Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

pralay · Post by **pralay** » 17 Aug 2010 11:48

Simulator Training Centre for Arjun tank inaugurated

Special Correspondent

CHENNAI: A state-of-the art Simulator Training Centre (STC) for Arjun Main Battle Tank to train the gunner, commander and driver was inaugurated by Lt.Gen. Dalip Bhardwaj, PVSM, VSM, Director-General, Mechanised Forces, Army Headquarters at the Combat Vehicle Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE) on Friday.

The simulator consists of a turret simulator and driving simulator. While the turret simulator helps the gunner and commander to practise target engagement, tracking, laying and firing, the driving simulator aids the driver to practise driving related exercises under dawn, dusk, fog, rain and poor visibility conditions with obstacles and undulated terrain.

S. Sundaresh, Distinguished Scientist, Chief Controller, R and D (ACE), R. Shankar, DCV and E, DRDO Headquarters, and P. Sivakumar, Director, CVRDE, and V.N. Swamiraj, Additional Director (Simulator), were present, according to a press release.

P Chitkara · Post by **P Chitkara** » 17 Aug 2010 14:46

Where will the reduction in weight come from? To me the primary source is the armor, which means lesser protection in face of newer rounds - a risky strategy.

As far as the movement of armor is concerned, can anyone list out the specific problems being faced wrt Arjun and how are they so severe that the IA wants a lighter tank?

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 17 Aug 2010 16:09

I think they are looking at a mix of activ protection along with modular armor for the FMBT.

niran · Post by **niran** » 17 Aug 2010 17:12

my take is this
it is Yindu conspiracy onlee, inline of American conspiracy
to bankrupt Soviet Russia, this FMBT tank shank is just vapour ware
to incite poakese to pull the switch mucho quickly.

Kanson · Post by **Kanson** » 17 Aug 2010 18:53

P Chitkara wrote:Where will the reduction in weight come from? To me the primary source is the armor, which means lesser protection in face of newer rounds - a risky strategy.

As i said before, when you make the tank small enough throu' miniaturisation, the amount of armour needed to protect the small tank(comparatively) is smaller than the one needed for the lager tank. Its not a compromise on the armour but the volume of the armour needed for protecting the smaller tank becomes less and so is the weight, just as the volume of paint needed to cover a smaller room will be less compared to the bigger room.

As far as the movement of armor is concerned, can anyone list out the specific problems being faced wrt Arjun and how are they so severe that the IA wants a lighter tank?

For this one has to talk abt the tactics and there is no hard and fast rules in that. So its all depends upon which school of thoughts you belong.

Kanson · Post by **Kanson** » 17 Aug 2010 19:02

Pratyush wrote:I think they are looking at a mix of activ protection along with modular armor for the FMBT.

Yes probably. i guess there wont be any reduction in the protection level just becoz we want a tank in 50 ton weight. If i'm not wrong, the armour in arjun weighs ~20 tons. i guess we can cut the total weight by 5-6 tons of the Arjun by making them smaller like Tank-Ex, so the resulting tank will be in 50 ton class.

negi · Post by **negi** » 19 Aug 2010 18:24

Well if the FMBT specifications include an 'autoloader' with a crew size of '3' then the parameters like size and weight can be kept in check.

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 19 Aug 2010 18:46

err the K2 with 3 man crew and autoloader is 55 tons???

The Leclerc with 3 man crew and autoloader is 54.5 tons

and this is without getting into a fight.

personally I do not believe in auto loader and like the 4 man crew. I would hate to have a mechanical piece whipping around in my proximity and the potential to snag a piece of me.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 19 Aug 2010 21:38

people who have seen real combat like m1, merkava and challenger have grown heavier and beefed up protection levels. esp urban warfare with infantry wielding high quality LAW weapons and mines demands better all aspect protection and a remote weapons station and sensors capable of elevating to near vertical angles. that adds to weight.

perhaps if leclerc and leopard saw some heavy combat they too go that route.

while tibet is unpopulated with few urban settlements, much of pakistan is heavily populated and built up , IA cannot avoid urban warfare in some cases and needs to prepare its weapons for it.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 19 Aug 2010 21:46

merkava is the only slight possibility, no one else has a chance.

that said, I don't think urban warfare should be a priority, at least for India. it is required to hold a place, the conventional war we can realistically expect to fight won't need that.

even in BD, a far more densely populated place IA simply bypassed the major urban centres. strategy can be devised that doesn't call for armoured forces to do urban pitched battles where tanks lose their greatest asset, mobility.

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 19 Aug 2010 22:16

rahul

I don;t think we will have too many open places going forward. While not urban it will still be relatively congested. and secondly with all the DCBs and other stuff - tanks will be at many times not have place to maneuver

Its kind of like the poor guys planning SHBO and trying to find places with no wire strung across

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 19 Aug 2010 22:31

the DCB system is built as a few layers to prevent IA forces from crossing over, it cannot cover the whole theatre, isn't that correct ?
since doing so will hamper the movement of the PA reserve corps as well, the ARN and ARS and PA certainly doesn't have enough forces to cover the whole border without moving forces around. there will be choke point like situations at the crossings but these would be anyway defended heavily enough to need air support and other associated arms to protect the forces. will armour plating it to merkava levels (say) really help protect the tanks in these situations ? pakistan will throw everything at these points, including the cobras and mudmover jets, armour won't protect the tanks against these.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 19 Aug 2010 22:35

even villages are no longer collection of mud huts ... lots of cemented structs, narrow lanes, providing ideal covers for ATGM teams to take shots at convoys attempting to strike cross country and bypass.

if tanks are not going in, we need cheap 105/155/pinaka artillery in soviet unionish scary numbers to flatten such areas. need not be bleeding edge and uber automated, but truck mounted/cheap/robust enough for the siege role.

they key is probably massed (and somewhat accurate) firepower and movement by OMGs including at night to keep people off-balance. a couple of 75-100km incursions in 2 days by OMGs will spread complete panic in the rear logistical buildup zone - just as the old soviets intended.

Prasad · Post by **Prasad** » 19 Aug 2010 22:52

The ability to make the very ground shake with masses tube artillery is and will be of prime importance to enable rapid and strong thrusts into pakland. We are lacking when we need numbers of giant proportions.

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 19 Aug 2010 22:56

rahul

The DCB I would guess is mostly Punjab not as much in opp lets say the desert.

Assuming that air power takes care of the mudmovers and the rest slog it out.

Even as we get past them I would expect large number of mujahid type units with atgms and rpgs who would survive our air power and arty unless miraculously we transform in firepower to US levels

Agreed i do not want merkava like protection but I am not convinced 50 tons will cut the ice.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 19 Aug 2010 23:59

The main arena for large tank battles or maneuver warfare is the sector south of Fazilka-Abohar. TSPA Punjab (and our side as well) has serious DCB structures...plus, don't forget the canal network - the BRB and MRLK (Icchogil Canal). I think we also have strong fixed defences in the plains of Jammu.

As for the 75-100 kms penetration - TSP will cease to exist even if we achieve half of this.

AnuragK · Post by **AnuragK** » 20 Aug 2010 00:45

IA had placed its first order of 124 Arjun MBT in 2004. As of May 17, 2010, it had received 50 only.
http://www.defenseworld.net/go/defensenews.jsp?n=Indian Army to buy additional 124 Arjun main battle tank from DRDO&id=4506

Suppose the IA were to place an order for 500 Arjun tanks; it would take the HVF, Avadi 60 years to fulfil this order at current production rate. Even if they are somehow able to double up, it would still take them 30 years which is one hell of a long long time and during which period all strategic, tactical, n doctrinal imperatives will have changed. So, what options does the IA have???????

Rampy · Post by **Rampy** » 20 Aug 2010 01:51

AnuragK wrote:IA had placed its first order of 124 Arjun MBT in 2004. As of May 17, 2010, it had received 50 only.
http://www.defenseworld.net/go/defensenews.jsp?n=Indian Army to buy additional 124 Arjun main battle tank from DRDO&id=4506

Suppose the IA were to place an order for 500 Arjun tanks; it would take the HVF, Avadi 60 years to fulfil this order at current production rate. Even if they are somehow able to double up, it would still take them 30 years which is one hell of a long long time and during which period all strategic, tactical, n doctrinal imperatives will have changed. So, what options does the IA have???????

Please don't start again, this is DDM at best.. Army ordered, but never accepted the 124. we had comparative trails only this year.

Gaur · Post by **Gaur** » 20 Aug 2010 01:57

AnuragK wrote:IA had placed its first order of 124 Arjun MBT in 2004. As of May 17, 2010, it had received 50 only.
http://www.defenseworld.net/go/defensenews.jsp?n=Indian Army to buy additional 124 Arjun main battle tank from DRDO&id=4506

Suppose the IA were to place an order for 500 Arjun tanks; it would take the HVF, Avadi 60 years to fulfil this order at current production rate. Even if they are somehow able to double up, it would still take them 30 years which is one hell of a long long time and during which period all strategic, tactical, n doctrinal imperatives will have changed. So, what options does the IA have???????

This has been discussed countless times not only in Armour thread but also in lca thread. Production rate depends upon the size of the order placed. It is not economically feasible to setup numerous new manufacturing lines for a small order. If a large enough order is placed, the the production would obviously be ramped up.

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 20 Aug 2010 14:29

Singha wrote: perhaps if leclerc and leopard saw some heavy combat they too go that route.

The leo-2 latest Upgrade already tips the scales at 70 tons. Link was on the previous iteration on this thread.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 20 Aug 2010 17:39

70? I though only the merkava around 68t was heaviest, followed by m1 at 65. and leo2 was 56t to start with.

web sources claims the strv122 (a6-mki std) swedish model leo2 weighs 62t. even accounting for a remote weapons
station and all round more armour, I kind of doubt if the A7 urban warfare model would rise above 65t.

the new "base level" for western primary MBT is north of 60t for sure....50t wont hack it against the latest ammo, tandem warhead atgm
and L55 cannons. *may* be possible if using a 3 man crew sitting inside the hull and a much smaller unmanned turret housing the main cannon
and coax only, topped by a remote weapons station and EO sensors. ...russia had some concept using a 140mm gun.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 20 Aug 2010 17:47

Surya wrote:rahul
................Agreed i do not want merkava like protection but I am not convinced 50 tons will cut the ice.

oh, of course, I'm not convinced about that either.

this discussion was about the feasibility of top protection, not whether 50tonnes is sufficient.

negi · Post by **negi** » 20 Aug 2010 18:16

The number of MBTs required/fielded by the IA is huge we cannot afford to equip all regiments with gold plated stuff like Merkava-IV . However if we manage to get a platform which has enough scope for growth then same template can be mass produced in bulk i.e. a lighter and cheaper one for equipping our entire armored division and a heavily modded one with extra armour for specific missions, may be the FMBT can go down that route with the 50tonne to serve as a baseline.

Kersi D · Post by **Kersi D** » 20 Aug 2010 20:20

Singha wrote:......

a couple of 75-100km incursions in 2 days by OMGs will spread complete panic in the rear logistical buildup zone - just as the old soviets intended.

a couple of 75-100km incursions in 2 days by OMGs will spread complete panic in the rear logistical buildup zone

PANIC ?????

It will be the threshhold of a nuclear attack.

K

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 20 Aug 2010 20:50

Singha wrote:70? I though only the merkava around 68t was heaviest, followed by m1 at 65. and leo2 was 56t to start with.

web sources claims the strv122 (a6-mki std) swedish model leo2 weighs 62t. even accounting for a remote weapons
station and all round more armour, I kind of doubt if the A7 urban warfare model would rise above 65t.

the new "base level" for western primary MBT is north of 60t for sure....50t wont hack it against the latest ammo, tandem warhead atgm
and L55 cannons. *may* be possible if using a 3 man crew sitting inside the hull and a much smaller unmanned turret housing the main cannon
and coax only, topped by a remote weapons station and EO sensors. ...russia had some concept using a 140mm gun.

You are correct, I remembered 70 tons from this link http://www.fprado.com/armorsite/leo2.htm . But am unable to find it now

However M1Ai TUSK seems to tip 69 tons which is quite heavy.

ParGha · Post by **ParGha** » 20 Aug 2010 23:20

Kersi D wrote:PANIC ?????
It will be the threshhold of a nuclear attack.
K

Bingo!

It is pointless to consider a serious Indo-Pak showdown, especially with armored formations being used in penetration roles, without considering the nuclear shadow. If India enters beyond a certain nebulous point nuclear weapons come into play, which India doesn't want to deal with; if it limits itself to shallow thrusts it is playing to Pakistan's advantage (prepared positions, Achmed's Victory Paradigm), which is self-defeating. The solution therefore seems to be to not enter (with conventional forces

) at all, but to deter and punish from beyond. Singha's suggestion of a massive attrition based approach, with 30-40K artillery pieces capable of turning 3 to 70KM depth of Pak territory into a death-zone for thousands of kms along the border, has its merits. Remember the adage about wrestling with pigs? Pigs enjoy it and you get dirty; they don't enjoy being shot apart from far.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 20 Aug 2010 23:24

"Singha's suggestion of a massive attrition based approach, with 30-40K artillery pieces capable of turning 3 to 70KM depth of Pak territory into a death-zone for thousands of kms along the border, has its merits."

That too crosses Pakistan's redlines. Please refer to Kidwai's enumeration of redlines.

The only political option is to make limited gains in land in Kashmir and Punjab which dont create a total war scenario, but at the same make it very politically embarassing for the Pakistani Army, which is fixated on Kashmir and Punjab is of course, critical to its image/respect

ParGha · Post by **ParGha** » 21 Aug 2010 00:37

Karan M wrote:That too crosses Pakistan's redlines. Please refer to Kidwai's enumeration of redlines.

How? I do remember the hypothetical tipping points published by RAND, which is why I supported Singha's point. Artillery is a scalable response, whose effects can be escalated in a controlled manner from 81mm mortars to Pinakas and Smerchs. In OP Parakram, when two strike forces were mobilized and told to stand down because of the nuclear apprehensions, only way India could respond to the grevious provocation of the Kaluchak attack was through artillery: a PA Brigade HQ was wiped out with 155mm fire. India can basically establish a fixed and published ratio of response, you kill one of ours - we kill ten of yours, and put the ball in Pak's court and let the whole world watch. Paks can choose to escalate it to whatever point they want.

The problem with aiming for "limited gains" is that "limited" is a subjective term. What appears "limited" to you may appear critical to them and their supporters, or so they will always pretend (see their pretend outrage and blame-shift at supposed Indian water diversion). 1:10 is objective, they shouldn't start $#!+ if they aren't willing to pay that price. It can be published internationally. It can be broadcast to bordering Pak villages to let them know who will suffer if they sustain and shelter cross-border terrorists, and to let them know who is to blame for the devastation that will come their way when PA starts off another misadventure.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 21 Aug 2010 01:21

ParGha wrote: How? I do remember the hypothetical tipping points published by RAND, which is why I supported Singha's point.

I am not referring to RAND but:

The threat of massive retaliation could have utility when the crossings of red lines that would result in the use of nuclear weapons are clear and bright, but such clarity is elusive in international relations. For example, Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, Director-General of the Strategic Plans Divison, offered the following red lines in an interview with two Italian researchers. Kidwai, a key overseer of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent, is reported to have said that Pakistan would resort to nuclear weapons' use in the event that:

* India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory;
* India destroys a large part either of its land or air forces;
* India proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan;
* India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large scale internal subversion.

(Lots of sources on Google etc, quoting from one of the sites)
http://www.google.co.in/search?q=kidwai ... +red+lines

Your artillery across a wide front inflicting massive attrition crosses #2 and even 3 and 4 as I note below.

Artillery is a scalable response, whose effects can be escalated in a controlled manner from 81mm mortars to Pinakas and Smerchs. In OP Parakram, when two strike forces were mobilized and told to stand down because of the nuclear apprehensions, only way India could respond to the grevious provocation of the Kaluchak attack was through artillery: a PA Brigade HQ was wiped out with 155mm fire. India can basically establish a fixed and published ratio of response, you kill one of ours - we kill ten of yours, and put the ball in Pak's court and let the whole world watch. Paks can choose to escalate it to whatever point they want.

Its not that simple. Why would Pakistan sit quietly and absorb punishment in a duel of attrition, it will provoke a conflict as it usually does, and then count on its flawed belief that the international community will stop the fight - nuke factor. After that, things can go haywire as it becomes a case of who does what, when

The Brigade HQ example is not germane, because it was far more limited than what the scenario mentioned by you and Singha perceives namely:

"Singha's suggestion of a massive attrition based approach, with 30-40K artillery pieces capable of turning 3 to 70KM depth of Pak territory into a death-zone for thousands of kms along the border, has its merits."

This clearly goes against point 2 and depending on damage inflicted even 3 and 4.

The problem with aiming for "limited gains" is that "limited" is a subjective term. What appears "limited" to you may appear critical to them and their supporters, or so they will always pretend (see their pretend outrage and blame-shift at supposed Indian water diversion).

Exactly my point. What you are proposing faces entirely that problem, it is anything but limited.

1:10 is objective, they shouldn't start $#!+ if they aren't willing to pay that price. It can be published internationally. It can be broadcast to bordering Pak villages to let them know who will suffer if they sustain and shelter cross-border terrorists, and to let them know who is to blame for the devastation that will come their way when PA starts off another misadventure.

The assumption here is that Pakistan will play by the 1:10 rule. It will not. It will launch a war, and grandstand its way into a point where it believes the world will intervene to prevent a nuke war. The problem is that this scenario has a huge tendency to go haywire, as Pakistanis end up getting carried away by their own propaganda and the escalation-reaction matrix goes up and up.

In contrast, seizing x frontage of tactically useless but politically volatile land across the border makes the PA seem impotent to their constituents while avoiding the risk of overt nuke war, and scaremongering.

Its a perfect slap to their face

And of course, 30-40K arty pieces can help us achieve this objective

D Roy · Post by **D Roy** » 21 Aug 2010 01:33

Russia experiments with 135mm, whereas its the Germans who tested a 140mm Leopard 2.

Prasad · Post by **Prasad** » 21 Aug 2010 01:54

Opening up multiple fronts all across the border from Jammu to Jaisalmer is what will get the paki pants brown. However, if any conflict is limited to a particular part of the border, then in order to ensure a hot-knife-through-butter effect, we will need massive and overpowering artillery strength to go with the armoured needs. In the event that we reach a city like say Lahore, like the last time, without opening up attacks on other parts of the border, will the pakis be able to pull the trigger? I'm not sure. Is losing a major city == losing major land area implied?

ParGha · Post by **ParGha** » 21 Aug 2010 02:01

Those four were the exact "tipping points" mentioned in the RAND study, so so far we are in accord. However you are mistaken in assuming that all the guns across the entire front will be used in a massive counter-attack, hence tripping off point 2s (destruction of a large portion of army and af). The numbers, disposition and capabilities serve to create and maintain a level of unpredictability in Indian response; otherwise it would be very easy for them to predict the units likely to engage, prepare their positions accordingly, and lure in a unit with a low-level provocation and destory that unit. The large numbers and wide disposition means a response may come from anywhere on the border, consequently the pressure will be high not to risk provocations. BTW, this is not simply a justification we are making up as we go along - a similar stasis has been achieved in other fronts before, most notably on the Sino-Russian border (albeit there are differences).

If the size of the Pakistani provocation is large enough to require use of all those massive forces at once, it probably indicates they have finally gone completely ape-$#!+ insane and are heading full throttle towards national suicide. At that point of time it is simply more humane and responsible to break NFU and be done with the matter.

PS: Apart from the wresling with the pig problem, another problem with capturing land and returning it is the demoralizing effect it has on our soldiers and their families which persists long after we, as a nation, may have washed off the dirt from the wrestling bout.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 21 Aug 2010 02:37

ParGha wrote:Those four were the exact "tipping points" mentioned in the RAND study, so so far we are in accord.

Wokay, d'accord!

However you are mistaken in assuming that all the guns across the entire front will be used in a massive counter-attack, hence tripping off point 2s (destruction of a large portion of army and af). The numbers, disposition and capabilities serve to create and maintain a level of unpredictability in Indian response; otherwise it would be very easy for them to predict the units likely to engage, prepare their positions accordingly, and lure in a unit with a low-level provocation and destory that unit. The large numbers and wide disposition means a response may come from anywhere on the border, consequently the pressure will be high not to risk provocations. BTW, this is not simply a justification we are making up as we go along - a similar stasis has been achieved in other fronts before, most notably on the Sino-Russian border (albeit there are differences).

Boss my point is not that they'll get us or destroy us. With 30-40 K arty pieces on our side, it'd be BRING IT ON...my point is that theres little point in talking of decimating 3-70 Km Pak territory, as it would involve engaging substantial civilian infrastructure in many cases and/or degrade the Pakistani Army to the level that it would provoke an open conflict.

Simply put, the Pakistanis are not going to play by our rules.

Once fire assaults become a way of life and are restricted to specific military objectives, they will invest substantially in bunkers & other defenses, which bar direct hits are going to make the ammunition expenditure and effort ineffective (bang for buck) unless we expand the theater of conflict to your 70km depth, which brings in the "unacceptable metric" again.

One its good for propaganda (show off crying babies and widowed women) and then they attack across the IB and LOC, and pretend to have a victory or even avoiding defeat is enough for their home constituency.

Pakistan exists on the hatred of India & Hindus, and their constituency just wants PR victories. India so far has won/ at worst equaled them in all wars but outright lost the propaganda battle in so far as the average Abdul has concerned.

We need to break this dynamic. The Pakistani Army should not be seen as the heroic force fighting the evil Hindus who shell civilian homesteads and are afraid to fight the PA but should be the ones unable to defeat an implacable enemy, parked 5-6 km in Pak territory in Kashmir, Punjab, sending the public into a frothing rage at first, but making them then consider - that their army is not all what it claims to be.

We have to defeat the Pak army's hold on the Pakistanis pysche. They have to be shown to be losers, and impotent losers at that. Once the PA loses its prestige, it loses its moral claim to authority.

Each attack, we do something likewise or squeeze them economically or someway.

Make the war of attrition a constant one, change the mindset and arty is just a channel, a means to the end not the end by itself

If the size of the Pakistani provocation is large enough to require use of all those massive forces at once, it probably indicates they have finally gone completely ape-$#!+ insane and are heading full throttle towards national suicide. At that point of time it is simply more humane and responsible to break NFU and be done with the matter.

They went apesh!t insane a long time back & we gave them justification to believe that their insanity is ok dokie.

We have a PM who accepts cases of mangos after umpteen terror attacks in India, and even sent a dove card a few months after the worst terror attack we ever had.

We have a DefMin who is tying himself up in knots to ensure that a particular contentious gun is not chosen, when the arty tube saga is well known.

We have innumerable citizens in India who frown on any talk of war as jingoism and communal behaviour (turn the other cheek, think of Gandhi!!)

We have political leaders and self proclaimed intellectuals (including a former editor of a softcore girlie mag who now runs a national daily and thinks it fit to provide sage advice) rhapsodize on peace

My friend - the train left a long time back. All we are left with are the feeble attempts by a few souls to break the gordian knot of dismay & helplessness

PS: Apart from the wresling with the pig problem, another problem with capturing land and returning it is the demoralizing effect it has on our soldiers and their families which persists long after we, as a nation, may have washed off the dirt from the wrestling bout.

Dont return it as simple as that. Keep it, as long as Pakistan exists. They hate us anyhow, high-time we gave them a proper reason for their hate.
Our ultimate aim should be to cripple Pakistan anywhichway and anyhow. No mercy. Total and absolute hostility from our end, all the while staying clear of Kidwai's stupid maximalist redlines.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 21 Aug 2010 09:57

historically the jihadi/RoP armies have only given pause from relentless aggression and war when met with opponents willing to stoop to equal levels of ruthlessness and cruelty. i.e. no "honour" in war like fighting for a day and not pursueing a retreating enemy etc "indic ethics". some north indian rulers paid with their lives and kingdoms eventually for such mistakes and humanity.
one example I can cite is the ahoms, who were originally tai tribes from thailand and not infused with the same yindu-buddhist-jain "scruples" yet when they encountered the mughal and bengal nawab armies . apart from the miserable and disease ridden climate, apparently the ahoms had little interest in taking prisoners or organizing H&D treaties - it was kill or be killed. those few that survived a ahom victory were massacred on the spot or dragged off to arunachal border far in the east to serve as a buffer against periodic raids by the militant hill tribes.

we need such single minded animal focus from the PMO level, something which was only seen for a while around 1971 and never thereafter.

instead we have large sections of the media, 'intellectuals' and political class doing their best to shield anti-national activities, undermine those few patriots that serve in positions of power, boost the enemy's morale and obtain bail for people accused of serious anti-national crimes.

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 21 Aug 2010 10:28

^^^^ I thought that I was reading Bhirispati

Yagnasri · Post by **Yagnasri** » 21 Aug 2010 19:54

Time and again we hear this canal based defences in Paki Punjab etc. Why not use some good amphi armor. From what i read todays amphi armor can cross kms of sea. Is there any way avaliable for us to take care of these fixed defences ( Patton - monuments for human stupidity)

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 21 Aug 2010 20:06

Please read up a bit on how DCBs work and what armour can and cannot do.

Yagnasri · Post by **Yagnasri** » 21 Aug 2010 20:13

Can you please suggest some materials online and free. I had this doubt for some years and could not find any material.

aditp · Post by **aditp** » 21 Aug 2010 22:51

Sample cross section of DCB design (illustrative / reference only)

Now compare the dimensions with that of the tank

Not only will the tank have extreme difficulty crossing the DCB even the approach would be very difficult

Brando · Post by **Brando** » 22 Aug 2010 00:04

Surya wrote:Please read up a bit on how DCBs work and what armour can and cannot do.

Can DCB's be destroyed through a direct air strike or missile attack enough to create a breach ?? How well do they stand up against the 2000lb'er "mud-movers" ? Indian armor can either go through it, above it or around it and strike Punjab.