Strategic leadership for the future of India - II

[ramana]

A study of the long years of Indian history: North or South, ancient or medieval or modern periods shows that its not the rulers but the busniess class that runs things. If the business class does not have stability to make money there is chaos. The rulers are titular figureheads and get name and recogniton when the classes prosper. So to study India history thru Western pradigms leads to errors of interpretation.

Grover Clevland said " Business of America is business!"

However for India "history is business!"

When leaders/rulerrs deviate from this it leads to disasters.

[ramana]

Link:
http://www.newsinsight.net/archivedebat ... recno=2084

History-maker In his eighty-seventh year, A.B.Vajpayee's greatness grows, says N.V.Subramanian.

Los Angeles, 29 December 2010: On the occasion of A.B.Vajpayee's eight-seventh birthday, two interesting questions pose themselves. Why is Vajpayee considered a successful prime minister although he never saw a fourth term? And why is he in a class of his own that his immediate successor, Manmohan Singh, can never hope to attain?

Vajpayee's success as a prime minister is a bit of an oddity in Indian politics. He was not only the only non-Congress prime minister to complete his term, but he did so despite being a sort of (poetic) loner in his own party, the BJP. Vajpayee had more friends outside the BJP than within it, and he never saw eye-to-eye with the BJP's parent organization, the RSS.

Part of the credit for Vajpayee becoming PM should go to L.K.Advani, who proposed his name for the PMO before his own. It is also true that he later came to regret his magnanimity, because public sympathy attached to Vajpayee when his first attempt at prime ministership failed after thirteen days. When later, Vajpayee's thirteen-month government collapsed after J.Jayalalithaa pulled out, he had generated enough of a wave to come back a third time. This wave is significant because it came about without a tidal event such as an assassination, a huge corruption scandal-triggered negative vote, etc.

A fourth term eluded Vajpayee for a complex set of reasons but they cannot take away from his success as prime minister. It is a feat that he could deliver despite, by the early phase of his third and only full term, facing nasty opposition from Advani, his previous backer, with the support of the RSS. People forget that Advani put RSS pressure on Vajpayee to make him deputy PM. The Loh-Vikas Purush controversy set off by Advani's minions brutally exposed Advani's desperate prime-ministerial ambitions.

But the undercurrent of public sympathy that carried Vajpayee to the PMO transformed into the NDA's overall support for him, which was discussed in an earlier piece (Commentary, "Drift & despair," 24 December 2010) by this writer. There is nothing to suggest that Vajpayee used the NDA against the BJP. He was not a schemer for personal gains. But unintentionally, he built such a constituency for himself with the NDA, with his integrity, decency, humility and moderation, that the BJP was powerless to depose him, if it ever came to that.

Another aspect of Vajpayee's success, which will head to the second question contained in the opening paragraph related to Manmohan Singh, concerned his extraordinary ability sustainably to cohere and anchor a coalition government for the first time in India. He had intimate knowledge of the failures of three Janata and two Third-Front governments in addition to his own inability to put together two lasting BJP-lead coalition administrations before he hit success with the NDA a third time.

Prior to Vajpayee's unique NDA success, the failures particularly of two non-Congress Third-Front governments had given a TINA advantage to the Congress party, which consequently made it arrogant and imperious and put the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty in false indispensible light. The sun has still to set on the dynasty, but by Vajpayee and the NDA's success, the Congress so-called high command slightly was humbled to accept the necessity of a UPA. But Vajpayee's contribution was greater. Quite outside the Congress-non-Congress grid, he brought coherence and stability to a coalition government for the first time in India. He gave an ineluctable alternative to non-dynastic politics.

Indeed, in a significant way, Vajpayee and his close friend, the late P.V.Narasimha Rao, succeeded in their separate but organically-linked efforts to keep India united. Narasimha Rao kept India territorially integrated in the deeply unsettling immediate post-Cold War period when the Soviet Union disintegrated and similar designs were advanced on India. On the other hand, by giving considerable tensile strength to coalition politics via the example of the NDA, Vajpayee brought a degree of unity to divisive Indian political crosscurrents, thereby firming the country's federal foundations.

Given Vajpayee's tremendous successes overcoming great odds, it is powerfully pathetic to see Manmohan Singh go down despite some advantages. Granted that the length and life of Manmohan Singh's prime-ministership shamefully has always been determined by the pace of Rahul Gandhi's learning for and grasp of that job. But his inherent timidity has denied Manmohan Singh the capacity to maximize on his limited opportunities. In an earlier commentary, this writer had alluded to a "Vajpayee phase" enjoyed as well by Manmohan Singh, when both men won public sympathy because of internal party opposition to them. But there was (and is) a qualitative difference in the internal party opposition faced by both Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh, which (has) produced vastly different results.

The quality of Vajpayee's opposition has been described in the previous paragraphs. For himself, Manmohan Singh faced not so much opposition as scorn- and derision-laced apathy to his prime-ministership from within his party, because he had been nominated to that job by the empress of the Congress, Sonia Gandhi. One could argue that Advani was somewhat in Sonia's position when he proposed Vajpayee for prime-ministership, because the BJP was with him. But equally, Advani lost the prime-ministerial race once Vajpayee got the job. Try as he might, Advani could not wrest it.

But in Manmohan Singh's case, it is different. Sonia Gandhi can (hurtful as this is to write) drive him out of the PMO whenever she chooses. She conditionally made Manmohan Singh PM, the condition being that Rahul Gandhi would succeed him whenever he chose. Being utterly loyal to the Nehru-Gandhi family, and without a political base of his own, Manmohan Singh kept to his allotted parish. But Vajpayee has been an outstandingly independent politician and parliamentary leader, with many personal political and Lok Sabha victories to his credit. After Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi and possibly Rajiv Gandhi (on account of his mother's assassination), Vajpayee very likely is the most nationally-renowned former prime minister.

In truth, there is very little to compare between Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh, although both are coalition prime ministers. By the strength of his personality, Vajpayee wrought and moulded the coalitional NDA. Manmohan Singh, for his part, was merely asked to lead the UPA government by Sonia Gandhi. To be sure, it was an advance in coalitional experimentation (even if unintended) to have a technocrat head a government, but it has proved an unqualified disaster.

The more you evaluate the multiple dimensions of Vajpayee's prime-ministership, the deeper you are impressed by the multifarious brilliance of it. There is the downside of Gujarat certainly. But Nehru is ranked among great prime ministers despite the Jammu and Kashmir UN blunder and the nineteen sixty-two debacle (his much-reviled embrace of mixed economy suited the times) while the Emergency and Operation Bluestar cannot detract from the pugnacity of Indira Gandhi's leadership. History promises to be enviably friendly and sumptuously generous to A.B.Vajpayee, and nobody should grudge that.

N.V.Subramanian is Editor, www.NewsInsight.net, and writes internationally on strategic affairs. He has authored two novels, University of Love (Writers Workshop, Calcutta) and Courtesan of Storms (Har-Anand, Delhi). Email: [email protected].

[Bharath.Subramanyam]

Some news from Political circuits of Delhi:

http://www.india-forum.com/forums/index ... ntry110263

http://www.india-forum.com/forums/index ... ntry110263

[Vivek Raghuvanshi]

I advocate that Dr Karan Singh should be the Future President of India

http://www.karansingh.com/index.php?action=chronology

[ramana]

Op-Ed inPioneer, 17 Jan 2011:

So, is a sense of regret sinking in?January 17, 2011 10:28:00 PM

Mihir Bholey

Besieged and under attack from Taliban-inspired radical Islamists, the state of Pakistan is on the verge of imploding. Muslims are no longer secure in the homeland for the sub-continent’s Muslims that Jinnah extracted in 1947

Reacting to the killing of Salman Taseer, a peeved Pakistani reader Aasma Farhad wrote in Dawn that the founder of Pakistan Mohammed Ali Jinnah must have been turning in his grave learning that it is safer to be a modern and enlightened Muslim citizen in India today, than in Pakistan. The comment could be interpreted in two ways: As the genuine frustration of a helpless Pakistani citizen or as an unintended tribute paid to India’s democracy and liberal social ethos. But in either case, it sends out a clear message that to an average Pakistani the land of kafirs (read Hindus) now seems a more secure place for Muslims as compared to their utopian ‘land of the pure’ — Pakistan.

Surely, the message of peace and love of Islamic brotherhood is lost in Pakistan and better preserved and nurtured in predominantly Hindu, yet secular, India. But how long will Indians be able to confidently repudiate the ‘two-nation’ theory of Mohammed Ali Jinnah as an ill-conceived notion eventually responsible for the rise of radical Islam in the Indian sub-continent is not certain. The kind of secular credentials that the political class in India is trying to present for obvious competitive political advantage may soon disappoint Pakistani citizens like Aasma and surely leave many Indian Muslims totally disenchanted.

Mr Rajmohan Gandhi, the grandson of Mahatma Gandhi and a social thinker of high intellectual calibre, remarked recently, while giving a lecture on ‘India as a World Power: Potential and Realities’, that Islam had not been the cause of major conflicts in the world. No sensible person can controvert what Mr Gandhi believes. Sure, it will be rather imprudent to blame a particular religion for all global and regional strifes because such conflicts are the outcome of muddled political, economic, social and cultural complexities. Therefore, creating a global stereotype of mistrust and hatred for Islam will be counter-productive. Nevertheless, can the process of negative stereotyping be prevented in the wake of such violent incidents followed by widespread social support to religious fanatics and comparatively feeble voices of condemnation? This is a question the civil society of Pakistan and India have to seriously ponder upon.

But what is strange is that instead of waking up to the grave reality in Pakistan a section of India’s political class is busy obfuscating the national mindset with the idea of ‘saffron terror’, which is nothing more than an illusory devil parallel to the terror outfits of the radical Islamic tanzeems. Are they trying to vindicate the cult of violence adopted by such fanatics, who hope to teach kafir India a lesson for its so-called ill-treatment of fellow Muslims? Thanks to our self-proclaimed secular breed, Pakistan has put India into a diplomatic tight spot by asking for details of the Samjhauta Express blast. The secular breed has branded it as the handiwork of the hitherto unheard of ‘saffron terror’. What is not clear is their intention: Are they trying to win some cheap brownie points from across the border or strengthen India’s secular image?

There is no doubt that Indian secularism of late has become synonymous with majority bashing. Such a communal portrayal of an act of crime, which is yet to be ascertained conclusively under the due process of law, has come as a shot in the arm of fundamentalists. If such unfounded hasty stereotyping of the majority population becomes part of the national politics, it will be difficult for India to convince the world that the Union Government does not oppress Muslims in Kashmir Valley. Sure, fishing in troubled waters may yield political mileage to some but it will be disastrous for our national interest and international image.

Jinnah’s insistence on the partition of India based on the ‘two-nation theory’ by default implied that the remaining part of India is a ‘Hindu’ India. However, our policy-makers included the term ‘secular’ in the Preamble of the Constitution by the 42nd Amendment in 1976 and our democracy gladly accepted it. In sharp contrast, Pakistan, under General Zia-ul-Haq, announced in 1978 that Pakistani law would be based on Nizam-e-Mustafa and thus the process of Islamisation of Pakistan was set into motion. Gen Zia apparently was trying to reinvent the identity of Pakistani Muslims as against Indian Muslims. He believed the Indian version of Islam had evolved under the moderate social ethos of a predominantly Hindu society. His deliberate attempt to implant the Arabian version of Islam in Pakistan has subsequently influenced a cross-section of the society to sympathise with radical Islam, which is a threat to both India and Pakistan.

Secularism is fundamental to modern democracy. But how long can it survive in India if bigotry of the extreme kind flourishes in neighbouring Pakistan and short-sighted opportunism becomes the political culture back home? Secularists crying foul over unfounded allegations of ‘saffron terror’ in India prefer to remain silent over the brutal killing of a secular person across the border who dared to oppose the heinous blasphemy law. None of them has raised the issue that in a globalised world, secularism has to be a world order and not an exception. The so-called secularists must understand that secularism needs to maintain a delicate balance between the majority and minority sentiments in a religiously diverse society.

[ramana]

Kalam saab in his Field Marsahl Cariappa lecture in October 2010

"I am indeed delighted to deliver the Field Marshal KM Cariappa Memorial Lecture as part of the celebration of Infantry Day. My greetings to all of you friends. I like the motto of infantry “The ultimate”, I have witnessed how the infantry’s are ultimate in the army formations. What tribute we can give to a great son of India, who transformed himself from infantry soldier to the field Marshal, the only one tribute all of us can give it to Field Marshal KM Cariappa, the vision of a “Soldier as a system”, making more powerful in handling sophisticated arms, communication equipments and life support system. Next-generation infantry Small Arms Systems with self-protection, surveillance & communication system Weighing 25 kgs. My best wishes to all of you on the “Infantry Day”.

Friends, Field Marshal KM Cariappa, the first Chief of Army Staff in Indian Armed Forces had a distinguished military career spanning over three decades. He is among the only two Indian Army Officers to hold the highest army rank as Field Marshal. When I am here with you all at this lecture, I am reminded of the words of Field Marshal Cariappa “in modern warfare, a large Army is not sufficient, it needs industrial potential behind it. If Army is the first line of defence, industry is the second”. This visionary thought, expressed about four decades ago, highlights the dynamic amalgamation of national development and national defence and the role of the Armed Forces in scenarios of peace and war. When I am here with all of you, I would like to express my thoughts about this topic “Perspectives of Future warfare and Preparedness of Defence services”.

First let me discuss about future warfare and how it is increasingly technology centric.

Future Warfare – Technology Centric

Friends, the challenge is to equip ourselves to combat the fast paced technology driven warfare. The whole war environment will be a network centric warfare and it could be electronically controlled combined with space encounters, deep sea encounters, and ballistic missiles encounters. The winner of future warfare will be the Armed Force which can visualize the strength of the enemy, not based on the previous wars but based on the current capabilities, and technological advancements in the global scenario.

Our officers serving in Armed Forces will have to get trained in virtual reality based simulated warfronts of all the terrains and all extreme conditions of warfare. Walk through during a space attack, chemical attack; nuclear attack and electronic encounters need to be visualized and proper counter measures, with decision making process, need to be propounded. The future battle field would require a synergized team work with joint services operation and use of land, aerospace and ocean as important war theatres. Future soldiers will be knowledge workers.

Above all, winners will be soldiers in the frontlines carrying maximum payload of weapon, life support systems and communication kits with minimum weight. We should remember that every gram of weight saving of soldier’s payload will add to the physiological and psychological capability of the soldier. Electronic Warfare – Computers with intelligent software will fight in the place of many strategic systems. They will be more powerful– which will travel at the speed of light - to destroy the economic capability of countries exceeding the power of nuclear weapons. As a leader in national defence, may I request you to develop all round capabilities in your assignments so that you can emerge victorious in all your missions.

Dear friends, remember, even at the end of victorious wars, the real situation is, countries lose certain territories because of underlying circumstances and inadequacies in strategic thinking. I have visited almost all the border areas wherever our Army units and Brigades are defending the borders. When I was addressing one of the Army formations, there was a large number of young officers from all the units of Armed Forces near by. There I asked a question to the young officers, what you would like to be remembered for? There was pin –drop silence. One newly joined young officer lifted his hand and said, Sir, I would like to be remembered as a soldier who got back the land lost during various wars. There was indeed a genuine cheer of all the members presents. I felt proud of being a part of such a great Army with such visionary officers.

A Nuclear war scene

Since I am in the midst of Defence experts, I would like to present a hypothetical scene of nuclear war and the typical leadership needed for combating such a war situation.

a) India as a nuclear weapon state has stated policy of “no first use”. This leads to a situation that our Armed Forces have to get a precious pre-knowledge about weapon sites, weapon dummy sites, weapon storage sites of multiple types and the actual weapons in land, air and sea of the adversary.

b) With the above situation, the reconnaissance and intelligence both electronics and manual has to be omni-directional and precious, so that preparation for nuclear warfare and camouflage nuclear warfare, combination of nuclear and conventional war systems can be detected well in advance.

c) This will need correct positioning of long range radar systems, phased array radar systems and weapon locating radar systems linked to typical antiballistic missile systems to intercept and destroy the incoming missiles and aircraft in the enemy territory itself.

d) When the attack is in progress, it is essential to continuously monitor and identify whether a conventional weapon has been used or a nuclear weapon has been used, so that the nuclear command can be activated within minutes of a nuclear weapon attack.

e) Entry into the nuclear weapon affected area has to be with a completed protected life supporting system. A rescue brigade with such protection system has to be immediately deployed to save precious lives. That means, the intensive virtual training is needed for strategic engineers and operation engineers.

f) Simultaneously, rescue mission has to start immediately within the 2 km to 3 km radius for protecting the people who have been exposed to nuclear radiation by moving to the hospital for bone marrow transplantation and other treatment. This has to be done in identified hospital located within 10 to 15 kms distance. Bone marrow banks have to be established and preserved in military and well known hospitals in 10-15 Km radius of possible nuclear attack sites.

Friends, I have discussed the scene of a Nuclear War since, all around our nation there are nations which possess nuclear arsenal. Now, I would like to discuss about elimination of nuclear weapons or making them insignificant, both politically and technologically.

Cyber warfare

In an electronically linked world, nations are increasingly connected economically. In a war, destruction will be more severe and fatal if the economy collapses. And the recovery process after the war will be long winding. Cyber technology is the tool for such type of war. The future war, that is powered by cyber war, can create destruction effortlessly at the speed of light. The ICBM and other nuclear weapons will be becoming insignificant in the cyber warfare environment.

Now-a-days nations have electronically connected all their economic, defense and national security establishments which will be the target for cyber attacks during a conflict or to create instabilities. In the present law, for example, the jurisdiction will correspond to the location where the crime is committed and where the damage occurs - very often both being the same location. Whereas in the digital world, the crime may originate from a strange place even outside nation’s shores and may damage organizational wealth which will be in the digital form in multiple locations. In the world of cyber crimes, the distinction between fun and crime, accidental and premeditated offences and even indirect and insinuated crimes become blurred. In such situations, the armed forces, the judges, the lawyers, the police and the law officers should be trained to be aware of such possibilities of technology centric crime and war much the same way they have been trained to understand, war and crime in the physical world. In the absence of such awareness programme, a country can be defeated even without a missile or aircraft attack just through intelligent cyber war.

Different threat perceptions of Cyber warfare

Cyber espionage: As the technology is advancing, cyber espionage may establish the economic assets of the country, if it is vulnerable to the external and internal threat perceptions. These may include any Secret and classified information such as sensitive, proprietary or classified information from individuals, competitors, rivals, groups, governments and enemies. Illegal exploitation methods on internet, networks, software and or computers for military, political or economic advantage have to be probed . If this information is not handled in a secure way, they can be intercepted and even modified, making it vulnerable for espionage from any part of the world.

Smart system to deduct vulnerabilities: Any information, physical infrastructure, communication and economic infrastructure and its access devices and methodologies may be vulnerable for disruption, if it is not secured. Even electrical power grid may be vulnerable to cyber warfare, hence we may need a smart system which can deduct the vulnerabilities and able to respond to the security loop holes dynamically. Massive power outages caused by a cyber attack, may disrupt the economy, cyber attack on airport infrastructure may bring down the countries to a standstill, distract from a simultaneous military attach or create a national trauma.

Electronic warfare: Computer network operations involve attacking, defending, or exploiting purely computer-based networks; whereas the electronic warfare involves any military action involving the direction of control of electromagnetic spectrum energy to deceive or attack the enemy. Electronic warfare is becoming more matured that there is a technology gap; capacity gap which leads to the gap in the effective laws and public polices to handle such cyber crimes in land, sea, air and space. Hence we need to have a multi pronged approach technically, managerially as well as with proper laws of the land to deal with that situation effectively to defend the economic assets of the nation. Legal frame work may have to consider several aspects such as individual privacy, inconvenience to honest public at large, agreed international norms and above all decision making at “electronic speed”.

Survivable systems: We are moving towards air defence networks and weapon systems with the computer systems, wireless systems, command and control systems, radars, signals which have to be protected against the vulnerabilities and have to be built with survivable technologies even if there is an external attack crossing the security systems.

When the internet technologies are developing and the world is moving towards cloud computing paradigm with the ubiquitous access devices, the vulnerabilities and threat perceptions from the internal and external forces is also increasing. This possibility creates more opportunities for the interested elements to decipher the flow of information to their own advantage and disrupt the whole transaction or a mission to their own advantage which ultimately will have a negative impact on the economic infrastructure of the nation. These technologies bring borderless world in the economy irrespective of its physical national borders, will challenge the legal systems which are not updated for effectively dealing with the technological challenges of today and will further complicate the nation’s ability to deter threats and respond to contingencies.

Cyber warfare challenges the sovereignty of the nation: The cyber warfare will use more and more internet and its related technologies against the socio, economical, political technological and information sovereignty and independence of any other state as per the research project called the International convention on Prohibition of Cyberwar in Internet according to a Ukrainian professor of International Law, Alexander Merezhko. Professor Merezhko's project suggests that the Internet ought to remain free from warfare tactics and be treated as an international landmark. He states that the Internet (cyberspace) is a "common heritage of mankind.

Technology in counter terrorism

In the recent times we have witnessed a growing tendency of usage of modern technology in the various terrorist operations across the world. This comes in the form of upgraded explosives and weapons, better detonation mechanism and advanced communication systems. Remember, every terrorist or extremist can acquire best of weapons and communication systems for ideological support or for money. As we evolve strategies for tackling terrorism we will have to upgrade our understanding and application of technology.

We also saw how the terrorist operations were commanded and controlled using mobile communication devices in midst of people, armed forces and paramilitary forces. In the modern day, fight against terrorism blocking these communication devices using local high powered jammers. In such missions, one of the important strategic needs is: fast and secure encryption and decryption. It would be an essential tool towards preventing terrorists from achieving coordinated attacks and we should have independent secured channels for our communication.

If this trend of terrorism is allowed to continue, it is possible to even see terrorists attempting biological attacks on consumable like water and milk, which are sourced from multiple points, stored and processed in a central location and distributed to multiple regions simultaneously.

To match and counter such threats, there is a need of assimilation of better technology and cutting edge systems in all agencies involved with security of the nation. As defence experts all of you may like to study, research and deploy the counter terrorism technologies of the future in all its training.

The role of Armed Forces is beyond being confined to merely war scenarios. With its skilled human resources, technological expertise and the spirit of national service, the Armed Forces has contributed to make even in time of peace which the Armed Forces are already doing to the happiness of the people of the nation.

I was asking myself how you all present here can contribute towards national development. I believe, definitely one way or other each member present here can work for the national development by defending the nation and bringing peace or participation in social changes and economic development.

Here I would like to discuss with you an example which I witnessed, showing how the engineers of the US Army are playing an important role in managing the entire river system of their nation.

National Development and Army Corp

Friends in April 2010, I was in USA, primarily to take a course titled “Evolution of Happy, prosperous and peaceful societies” at Gatton College of Business and Economics at University of Kentucky. Apart from teaching assignment, I was interested to know, how Ohio and Mississippi river basins have been managed for flood control and smart navigation. I wanted to explore how such models can find application in the context of of Bihar which is quite often affected by floods from Kosi river. I studied how the Corps of Engineers of the US Army has responded to changing Defence requirement and played an integral part in the development of the country’s infrastructure, from the time it was established by the decree of order by First President of the United States, George Washington in 1775.

From the 19th century onwards, the Corps has built coastal fortifications, surveyed roads and canals, eliminated navigation hazards, explored and mapped the western frontiers and constructing buildings and monuments in the nation’s capital. In the 21st century, the Corps became the lead federal flood control agency and smart river navigation provider and significantly expanded its civil works activities, becoming among other things a major provider of hydro electric energy and the country’s leading provider of recreation. The river navigational routes provide right time at reduced cost of transportation of coal to the hundreds of thermal power plants. It’s role in responding to natural disaster dramatically.

In the late 60s, the Corps became leading environmental, preservation and restoration agency. It now carries out natural and cultural resource management programme at its water resources projects and regulates activities in the nation’s wetlands. Today, the Corps of Engineers is a federal agency and a major Army command made up of some 34,600 civilian and 650 military personnel, making it the world’s largest public engineering, design and construction management agency. The Corps have constructed more than 400 major artificial lakes and reservoirs, built more than 8,500 miles of levees and implemented hundreds of smaller local flood protection projects. The Corps of Engineers’ lakes store more than 372 BCM of water. I am giving you this example to illustrate, how the role of one arm of the Army has been changing with time based on national priorities. We, in India, lose every year, 1500 BCM of flood water which flows into the sea. If we can store even half of this water, India’s water shortage problem can be solved for the entire nation.

While country is grateful to the role played by the Indian Armed Forces in national development through various dimensions, such experiences from elsewhere can add value to your future plans. I was studying an article about this year flood situation in India. It said, that while the north-western India suffered flood through an excess rain fall of 13%, at the same time the east and northeastern part had a short fall of 18% rain. If our rivers were connected and managed well, this excess from one part, and short fall in another could offset each other, leading to prosperity and protection against nature’s fury. Development of State wide Smart Waterways – will act as a reservoir and excess flood can be shared among the short fall regions and vise versa. Interlinking of rivers is easy if the state wide waterways are established for easy distribution and storage during flood and drought seasons. State wide Water ways and rivers have to be the national asset and I believe armed forces can play a very important role in management of the national rivers and make them transform into smart waterways.

Friends, I have been involved with the defence services for more than four decades in various capacities. I have interacted with many defence scientists, leaders from defence services and soldiers who dedicate themselves completely to the nation and its people. I have witnessed multiple occasions where the defence services have gone beyond their call of duty and actively participated in missions of development and relief, often in the most difficult terrains. There is another changing role of the armed forces where they are actively participating in developmental missions. Army is working in the difficult environment like desert, glaciers, mountainous regions, sea coasts, islands and forest areas, and at every place you have unique challenges and roles. Every aspect of terrain of the nation is known to you. Even when the nation sleeps, the men and women of Indian Armed Forces are vigilant and vigilantly safegurarding the nations interests and above all you are ensuring peace in the nation so that it can concentrate on the economic development and strategic importance.

Strategic dimensions for vision 2020 Developed India

Dear friends, our focused vision is to become a developed India before 2020. We have to, through a well orchestrated strategic approach, foresee and deter any impediments to this vision. On multiple fronts India is facing challenges of war and its dynamics, due to its economic growth and the vision to become a developed India before 2020. When the nation progresses with economic strength and youth power, the international dynamics completely takes new dimension, some enjoy our progress, few make the progress as the target. You have to be prepared to safe guard our progress at all costs and we cannot afford to compromise our national unique culture.

In this scenario, India has to focus and strengthen its capacity on four fronts. Hence we should visualize the following five scenarios in place before the year 2020. They are:

1.Space based surveillance and Reconnaissance

2. Intelligence

3.Defence

4.Weapons

5.Strategic alliances

Space based Surveillance and Reconnaissance

a.Positioning Space based surveillance and reconnaissance satellite network for armed forces.

b.Positioning the reusable super sonic and hypersonic cruise missile for reconnaissance and delivery of payloads.

c.We cannot depend on the public domain GPS systems or Glosnows in view of our strategy, the availability is not assured at the time of critical requirement. India should go for its own GPS satellite and SMB Satellite, because most of our systems are strategic systems have got linked with Global position systems.

Intelligence

a.Regular electronic intelligence collection and manual intelligence gathering have to be strengthened. Most important thing is to strengthen our cyber warfare technologies with the capability to penetrate any kind of network of the adversaries’.

b.India has to achieve mastery over encryption and decryption of certain unique languages which we are not accustomed to. At the same time we have to evolve a scheme to respond quickly and be able to jam the network with our intelligent software agents.

c. We also need to establish the intelligence gathering network by observing the behaviour of the mobile systems, wireless systems used and to build the possible war scenarios and its dynamics.

Defence preparedness

a. Multiple centers with Anti Ballistic Missile system with two layer interception to be ready for deployment.

b. Aircraft surveillance with Deep Penetration Strike Aircraft to be in position

c. Long range weapon locating radars

d. Integrated war theatre for armed forces, with virtual war scenarios built with its command and control system for taking integrated decision.

e. Nuclear command able to be integrated with the conventional war system.

Strategic Weapons have to be in position

a.ICBM with Multiple Independent Reentry vehicles (MIRV) – beyond 5000 km.

b.IRBM – with nuclear war heads (within 5000 km).

c.Long range and short range ballistic missile which are already available should be in a ready situation to tackle the threat perceptions deployed on the field.

d.Medium Combat Stealth Aircraft in position along with Light Combat Aircraft.

e.Nuclear Submarines with Strategic Missiles.

f.Long range supersonic cruise missile.

g.Integrated Electronic Warfare system operating in millimeter wave.

Strategic alliances

Our strategic alliances, the strategic public policy has to be restructured and should take a lead role in a partnership mode by wining over the confidence of our neighbours. We need to create a situation that it is always better to align with India, a democratic nation of billion people for achieving peace and prosperity, rather than get into war dynamics which will ultimately detrimental to their national interest and their growth towards development, peace and prosperity.

a.India should evolve strategic friendship with our neighbours and critical locations.

b.Establish mutually benefit economic cooperation and revitalize the relationship with meaningful partnership with neighbours for the win-win situation

c.Imbibe the confidence among the neighbouring nations that aligning with democratic India is the paramount importance for their internal peace and prosperity rather than certain infrastructural assistance getting with vested interest to suit their military and economical ambitions.

d.A strategic public policy for external affairs for this region and carry out the specific diplomatic useful campaign among the friendly nations and win over the confidence towards India.

Strategic Military Leadership

Now friends, in such a situation, what type of leadership quality are needed? What type of training is needed to build such a capacity among our youth?

a) Courage, Courage and Courage.

b) A visionary thinking to predict, how and what type of damages, the enemy is likely to inflict upon us. How many simultaneous attacks are possible if we miss the positive interception? A totally “out of the box” thinking is needed for precise prediction and action.

c)The leader must have the capacity to defeat the problem and succeed. Empowerment decision making is needed at all levels.

d)The leader must be able to simulate models of various types of encounters and have most effective solutions for each one of the simulated models.

e)In-spite of all the preparation, if the enemy really springs a surprise, the leader must be able to quickly react and win.

f)The leader has to delegate authority to different teams, coordinate and work with a unified purpose. He should also plan for contingences for unexpected causality arising during the encounter.

g) The aim of the leader must be to minimize our loss and maximize damage to the enemy.

h) The leader must work with integrity and succeed with integrity.

Conclusion: Defence, Development and Integrity

Friends the world has been witnessing and continue to witness many transformational technologies that enhance the quality of life, accelerate the development and contribute to defence needs. However the same tools can become dangerous weapons in wrong hands. This is true not only of the technologies, but also phenomenon like social networking. Past animosities, real or perceived enmities and large inequities in development within nations and globe are waiting to use such networking and technologies for vicious purposes and future warfare strategists have to be well aware of this. Such potential threats have not only to be transmitted right at the time of induction training but also get embedded in every aspect of preparedness including decision making, legal frame work and public awareness. Social evil of corruption forms the other dimension and it cannot be allowed to intrude into the defence systems. So the perspectives of the future warfare in addition to the known experiences and current developments should address the future dimensions. Warfare is not just about fighting wars, but also enabling peace. Development, integrity are integral to peace.

For achieving all the missions, what we need is the determination and indomitable spirit. Hence, I am reminded of the Maharishi Pathanjali’s Yoga Sutra written 2000 years ago.

“When you are inspired by some great purpose, some extradinary project, all your thoughts break their bounds, your mind transcends limitations, your consciousness expands in every direction, you will find yourself in a new great and wonderful world. Dormant forces, faculties and talents become alive and you discover yourself to be a greater person by far than you ever dreamed yourself to be.”

Dear friends, Our young Armed Forces officers should dream and work for the great military leaders like Field Marshal Cariappa. My best wishes to all of you in your endeavor to make a better nation and the world.

May God bless you."

[ramana]

Actually its blueprint for whats happening in the Armed forces and the DRDO research areas. MEA needs to be aligned.

Maybe time to have Dr. Rajendra Prasad memorial lecture for the civilans?

[RamaY]

^+1

Until a couple of years ago the entire nation is inspired to think/dream big.

A NHDP here, a river linking project there, a sky scrapper city here, an industrial park there, a super electric company here (5000MW), a $30B refinery there and so on...

In past one and half years, it is all about a huge scam here, a state split there, a terror attack here, an accommodation with terrorist state there...

sad indeed!

[SwamyG]

The words elite is often used in BRF and scholarly circles. A whole lot has been discussed in BRF about the role of elites. I liked the following paragraphs about the role of elites, so I present it here:
They Myth of Lokamanya: Tilak and mass politics in Maharastra {ignore the provocative title}

An elited performs a highly useful function or a colonial power. From its numbers are drawn bureaucrats to help in the task of administration and to interpret colonial rule to indigenous society, providing a model of the type of behavior which the rulers hope might be emulated by other groups of the society. In return the elite hopes that it may be recognized as the legitimate spokesman of its society and may enjoy a continuing flow of benefits from the colonial power. In anticipation of some degree of present and future power, it learns a new style of behavior, a process referred to as "anticipatory socialization". The colonial elite is thus a highly visible group delineated from its surroundings by its orientation to the new political idiom and the favored treatment it receives at the hands of foreigners.

I can see so many heads nodding. Now this has so many parallels in the current times. The media anticipating money and ratings; the celebrity media anticipating more money and say in the affairs, the NRI elites and Indian-origin elites living and working across the globe, the Indian business and political class behaving looking up to the foreigners. It is akin to a dog wanting to please his master to get the juicy bone.

More...

If an elite is to be a successful purveyor of the new ideas, recruitment should be from groups which enjoy a high status in their society so that the other communities may emulate their ways. When the British established hegemony in Western India in 1818 it was natural for them to rely on the Brahmans of the Deccan, since they were the immediate, pre-British ruling elite. As the rulers of the Maratha empire of the eighteenth century, the Brahmains combined secular power with sacerdotal status and attained an authority scarcely rivalled in any other part of India. The Maratha Brahman also had the necessary administrative skills and aptitudes and was the logical subordinate to the British official. To ignore this powerful community and to build on any other foundation would have alienated this important group and hampeered the spread of western culture, since Maratha society would have been less inclined to imitate a community of lower status.

This is precisely what the Christian Missionaries attempted. They attempted to convert the brahmins with the hope that when the brahmins convert the rest of the society will ape them too. J A Dubois miserably failed in his adventure and went home with a broken heart.

[ramana]

X-post...

Why Congress wants to forget 1962 war

Why Congress wants to forget 1962 war
By Claude Arpi
17 Jan 2011

While the Indian National Congress is still able to remember the role of former prime ministers Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi in the India-Pakistan conflicts of 1965 and 1971, it has forgotten the 1962 War with China.

'Congress and the Making of the Indian Nation', a souvenir released on the occasion of the 125th anniversary of the foundation of the party and edited by senior leader Pranab Mukherjee says that in 1971 Indira Gandhi "was hailed as Durga, an incarnation of Shakti." The events which saw the birth of Bangladesh are still considered to be 'her personal success'.

During the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, Shastri had already demonstrated to the world that India could defend its territory with modest resources: "The aggression by Pakistan was effectively checked. The Indian troops even crossed over to Pakistani territory near Lahore", write Congress historians.

The 1962 conflict with China remains a deep scar on the Indian psyche, but the 172-page book entirely omits the episode. To many, it resembles a Stalinian way to write history.

This reflects a great deal on the level of the historians working for the Congress. Foremost is Mridula Mukherjee, the director of Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, an autonomous body under the Ministry of Culture who flouted all government rules, which prohibit the director of such bodies from associating with a particular political party.

Interestingly, the release of the book came soon after another 'release': two letters sent by Jawaharlal Nehru to US President John F Kennedy on November 19, 1962.

Thanks to the truly eminent journalist Inder Malhotra these two missives are today in the public domain. Did the Indian National Congress know that the first prime minister of India informed the US President that the situation in November 1962 was 'desperate'? Nehru begged to the US to immediately despatch a 'more comprehensive' US military aid, "if the Chinese are to be prevented from taking over the whole of Eastern India."

Till these letters were 'declassified' by the veteran journalist, there was only a brief mention about their existence in the "Foreign Relations of the United States" which mentions: "The letter conveyed in Telegram 1891 was the first of two letters sent by Nehru to Kennedy on November 19. The second was delivered to the White House by the Indian Ambassador on the evening of November 19.

These letters have not been declassified by the Indian government." The Office of the Historian of the US government quotes their summary published by S Gopal, Nehru's biographer: "Nehru, apparently without consulting any of his cabinet colleagues or officials, apart from the Foreign Secretary, M J Desai, wrote two letters to Kennedy describing the situation as 'really desperate' and asked for the immediate despatch of a minimum of twelve squadrons of supersonic all-weather fighters and the setting up of radar communications. American personnel would have to man these fighters and installations and protect Indian cities from air attacks by the Chinese till Indian personnel had been trained. If possible, the United States should also send planes flown by American personnel to assist the Indian Air Force in any battles with the Chinese in Indian air space; but aerial action by India elsewhere would be the responsibility of the Indian Air Force. Nehru also asked for two B-47 bomber squadrons to enable India to strike at Chinese bases and air fields, but to learn to fly these planes Indian pilots and technicians would be sent immediately for training in the United States."

Malhotra discovered by chance the unredacted letters: "Imagine my surprise, when soon after arriving in Washington this time around, I had easy access to these 'forbidden' epistles (in the JFK Library)." Though there is no mention of it in The Making of the Indian Nation, in November 1962, India faced the most dramatic moment of its recent history. In the words of Nehru (to Kennedy): "The situation in NEFA (North-East Frontier Agency, today Arunachal Pradesh) Command has deteriorated still further. Bomdila has fallen and the retreating forces from Sela have been trapped between the Sela Ridge and Bomdila. A serious threat has developed to our Digboi oilfields in Assam. With the advance of the Chinese in massive strength, the entire Brahmaputra Valley is seriously threatened and unless something is done immediately to stem the tide, the whole of Assam, Tripura, Manipur and Nagaland would also pass into Chinese hands."

The prime minister not knowing that the Chinese were ready to declare a unilateral ceasefire (it was done three days later) informed the American President: "The Chinese have poised massive forces also in Chumbi Valley between Sikkim and Bhutan and another invasion from that direction appears imminent… In Ladakh, as I have said in my earlier communication, Chushul is under heavy attack and the shelling of the airfield at Chushul has already commenced. We have also noticed increasing air activity by the Chinese air force."

In the first letter, Nehru had told Kennedy that after the fall of Chushul there was "nothing to stop the Chinese till they reach Leh, the headquarters of the Ladakh province of Kashmir." B K Nehru, the Indian ambassador, delivered the second letter to the White House at night. He later said that his first impulse was to not deliver it. Malhotra recounts: "(B K Nehru) never discussed the contents of the two letters with anyone but did tell me that he locked them up in the safe that only the ambassador could open." Though according to the official history of the Congress, it was Nehru who "outlined five principles of Panchsheel which became the basis of the Non-Aligned Movement", in November 1962, he badly panicked and aligned himself with Washington.

It has always surprised me why the government is adamant on not publishing the Henderson-Brooks report of the 1962 debacle.

Defence Minister A K Antony recently told Parliament that the report could not be made public because an internal study by the Indian Army had established that its contents "are not only extremely sensitive but are of current operational value."

Is it not strange that a 47-year-old report is still of 'operational value'? The officials who drafted the minister's reply may not be aware that another report, the Official History of the Conflict with China (1962) was prepared by the History Division of the Ministry of Defence which details the famous 'operations' in 474 foolscap pages.

After the release of Congress and the Making of the Indian Nation, the motives of the government are clear. The party would like to forever erase the painful months of October/November 1962. Delhi has decided to forget about 1962 altogether.
[email protected]

[svinayak]

Thanks to the truly eminent journalist Inder Malhotra these two missives are today in the public domain.

Malhotra discovered by chance the unredacted letters: "Imagine my surprise, when soon after arriving in Washington this time around, I had easy access to these 'forbidden' epistles (in the JFK Library)."

It has always surprised me why the government is adamant on not publishing the Henderson-Brooks report of the 1962 debacle.[/b]

Is it not good timing that US is trying to discredit JLN at the right time to create chaos inside India by giving a blow to JLN and to INC. This is a big psy ops game.

INC has become a football in this.

Did the Indian National Congress know that the first prime minister of India informed the US President that the situation in November 1962 was 'desperate'? Nehru begged to the US to immediately despatch a 'more comprehensive' US military aid, "if the Chinese are to be prevented from taking over the whole of Eastern India."

But the question is did the Indian govt realize that JFK may have been on the know that PRC is going to withdraw within a few days.

[brihaspati]

JLN might have had good reasons not to disseminate this begging widely within the cabinet. I have tried to raise this issue before - that something happened between 1958-1959 that radically shook JLN about Mao/China. Just as he was overtly and unrealistically positive and confident about Mao, before, he swung to the opposite mood about Mao/China early on in 1959.

[Arjun]

Due respect not shown to Netaji: Narayana Murthy

Interesting piece, particularly this part....

Describing Netaji as the most courageous leader of his time, the iconic corporate leader said that his presence would have spearheaded India to become the second most powerful economy of the world ahead of China.

Hopefully leads to an objective debate on the relative under-performance of the Indian economy over the last six decades and the opportunity loss due to ineffective leadership.

[Johann]

JLN might have had good reasons not to disseminate this begging widely within the cabinet. I have tried to raise this issue before - that something happened between 1958-1959 that radically shook JLN about Mao/China. Just as he was overtly and unrealistically positive and confident about Mao, before, he swung to the opposite mood about Mao/China early on in 1959.

The "Forward Policy" of Summer 1961 hardly seems like something produced by an air of deep pessimism and defeatism.

On the other hand it seems very much the product of an unrealistic estimate of the PLA's means and will versus the IA and IAF's preparedness.

If anything there seems to have been a surging overconfidence at the highest levels after the token Portuguese resistance during the Goan operation during Op. Vijay. After all the Portuguese had been around in Goa for almost five centuries, still had an African and Asian empire, and were a founding member of NATO in 1949. If they collapsed like a deck of cards, why couldn't India teach an aggressive Mao a lesson?

[brihaspati]

Johann ji,
I should have clarified about the "mood". But the "forward policy" could have been the direct result of that change of mood - in the sense of perception about Mao that he could really perhaps bite. Not necessarily panic or fear but a feeling of urgency. The duality of response - the continued public trashing or downplaying the threat angle or belligerence and hostility on PRC part - and the secret "urgent SOS" fits with this sudden change of mood perfectly. JLN could not publicly show that his assessment and his projection about China to the Indian public was utterly wrong.

Something went drastically wrong in calculations between 58 and 59. Whereas HH Dalai Lama was discouraged from seeking asylum in India before, Zhou en Lai was being entertained, all of a sudden Dalai Lama was welcome to escape to India. JLN understood the politics of hostages quite well - holding onto individuals and secrets that nation states could use as bargaining points against another. Dalai Lama could have been exactly such a hedge for JLN. Question is as a bargaining point against what or whom?

[svinayak]

JLN might have had good reasons not to disseminate this begging widely within the cabinet. I have tried to raise this issue before - that something happened between 1958-1959 that radically shook JLN about Mao/China. Just as he was overtly and unrealistically positive and confident about Mao, before, he swung to the opposite mood about Mao/China early on in 1959.

Bji
I will ask you to read this book. Read it carefully on the period between 1940-1962

http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=55390439

India and Pakistan

A Political Analysis by HUGH TINKER

Publication Information: Book Title: India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis. Contributors: Hugh Tinker - author. Publisher: Frederick A. Praeger. Place of Publication: New York. Publication Year: 1962.

You will find some clues in the election of 1957. That changed the mind of the western countries regarding India.

[Murugan]

Where to post the news about Padma Vibhushan, Padma Bhushan and Padma Shri Awardees.

btw, Brijest Mishra has been awarded Padma Vibhushan

[ramana]

Read Telegraph's reasons on thier front page!

Nukkad has lively discussion.

[Johann]

Johann ji,
I should have clarified about the "mood". But the "forward policy" could have been the direct result of that change of mood - in the sense of perception about Mao that he could really perhaps bite. Not necessarily panic or fear but a feeling of urgency. The duality of response - the continued public trashing or downplaying the threat angle or belligerence and hostility on PRC part - and the secret "urgent SOS" fits with this sudden change of mood perfectly. JLN could not publicly show that his assessment and his projection about China to the Indian public was utterly wrong.

Something went drastically wrong in calculations between 58 and 59. Whereas HH Dalai Lama was discouraged from seeking asylum in India before, Zhou en Lai was being entertained, all of a sudden Dalai Lama was welcome to escape to India. JLN understood the politics of hostages quite well - holding onto individuals and secrets that nation states could use as bargaining points against another. Dalai Lama could have been exactly such a hedge for JLN. Question is as a bargaining point against what or whom?

The source of the difference between 1956 and 1959 (the 14DL's two escape attempts to India), and Nehru's general attitude towards the PRC is pretty well documented.

In September 1957 Zhou Enlai *publicly* inaugurates Xinjiang-Sinkiang highway built across Aksai Chin, Indian territory.

We can imagine what a slap in the face this was for Nehru. Especially since the Indian Army had been reporting road-building activity since 1955, which Defence Minister Menon had dismissed as 'CIA propaganda'.

It is not surprising that after this point Nehru takes a relatively lax attitude towards CIA activity along the Tibetan border, which culminates in the Tibetan uprising of 1958. In fact the 14DL's request for sanctuary in 1959 is made through a CIA supplied radio, and the request goes through the US embassy in Delhi, and then to the Prime Minister.

The CPC has never shaken the belief since that India has been involved in every Tibetan uprising. India in turn has bent over backwards to assure them this isn't the case, but of course the key Chinese demand is expelling the 14DL which is not possible.

[Pranav]

The source of the difference between 1956 and 1959 (the 14DL's two escape attempts to India), and Nehru's general attitude towards the PRC is pretty well documented.

In September 1957 Zhou Enlai *publicly* inaugurates Xinjiang-Sinkiang highway built across Aksai Chin, Indian territory.

We can imagine what a slap in the face this was for Nehru. Especially since the Indian Army had been reporting road-building activity since 1955, which Defence Minister Menon had dismissed as 'CIA propaganda'.

It is not surprising that after this point Nehru takes a relatively lax attitude towards CIA activity along the Tibetan border, which culminates in the Tibetan uprising of 1958. In fact the 14DL's request for sanctuary in 1959 is made through a CIA supplied radio, and the request goes through the US embassy in Delhi, and then to the Prime Minister.

The CPC has never shaken the belief since that India has been involved in every Tibetan uprising. India in turn has bent over backwards to assure them this isn't the case, but of course the key Chinese demand is expelling the 14DL which is not possible.

Interesting to see Nehru's erratic mood swings, from dismissing the Indian Army's warnings as "CIA propaganda" to collaborating with the CIA himself. Truly the fellow was unfit to be in any position of responsibility.

[Johann]

Pranav,

I think the far bigger discrepancy was in CPC behaviour - publicly endorsing Panchsheel and Nehru's hope for Asian solidarity which lay behind it, while almost immediately working to undermine it. This is a pattern that has continued right up until the present.

This challenge of dealing with this discrepancy kept Nehru off balance, and I think it still keeps India off balance, although not as much since the watershed events of 1962.

In particular the influence of deeply ideological communist fellow-travelers like defence minister Krishna Menon and the ambassador to Beijing K.M. Panikkar, both big fans of the Chinese Revolution were I think much more responsible than Nehru for blocking realistic appraisal of PRC actions and intentions. The PRC lost that kind of hold on minds within the GoI and the Indian establishment by going for open confrontation.

The other factor was that the Indian public was much more ideological about foreign policy than it is today, and that trapped Nehru even after he realised he was wrong about (a) PRC intentions and (b) India's strength vis a vis the PRC. Realpolitik policies, including using the West to balance the PRC had to remain on a scale that could remain secret for fear of public uproar, and that limited rather than enhanced the GOI's freedom to manoeuvre. It was only by Indira Gandhi's second stint in power in the early 1980s that I think that sort of thing became possible.

[brihaspati]

JLN had a chance - during the Korean War, when he could have had US support for using the "successor" state status of India [ I think offers were made too from the US side] to claim the "facilities" under previous agreements with the Tibetans made by the Brits. JLN refused. Question, is in 1950 what made JLN fail to see the potential for trouble given that Mao had already committed so much in order to protect his "buffer"? Understood that any US offer at this stage would have been the standard cynical two-front pressure tactics only, and there was every risk of the US showing its undies in a swift flight from the scene when things turned painful for its boys and home opinion.

Even in '57 JLN had tried to downplay the PRC threat. Moreover, there have been contradictory claims about how far JLN personally really knew about the alleged CIA activities. But long before the actual PLA attack, this CIA "activity" vanished and the total amount of "help" given to the so-called Tibetan guerrilla action was minuscule - according to some veterans from the Tibetan side.

[ramana]

What is the role fo Sr. B.N> Mullick the IB director. He was eyes ears and every other sense for Nehru govt and he failed miserably.

Late he wrote a self serving account of he saved the nation.

More likely everyone was in a silo thinking mode and doing the best they could and JLN dealt with the silos and never integrated them leading to the disaster.


BTW, sycophants have brought out a book "Nehru's Kashmir" today.

Like Kashmir was his father's jagir and he could deliver it to the Abdullah family.

[Johann]

Brihaspati,

I think what it came down to was that Nehru regarded the left as his ally around the world, whether it was the Labour Party in Britain, or at the more extreme end, Mao and the communists in China.

He also regarded anti-colonial movements as natural allies. Mao's CPC was both of the left and intensely anti-Colonial - by those measures, doubly trustworthy.

Truman's America was just far too much to the right for Nehru - he instinctively distrusted states where industrial private corporations and evangelism were the most powerful voices, and Eisenhower's America was absolutely repellent. I think if FDR had been alive in 1949-50, or a Kennedy had been in power something might have been worked out with Nehru on Tibet.

re. CIA assistance to the Tibetans - the logistical challenges of supplying the Tibetans were just enormous, especially for something that was supposed to be covert in order to be countenanced by the GoI. Most supplies and trained guerrillas were parachuted in, and once the PLAAF was deployed and their air defences were modernised with Soviet help that made C-130s vulnerable (the U-2 shootdown in 1960 was the beginning of the end) and it became practically impossible to supply the interior.

The PLA had all the logistical and diplomatic advantages against the Tibetans, and even after the 1962 war neither India nor the world was willing to de-recognise Tibet as Chinese territory while PLA access to the area increased, bringing more forces, more resources and more control. There's just no way the Tibetans could (or can) win without open Indian and other support for their independence. Imagine for a second if Pakistan had adopted India's Tibet policies when it came to Afghanistan - the Afghan communist party would probably still be in power from Kabul down to Kandahar. On the other hand Pakistan's Kashmir policy has hurt Kashmiris more than its hurt the GoI - so perhaps not fighting to the last Tibetan is a more humane and realistic policy. These are all very hard, and very unappetising choices.

[AKalam]

I am not sure if this is relevant, but here is my take on the issue of Chinese expansionism.

Han Chinese unspoken and instinctive expansionist doctrine and method is similar to that of the Borg, "resistance is futile". First a smaller ethnic group is let into the list of minorities and then slowly that group is homogenized with time. Korean and Mongol minorities within PRC are still in the process of being assimilated. Manchu's since the fall of Qing in 1912 has been almost completely assimilated. Most of the 55 recognized ethnic minorities are at various stages of assimilation. Burmese, Vietnamese and Japanese may become targets of assimilation in the future, as Chinese influence grows in the region. Religion, if it stands in the way in this assimilation process, becomes a hostile ideology, but if it is removed as an obstacle such as Islam w.r.t. Hui Muslims after their many suppressed rebellions during Qing dynasty, then religion is no longer considered a hostile ideology for that particular group. Islam however continues to be considered as hostile and subject to suppression among Uighurs, Qazaq and Kyrgyz. Of course any popular ideology such as Falun Gong that becomes a competitor to the ruling ideology (Confucianism, Chinese Buddhism, Neo-Confucianism in the past and now official Maoist Communism which is giving way to "Socialist Democracy" led by single party) among the majority can also become a hostile target for suppression, as it can be a threat to the unity of the majority Han.

Any target ethnic group that has its own separate homeland (nation state) then those remain as thorns on the side and an impediment, since the culture cannot be assimilated as easily for a particular ethnic group part of which is residing within PRC or Taiwan (we can collectively call these two countries "China" both of whom are Han Chinese majority domain). Examples are Japan, Korean peninsula, almost all nation states of South East Asia and Central Asian Russianized neighbor states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia. Russian Siberia falls in a different category as Russians themselves are in the process of assimilating the natives in this region, although Chinese influence there is increasing everyday.

The official definition of a Chinese person is no longer being a member of the Han ethnic group, but it includes the minorities which are in the process of getting assimilated and groups that may be targeted in the future. One must remember that the Han ethnic group has itself formed in the past with assimilation of many different ethnic groups, so the present is simply a continuation of the past.

For obvious reasons, the target groups for assimilation (till they are completely assimilated like the Manchu's) resist as they want to keep their culture alive. That is why the neighbor target ethnic groups to Han Chinese end up as hostile groups. The list includes Burmese, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Laotians, Japanese, Koreans, Mongols, proto-Turkics (Tuvans etc.), Islamized Turks such as nomadic Qazaq (Kazakh) or Kyrgyz or settled Uighurs.

In case of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, there is significant diaspora Chinese in these countries who are influential and control disproportionate percentage of the economy. Since they are not immediate neighbors and are larger units with divergent histories far away from the Sinic core, they may or may not be future targets, but work will continue to increase Sinic influence in these countries, as there is some underlying common ethnic roots from Southern Chinese migrants into these countries from recent past centuries who have contributed to local gene pools, in addition to the influential and significant Chinese diaspora.

Iranics such as Tajiks or Afghans or the subcontinentals are not targets of assimilation, as far as I can tell. But Siberian asiatics in Russia such as Evenks, Chukchi, Yakut, Buryat mongols, Altaic proto-Turkics are probably in the list of future targets. Qazaqs and Kyrgyz, due to their close affinity to Mongols and being descended from proto-Turkics, could also end up as valid targets. More Iranic Uzbeks and Turkmens I believe are not future targets.

So the above paints a picture of a maximal expanded Sinic centered entity/world that may take shape in the future.

Deception seems to be a key weapon in all Chinese endeavors throughout history, that is to gain victory by strategies advanced in stealth. One interesting aspect of this deception is its implication on product reliability and quality. Knowledgeable Chinese consumers often, when the options are available, do not buy Chinese (specially PRC) products themselves.

The gora have fell into a trap, as they gave access to their market and thus shared their wealth with the Chinese in the hope that the Chinese will remember this act of generosity by gora elite, who of course chose the Han under authoritarian leadership among many other nations, as the best group to utilize/exploit out of pure self interest (profit maximization of share-holders), although the perspective might be a bit short term. The gora hope is that when the Chinese rise, they will share the global leadership space with them and continue to provide Chinese market access for gora goods and services in PRC, even after the Chinese reach parity with gora in knowledge and technology. The result remains to be seen, but if past is any indication of Chinese collective behavior then there will be surprise in store for the gora nation.

English educated and influenced Nehru probably fell into this same trap. Perhaps the problem with Subcontinental Aam and Khas Janta is that because of the Himalayan wall and Tibetan high land buffer and limited interaction with Chinese in the past due to these, there is very little exposure and experience with the Chinese "character", prior to the occupation of Tibet by PLA in 1950's.

So for the gora and Subcontinentals, it is essential to learn about the Chinese from China's neighbor ethnic groups, who are not of part Chinese descent, in the recent past centuries. But for any strategist it is hard to depend on collective wisdom of any other group, that is not part of their own, as there is the matter and issue of trust and lack of common interest.

As a believer in the importance and significance of Historical Continuity of cultures, I personally take issue with this philosophy of assimilation via homogenization, specially coerced or forced attempts in this direction. In the future, an alternative model as has evolved in the Subcontinent, a harmonious existence of multiple ethno-linguistic as well as religious groups, can become a general model for inclusion into a larger system, for victim ethnic groups who are present and potential future targets of Han assimilation. Tibet is only a part of a much bigger general phenomenon and historical trend. As for Asia, the global population will much prefer a Harmonized model rather than any attempts at forced Homogenization. The future great power that provide such a leadership in the future, whether that is today's gora or a wiser Han Chinese of tomorrow or an India (or a Subcontinental conglomerate/federation) of day after tomorrow, may win the race for influence in Eurasia and elsewhere in the globe. Winning is important, as winners always call the shots, using a cliche.

[surinder]

Especially since the Indian Army had been reporting road-building activity since 1955, which Defence Minister Menon had dismissed as 'CIA propaganda'.

It is odd and sad that the Defence Minister goes to all the trouble of calling a road on his own country's territory as CIA Propaganda, when all he had to do was simply take a flight and go to Aksai Chin and verify it himself. Surely, it cannot be that impossible to fly out there and either drive or fly by to confirm that no Chinese road exists. But this remarkable man would call something so easily verifiable as propaganda.

[surinder]

I think the far bigger discrepancy was in CPC behaviour - publicly endorsing Panchsheel and Nehru's hope for Asian solidarity which lay behind it, while almost immediately working to undermine it. This is a pattern that has continued right up until the present.

But is it not fair to say that *ALL* states use such tactics? It does not appear that PRC is the only one who is so devious.

This is a something any reasonable leader should be expected to deal with it.

[brihaspati]

Johann ji,

I am still intrigued by lots of what went on. I don't think the full picture is allowed to be aired, really.

As for PRC perfidy, this is what I was explicitly raising in my post - why did JLN expect Mao to give up on militant expansive designs on Tibet - when Mao sacrificed so many of the PLA on the Korean front? However, ironically it was Nehru's government [and he retained the MEA in his own hands] that was one of the first few governments to recognize PRC, in 1949 - probably the 3rd or 4th one to do so - in 30th December, 1949. Note that only about 5 weeks before India had formally adopted a constitutional republic status within the commonwealth on 26th November, and Mao had declared the PRC on 1st October, 1949. Burma had recognized PRC on 17th December, and subsequent letters and discussions from Nehru about/in ref to/with Zhou en Lai indicates that the Burmese leadership played an inside role in the triangular interactions then between China, Nehru and Burma. This again is significant in that this very same Burmese leadership had actually switched sides suddenly prior to Japanese withdrawal and joined up with the Brits - a factor which appears also in discussions about the INA in Burma.

Even more ironically, Nehru's government opposed UN resolutions branding China as an aggressor in the Korean war in 1950 - within the year. Well '54 was Panchsheel, but between 1949 and 1954, there was a wide window of opportunity when previous agreements with the Tibetans could have been used by India to place its claims - perhaps in combination with some of the US forces - to take up really "forward" positions on Tibetan borders with China. These were not a very convenient spot for the PLA to operate in if they had to come up through the plains under opposition. Of course without any modern army facing it - it had a much easier time to cross this zone. It was not an easy zone because the Long March had passed and skirted around exactly this region and lost most of its troops in this region.

Moreover, "aggression" started almost at the same time as "Panchsheel" in 1954-1955. "Map-conquest" incident first happened in 1955. But Nehru and Zhou went on chatting. Things go on happening almost every year since then 1956/1957/1958/1959/1960/1961- when did Nehru had the big leisure to be even confused about Mao's intentions?

[brihaspati]

Johann ji,
additionally why do you think Nehru hated/resented Eisenhower? I have the distinct impression that Nehru had quite a bit of admiration for Ike! JLN had severe problems with Truman - true. And Dulles. But JLN expressed favourably about Ike as a person ["a certain moral quality", "thoroughly honest"] and during the Ike admin, India had come rather ambivalently on US side at least on two occasions - the Anglo-French-Israeli thrust towards Suez and Soviet crackdown on Hungary. They differed of course on Pak and "Kashmir". With Kennedy, the relations went back to Truman level - primarily because of JLN's tirade against all forms of N-tests.

But then how did JLN justify Soviet atmospheric tests? He was trying to be equally close to all "super powers" rather than really be "equally distant" from them.

[AKalam]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Godfrey_Lias

During the first World War, Godfrey Lias was Captain and Adjutant, 11th Battalion Duke of Wellington's Regiment and Instructor at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. At the outbreak of the second World War, he joined the Foreign Office News Department. Later, he was British representative on the Inter-Allied Information Committee, the official publicity organ of the Ministries of Information of the Allied Governments in London. In 1944, he joined the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office as Director of the Czechoslovak Region.

At one time, Godfrey Lias was an Assistant Master at Victoria College, Alexandria, Egypt, and then Head-master at the Muhammadan Anglo Oriental College (now Aligarh Muslim University) in Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh, India.

He took the History Tripos at King's College, Cambridge, and in the period between WWI and WWII (ie: circa 1918-1939) was diplomatic correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, for which time he was awarded an O.B.E. for political and public services.

He was Correspondent of The Times, The Economist and Christian Science Monitor in Prague, from August 1945 until he was expelled by the communists in July 1949, then in Vienna until June 1953, when he returned to England.

http://pratyeka.org/books/kazak-exodus/

KAZAK EXODUS
by GODFREY LIAS
LONDON EVANS BROTHERS LIMITED
First published 1956
Coverted to e-text in August, 2002 by pratyeka in Sydney, Australia.

In 1948, some twenty thousand Kazak families, with their herds of camels, sheep and horses and all their possessions, set but from Sinkiang Province on a tragic but unwavering exodus from their communist-dominated country.

In addition to continual attack and pursuit by communist troops, the nomads suffered intense and dreadful hardships on a journey which took them across waterless deserts where their animals died of thirst, into the icebound Tibetan uplands without food or shelter, over mountain passes eighteen thousand feet above sea level and across vast stretches of trackless, hostile land.

Two years later, less than a quarter of their original number finally straggled, exhausted but undaunted, into East Kashmir.

When the survivors crossed the frontier on October 10, 1951, they were allowed to bring with them what was left of their flocks and herds, tents and other personal possessions, but they laid down their arms and military equipment at the frontier. So Ali Beg lost not only his field glasses, compass and map, but also his sword which the tradition of his family declared to have been a gift from Genghis Khan himself.

The party spent altogether fifty-two days waiting on the Tibetan side of the frontier before being allowed to enter Kashmir, although Mohammed Emin Bugra, the Turki leader who was living in Srinagar, hurried to Delhi to appeal personally on their behalf to Mr. Nehru himself, as soon as he heard of their arrival. They fought six battles with the Communists between Gezkul and the Indian frontier and two more while waiting for permission to cross. They also had three clashes with Tibetans. Of the two hundred and thirty-four persons who set out with Ali Beg from Gezkul, a hundred and seventy-five came through safely. They lost eleven hundred sheep, sixty horses, thirty-seven cows and forty-five camels in the fighting and from malnutrition and sickness, apart from those they killed for food. I was unable to get accurate figures for the other groups but I estimate that about two thousand eight hundred Kazaks started from Gezkul and between fifteen hundred and eighteen hundred reached Kashmir. Some of these are still in India. On the other hand some Kazaks who had been living in India and Pakistan for years joined the Gezkul refugees when they went to Turkey where other Kazaks from East Turkistan went as many as twenty years ago and have become quite prosperous, though not as shepherds but as merchants.

Such a poem and, indeed, such a people, pose a challenge and provide an opportunity. In spite of all that has happened, the Kazak refugees still believe that their country will be free again. They are an Asiatic people whose necks are still unbowed after all the years during which the Chinese and the Communists tried to force their yoke upon them. They know the strength and the weakness of the Communist system in Asia. They understand how it obtained its hold and how that hold can be loosened. Their exploits provide tangible evidence that the heart of Asia, where is the centre and core of Communist power, is full of men and women who are bitterly opposed to everything that Communism stands for.

The book above might be interesting as it describes the situation on the ground in Xinjiang at the time of PLA takeover in 1948, from a native POV. Not sure if this is OT, please disregard if it is. I thought it might be helpful in some way to understand the geopolitics of the region at the time period in question. It is also a very nice read.

[Johann]

Hi Brihaspati,

I don't think Nehru had anything against Eisenhower personally - as you say there was even mutual respect - but Eisenhower's administration, specifically the Dulles brothers represented a kind of crusading anti-communism that Nehru couldn't stand, especially since it was largely powered by Wall Street and the conservative wing of the Catholic Church (Cardinal Spellman specifically), forces that Nehru intensely disliked and distrusted.

From everything I've read and heard, Nehru regarded these sort of forces as the real threat to world peace, rather than Stalin or Mao. This is not unusual - many people whose formative experiences were in the 1930s (when liberals banded together with communists, while many conservatives backed the fascists) felt the same way in the 1940s and 50s.

If people were worried about anything it was Pakistan, especially after 1954 when the Eisenhower administration rewarded it for joining their anti-communist alliance ringing the USSR and PRC. Nehru could have done the same thing but refused, preferring to conduct an arms build up by buying British weapons using Britain's WWII rupee debt to India not only because that compromised sovereignty less, but because a highly nationalistic press would have raised hell. Nevertheless its clear Nehru deeply resented the Americans for forcing India to spend on weapons instead of development - one of Nehru and the INC's fundamental criticisms of the Raj was that its spending was largely on defence rather than social and economic development.

If we are to go back earlier to the 1949-50 period think Nehru made the same mistake with Mao that Chamberlain made with Hitler, believing that there were limits to their ambitions. Nehru thought he could buy off Mao's support by letting him have Tibet, just as Chamberlain hoped the Sudaten would be enough for Hitler. In both cases these leaders desperately wanted peace, and their initiatives were popular at home - those who warned of the dangers were few and far between. In both cases the leadership over-compensated by challenging the threat before they were ready - The French and British extending guarantees to Poland and Czechoslovakia in March 1939 that they were in condition to deliver on, and Nehru launching the "Forward Policy". Where the analogy really breaks down is the size or the voice of the constituency in India that had real concerns over Mao and the CPC before Panchsheel, despite the Korean war, despite the invasion of Tibet. In relative terms it was much smaller than those who feared the Nazis in Britain - India and China did not have a history of conflict, and Marxism was still something that seemed to back anti-colonial national liberation an end to exploitation by capitalists. Sardar Patel, the most powerful secular conservative force in the INC was gone by then.

[brihaspati]

Johann,
Nehru does not appear to have thought of the Communists as "liberals" to take along or see as a non-threat - as far as evidence goes about Kerala. In fact he dealt quite aggressively with them. The first encounter with communists in Telengana in 47-48 can perhaps be passed off on Sardar [but then why did not Nehru put his foot down like he did in Korean War when Sardar was still very much kicking and pulling punches?]. In fact the Telengana episode could be a singular branching point for all subsequent twists in Indian communist movement. They were fighting against the Nizam shahi, formally using liberal land-reforms slogans that should touched a chord in Nehru's heart - and a perfect mix of anti-colonial/anti-feudal/pro-peasant-landless/leftist bandwagon that Nehru was at least formally aligning with for some time. He could have had them right on board at the time and slowly digested into the toothless CPI that the original core became.

But then what happened with Kerala after Sardar was gone - shows that Nehru never had any illusions about the threat posed by the Communists - where internal politics was concerned. So why the illusion with external ones?

[ramana]

And don't forget Allen was college lecturer in Shimla before WWI and had his own views about India.

[brihaspati]

The 1948- Telengana experience became the foundation for the factional opposition within the CPI to the official collaboration line with "nationalist" governments - a remnant of the WWII defend-the-socialist-motherland line of Stalin as implemented for foreign communist movements. Even though most of the original Telengana leadership were either destroyed/expelled/resigned, the experience provide dthe basis for subsequent rejection of the Indian rashtra's "class character" as propounded by the CPI and started the long trek towards Maoism.

Since we are nowadays always looking for "original causes" for current "insurgencies" we might just explore this episode in Andhra leftism.

[Johann]

Brihaspati,

It doesn't seem mysterious to me - Nehru was a politician, not just an activist intellectual and statesman, and he was certainly experienced as two out of the three by 1949-50.

Nehru had relatively few problems with communism as an ideology but more problems with the Communist Party of India as an organisation and as a domestic political competitor.

The relationship between the CPI and Congress was very close between 1935 and 1942.

In fact even until the end of 1947 the CPI's guiding political strategy at the national level was to support 'progressive' forces within the INC led by Nehru against 'reactionary' forces led by Sardar Patel.

Sankar Ghose's biography quotes a letter he wrote to Mountbatten in August 1948 proclaiming "that he had no feelings against communists or communism as such, but that the way the Indian Communists were indulging in the most violent acts would disgust anyone". His specific problem was their willingness to mobilise the unions in to striking - but he seemed to think this was some sort of local problem.

Even after this Nehru consistently opposed Sardar and the various chief ministers when it came to the question of banning the CPI, that repression would only strengthen them.

I think it's safe to say Nehru lacked any sort of anti-communist ideological bent, and was prone to appeasement as the first line of political strategy in dealing with communist challenges. Nehru was honestly against totalitarianism, but I think he came to realise what communism was capable of only very late in life.

Although Winston Churchill was extraordinarily racist about the Indians even by British standards of the time, his biggest source of opposition to the INC and Nehru (and hence support for the Muslim League) was a fear that he would simply cave in to the communists once the British were gone- hence the infamous "men of straw" comment at the time of independence. Nehru's success in domestically containing communism led Churchill to completely revise his opinion of Nehru, calling him in 1955 "The Light of Asia".

[ramana]

Bji,
The simple explanation could be by embracing Soviet Union he defused the political threat from the CPI which was the only other cadre based modern party at that time. The Communist armed revolt in Telangana was the major civil/internal threat to the new nation state. He needed to defuse it with minimum force. in addition commanding heights economy was the new dogma of the era due o the success of SU in jump starting the Russians from peasant to modern times despite the horrors of nazi invasion. And the resultant extra territory in Eastern Europe.

[svinayak]

Even more ironically, Nehru's government opposed UN resolutions branding China as an aggressor in the Korean war in 1950 - within the year.
Moreover, "aggression" started almost at the same time as "Panchsheel" in 1954-1955. "Map-conquest" incident first happened in 1955. But Nehru and Zhou went on chatting. Things go on happening almost every year since then 1956/1957/1958/1959/1960/1961- when did Nehru had the big leisure to be even confused about Mao's intentions?

One more thing you need to understand is that foreigners are interested in the Indian national interest and also in Indian foreign policy. Especially when it comes to China.
Watch out for foreigners who pretend that they know the national interest of India.

JLN thought that JFK was in his side when dealing with PRC. India's assumption was that US China entanglement meant that JFK was in the side of Indians.

[svinayak]

Especially since the Indian Army had been reporting road-building activity since 1955, which Defence Minister Menon had dismissed as 'CIA propaganda'.

It is odd and sad that the Defence Minister goes to all the trouble of calling a road on his own country's territory as CIA Propaganda, when all he had to do was simply take a flight and go to Aksai Chin and verify it himself. Surely, it cannot be that impossible to fly out there and either drive or fly by to confirm that no Chinese road exists. But this remarkable man would call something so easily verifiable as propaganda.

The news about PLA advances against India and against Indian territory comes from US sources. Even now most of that kind of news comes from US sources and they make sure it is reported in Indian newspapers. Just check the news item when MMS went to Tawang in 2009 and 2010. The news report published at the time of visit was PLA troops detaining Indian scouts inside Indian territory and PLA violating LAC in Arunachal.

Is it not odd that such news come from western sources.

[Arjun]

I think it's safe to say Nehru lacked any sort of anti-communist ideological bent, and was prone to appeasement as the first line of political strategy in dealing with communist challenges.

It would be safe to say that the "appeasement" route has since been institutionalized within the INC as pretty much as the first line of strategy in dealing with both subsequent overseas challenges (China, Pakistan) as well as in internal insurgencies (J&K, NE) - other than the occasional flash-in-the-pan as in Bangladesh.

[chandrabhan]

Cross posting from Geopolitics thread..

On 28th , At my brother's 'Tehrvi' a Congress chief minister had made a comment rather speculation with my uncle and brother that the leaks of black money and other selective leaks of Rahul Gandhi's dubious education along with Inheritance money have made to the media by someone in PMO.
CM is complete 'Chammach' of Gandhis and knows my family due to old UP connection - being the daughter in law of Umakant Dixit, a friend of my grand father. I dont know what to make of it. She was hinting that removal of Sanjay baru and all has been a game plan to facilitiate it, "Someone is trying to bring the house down, considering people firmly believe that he is honest"

I hate MMS and his timidity and felt that she was trying to build image of MMS for the forthcoming UP elections. She never even mentioned that Rahul is ready to lead. She mentioned that younger leaders are not ready to face the public.