India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector

[Kanson]

Thanks Sarkar for ending in good note. The feeling is mutual.

that is why we surf BRF when at work

Good going!

[Karan M]

TSarkar,

Unfortunately your statements contain certain errors - including the claim that the Elta BFSR was the same as the LRDE one. Kindly allow me to correct the same.

Going by visual appearances would not be the correct approach or even looking at production numbers as allotted by BEL. The difference lies in the plethora of details.

The Elta radar uses a slotted waveguide array - the LRDE BFSR uses a microstrip patch array by ISRO & DRDO. The former uses dedicated COTS MPs for processing, power hungry and run hot - the LRDE one used FPGAs designed around an integrated SP board different in architecture. The software is completely different allowing the BFSR to be LPI. The latter (Indian) used Li-Ion cells versus the Lead acid units supplied with the israeli ones, and had integrated north finding. Plus could scan at much higher speeds thanks to a nifty design feature which used the battery as a counterweight. The only thing even remotely common to both designs was the rotational assembly which was somewhat common but designed in the Indian radars case by Bangalore based System Controls who also provide similar items for the Aslesha, Bharani, SV-2000 and XV-2004.
Over 1100 of these radars, leaving exact numbers aside have been manufactured by BEL and supplied to the Indian Army. Its engineering was recognised as being worthy of a national award. The latest version as upgraded by BEL and LRDE now uses a locally developed thermal imager integrated with the system and 4 BFSRs can network together. Even the CDU is completely different.

PLEASE PROVIDE PROOF THAT TRISHUL IS READY, AND A SMALL NUMBER OF COMPLETE SYSTEMS ARE EXPECTED TO BE TRANSFERRED TO IAF. THIS IS UTTER FALSEHOOD.

Why the caps lock?

The DRDO was in negotiations to handle the IAF developed variant of the Trishul over to them, with a batch of last produced missiles. It is a fact which several here are or should be aware of. But lets get to the point.

First, lets handle the technological challenges that plagued Trishul and should testify to how hard developing such a complex, and still sophisticated system is.

First the need for 3 beam guidance must be understood. The critical requirement was how to gather the missile, ie to capture the missile in a tracking schema so as to guide it accurately. First attempt was by using a TV Camera. These trials were done in 1989. Challenging as the o/p of the camera had to be processed through a tracker. When propellant obscuration was observed, the change was made to a 3-5 Micron IR camera. These were done from 1990-93. Again, there were issues with poor temperature contrast & smoke, hence the decision to proceed to the hardest method, eg 3 beam guidance. Each of these attempts would require a paragraph to detail, but for brevity, lets keep it to a line.

There were other issues observed each of which was analysed carefully by doing root cause analysis and fixed. I will be brief and not get into details. However, what Rahul said was factually correct.

I will address the problems that were observed and solved towards the end of the project.

1. Inadequate communications Link - due to attenuation of signals by the plume. Solved by 2002 and flight tested.
2. Guidance algorithm modification - high oscillations in the trajectory, and solved by a back to the drawing board approach. For details, please refer to DSJ, 2005. Major milestone as 15 test flights thereafter from 2003-2006 showed these capabilities.
3. Range enhancement - IAF noted it wanted range enhanced from 9 km to 12km in 2003. This too was evaluated and demonstrated via test flight in 2005. Changes included changes to the propulsion, new thermal power pack (size reduction to keep overall length unaltered), new digital autopilot replacing the original analog system.
4.Improving the explosive system for the warhead - reliability reengineering demonstrated and flown successfully in 2005.

Finally, from your posts one gets the impression that all three services had essentially the same requirement and if one system does not work, nor would any. That would be incorrect. The Naval requirements were different in several key respects & the purchase of the Barak & communication by the Navy that they would no longer be interested in a Trishul effectively ended the Naval trishul. Arguements can be made both ways for the pros and cons, but as long as the Barak works, the Navy is happy with it, lets leave that be.

Furthermore you note - as its too hard to trawl through the thread to get the exact post, please allow me to paraphrase - that the Trishul contributed nothing essentially to SRSAM or that DRDO needs a foreign partner for SRSAM because it cannot develop a SHORAD. That would not be accurate.

If one were to write what was developed for the Trishul, and what was learnt in the process for the SRSAM, it would run into pages. Suffice to say, that the missile production facility itself at BDL, remains highly relevant from complex assembly, checkout, 3D Measurement, environmental test etc. These can be used for the SRSAM - for the record, some 100 Trishuls were produced at BDL. At the subsystem and technology level, many technologies developed via the Trishul program (hardware and software) remain relevant and can be and are being used for other programs. The experience that was gained by different teams is another case altogether, and arguably (imho) which needs to be used to the highest extent possible.

Let us speak from the viewpoint of the Navy as to what the SRSAM brings to the table which no Trishul or Barak can, and as to why its being developed.

The DRDO has newer technologies today, and it intends to leverage them for the SRSAM as they make what was available for the Trishul (and Barak-1) obsolescent. It is not technology for technology's sake but directly relates to operational performance.

The SRSAM f.e. is intended to use an active seeker developed with MBDA input which relates to future and current threats both, eg the interception of low flying targets. Current gen systems over the sea repeatedly face multipath reflection problems. The SRSAM is also intended to be a VLS drop in system like the Barak-1 but with complete integration into the existing radar systems onboard, including the Revathi. It will not require an additional targeting radar. Furthermore, it is intended to handle surge attacks, which a LOS system has issues with. The range of the Trishul for instance was 9 km, upgraded to 12km at IAF request, but the SRSAMs smokeless solid rocket is intended for a slant range of 15 km.

Most of the above details can be confirmed but however, not by any online links. And they are all verified.

The Trishul system has arguably been one of the most complex attended by any nation in terms of scope creep and what it was meant to achieve and has delivered substantial results.

In any other nation, there would be a balanced approach to both its successes (including breakthroughs in radar technology with the help of BEL, which allowed naval radars to track targets much smaller than 1 Sq Mtr RCS) and failures but here, it has got stuck in a stupid battle to either support imports, or malign a Naval chief, or attack DRDO.

The Trishul developers note that effectively, the Trishul program meant developing three separate systems under the guise of a common name. As the JSF program is now discovering, commonalities in terms of subsystems dont take away from the significant challenges of differing requirements to be met by a standardised system.

The Trishul developers have also documented what they achieved, did (but should not have), did not (but should have) and that too in several public events but as usual, it has not been archived or detailed online as would have been done by any private organization which was keenly concerned about its image.

As a developer from the user side stated - "We asked for what we should do, nobody told us, the biggest challenge was our inexperience but the advantage is you begin with a clean sheet of paper when you go wrong and solve the problems if you can.". This note was taken in 2008

The biggest need for India today is to retain this hard won experience via the Trishul, which has been very poorly understood by lay media - and implement it via the SRSAM and associated programs.

You note that DRDO lied about the Trishul. That they did not - they closed the project when it became clear it had no future in naval service. Unfortunately, due to the CBIs ham handed investigation of the affair, targeting a rtd Naval chief, the entire issue became political. Let us see the issue here - the MODs POV was simple, it would remain silent and the whole thing would blow over, but it was not fair to the CNS rtd. as he felt targeted. Lets get to the last statement made - the DRDO noted that the Trishul had been closed, and moved to the TD stage, ergo the case is over, and there was no prima facie charge of corruption etc from the DRDO end (Kalam himself signed off on the Trishul). If the DRDO had stated that it closed the project as the Navy would not buy it and that it could even attempt to meet naval requirements, then the CBI could rake up yet another can of worms by claiming that the CNS rtd had done the wrong thing. The DRDO did no such thing. For his part, the CNS was absolutely right in stating that he took an operational decision at the time to import the Barak which was available (per data available to him) and the Trishul wasnt. What constitutes a grey area, and what the CBI would use is what next, ie was Trishul development continued to meet all naval requirements? Ergo, the MOD/DRDOs guarded, response to kill the topic and get the CNS his due irrespective of the media hype. Now that its been done, it makes little sense to continue this discussion. A service member is out of a hamfisted investigation that should never have been launched but for politics to get back at a prior Def.Min. and he ended up as the fall guy.

If the DRDO truly were as malicious as you note they were, all they needed to do was make a statement that further developments could have been done and still attempt to push the Trishul development. No, they closed it, and moved on. Its best that it be done by all of us, enough media attacks have occurred already and the only ones who benefit are the arms peddlers and wheeler dealers who would love the attempt to incite a split between two organizations, which more often than not have worked together and delivered leading results in indigenization.

Finally, coming to Dr. Paulraj - again what RahulM said was unfortunately right. At the time Dr Paulraj was in service, the Navy rules & attitudes as prevalent in some sections of the Naval establishment (not personal malice but organizational inertia) meant that that rules were rules and changing them for the sake of one person could not be done. This piece of information comes directly from one of the key founding members of a Naval organization who fought to reverse the state of affairs but could not. The GOI & DRDO for their part did what they could. Dr. Paulraj was given a scientist of the year award (and for the record, this is a key award within the organization as confirmed via innumerable discussions with stakeholders across projects), Director position at CAIR, allowed to work at CDAC and BEL (as Director of its prestigious CRL, no less). The GOI did what it could to retain this talented individual.

Unfortunately, Dr Paulrajs justifiable career and research aspirations took him in a different direction, and if he preferred Stanford can anyone here blame him? Dr VS Arunachalam of the DRDO also ended up at Carnegie Mellon. For the record, it did not stop Dr Paulraj from continuing to contribute to India. He started Spectrum Infotech Ltd with Dr Thomas Kailath, which org was purchased by L&T. Spectrum did several key projects for DRDO, especially around image processing.

Secondly, the entire Paulraj arguement is irrelevant to the discussion at hand. Managing people, especially talented ones in any organization is akin to herding cats. There will always be issues/ squabbles and all management can do is not take sides and try to make sure both key contributors have their say & are given their chance. That was done in this case.

I regret to say that far worse has been done in many others across the board, whether it be the services, DRDO or DPSUs or even at the GOI level itself wherein large organizations have simply been unable to react properly and in a timely manner when faced with personal conflicts. In my immediate family I have people with service experience who loath what was done to them in the name of rules whereas others have had a better time.

Furthermore, nor has it affected Sonar development at NPOL. As of date, over 80% of naval sonars are from NPOL. For instance, a few years back, the project director for the Nagan Sonar was Commodore Kuruvilla who has been at NPOL, since 1974 and worked across the board in terms of sonar systems including the APSOH itself, the HUMVAD VDS, submarine sonars including the Panchendriya and others. He played a key role in its fitment on INS Mumbai for trials. And the Navy is keenly awaiting the final development and certification of Nagan which would make India self reliant in another key aspect.

If Naval perception of NPOL/DRDO is concerned, suffice to say that in both private and official/public events, naval officers working with their peers at NPOL/DRDO have been very gung ho and upbeat about their work & that of their peers. For the record, at one event, without any sort of prompting whatsoever, referred to the people at NPOL as family.

It is this organizational culture both from certain visionary leadership at the Navy, and from the organization at DRDO, which needs to be replicated across both other services. The family comment was especially telling, as it reflected the ownership the Navy had of its programs and that they could face the good and the bad with equanimity, with the end goal - a better Indian mil ind complex, firmly in mind. It is to be praised for sure, but more importantly replicated and even improved.

The issue is beyond Trishuls or a Paulraj who are irrelevant to the actual topic under discussion - the issue of what went wrong in the Arjun program (as versus the tank itself).

The issue is actually is one of organizational support and culture, as the systems that are in place in the Navy - from designing their own ships, deputing personnel to head/assist/consult with programs at defence labs, assist/lead manufacturing programs at defence shipyards and DPSUs - are simply not there in the Army. As such the number of stakeholders, the organizational drive to support indigenization is not there. It becomes limited to programs, to people and consistency suffers.

As one supplier told me - "I have to convince the Army to let me make things for them, with the Navy, they convince me to make things for them".

With that in mind, what happened to the Arjun may yet happen to the FMBT or any other fancy acronym, if corrective measures are not taken.

[sum]

Wow, amazing post. A true keeper in terms of info and superb explanation.

Thanks a ton, Mrinal-sir.

[chetak]

Kanson,

The design was flawed. Not the aerodynamic design, but the system architecture. No amount of imported parts could have rectified it. And everyone knew it.

To give an analogy, I cannot take LCA flight computer, fit it to a MiG-21, and expect smaller turn radius and more nimbler fighter. Something similar was tried with Trishul.

Lets end the discussion here. All BR members are keen in the nation's best interests and I appreciate and respect that fact.

Trishul could not even be gathered in the beam when it first came for trials at Dronacharya !!

[tsarkar]

Thank you, Mrinal, for your explanation, that probably took a lot of effort and patience typing.

Regarding BFSR, my information goes that an original batch of radars was imported from Israel, followed by license manufacture. Thereafter enhancements were carried out by LRDE/BEL. I got this information around 2004 from serving Infantry, EME and retired IN engineering cadre officers working at BEL.

What you have described here is quite commendable, however what I would like to know whether the product roadmap I was told earlier the actual approach followed, or did LRDE decide to develop the BFSR from ground up, independent of any association with the Elta product.

I am well versed with command guidance, having worked with the OSA system. Incidentally the Barak also uses command guidance.

During my interaction with the Trishul team, in 1999, I came to know, that the missile couldn’t be passed to the pencil beam that was required for engaging sea skimmers. The oscillations were also observed during trials from INS Dronacharya. From a naval perspective, the missile was a non starter.

It was around the same time that Barak was ordered and installed 2001 on INS Ganga. The officer who fired the first Barak happens to be a coursemate.

When I last checked (2003), I came to know that deficiencies remain, and Trishul still does not have the capability to engage sea skimmers. Your response does not touch this area, hence would want to know your perspective.

The reason I raised this issue was purely operational. INS Brahmaputra was launched without Barak, and a handful of Igla missiles borrowed from other services, who post Kargil were loathe to share any. To any officer or sailor on watchkeeping, remembering how Khukri was sunk, and knowing they lack any effective defenses, causes a higher degree of alertness, with added stress levels. Personnel remember the weeks they spend on patrol, and they remember how a missile was promised but never delivered. The memory comes back when they’re taking decisions from a command billet on newer projects.

Incidentally, Brahmaputra finally got Barak in 2008, however in the interim, when patrolling billets where threats were anticipated, it patrolled along a missile equipped ship, like Delhi or Mysore.

I purely spoke from the Naval perspective, and not for the sister services. My point was crystal clear that DRDO has no business doubting the Barak purchase if it doesn’t have a missile to engage sea skimmers. And in my view, it doesn’t today.

While you mention certain technologies have been mastered, I dont have a confirmation that full operational parameters have been met. From what I found when I checked with an IAF coursemate in 2005, it was that Trishul had failed to make the cut. Its presently midnight in India, but I will seek confirmation that IAF is indeed procuring Trishul, as Rahul claims.

You also mention scope creep. I find no scope changes, other than changes in guidance technology, which was driven by the need to achieve operational parameters, rather than any service specific requirement. The only operational change was increase in range from 9 km to 12 km.

When I questioned why DRDO is looking for a JV partner in SHORAD development, I inferred glass half empty while you are inferring glass half full.

Fact still remains that we lack the full set of capabilities to produce missiles indigenously, until that capability is achieved, as a best practice, promises should be avoided since they are forward looking and fulfillment isn’t certain and assured.

I agree with you that newer generation active seekers will save topweight dispensing guidance radars like Orekh or Elta 2221. Active seekers also eliminate channel limitations of guidance radars.

Regarding the recent Trishul procurement controversy, my point of view is clear. Remaining silent is as good as condoning the false allegations. Fact remains that Trishul development was stopped after proper assessment. It was not a knee jerk decision by the Navy. Nor was any certainity that DRDO could produce the required results.

Regarding Dr. Paulraj, I entered service as he was leaving. I have never met him, however prima facie I find no naval rules or attitudes preventing him from pursuing a career in sonar development. I have spoken to many officers, who mentioned DRDO didn’t retain him for sonar development, which was something he personally wanted.

Holistically, my intent with these examples was to correct the misperception at BR that services deliberately don’t prefer indigenous equipment. This is quite far from the truth.

[tsarkar]

Secondly, the perception that IN is technically savvy and hands on, while IA is a bunch of retards, is also incorrect.

The IA and IN evaluated Shorts Tigercat and Seacat missiles at the same time. IA was not impressed and did not order the Tigercat. On the other hand, IN evaluators approved inducting the Seacat, not because the missile was superlative, but because of their keenness to induct Navy’s first SAM and it was standard fit on British Leanders.

The Seacat failed to meet expectations in service and served only around 15 years.

[a_kumar]

While the curious side of me is jumping with joy reading the treasure trove of information, other side wonders if there should be more caution on what specifics can be put in open forum!!!

[Rahul M]

there is nothing here that is sensitive. have that much trust in the participants here.

[Karan M]

TSarkar,

Thanks,

Re: radars

The BFSR-SR was an ab-initio local development. The systems are also fundamentally different from an architectural and subsystem standpoint. An initial batch of ELTA radars were imported by the Army, but chances to license and make them in India were dropped once the LRDE radar came about and proved superior in trials.

In what would classify as "things that happen" - on one occasion, the Elta BFSR-SR designer found his way over to where the LRDE contingent were, and was appreciative of the product and both were happily discussing differences and where solutions converged to similarity and didnt. The LRDE did however have plans to develop a local BFSR-MR but in perhaps what made sense from the logistical viewpoint, we are standardizing on the Elta design (as produced by BEL). Apparently plans may have varied to developing a LR variant instead.

On consideration, your information would apply to some extent to the BFSR-MR. In which case a similar process to what you suggest was followed but not exactly. I dont know whether BEL would appreciate me blabbing all over the net, so perhaps its best left

About Trishul

Re: beam guidance
The Beam guidance issue was finally solved over 2003-05 (15 guided flights during the period), including modifications to gain & other improvements. The details may be found in the paper "Post-flight Analysis and Design Improvement in Command Guidance System for a Short-range Surface-to-air Missile System" released in 2005. You may check the same as it has the relevant details of interest/discussion. This of course, was the final issues with beam guidance (the penultimate) as the others including initial gathering, communications were solved previously.

However the point I was attempting to elucidate was that there are things viz. the original Trishul about what the program has already achieved there are things that are there and things that arent. However, the lay media has come to the erroneous conclusion that no capabilities were achieved at all or could be progressed into the SRSAM, which is where I would respectfully disagree with them. On discussions, I found it surprising that the amount of technology developed via the Trishul compared well with any other similarly large systems program and was production ready, but thanks to the controversy associated with the program was noticeably absent from discussion.

Now about whether DRDO has the tech viz sea skimmers or not, it becomes a chicken or egg scenario akin to the Airavat ASP program. If I may explain further - i.e., if the program is cancelled in toto, the systems and technologies will not get developed further unless the program is kept alive and active funding kept in place - which was disclosed to me via a brief interaction in 2005 with an Army person associated with the program. Now about whether that funding continued: when I last discussed these issues in depth (early 2008), was noted that there was a proposal that the SRSAM effectively take over & no further funding into Trishul would be progressed. There was also the perception that the command guidance system may be simplified and dropped altogether in lieu of a seeker based system. In 2009, it was informed that the seeker would be an active RF one sourced via MBDA involvement and participation and that would address all tri-service requirements.

I would state that DRDO intends to leverage its progress via the Barak-8/LRSAM program viz low flying targets/sea skimmers for the SRSAM itself and hence the choice of a common guidance schema ie RF seeker + surveillance radar guided data uplink across both programs. The LRSAM is also clearly intended to address VL flying targets, so this would assist with the SRSAM as well.

Also based on an analysis of what was developed (and what was not) via the Trishul program, the SRSAM program was identified and mooted and it included service inputs about what it should be.

Re: procurement controversy

Regarding the procurement controversy - DRDO did what it could by speaking up on occasion (and receiving egg on its face via headlines such as "DRDO admits it made dud missile") to keeping quiet (hoping the MOD would resolve the issue vis a vis another central Govt organization, the CBI). This is a problem that has occurred in the past both with CAG and CVC statements as well, wherein it becomes a political battle played out to great opprobrium in the press. Even the IAF & IA have had to bide their piece and let statements fly unchallenged. In this case, the MODs deliberately worded last statement on the matter exonerates the CNS rtd. and lets the issue rest. Given the manner in which these things are played out, that is the best one can hope for. At any rate it has been resolved vis a vis the manner in which a national periodical hounded another CNS rtd. on grounds of having a shady relative. I wonder if he even received an apology.

Re: operational requirements

I understand the issue of operational requirements and the resultant stress. If we note present day requirements, there is a realization that what can be developed within a reasonable timeframe is pursued inhouse and if not, what is required operationally, is procured as required from outside (as it should be imho)

Re: scope creep

You also mention scope creep. I find no scope changes, other than changes in guidance technology, which was driven by the need to achieve operational parameters, rather than any service specific requirement. The only operational change was increase in range from 9 km to 12 km.

I was informed that specific operational requirements specified were more than anticipated and drove stringent choices in terms of system complexity and choice of RF bands and components, each in turn causing more challenges. The operational range increase from 9 to 12 km was also fairly significant as the missile had to be re-engineered to achieve 30% more range within current dimensions, which meant developing new subsystems and redesigning the missile.

While you mention certain technologies have been mastered, I dont have a confirmation that full operational parameters have been met. From what I found when I checked with an IAF coursemate in 2005, it was that Trishul had failed to make the cut. Its presently midnight in India, but I will seek confirmation that IAF is indeed procuring Trishul, as Rahul claims.

What Rahul referred to was this, namely discussions on inducting the IAF version into service, in 2007, by which time critical guidance issues had been resolved.

http://frontierindia.net/trishul-sam-mi ... quirements

The issue of whether the Trishul systems found their way into the IAF or not is of course not dependent on operational parameters alone. The issue would also be whether the IAF finds it worthwhile to induct a handful of systems into its force when series production of missiles & suppport systems has not been launched, and also whether it has alternative systems available, eg like the SpyDer. This is something DRDO would face an uphill battle over and with the launch of the SRSAM program, it might be dropped.

Regarding Dr Paulraj - I really do not know whether I have the right to discuss a private conversation online in further detail, but from what I can state, the issue was not with his choice of field e.g. sonar development, but overall career prospects given existing rules at the time. Even so, his contribution was recognised both at the Naval, GOI and DRDO level and several folks did their best to do right by the situation at hand. However to be fair it was also noted that, times have changed now & we are less likely to face such situations - which I hope would be the case

Holistically, my intent with these examples was to correct the misperception at BR that services deliberately don’t prefer indigenous equipment. This is quite far from the truth.

I would state that the nuance I intended to point out is different if I may.

In one case, i.e. the Navy has the systems, the structure in place to make sure a program is successful, and is taken from cradle to delivery in a feasible manner. However, in the case of the other two services, the systems are not in place to the same extent. The end result of these is the ad hocism that has played havoc with programs like the Arjun. As Rahul's quotes depict - we have had significant support for the Arjun from one section of people.

At the same time, as quotes in Livefist/Broadsword note - once these folks retired, others were equally passionate about scrapping the program.

What it boils down to is ownership. The Navy is systematically invested in the program via discussions, actual involvement and leadership/deputation at the organizational level. The only times the projects end up scrapped are when they dont meet operational needs (eg Trishul or re: Broadsword on the ALH). In other words, its not the requirements that are questioned but whether they will be met! Unfortunately, in the case of the Arjun we have an entirely different set of issues due to the lack of such organizational support and consistency. Many T-Series commanders are simply at odds with the basic requirements for the Arjun itself, and with that problem, the tank has faced a see sawing battle for its future.

[Rahul M]

Secondly, the perception that IN is technically savvy and hands on, while IA is a bunch of retards, is also incorrect.

as an institution, would you disagree that IN is more adept at initiating and guiding development of mil technology ? no one is arguing that either of the services does not have individual brilliant men, it's the approach of the institution as a whole that is being discussed here.

[tsarkar]

Mrinal,

Firstly, my appreciation for the hard work that has happened. The LRDE BFSR-SR described by you indeed offers technological and operational advantages over similar systems.

Secondly, It is a significant achievement that three beam guidance has been perfected. I will definitely try to access and read the paper referred by you.

I do share your point of view that if development was continued 2005 onwards, when command guidance was perfected, we could have possibly mastered engaging sea skimmers by now. I do hope the learning from Barak-8 are transferred to the SR-SAM program.

From my experience, such decisions are never easy. My personal belief is that every serviceman will prefer indigenous, for the simple reason of having an inhouse supply chain, and freedom from political or commercial strings. The issue with local development and production is typically lack of full fitment to requirements, ruggedness, production QC. These issues could definitely be addressed via iterative development based on usage feedback. For a sailor on a ship 100 nm from the enemy coast, the only concern he has is having a tool he can use. Such decisions are extremely difficult to make.

My personal approach would be ensuring, while immediate needs are met, long term capability building happens in parallel. I do understand sophistication in missiles like Shourya or Agni 3 has its genesis in the IGMDP missiles.

Regarding the Navy, I presume being in the middle of nowhere automatically fosters teamwork between different cadre and branches, and technology was always an essential requirement to survive and fight at sea. That is why, maybe, the naval brass wants every naval officer passing out from Ezhimala will be a B.Tech.

[Kanson]

Let us speak from the viewpoint of the Navy as to what the SRSAM brings to the table which no Trishul or Barak can, and as to why its being developed.

The DRDO has newer technologies today, and it intends to leverage them for the SRSAM as they make what was available for the Trishul (and Barak-1) obsolescent. It is not technology for technology's sake but directly relates to operational performance.

The SRSAM f.e. is intended to use an active seeker developed with MBDA input which relates to future and current threats both, eg the interception of low flying targets. Current gen systems over the sea repeatedly face multipath reflection problems. The SRSAM is also intended to be a VLS drop in system like the Barak-1 but with complete integration into the existing radar systems onboard, including the Revathi. It will not require an additional targeting radar. Furthermore, it is intended to handle surge attacks, which a LOS system has issues with. The range of the Trishul for instance was 9 km, upgraded to 12km at IAF request, but the SRSAMs smokeless solid rocket is intended for a slant range of 15 km.

Most of the above details can be confirmed but however, not by any online links. And they are all verified.

Media reported about the bunch of Trishul missile made available for the IAF. Dr. Saraswat confirmed the range enhancement of Trishul. Infact potential growth in system capabilities of Trishul was conveyed to the Services much earlier. But IAF deal didnt go throu becoz, IAF wanted a system similar to SPYDER SR.

Secondly, It is a significant achievement that three beam guidance has been perfected. I will definitely try to access and read the paper referred by you.

Sarkar, that paper was discussed here circa 2007, if you r lucky you may get it in the archive.

[rohitvats]

To tsarkar and Mrinal: Gentlemen, thank you for the series of highly informed post. I'm a more informed forumite after reading your posts. To me, the conversation between you gentlemen, very clearly brings about the POV of an end-user and developer and set of requirements and challenges for both. The Brahamaputra example with Igla MANPADS is a real eye opener (if not a shocker all together) and brings forth the exigency of operational requirements and which in my opinion, are above anything else. These need to be met first and foremost. However, as tsarkar said, get what is required for present from wherever (if not available locally) while continue to build upon the domestic mil-ind capability.

On a lighter note, we're already seeing the +ve spin-offs of Arjun programme. But for the Arjun program and surrounding controversy, such topics (as have been discussed here) would not have come forth and we would have been poorer in terms of knowledge gained through above posts.

[VinodTK]

Indian Army Develops Blinding Chili Grenade

[chackojoseph]

Secondly, the perception that IN is technically savvy and hands on, while IA is a bunch of retards, is also incorrect.

The IA and IN evaluated Shorts Tigercat and Seacat missiles at the same time. IA was not impressed and did not order the Tigercat. On the other hand, IN evaluators approved inducting the Seacat, not because the missile was superlative, but because of their keenness to induct Navy’s first SAM and it was standard fit on British Leanders.

The Seacat failed to meet expectations in service and served only around 15 years.

When the NLCA flies from the indigenous aircraft carrier, give me your address, I will send you a box of mithai.

You do not understand the basic fact that failures are an inherent part of success.

[shukla]

Indian Army Develops Blinding Chili Grenade

Sorry Vinod, didn't realise that you had cited this post earlier.. I happened to repost it in the Indian Army discussion.. Happy to delete my post if you feel strongly.. No offence meant.. My apologies.

[shukla]

HAPP, Tiruchi develops indigenous version of RGB 60 for Indian Navy

indigenised version of the Russian Anti-Submarine Rocket Guided Bomb 60 (RGB 60), for catering to the needs of Indian Navy.

The 110 kg RGB 60 rocket developed through in-house Research and Development process within a duration of one year, has been designed to deliver a war head mass of 25 kg to a range of 5.8 km within ten seconds. The rocket is fired in formations from the RBU 6000 (Rocketnaya Bombometnaya Ustanovka) Rocket Depth Bomb Launcher mounted on ship.

The first batch of 20 indigenously manufactured and assembled RGB 60 rockets will shortly be despatched for test trials with support from the officers and staff of the NAI (Naval Armament Inspectorate) detachment of CINA (Chief Inspectorate of Naval Armaments), the HAPP General Manager M. Ravi told presspersons here on Thursday. The hardware manufactured by HAPP will be filed with high explosives and propellents, and the fully charged Rocket will be issued to the Navy by AF Khadki, a Sister Ordnance Factory, he said.

[JE Menon]

Thank you Mrinal.

[Karan M]

Rohitvats and JE Menon, thanks.

[shukla]

x post

Definition of Optimism...

Long-term plan to indigenously manufacture all major defence equipment'

Vice-Chief of Army Staff Lt General P C Bharadwaj on Saturday said India had a long-term plan to indigenously manufacture all major defence equipment used in combat zones as part of its modernisation programme.

"Modernisation is a very high priority matter. We are looking up to 2027. All the services (Army, Navy and Airforce) have drawn up their plans," Bharadwaj told reporters on the sidelines of the passing out parade at Officers Training Academy. He said India has progressed in a big way in making indigenous defence equipment like Brahmos supersonic cruise missile and said a lot of technical equipment used in battle is being produced indigenously.

2027 !!!!! I hope some of are still alive to see that dream "actually" materialize.. Oh.. if it does happen in 2027, I might get lucky

[vina]

Secondly, It is a significant achievement that three beam guidance has been perfected. I will definitely try to access and read the paper referred by you.

I do share your point of view that if development was continued 2005 onwards, when command guidance was perfected, we could have possibly mastered engaging sea skimmers by now. I do hope the learning from Barak-8 are transferred to the SR-SAM program.

tsarkar, Mrinal.. I think that fundamentally except for the Nag, the other tactical programs in the IGMDP were flawed in one respect. They were aimed at import substitution rather than fielding "forward looking" new systems.

What they were basically trying to do was an "improved" OSA-AK and an "improved" SA-6. That resulted in carrying the systems architecture from the "legacy" soviet systems and trying to "improve" via new technology infusion (Phased Array radar for Akash and 3 beam guidance for Trishul). But in the end, the system limitations of the legacy platforms remain!.

If like the Nag, the DRDO had wanted to develop "forward" looking systems, they would not have made the architectural choices they did and like their peers in France, Isreal and US and other places, they would have gone for active guidance. Lets face it. The guidance architecture of the Trishul, especially is pretty dated.

How so ?. Well, unlike the Akash and I think the Barak for example, the Trishul is a "beam riding" missile , the missile is guided within the "walls" of a microwave beam. But the problem , is that the missile does not fly in a straight line in the middle of the beam by magic, but oscillates back and forth between the "walls" of the beam on the way to the target (thus taking longer and wasting more energy in the process) . Of course, wider the beam, greater the oscillation possible. So even if you went to a very small beam in the 3rd stage, the inherent problems of beam riding guidance remain. Probably fine for a target coming directly towards you. Try engaging a fast crossing target with a beam rider, given that the beam has to swivel really really fast in that case, guiding a beam riding missile at such high angular rates sweep rates of the beam is close to impossible.

That the DRDO had problems with making it fly in the middle of the beam is well known (everyone knows the huge porpoising from the videos of the Trishul tests, there were problems with handing off from one beam to another, and finally even making the missile fly at consistent height above the waves was difficult ,including instance where the missile porpoised into the sea!) . So if they finally got the 3 beam guidance working, one wonders if they really re-invented a dated 1950s technology , that got obsolete by mid 70s max.. To what effect I wonder.

I basically feel that DRDO should have focused their efforts in learning and perfect the NEXT gen.. active guidance ones (which we are now doing with foreign partners and developing and fielding as collaborative efforts)

In fact, beam riders were basically given up by others for precisely this reason. Akash is probably still relevant, because the Phased Array radar sort of makes up by it's huge multi beam capability and makes it competitive with active guidance equivalents (within line of sight of course, notice, that if it is out of sight of the guidance radar, only active guidance will work). Unfortunately , no such lock for the Trishul. The architecture was too dated and rigid.. For instance, if we have a great phased array radar and all IN ships went that way (right from the Frigates to the Capital ships.in fact the le Formidable class with the Thales Phased Array radar is the kind of thing to come) and the single PA radar replaces multiple radars , the Trishul cannot work in such a scenario, if based on the 3 beam guidance.

Sorry to say. It looks like that DRDO spent tremendous amount of time re-inventing the wheel with Trishul. I really dont see what much they got out of it. Instead, the radar and guidance resources should have been put in to Phased Array radars and more architecturally upto date guidance models.

Someone with some sanity should have been able to look at the Trishul and call the "Emperor's naked clothes" long ago and pulled the plug before all those trials , tribulations and heart burn . That in reality is the weakness of the DRDO and the Indian system. There are no voices to challenge a "bad consensus" (the Indian boss knows best systems and the value and culture systems are absolutely great here) and the .

That in my analysis is the REAL learning from Trishul. More than a technical failure in the implementation sense (it is too), but rather a larger Product Strategy failure and organizational failure in allowing more dissent and challenge.

[chackojoseph]

They were aimed at import substitution rather than fielding "forward looking" new systems.

This sentence is a killer. It sums up the entire problem. I actually want to use it for Army GSQR processes.

[Kanson]

I think that fundamentally except for the Nag, the other tactical programs in the IGMDP were flawed in one respect. They were aimed at import substitution rather than fielding "forward looking" new systems.

What they were basically trying to do was an "improved" OSA-AK and an "improved" SA-6. That resulted in carrying the systems architecture from the "legacy" soviet systems and trying to "improve" via new technology infusion (Phased Array radar for Akash and 3 beam guidance for Trishul). But in the end, the system limitations of the legacy platforms remain!.

If like the Nag, the DRDO had wanted to develop "forward" looking systems, they would not have made the architectural choices they did and like their peers in France, Isreal and US and other places, they would have gone for active guidance. Lets face it. The guidance architecture of the Trishul, especially is pretty dated.

My thoughts. Run before Walk ? Every country who started their defence research program started like that. Even the mighty US took the Germans help after WWII for the missile development and their initial development is a variant of or the knowledge gained from the United Germany's missile. You probably kown Nag started as wire-guided AT missile. The idea of IGMDP is to utilize the spin-off from one missile program to the benefit of the other one. Like, what i gain from Trishul i will use it in Akash. That is why as everyone knows, all the missiles are clubbed under one program, IGMDP and they benefited from each other. So basement of Nag's success to be considered as forward looking got the help from other missile program as well and they were already one step ahead with AT missile as they already done one compared to other missile program[Nag got auto-pilot tech base from Trishul]. As i stated, as Nag started as wire-guided, similary there exists upgrade plans for Trishul and Akash. System gowth potential of Trishul[upgrade path like that of Nag] was well known before 2000 and the same was shared with Services. And the three beam guidance is good for the missile like Trishul.

Sorry to say. It looks like that DRDO spent tremendous amount of time re-inventing the wheel with Trishul. I really dont see what much they got out of it.

You wouldnt be in a position to make this statement if IAF went ahead with the purchase of this missile. At that time, situtation changed after 2005 and IAF wanted similar system like Spyder. EoS.

[vina]

And the three beam guidance is good for the missile like Trishul

Maybe for the Barak equivalent role. But not for the tri services role that the Trishul was meant to play. Even if the naval trishul to be used as a short range anti missile point defense one could have been perfected, now way that beam riding missile would have been competitve in an Air force or Army roles

You wouldnt be in a position to make this statement if IAF went ahead with the purchase of this missile. At that time, situation changed after 2005 and IAF wanted similar system like Spyder. EoS.

In 2005, why in heaven's sake would the Air Force be interested in a beam rider?. Things have moved on long past it. Why would even the Isrealis themselves who have a perfectly decently working beam rider, the Barak -1 field a Spyder instead for AF kind of roles ? That is really EoS.

I really think the Trishul was a wasted effort in re-inventing an obsolete guidance system (with very very limited role, if at all in future) and airframe (OSA-AK equivalent).

[Kanson]

Vina ji,

The way i see it, i dont consider the obsoleteness of the system based on the tech generation but by the capabilities and every system has pros and cons. We are still retaining the rifled gun while the world moved to smoothbore gun. Ramjet tech was once replaced by solid fueled and its coming back in AAM, SAM and SSM.

Coming to Trishul, CLOS provides cheap options. Seekers are the most costliest part of the missile, as you know. Secondly, its a short range, quick reaction missile for which CLOS is adequate. Accuracy provided by the 3 beam guidance in case of Trishul is adequate. Beam rider may have problem with evasive manoeuver but not with 3-beam guidance. So its boils down to what capabilities you want. You must have heard of IR guidance for Trishul much before the Maitri JV. And the performance of IR guidance actually relies on the seeker gen. How good you make it. By merely talking abt IR guidance doesnt make the missile modern. If you ask me, i would say, except in some circumstances, the Trishul with CLOS guidance can do the same damage as IR guided missile and some areas it comes favourable. And when you talk abt IR guidance as comparision, it must be what type of tech and generation you should compare and do we have the tech ? More than that, will IAF accept that second best or third when it has Spyder in sight? Without that latest generation seeker, it is good to have CLOS Trishul as a short range missile.

Why would even the Isrealis themselves who have a perfectly decently working beam rider, the Barak -1 field a Spyder instead for AF kind of roles ? That is really EoS.

Simple, becoz Isarel has access to and started developing the tech long back. We dont have such tech base nor have such access in 90s and early 00s So we stick with whatever we have. Seeker tech is still the achilles' heel in our case.

Try engaging a fast crossing target with a beam rider, given that the beam has to swivel really really fast in that case, guiding a beam riding missile at such high angular rates sweep rates of the beam is close to impossible

Not a problem with 3-beam guidance.

But the problem , is that the missile does not fly in a straight line in the middle of the beam by magic, but oscillates back and forth between the "walls" of the beam on the way to the target (thus taking longer and wasting more energy in the process).

You might like to check with how exactly the missile align itself at the center.

I bet with the proliferation of DIRCM tech, we are once again probably revert back to advanced CLOS.

[vina]

Coming to Trishul, CLOS provides cheap options. Seekers are the most costliest part of the missile, as you know. Secondly, its a short range, quick reaction missile for which CLOS is adequate. Accuracy provided by the 3 beam guidance in case of Trishul is adequate. Beam rider may have problem with evasive manoeuver but not with 3-beam guidance.

Don't know. But on the face of it, I would think that a beam rider, especially when it has a very narrom beam and the missile has to be contained in it, will have huge trouble in enganging a fast moving and maneuvering crossing target, given that the beam itself will have to swing at pretty fast angular rates to track the target!. Yeah, the wider beam will probably have a "bigger cone" and probably can "catch" the such a target with a slower swing rate, but then that is no good for an interception. The missile has to be in the thin beam in the end phase.

Yeah, I agree that for a point defense anti missile, self protection kind of thing the Barak/Trishul kind of stuff is good, gives cheap , simple, missiles /reloads and probably lower cost. But for AF/Army, the requirements will be quite different from just point defense I think. They will need some sort of anti low level cruise missile and anti aircraft capability from all engagement aspects. That probably was what really killed Trishul, once the Navy went for Barak.

So its boils down to what capabilities you want. You must have heard of IR guidance for Trishul much before the Maitri JV. And the performance of IR guidance actually relies on the seeker gen. How good you make it. By merely talking abt IR guidance doesnt make the missile modern. If you ask me, i would say, except in some circumstances, the Trishul with CLOS guidance can do the same damage as IR guided missile and some areas it comes favourable. And when you talk abt IR guidance as comparision, it must be what type of tech and generation you should compare and do we have the tech ? More than that, will IAF accept that second best or third when it has Spyder in sight? Without that latest generation seeker, it is good to have CLOS Trishul as a short range missile.

Actually, this is the first time I am hearing of the IR guided Trishul. In fact, that makes a lot more sense as a tri sevice missile with anti missile and anti aircraft capability than a CLOS type missile.

A variant of the Nag IIR seeker for the Trishul with data links and final IR engagement makes the most sense and maybe even conceptually easier. You immediately get genuine multi target capability, possibly longer engagement ranges than a CLOS, more capability against fast and higher maneuvering targets.. etc..etc.

But, you are right, it will come down to , do you have a seeker ?. With Nag, they do seem to have one. So maybe, that was what was the problem. The moment the guidance problems become apparent, someone internallys should have probably challenged the entire concept and looked for a plan B via an IIR version of Trishul!.

Try engaging a fast crossing target with a beam rider, given that the beam has to swivel really really fast in that case, guiding a beam riding missile at such high angular rates sweep rates of the beam is close to impossible

Not a problem with 3-beam guidance.

Ok. Explain how. I would think, it becomes a "bigger" problem.

You might like to check with how exactly the missile align itself at the center.

I can guess. Tweak the control response and sensitivity and increase damping in the missile and make it track the peak intensity , which I guess should be in the middle of the beam lobe( a guess, but I think reasonable) .. But ah, to solve the oscillation problem, you put limits on the maneuverability of the missile. Nothing is free

I bet with the proliferation of DIRCM tech, we are once again probably revert back to advanced CLOS.

Dont know. Cruise missiles, BMs etc wont have DIRCM which will probably be restricted to high value manned platforms. CLOS is too restrictive. With fallng costs and more maturity of active seekers, probably more compact active seeker based missiles are the future I think.

Fundamentally, put more resources and effort into seekers if you want to be a long term player , the lesson here I think.

[ASPuar]

Seems that DRDO in its technical report to the Home Ministry has fudged crucial trial data on Bullet Proof jackets, which, if undetected, might have ended up getting CPO jawans killed.

The home ministry apparently doesnt trust the DRDO to evaluate bulletproof jackets for CPO personnel. Apparently a DRDO official fudged the test results in favour of a vendor... apparently playing with the lives of the jawans, for personal gain.

The Home Ministry has scrapped the DRDO test results, called for samples from fresh vendors, and demanded the retrial tests to be conducted under their own supervision, which are now complete, and is tendering according to the new results.


http://sify.com/news/new-bullet-proof-j ... iejjh.html

New bullet-proof jackets for paramilitary forces by June
2010-03-21 16:30:00

The Indian government is set to procure around 60,000 lightweight bullet-proof jackets to be used by paramilitary troopers for counter-insurgency operations in the country.

A home ministry official said the testing procedure for the jackets has been completed and a report is expected by March end.

Earlier in January, the government had scrapped the technical evaluation report and ordered re-trial of the jackets following reports that their tests were fudged at a Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) lab in Chandigarh.

'Now the retrial has been done and concluded. The report is expected by March end and the bullet proof jackets will be procured by June,' the official said. The retrial was conducted on fresh samples from suppliers.

The home ministry got several complaints against a DRDO joint director R.K. Verma who had conducted the previous tests after the government floated a tender for procuring nearly 60,000 bullet-proof jackets.

Verma was in the evaluation committee formed by the government. A CD purportedly containing conversations between Verma and one of the bidders was received by the ministry in which the official claimed that the approved vendors had rigged the tender to jack up prices. He also admitted in the CD that discrepancies existed during the tests.

The bidders were asked to submit fresh samples and the tender advisory and evaluation committees were ordered to conduct a retrial under the strict vigilance of the home ministry to ensure scrupulous adherence to the terms and conditions of the tender.

The bullet-proof jackets are for the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), National Security Guard (NSG), Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), Assam Rifles and Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB).

The CRPF, which is engaged in anti-Maoist operations in central India and counter-terrorism operations in Jammu and Kashmir, is the nodal agency to procure the jackets.

[ASPuar]

The sordid story behind the matter.

http://ibnlive.in.com/news/govt-to-orde ... om=rssfeed

Govt to order retrial of bulletproof vests

Parul Malhotra / CNN-IBN

New Delhi: Union Home Ministry has taken tough action after CNN-IBN exposed the bulletproof jackets scam.

Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Joint Director, Terminal Ballistic Research Laboratory RK Varma was on Thursday called from Chandigarh to Delhi and questioned during which he reportedly admitted to talks with bidders on the bulletproof jackets tenders.

He has also been is asked to explain the discrepancies during the trials.

During the questioning Varma was also confronted with a CD in which he is allegedly heard confessing to fudging technical data; attempting to collude with vendors on the price bid and claiming political patronage.

Varma reportedly admitted that the voice on the CD was his when grilled by senior officers from the Intelligence Bureau, DRDO and Home Ministry.

Sources say the Home Ministry is set to recommend action against the DRDO official as the trials were compromised.

DRDO, too, is likely to order a departmental inquiry against Varma.

Meanwhile, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), which was to use 20,000 of the 59,000 bulletproof jackets being purchased, has asked for a retrial.

The Home Ministry is expected to announce the retrial on Friday.

But those familiar with the process say any inquiry is incomplete without investigating the role of other members on the technical committee, especially those belonging to the Bureau of Police Research and Development.

It also remains unclear whether new procedures will be put in place, which will ensure better transparency, in procurement of critical life saving equipment.

Even though Varma's confessions are enough to show the compromise during the technical tests, his claims of enjoying political patronage have been dismissed as incredible.

Sources say the episode is being seen at the highest level as one having grave implications for India's national security.

Varma is likely to undergo detailed and prolonged questioning, and faces disciplinary action.

DRDO, too, has been asked to clean up its act and the tainted ballistic trials will likely be held again.

[ASPuar]

WRT to the Arjun and other DRDO-vs-Services discussions, I will suggest to all those who are so strongly in favour of DRDOs position vis a vis the services, please understand that anyone can be compromised, and even DRDO doesnt always tell the truth. This was a home ministry matter, so the cops got involved quickly. Who knows what else has gone under the radar in these sorts of cases?

There is a lot of lobbying going on by DRDO in these matters, and one should not fall prey to spin. It is easy to throw dirt on a lifetime of service by issuing catchy media friendly phrases like "RFP came from glossy janes brochures" (even some of our admins say these sorts of things, sadly, without any proof, and largely as a slur), "possibility of sabotage of trials", "service officers are not intelligent", "disloyalty", "lack of patriotism", etc etc.

But dont forget, that the personnel of DGMF/IA/IAF/IN are professionals, and being soldiers, are so in a way that most other government departments will not understand. They armoured corps know their tanks. They are not idiots. They have to drive these weapons into battle, and have to be 100% convinced that they are the right tool for the job. That should be the final word on the matter.

Else, all this chaff about building national capacity etc can be defined very easily, viz.:

"Careerist powerplay lobbying for personal gain, by people who will not have to face the music once the shooting starts, but want to force those who will have to fight, to do what they (the lobbyists) want".

In the final calculus, it is a matter of who you want to trust. I trust our soldiers. They have not let us down. Ever. And they have already been treated badly by an ungrateful nation, and an actively useless government. I trust our troops over a bureaucrat anyday. What have the bureaucrats ever done, save for lord over the people, and steal from the public till? Our men in uniform deserve better. The rest, ie these discussions, are a question of semantics, As far as Im concerned.

[SSridhar]

L&T wins a MoD contract to build 36 High Speed Interceptor boats for Coast Guard

The interceptor boats will have aluminium-alloy hull construction with water jet propulsion to enable quick response, necessary for the intended applications, and shall be also crucial for near shore action.

The boats shall be designed in-house at the L&T's Ship Design Centre, a part of its heavy engineering division, and shall be constructed at its existing shipyard at Hazira (in Gujarat) and the new shipyard coming up at Katupalli near Ennore (in Tamil Nadu).

[ASPuar]

The action taken against RK Verma, after he was indicted for fudging technical reports for 60000 bulletproof jackets: He was shifted to the Snow and Avalance Study Estt. Where no doubt, he will find new ways to make cash, while our boys in green are buried alive.

http://www.dailypioneer.com/228777/DRDO ... -scam.html

DRDO official shifted in bulletproof vest scam

Navin Upadhyay | New Delhi

Retrial ordered

The Government has decided to shift Joint Director of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (Terminal Ballistic Research Laboratory) RK Verma from his present post and initiate action against him following uproar over his role in ‘rigging’ the ballistic trial for short-listing vendors to supply bulletproof jackets to the paramilitary forces.

The Home Ministry on Monday also asked the vendors to provide fresh samples for a re-trial of bulletproof jackets and recommended action against Verma.

Sources said Verma is being shifted to Snow and Avalanche Study Establishment (SASE) at Chandigarh after he was questioned by security and intelligence officials in Delhi last week.

Verma was summoned to Delhi and interrogated after media expose that he played a key role in manipulating the result of the ballistic trial. A sting operation carried out by an unsuccessful vendor also established that Verma fudged the technical data of the ballistic trial. Verma was questioned about his claim on the ‘sting’ CD that the approved vendors rigged the tender to jack up prices and irregularities took place during the trial.

The Pioneer tried to get an official confirmation from Director TBRL Satish Kumar about decision to remove Verma, but the former switched off his cell without responding to the question. Repeated calls to his mobile went unanswered throughout the evening on Sunday. Such has been the mode of secrecy surrounding Verma’s episode that even in Delhi DRDO official feigned ignorance about any move to shift Verma.

Verma himself could not be contacted despite calls made on three separate mobile phones used by him. The phones were switched off and the official phone installed at his residence at Chandigarh was not in use.

The SASE, where Verma has been transferred, is an organisation under the DRDO at Chandigarh. The fact that the testing range at the terminal ballistic test laboratory, where Verma was posted, is also located at Chandigarh, has raised eyebrows.

Vendors feel that being in the same town, Verma could still use his influence to scuttle an honest probe.

Incidentally, Verma has enjoyed an uninterrupted 12 years stint at Spark range of TBRL Chandigarh. “Verma is being moved this time because the Home Ministry, which wants a transparent probe into the mater, has insisted that the Defense Ministry must act on the complaints against the DRDO man,” said a source.

The Home Ministry has also asked the Defence Ministry to initiate stern disciplinary action against him.

The probe into the bulletproof jacket scam is going into several specific allegations of manipulation of the ballistic test. These include altering the sequence of firing at ‘will’; continuation of firing in below-normal visibility; ignoring wet firing norms, and not allowing vendors to attend the test firing trial.

But the most crucial piece of violation involves short-listing a vendor, who is alleged to have used hard plastic sheets in the jackets and different materials for different layers. The specification laid out clearly said that “each component should be made of many layers of same material. Each layer will be in single piece and equal shape and size to maintain uniform thickness all over the area up to edge level.”

God knows what this man said the army should buy? Hopefully our troops are not going about wearing the fruits of this mans labours, and dying because of him. If the army had demanded action, Im sure DRDO and MoD would have shielded him, and nothing would have come of it!

[somnath]

^^^ASPuar,

Vested interests are everywhere, including the services...There are enough examples in public domain (Dr Natrajan's insinuation against an ex-Air Chief wrt the Akash order, the imbroglio over the utility chopper trials, the list is long)...

At the same time, I would (at least like to) believe that most soldiers would be honest, professional public servants..At the same time, militaries are extremely conservative institutions..Left to themsleves, they are reactive and very often fail to take that "fundamental leaps" of faith..There are enough instances in history..You have to only look at the farce over the CDS setup in India to realise..Very often it takes a leader to make those leaps and ram it down everyone's throats..

the discussion wrt Arjun is similar - it is about a different armoured doctrine..I think that the IA migth have a case there..However, the communication on both sides has been so muddled and acrid that the real issues have been left behind allegations..

[ASPuar]

Excerpts from the RK Varma DRDO BPJ scam sting tape:


http://www.indianexpress.com/news/every ... e/564954/0

‘Everyone wants crores for bulletproof jackets... mere chaar paise bach jaate’

A sting operation by a disqualified bidder purportedly features a Joint Director of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) — who monitored the jackets’ testing process — as claiming that he had first rigged the trials and could now “undo the damage.”

The tape, obtained by The Indian Express, was submitted to the Home Ministry by a security firm which had supplied 20,000 bulletproof jackets to the Government last year but failed to make the cut this time.

The 25-minute tape is said to feature R K Varma, Joint Director of DRDO’s Terminal Ballistic Research Laboratory near Chandigarh, the venue of the jacket trials.

The Home Ministry today summoned Varma for an explanation to New Delhi and Home Secretary G K Pillai told The Indian Express that the voice on the tape would be tested.

“If the voice matches that of the official who did the testing, then if not a re-tendering of the contract, a re-testing of all samples could be on the cards,” Pillai said.

Among those who has heard the tape is A S Gill, Director General of CRPF and head of the Tender Approval Committee for the Rs 150-crore jacket contract. He told The Indian Express: “I am unhappy that procurement of the life-saving bulletproof jackets for the forces will be delayed since some key officials appear to have been compromised. As many as 13 complaints were received by us on this tender, but what is contained in the tape is very serious.”

The tape reveals that after a slew of complaints against the trials, Varma was pulled up by the Director, Vigilance, DRDO. He then decided to approach disqualified firms to include them afresh provided they raised their prices to the level of other vendors.

“I agree I was carried away by them (vendors),” Varma allegedly says on the tape, “but they are out to get me now...the last time we got medals for the bullet-proof jacket trials...this time we are getting juttis (beaten by shoes). Galti koi kare aur jutti main khaoon. Jutte bhi baant ke khanee chahiye...Everyone is involved. I am willing to accept my fault since I am the Joint Director and the head but others should get the juttis (the shoes) too.”

He purportedly says: “Main razor edge par chal rahaa hun. Agar yeh tender ho jaata through, mere chaar paise bach jaate (I am walking on the razor’s edge. If this tender goes through, I would have made some money.) I have also moved all my links till the top all of which are political...They (the selected companies) have rigged the tender and jacked up prices.”

In the tape, Varma purportedly claims that senior DRDO officials as well as corporate bigwigs were in contact with him in connection with the mega contract. He claims that one of the persons he met was Delhi’s Lt Governor Tejinder Khanna. “I met him personally in his chamber today...He told me son, do not worry I will take care.”

Ranjan Mukerjee, OSD to the Lt Governor, denied this and told The Indian Express that no such individual had either sought or was granted an audience with Khanna at his residence or office.

On the tape, the DRDO official allegedly unveils a “plan” to tell the Technical Advisory Committee that discrepancies did exist during ballistic testing of the samples — conducted in August and October 2008 — and that he had browbeaten a woman scientist into admitting to “committing mistakes” during the trials.

“We have to encash the situation...we have to burn the dead body now...Ballistic cheez hi aisi hai banana mushkil hai maarna bahut aasaan hai (Ballistics is such a thing that it is very difficult to make easy to kill someone, but difficult to save someone).”

He allegedly claims that during the trials, he misrepresented the “trauma for some samples” (effect of bullets on the jackets) and “did not take cognizance of the angle of incidence and conducted some firing in darkness.”

Varma allegedly admits to threatening the scientist who signed the ballistic trial reports.

He purportedly says on the tape, “I was very tough with her on the phone. I told her I will spoil your ACR and you will remain a Scientist B for the next 30 years...She was trembling and was wondering what has happened to Varma...she said I am ready, will tell the Committee I overlooked certain things and that I will say it was all my mistake. I told her, yes my dear, you will speak these very lines in the meeting. And I will also tell the meeting that some mistakes have been done inadvertently and were not of the point of view of the SOPs (Standing Operating Procedures).”

Varma then allegedly claims to have a “new formula” for “redistribution of the quantity of jackets to vendors.”

“If R K Varma is not there who will clear the production lots?...how these things are passed or failed is not something that is never discussed. There have been lots of miscalculations and politics (over this tender). A lot has happened...Everyone wants 15,000 jackets and earn crores.”

[ASPuar]

^^^ASPuar,

Vested interests are everywhere, including the services...There are enough examples in public domain (Dr Natrajan's insinuation against an ex-Air Chief wrt the Akash order, the imbroglio over the utility chopper trials, the list is long)...

At the same time, I would (at least like to) believe that most soldiers would be honest, professional public servants..At the same time, militaries are extremely conservative institutions..Left to themsleves, they are reactive and very often fail to take that "fundamental leaps" of faith..There are enough instances in history..You have to only look at the farce over the CDS setup in India to realise..Very often it takes a leader to make those leaps and ram it down everyone's throats..

the discussion wrt Arjun is similar - it is about a different armoured doctrine..I think that the IA migth have a case there..However, the communication on both sides has been so muddled and acrid that the real issues have been left behind allegations..

Boss, though youre right, insinuations made by vested interests are not my concern, in this post. My position on the DRDO-Services debate is, any good product should be inducted, but lets not second guess the professionals. Itll all sort itself out on its own, without our going crazy on BR.

All I know is, that Im pretty much disgusted by Mr. RK Verma, Jt Dir. DRDO, and I think that any man who makes money by trying to alter specifications and fudge data on BPJ's being bought for men whose lives are on the line, should be put on a firing range, wearing his reccommended jacket, and made to face the bullets himself, not spirited away to another establishment, to avoid the ire of the Police.

[Karan M]

Posting a person to another establishment is done to avoid him influencing the outcome of investigations in the establishment under question. Further action is taken under GOI rules and procedures.

Judging an entire organization by the actions of one rogue element is also without merit.

Lets take for instance, this, and whats been reported about "quietly moved out last week".

http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_mu ... 11_1361808

Murmur in army over fast-track weapons purchases post-26/11

New Delhi: Fast-track purchases for the army without competitive tendering after the 26/11 Mumbai attacks have come under government scanner following allegations that vested interests were trying to influence decision-making.

Director-general (infantry) Lieutenant General Jasbir Singh, who was overseeing those purchases, besides several other big-ticket procurements for infantry units, was quietly moved out last week.

The official position is Singh had to be shifted out because he completed three years in Delhi. Lieutenant General SN Handa took over from him on March 13.

Sources in the defence establishment, however, said the decision was taken by army chief General Deepak Kapoor “in consultation” with his successor-designate Lieutenant General VK Singh after they were briefed about “vigorous efforts” to push through certain deals. VK Singh takes over as army chief on March 31.

The military top brass was also briefed about certain meetings of some senior officers in their official residences with representatives of arms companies. Such contacts are prohibited.

The sources did not say whether a formal investigation had been launched into purchases and tenders initiated by the infantry directorate. The army leadership could take a re-look at some of these purchases and tenders in the coming days, the sources added.

There were several inputs with the army leadership and the ministry of defence about strong efforts by the infantry directorate to “hastily” push through a host of purchases.

Those fast-track purchases were sanctioned after the 26/11 attacks, and were mostly meant to equip the Ghatak units.
Each of the infantry units of the Indian army has a Ghatak (lethal) unit which comprises about 20 soldiers trained as commandos for carrying out shock attacks on enemy positions and conducting ambushes.

Government sources said several other tenders of the directorate have come under scrutiny. Among them was the move to purchase a foreign rifle in place of the Insas (Indian small arms system) assault rifle, which is developed by the Ordnance Factory Board. The infantry directorate had also rejected the Insas carbine after several months of trial and without much explanation.

If the same media which is to be believed (every bit of hyperbole included) in the previous case, then the above also stands as a case by itself.

After all, there have been incidents like Tehelka, the Helicopter purchase scandal (both of which were very similar to the above in terms of procedural lapses, and vested interests influencing procurement).

The point remains, that in any large organization, there will always be the occasional person who either via an act of culpability or by lack of judgement or otherwise, leads to such events.

To stereotype the entire organization on that basis however, is meaningless.

This was a home ministry matter, so the cops got involved quickly. Who knows what else has gone under the radar in these sorts of cases?

There is a lot of lobbying going on by DRDO in these matters, and one should not fall prey to spin. It is easy to throw dirt on a lifetime of service by issuing catchy media friendly phrases like "RFP came from glossy janes brochures" (even some of our admins say these sorts of things, sadly, without any proof, and largely as a slur), "possibility of sabotage of trials", "service officers are not intelligent", "disloyalty", "lack of patriotism", etc etc.

But dont forget, that the personnel of DGMF/IA/IAF/IN are professionals, and being soldiers, are so in a way that most other government departments will not understand. They armoured corps know their tanks. They are not idiots. They have to drive these weapons into battle, and have to be 100% convinced that they are the right tool for the job. That should be the final word on the matter.

Else, all this chaff about building national capacity etc can be defined very easily, viz.:

"Careerist powerplay lobbying for personal gain, by people who will not have to face the music once the shooting starts, but want to force those who will have to fight, to do what they (the lobbyists) want".

In the final calculus, it is a matter of who you want to trust. I trust our soldiers. They have not let us down. Ever. And they have already been treated badly by an ungrateful nation, and an actively useless government. I trust our troops over a bureaucrat anyday. What have the bureaucrats ever done, save for lord over the people, and steal from the public till? Our men in uniform deserve better. The rest, ie these discussions, are a question of semantics, As far as Im concerned.
WRT to the Arjun and other DRDO-vs-Services discussions, I will suggest to all those who are so strongly in favour of DRDOs position vis a vis the services, please understand that anyone can be compromised, and even DRDO doesnt always tell the truth.

This post unfortunately, does not even deserve a reply in the logical sense as it seems to be asking rhetorical questions and then providing answers. One case has been taken to support an indictment of the entire organization.

While it is easy to muck rake on scientists by dismissing them as bureaucrats or lobbyists, because unfortunately, thats how the above post comes across as, but are the men of the 43 AR who supported the Arjun so staunchly careerists and lobbyists - plus were these men lobbyists as well who tested the Arjun and praised it?

http://www.business-standard.com/india/ ... ono=326234

And was the DGMF's conduct in the above case fully on the basis of merit.

There are occasional bad apples in all organizations , but they dont represent the majority, and I would say the same extends to the DRDO and other organizations as well, who have had many people like Kalam in them, anything but a bureaucrat but a committed scientist who did his best to do what he could for India & the services.

And surely comments like these are hyperbole, and rabble rousing "What have the bureaucrats ever done, save for lord over the people, and steal from the public till? " - surely there are many here who have had family, kith and kin, who have served honestly and with merit, in the Govt services, and now we are to dismiss them all as mere thieves and petty tyrants!

To give an example of where this leads to, I am used to seeing a lot of sweeping words like this from Ms Arundhati Roy unfortunately, who has a habit of dismissing the entire state and its armed forces, as fascist, by cherry picking comments and incidents and resorting to sweeping generalization. I certainly hope we do not proceed the same way, either versus the armed forces of India or other organizations.

Without any offense, such sweeping generalizations should not have a place in discourse.

[Karan M]

Secondly, It is a significant achievement that three beam guidance has been perfected. I will definitely try to access and read the paper referred by you.

I do share your point of view that if development was continued 2005 onwards, when command guidance was perfected, we could have possibly mastered engaging sea skimmers by now. I do hope the learning from Barak-8 are transferred to the SR-SAM program.

tsarkar, Mrinal.. I think that fundamentally except for the Nag, the other tactical programs in the IGMDP were flawed in one respect. They were aimed at import substitution rather than fielding "forward looking" new systems.

What they were basically trying to do was an "improved" OSA-AK and an "improved" SA-6. That resulted in carrying the systems architecture from the "legacy" soviet systems and trying to "improve" via new technology infusion (Phased Array radar for Akash and 3 beam guidance for Trishul). But in the end, the system limitations of the legacy platforms remain!.

If like the Nag, the DRDO had wanted to develop "forward" looking systems, they would not have made the architectural choices they did and like their peers in France, Isreal and US and other places, they would have gone for active guidance. Lets face it. The guidance architecture of the Trishul, especially is pretty dated.

How so ?. Well, unlike the Akash and I think the Barak for example, the Trishul is a "beam riding" missile , the missile is guided within the "walls" of a microwave beam. But the problem , is that the missile does not fly in a straight line in the middle of the beam by magic, but oscillates back and forth between the "walls" of the beam on the way to the target (thus taking longer and wasting more energy in the process) . Of course, wider the beam, greater the oscillation possible. So even if you went to a very small beam in the 3rd stage, the inherent problems of beam riding guidance remain. Probably fine for a target coming directly towards you. Try engaging a fast crossing target with a beam rider, given that the beam has to swivel really really fast in that case, guiding a beam riding missile at such high angular rates sweep rates of the beam is close to impossible.

That the DRDO had problems with making it fly in the middle of the beam is well known (everyone knows the huge porpoising from the videos of the Trishul tests, there were problems with handing off from one beam to another, and finally even making the missile fly at consistent height above the waves was difficult ,including instance where the missile porpoised into the sea!) . So if they finally got the 3 beam guidance working, one wonders if they really re-invented a dated 1950s technology , that got obsolete by mid 70s max.. To what effect I wonder.

I basically feel that DRDO should have focused their efforts in learning and perfect the NEXT gen.. active guidance ones (which we are now doing with foreign partners and developing and fielding as collaborative efforts)

In fact, beam riders were basically given up by others for precisely this reason. Akash is probably still relevant, because the Phased Array radar sort of makes up by it's huge multi beam capability and makes it competitive with active guidance equivalents (within line of sight of course, notice, that if it is out of sight of the guidance radar, only active guidance will work). Unfortunately , no such lock for the Trishul. The architecture was too dated and rigid.. For instance, if we have a great phased array radar and all IN ships went that way (right from the Frigates to the Capital ships.in fact the le Formidable class with the Thales Phased Array radar is the kind of thing to come) and the single PA radar replaces multiple radars , the Trishul cannot work in such a scenario, if based on the 3 beam guidance.

Sorry to say. It looks like that DRDO spent tremendous amount of time re-inventing the wheel with Trishul. I really dont see what much they got out of it. Instead, the radar and guidance resources should have been put in to Phased Array radars and more architecturally upto date guidance models.

Someone with some sanity should have been able to look at the Trishul and call the "Emperor's naked clothes" long ago and pulled the plug before all those trials , tribulations and heart burn . That in reality is the weakness of the DRDO and the Indian system. There are no voices to challenge a "bad consensus" (the Indian boss knows best systems and the value and culture systems are absolutely great here) and the .

That in my analysis is the REAL learning from Trishul. More than a technical failure in the implementation sense (it is too), but rather a larger Product Strategy failure and organizational failure in allowing more dissent and challenge.

Vina,

Thanks for the detailed reply,

Unfortunately, based on some data that may be of interest to you, there are some errors in your post with what the IGMDP was supposed to be and with what the Akash and Trishul - how they were defined. Perhaps this is due to the paucity of information on how these systems came about and were developed and with what aims in mind.

I would definitely share the correct data with you but, due to some constraints, it would take me a few days,

Thanks

[Misraji]

^^^
Mrinal Sir,

You have been posting awesome stuff here.
My respects.

Regards,
Ashish.

[ASPuar]

This post unfortunately, does not even deserve a reply in the logical sense as it seems to be asking rhetorical questions and then providing answers. One case has been taken to support an indictment of the entire organization.

Judging an entire organization by the actions of one rogue element is also without merit.

Mrinal, thank you for your reply. I will begin by saying, that to say that something doesnt deserve a reply, and then to proceed to give one, while enshrouding us in a warm cocoon of self awarded moral superiority, is, if I may say so with the greatest respect, disingenuous, and also illogical.

To ignore the grave seriousness of this case, is to bury ones head in the sand. To purposely downplay it, is to attempt to cover up the truth. And let us have done with this ridiculous moral relativism. There isn't even one instance to support ridiculous claims of generals generating RFPs by reading glossy brochures, and yet we have preposterous slander of that sort being thrown about on this forum. So why should we ignore a genuine case, and that too a very serious one, where trial results of crucial life saving equipment were deliberately tampered with for personal gain? I can think of nothing more reprehensible than what this man has done.

Mrinal, I would suggest to you that It is the actions of individuals, which make up the reputation of the collective. And such an action, which heinously and callously endangers men fighting for our safety, goes far beyond even what is alas, the baseline run of the mill corruption in this country. So to pretend that this has no reflection upon the organisation, is a hollow claim, especially since the MHA has made a strong complaint to MoD about not only this 'gentleman', but DRDO's services as well.

Trotting out an investigation in the army to downplay an indictment of this order may satisfy any hurt feelings, but it makes no difference to the facts of this case.

To pretend that all is well within DRDO even when things of this sort are happening, is to do the nation a disservice.

After all, there have been incidents like Tehelka, the Helicopter purchase scandal (both of which were very similar to the above in terms of procedural lapses, and vested interests influencing procurement).

Nothing concrete was discussed in tehelka, merely vaguely sleazy innuendos, as opposed to the ACTUAL malfeasance and acts of commission in evidence here.

While it is easy to muck rake on scientists by dismissing them as bureaucrats or lobbyists, because unfortunately, thats how the above post comes across as, but are the men of the 43 AR who supported the Arjun so staunchly careerists and lobbyists - plus were these men lobbyists as well who tested the Arjun and praised it?

Im simply stating facts, not muckraking. Im all for the Arjun, if it works, and the Arjun is a nonissue in my mind. Just let the professionals do their job is all I say.

And surely comments like these are hyperbole, and rabble rousing "What have the bureaucrats ever done, save for lord over the people, and steal from the public till? " - surely there are many here who have had family, kith and kin, who have served honestly and with merit, in the Govt services, and now we are to dismiss them all as mere thieves and petty tyrants!

Im sorry if this post has upset you, but it does not reflect upon yourself or your family personally, nor that of anyone else. It is not the individual who ends up being corrupt, but the institution of the bureaucracy itself, which is an exercise in lack of accountability, waste of public funds, unelected persons holding power over the citizenry, and, as a result of the aforementioned, even corruption, if examined over the past 60 years. It is not the individual bureaucrats fault, that the job he is given to do, is in fact immoral in of itself. No unelected person should wield such power over the people, as the District Magistrate or Superintendent of Police in independent India does. There is not one, but thousands of unfortunate examples of abuse of these powers over time.

To give an example of where this leads to, I am used to seeing a lot of sweeping words like this from Ms Arundhati Roy unfortunately, who has a habit of dismissing the entire state and its armed forces, as fascist, by cherry picking comments and incidents and resorting to sweeping generalization. I certainly hope we do not proceed the same way, either versus the armed forces of India or other organizations.

Tsk. Im not resorting to any sort of sweeping generalization. Youve answered several posts in one, and Ive spoken of something specific (this one case), in several. In my opinion, this chap should be punished very severely indeed. As to the rest, I respect the defence scientific community, but when things reach such a pass that even bulletproof vests for jawans are fair game for govt hustlers, then I think its all gone a bit wrong.

[Karan M]

Mrinal, thank you for your reply. I will begin by saying, that to say that something doesnt deserve a reply, and then to proceed to give one, while enshrouding us in a warm cocoon of self awarded moral superiority, is, if I may say so with the greatest respect, disingenuous, and also illogical.

With even greater respect, I was merely referring to the fact, that your rhetoric contributed little to the topic at hand and was at best as you described it "disingenuous and also illogical". Clearly, you had a case to make, but the manner in which you attempted to make it, all the while with rhetorical flourishes and continue with ("warm cocoon of self awarded moral superiority"), left and leaves a lot to be desired.

Now perhaps, we could go to something more substantive?

To ignore the grave seriousness of this case, is to bury ones head in the sand. To purposely downplay it, is to attempt to cover up the truth. And let us have done with this ridiculous moral relativism. There isn't even one instance to support ridiculous claims of generals generating RFPs by reading glossy brochures, and yet we have preposterous slander of that sort being thrown about on this forum. So why should we ignore a genuine case, and that too a very serious one, where trial results of crucial life saving equipment were deliberately tampered with for personal gain? I can think of nothing more reprehensible than what this man has done.

I would daresay that for all the words that you are bandying about, while enraged (and then imputing motives implying that you are the only one enraged while others suffer from moral relativism), you have failed to even read the amount of evidence posted in this forum.

Here is an ex Army man himself pointing to how shoddily several GSQRs are written. Will you accuse him of moral relativism as well, of burying his hand in the sand, and covering up the truth or other such rhetorical insults?

http://www.business-standard.com/india/ ... ds/285028/

The military's Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) is supposed to start with an identical process, identifying precise requirements for the equipment proposed to be purchased.

Laying down those requirements in the form of General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQR) is the first, and the most vital, part of any procurement. According to theCAG, the army goes wrong from this very first step.

The CAG report, in unusually blunt terms, points out that GSQRs have been wrongly formulated, reflecting neither the army's own requirements, nor the reality of the market. In the GSQRs for 11 purchases that were scrutinised, the CAG found that four spelt out requirements that were unavailable anywhere in the world.

In four cases, the requirements "were unrealistic with respect to the actual requirements on the ground," which means that they did not meet the army's operational needs. And in seven cases, there was no way of testing whether the equipment met the parameters specified in the GSQRs.

The CAB observed that unrealistic GSQRs meant that, "in 66 per cent of the cases, only a single vendor was pre-qualified." In "single-vendor" cases, the vendor's monopoly means that he can virtually dictate his own price. Even more serious was the CAG's observation that GSQRs were formulated "sometimes merely on the basis of manufacturer's brochure."

If you would leave your outrage aside, and post with a clear head, you would realise that criticizing an organizations failures in process is not marking them out to be traitors or fundamentally dishonest.

Here is another report on the issues with Army purchase procedure:

http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2007/05/ ... chase.html

As we can see, an ex Army person, who could have taken issue with these details if they were at fault, is actually pointing to them as a serious problem.

I have myself seen several debates amongst service members who roundly criticize unrealistic GSQRs released on the basis of manufacturers claimed specifications. The humorous term, if you are unaware is referred to as "BBC" - Best of Brochure Claims

Finally, Mrinal, It is the actions of individuals, which make up the reputation of the collective. And such an action, which heinously and callously endangers men fighting for our safety, goes far beyond even what is alas, the baseline run of the mill corruption in this country. So to pretend that this has no reflection upon the organisation, is a hollow claim, especially since the MHA has made a strong complaint to MoD about not only this 'gentleman', but DRDO's services as well.

By the same standard, ASPuar, we have had several individuals from the services who have conciously chosen to break their oath to their fellow soldiers and their country. By your standards, one would hold the entire service accountable then!
For every gentleman of the kind you have pointed to - and who should deservedly get his just rewards, there are many many others who are doing right by their organization.

In this case, perhaps you are not aware, the person in question even threatened and browbeat his junior and attempted to get his own way. Would he have to do so if all were like him? How exactly do you think his antics were leaked out and bidders made aware that he was breaking the law.

Unlike your partisan method of pointing fingers - I would not rush to impute motives or imply that the entire organization is corrupt. Why, a few years back, a certain gentleman in a public unit was held for corruption, his Dept Head happened to be from the services, should he and the entire dept have then been drawn and quartered, sir?

Trotting out an investigation in the army to downplay an indictment of this order may satisfy your feelings, but it makes no difference to the facts of this case.

No, actually I was pointing to the fact that your arguement was deeply flawed wherein you took one incident and then extended that one incident to imply that ergo, DRDO folks were babus etc and hence not worth a whit, and that the same case extended to the Arjun in specific wherein similar corrupt babus were lobbying for the tank versus a professional DGMF.

This argument fails on many grounds.

If you would rather point out substantive issues with the Arjun in specific or muster up any sort of overall critique of the product itself, or why the Army was rejecting it. These would have been proper responses, not alluding to one case of corruption, however despicable, and stating that it was all like this.

To pretend that all is well within DRDO even when things of this sort are happening, is to do the nation a disservice.

Let us not be disingenuous here & put words in other peoples mouths. My stand has been consistent, that while a grave incident, it is not by all means standard across the entire organization, whereas yours seems awash in stereotypes and generalizations, and extends it to an entirely different topic.

Nothing concrete was discussed in tehelka, merely vaguely sleazy innuendos, as opposed to the ACTUAL malfeasance and acts of commission in evidence here.

I see, so there was nothing concrete in Tehelka, as a result of which, the Army for no reason at all, took stern and justifiable action against erring officers. Does the Army proceed on judicial action without having reason to do so?

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 038674.cms

Now, I fully expect you to state that while the Army has shown this gentleman the door, while the prior person has been transferred. But the point stands, that a transfer is the first step to avoid the aforesaid person from tampering with the evidence, influencing people, while the GOI has clearly asked for action to be taken, which is due process. The wheels of justice may grind slow to your taste, but they grind nonetheless.

Come sir, let us not bandy semantics on Tehelka not being "concrete". It is in nobody's interest, least of all mine, who has service members in immediate family, to bring this up. But corruption has had its way penetrating into the most elite and honourable of institutions.

While the Tehelka sting was clearly done to embarass the Govt of the day by folks who had political motives, it did shine a light into the world of wheeling and dealing, as a result of which action had to be, and was taken.

I would still state though, on empirical and anecdotal basis, both that the rot is limited. But it does exist, and pretending it doesnt is of no merit.

Im simply stating facts, not muckraking. Im all for the Arjun, if it works, and the Arjun is a nonissue in my mind. Just let the professionals do their job is all I say.

Dear sir, you have made the statements in the prior post that based on the Arjun issue, folks are more or less supporting the DRDO in a partisan manner! Then you take one case of corruption and extend that as being equal
to lobbying by the DRDO and state that the organization is more or less run in that very manner, staffed by such people.

Then you go on to state that the DGMF is by far the only competent authority to judge and the rest are careerists, lobbyists et al.

This is a mockery of having a proper debate but merely promoting partisanship as a badge.

Here, kindly read this again:

http://www.business-standard.com/india/ ... ono=326234

Now in the above link, you have cases of the 43 AR officers saying that they are soundly backing the Arjun. You have other Armoured Corps officers pointing out why they support the Arjun. You have a reported event wherein the DGMF upbraids an otherwise competent officer for not conducting trials soundly (when he has) and his senior has to intervene on his behalf.

All this is reported by an ex Indian Army soldier himself, a T-72 tanker himself.

So let me ask you this, are all these men DRDO careerists or lobbyists? Will you impute motives to them as well?

Or will you acknowledge the topic is beyond taking sides, and clearly opinion on the Army is divided on this topic as well?

This is not a case of us presumptuous ungrateful civilians maligning the Army on behalf of an incompetent DRDO, but seeing the evidence presented and asking objective questions which need to be asked.

Ones support for reform in the Army's acquisition process and the shambles that is procurement, in part due to Army planning lapses itself does not imply that it is being anti-Army or blind support of the development agency.

Im sorry if this post has upset you, but it does not reflect upon yourself or your family personally, nor that of anyone else. It is not the individual who ends up being corrupt, but the institution of the bureaucracy itself, which is an exercise in lack of accountability, waste of public funds, unelected persons holding power over the citizenry, and, as a result of the aforementioned, even corruption, if examined over the past 60 years. It is not the individual bureaucrats fault, that the job he is given to do, is in fact immoral in of itself. No unelected person should wield such power over the people, as the District Magistrate or Superintendent of Police in independent India does. There is not one, but thousands of unfortunate examples of abuse of these powers over time.

Sir - first things first, why is the DRDO being called a bureaucracy, when it is a scientific and development organization wherein the bureaucracy is in support of the technologists as it should be. One daresays that if we count the number of people in staff and support functions e.g. the commonly accepted definition of bureaucracy, there would be more people in the Army serving such a role than in the DRDO, CSIR or MOD.

Kindly realise that this is not bureaucracy that is leading or misleading us to question the issue of the Arjuns induction, and nor has the bureaucracy developed the Arjun, but a competent, hard working team with significant Army involvement as well.

Perhaps you may be unaware, but the Arjun tank owes its existence to not just the DRDO but the EME which first came up with many of the tank features and also people like Lt Gen HM Singh who led the program from the user side till recently.

Would you dismiss all these people as careerists, lobbyists and bureaucrats as well, sir?

Tsk. Im not resorting to any sort of sweeping generalization. Youve answered several posts in one, and Ive spoken of something specific (this one case), in several. In my opinion, this chap should be punished very severely indeed. As to the rest, I respect the defence scientific community, but when things reach such a pass that even bulletproof vests for jawans are fair game for govt hustlers, then I think its all gone a bit wrong.

Please realise that it is not a question of "things having reached such a pass", and secondly it is irrelevant to the Arjun.

If that were the case, then these things reached such a pass in independent India on all sides a long time back - whether it be all aspects of civilian and public life. Action is taken and implemented however, but more importantly it is irrelevant to the topic of the Arjun.

I agree he should be punished severely - hung even, but its irrelevant to the case of selecting a MBT which several Army officers feel is not being given its due. And I would not even suggest that these men from the 43AR, and many other officers are in any manner susceptible to lobbying by vested interests which could collectively convince them all to bat for the Arjun.

[Karan M]

^^^
Mrinal Sir,

You have been posting awesome stuff here.
My respects.

Regards,
Ashish.

Thank you! As a newbie, if I stepped on any toes, my apologies. But lack of time and some other matters force me to be type as fast as possible. Please also excuse my occasionally poor English and grammar, I do my best to make sure what I have written is legible, and word check it, but tend to miss a few words, sentences from time to time.