chola wrote:A victory over the PRC will vault us into number two slot of global powers.
A desire to be number 2 is IMO a totally worthless desire - so I disagree with the premise of your post
chola wrote:A victory over the PRC will vault us into number two slot of global powers.
TKiran wrote:NDA 1 did a lot of damage by declaring that Tibet is China. NDA2 did a lot of damage by increasing trade with China 3 times in 2.5years.
TKiran wrote: NDA 1 did a lot of damage by declaring that Tibet is China
putnanja wrote:India is not reiterating the One-China policy for last 3-4 years (from UPA-II time) in joint statements till China reciprocates on One-India including J&K etc.
Austin wrote:putnanja wrote:India is not reiterating the One-China policy for last 3-4 years (from UPA-II time) in joint statements till China reciprocates on One-India including J&K etc.
We dont offically consider Taiwan and Tibet to be disputed but part of China right ?
The only issue is with AP ?
New Delhi’s reaction was uncharacteristically swift and punitive, suspending all forms of bilateral military ties and joint exercises. When Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited New Delhi in December 2010, for the first time India refused to acknowledge the One-China policy in a joint statement with China. Beijing, New Delhi signaled, would have to recognize Indian sovereignty over Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh if it wanted India’s consent on the One-China policy. “The ball is in their court. There is no doubt about that,” explained Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao at the time.
Joint statements in the years to follow continued to omit the One-China policy, a position adopted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi when he assumed office in 2014. “For India to agree on a one-China policy, China should reaffirm a one-India policy,” External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj declared before Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first trip to New Delhi in September 2014. “When they raised the issue of Tibet and Taiwan with us, we shared their sensitivities.… They should understand and appreciate our sensitivities regarding Arunachal Pradesh.”
It’s notable, then, that beyond its broad refusal to endorse the One-China policy, New Delhi has given no indication that it plans to walk back its repeated reaffirmations of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet (much less Taiwan). On the other hand, Prime Minister Modi has adopted several initiatives short of that threshold to signal a more defiant posture on Tibet and the border dispute. Early in his tenure, for instance, Modi fast-tracked military and civilian infrastructure upgrades along the disputed Sino-Indian border, where Beijing has enjoyed a large and widening advantage.
A victory over the PRC will vault us into number two slot of global powers. My heart quickens at the thought!
BR can help by starting a grass root campaign to fight the PRC.
I think Pakistan has no hope, but China is a very different animal, I don't think we have the infrastructure or number of weapons to do this: the general should avoid making such statements.
Philip wrote:Once they hit our wonderful roads,sorry,potholes connected by ribbons of tar,and their armour and vehicles breaking down "as per usual" in India,they'll realise the futility of the enterprise and high tail it back to Tibet! They'll have a better chance of getting to India by sea.That is by sending their troops/personnel in batches to Sri Lanka,Gwadar,etc. It is the maritime dimension that is the most worrying with Chinese N-subs now on regular IOR patriols,using Paki ports as bases.
The PLAN's new SSBN variant.Ck the link for more details and pics of the class,etc.
http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news ... se-9609304
China's new secret 'humpback' stealth submarine which carries 12 nukes capable of reaching US mainland
The "Jin" Type 094A rear can carry 12 ballistic missiles hidden in its "hump" rear
How China is building up its naval and shipbuilding capability to rule the waves
A woman walks past a billboard featuring an image of an island in South China Sea on display with Chinese words that read: "South China Sea, our beautiful motherland, we won't let go an inch" in Weifang in east China's Shandong province. AP
by James Kynge, Amy Kazmin and Farhan Bokhari,
Pakistan's Arabian Sea port of Gwadar is perched on the world's energy jugular. Nearby sea lanes carry most of China's oil imports; any disruption could choke the world's second-largest economy.
Owned, financed and built by China, Gwadar occupies a strategic location. Yet Islamabad and Beijing for years denied any military plans for the harbour, insisting it was a purely commercial project. Now the mask is slipping.
"As Gwadar becomes more active as a port, Chinese traffic both commercial and naval will grow to this region," says a senior foreign ministry official in Islamabad. "There are no plans for a permanent Chinese naval base. But the relationship is stretching out to the sea."
Gwadar is part of a bigger ambition, driven by President Xi Jinping, for China to become a maritime superpower. A Financial Times investigation reveals how far Beijing has come in achieving that objective in the past six years.
A Pakistan Navy soldier stands guard while a loaded Chinese ship prepares to depart, at Gwadar port in Pakistan in November 2016. AP
Investments in a vast network of harbours have made China's port operators the world leaders. Its shipping companies carry more cargo than those of any other nation – five of the top 10 container ports in the world are in mainland China with another in Hong Kong. Its coastguard has the largest maritime law enforcement fleet, its navy is the fastest growing among major powers and its fishing armada numbers some 200,000 seagoing vessels.
The emergence of China as a maritime superpower is set to challenge a US command of the seas that has underwritten a crucial element of Pax Americana, the relative period of peace enjoyed in the west since the second world war. As US president-elect Donald Trump prepares to take power, strategic tensions between China and the US are already evident in the South China Sea, where Beijing has pledged to enforce its claim to disputed islands and atolls.
China understands maritime influence in the same way as Alfred Thayer Mahan, the 19th-century American strategist. "Control of the sea," Mahan wrote, "by maritime commerce and naval supremacy, means predominant influence in the world; because, however great the wealth of the land, nothing facilitates the necessary exchanges as does the sea."
Drummed into military service
The Gwadar template, where Beijing used its commercial know-how and financial muscle to secure ownership over a strategic trading base, only to enlist it later into military service, has been used in other key locations.
China's first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, is anchored in the northern port in Qingdao, east China's Shandong Province. AP
In Sri Lanka, Greece and Djibouti, Chinese investment in civilian ports has been followed by deployments or visits of People's Liberation Army Navy vessels and in some cases announcements of longer term military contingencies.
"There is an inherent duality in the facilities that China is establishing in foreign ports, which are ostensibly commercial but quickly upgradeable to carry out essential military missions," says Abhijit Singh, from the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.
Data compiled or commissioned by the FT from third-party sources show the extent of China's dominance in most maritime domains. Beijing's shipping lines deliver more containers than those from any other country, according to data from Drewry, the shipping consultancy. The five big Chinese carriers together controlled 18 per cent of all container shipping handled by the world's top 20 companies in 2015.
In terms of container ports, China already rules the waves. Nearly two-thirds of the world's top 50 had some degree of Chinese investment by 2015, up from about one-fifth in 2010, according to FT research. And those ports handled 67 per cent of global container volumes, up from 41 per cent in 2010, according to Lloyd's List Intelligence, the maritime and trade data specialists. The dominance is reduced but still emphatic if only containers directly handled by Chinese port operators are measured. Of the top 10 port operators, Chinese companies handled 39 per cent of all volumes, almost double the second largest nation, according to Drewry.
A Chinese navy submarine. Guang Niu
It is not only the world's biggest ports that have attracted Chinese investments. Key strategic locations such as Djibouti or Hambantota in Sri Lanka and proposed ports on the Atlantic Ocean islands of São Tomé and Principe – have also drawn investments or promises of Chinese port construction.
The total spend is difficult to calculate because of sketchy disclosure. But since 2010, Chinese and Hong Kong companies have completed or announced deals involving at least 40 ports worth a total of about $US45.6 billion, according to a study by Sam Beatson and Jim Coke at the Lau China Institute, King's College London, in co-operation with the FT.
Rounding out a picture of China's merchant navy dominance is the country's fishing fleet, which is by far the largest in the world, according to Michael McDevitt, a former rear admiral in the US navy and a senior fellow at CNA Strategic Studies, a US think-tank.
"[China's] maritime power equation includes a large and effective coastguard, a world-class merchant marine and fishing fleet, a globally recognised shipbuilding capacity and an ability to harvest or extract maritime resources, especially fish," he wrote.
China's behaviour in the South China Sea is aggressive. Bloomberg
For thousands of years, Chinese emperors focused on defending the middle kingdom against land-based invasions. But in 2015 an official white paper on military strategy decreed a big shift that offers a glimpse of China's changing objectives. "The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests," it said.
Analysts say China's strategy is aimed primarily at denying US aircraft carrier battle groups access to a string of archipelagos from Russia's peninsula of Kamchatka to the Malay Peninsula, a natural maritime barrier called the "first island chain" within which China identifies its strategic sphere of influence.
Another focus is a string of artificial islands that Beijing has created out of coral reefs and rocks to help reinforce its claim to most of the South China Sea, putting it on a collision course with its neighbours as well as the US. The artificial islands have been equipped with landing strips and a US think-tank recently said, after analysis of satellite images, that Beijing appeared to have installed anti-aircraft guns, anti-missile systems and radar facilities.
Although Beijing plays down such sweeping strategic objectives, the drive to step up naval security is regularly emphasised in official Chinese circles.
A merging of agendas
The political justification often used for port investments is "One Belt One Road", a grand design advocated by Mr Xi to revive the ancient Silk Road trading routes and boost commerce in more than 60 countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe. Gwadar port, for example, is described as the core element in a $54bn China-Pakistan economic corridor. At its inception, Chinese involvement of the port was limited to financing and construction but in 2015 Islamabad handed ownership to the state-owned China Overseas Port Holding Company on a lease until 2059.
To the west of Gwadar at Djibouti – on the Horn of Africa's maritime chokepoint – a similar story has unfolded. China's initial embrace seemed purely commercial, with the state-owned China Merchants Group taking a stake in the port's container terminal in 2012, paving the way for a $US9 billion investment.
But in 2016, Beijing acknowledged that its plans for Djibouti had an additional dimension - the construction of the country's
first overseas naval base, ensuring China's military presence in the region until at least 2026.
In Greece too, the 2015 acquisition of a $US420 million controlling stake in Piraeus, one of Europe's largest ports, signalled a merging of commercial and strategic agendas. At the time Chinese officials recalled how Beijing was embarrassed in 2011 when it needed to evacuate 36,000 Chinese workers from Libya as violence broke out, forcing it at short notice to enlist the help of Greek merchant ships for rescue missions.
"If that was to happen again," says a Chinese official. "We would be much better prepared. We could use the Chinese navy and take the evacuees to our own port at Piraeus."
Read more: http://www.afr.com/news/world/asia/how- ... z4VvdNS6Oh
UlanBatori wrote:OTOH, being an idiot jingo in reality, I do believe that China **CAN** lose a new war with India in a massive disaster. The scenario for a war is more like 1962: Chinese insecurity because Tibet and Xinjiang look like the pine tree in my backyard where I have already made 2 deep cuts, but am not quite sure which way it will fall, or whether my saw will get caught as it buckles. A logical result of systematic (and FASTER!!!) infrastructure improvement on the Indian side would be some sort of force parity. China is still looking at, what? 1000 km of logistics transit through hostile Northern Arunachal (aka Tibet) and Northern Ladakh aka Xinjiang. If the locals start inflating vacuum bulbs on a more organized basis in both N.A. and N.L., the logistics trail becomes unstable and unsustainable. The divisions on the border must then depend on aerial supply - or invade downhill to more sustainable climes and localities. Or die. That would trigger an invasion, I think.
In which case, a massive air defense plus a massive air bombardment of the Chinese transports, airfields and supply lines would cause takleef. If coordinated with a cutoff of the Karakoram Hwy, a wipeout of the seaport in the Pakistani Ocean, letting loose a few Indus dams, and a swift takeover of the chinese bases in Myanmar before they take over the Andamans. China will presumably open the Brahmaputra dams and cause a disaster in the NE.
A stable Indian border would then have to be established north of Manasarovar, but will take a truly massive force to defend. So, first, massive expansion of defence manufacturing to enable sustaining a war beyond 1 week. Until then, zzzzzzzzzzz
Philip wrote:We have allowed the Chinese to now encircle us in the IOR itself,using Hambantotat in SL,Gawdar in Pak,with Chinese subs sold to BDesh-as if we couldn't have provided them with older Ru KIlos for a start,or even our Foxtrots earlier,and now PLAN sub visits to Malaysia,which will become regular visits according to this PRC mouthpiece.
Gagan wrote:This is probably the Cheeni equivalent of some vernacular news media, that deals with jingoism and nationalism and is directed towards goat hearding and dog loving chinese rural folk.
Does it deserve a BRF page for it?
pankajs wrote:TKiran wrote:NDA 1 did a lot of damage by declaring that Tibet is China. NDA2 did a lot of damage by increasing trade with China 3 times in 2.5years.
I am very curious about this last claim. Would be great if you could link us up to some data.
Also, you assertion is not clear and can be read in multiple ways. Which one of the below is the proper reading?
1. Total (2 way) trade increase by 3 times.
2. Chinese exports to India increase by 3 times.
3. India's trade deficit with China increase by 3 times.
Gagan wrote:This is probably the Cheeni equivalent of some vernacular news media, that deals with jingoism and nationalism and is directed towards goat hearding and dog loving chinese rural folk.
Does it deserve a BRF page for it?
Myanmar: The Disobedient Generals Anger China
January 13, 2017: In the north neighboring Bangladesh has at least persuaded the Burmese government to begin (this month) high-level talks about their border control problems. Burma is the cause of this mess by not controlling ethnic violence up there that has sent over half a million Burmese fleeing, mostly to Bangladesh. In response Bangladesh has already reinforced border security to try and stem the illegal migration. Bangladesh wants Burma to take back some or all of the more than 400,000 Burmese Rohingya Moslems who have fled across the border, usually as illegal migrants, since 2011. The situation got worse in late 2016 and over 40,000 Burmese Moslems have fled to Bangladesh since then. Bangladesh borders Burma’s Rakhine State which contains most of the Burmese Rohingya Burma insists the Rohingya are Bangladeshis who are in Burma illegally. Burma also fears the Rohingya will be a source of Islamic terrorists. While Bangladesh has arrested a few Pakistan trained Rohingya Islamic terrorists the Rohingya have largely avoided Islamic terrorism. But in Burma the Rohingya, who trace their origin to Bangladesh, have suffered increased persecution in Burma since the 1980s, and especially since the 2011 elections that restored democracy and got lot of anti-Moslem Buddhist nationalists elected. Most Rohingyas are Bengalis, or people from Bengal (now Bangladesh) who began migrating to Burma during the 19th century. At that time the British colonial government ran Bangladesh and Burma, and allowed this movement, even though the Buddhist Burmese opposed it. Britain recognized the problem too late, and the Bengali Moslems were still in Burma when Britain gave up its South Asian colonies after World War II (1939-45). Any kind of peace deal with the Rohingya is unlikely as far as most Burmese are concerned. There is growing popular anger among Burmese towards Moslems in general and the Rohingya in particular. This is fed by the continuing reports of Islamic terrorism word-wide and especially in the region (Thailand, India, Bangladesh and China).
Not everyone in Burma is convinced that the Rohingya are any kind of threat, Islamic or otherwise and the no one has not produced much proof yet. Many Buddhist and Christian Burmese oppose the treatment of the Rohingya and have been held protests in major cities against the decision to deny the Rohingya citizenship and classify them as Bengalis. But this is a minority attitude as most of the voters will not back any pro-Rohingya moves.
Despite that senior government officials called for a proper investigation to find out exactly what is happening up there especially since the army bans journalists from the conflict area. One thing most Burmese can agree on is that the army can’t be trusted to give an accurate account of anything going on in the north. The military has long seen the tribal areas, mainly in the north and along the eastern borders, to be their territory and to do what they want. That usually involves illegal activities, most of them involved with making money using corrupt practices. This has caused more problems with the locals (mostly non-ethnic Burmese tribes) and China.
While a lesser number of Burmese refugees are fleeing to China the Chinese government is getting angry and no longer waiting for the Burmese government to act. For the last month Chinese soldiers and police have been either stopping Burmese refugees at the border or finding them inside China and forcing them to leave. China complains that the latest outbreak of tribal rebel violence in Shan and Kachin States had driven over 30,000 Burmese into China and interfered with trade and movement across the border.
China wants the Burmese government to do something about it or face reduced Chinese investment. That threat has largely been ignored (or promises made and not kept) so now China is going to act without regard to Burmese promises or wishes. This means forcing refugees to return to areas where Burmese troops frequently fire on civilians or the refugee camps built inside Burma near the Chinese border. Burma can’t really afford bad relations with China, mainly because China has become a (if not the) major source of foreign investment. The Chinese want to continue doing business in Burma, but it has to be safe for those investments as well as the Chinese and Burmese working for Chinese firms in Burma. The problem is that the government has still not been able to gain control of the military, which has had a free hand in the tribal areas (especially Shan and Kachin) for over half a century. The Burmese government is having more success negotiating peace deals with the tribes but these deals often fail because the Burmese military won’t cooperate.
January 8, 2017: In the north (Kachin state) troops spent several hours fighting the KIA (Kachin Independence Army) tribal rebels before the KIA retreated from four outposts. There were at least ten dead, most of them KIA, and many more wounded. The army has been fighting the KIA again for nearly a year. A new Burmese president, backed by the new parliament, was expected to change that eventually but so far the army is misbehaving with impunity as it always has. Since early 2016 this violence has been concentrated in the northern states of Kachin and Shan. Tribal rebels have been again violently resisting advancing soldiers but the army keeps the media out so news of what is actually going on there takes weeks to get out. The army says it is defending itself against tribal aggression and by the time the facts get out (if they do at all) it is old news and thus no news. The troops are using their usual tactics of attacking (with gunfire, air strikes and artillery) villages believed to be pro-rebel (or at least anti-army). Troops are apparently under orders to burn the bodies of any civilians found in the villages (along with burning everything down). The fighting here is with tribal rebel groups that the military won’t negotiate with for various reasons.
December 27, 2016: In the north (Kachin state) troops attacked several KIA (Kachin Independence Army) tribal rebel outposts and took them before the end of the day.
December 26, 2016: In the north (Shan State) fighting between soldiers and TNLA (Tang National Liberation Army) left three civilians dead and eight wounded. Since late November 2106 renewed fighting with the “northern alliance” of MNDAA (Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army), TNLA, KIA and AA (Arakan Army) has left over a hundred dead, about half of them security forces (including some pro-government tribal militiamen) and civilians. Despite agreements for these rebel groups to join the current peace talks (which resume in February 2017), the rebel tribes all have serious territorial and economic disputes with the army. In Shan state, for example, the army and tribes are fighting over lucrative coal mining operations. In Kachin state the army violence is connected with the illegal gold mining and the tribal fear that the army cannot be trusted to observe the terms of any peace deal. Along the west coast (Arakan and Chin states) it’s about the army effort to control (tax) illegal logging by tribesmen. The tribes have been mistreated by the military for so long it is difficult to generate a lot of trust for a new peace agreement.
December 17, 2016: In the north (Kachin state) troops finally captured a major KIA base (Gidon) after four months of effort (mainly against roadblocks and outposts).
December 16, 2016: In the north (Shan State) tribal rebels (mainly KIA and TNLA) battled soldiers in several places over the last few days. There appear to have been over twenty dead and wounded. This fighting is not appreciated in nearby China, where civilians fleeing the violence illegally cross the border.
December 14, 2016: China again warned Burma to do something about the fighting along the border. This has been particularly intense since late 2016 in Shan State. There fighting between rebellious tribes and the Burmese army has increasingly seen stray bullets and mortar shells land on Chinese territory. In November a Chinese citizen inside China was wounded by some of the gunfire. China told Burma to restore order to the border which has been unruly for centuries. To emphasize the point China put army units near the Burma border on high alert and publicized the order. Aside from the violence China is unhappy with how all this violent interferes with trade moving across the border in both directions.
December 13, 2016: In the north (Kachin State) four more jade miners died in work related landslides. Since late 2015 (when a landslide killed over 200 miners) the government has threatened to suspend jade mining until acceptable environmental and safety procedures could be agreed on and implemented. Some work has been done on that but these new rules did not apply to the freelance jade miners who work illegally and are taking advantage of any mining bans to keep working. All the recent jade miner fatalities have been freelancers, usually inexperienced scavengers working in unstable areas that have already been scoured by professionals for nearly all the jade that was there. The main reason the government wants to reduce miner deaths is to halt all the bad publicity, which has forced the government to at least pretend to do something about what had been going on illegally in the north for decades. Efforts to enforce existing laws banning such activities and more forceful efforts to curb illegal jade mining did not work. Until now government threats caused unease among many of those involved in the largely illegal jade industry but had not slowed down production much. If anything jade mining has increased during 2106 with some 300,000 workers, mostly manual laborers (and often illegal migrants) working in a 700 square kilometer area that, from the air, looks like a wasteland with dozens of hills leveled and the debris left in unstable heaps that cause most of the landslides. This was believed to be a good time for the government to try and reform the jade business. Demand and prices are way down in China and the jade producers have to increase production to make any money at all. That means the jade mining is more visible from the air (which the government controls) and space (where even commercial satellite photos show the jade operations). The tribes involved in the jade trade would normally fight hard to oppose any government crackdown but because many of the people killed in the jade mining incidents are from the north there is less justifications for the tribal militias to get involved. Most jade mining activity is 650 kilometers north of the Burmese capital. The fatal landslides occur because the jade mining often involves removing most of the vegetation on a hillside. With the trees and shrubs gone there is nothing to hold soil together when there are heavy rains. All this has brought a lot of unwanted publicity to the jade trade. Burma is the main source of jade on the planet and is a $30 billion a year operation in Burma. Yet only about one percent of that is taxed and half of the jade is found by illegal mining operations and is quietly sold to Chinese traders. Most of the illegal jade trade is controlled by Burmese military officers who have connections inside China. The rest is controlled by tribal rebels, mainly the Wa of the UWSA (United Wa State Army). Most of the jade is in the northern tribal territories and the army is constantly fighting with tribal rebels who are seeking to make some money in the jade producing areas. The corrupt Burmese generals and businessmen and their Chinese counterparts are not eager to give up the jade profits but they are now in a weak position. A lot of the current fighting in Kachin State is a continuation of this decades old “Jade War.” Local tribes have long complained that all the illegal jade and gold mining ruins many water supplies (streams and lakes) but since outsiders (military and tribal warlords) dominate and protect the illegal mining, no one cares about some bad water except a few locals. But that has changed since 2011 because all the publicity has forced the Chinese government to at least recognize that the problem exists, mainly because of Chinese demand for jade and Chinese providing the cash and access to Chinese made earth moving equipment and corrupt border guards who let the illegal cash and equipment into Burma and the valuable (and untaxed on either side of the border) jade out. The Chinese are now willing to help crack down on the jade and other smuggling because it involves items popular with many corrupt Chinese officials.
Currently known as:
The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs (1983 - current)
Formerly known as
Lo Spettatore Internazionale (1966 - 1982)
Philip wrote:It is going to be v.interesting to see what happens now to the Indo-Viet mil relationship after the just concluded talks in Beijing where the two nations have resolved to work together to establish a peaceful status in the CS.china is doing everything to sabotage the growing Indo-Viet relationship which India cannot allow to fail. The PRC always speak with a forked tongue and the Viets know that well from history.They too ned to keep all their options open.
shiv wrote:sudeepj wrote:We should neither shiver, nor die laughing but take Chinese threats seriously. My personal favorite is to pull a Paki on the Chinese and deploy nuclear armed Prahaars with Division commanders in the NE. If the Chinese think they can annihilate a division, they should be prepared to face the prospect of tactical nukes.
A second idea is mahabums, but doing that will have serious repercussions and must be done in consultation with the west.
One of the problems of perception that I see (on BRF) is this constant refrain of Chinese ability to do things to us. Why are we obsessed with the idea that we will always be on the defensive in a border war. As I see it we could well end up grabbing chunks of Tibet.
The point I am making is that our inherent Indian need to dhoti shiver makes us rule out any Indian gain or advance whatsoever. The Chinese do not do that. For all their bluster they know damn well that they could take a licking in a border war and if they do it is the escalation that causes problems. Can they back down from a war they start and lose face or escalate and face Agony?
What will the Chinese do if we kick their butt and grabs huge chunks of Tibet? Dick waving will not cut it.
TSJones wrote:all of this is red dawn fantasy.
a border area? yeah, maybe.
but new delhi?
give me a break.....
Here is a thread where BRFites can boast, laugh or cry out in fear and I am not going to fight with them for sharing their views on this latest Chinese threat. Trashy or not that channel has access to a lot of military footage
venug wrote:Many are laughing:
China claimed its troops can reach New Delhi in 48 hours and everyone cracked the same joke
the Chinese soldier is still vastly under equipped compared to its western counterpart.
Most Chinese soldiers are still issued WWII era steel helmet.
Chinese command see’s Chinese soldiers as cannon fodder. They are designed to not think for themselves and adapt to situations. Soldiers and officers who break that mold are considered political liabilities. As a matter of fact the average PLA soldiers spends and upwards of 30–50% of their training doing something called “Party Training” essentially political brainwashing to support the communist party of China.
The Chinese military is all about top down control and without a commanding officer essentially Chinese units become completely aimless.
a well placed sniper bullet to the commanding officer or damage to one of the radios in the company will render the entire force useless
It’s generals and leaders are often political appointees and not career soldiers and corruption is rife in their ranks.
In history time and time again ill equipped highly motivated and trained soldier will always beat poorly trained, poorly motivated soldiers with fancy gadgets. (Let’s not even begin to talk about how corruption has seriously handicapped the quality of China’s domestic arms industry).
Experts and retired army officers were quick to rubbish this as illogical rhetoric, and questioned the logistics of the provocative claim. The ill-thought-out remark shows the level of understanding of the people who’ve made it, says retired colonel Rohit Agarwal. Speaking to The Quint, he breaks the comment down and analyses its impracticality. For motorised troops to infiltrate the mountainous terrain of the north-eastern border of India and advance further inside is not possible, he says.
Users browsing this forum: ranjbe and 74 guests