sit in the control room either and would have much rather been on the ground, responding with the rest of the force.

In an aside, the report mentions a contradiction in the statements of Gafoor and then joint commissioner (Law & Order) K.L. Prasad.

While Gafoor told the committee it was he who instructed Prasad to head to the Taj, Prasad denied this, saying Director General of Police A.N. Roy had instructed him to head to the besieged luxury hotel as Maria was already handling the control room.

The report also praises Nitin Kakade for having detected an 8 kg RDX bomb in Colaba and sealing off the area.

Kasab the scared cook terrorist suffering from amnesia

'I am scared of Nikam,' says Kasab
Mumbai, December 22, 2009

"I am scared of prosecutor Nikam," said lone surviving Pakistani gunman Ajmal Kasab to the 26/11 court while giving his statement on evidence adduced by the prosecution against him.

"Why are you looking every now and then at Nikam?" Judge M L Tahaliyani asked Kasab, to which he replied "kya karun woh kuch kehte hai to mere zehen mein ghus jata hai" (what to do, if he tells me something it has a deep effect on me).

Does Nikam knows black magic that he mesmerises you to look at him, asked the Judge to which Kasab replied: "No Sir, he keeps mumbling something then I hesitate and this hinders my ability to express".

The gunman further said, "I also want to see how Nikam reacts when I am making a statement".

Kasab, attired in a white kurta-pyjama, has denied completely his role in 26/11 attack and also said he had made a confession earlier before a Magistrate under police duress.

When Judge and Nikam were conversing in Marathi, Kasab kept nodding, which prompted the judge to say he understands Marathi. Kasab then replied in Marathi, "Ikdhech Shiklo (I learnt it here)."

I’m a cook, not a killer: Ajmal Kasab
23 Dec 2009, 0449 hrs IST, ET Bureau

MUMBAI: I’m a cook, not a killer, claimed lone surviving Pakistani gunman Ajmal Kasab on Tuesday, in keeping with his series of cooked-up stories about the 26/11 last year. On Tuesday, Kasab said he had not undergone any training at the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) camp in Pakistan . Kasab also told the court, which was recording the gunman’s final statement on the prosecution evidence , that he was a cook with a catering company in “Saarayee-Alamghir” near Jhelum in Pakistan.

Denying any involvement with terror outfits such as LeT and Jamat-ul-Dawa (JUD), Kasab declined meeting Hafiz Sayeed, Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, Abu Kaafa and Abu Hamza — all wanted accused and alleged LeT operatives. “I heard the names of Lashkar and JuD from the police here. Crime Branch officials had shown the photograph of Lakhvi,” Kasab said.

Asked by the court if he was introduced to one Major General Saab at the training camp, Kasab said: “This is absolutely wrong.” The judge, M L Tahaliyani, was putting questions to Kasab on the basis of his confession before magistrate in February . However, Kasab disowned the confession , saying it was given under duress. Alleging that the police had threatened to administer electric shocks to him if he did not give a statement to the magistrate, Kasab said the police had prepared the confession and forced him to recite it.

Asked by the court, if he was told in the training that he would go to heaven if he attacked India, Kasab replied in the negative saying he did not attend any training. Kasab also denied having told the police anything about Kuber boat and a dead body found on it.

According to the prosecution, the group of 10 terrorists had hijacked Kuber on their way to Mumbai from Karachi in Pakistan. “I have never seen the boat; crime branch and FBI had showed me pictures of Kuber and my clothes and articles seized from the boat. These articles must belong to either fishermen or smugglers. The AK-47 rifle may belong to the police , it is not mine.” An I-card recovered from his trouser pocket was shown to Kasab in the court on Tuesday, but he refused to identify himself.

I’ve never seen Hafeez Saeed: Kasab
Mumbai, December 23, 2009

Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab, the sole surviving 26/11 attacker, on Tuesday disputed contents of his confessional statement saying the first time he heard names like Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and Jamat-ud-Dawa, he was in Mumbai police’s custody.

The LeT has been accused of engineering the terror attacks.

“Police showed me some photographs published in newspapers saying they were of Hafeez Mohammed Saeed and Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi,” said Kasab while replying to queries from special judge M L Tahaliyani. “Sir maine unko kabhi nahi dekha (I have never seen them),” he added.

The Pakistani national denied all contents of the statement, saying it was a story concocted by Mumbai police.

Disputing the genuineness of the statement, he said that the statement produced in the special court wasn’t the one recorded by Additional\ Chief Metropolitan Magistrate R V Sawant-Waghule. “Dhokese signature liya gaya, kehke ki baad mein padhake sunayenge. Lekin kabhi padhke sunayahi nahi (They asked me to sign saying that they will read it out to me later, but they never read it out),” said Kasab.

“I have never seen these things,” he said when the special court asked him about his last training involving an AK-47 rifle, hand grenades and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). “I was busy earning livelihood, why would I go there?”

Kasab claimed he was working as a cook at a tent house in Sarai Alamgir, a small town near Jhelam on the Pakistani side of Punjab during the period, in which he is stated to have undergone training at LeT camps. He said that the court could cross check the facts with the tent house’s owner.

Kasab alleged a senior crime branch officer threatened him with electric shocks to record his confessions.

chetak · Post by **chetak** » 23 Dec 2009 10:17

surinder wrote:
chetak wrote: ... ( and sees his wife almost daily.)
He has a wife? She visits him daily? Was she given a visa to come to India?

I was referring to fahim ansari's wife yasmin.

fahim ansari has a Bombay, Goregaon residence.

AjayKK · Post by **AjayKK** » 23 Dec 2009 16:05

The response of the weekly "Intelligent Pune" to the two member Ram Pradhan Committee report. The editor of the weekly , Vinita Deshmukh, along with Vinita Kamte wrote the book "To the Last Bullet".

"Ram Pradhan Report Deceptive"

http://www.intelligentpune.org/Intellig ... /page8.htm

The article continues on page 9, 10, 11.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 23 Dec 2009 20:22

Okay foollks, get a load of this...this info is probably from Indian intel officers via french intel. IOL reports:

Force One has neither weapons nor premises and the foreign experts it consulted didn’t come to help train it.

A plan to set up branches of the ATS in Nasik, Aurangabad and Akola, three other big cities in Maharashtra has come to nothing (the authorities say the reason is they can’t find anyone to volunteer to head them). Elsewhere, the prestigious intelligence institute at Pune, has indeed put anti-terrorism courses on its curriculum and enrolled some officers, but without being able to set up a fully-fledged department.

Authorities won’t admit it, but the LeT assailants had accomplices in India, especially among certain Islamic circles in Ahmedabad. And even if they’re not yet saying it, the security services have received indications there were accomplices in Mumbai itself. A witness questioned by Intelligence Online in the city claimed that when the terrorists attacked the hospital, people inside the building opened the doors to allow them to rush in.

George J · Post by **George J** » 23 Dec 2009 21:11

shyamd wrote:Okay foollks, get a load of this...this info is probably from Indian intel officers via french intel. IOL reports:

Force One has neither weapons nor premises and the foreign experts it consulted didn’t come to help train it.......A plan to set up branches of the ATS in Nasik, Aurangabad and Akola, three other big cities in Maharashtra has come to nothing (the authorities say the reason is they can’t find anyone to volunteer to head them). ..............A witness questioned by Intelligence Online in the city claimed that when the terrorists attacked the hospital, people inside the building opened the doors to allow them to rush in.

ABSOLUTELY INCORRECT..........

1) Force One is another name for MSG or Maharastra Security Guards. Before 26/11 there was no such thing. Since Mumbai is the principal city in MH it WILL get priority over other cities, but the fact that Force 1 was deployed in during the Nagpur session means that they are very much mobile.

2) The MOST important thing that Force1 needs is infrastructure, i.e. land, then building ...and by building I am not talking about training areas...the MOST importantly buildings are family quarters...everything is secondary to that.

3) Right now the state is evaluating what model it needs to secondary cities like Pune, Nasik and HOW MUCH resources need to be invested. For example the NSG are deployed in Mumbai but their homebase and training base in Manesar. The Marcos are deployed at Lions Gate but their home base is in Karanja. Similarly does Pune need a full fledged infrastructure or just a deployment base..with Goregaon evolving as the training and induction base.

4) The weapons and instructor stuff not being available is pure BS. The main problem is that MH "might" want joint op with NSG (and MARCOS) and the Home Ministry and Navy might not be so inclined. The Navy actually has a vested interest so they might be willing to oblige...but NSG/Home Ministry does not.

5) No such thing happened in Cama.....

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 23 Dec 2009 21:38

Aditya G wrote:http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=ma ... 39&u_id=36

A year since 26/11: OP Black Tornado: A Case Study

Centre for Land Warfare Studies
E-Mail-landwarfare@gmail.com

Following is the report of a presentation, "Urban Counter Terrorism Operations: OP Black Tornado-A Case Study" by Maj Gen Abhaya Gupta, SM, VSM, IG (Ops), NSG (now retired) held at the United Service Institution of India, New Delhi, on 4 March, 2009.

excellent find - thanks

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 23 Dec 2009 21:54

Thanks for the reply George J.

George J wrote:
ABSOLUTELY INCORRECT..........

1) Force One is another name for MSG or Maharastra Security Guards. Before 26/11 there was no such thing. Since Mumbai is the principal city in MH it WILL get priority over other cities, but the fact that Force 1 was deployed in during the Nagpur session means that they are very much mobile.

I think this is your reply with regards to the ATS being set up in Nasik etc. The article is in relation only to ATS not Force 1.

2) The MOST important thing that Force1 needs is infrastructure, i.e. land, then building ...and by building I am not talking about training areas...the MOST importantly buildings are family quarters...everything is secondary to that.

Thats right. Have they been provided with family quarters or will they be accommodated in existing accommodation?

4) The weapons and instructor stuff not being available is pure BS. The main problem is that MH "might" want joint op with NSG (and MARCOS) and the Home Ministry and Navy might not be so inclined. The Navy actually has a vested interest so they might be willing to oblige...but NSG/Home Ministry does not.

Interesting... Has the weapons that were ordered arrived? News reports mentioned that Force one received training from NSG. But did they receive any assisstance in training from Foreign forces?

5) No such thing happened in Cama.....

IOL says its from a witness... Is there any evidence to say that it wasn't true?

Thanks.

George J · Post by **George J** » 23 Dec 2009 22:06

ATS=MSG=Force One=Maharastra Police based out of Mumbai (For Now)

QRT=Mumbai Police ATS

No such thing happened in Cama....a LOT happened in Cama (which speaks to catastrophic failure) that has been neatly covered up but there was no inside support in Cama. If you want to believe IOL I cannot change your mind.

Regarding weapons...I have it from the probably the one of the highest panwallah that they have enough and more weapons (you have seen the pics of 26/11 anniversary marchpast on the other BR threads....unless you are referring to the CornerShot (no open source ref) which has been ordered for Force One while the NSG is still evaluating it....or any other exotic weapons)

When you say training what does it mean?

Did Force One get training from NSG personnel? Yes.
Did Force One go to Manesar to get this training? No.

Which is why the whole Joint Ops thing is important, NSG does not want Force One (or any other agency) to get into its turf.

Sridhar · Post by **Sridhar** » 23 Dec 2009 22:20

GJ,

What is the vested interest of the Navy that will make joint ops of Force-1 with MARCOS more likely than with NSG? Didn't quite understand.

Sridhar · Post by **Sridhar** » 23 Dec 2009 22:24

BTW, if the terrorists were let inside Cama by an insider, why weren't there are any casualties there (other than those who were attacked outside the hospital)? There are witness accounts (including in the "Terror in Mumbai" documentary) pointing to the fact that people in Cama were saved because the doors were locked and remained so throughout the episode.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 23 Dec 2009 22:39

George J wrote:ATS=MSG=Force One=Maharastra Police based out of Mumbai (For Now)

QRT=Mumbai Police ATS

No such thing happened in Cama....a LOT happened in Cama (which speaks to catastrophic failure) that has been neatly covered up but there was no inside support in Cama. If you want to believe IOL I cannot change your mind.

Lol... I didn't say I believed them...just askin for source. I am curious, what did happen on that night in CAMA?

Regarding weapons...I have it from the probably the one of the highest panwallah that they have enough and more weapons (you have seen the pics of 26/11 anniversary marchpast on the other BR threads....unless you are referring to the CornerShot (no open source ref) which has been ordered for Force One while the NSG is still evaluating it....or any other exotic weapons)

Yes, checked out pics and did a bit of googling etc, they do have weapons(AK's and MP-5, some M4A1's) and some on order I believe.

When you say training what does it mean?

Training by NSG and foreign forces.

How is the New intel academy? IOL says it hasn't been able to develop fully yet.

Thanks

Lalmohan · Post by **Lalmohan** » 24 Dec 2009 00:56

after CST kasab and boyfriend didn't have a clear plan, nor active guidance. i doubt if their handlers thought they would survive CST. after that i think that they wandered about for targets of opportunity. they killed a man whom they asked for water. then entered the hospital, probably because it was there. they appear to have randomly shot up the hospital rather than work with a plan. the elation in the handlers voice when he describes (to the others) that senior police have been killed indicates that it was a lucky break. their less than methodical approach to then hijacking the skoda and their running the roadblocks are the actions of unguided rockets rather than missiles

gandharva · Post by **gandharva** » 24 Dec 2009 09:29

PBS - Secrets of the Dead: Mumbai Massacre (2009)

Mumbai, November 26, 2008. What began as a typical day in a bustling, cosmopolitan city turned into a horror-filled 60 hours of orchestrated chaos when terrorists infiltrated the city and rampaged through the train station, cafes, a Jewish center and two of India’s most famous five- star hotels. As police struggled to coordinate a response and journalists clamored to cover the story from the streets, victims trapped inside the hotels began making contact with the outside world using cell phones, text messages and Twitter. Their urgent and heart-wrenching messages begged for information and painted a gruesome picture of indiscriminate killing, unfettered brutality and mass confusion. But the victims weren’t the only ones communicating with the outside world. The terrorist leaders in Pakistan were watching the coverage of the attacks on the news and relaying crucial information about the whereabouts of the victims back to their operatives on the ground.

http://rapidshare.com/files/323921937/S ... .part1.rar

http://rapidshare.com/files/323921936/S ... .part2.rar

http://rapidshare.com/files/323921884/S ... .part3.rar

http://rapidshare.com/files/323924116/S ... .part4.rar

http://rapidshare.com/files/323921938/S ... .part5.rar

http://rapidshare.com/files/323922146/S ... .part6.rar

http://rapidshare.com/files/323924474/S ... .part7.rar

http://rapidshare.com/files/323924474/S ... .part7.rar

http://rapidshare.com/files/323921634/S ... .part8.rar

here is the torrent link

http://torrents.thepiratebay.org/518147 ... PB.torrent

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 24 Dec 2009 15:09

Pakistani terror court delays case until Jan. 6th

Anti-terror court Judge Malik Muhammad Akram Awan, who was not present in court on Thursday due to some personal engagement, is yet to rule on four applications filed by the accused challenging their indictment and seeking their acquittal.

Updated chronology of the court case in Pakistan, here

Absolutely no meaningful progress at all at the Anti Terrorism Court in Pakistan.

George J · Post by **George J** » 25 Dec 2009 02:26

Sridhar wrote:What is the vested interest of the Navy that will make joint ops of Force-1 with MARCOS more likely than with NSG? Didn't quite understand.

It was too close to comfort..............more later in person.

Shyam:
Donno about the State Intel Institute but I will try and ask the next time I get to speak to someone. AFAIK most of the Force One training was done by NSG/ex-NSG trainers but in MH not in Haryana. No one has a clear answer about who and what the Phoren trainers did. One person remarked it had to with weapons training (OEM support)...not the actual counter-terror ops training.

I am still scratching my head about this: what exactly does GSG-9 or any other phoren outfit have in terms of experience that is not currently available in India between Army-Para/Para Military-NSG/Navy-MARCOS in dealing with Al-keeda?

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 25 Dec 2009 13:56

George J wrote:I am still scratching my head about this: what exactly does GSG-9 or any other phoren outfit have in terms of experience that is not currently available in India between Army-Para/Para Military-NSG/Navy-MARCOS in dealing with Al-keeda?

Our forces have the great experience and our forces have not been defeated by the jehadi hordes since 1947.

However, following two points set the NATO forces a class apart:

1. Access to latest equipment and weaponry.

2. Rapid mobility in any strength thanks to helicopters and 'commando' transport aircraft. Our forces only have 'access' to IAF helicopters.

3. Organic support from the air when required.

4. Unmatched experiences in cross border covert operations. Recent example include raids in Somalia, Syria and in Pakistan.

George J · Post by **George J** » 25 Dec 2009 20:22

ShyamD:

Ok here is the update on the State Intel Institute:

It was always in existence (i.e. before 26/11) but it did not have a separate infrastructure (or importance)....after 26/11 they got Rs. 2Cr...and a state of the art building with all the gadgets and will be headed by a Commissioner Level MH Cadre IPS officer. The new facility was to be inaugurated by Chidambaram on 26/11 anniversary but that never happened, instead it has been inaugurated by the State Home Minister.

Aditya:
Buying MP-5 and PASGT is a money issue. Getting a helicopter is not a financial issue....IAF, IN and every other uncle will have a say on what can and cannot do done with a helicopter and who can or cannot fly the helicopter....there is nothing that GSG-9 can tell you about that that we don't already know.(which is why I am scratching my head)

Example: Ambani's have a helipad on SeaWind. To construct it they need permission from BMC (which they got) but you can't do diddly squat with it coz the IN has to give you permission to FLY from there. Only Ratan Tata has permission from IN to fly from the Wellingdon Mew helipad. But the kahani mein twist comes from the fact that all civilian air traffic north of the Race Course is controlled by DGCA, but south of the race course is controlled by the IN since it is considered defense air space. Only other helipad is in MH Rajbhavan where the MH Govmt. Helo (Sikorsky) operates from. But that's only Mumbai...each city has its own air lords.

So what is GSG-9 going to tell you about air support when there are FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES that have nothing to do with acquiring a helicopter.

IIRC it was NSG chief who is quoted as saying that he has interacted with GSG-9...so unless NSG is now being tasked with cross border covert ops (which is why I am scratching my head) it makes no sense. The MARCOS have categorically stated that they are well prepared (they got INS Shikra and then a detachment in Lions Gate).

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 25 Dec 2009 21:05

The pakistanis are waiting for Kasab's testimony to be over here in mumbai, and for kasab to completely deny his testimony in court there so that the 7 in the dock in pakistan can be let off.
Since the court case there is based on Kasab's testimony here.

Excellent analysis by Sridhar garu, hats off to you saar.

This is kasab's last bit of service to his masters who have possibly conveyed to him that his parents will enjoy djannat here while he enjoys his 72 in the netherworld. Kasab understands that he is a dead man walking.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 25 Dec 2009 21:45

George J, Thanks

Lets wait for the press to pick up the fact that they will be trained by GSG-9 and lets see what the story is. my guess is that Europe is scared that a similar act will occur, so NSG will offer tactics used in Mumbai in exchange for training in some specific area.

Tanaji · Post by **Tanaji** » 28 Dec 2009 23:07

George J:

There have been a few mock terrorist drills held in Mumbai, the latest of which was today. WOuld be interesting to see if "Force 1" took part. All I saw was mentions of "QRT" teams armed with "AK 47"... one or two photographs that I saw were that of usual policemen carrying automatic weapons in standard khaki.

Not saying Force 1 wont do anti terror ops, but is more likely they will be busy guarding Shri Ashok Chavan and R. R Patil , so that they get their own "black cats".

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 29 Dec 2009 12:12

The nigerian passenger's antics show that internal security is really a close ditch action. There are calls for more proactive measures to strike at root of the problem.

jrjrao · Post by **jrjrao** » 30 Dec 2009 11:43

Not sure which thread is best for this. Ralph Peters' commentary in the NY Post today is something that could have been written right after Mumbai:

Lying to ourselves
By RALPH PETERS
Last Updated: 5:52 PM, December 29, 2009
Link

On Christmas Day, an Islamist fanatic tried to blow up an airplane whose passengers were mostly Christians. And we helped.

Our government gets no thanks for preventing a tragedy. Only the bomber's ineptitude preserved the lives of nearly 300 innocents.

How did we help Umar Abdulmutallab, a wealthy Muslim university graduate who decided that Allah wanted him to slaughter Christians on their most joyous holiday?

By continuing to lie to ourselves. Although willing -- at last -- to briefly use the word "terror," yesterday President Obama still refused to make a connection between the action, the date and Islam.

Was it just a ticketing accident that led to a bombing attempt on Christmas? Was it all about blackout dates and frequent-flyer miles?

It wasn't. You know it. And I know it. But our government refuses to know it. Despite vast databases crammed with evidence, our leaders -- of both parties -- still refuse to connect Islamist terrorism with Islam.

Our insistence that "Islam's a religion of peace" would have been cold comfort to the family members of those passengers had the bomb detonated as planned.

Abdulmutallab's own father warned our diplomats that his son had been infected by Islamist extremism. Our diplomats did nothing. Why? Because (despite a series of embassy bombings) the State Department dreads linking terrorism to Islam.

Contrast our political correctness with Abdulmutallab's choice of Christmas for his intended massacre. Our troops stand down on Muslim holidays. A captive terrorist merely has to claim that a soldier dog-eared a Koran, and it's courts-martial all around.

We proclaim that the terrorists "don't represent Islam." OK, whom do they represent? The Franciscans? We don't get to decide what's Islam and what isn't. Muslims do. And far too many of them approve of violent jihad.

It gets worse. Instead of focusing on the religious zeal and inspiration of our enemies and how such motivations change the game, our "terrorism experts" agonize over whether such beasts as Abdulmutallab or Maj. Hasan, the Fort Hood assassin for Allah, are really members of al Qaeda or not.

As a Sunday Post editorial pointed out, al Qaeda's far more than a formal organization; it's an idea, a cause. If a terrorist says he's al Qaeda, he is, even if he doesn't have a union card from Jihadi Local 632.

We're dealing with a global Muslim movement, not a Masons' lodge.

And that "global" aspect is especially worrying. Despite limited Special Operations strikes beyond our recognized combat zones, we still don't accept the nature of the threat from jet-set jihadis. Our leaders and our military are obsessed with holding ground in Afghanistan -- even though al Qaeda's growth areas are in Yemen and Africa.

We voluntarily tie ourselves down, while our enemies focus on mobility. Worse, we've convinced ourselves that development aid (the left's all-purpose medicine) is the key to defeating al Qaeda.

That's utter nonsense. Abdulmutallab's a rich kid. He didn't come from a deprived background, bearing the grievances of the slum. He's a graduate of a top English university. And Osama bin Laden's from a super-rich family. How does building a footbridge in Afghanistan deter them?

Most of our home-grown Islamist terrorists hail from middle-class families -- such monsters as Maj. Hasan or the Virginia virgin-chasers under arrest in Pakistan (where jail conditions are a lot worse than at Guantanamo -- can't we just leave 'em there?).

This isn't a revolt of the wretched of the earth. These terrorists are the Muslim-fanatic versions of Bill Ayers and the Weathermen, pampered kids unhappy with the world. Al Qaeda's big guns are re- belling against privilege. There's a lot of Freud in this fundamentalism.

Spoiled brats remade their god in their own vengeful image. And we have to kill them. This one really is a zero-sum game.

We're not just fighting men but a plague of faith. Until Washington accepts that, we'll continue to reap a low return on our investments of blood and treasure.

On Christmas Day, a Muslim fanatic attempted to butcher hundreds of Christians (dead Jews would've been a bonus). Our response? Have airport security analyze the contents of grandma's mini-bottle of shampoo -- we don't want to "discriminate."

With our lies, self-deception and self-flagellation, we're terror's little helpers.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 31 Dec 2009 06:18

Its very contrasting to see how Obama even when on vacation is being "in-charge" with regard to the Christmas day attack on NW flight whereas Indian leadership even when on duty were passing the buck to the lowest level.

mmasand · Post by **mmasand** » 31 Dec 2009 09:45

Tanaji wrote:George J:

There have been a few mock terrorist drills held in Mumbai, the latest of which was today. WOuld be interesting to see if "Force 1" took part. All I saw was mentions of "QRT" teams armed with "AK 47"... one or two photographs that I saw were that of usual policemen carrying automatic weapons in standard khaki.

Not saying Force 1 wont do anti terror ops, but is more likely they will be busy guarding Shri Ashok Chavan and R. R Patil , so that they get their own "black cats".

Saw the last one in Bandra,only gun toting cops were the QRT teams (2) and a RAF contingent of 10-15 chilling in their bus.Besides the only intimidating weapon was the 'LATHI' by local havaldars keeping the crowd at bay.Absolutely no sign of Force 1.Although i must say the rumor that some terrorists have entered the mall spread like rapid fire....What intrigued me was that 3 Mahindra Marksman and the armored rakshak have been kept on display at the ACP's office on Carter road...i wonder for what???

vera_k · Post by **vera_k** » 01 Jan 2010 00:51

26/11 trial: Sabahuddin’s lawyer writes to HC for two more judges

George J · Post by **George J** » 01 Jan 2010 03:37

mmasand wrote:.....Absolutely no sign of Force 1.Although i must say the rumor that some terrorists have entered the mall spread like rapid fire....What intrigued me was that 3 Mahindra Marksman and the armored rakshak have been kept on display at the ACP's office on Carter road...i wonder for what???

......The commandos of the first batch have been divided into three groups, said Jaganathan, who is also Additional Deputy IG and added that while one group remains alert, one practices and the third takes rest.

Was there ANYTHING SPECIFIC for Force One to respond to? When was the last time you saw NSG or MARCOS or Para just hangout ????

I know this is the Hot Air forum, but I don't get WHY you kids don't understand the concept of "Anti-Terrorist Squad". They are an incident response unit. They are not like SWAT who come out every time some deranged dad holds a knife to his kids in his ex-wife's house.

Here is how it is supposed to unfold:

1) An incident (not a rumor or a jingo wet dream) is reported with gun fire in Mumbai, the Mumbai Police QRT will take the lead with Force One/NSG/MARCOS on alert.

2) The QRT will NOT be caught with its pants down (hopefully) they have NIJ Level III BPJ, PASGT all sorts of bandooks. If they cannot handle the situation (or multiple incidences are reported) then Force One will be deployed since they are under Govt of MH > DGP.

3) At the same time a call goes out to Dilli and to C-in-C WNC. Dilli authorizes NSG even if they happened to be in Mumbai but C-in-C WNC can and will deploy MARCOS (as they did during 26/11) without formal approval of NHQ. Given the memory of 26/11 both Home Ministry and NHQ will probably themselves call Mumbai to tell their assets to deploy and engage if requested by "competent authority".

Now here is the problem:

The "competent authority" in this case CP Mumbai and DGP MH must assess the situation correctly and not go gung ho like 26/11 which lead to the Cama Hosp incident and there never was or never will be any sort of special training to the IPS chaps to assess the situation. Some very bad decisions were averted during 26/11 when the "competent authority" showed total incompetence the cops assumed they could "handle" the situation even after Cama Hosp.

Tanaji · Post by **Tanaji** » 01 Jan 2010 18:41

George J:

If you were carrying out mock drills, would you not expect Force 1, the premier agency tasked with resolving such issues to be on location, if only to gain experience of operating in such an environment? You are the one who has been saying that Force 1 has some land issues, and they did not go to Manesar to exercise. So, in absence of a dedicated training facility, is it unreasonable to expect that they would jump at the chance to do a near live exercise, that brings to fore all the issues from just getting to the location, observe crowd control, getting access to the places etc etc? Why doyou find the expectation that Force 1 be present at least a few of these drills to be so unreasonable?

Now if you tell me that

Force 1 already has mock malls built up where it practises regularly in secret out of public view
or Force 1 was present in mufti at these drills,

then I would agree with your view.

BTW, you were the one saying that whether Force 1 will be tasked for VIP protection can be determined only if we find people in black dungrees following the CM. Fair enough, I am just using the converse of the above, that I would also expect Force 1 to be present at drill simulations. I am ready to accept that I am a "kid" and wrong, but am a loss to understand your reasoning behind your previous post.

Tanaji · Post by **Tanaji** » 01 Jan 2010 18:46

Dont get me wrong, I am not saying Force 1 is useles. I am just saying that the money being spent on bring up a force that will be at least partly used for VIP protection, and will have a very minimal usage, is better spent on other things, namely:

Improving the control room communications to gain better situational awareness
Getting the police, fire brigade and ambulances a dedicated network for communications
Investing a LOT more money into fire brigade resources and manpower, BMC in terms of heavy moving equipment

But no, its far more sexier and macho to say "look, we have raised Force 1... dont they look so cool dudes in black nomex and their guns?" "Look, I even have them guarding me!".

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 01 Jan 2010 19:01

imho its also important to do a thorough survey of all important potential targets and map their layouts, utilities, entrances. over decades many buildings undergo approved modifications and illegal changes internally and typically in
india both the original and changed plans would like somewhere in municipality
office in paper form. most such stuff decades old are probably lost due to rats , roaches and seepages.

our major metros need to start a outsourced drive to digitize all existing records and send out people to survey and update the records to current status.

the digitized data may be made available to the police and army.

using TES and Ofek5 we should also totally photograph all cities down to tier2
level at 1m resolution and build up a digital 3D "world" piped through a google
earth type viewer.

George J · Post by **George J** » 02 Jan 2010 00:16

Tanaji wrote:.... Why doyou find the expectation that Force 1 be present at least a few of these drills to be so unreasonable?............. I am ready to accept that I am a "kid" and wrong, but am a loss to understand your reasoning behind your previous post.

They don't have land issues in Mumbai...they have land issues in the satellite cities (pune, Nagpur) they have 100 acres in Goregaon where the infrastructure is coming up as we speak. The major problem with Nagpur etc is that you need to build your "Manesar" in Goregaon first before figuring out what to do next. This is all new to MH.

The last I checked neither the MARCOS/PARA nor NSG go around doing mock drills in any other location but their own training base. They do put up demonstration for public but I can't recall either of them doing "mock drills". They have adequate training facilities on site (which is being built for Force One home base in Goregaon) and then they deploy when required.

Command and Control has major "control issues" it is not technology/IT-Vity it has to be to be "who is in charge" and who does what and those lines are pretty blurred. They are hoping that by parading QRT, Force One, Ugly Mahindra jeep people will forget that there is still no executive control for such situations.

This is where our situation becomes complex. Mumbai now has QRT (SWAT), State ATS, Federal ATS (NSG) and MARCOS (Navy Seals). So we are now INCREDIBLY WELL PREPARED with PLENTY OF RESOURCES. But none of this means anything if the folks in charge (police and babus and netas) do not know their role and are willing to set aside their egos and bravado to deploy ALL these assets.

Lilo · Post by **Lilo** » 02 Jan 2010 06:14

The Next Mumbai: The Future of India-Pakistan Deterrence

Bennett Ramberg | 08 Dec 2009

On the first anniversary of the Mumbai attacks, many observers discussed the implications of the events that took place last Nov. 26. But few have commented on the implications of what did not take place: New Delhi did not mobilize its armed forces. It did not retaliate against terrorist safe havens, nor did it go to war with the country -- Pakistan -- where they were located. Rather, it limited its response to calling upon its neighbor to shut down the terrorist cells and extradite the masterminds and abettors of the Mumbai attackers.

Islamabad responded half-heartedly. It failed to bring key players responsible for plotting the attack to justice, refused to shut down the organizations behind them, and offered no reassurance that it would not be the home for future attacks.

All of which prompts the question, why didn't New Delhi retaliate, as did Washington in Afghanistan following the attacks of 9/11? The answer remains murky, but history provides an inkling: Nuclear deterrence probably tempered the impulse.

But history also suggests that the same deterrence also provided militants with the shield to plan and execute the Mumbai assault. And if what appears to be a pattern holds, the possibility remains that another attack like that of last November may one day confront New Delhi with a stark challenge: In the next Mumbai, will it continue to restrain itself, or will it risk the sum of all our fears -- the first nuclear war of the 21st century?

From the inception of Pakistan's nuclear program in the 1970s, India wrestled with how to respond to the challenge. In the early 1980s, after Israel successfully eliminated Iraq's Osirak reactor, nuclear pre-emption appeared to provide a solution. But Indian decision-makers realized that Pakistan held a nuclear hostage: India's civil nuclear reactors. If attacked and destroyed, the plants could release immense inventories of radiation, putting at risk large populations. In this ironic twist, India's own nuclear infrastructure became Pakistan's shield to develop the atomic bomb.

As Pakistan's nuclear arsenal matured, the tables turned against India again. Now it would be the fear of Islamabad's weapons that would allow Pakistan to take India on.

The first game of nuclear chicken played out in 1990, a year that saw growing agitation for secession among Kashmir's Muslim population explode into mass violence. Seizing the moment, Pakistan provided insurgents with training and material. Mounting tensions prompted Pakistan's largest military exercise in history. Indian mobilizations followed. Concerned about a nuclear rupture, Washington rushed in as peacemaker as India suppressed the revolt. But Pakistan learned the value of having a nuclear bulwark to challenge its foe.

In 1998, both countries beat their chests in a series of tit-for-tat atomic detonations. Emboldened, Islamabad decided to go toe-to-toe with New Delhi over Kashmir, banking on its evident nuclear prowess to shield it from retaliation. In the Kargil war, fought in the snow line and glaciers of Indian Kashmir, infiltrators attempted to push India off its mountain perch as a wedge to contest New Delhi's hold on the broader region. Again India, pushing back, eschewed striking Pakistan, fearful of the escalatory consequences.

In 2001, the boldest test of the nuclear shield played out, as militants struck the heart of India's democracy, its parliament. The adroitness of India's security forces spared the country's legislators in the shootout that followed. But rather than take revenge against known terrorist camps inside Pakistan, India puffed. It demanded the extradition of those responsible. It slowly mobilized an immense army that approached the Pakistani border. And then, as Pakistan mounted its own response, India stopped. The risks of a nuclear exchange loomed too great.

In the years that followed, India attempted to overcome its hesitancy by devising a new conventional blitzkrieg strategy, dubbed "Cold Start." The hope was that a certain response to provocations would intimidate its adversary. But doctrine proved hollow. Cold Start never received the required resources, and at the time of Mumbai, New Delhi remained self-deterred by fear.

The Indo-Pakistani relationship demonstrates that nuclear deterrence can be a double-edged sword. It proved remarkably durable in the face of the most "offensive" acts of Pakistan and its surrogates. We have seen this pattern before. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union repeatedly tested one another, with both sides betting that the other would not dare pull the nuclear trigger.

Prudence worked then. Whether it will continue to work in South Asia depends on one side or the other being willing to give. Come the next Mumbai, the world would do well to cross its fingers.

Bennett Ramberg has served as a foreign policy analyst and/or consultant to the Department of State (Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs), the U.S. Senate, the Nuclear Control Institute and the Committee to Bridge the Gap, as well as other organizations. His academic appointments have included positions at Princeton, Stanford, and UCLA. He is the author of three books and the editor of three others on international politics. His scholarly writing has appeared in Foreign Affairs, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and Arms Control Today, among other journals. In addition, he has published op-eds in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, and many other major newspapers in the U.S. and around the globe.

a western analyst exposes our weakness to the rest.
i see no other recourse than wait and watch to address this asymmetric threat.Wait till the threat destroys itself ?

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 02 Jan 2010 08:59

To add to what GeorgeJ said, if MH has Force One as an ATS, does it not make a local hub of NSG in Mumbai redundant. If each state then invests in such a structure, and as law enforcement is a state subject, does it not relegate the NSG to a backup structure or something for the politicians to play with, as they did in MH during 26/11 by passing the buck to the center?

My cunning mind says, the state politicians will like to have both ways. Claim credit, if an ATS like Force One is able to respond effectively or pass the blame to the center, and to the NSG/procedures, when it does not go well.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 02 Jan 2010 09:59

Pak should take back the bodies of the slain terrorists

"As the bodies have been identified as those of Pakistani nationals, the neighbouring country should accept them," Maharashtra Home Minister R R Patil [ Images ] told mediapersons.

George J · Post by **George J** » 02 Jan 2010 11:13

ShauryaT wrote:To add to what GeorgeJ said, if MH has Force One as an ATS, does it not make a local hub of NSG in Mumbai redundant........... Claim credit, if an ATS like Force One is able to respond effectively or pass the blame to the center, and to the NSG/procedures, when it does not go well.

Well its brutally simple....it takes something like 26/11 to open up state and federal coffers. So strike while the iron is hot...get as much funds as possible to set up and gear up as many state resources are possible. Think about it....Force One has already been SANCTIONED the acquisition of Corner Shot while the NSG/PARA are still evaluating it. In less than one year you see Mumbai Police go from haphazard pandus to Black dungreed, PASGT, Level III BPJ and all the bandooks in the world.

If 26/11 had not happened even if there was CREDIBLE ACTIONABLE intelligence no one would have spared one rupee for all this. It has taken the death of Karkare...and the resulting brouhaha to make sure the NIJ Level III/IIIA BPJ is now familiar terms to aam janta.

NSG in Mumbai is a "Regional Hub" (Mumbai, Chennai, Hyderabad and Kolkata)...so if NSG is needed in any of the western region-GJ, MP, Goa etc...it will be the Marol based NSG that will respond first...with additional commandos coming from Dilli if they ever make it through the traffic. Force One will not have anything to do with it.

Also the threat perceptions are MUCH higher for the states with metros, not all states need their own Force One....and will not get one till something like 26/11 happens.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 02 Jan 2010 11:55

btw the parachute regiment as a large training center in belgaum where some multi national exercises like with china and maldives have also been held.

the whole place looked wooded and deserted. might be easier to make MH police a secluded base there
as opposed to another large Maneswar type facility in MH.

inter state politics will also come into play being belgaum but the base land would be under army control.