New insights have been provided in the new book authored by Gen. VP Malik.
http://www.hindu.com/2006/04/30/stories ... 411000.htm
Indian spies, soldiers cross swords on Kargil http://www.newkerala.com/news2.php?acti ... s&id=49995
V.P Malik's book provokes renewed debate on pre-war intelligence
Unusual decision by the Intelligence Bureau chief to bypass RAW
Pakistani activity misunderstood to represent preparations for local peak-seizing operations
NEW DELHI: India's covert services and its former Chief of Army staff, Gen. Ved Prakash Malik, have crossed swords over the root causes of Pakistan's successful offensive in Kargil in the summer of 1999.
In his newly-released memoirs on the conflict, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory, Gen. Malik has asserted that Pakistan's successful intrusions "reflected a major deficiency in our system of collecting, reporting, collating and assessing intelligence." However, India's covert services have hit back, saying they had provided detailed information on Pakistan's offensive plans 12 months before fighting broke out in Kargil.
Controversy over note
Much of the controversy revolves around a secret June 2, 1998 note, personally signed by the then-Intelligence Bureau Director, Shyamal Datta. Based on intelligence provided by the Intelligence Bureau's Leh station, Mr. Datta's note warned of the training of large numbers of Pakistani irregulars in the Kargil sector, who it said were being prepared for a renewed wave of infiltration after the May 1998 nuclear tests at Pokhran.
While such infiltration was unusual, the second part of Mr. Datta's warning was not. Increased Pakistani military activity, it recorded, had been noticed along the Line of Control in the Kargil sector, notably along posts code-named Chor, Hadi, Saddle, Reshma, Masjid, Dhalan and Langar. All these posts, it is now known, functioned as base camps to feed the intrusion which India was to detect only a year later.
Mr. Datta's unusual decision to personally sign the note indicated the seriousness with which he took this information. To put pressure for rapid action, the Intelligence Bureau bypassed the Research and Analysis Wing and Joint Intelligence Committee. Instead, Mr. Datta directly marked copies to the Prime Minister, Home Minister, Cabinet Secretary, Defence Secretary, and the Director-General of Military Intelligence.
Over the next several months, several other warnings were also issued. In July, Intelligence Bureau informants reported the deployment of M-11 missiles on the Deosai Plains and new mine-laying activities. RAW, for its part, reported that new Pakistani troops â€” the 164 Mortar Regiment, the 8 Northern Light Infantry and 69 Baloch Regiment â€” had been pumped into the area, and that numbers of troops were being given special training.
Even the military's own covert services made similar determinations. In June 1998, the Kargil Brigade Intelligence Team reported that supplies of ammunition were being dumped, and that terrorists had been seen in Skardu, Warcha and Marol, awaiting infiltration through the Kargil sector. Again, in August, the BIT and the Intelligence and Field Security Unit reported the presence of terrorists preparing to cross the LoC.
As late as November 1999, the Intelligence Bureau's Leh station issued warnings that Pakistan was "training Taliban who were undergoing military training as well as learning the Balti and Ladakhi language." These irregulars, the warning stated, were likely to be inducted into the Kargil sector during April 1999. While the Intelligence Bureau did not realise these `Taliban' were in fact Pakistani troops, its assessment was in general correct.
Far from preparing to meet the onslaught, the Srinagar-based 15 Corps is known to have actually withdrawn numbers of troops from the Kargil sector, ignoring warnings generated by commanders in Kargil that there were serious deficiencies in Indian defences. Military strategists misunderstood Pakistani activity to represent preparations for local peak-seizing operations which used to break out along the LoC every summer.
Sources told The Hindu that India's acquisition of bunker-busting missiles had led Pakistan's Force-Commander for the Northern Areas, Lt.Gen. Javed Hasan, to anticipate an attack on positions from where his forces could interdict traffic on the Srinagar-Kargil road. Gen. Hasan was thought to be readying to seize undefended heights on the Indian side of the LoC to in the event of a local Indian offensive.
If we had a CDS, Kargil war could have been less damaging: Rasgotra http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/arti ... 508724.cms
New Delhi, April 27: If India had a Chief of Defence Staffs, the Kargil war could have been "shorter" and "less damaging", said former Foreign Secretary M K Rasgotra here today.
"If we had a CDS, even if one of the chiefs was out the war, the war would have had direction from the word go and the time that was taken in individual consultation, persuading the chiefs of staffs committee, persuading the individual chiefs, and what their role should be, that kind of delay would have been avoided. Probably, the war would have been shorter and less damaging than it actually was," said Rasgotra at the launch of the book "Kargil: From Surprise to Victory" by former Chief of Army Staff V P Malik.
"In a very short paragraph or two, Gen Malik makes a very succinct and a very powerful case for the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff", he said.
Rasgotra said he was referring to a paragraph in the book which reads: "The first thing I (General V P Malik) had to do was to explain the operational situation and its serious political and military implications to my colleagues in the COSC and get them on board to fight the war jointly. I was convinced that the Air Force must make its presence felt by using its power in Kargil." The next paragraph reads: "Admittedly the Army, Navy and Air Force were faced with their respective problems when it came to timely mobilization for war. But these problems could be overcome, if all three services planned, coordinated and implemented a joint military strategy and, more importantly, put across our points of view to the CCS in unison."
'Kargil changed the way Army thinks'
[ Friday, April 28, 2006 12:04:02 pmIANS ]
NEW DELHI: The 1999 Kargil war in Jammu and Kashmir, in which Pakistani intruders occupying the heights were evicted after a bitter battle, changed the way the Indian Army thinks, says the man who commanded the force at the time.
"The Kargil war and events thereafter have highlighted some new trends which have had a marked influence on the conduct of warfare and the structure of the armed forces," Gen. (retd) V.P. Malik writes in his just-released book "Kargil: From Surprise To Victory".
Some of these trends are being driven by technology, others by strategic considerations and concepts.
"The objectives are varied: to avoid escalation of violence, to minimise collateral damage, and to achieve success with minimum losses," Malik says.
This has had a threefold impact on strategies and tactics, the first of which is that the separation among the tactical, operational and strategic levels of warfare is getting blurred.
"While there was always some degree of overlap among these levels, due to the increasingly pervasive influence of IT on warfare, this overlap is increasing," Malik writes.
"Even a small military action along the LoC (Line of Control that divides Jammu and Kashmir between India and Pakistan), or a terrorist act in the hinterland, tends to become issues for consideration and decision making at the strategic level.
"It is a situation wherein a junior military officer is expected to understand political considerations and a political leader is expected to know the tactical and operational factors," Malik maintains.
Thus, fast flow of information, quick assessments and transparency at the three levels is essential as communication gaps can be fatal.
"To a considerable extent, all these aspects became evident during the Kargil war," Malik states.
Second, "there is need for more effective integrated command, control, communications and intelligence systems, apart from faster decision making at tactical, operational and strategic levels of command," he maintains.
Third, there is greater need for politico-military synergy.
"At the military level, the actual fighting during a war has to be conducted in a more integrated manner; hence the need for more integrated capabilities and 'jointness' to obtain optimum results," Malik states.
However, with nuclear weapons here to stay, the author feels, the possibility of an all-out high-intensity regular war will remain low.
"Even if a conventional war does break out, it is likely to be limited in time, scope and space. Such a war would have to be conducted within the framework of carefully calibrated political goals and military moves that permit adequate control over escalation and disengagement," Malik writes.
He says, "I am not one of those who believes that war makes the state and states exist only to make wars. No one in his or her right senses wants a war on their hands, least of all democracies like India and people like me who have studied, participated in and conducted wars.
"But the armed forces have to be prepared for all possible conflict contingencies so long as wars remain an instrument of state policy."