US and PRC relationship & India

[abhishek_sharma]

Stephen Walt on China

http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/201 ... bout_china

1. Is there a new Cold War between the United and China?

In my opinion, no. There is growing concern about the relationship in both countries, and I think there is likely to be a rising security competition between the two, especially in Asia. But it's a far cry from the Cold War struggle between the United States and Soviet Union. That was really a battle to the death, where both states actively wanted to bring the other down. Nothing like that is occurring between the United States and China these days. The Cold War was also an intense ideological competition, where each side saw the other's political system as not merely different, but as the embodiment of evil. There are some differences in values between the United States and China, but it's not at nearly the same level as the Cold War. Lastly, the United States and USSR did not interact very much: trade and investment were quite low and there wasn't a lot of personal or cultural exchange between the two states. Again, the situation with China and the United States today is very different: there is a lot of trade and investments, thousands of students going back and forth every year, and and fairly high degree of elite engagement too. So while there is an emerging rivalry that I expect to become more intense, it isn't what I'd call a "Cold War."

2. Is President Obama's Asia policy a success?

On balance, yes. Despite having allowed itself to get distracted by events elsewhere, I think the administration has done a fairly good job. President Obama's trip to Asia last year was quite successful. The security partnership with India is deepening, and the United States has managed relations with traditional allies such as Japan well. It has backed South Korea effectively in its delicate relationship with North Korea, and restored closer ties with Indonesia. Relations with Singapore are strong, and Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of State Clinton have made it clear that the United States intends to remain closely engaged in Asia for many years to come. Overall, they've done much better in East Asia than they have in Central Asia (Afghanistant/Pakistan) or the Middle East.

3. What are China's aims?

China's objectives are not really that hard to understand. First, they want to continue to grow economically, because doing so is critical to the welfare of the Chinese people and to the stability and legitimacy of the government. Second, like any other country, China wants to maximize its security. It doesn't want to be vulnerable to events elsewhere, or to pressure from other major powers. This means it wants reliable access to raw materials, to energy, and to the world markets on which its prosperity increasingly depends. Over the long term, that means it would like to reduce the American role in Asia, because its leaders will feel they are safer if there isn't any major military adversary with a strong position in Asia. Americans wouldn't be happy is some world power had an array of alliances in the Western hemisphere; by the same logic, Beijing cannot be delighted by America's close ties with many Asian countries (not to mention Taiwan). This view isn't a sign of innate Chinese expansionism or aggressiveness; for a realist, it's how any great power would view this situation. Whether Beijing will achieve its various aims, of course, is another matter.

[TonyMontana]

Over the long term, that means it would like to reduce the American role in Asia, because its leaders will feel they are safer if there isn't any major military adversary with a strong position in Asia. Americans wouldn't be happy is some world power had an array of alliances in the Western hemisphere; by the same logic, Beijing cannot be delighted by America's close ties with many Asian countries (not to mention Taiwan). This view isn't a sign of innate Chinese expansionism or aggressiveness; for a realist, it's how any great power would view this situation.

Sage words. Quoted for truth.

[sanjaykumar]

American involvement leads to relatively open wealthy countries like Japan, Taiwan, South Korea. Chinese engagement leads to North Korea, Myanmar and Pakistan.

[ramana]

Henrybhai has messages wrapped in messages. Working on deconstruction. Please wait.

[abhishek_sharma]

Reality in U.S.-China Relations

http://www.cfr.org/publication/23803/re ... tions.html

[RamaY]

Henrybhai has messages wrapped in messages. Working on deconstruction. Please wait.

I found few nuggets in the dark. But will wait for the light.

[ramana]

Comments by e-mail:

This article is important since the timing and the by HK who is the architect of the US China relationship in the last 40 years.

When the relationship was built it was based on a geo political balance of power during the cold war against the former soviet union. After the fall of the SU and after 911 this relationship is now defunct and a new one has to be built.

Russian article says that Russia is alone and it does not have any friends since it is a large geo political power. It also said that US will also find itself in the same situation with the elite being alone without any allies.

For the US elite who are used to allies during the cold war this is big change and is actully something which they are not ready yet. PRC china was supposed to be its ally in the trade and global arena after the 90s and make PRC as a major power.

After the western financial collapse US wants to connect to the large China economy and reboot itself. China is the only large country which can be equal to US in Asia and Japan and Korea has slide in the rankings for US.

China has taken help during the global economic collapse after 911 and used its large leverage of reserves to buy US treasuries and other assets to keep its juggernaut moving. After the finanical collapse and signs of dollar deflation China has been carefull. US wants to keep the currency and trade relationship going forward to get out of this global situation. It is risky and may lead to inflation and dollar value going down.

So at this time if US launches a cold war it is going to make the elites friendless and without any external country to get itself out of the situation and still be the leading nation.

If the elites feel that the US is not ready to fix itself then they want to make China as the image of a rival and make it as a large power which is going to take over hte world leadership. It gives them many benefits by taking the focus away from US and its recovery and creates global turmoil which US will be called in to fix it after 10 years or so.

[Pranav]

I'm indeed very happy to see unkil dreaming merrily of G2 and planet carve-ups. More such dry dreams, the merrier.

Elites controlling the US have to move towards G1, by their very nature. Like the scorpion that stung the frog. They may try to fool the Chinese for the time being, however.

[abhishek_sharma]

U.S. Shifts Focus to Press China for Market Access

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/19/world ... prexy.html

[abhishek_sharma]

What Obama should NOT say to Hu Jintao

http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/201 ... _hu_jintao

There is clearly considerable concern that the United States will "do a deal" with China, in effect granting it a free hand in its neighborhood in exchange for concessions elsewhere.

I've tried to explain to my audiences here that this is very unlikely. Realism tells you that the two most powerful states in the international system tend to be very wary of each other, and find it difficult (though of course not impossible) to cooperate, particularly on core issues of national security. Some sort of "G-2" condominium would be difficult to negotiate and hard to sustain, because both sides would worry that the other was getting the better part of the deal.

The immediate problem, however, is that both China and the United States have some incentives to make the summit a success, and to mask or minimize differences under a veil of flattering diplomatic language. Moreover, China's neighbors are somewhat ambivalent themselves: they don't want to be dominated by China, but they also don't want a "Cold War" in the region. This situations gives the United States and China reasons to "act nice," even if both are aware of some significant underlying differences, and it may tempt the Obama administration to remain silent on some key areas of disagreement, such as China's territorial claims.

So President Obama needs to be careful. His normal instinct, as we've seen repeatedly, is to play the role of conciliator, to avoid setting clear red lines, and to look for whatever deals he can get. My guess is that his advisors will also be encouraging him to avoid any sort of confrontational language, and Secretary of State Clinton has already emphasized the U.S. desire for "real action, on real issues." If the United States and China can make progress on currency issues, North Korea, and climate change, then they can view the summit as a success and other states in Asia will not be overly alarmed.

...

Lastly, bear in mind that this is just one meeting. No matter what gets said by either side, or what agreements they do or do not reach, this meeting is not going to determine the future of Sino-American relations or the future of the U.S. position in Asia. There are enduring structural features -- both economic and strategic -- that will exert lasting effects on how those features of contemporary world politics evolve, and it would be a mistake to put too much weight on just one meeting. But I still hope the president chooses his words with great care, and keeps that smile of his in check.

[abhishek_sharma]

The China threat: considering the growing consensus

http://rothkopf.foreignpolicy.com/posts ... _consensus

But in my conversations with diplomats from around the region during the past couple of weeks, there has been a recurring theme that China is engaged in a sweeping, systematic effort to extend its influence and flex its muscles.

Some are even more worried than the articles in the press. One senior diplomat from one of Asia's most important countries described a perception that China was consciously embracing unstable regimes and promoting instability on Asia's western and eastern flanks in order to keep its rivals distracted. The argument was that the China is content to let the North Koreans behave badly because they neither want a unified Korean peninsula and because instability essentially preoccupies Japan and Korea and keeps them on the defensive. At the same time, it was suggested the Chinese were selling arms and supporting WMD proliferation to Pakistan to build good will and shore up a strategy that will help them build a corridor to the sea through Pakistan and which will, in coordination with related efforts in Tibet, Nepal, and Central Asia, keep the Indians on the defensive.

In Latin America and in Africa it is common place to hear talk of how China has supplanted the West in terms of economic aid and influence. China has also been very sophisticated in playing the United States and the Europeans against each other in its handling of trade and currency issues (such as Vice Premier Li's check-writing mission to Europe that was clear a balance-providing scene setter for the Hu visit to the United States)

Clearly China has come a long way from its sleeping giant days. Indeed, China is hardly the "developing nation" she argues she must still be treated as in climate and trade discussions. (When you give out more aid than the World Bank and have more reserves than any nation on earth, you don't qualify for developing nation status even if much of your society is just that. China shouldn't be able to have it both ways.) Further, on military matters recent initiatives and rhetoric have clearly signaled we are on to a new era in which a China that is actively investing in space and stealth technologies and building about her ability to project force a great distance from her home shores is not the China that successfully sold the argument that she was safely inward-looking by nature. (A position many of her neighbors found laughable thanks to centuries of history.)

Indubitably there is a growing threat posed by China. It is dramatically different than the threat once posed by the Soviet Union. China does not seek to claim territory via some old-fashioned strategy of imperial competition. And it is not a zero-sum competition with the United States -- both sides depend on one another too much for that. Rather, it is a threat posed by a power that has views, values and objectives that are out of sync and sometimes in conflict with those of the United States and many of our allies. In fact, a core element of China's strategy is to remain aloof from debates about how the nations of the global community should conduct their affairs, being a values-blind dealer in pure national self-interest. Whereas the United States and the Soviets sold competing ideologies, the China's are simply buying and selling without any apparent political strings attached.

That's a sham, of course. There are always strings. Big businesses that are required to trade intellectual property for market share are starting to feel it. Countries that grow dependent on Chinese cash are starting to feel it or will soon do.

It's not time to contain China, but it is certainly time to counter-balance her. It is not a time for enmity but it is a time to demand balance and a respect for the rule of law ... and to be willing to take action from withholding market access to building international coalitions in support of our views to bringing cases in international forums to deliberately and visibly building the capabilities to assert our views wherever that is called for. It is a rivalry that calls for a new kind of subtle diplomacy and an old-fashioned brand of steely toughness.

As such, it poses the single central challenge not only for Obama foreign policy but for diplomats from every major power worldwide.

[ramana]

Hu, US and us: C Raja Mohan

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/hu-us-and-us/739302/

Hu, US and us

C. Raja Mohan Posted online: Wed Jan 19 2011, 04:08 hrs

When US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described some time ago that the US-China relationship is “the most important” in the world, there was much anxiety in New Delhi. There were two reasons for Delhi’s heartburn. One, for decades, India had seen itself as an equal to China. It was difficult for Delhi to acknowledge that not only had China overtaken India, but it had also become a consequential global power, thanks to three decades of double-digit economic growth. China’s gross domestic product is now more than three times that of India; and that gap is likely to widen in the coming years even if Delhi produces outstanding economic performance. The other was an apprehension that a Democratic administration in Washington might replace President George W. Bush’s special warmth for India with an emphasis on cultivating a privileged partnership with China.

The pomp and ceremony that will mark Chinese President Hu Jintao’s reception at the White House this week and the intensity of the American debate on China underline one inescapable reality: Sino-US ties are the most important in the world today.

Sixty-odd years ago, independent India’s attempts to craft a foreign policy were shaped by the nature of the relationship between Washington and Moscow. After the global financial crisis, which has brought into sharp relief the relative decline of the US and the rapid rise of China, the Sino-US relationship has become the principal external factor in India’s engagement with the world.

Some predictions put 2027 as the date when the Chinese economy will overtake that of the US. Others suggest it could happen sooner, maybe by the end of this decade. While individual Americans will be richer than Chinese, the balance of power between the two is bound to evolve in China’s favour in many areas.

Whether Delhi likes it or not, most big issues confronting the world — from rebalancing the world economy to managing
climate change and the maintenance of international peace
and security — will be shaped by the policies of Washington
and Beijing.

As India begins to recognise the centrality of the Sino-US relationship for world politics, it will confront what we might call the “Goldilocks Problem”. Like the girl in the fable who went into the house of bears in the forest, India does not want relations between Washington and Beijing to turn either too warm or too cold.

Recall how Delhi went into a tizzy, when a joint statement was issued by US President Barack Obama and Hu at the end of their summit in Beijing in November 2009. The suggestion that Washington and Beijing might work together to stabilise the subcontinent saw Delhi froth at the mouth. For India, the idea of a Sino-US condominium or more broadly the notion of the “Group of Two” is utterly unacceptable. At the same time, India also recoils at the notion of aligning with one against the other.

Proposals from Washington for deeper security cooperation in East Asia and the Pacific make many in India nervous. Delhi is equally wary about relentless pressures from Moscow and Beijing to join a countervailing block against the US. Some in India would be tempted to think of “non-alignment” between Washington and Beijing. Delhi must resist that temptation, for the Sino-US dynamic is very different from that between Washington and Moscow in the past. During the Cold War, India had the luxury of demanding peaceful coexistence between the two superpowers when they threatened each other and of denouncing their collusion when they acted together.

Emerging India’s political and economic fortunes today are inextricably intertwined with the future of Sino-US relations and Delhi can’t detach itself from what happens between Washington and Beijing.

Unlike the Soviet-American dynamic which was centred around Europe and the Atlantic, the Sino-US power-play occurs right around us in Asia, in the shared periphery between Delhi and Beijing. Without a border with either protagonist in the Cold War, India was spared the direct impact of the rivalry although it had to deal with secondary consequences. With a long and contested border with China, India will be on the very frontlines of a potential Sino-American conflict.

Unlike Soviet Russia, Communist China is part of the world economic system. Reordering the extraordinary financial interdependence between the world’s two largest economies — the US and China — is one of the main themes of Hu’s summit with Obama. How they deal with that issue will have a profound bearing on India.

As India’s relative weight in the international system increases, though slower than that of China, Delhi can’t return to non-alignment. It must develop a very different approach. India’s emphasis must be on becoming an indispensable element in the future balance of power in Asia and acquiring a decisive say in the construction of a new international order amid the rise of China and the weakening of the US. This in turn would demand a deeper engagement with both Washington and Beijing in order to influence the outcomes from the rapidly changing Sino-US relationship.

On the face of it, the danger of a “G-2” between China and the US has passed amid the mounting tension between the two last year. Nevertheless, Obama and Hu must be expected to moderate their potential rivalry and find ways to cooperate.

Delhi needs to develop strong political and economic leverage with both if it wants to avoid the negative effects of either collaboration or conflict between Washington and Beijing. Innovative diplomacy from Delhi in the last few years has generated a new level of political comfort with the US as seen during Obama’s visit to India last November. The relationship with China, however, has stalled amidst many new problems that remained unresolved in the talks with Premier Wen Jiabao last month.

As it builds on the new opportunities with the United States, Delhi must also make some bold moves towards Beijing in the coming months. Delhi must ensure that its ties with Beijing do not fall too far behind the Sino-US relationship or the Indo-US partnership.

Good article. Its similar to the advice Henry Kissinger wrote on not having a new Cold War between US- PRC.

Jospeh Nye the US scholar and a guest at the State dinner for Hu was saying on Bloomberg Radio today, that in less than 3 decades we sill see an Economic ChIndia and the three powers will be US, PRC and India. Apparently he wrote in Korea Times.

Indian elite has to educate and control their politicians to behave as future world leaders and not village zamindars and loot the treasury when in power or play divisive politics leading to self goals.

I agree with CRM that its important for India to build politicial, economic and military power to ensure Indian interests are protected and furthered.

[RajeshA]

Hu, US and us: C Raja Mohan
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/hu-us-and-us/739302/

As India’s relative weight in the international system increases, though slower than that of China, Delhi can’t return to non-alignment. It must develop a very different approach. India’s emphasis must be on becoming an indispensable element in the future balance of power in Asia and acquiring a decisive say in the construction of a new international order amid the rise of China and the weakening of the US.

I agree with CRM that its important for India to build politicial, economic and military power to ensure Indian interests are protected and furthered.

For India to become an indispensable element in the future balance of power in Asia, and especially to be able to have an equidistant relationship between USA and China, India would first have make herself indispensable for China.

China should not have the option to circumvent India in Asia by building alliances with our periphery and by destabilizing India. China should know that any access to the Indian Ocean needs Indian approval and friendship. That is why it is of paramount importance that we start thinking in terms of consolidating the Indian Subcontinent under one political center. If China should ever feel, that it can circumvent India, it would prefer to do so. Putting it differently, China should need India just as much to get access to the Indian Ocean as it needs Russia to get access to the Arctic Ocean - completely. That is indispensability!

In the other scenario, China would simply neutralize India by spreading chaos in the Subcontinent, and India would be nowhere in a position to play balancing games.

[rsingh]

Gurus watch public dhulai of Unkil's H&D on CNN. One reporter asked obama and HU about human rights.Obama responded promptly. Then question was translated to Hu for 10 min.................it seems translater started with defination of "human rights". Obama waited like Baki wait for alms . After that Hu ignored the question completly anyway. At that moment some reporter from some cccccctv pinched Obama "do you really want good for China..........flom your heart"
Oh not finished yet. Some reporter reminded Hu that he forgot to answer the question...............Hu responded that he never heard the question typical

[RajeshA]

That is not Hu. That is just some Life Model Decoy (LMD) and being Chinese-built, not such a good one. It is just standing there giving no reaction.

[Prem]

That is not Hu. That is just some Life Model Decoy (LMD) and being Chinese-built, not such a good one. It is just standing there giving no reaction.

Someone just made the remark about lacking any human emotion in that LMD in front of the camera. Demand was made in Triplicate , :Respect, Respect, Respect" , "you must respect us as equal". Doc here need to come up with Chikological explanation of this craving by Hu. AFAIK, those who command respect ,dont demand respect but earn it.

[surinder]

Does anyone else get the feeling that the Hu visit to US is like a crowning, a coming-out party for the new super power. The crown of global superpowerdom is passing from US -> PRC right before our eyes. Khan looks old, middle aged, tired---PRC looks virile young and cocky.


PS: And India? What is that? Where is it located?

[ramana]

surinder, I guess you haven't learned anything from this thread nor its earlier version. You might have read but thats all.

[surinder]

ramana, I have probably read the stuff differently. I suppose I may be the only one who gets a these feeling watching the visit and the press conference.

[TonyMontana]

Na. It was a send off party for Hu. Good effort old chap and all that.

[shyamd]

Indian elite has to educate and control their politicians to behave as future world leaders and not village zamindars and loot the treasury when in power or play divisive politics leading to self goals.

So true. It is now time to stop the crap. Put in harsh laws on corruption.

I agree with CRM that its important for India to build politicial, economic and military power to ensure Indian interests are protected and furthered.

There is an agreement between India and US on this. A look back over the last 11 years or so will tell us that.

Question is: Is the US giving room for India to operate in West Asia, in order to help India grow?

[ramana]

No. To reduce Muslim anger against them. Its an indirect strategy.. Even the brits used Indian troops in West Asia in WWI. It was Indian troops that Gen. Allenby led into Jerusalem.

[shyamd]

^^ Every other source from Debka (from 2003/4) to IOL to others are pointing at US pressure on GCC to build relations with India.

Its not to say that reducing muslim anger is not a reason, but its not the only reason. IMO. There are fundamentals to the relationship too - we will be a good buyer of the black stuff, we are closest geographically to GCC and it'll be easier for us to protect them than any other in exchange for gifts.

[ramana]

The Gulf guys wanted to be with India since a long time. However there was pressure from UK and US not to align with India. Now they want to reverse it. the protection aspect was the reason. In addition the gulf royals recall when the Brits/EIC used to chase them as bandits and pirates and they sought shelter in the coastal kingdoms.

[svinayak]

The Gulf guys wanted to be with India since a long time. However there was pressure from UK and US not to align with India.

When HK used to visit the Indian analyst they used to ask him that India will park itself in the Gulf and be able to control the situation. HK dismissed such suggestion.

Now the US may have felt the hostility by the local population and they can no longer have similar kind of relations as before 30 years ago. Once the local show hostile reception to foreign people and troops that means it is the end of the road.
Indians have to come back to its historical role in the region which includes economy and the Rupee currenecy

[shyamd]

^^ That was Sultanate of Oman, I think they have actually put parts of it in official history. You can read some of those stories on their MFA page.

Today TSP is well entrenched and is just an extension of the GCC. You could be right - KSA supported TSP with you know what and also during 1971. We also need to analyse who was in power during these periods. Each had different views. It could also be that cold war era - india siding with Soviets might be an issue. So US told GCC to stay away from India. But again, TSP was approached in 1996 for the integration. India was okay then.

Fact is: Its got cannon fodder today - TSP and its got some level of protection from the US/west. US/West isn't leaving the region as long as the black stuff is present.

Does India have the legs today? nope, but it will have the legs in the next 4 - 5 years.

Read Dhahi Khalifan's comments. the way things are going at the moment, in the next 8-10 years it may become another Indian state!

Aside, its also a good point to revisit the Debka article on why Bush/Cheney was askin the Emirs to do India's bidding:

This isn't the actual I was looking forr, need to do some digging.

Desperately Shopping for New Protectors
India Offers Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms Military Treaty


President George W. Bush will find a Persian Gulf region moving on – and slipping away – when he lands there on Jan. 12, 2008.

DEBKA-Net-Weekly's regional sources report that the rulers of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates have taken on board the realization that President Bush does not intend to uphold the commitment he and vice president Dick Cheney made to them to solve the Iranian nuclear problem before the end of their term.

They attribute this retraction to a direct US dialogue with Iran, which every ruler, secret service and military leader in the Gulf region is convinced is underway and bound to override administration decision-making on Iran, Lebanon, the Palestinians and therefore the Middle East at large in the year to come.

The Gulf emirs, as the US president will discover on the spot, have responded by diversifying their security options. Although willing to host US military forces on their soil and across the Middle East, they are no longer willing to rely exclusively on the United States for their security. The Gulf Cooperation Council heads have accordingly gone shopping around for new protectors against military aggression.

In particular, they want a shield against the clandestine nuclear menace which they feel is breathing down their necks from Iran. No responsible Gulf official credits the US National Intelligence Estimate assertion that Iran suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003. None doubts that the Islamic Republic is still deeply engaged in this quest. Washington's release of the NIE report is seen as a key component of the package of understandings and accommodations it is forging with Tehran.



Bush is reconciled to a nuclear-armed Iran



It is taken to mean that the Bush administration, and therefore the United States, has come to terms with a nuclear-armed Iran.

This conviction impelled the Gulf en bloc to embark in recent weeks on a desperate quest for new protectors outside the American orbit, and cast their net farther afield than ever before. In discreet approaches through undercover channels of communication, DEBKA-Net-Weekly's sources reveal that Russia, China, Japan, India and Indonesia, were requested by GCC members to submit proposals for military pacts embodying guarantees for their security.

Most of the replies were negative or evasive, signifying a reluctance to go up against the United States which, despite the knocks to the administration's credibility over Iraq, the war on terror in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Gulf and the Middle East, is still by and large respected as the world's No. 1 superpower. Even the Russian and Chinese nay-sayers were wary of openly throwing down the gauntlet against America in one of its principal spheres of influence.

DEBKA-Net-Weekly's exclusive sources disclose the content of the replies reaching the six Gulf governments:



Russia

Although President Vladimir Putin freely and public flexes Russia's military muscle at every opportunity (see separate article in this issue), he avoided a commitment to allay the anxieties of the Gulf rulers. Without saying yes or no, he stressed that Moscow is already bound to certain Gulf nations, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, by military accords covering Russian arms sales to those countries. Nonetheless, Moscow is not averse to amendments that in the future would have the effect of military cooperation treaties.

The Gulf saw this as polite refusal: Moscow has no interest at this point in openly taking on the United States in the Gulf.



China

Beijing bluntly informed the Gulf applicants that it has no interest in any military pacts in the near future. DEBKA-Net-Weekly's military sources explain why this response was predictable: China has no navy, air force or army contingents capable of long-range deployment as far distant as the Gulf or the Middle East. Furthermore, since 2006, Beijing's ties with Tehran, especially in energy, have evolved from ordinary business links to a strategic relationship which Beijing is not prepared to hazard at this point.



Japan

Another straight no came from Tokyo, primarily because Japan is likewise short of the military resources to back up a military treaty.



Indonesia

Jakarta turned the Gulf emirates down on a treaty, but offered to train their armies.



India

The only affirmative reply to the Gulf plea came from New Delhi. Indeed, Manmohan Singh's government had two optional proposals ready:

1. A military treaty that would spread India's nuclear umbrella over the entire bloc.

2. Alternatively, separate pacts entailing the same nuclear shield between India and each of the six GCC members.



New Delhi learns of secret Saudi-Pakistan pact



New Delhi, it was noted, is in the middle of a major expansion of India's naval, air and marine forces. They are perfectly capable of detaching the units needed for deployment in the Persian Gulf, the Oman and Arabian Seas and the Indian Ocean.

DEBKA-Net-Weekly's sub-continental sources report that no time was lost in taking up the offer: Gulf military and intelligence officers have started meeting with senior Indian security officials to develop the terms of the military pact.

Our sources add that New Delhi's eagerness to go forward with the new strategic association was quickened by intelligence received that Saudi Arabia had signed a secret defense pact with Pakistan's Pervez Musharraf, including a nuclear protection clause.

The GCC has not yet sent its collective response to the Indian proposals. But our sources report at least two of its members, one of which is Qatar, have entered into separate talks with New Delhi.

The upshot of these moves, if they mature fully, may see India and Pakistan sharing the Gulf region between them as providers of defense guarantees and nuclear shields.

India's added interest in planting a foothold in the Gulf region comes from the conservatively estimated three million Indian expatriates living and working in those countries.

Indian citizens make up one-fifth of Bahrain's population; 15 percent of Oman's, a quarter of Qatar's inhabitants and 32 percent in the United Arab Emirates.

While 70 percent do unskilled jobs, one fifth are white collar workers and 10 percent professionals. Hundreds of Indian associations function in Kuwait and the UAE.

In Kuwait, the Indian Art Circle has built an auditorium for an audience of 1,200 for cultural programs and performances. High-income Indian workers, who are allowed to bring their families over, have opened dozens of schools which follow the Indian curriculum in the Gulf emirates.

[svinayak]

Read Dhahi Khalifan's comments. the way things are going at the moment, in the next 8-10 years it may become another Indian state!

Can you give some links.
Pak military has a grey market business for western mil parts in the gulf region.

[shyamd]

Check out the West Asia thread, it got some exposure there. They are certainly all over the net, I even did a blog post on it. See here http://middleeast-analysis.blogspot.com/

[abhishek_sharma]

Obama Pushes Hu on Rights but Stresses Ties to China

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/20/world ... prexy.html

[ramana]

^^^ Thats a mixed message all right. One cant stress ties while pushing guests on other matters.

The pushing is for benefit of the Democrat supporters who expected more. And ties is for the businesses who need it.

[abhishek_sharma]

Hu Cometh

http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2011/01/15/hu-cometh/

For one, many, both in and out of China’s government, want to test what Beijing’s growing weight might yield. They are confident of China’s growing strength and relish the opportunity to, at minimum, make Washington work harder for Chinese support of ostensibly shared objectives. Many in China wish to see if Washington will accommodate a wider array of Chinese interests.

For their part, many in Washington have been chastened by China’s choices of the past 9-12 months—as has nearly every country in Asia. In 2009 and 2010, Beijing was far less accommodating than many in the Obama administration had hoped of U.S. preferences on issues from climate, to the pace of renminbi appreciation, to coordinated action in response to North Korean provocations. Despite successes—for example, mutual support for Iran-related sanctions in the UN Security Council—China’s deliberate, self-interested approach in many areas simply did not mesh with American exhortations or expectations. And on Iran, for example, China has not changed its fundamental approach: It retains strong interests in commercial cooperation with Iran and seeks to maintain its energy interests, in particular, even if it ultimately respects sanctions. Chinese oil companies are long-term players who hope to weather the current storm and maintain a presence. They will not likely proceed with new contracts and are slowing down old ones in the short term; they will, however, retain ties to the current Iranian regime and position themselves to move quickly when the present environment changes.
Meanwhile, supportive domestic constituencies (who have long provided ballast to U.S.-China relations in tough times) continue to fracture. China’s central bank has, in various ways, made the case for currency appreciation. But Chinese export lobbies continue to resist, arguing that many companies will go under and China will suffer massive job losses. And this dynamic plays out on the American side too: a once-solid business lobby has, quite clearly, become more conflicted. Few, if any, U.S. firms are pulling out of China. But, for example, a 2010 survey from the American Chamber of Commerce in China put the percentage of U.S. companies that feel unwelcome in the Chinese market at 38 percent, up 15 points from 23 percent just two years earlier in 2008. And that sentiment extends beyond technology companies, like Google, into the manufacturing sector, with a variety of companies now complaining about a host of issues, from intellectual property theft to non-tariff barriers to various aspects of China’s regulatory regime.

Are these challenges manageable? Probably. But China and the U.S. have become centerpieces in wider strategic and economic debates on each side that will play out, ultimately, in each side’s domestic politics — and are bigger than bilateral relations per se.

In the U.S., these include: (1) the future of American manufacturing, competitiveness, and innovation; (2) the future of U.S. primacy in Asia; and (3) what kind of global arrangements best serve U.S. interests.

In China, such debates include: (1) the pace and scope of economic rebalancing; (2) whether (and when) to knuckle under to international pressure on China’s currency and industrial policies; and (3) how to bolster Chinese military projection.

So, while the U.S. and China are deeply interdependent, a growing number of stakeholders on both sides find that reality deeply disquieting. And these structural changes comprise the backdrop to Hu’s visit.
Just take Chinese industrial policy: if 2010 was dominated by the currency issue, 2011 may well see industrial policies rise to the fore, especially if China sustains a gradual appreciation of the renminbi.

But such tensions will be especially challenging because they strike at the core of each country’s economic competitiveness: China’s ability to compete with U.S. firms has improved faster in some areas than many had anticipated. From high-speed rail to nuclear power plants, China’s capacity to digest foreign technology, re-engineer it to Chinese specifications, and then produce (but as a lower-cost competitor) have unnerved a host of foreign companies, who now question the wisdom of transferring technology to China. The underlying fear is that if China can quickly produce substitutable (but cheaper) products, then foreign firms will be marginalized. And Hu’s trip will, in some sense, showcase just how difficult it will be for the U.S. to coordinate actions and responses as the complexities of this Chinese challenge vary across sectors and affect distinct companies differently.

For this reason, China’s “indigenous innovation” policy will be much discussed during the visit, particularly the terms of prospective Chinese accession to the WTO government procurement agreement. But the summit will likely produce agreements only on principles and frameworks … if even that.
U.S.-China relations have been fraught since at least the 1980s. And let’s be clear: the two have had numerous ups and downs, and they have seen worse—much worse—than their current spate of tension.

But structural changes are afoot that are sure to make the next several years more difficult. And even when the two sides share interests, divergent threat assessments and countervailing interests too often obstruct efforts to fashion complementary policies.

[abhishek_sharma]

Full Text of the U.S.-China Joint Statement

http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts ... _statement

The Presidents further reaffirmed their commitment to the November 2009 U.S. - China Joint Statement.

[abhishek_sharma]

Subtle Signs of Progress in U.S.-China Relations

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/20/world ... ssess.html

[shyamd]

Ramanaji, things are always sold to justify a deal. Remember the story of Bush saying to MMS that he wants a nuclear deal with India? Of course we can believe that it happened like that but personally I don't think it would have happened that way..

Come to think of it I'd support your theory if we apply it to Oman, the Omani's actually wanted a deal with India - our defence relations with Oman have been strong since the 80's. That part has always been reliant on India. Rajiv Gandhi was the first to strengthen the defence relationship - India contributed medical and engineering corps - despite NAM and being allied with FSU.
But I wouldn't say that the others wanted it. Also keep in mind Sultan Qaboos is very different from your average GCC leader.

The US is pushing the GCC as a whole to strengthen defence ties and develop India as a super power - in order to prevent China becoming the sole superpower in the region. I could be wrong but at the moment there is more evidence supporting this theory for the GCC as a whole.

[ramana]

UAE wanted a deal in early 90s and told the visiting babus. (they told a lot of historcial things that made them ask India). They went back and told the PM. It sat in a file as Indian economy was in tatters. Meanwhile UAE got worried and next we know Centcom was setup.

[ramana]

Nightwatch on the Obama Hu charade.

China-US: Comment: US media are gushing about China, but long time students of China and Chinese will remind Readers that Chinese are not like Americans. China has middle and upper classes about as large as the population of the US. However, the condition of the other billion Chinese is never discussed by Chinese authorities, but does not include a vehicle in every house, but might include a television in every village.

The point is that US leaders have made the mistake in the past of investing with equal stature a country that was vastly inferior to the US. Kissinger made this mistake with respect to the Soviet Union in the first STAR Treaty during the Nixon administration.

The US might be repeating that precedent with China. The leadership structures are dominated by authoritarian communists who have encouraged capitalist entrepreneurial success. Wealth and communist orthodoxy vie for dominance as the sources of and paths to leadership. To date, orthodoxy has prevailed over entrepreneurial talent, but that is no longer a given.

The wealth of the cities is resented by the masses of people in the countryside, creating tension between metropoles and the countryside. The prosperous modern sector overlays a vast underworld of unprofitable state-supported enterprises that must continue because the workers have a right to work.

The Chinese accomplishments in raising living standards for more than a billion people are prodigious and astonishing, but they might not be permanent. They feature multiple internal contradictions that can lead to secession or serious internal unrest. Chinese authorities are careful to suppress news of peasant and worker riots. Success also rests on an economic foundation of large state subsidies to state enterprises that is not sustainable. The Chinese communists keep more than one set of books, as they always have.

India-China: Indian paramilitary police arrested three suspected Chinese spies who were spotted taking photographs of their camps on the Rupaidiha check post of the India-Nepal border, the Times of India reported on 19 January. Superintendent of Police Sanjay Kakkar said the soldiers held the three Chinese nationals overnight and during interrogation the suspects claimed they were engineers working in Nepal on a Chinese project. The suspects did not possess passports or visas and entered Indian territory illegally, Kakkar said.

Indian intelligence agencies remain on high alert after receiving information that six Chinese intelligence agents infiltrated India illegally via the India-Nepal border. According to Indian intelligence agencies, the Chinese agents are disguised as monks and have taken refuge in different Tibetan monasteries of Shravasti. The agents are reported to be between 18-35 years old and one is a woman carrying out her mission independent to the rest who are tasked with spying on the Dali Lama and his aides, Indian intelligence sources said.

Comment: In the six years of NightWatch based on open sources, this is the first report NightWatch has found about Indian intelligence and police arresting Chinese spies. Every student of international security affairs, no doubt, understands that nations spy on each other all the time. Chinese spies probably have a large list of information requirements because the Indians are making major changes to Army and Air Force capabilities along the border with China, especially in Arunachal Pradesh State, which China claims.

States seldom, however, release information about this activity to the public. Thus, the key point for analysis is why would the Indians release this information at this time. The most immediate answer is they want to add balance to the nice words about China emerging from Washington. In the group of great Asian democracies, China is not a friend and not cooperative. Some Washington leaders need to keep in mind that our allies have important opinions about and valid experiences in dealing with China, some predating the US as a nation.

[svinayak]

Very important observation.
There is a vacuum in the strategy

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/Ou ... 295435040/

Outside View: For want of a strategy
Published: Jan. 19, 2011 at 6:04 AM
By HARLAN ULLMAN, UPI

WASHINGTON, Jan. 19 (UPI) -- Despite America's penchant for lauding its "exceptionalism," regarding "strategic thinking," this exceptionalism applies to getting that thinking right.

Too often, we get it wrong or allow it to be absent without leave. Over the past century, our record has been poor.

We won World War I yet, in the aftermath, we helped sow the seeds for World War II. Korea was at best a draw. Vietnam was a defeat.

In Iraq, we have inadvertently enabled Iran to become a serious regional power. Guarded optimism over military progress against the Taliban isn't synonymous with turning Afghanistan into a functioning state under the rule of law.

World War II and the Cold War were obviously two of the greatest conflicts of the 20th century. In the latter, while Richard Nixon's thrust to China was strategically brilliant and disciples praise Ronald Reagan for defeating the Evil Empire.

In fact, the Soviet Union fell of its own weight and incompetence. Indeed, had Dwight Eisenhower had his way, and John Kennedy not been so politically motivated in distorting the Soviet threat above its actual danger, who knows if the Cold War might have ended earlier.

During World War II, Britain's leading general, later Viscount Alanbrooke, continually criticized the lack of U.S. strategic thinking as well as its impetuous nature to launch a second front in Europe before the allies were ready.

Of course, American generals rightly faulted General Sir Bernard, later Viscount Montgomery of El Alamein for his tactical caution and timidity. The one bold operation Montgomery attempted was the failed Market Garden assault on Arnhem, dryly critiqued as "a bridge too far."

And Roosevelt complained that Churchill's opposition to early European landings was based on his paranoia over Stalin and Soviet post-war intentions -- not a faulty prediction.

Since the end of the Soviet Union, American strategic thinking hasn't been distinguished. One reason is that we elect presidents with little strategic experience. Of the last three, two (Bill Clinton and George W. Bush) were governors with no obvious national security backgrounds. Barack Obama served for only four years in the U.S. Senate and the Foreign Relations subcommittee of which he was chairman never was convened.

Of course, advisers are meant to fill this void. That doesn't always happen. And when it does, as Bush 43 learned, that doesn't guarantee success.

Obama ran as the uncola candidate chastising Bush's excesses in making war on Iraq and compensating by making Afghanistan his war in large part to pre-empt his opponent, John McCain, from accusing Obama of being weak on national security.

Once president, his rationale for the buildup in Afghanistan was based on "disrupting, dismantling and defeating al-Qaida."

However, to achieve that end, the Taliban became the strategic center of gravity. This was an absurd reversal of ends and means, mainly because there was only a handful of al-Qaida in Afghanistan with many other places where this loosely defined network of extremists could and did find safe haven.

Worse, the real center of gravity for stability in the region -- Pakistan -- was only regarded with rhetoric and not with serious resources that would strengthen both its economy and its military capacity to deal with its extremists particularly on its Afghan border.

None of this should be surprising. After all, who in the new and young president's immediate circle had any background in strategic thinking?

Those who did came from military backgrounds -- the first national security adviser U.S. Marine Gen. James Jones -- and the Pentagon, namely Defense Secretary Robert Gates who was appointed by Bush and U.S. Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Pentagon, armed with greater intellectual and operational firepower than the White House civilians, predictably set the new Afghan strategy. Unfortunately, as with Bush 43 who ignored the post-war consequences of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Obama failed to appreciate that peace in Afghanistan required a regional solution, one he has been unable to generate. And the influence his small circle of political advisers trumped that of his national security adviser.

Jones has since stepped down and Gates and Mullen will both end their service this year. The new national security adviser Tom Donilon isn't a strategic thinker in the mold of a Zbigniew Brzezinski or Brent Scowcroft and more akin to Clinton's second national security adviser, Sandy Berger, an international trade lawyer.

So where will this new thinking arise?

In Congress, U.S. Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, surely fills that bill. Yet, Kerry will stay where he is. And most members of Congress are understandably fixated on jobs, healthcare and domestic agendas.

Does the president fully understand that across the globe, America needs a strategy, not a laundry list of expectations? If not, we will attempt to muddle along. And if muddling doesn't work, then …

--

(Harlan Ullman is chairman of the Killowen Group, which advises leaders of government and business, and senior adviser at Washington's Atlantic Council.)



Read more: http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/Ou ... z1Bby8vs5S

[ramana]

To be fair before getting elected obama was very clear about role of TSP. However after taking office it became fogged. Even the writer is very clear about the center of gravity being TSP. But even he once he gets into the decision maker shoes will mollycoddle TSP. There is something in the establishement that makes them favor TSP.

[svinayak]

To be fair before getting elected obama was very clear about role of TSP. However after taking office it became fogged. Even the writer is very clear about the center of gravity being TSP. But even he once he gets into the decision maker shoes will mollycoddle TSP. There is something in the establishement that makes them favor TSP.

It is simple
A failing, extremist supporting - defiant nuclear state near India is a strategic asset for major powers.

[shyamd]

UAE wanted a deal in early 90s and told the visiting babus. (they told a lot of historcial things that made them ask India). They went back and told the PM. It sat in a file as Indian economy was in tatters. Meanwhile UAE got worried and next we know Centcom was setup.

But what about 5th fleet, CENTCOM was created in 80's. They just took over from the British in the region. Nevertheless, worth a look into.

---------------------------------
If tomorrow India becomes too strong - then who is left to keep a check on India?