If not true, then chiskology onlee to prepare ourselves better and do csy-ops in Asia, and if true, then that preparation will come in handy.shiv wrote:But I think too many commentators are being disingenuous saying that "China wants to dominate Asia and keep India down".
May a thousand uprisings bloom and serve as a nail in the lizard's tailPhilip wrote:Reg.MKB's vies,there is no doubt that the Chinese economic miracle inevitably will ahve to be protected by the Chinese.How they do i is another amtter.In a recent "hard talk" interview wth the BBC,a Chinese eco minister,Chung,described the Chinese as "saving today for tomorrow's spending,while Americans spend tomorrow's savings today"! It is quite accurate.
China however acan establsh good realtiosn wih all its Asian neighbours,who fear t just as Japan was feared during the pre-WW2 period,and Japan's paranoia and US pressure upon it led to its pre-emptive strike at Pearl Harbour.
If I had anything o do with Chinese decision making,I would emulate JFK who said of Lyndon Johsnon (who hated JFK) when he chose him as running mate suprising close friends,that "I'd rather have him pissing outside the tent than pissing in".Similarly,it would be better for China to have India "pissing into the IOR than having it pissing over the Himalayas".But that attitude requires maturity from the Middle Kingdom,who have both monumental egos and equally monumental paranoia.Look a the way in which windows were ordered closed in hotels during the Olympics and other asinine security measures.In fact,China's attempt to keep India rstrained within the Himalayas can be turned around so that it is China a "scaredy dragon",but still an unpredictable dragon with a lot of fire in its nostrils that requires to be kept imprisoned between the Pacific and the Himalayas.That should be India's task,so that there is no "Breakout" of China from over the Himalayas and into the IOR that cannot be met and swiftly dealt with.This requires a massive expansion and modernsation of the Indiana rmed forces and a very agressive Indian diplomacy that engages every country on the globe especially China's rivals/enemies.
With or without war - China has forced India to:shiv wrote: If, as you say war is not a solution and the Chinese also believe that war is not a solution - surely they are being too clever by half by acting like they want to make war.
Based on the theory/hypothesis I have presented in GDF harmonization thread, it is not just because of Mao and Communism, a foreign (European) disruptive idea, but also the result of two successive disruptive foreign dynasties (Mongol Yuan and Manchu Qing) that wrecked havoc on Han Chinese social fabric in the last 800 years.shiv wrote:But accusing China of being like that may not be China's fault - it may be Indian and other observers watching China's aggressive boorishness and mistakenly assuming that they are trying to do that. Perhaps Chinese are only looking for respect, approval and peaceful rise but behave boorish and aggressive because Mao wiped out all culture and finesse from China in his revolution. I am still trying to figure that out..TonyMontana wrote: Sure. But to me it seems just a little obsessive. Wouldn't it be more productive to talk about things India actually have controls over?
Also a good map of the situation in the article. My comments in the Managing China Thread.India has apparently lost its cold war with China, or at least the current phase of it. What is disturbing to India is not only China's superior military power and stronger economy, but also China's intrusion into what was once regarded as India's backyard.
The development has rendered the so-called Indira doctrine ineffective or obsolete. The doctrine, formulated during the Indira Gandhi premiership, made it clear to regional countries that they should seek help from within the region — meaning India — before they approached any outside power. In terms of the doctrine, India opposed the presence of superpowers in the Indian Ocean which it regarded as its backyard. Small countries in the region were punished for defying the doctrine. It happened to Sri Lanka in the early 1980s. India armed, trained and financed the Sri Lanka's separatist rebellion. In the late 1980s Nepal tried to defy the doctrine and was punished. New Delhi economically suffocated the land-locked Himalayan nation by closing down almost all the trade routes.
Today India may be much stronger than what it was three decades ago. But its power is confined within its borders. In contrast, China has been increasing its soft and hard power and making its presence felt in South Asia and also throughout the world in so subtle a manner that India could do almost nothing except make belated remarks. Recent statements made by Indian leaders resemble the screams of a man who suddenly wakes up from his slumber under a tree and finds his belongings are gone.
Their statements, like a fiery storm, however, had blown away the cloth of diplomacy that had kept the disputes between the two countries covered. The disputes are now in the open.
The soft-spoken and usually philosophical Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was furious last week. The fire in his remarks made the rest of the world to stop and take note of what he said.
Though the remarks came against the backdrop of China's refusal to grant a visa to a top Indian military commander to visit Beijing, the real problem is more complex. It involves unresolved border issues — eg: Arunachel Pradesh — which led to a war between the two countries in 1962. It also involves Kashmir, the presence of Dalai Lama in India and New Delhi's perception that China is increasing its assertive presence in India's backyard.
India suspects China is interfering in Kashmir. A little known fact about Kashmir is that it is shared by not only India and Pakistan but also China. Kashmir's Aksai Chin region is with China. Though India has been making occasional noises about what it calls Chinese occupation of Kashmir, Pakistan goes along with China's claim of sovereignty over Aksai Chin. There is strong suspicion in New Delhi that not only Pakistan, but China also is stoking up trouble in Indian-administered Kashmir.
China last year started issuing a different kind of visas to the people of Kashmir, sending a strong message to India that Beijing did not recognize India's sovereignty over the disputed region. China's explanation to India in refusing the visa to the Indian military officer is that he was not welcome because of his role in Kashmir.
Premier Singh's remarks came days after India fired off a strongly-worded demarche — a diplomatic note — to China, saying it was calling off the defence exercises and exchange programmes between the two countries.
China responded to the Indian anger with cool diplomacy pointing to the thriving trade between the two countries and claiming that Beijing was committed to the Pancha-Sheela principles that define China's relations with India.
Singh charged that China was seeking to expand its influence in South Asia and gain a "foothold" in the region.
"China would like to have a foothold in South Asia and we have to reflect on this reality. We have to be aware of this," Singh said.
He said China's leadership would change in two years and there was a new assertiveness among the Chinese. "It is difficult to tell which way it will go. So it's important to be prepared," he said.
Hidden in Singh's statement is India's disappointment over its failure to check effectively China's intrusion into South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. India was a mere onlooker when China built ports in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Myanmar. Except for Pakistan, India has friendly relations with all its neighbours. But today China weighs heavier on the diplomatic scales of India's neighbours. China has become Sri Lanka's biggest aid giver. China's harbour project in Hambantota has raised the eyebrows of Indian defence analysts. However much both Sri Lanka and China insist that the harbour project is essentially a commercial venture and has no military intentions, these analysts say India could not prevent Sri Lanka from allowing China to have a strong foothold in Hambantota from which Beijing can, if it wants to or if the needs arises, control a vast area of the Indian Ocean extending up to Antarctica.
Myanmar has become a virtual Chinese protectorate. Last month, China and Myanmar conducted a series of naval exercises close to Indian waters, prompting India to put its naval troops on alert.
Premier Singh's statement is not the sole protest. Opposing China's assertiveness has become India's official policy. This week, India's Defence Minister A.K. Anthony addressing a combined commanders' conference in Delhi, said India could not ignore the fact that Beijing was fast improving its military and physical infrastructure on the border. He called on Indian military leaders to keep abreast of the military modernisation drive in the neighbourhood to ensure that the Indian armed forces held an edge in the region.
India's sudden awakening to the growing Chinese power has moved it to seek new strategic allies. It has found one such ally in Japan. In recent weeks, Japan and China have been trading charges and counter charges over the arrest of a Chinese fishing captain off some disputed islands in the East China Sea after his boat collided with Japanese coast guard craft. The uninhabited but believed-to-be oil-rich islands, known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China, are controlled by Japan, but are also claimed by China and Taiwan. The incident has raised tempers in both countries.
When Japan's Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada held talks with his Indian counterpart S.M. Krishna in New Delhi last month, they shared concern over Beijing's growing military power and its military build-up in India's neighbourhood.
The Indian Express newspaper quoted sources as saying that the two sides had expressed "similar language" in describing Chinese actions.
India is also seeking to strengthen its defence relations with the United States. During the George W. Bush administration, the two countries had struck a strong bond in the fight against their common enemy — Islamic terrorism. The relations between them improved with the signing of a civilian nuclear deal and enhanced defence cooperation. But under President Barack Obama, the speed with which the relations improved has slowed down a little. This was largely because of the Obama administration's pressure on India to find a speedy solution to the Kashmiri problem. However, the visit of Obama to India in November, analysts say, will give the necessary impetus for relations between them to reach the level that was seen during the Bush era.
Of course, the rise of China's military power is a concern for the US as well. According to Indian media reports, US Pacific Forces' commander Admiral Robert Willard on a visit to India referred to China's 'naval assertiveness', which he said had 'complicated matters'.
Though Admiral Willard did not elaborate, he was probably referring to the US concern over the growing Chinese presence in South Asia, Central Asia and the Pacific. One reason why the US is unwilling to leave Afghanistan is its fear that the vacuum created by its departure would be filled by China. According to the latest Globalfirepower.com rankings, China is second only to the United States in terms of military power. India occupies the fourth place after Russia.
These moves and diplomatic contacts may indicate informal alliance formation. The problem with these informal alliance formations is that no bloc has advantage over the other, especially in view of the nuclear capabilities of the major players. The nuclear deterrent works and will avert a major war. China certainly knows this and quietly spreads its power far and wide, reaching even Africa and Latin America.
Why the sudden awakening. Why not 5 years ago - 10 years ago.ramana wrote:India's sudden awakening to the growing Chinese power has moved it to seek new strategic allies.
Also a good map of the situation in the article. My comments in the Managing China Thread.
I wonder if PRC's string of pearls is working why did they chose to drop the mask and enter POK so blatanlty. Is it because the TSP cant provide plausible deniablity as its failing? IOW working thru proxies is not working. Further while the Sri Lanka reporter exults in India getting its comeuppance, I detect a twinge of fear now that PRC is inside South Asia or is it my paranoia?
The key to controlling any neighbor is through strong influence on the most influential groups in the country - be it media, be it the religious leadership, be it the most assertive ethnic groups, be it business.ramana wrote: View from Sri Lanka....
Indo-China Cold War hots up
By way of denial, Pakistan and China haven’t refuted the presence of the troops but their purpose. Pakistan claims they were there to assist in “flood control”. Zhao Gang Cheng of the Shanghai-based Institute of International Studies stated that the purpose was for considerations of economy and energy and not to pose a threat to anyone.
China’s dependence on imported oil is now to the tune of 56 per cent. By 2015, it will go up to two-thirds of China’s energy needs and by 2030 it would touch four-fifth. Hence the Chinese paranoia over the vulnerability of its energy imports.
A key component of this strategy hinges upon its investment in the Gwadar Port of Pakistan and the frenzied construction/upgradation of a triple-tier rail and road highway along with a gas pipeline that will carry Iranian gas to China’s Western Provinces. This will reduce a 16,500-km journey to just 2,500 km. This Chinese oil and gas artery via Pakistan and the Shia rebellious province of Gilgit in PoK has become a core Chinese interest.
But China has an ingrained habit of defining core interests and vital communications arteries
For example, in the 1962 India-China war, a key Chinese concern was its perceived threat to the Aksai Chin highway that connects Tibet with Xinjiang. It perceived India’s ‘Forward Policy’ (of establishing its claims by token posts in disputed areas) a threat. If Pakistan persists with its terrorist provocations, a limited war between the two nations could erupt. China could view it as a threat to Gwadar–Karakoram energy lifeline and intervene militarily.
There has been an alarming shift in the Chinese stance over Kashmir. From complete neutrality in the Kargil war of 1999, China now assertively claims J&K as disputed territory
xposting from TSP threadChina’s moves have long-term implications that we can’t afford to overlook. There is an urgent need to speed up our arms acquisition process. We can’t postpone them to a distant date in 2025, the date line being based on the presumption that we must complete our economic reconstruction first and then build up our military muscle by 2025. Will our adversaries patiently wait and watch till then? This decade could be critical in terms of sudden and non-linear changes. The reports of a sizeable Chinese military presence in Gilgit and its change in stance on the status of J&K are an ominous shift of pattern that is cause for serious disquiet.
Another one is the Tibet issue to opened.krisna wrote:
How can India stave off the potential danger to its security from TSP and panda?
How not to exit afghanistan posted earlier in this thread
India should also revisit its position on the Durand Line. It may be worthwhile for us to signal that we do not necessarily recognise the Durand Line as a legitimate frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Aligning India with long-standing Pakhtoon aspirations may be a potentially potent lever to use as the new version of the Great Game unfolds in our neighbourhood.By doing this, we signal to pashtuns that we are with you on this.
TSP does not want this to happen as it will balkanize the TSP. once this happens baluchis and other provinces may also ask for it. Pakjabis may not like it—leading to intercine civil war.
China had relations with pashtuns and TSP. By forcing china to take sides it will be interesting duel.
USA wants to withdraw- likely it may station some troops in north western parts of afghanisthan away from pashtuns. They may like to keep a watch on Iran and china (not getting access to gwadar)
POK to be taken by India- this is again is possible only by breaking TSP. Otherwise India will be in danger of china helping TSP as long as its economic security is not in jeopardy. TSP will ask for china help 400% positive. No doubts on this regards. It benefits china as TSP takes on India.
China has a policy of not interfering on any nations politics. But will interfere if its economic jewels are attacked which will happen when war breaks between India and TSP inevitably the way TSP is behaving.
Overall in whatever way we see breaking TSP is a low cost cheaper option than any other military adventure. Even if china and US are in collusion, breaking TSP is the only way forward to ensure our survival.(if TSP is intact India will have greater terrorists attacks as TSP economy will improve with oil pipelines money and is militarily secure with panda and US help)
This will be against the policy of uncle and panda. but it is the survival of India and its core interest.
India can offset the whole thing by going along with US so that it can drop the condom state and tag along with India.(again quoting KS artcle-countering china
Quote:It is tough times for India. But we will do it.Even while retaining Russia as a friend in the Asian context, India has to develop a new balance of power equation to deal with the challenge from China and Pakistan not merely to our external security but to our national development as a pluralistic, secular and democratic nation. India too has its ancient strategic wisdom, preached in the Panchatantra, Hitopadesa and Arthasastra, encompassing sama (cooperation), dhana (buying up), bedha (causing division) and dhanda (use of force). It is time to invoke that ancient wisdom and devise an appropriate international strategy to counter the Chinese-Pakistani challenge.
ramana wrote:
I wonder if PRC's string of pearls is working why did they chose to drop the mask and enter POK so blatanlty. Is it because the TSP cant provide plausible deniablity as its failing? IOW working thru proxies is not working. Further while the Sri Lanka reporter exults in India getting its comeuppance, I detect a twinge of fear now that PRC is inside South Asia or is it my paranoia?
ramana wrote:All reports say this is hedge in case US shuts the Mallaca gap. So maybe its only for emergency use. But then it will be subject to disruption by many non state actors. Yes is conundrum.
So if TSP collapses who gets POK by default: India by virtue of its claim on J&K or China by virtue of its recent troop presence and investment in POK? Direct land and air access to Afghanistan and beyond depends on it.brihaspati wrote:I would guess - it is more about hedging an immediate and local risk. Militarizing POK by PLA helps in
(1) stabilizing any rump Islamabad whose vague southernmost border runs in an arc just south of Islamambad, and advantages of being the patron of a dependent Pak proxy
(2) Keeping India cut off from AFG and CAR and use the easier topography from the north to keep military pressure on India if needed
(3) if possible regulate Islamist contact with Uyghurs
(4) Keep a handle on AFG
But why are we assuming that PRC will be able to hold onto this region if Islamabad virtually loses control of the country to the south of itself?
So it may be that B.O will visit desh with his finger on fate of Malacca straits. In return for GUBO on cashmeare and yellow sea and other defence goodies, unkil will decide to tag-team with us or not. Interesting times indeed!ramana wrote:All reports say this is hedge in case US shuts the Mallaca gap. So maybe its only for emergency use. But then it will be subject to disruption by many non state actors. Yes is conundrum.
Some interesting articles about the Sino-Indian competition for Oil & Gasramana wrote:All reports say this is hedge in case US shuts the Mallaca gap. So maybe its only for emergency use. But then it will be subject to disruption by many non state actors. Yes is conundrum.
So we lost the Shwe Gas Fields to China, gas fields we helped explore.India's ONGC Videsh Ltd has 20 per cent stake each in the two blocks while gas firm GAIL held 10 per cent apiece.
"Myanmar issued a Letter of Intent on February 11, 2004, wherein GAIL was acknowledged as a preferential buyer of gas from these blocks. An MoU to this effect was signed between the two countries on March 9, 2006," he said.
In terms of the provision in the LoI and MoU, GAIL completed a detailed feasibility report for an onland pipeline from Myanmar passing through north-eastern states of India.
May simply be failure to pay bribes.RajeshA wrote:
Due to ideological dogmas, bureaucratic lethargy and subservience to interests of superpowers,
he journalist Justus Ondari wrote recently in Kenya's Daily Nation: “The Chinese influence, in the form of its people, investment and business, is sweeping across the African continent like a wildfire.” If China is ‘a complex actor' and Africa ‘a complex continent', it follows that their relationship is complex too. A staunch opponent of colonialism, China is now being projected by some as manifesting neo-colonialist tendencies. Is the China link a blessing or bane for Africans?
While this debate unfolds elsewhere, it does not receive much notice in India. But it should, because expanding China-Africa relations have global implications.
A look at the past
Western media tend to suggest that China has appeared suddenly on the African stage in recent years. China's publicists would have us believe that the relationship has ancient origins. Neither view is accurate.
The only important chapter in the history of these relations pre-dating the rise of Communist China pertains to Zeng He. Hailed as ‘the Chinese Columbus', he undertook eight voyages during the 15th Century to the region west of China, at the behest of Ming Emperor Cheng Zu. A few of these journeys took him across the Indian Ocean to Africa's eastern and southern seaboard, e.g. Mogadishu, Malindi and Madagascar. His aim was to explore and to spread China's influence and trade. Chinese scholars stress that conquest and colonialism did not result from them.
Cut to the 20th century. China-Africa relations were initially driven by common experience and ideology: shared subjugation by the West; a resolve to end colonialism and to launch economic development. Afro-Asian unity was forged at the Bandung Conference, with Nehru's India introducing the new China to African leaders. In 1956, Egypt became the first African country to establish diplomatic relations with China. Premier Zhou Enlai's historic visits to Africa in 1963 and 1964 created a lasting impact. The ‘One China' policy took quick strides: in 1960 only five of 22 independent African states recognised the People's Republic of China; in 2010, only four of 54 African states maintain relations with Taiwan. China began extending economic and military assistance to African countries, but the Cultural Revolution introduced aberrations. China's inclination ‘to export revolution' amounted to violating its own traditional adherence to the principle of non-interference.
From the early 1980s, China's policy marked a shift from an emphasis on ‘war and revolution' to ‘peace and development'. Economic cooperation assumed greater importance. During the 1990s, visits to Africa by top Chinese leaders became progressively more frequent and extensive. Since 1991, the Chinese foreign minister follows the tradition to inaugurate his annual calendar of foreign visits by first visiting a few African capitals.
Forum on cooperation
Sino-African relations have been institutionalised in the past decade through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). It has traversed through four important milestones, namely three ministerial conferences (held in 2000, 2003 and 2009) and the climax in 2006 — “China's Africa Year” — when the ministerial conference was followed by the first summit in Beijing, attended by leaders of 48 African countries.
Two FOCAC documents stand out. The Beijing Summit Declaration proclaimed solemnly “the establishment of a new type of strategic partnership between China and Africa featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges.” The Sharm-el-Sheikh Declaration (of November 2009) stressed that Sino-African cooperation had produced “fruitful results”, making it “a good example of South-South cooperation.”
Relations today
China's relations with Africa cover all facets — political, defence, economic and other areas of cooperation. Shared perceptions on regional and international issues have been highlighted repeatedly. The growing China link has helped put a global focus on Africa. Similarly, relations with Africa help China to project itself as a global power. New assertiveness of the Chinese Navy in the western Indian Ocean is noteworthy. China seems to be working actively to advance the FOCAC process. Over two dozen Confucius Institutes have been established in 18 African countries.
China-Africa trade, valued at $10 billion in 2000, shot up to $107 billion in 2008. China, to a large extent, imports minerals and crude oil, and exports manufactured goods. Currently, China imports over 20 per cent of its oil requirements from Africa. Over 1,600 Chinese companies have investment or an operational presence on the continent today. However, Chinese investment is barely 10 per cent of accumulated investment by foreign countries in Africa. Seven special economic zones being set up by China in five African countries have drawn special attention.
The ‘China in Africa' phenomenon has triggered conflicting reactions and assessments. Supporters have argued that China's approach is to promote mutual benefit and a balance of advantages. China does not interfere in internal affairs nor impose conditions and refrains from neo-colonialist actions. Unlike the West, it did not embark on colonialism, impose its religion and languages, conquer territory and practice slave trade. China has only challenged the exploitative Western dominance of Africa. It has contributed to Africa's integration, enhancement of Africa's importance in world affairs as well as to rise in prices of African commodities and growth in Africa's GDP.
On the other hand, critics have argued that China is an ‘exploitative' and ‘extractive' mercantilist power with its own neo-colonialist inclinations. It buys raw materials and sells manufactured products. Its economic policy damages Africa's development, delays industrialisation, ruins local industry, does not involve a transfer of technology nor value addition, contributing very little to employment as China prefers to bring its own labour. Besides, the quality of Chinese goods is poor. China jeopardises good governance in Africa, supports dictatorships, corruption, and a violation of human rights (as in Sudan and Zimbabwe). China is basically interested in Africa's natural resources, not in its long-term development.
Perhaps the truth lies somewhere between the two positions. In theory, China's engagement could be beneficial or harmful, with the actual mix varying from country to country. It may largely depend on how an African government manages to enhance benefits and reduce harmful effects.
The India angle
India's relations with Africa have been deeper, stronger and more substantive for long. The two sides were linked through trade, cultural influences, migration as well as shared struggles, ideals and icons throughout the 19th and the 20th Centuries. However, in recent years, the gap between India's and China's profile in Africa has been widening, to our disadvantage. Perhaps China is now a decade ahead of India.
Denying the fact of rivalry with China is not a feasible option. Many Africans are convinced that the two Asian powers are vying for Africa's attention, assets, markets and support for their political agenda.
Neither is it desirable to merely lament nor to suggest copying or ‘beating China in its own game.' A balanced view indicates that India should leverage its many natural advantages and core strengths. The most sensible choice would be to closely monitor China's activities in Africa and to intensify and broaden our cooperation with African countries selectively.
Recently a thoughtful African ambassador in Delhi told me: “China is doing more, but India is doing better.” China's presence in Africa is set to expand. It is time for India to enhance its engagement wisely and rapidly. A sustained combination of greater activism, sensitivity and synergy is essential. Then, India may be seen as doing both better and more.
That whine was in a slightly different context, but, yes, we did not pay enough bribes, because whereas it is easy to indulge in corruption within India, the system probably makes it difficult to pay bribes to outside agencies and countries.shiv wrote:May simply be failure to pay bribes.RajeshA wrote: Due to ideological dogmas, bureaucratic lethargy and subservience to interests of superpowers,
Thank god Sanjay Gandhi's population control measures were never implemented)Now, this whole issue is about to change. Chinese territory makes a sharp bridge head into Northern Pakistan, going by the Siachen Glacier. Siachen is also covered by Pakistan and its military deployment on one side. This would put tremendous pressure on India’s position in Siachen, a critical enemy gateway to J&K.
It has now been revealed that the Chinese workers in Gilgit-Baltistan are no ordinary labourers. They are from the PLA Logistics Department, engineers and soldiers involved in construction. Technically, they belong to the PLA and the PLA is on active duty on foreign soil. Deployment for UN Peace Keeping forces is something totally different. The PLA activity in Gilgit-Baltistan lays bare the much touted deceptive proclamation that not a single Chinese soldier will be placed on foreign soil.
There is clearly a need to recognize the fact that when the Chinese make an official statement, its impact, prospects and consequences are very carefully weighed, looking to future strategy for which the blue print is already in place. They never make mistakes or slip-ups. When changing, they quote change in circumstances critical to their security.
In this context, it merits to revisit what is generally believed in India that China recognized Sikkim as an integral part of India in 2005. Visiting Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao only showed a map to concerned Indian officials showing Sikkim as a part of India. China’s foreign ministry website showing Sikkim’s status in unreliable and can be changed at any time.
China can be nailed down to its words only if there is an official statement. More than that, there has to be written and signed agreements. The Sikkim issue is very much alive. After Wen Jiabao’s visit to India, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman in Beijing made it abundantly clear that the Sikkim issue will be resolved along with the border issue. This is the moot point.
As regards the boundary question, the Chinese never wanted to resolve it at this phase. They wanted stable and secure neighbourhood to secure economic and military development. Having achieved their objectives, the Beijing leaders appear to have embarked on the next stage of strategic domination in Asia.
The "Watch and Wait" approach by India, Japan and some of the South East Asian countries are fraught with serious danger. China’s territory hungry surge supported by military means, is becoming louder.
A point to note is the expanding designation of "core interest" territories. From Taiwan and Tibet it has expanded to the South China Sea and its island and the so-called first chain of islands, to Japanese territory emphatically, in the past months.
India may wake up sooner than later with China’s claims on Indian territories designated as "core interest" territories. This would mean that either submit to China’s claims or prepare for a war to protect them.
What exactly that territory would be is not known. Beijing has not agreed to exchange maps of the Western and Eastern Sectors, the most strategic sections, with the Indian interlocutors. Evidence exists with the Indian side that China is encroaching upon more Indian land surreptitiously, especially in the Western Sector.
India does not have the leeway to sweep more Chinese dirt under the carpet. The carpet is now too small to hide it all. It is now time not only to use quiet diplomatic channels with China, but show that India can also hurt China.
India may have signed in 2003 that Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) is Chinese territory. The operative part of this agreement in the "autonomy" of TAR. If autonomy of TAR as defined by several international treaties is addressed by Beijing, then the agreement stays. If not, the Agreement is dead, and India can revert to its original position on the entire Tibet issue, the true history of Tibet be brought out to demolish the history of Tibet concocted by China, and refuse to give visas to those Chinese officials including military officials who have served in TAR and Xinjiang Autonomous Region where Beijing has launched a scorched earth policy against pro-independent Uighurs.
Tibetans coming to India, whether on official duty or private visits, be given "paper", not "stapled" visas and their Chinese passports not recognized.
There are issues regarding Taiwan, the Dalai Lama, and Uighur leaders in exile like Rebiya Kadeer is still palpable around the world.
China need not think that it has drunk the elixir from the Cup of Life, and that it is invincible. The responsibility lies entirely on the Mandarins of Beijing. There is more to international behavior then a bag full of money, nuclear weapons and distortion of history.
The anti-ship missile that vexes China-watchers is an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), a weapon whose range, speed and hitting power dwarf that of any cruise missile. Estimates vary, but should the PLA perfect its ASBM, Chinese racketeers could pound away at ships underway up to 2,000 miles away.
What would this mean? It means that PLA forces could range the entire South China Sea from mobile launchers positioned on Hainan Island or elsewhere along the South China coast. Loo counsels Southeast Asian navies to simply wait out a Chinese Navy that lacks a robust logistics fleet. But if PLA forces can use land-based weaponry to sink ships in port or cruising the South China Sea, then this amounts to a strategy of defeat and destruction.
But sea power is anyway about more than the fleet. Even if the PLA Navy proves unable to mount a continuous presence in the South China Sea—an assumption growing more doubtful by the day—systems able to influence events at sea from the land provide continuous virtual presence throughout the spectrum of conflict, from peacetime to wartime. This versatility explains the emphasis Chinese strategists now place on extended-range shore-based weaponry.
Everybody is sick of the bully!China is mistaken if it thinks Japan will buckle to China's demands if it plays hardball.
Since the 1970s, China has claimed the Senkaku Islands belong to China. It has instilled this belief among its people through "anti-Japanese patriotism" education since the 1990s.
The world is taking note of China’s claim that the country has “indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea” and that the Yellow Sea is “pivotal to China’s core interests”. With such profound assertions made officially by government spokesmen – backed by a massive naval build up, the deployment of supposed “carrier killer” super missiles and aggressive tactics such as ramming and harassing foreign naval and coast guard ships in the South China Sea – demonstrate China’s apparent strategy to seize control of over a million square miles of the Pacific Ocean.
While China seeks to dominate large swaths of the Pacific, the number of warships in the United States Navy – the world’s traditional guarantor of freedom of the seas – has declined significantly (the force only has 286 of its required 313 warships). Last month, while Hillary Clinton was in South Korea attempting to shore up U.S. influence in Asia, the Obama Administration undercut her by announcing that another eight American warships would be decommissioned. In attempting to do more with less around the world, and especially in the Pacific, the US must rely upon its allies’ assistance in keeping the sea lanes open and in protecting Western economies that are more dependent than ever on the shipment of goods and energy resources by sea
As the world prepares for the second decade of the twenty-first century it is increasingly clear that the now subtle rivalry between China and India is only likely to exasperate.
This is similar to arthashastraThe approach most suitable to India’s character and ambitions is one of “soft power,” a term coined by Harvard international relations scholar Professor Joseph Nye. Nye argued that “power is the ability to alter the behavior of others to get what you want, and there are three ways to do that: coercion (sticks), payments (carrots) and attraction (soft power). If you are able to attract others,” he explained, “you can economize on the sticks and carrots.”
In his book, The Paradox of American Power (2002), In today’s information era there are three types of countries likely to gain soft power and so succeed:
Those whose dominant cultures and ideals are closer to prevailing global norms (which now emphasize liberalism, pluralism, autonomy); those with the most access to multiple channels of communication and thus more influence over how issues are framed; and those whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international performance.
Fits china to a TThough a country’s respect and prestige on the world stage is very much determined by its latent military power, it must also be supplemented with soft power. Otherwise in plain terms the former could be understood as arrogance.
In India’s case, a soft power approach could be the trump card. To start, apart from democracy, India has the ability to be an information power. Many students from Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia are interested in studying in India at much cheaper rates. India should implement a better infrastructure of absolving them. In that regard, the passage of the Nalanda University Bill by parliament may indicate that India is preparing to unleash its soft power onto Asia and the world. This perception is reinforced by the efficient completion of the South Asian University project under the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation’s header and India’s decision to open up its higher education sector to global inputs and competition.
why panda cannot project soft power--Moreover, there aren’t many countries in the world which resent India’s growing power(except TSP and panda). This is another main factor. From Singapore to the Sudan, from Angola to Afghanistan, from Australia to Argentina countries regard India with respect, not fear. What this means is that there is no need for a any power outside Eurasia to initiate a classic balance of power with or against India. This is certainly not the case with China.
Also add TSP and Burma and Algeria.China has actually a very limited ability to boost its soft power credentials. Its foreign policy has little regard for human rights and democracy while supportive of regimes that China does business with. The islands of Fiji are a case in point. It is very much because of the security umbrella provided by China that Fiji’s military dictator is able to withhold democratic elections. India doesn’t have any such constrains.
we have to be on guard, speed up defence procurements and infrastructure etc.In the short run, India may not be able to match China’s three trillion dollar currency reserve nor, indeed, its robust industrial growth, but it can project a more favorable image of itself to the world through a policy of soft power. That may well, in the long run, turn out to be much more beneficial to its economy as well as its people.
currently china is showing off its strength, making US aware of its strength.ramana wrote:Its demographics driving the geopolitics. PRC is rising power. US is decling. But both want to keep India checked as that will be the future rising power. Recall all those Goldman Sachs country reports etc 10 years ago.
And Indian elite is trading off that they can make a baragin to curb future power if they are allowed now to run the show.
It makes perfect sense. China is too big and artifical to sustain in the same way for the next 30 yearskrisna wrote:
Previously US helped china due to SU factor and cold war.
Now there is no cold war. it is under threat by potential rising powers.
china is nowhere near US in superpowerdom, but the most likely one to threaten.
If US thinks of making G2 with china then it is a foolish superpower, so India better prepare that china goes on top.
China will not be happy with being one of the G2 powers and surely will dismantle US once it spreads its wings outside asia unfettered.
US is only country to have access to 2 oceans. China by making inroads into IOR is trying to make it the second country to have access of 2 oceans.
It somehow does not make sense to me. I dont understand this.
Nihat wrote:Let facts speak for themselves
With its defence spending having grown almost twice as fast as its GDP, China is now beginning to take the gloves off, confident that it has acquired the necessary muscle. Rising power is emboldening Beijing to pursue a more muscular foreign policy not just against India, but also in the region extending from the South China Sea to Northeast Asia.
China’s belligerence, significantly, poses a greater threat for India than for any other Asian nation for several reasons. One, China is mounting both direct military intimidation (as underlined by the abnormally high level of continuing cross-border incursions) and proxy threats against India, including by shoring by its longstanding strategic nexus with Pakistan. Two, the largest real estate China covets is in India. Arunachal is almost three times bigger than Taiwan. Three, India has no formal security alliance with any other power and thus must depend on its own defence capabilities. And four, by seeking to badger India on multiple fronts, China is signalling that its real, long-term contest is more with India than with the US. The countries around India have become battlegrounds for China’s moves to encircle India. By assiduously courting these countries as proxies in its geopolitical competition with India, China has managed to make deep inroads into India’s strategic backyard — from Sri Lanka to Bangladesh, and Nepal to Burma.
Yet, the world knows more about China’s moves in the South China Sea and East Asia than its actions against India
Even in the pre-1962 period, India had made the same mistake by playing down China’s aggressive moves along the border. In fact, there are important parallels between the pre-1962 situation and the one now. Border talks have regressed, Chinese claims on Indian territories are becoming publicly assertive and their cross-border incursions are common. In fact, commentaries in military journals suggest that some in China believe that a swift, 1962-style victory in a border war with India is attainable to cut to size a peer rival.
Take another example. It was in June that the Chinese notified their refusal to allow the Indian northern army command chief to visit Beijing. But the Indian side leaked this notification to the press only in late August. It is still unclear what has been India’s response to the snub. Beijing has said flatly that it “has received no word that India has stopped military exchanges between the two countries”.
There is absolutely no need for India to periodically renew its commitment to a ‘one China’ policy when China not only declines to reciprocally make a ‘one India’ pledge, but also mocks at India’s territorial integrity openly. Little thought has been given that by bringing India’s Tibet stance in complete alignment with China’s, New Delhi has undercut its own leverage while boosting China’s.
Without contributing to the rising tensions with China, India has to gently allow facts to speak for themselves — whether on the border situation, Tibet’s centrality or China’s overt refusal to accept the territorial status quo. Facts indeed are an anathema even to schoolyard bullies. By not hiding its intent to further redraw the frontiers, Beijing only highlights the futility of political negotiations. After all, a major redrawing of frontiers has never happened at the negotiating table in world history.
India should learn how Vietnam has managed to turn the diplomatic tables on China by not shying away from spotlighting the latter’s aggressive designs. In the process, China stood isolated at the last Asean Regional Forum meeting.
Brahma Chellaney makes more sense than many others.A stable equation with China is more likely to be realised if India puts premium on leveraged diplomacy and avoids a trans-Himalayan military imbalance. More broadly, China’s trajectory will depend on how its neighbours and distant countries like the US manage its growing power. Such management — independently and in partnership — will determine if Chinese power does not slide into arrogance.
Beautiful poetry Prem, zillion thanks !!!Prem wrote:Sun-Zu might have the mastery of the art of deception but lacks in imagination which is sure sign of constructive intelligence. Any gain China has will be short term if relation with India remain antagonistic.
Some said When China awakes , World will shake and its true but also true When Mother India awakes, China will Shake and World will know its Fake , like all things Made In China.
Can we learn something from the Ramayana maybe, how they woke Kumbhkarana?!surinder wrote:India will wake
ramana garu,ramana wrote:I think UPA-2 has had its 1962 moment without firing a shot. And we haven't realised it all. People are arguing whether PRC is threat or which Indian political party not in power is to blame.
