Deterrence

[Virupaksha]

Punish the population for the misdeeds of their leaders.

This was exactly how the british conquered India.

[ramana]

Mort what you are saying is its not either or but both. I recall some USAF gen did a study that showed in terms of damage either strategy will do the similar damage, but counter force is more sellable to the public and the opinion makers.

[Mort Walker]

^^^This is correct. For example - there will be many civilians eliminated should the port of Karachi be destroyed, but the goal would be to destroy the port.

[Prem]

Please tell me about Salted strategic weapons. Do they kill or maim in millions?

[shiv]

^^^Historically, Hitler thought this after the start of the Battle of Britain and began the blitzkrieg on London. It left the RAF to reorganize and rearm with American help. In any full-fledged conflict with TSP, it will have to be won in a few days or both China and the US will resupply their military even if millions of civilians are eliminated, but if they have no command structure, aircraft, ships, ports or fuel, then resupply/rearm is futile.

Assuming this is 100% true, why are you also assuming that TSP will be waiting for conventional resupply of military? Why would they not use their nukes and devastate our cities? It would be naive high hopes to assume that a military facing defeat will not use its best weapon and instead try and keep its devastated ports and airfields working for resupply from unkil and chinkil.

Comparing conventional war and nuclear war can work only in terms of damage done per unit time.

The relentless bombing of Germany took its toll eventually. Even in 1944 Germany produced over 2500 aircraft - after 5 years of "strategic bombing of industrial targets". The relentless bombing of Japan would have taken a few more months to lead to surrender - but the nukes tilted the balance more quickly. Japan's armed forces were far from being destroyed. They were still fighting fit when the armistice came. Relentless attacks on Vietnam's military capability failed to win the war for the US.

On the other hand several outright defeats of the Pakistani military have all been declared as great victories because Pakistan survived. Defeating the military means nothing. Punishing the entire nation is essential and nukes must not be wasted on useless targets like airfields or military concentration when there are huge cities waiting like sitting ducks to be mauled. Cause 1 million deaths in the 5 or 10 of the biggest cities in one day and see how much longer the nation has the will to continue fighting.

Mao in fact calculated that China could take 300 million dead. Maybe we could see if Mao was right and give them 10 or 15 million casualties and check out Mao's doctrine. By Mao's mathematics India also should be able to take 300 million dead.

[Mort Walker]

Assuming this is 100% true, why are you also assuming that TSP will be waiting for conventional resupply of military? Why would they not use their nukes and devastate our cities? It would be naive high hopes to assume that a military facing defeat will not use its best weapon and instead try and keep its devastated ports and airfields working for resupply from unkil and chinkil.

They absolutely would use nuclear weapons and also expect the US & China to resupply them at the same time. But if they use them on Indian cities, then it leaves Indian forward bases intact and they can launch both conventional and nuclear counter attacks. For TSP, nuclear weapons are a terror weapon and I don't think planners in India see it in that way at all.

Comparing conventional war and nuclear war can work only in terms of damage done per unit time.

In your example this unit of time is a matter of day(s). 24-72 hours.

The relentless bombing of Germany took its toll eventually. Even in 1944 Germany produced over 2500 aircraft - after 5 years of "strategic bombing of industrial targets". The relentless bombing of Japan would have taken a few more months to lead to surrender - but the nukes tilted the balance more quickly. Japan's armed forces were far from being destroyed. They were still fighting fit when the armistice came. Relentless attacks on Vietnam's military capability failed to win the war for the US.

In the 1940s, Germany and the US were closer in terms of manpower and industrial capacity. Strategic bombing was very inaccurate as well. The atom bomb was designed to be used on Germany and the idea was to use several, however the USSR was already moving quickly from the east and the war in Europe was over before the US bomb was ready. Yes, for Hirohito the nukes tilted the balance, but it was also the USSR attacking Japanese islands at the beginning of Aug. 1945 that impacted his decision for surrender. Vietnam was being resupplied by the USSR and PRC and had the US continued bombing past April 1975 for another 6-9 months, the NVA would have surrendered. In the process of the war, North Vietnam had 1.2 million dead and the US + its allies had over 300,000 dead.

On the other hand several outright defeats of the Pakistani military have all been declared as great victories because Pakistan survived. Defeating the military means nothing. Punishing the entire nation is essential and nukes must not be wasted on useless targets like airfields or military concentration when there are huge cities waiting like sitting ducks to be mauled. Cause 1 million deaths in the 5 or 10 of the biggest cities in one day and see how much longer the nation has the will to continue fighting.

Actually, it kept the peace until the early 1980s. Hitting the port of Karachi, GHO Rawalpindi, military command Islamabad, Kamra PAF and a few other targets will inflict sufficient casualties and also satisfy the military objective to ensure that it will take TSP decades to build up a military for war again.

Mao in fact calculated that China could take 300 million dead. Maybe we could see if Mao was right and give them 10 or 15 million casualties and check out Mao's doctrine. By Mao's mathematics India also should be able to take 300 million dead.

The Chinese govt. is ruthless toward their own people.

[ShauryaT]

^^ In fact, deterrence works only on the concept of massive and indiscriminate destruction of ALL assets, the most prized of which would be its peoples. If there was a doctrine of an escalatory matrix, once the nuclear rubicon is breached, one may find many a politician/dictator, who may tinker with the use of such weapons. The fact that they do not, is evidence enough that there is no such escalation matrix. Also, none of the works by known MAD men, who dwell on these topics talk about an escalatory matrix with any a serious thought, except in the case of non state actors.

What Mort says, IMO is not part of deterrence theory, however can be a reality in the Indian context, due to a perceived weakness in the Indian leadership, to call for mass slaughter of the enemy.

Mao's way is the only "sane" way, to fight a nuclear war.

[svinayak]

The relentless bombing of Germany took its toll eventually. Punishing the entire nation is essential and nukes must not be wasted on useless targets like airfields or military concentration when there are huge cities waiting like sitting ducks to be mauled. Cause 1 million deaths in the 5 or 10 of the biggest cities in one day and see how much longer the nation has the will to continue fighting.

Germany after WWI was blocked and starved to sign the treaty. 1 M German starved to death and then the public opinion was changed to sign the Treaty of Versailles .
Pakistna looks like will also face the same future

[Pranav]

What is important is that the leadership of the enemy must be absolutely certain that not only will their nation be utterly annihilated, but also that they themselves will not survive. Deterrence that is not proved is not deterrence.

[shiv]

Deterrence that is not proved is not deterrence.

There is an inbuilt problem in this statement. Deterrence can never be proven. Only breakdown of deterrence can be proven. Deterrence exists between all nuclear capable states until it is broken.

[shiv]

What Mort says, IMO is not part of deterrence theory, however can be a reality in the Indian context, due to a perceived weakness in the Indian leadership, to call for mass slaughter of the enemy.

That is why it might be important to ensure the wiping out of any weak leadership in India in a first strike.

[SSridhar]

In fact, deterrence works only on the concept of massive and indiscriminate destruction of ALL assets. . .

ShauryaT, I differ from this. Deterrence varies from country to country. For deterrence to work, the other party must be somehow convinced that the enemy possesses weapons, delivery platforms and requisite will that are capable of inflicting damage/pain that is unsustainable by it. It need not be the destruction of ALL assets, as you put it, which may be impractical. The trick certainly is to know what that unsustainable pain threshold is. The third above is an important element that is generally not well appreciated. More or less, countries are aware of each other's capability (in terms of weapons and delivery systems) but assessment about 'will' may not be that simple. Pakistan has made mistakes in assessing India's 'will' in the past like in 1965 and Kargil. Indeed, Kargil was a breakdown of Pakistan's deterrence. From all appearances, Pakistan continues to make the same mistake on India's will even now.

A country like Pakistan can be expected to quickly surrender if China, for example, lobs just one or two nuke(s) at Pakistan. Pakistan will take a lot more beating from India and yet may continue to fight, however feeble the resistance might be post any nuclear exchange, because India is seen in a different light altogether by the Pakistanis. A reckless, revisionist state such as Pakistan, with religious fundamentalism and hatred to boot, may not be that easily deterred even if it knows that India can retaliate and inflict overwhelming, devastating and irrecoverable damage even to the point of obliteration. For Pakistanis, even one nuke that could evade Indian BMD or other defences and hit a population centre would be victory. Period.

One can reasonably assume that countries which are sure of their counterforce strike capabilities would not launch attacks on countervalue targets unless there were some other exigencies.

PS: We had a discussion here about this in November timeframe.

[Pranav]

Deterrence can never be proven.

One develops confidence in a system like the PSLV, say, by testing. The same logic applies to deterrence. In that case, however, one is seeking to convince not oneself, but the enemy.

[Tanaji]

Deterrence can never be proven.

One develops confidence in a system like the PSLV, say, by testing. The same logic applies to deterrence. In that case, however, one is seeking to convince not oneself, but the enemy.

Er, I think the same arguments are rehashed now: a PSLV is not a nuke. One can test the PSLV in open, measure its parameters openly. India has signed against atmospheric testing. So a full up military test is not possible. So given that, any other test fails to convince the validity of the deterrent since it does not replicate actual use cases.

In our case, deterrence is in the eye of the beholder: you either believe it or you dont. Just dont expect mushroom clouds like one on Bikini Atoll or Novaya Zemlya in our case as proof.

[Kanson]

Deterrence can never be proven.

One develops confidence in a system like the PSLV, say, by testing. The same logic applies to deterrence. In that case, however, one is seeking to convince not oneself, but the enemy.

Deterrence is an abstract which changes with time and circumstances. Say, if India is deterred in one circumstance it is not necessary that it will be deterred in every other circumstances.

Deterrence = ['Capability to deter' + 'Ability to psyche you adversary into belief that you can deter him'] WRT adversary's ['Capability' and 'Ability'].

Both these are subject to change WRT time and circumstances.

For example, One may have the Capability + Ability to defeat your opponent in normal case, but in the circumstance of famine ranging throughout the country, though you may have the capability you ability to do the same feat is called into question.

China can defeat India in 1962, but cannot do so in 1967 or so. Not only we increased our capabilities WRT China in 1967, circumstance also was not similar as in Cuban war crisis.

Sameway, String of Pearl (SOP) strategy adopted by China against India, might not be big headache, IF......India is strong. The moment, China sees opportunity, it can use the SOP to pin us down. In other terms, they are building and adding Capabilities to their deterrence.

[negi]

ShauryaT, I differ from this. Deterrence varies from country to country. For deterrence to work, the other party must be somehow convinced that the enemy possesses weapons, delivery platforms and requisite will that are capable of inflicting damage/pain that is unsustainable by it. It need not be the destruction of ALL assets, as you put it, which may be impractical.

SS ji I agree with the bolded part, I would post more later on this.

Pakistan has made mistakes in assessing India's 'will' in the past like in 1965 and Kargil. Indeed, Kargil was a breakdown of Pakistan's deterrence. From all appearances, Pakistan continues to make the same mistake on India's will even now.

Sir I have to disagree here, not sure how 1965 is relevant here for even from pov of conventional warfare it did not stop TSP from daring to pull off a Kargil (1971 was different ), coming to Kargil their deterrence did work i.e. they managed to keep the conflict within India's borders and our forces had to fight with their hands tied behind. My take on it is the classical definition of N deterrence does not apply to India as you yourself stated that it should be country specific.

Also we are aware of TSP's ploy of using terrorism as a means of waging war against India (death by thousand cuts and all that) and I am afraid we have not been able to 'deter' the TSP from continuing with the same, that is why I feel our 'deterrence' (as in being able to deter TSP form launching a first N strike) is of no use for TSP does not need to pull the N trigger and hence imho we do not have 'deterrence'.

We need to bring down our 'threshold' to pull the 'conventional' trigger first once that is done only then MCD and N-deterrence would become relevant and assume any significance.

[Rahul M]

negi sahab, pakis expected India to do 'nothing', what we did was take back the occupied land, return the status quo and in the process deliver a jhapad to H&D. so their deterrence did break down.

[ShauryaT]

In fact, deterrence works only on the concept of massive and indiscriminate destruction of ALL assets. . .

ShauryaT, I differ from this. Deterrence varies from country to country. For deterrence to work, the other party must be somehow convinced that the enemy possesses weapons, delivery platforms and requisite will that are capable of inflicting damage/pain that is unsustainable by it. It need not be the destruction of ALL assets, as you put it, which may be impractical.

I should have been more careful with my words and elaborated. What I meant by all assets, is all available assets are part of the game. Essentially to make a point that an escalatory matrix against say TSP or really any one is not how it would work, with the MCD, once deterrence is broken. It would not be wise on India's part to enterntain such an escalatory matrix.

Shiv ji: I for one, do not believe for a second that there is any confusion or great weakness on how India's policy makers and the ones with the nuclear trigger in hand would react. Now, for the chance to destroy weak political leadership, now who would argue against that

[Pranav]

India has signed against atmospheric testing. So a full up military test is not possible. So given that, any other test fails to convince the validity of the deterrent since it does not replicate actual use cases.

It is not all or nothing. If the claim is that underground tests are pointless then one cannot agree with it.

[Kanson]

Also we are aware of TSP's ploy of using terrorism as a means of waging war against India (death by thousand cuts and all that) and I am afraid we have not been able to 'deter' the TSP from continuing with the same, that is why I feel our 'deterrence' (as in being able to deter TSP form launching a first N strike) is of no use for TSP does not need to pull the N trigger and hence imho we do not have 'deterrence'.

We need to bring down our 'threshold' to pull the 'conventional' trigger first once that is done only then MCD and N-deterrence would become relevant and assume any significance.

Negi saar,

Not only during peace, even during war when the war is limited and not turns into 'Total war' deterrence always exists. Deterrence cease to exist only when there is Total War. Becoz somehow or other, your opponent is deterred in using every resources he has against you in limited war. But in Total War, he is using every resources he got against you. So Deterrence completely fails only in Total War. In today's world among N powers, Total war cannot be waged without using WMD like Nuclear weapon. People simplify this to say, Deterrence fails when Nuclear weapon is used.

Just as you mentioned, sometimes this Simplification is used to conversely state as, We don't have Deterrence as we couldn't use the N weapon, which is wrong.

Pakistan, is resorted to use this terrorist tactics becoz, we deterred Pak from directly engaging us in war by defeating them in 65 as well as in 71. Becoz of such deterrence in existence Pak is using terrorists. Now we must find a sutiable deterrence to deter Pak from using terrorists against us. Hope you understand.

[Prem]

The best counter option to deter the Paki is the deep water Interdiction. Hold the ground , dominate in the air and achieve rapid, comprehensive commercial, military destruction of them in water. Navy is the key to check both Paki and their D&T friend. China would not like to protect Paki at the cost of his global business interests.

[shiv]

cross post
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1110203/j ... 529914.jsp

Washington, Feb. 2: Governor M.K. Narayanan told the Americans when he was national security adviser that India had discovered a “manifest attempt” by jihadi groups “to get fissile material” to manufacture a crude nuclear bomb for use in a possible terrorist operation.

He, however, assured US Senators Russ Feingold and Bob Casey that these groups had not succeeded in acquiring fissile material, at the same time, warning them that terrorist organisations had “enough physics to fabricate a crude bomb beyond a dirty bomb”.

Narayanan made this unsettling revelation at a meeting with the two Democratic senators in New Delhi, which was also attended by then US ambassador to India David Mulford.

Mulford immediately transmitted Narayanan’s statements to Washington in a cable, which is part of a new tranche of US diplomatic telegrams leaked by whistleblower WikiLeaks yesterday.

The significance of the latest leak of the US secret cable is that this is arguably the first time that a top Indian official has explicitly acknowledged the threat of a nuclear attack against India by a non-state actor in a terrorist operation.

In the US, the George W. Bush administration had routinely talked about terrorist nuclear and biological weapons threats to American cities as part of its policy of using fear as a political tool almost like the Mubarak regime in Egypt.

But India has consistently refused to talk in public about any possibility that Indian cities could be targets of a crude nuclear bomb used in a terrorist operation, ostensibly for fear of creating panic among the public, especially when cross-border terrorist operations are common.

Narayanan’s revelation to the Americans, however, shows that such a threat is real and that Indian security agencies are seized of the danger.

[SSridhar]

I have to disagree here, not sure how 1965 is relevant here for even from pov of conventional warfare it did not stop TSP from daring to pull off a Kargil (1971 was different ),

That is the point I am making too, Negi. Pakistan has a fossilized mindset which tells them that the Indian cowards will not have the courage to escalate war or use any other means at their disposal to defeat Pakistan. So, they repeatedly launch misadventures as they did in Soltoro or Kargil etc. Or, even 1947/1948, for that matter. The reason that I referred to these conventional wars is that it is my belief that this Pakistani mindset transcends types of wars, conventional or nuclear.

coming to Kargil their deterrence did work i.e. they managed to keep the conflict within India's borders and our forces had to fight with their hands tied behind. My take on it is the classical definition of N deterrence does not apply to India as you yourself stated that it should be country specific.

negi sahab, pakis expected India to do 'nothing', what we did was take back the occupied land, return the status quo and in the process deliver a jhapad to H&D. so their deterrence did break down.

Negi, in addition to what Rahul has validly stated, I add this. The Kargil plan had been in the works for a long time, at least since Op. Meghdoot of 1984. It was dusted off at various times and presented to Ms. Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, but was not executed. What certainly tilted the PA was the Chagai tests of May 1998. They felt that under a nuclear rubric, India will be tied down from doing anything at all and world powers, fearing a nuclear exchange would intervene and by manipulating the negotiations etc. the Indian supply line to Siachen can be disrupted and possibly another attempt be made at Bilafond La etc. Or, even Kashmir can be grabbed. Nothing of that sort happened. India did use the air force, and pounded the hell out of these guys with precision bombing and field artillery. India did not go for a tripartite meeting at Washington, a la Tashkent.

. . . that is why I feel our 'deterrence' (as in being able to deter TSP form launching a first N strike) is of no use for TSP does not need to pull the N trigger and hence imho we do not have 'deterrence'.

The import of my post is also that with Pakistan, our deterrence does not have much of a meaning.

[negi]

negi sahab, pakis expected India to do 'nothing',

Boss I think you have already lowered your 'expectations' , how can anyone deter India from not taking action within it's own borders ? Moreover TSPA had initially disowned the whole operation and even we bought into it for a while so I don't see how 'deterrence' is relevant until this point.

what we did was take back the occupied land, return the status quo and in the process deliver a jhapad to H&D. so their deterrence did break down.

Wait let me list the sequence of events for my own clarity for I do not understand as to what did we 'deter' TSP from doing .

1. TSPA troops infiltrate our border and capture some key peaks on our side
2. We decide to get rid of the infiltrators the hard way (i.e. not crossing the LoC) and we did twiddle our thumbs over the issue of use of fighter AC for several days.
3. We manage to reclaim lost ground.

Point to be noted here is TSPA is the 'aggressor' here they took a calculated risk and it did not work, my only question is what is it we managed to 'deter' TSP from doing for they had already infiltrated without us even knowing about it in the first place ?

For me point '2' clearly shows that despite being 'attacked' it was TSP and it's nuke assets that dictated the way we fought the war within our own borders.

Leave this aside TSP went nuclear in 1999 and we had exploded a device in 74 but between this period when we were clearly aware of TSPA support to Khalistanis and separatists in Kashmir why did we not leverage our N muscle and threaten TSP with a nuclear attack in case latter and it's state machinery is found involved in a terrorist attack in India ? What 'deterred' India from brandishing it's nuclear option and prevent TSPA from continuing with it's policy to use terrorism as state policy ?

I have only one question now that both countries are equipped with nukes how can we claim to have 'deterrence' today when we couldn't even deter TSP when it had none ?

PS: Even if we assume our devices were not weaponized or deliverable by missiles/air until 99, I am sure there are other ways (I would dare say more reliable albiet crude) to slip in such a device into TSP via road/rail.

[Johann]

^^^^^
Secondly, a 'coup against the Emperor'? I've never heard of that, and forgive me for being incredulous, but that would have been tantamount to a coup against God and a total abrogation of 'Bushido' -- I just can't imagine it.

Well Ravi, that is why it is important to read widely and deeply about things before coming to conclusions. The military struggle to prevent the Emperor from issuing the surrender order is well known, and well documented.

There was an account of the attempted coup in the link I had in the post before yours, but it does not seem like you were interested in seeing what it had to say.

Here is a more detailed description, and I hope you look at it, as well as the sources it relies on;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyujo_Incident

The Soviets went to war against Japan on August 8th, and Nagasaki was bombed on August 9th.

The Japanese public, and those outside the highest levels of power had NO idea that their government offered to surrender on August 9-10th, let alone that the Allies accepted on August 12th. The coup attempt was an attempt to prevent those facts from coming to light, and to prevent dissemination of the Emperor's surrender rescript to the Japanese people and armed forces.

The significant numbers of Japanese army officers did not mutiny, but who committed suicide rather than obey the Emperor's orders to surrender tells you something about the institutional mindset of the time. The Emperor was a symbolic figurehead - the real loyalty was to the Army leadership, and to the idea of a conquering greater Japan.

From what I understand, there were a number of peace entreaties that were absolutely ignored by the Americans. They are well documented.

The IHR article hardly gives the full picture of what was going on the Allied and Japanese side. Please read the whole article here;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrender_of_Japan

An offer to negotiate peace is VERY different from the offer of immediate surrender (conditional on retention of the chrysanthemum throne) that Japan presented to the Allies on August 10.

What prevented the Japanese government from making the same offer of immediate surrender (again as opposed to offers of armistice negotiations) before the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and before the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, Sakhalin and the Kuriles?

It is very clear that the Japanese Army leadership was far from reconciled to occupation, disarmament and vehmently opposed to the trial of senior Japanese Army officers for war crimes. Many did not want to have colonies like Manchuria, let alone Korea and Taiwan stripped away.

It is also clear that it took a triple disaster for the Emperor to summon the authority to override the Army, and even this faced violent resistance.

IN BRIEF: An American invasion of Japan was never a foregone conclusion. The Americans might more easilly have firebombed the entire country, without setting a single pair of boots on mainland Japan.

The US Govt never counted on either atomic bombing, or on more conventional bombing to end the war either in Europe or the Pacific on their own, with good reason.

The Americans could not simply assume that the three Atomic bombs they had in stock would be sufficient to bring about Japanese surrender, especially since Japanese resistance at the popular level had been far more fanatical than that of the Germans.

While the RAF and USAAF believed the war could be won from the air, they were generally alone in that assessment. Army, navy and civilian leadership in both countries believed that strategic bombing would weaken Axis morale and war production to the point that they could be more easily defeated in the field.

The round-the-clock bombing of Berlin and the Ruhr from June 1943 onwards did not bring about Germany's surrender. It was the defeat of its armies in the field, the occupation of its soil, and the death of the man who took Germany in to war in May 1945 that did the trick.

Emperor Hirohito did not actually order his cabinet to find ways to end the war until the US succeeded in capturing Okinawa in June of 1945. Again this is not the same thing as an offer of surrender. In contrast the firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945 killed 100,000, more than either Hiroshima or Nagasaki, and produced no offer of surrender.

p.s. I want to make it clear that I do not personally support either the atomic bombings or the firebombings of Dresden, Hamburg, Berlin and Tokyo. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not especially more horrific than the others. Any form of strategic bombing that *deliberately* targets civilian populations en masse in order to break its will constitutes terrorism. They shortened the war, but they were still fundamentally wrong, regardless of the cause or the unpleasantness of the opponent. The logic of Bomber Harris and Curtis LeMay is precisely the logic of Bin Laden and Hafez Saeed when it comes to inflicting mass casualties on the enemy's cities.

[kumarn]

The best counter option to deter the Paki is the deep water Interdiction. Hold the ground , dominate in the air and achieve rapid, comprehensive commercial, military destruction of them in water. Navy is the key to check both Paki and their D&T friend. China would not like to protect Paki at the cost of his global business interests.

Doesn't that cross one of their defined nuclear red lines?

[Sanku]

p.s. I want to make it clear that I do not personally support either the atomic bombings or the firebombings of Dresden, Hamburg, Berlin and Tokyo. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not especially more horrific than the others. Any form of strategic bombing that *deliberately* targets civilian populations en masse in order to break its will constitutes terrorism. They shortened the war, but they were still fundamentally wrong, regardless of the cause or the unpleasantness of the opponent. The logic of Bomber Harris and Curtis LeMay is precisely the logic of Bin Laden and Hafez Saeed when it comes to inflicting mass casualties on the enemy's cities.

Johann although I have often been very hard on your views (and will continue to be) -- I would like to say that I truly appreicate what you have said here.

It is rare for a western person dealing in strategic matters to take such a view. I do hope you apply the same principles that you have applied here w.r.t. other continuing actions that happen in the world.

[Johann]

Hi Sanku.

I've said this before here, in fact every single time the discussion has led to discussing certain forms of strategic bombing in WWII and Korea.

I've also said that the greatest danger in fighting a depraved enemy over a long period is the very good chance that you might start thinking like them to beat them.

It is one of the great moral hazards of wars and conflicts, even (and perhaps especially) wars that are thought of as just wars.

[ShauryaT]

Sameway, String of Pearl (SOP) strategy adopted by China against India, might not be big headache, IF......India is strong. The moment, China sees opportunity, it can use the SOP to pin us down. In other terms, they are building and adding Capabilities to their deterrence.

All I will say here is so are we. India continues to build its capabilities and the posture remains one of "aggressive defense" against China.

[Prem]

="kumarnDoesn't that cross one of their defined nuclear red lines?

Let them decide their threashold. We must build excessive deep water capabilty to hammer hard on their weakest point. Security of PRC must be as strong as the weakest link in Pakistani defence forces. Question is ,Can China afford a Nuclear war and risk the hard work of last few decades? Indians should test the limits of Chinese love for Pakis by aiming at least 1000 nukes at PRC . The 300 Millions which they can afford to loose for their Paki love must come from their economically developed areas.

[svinayak]

It is rare for a western person dealing in strategic matters to take such a view. I do hope you apply the same principles that you have applied here w.r.t. other continuing actions that happen in the world.

Hippocracy is part of the world politics and geo politics.

Fundamentally all the proliferation of WMD and missiles in the world can be traced back to one country.

[ShauryaT]

That is why it might be important to ensure the wiping out of any weak leadership in India in a first strike.

OK, on a serious note. There are many who doubt the "will" of our political leadership and their response to or lack of response to a nuclear attack and it is easy to see why this view persists, both within the country and in enemy camps.
PS: Will not forget your Jingorampura scenario

This is where other institutions apart from the politician, institutionalized processes, plans, drills and training come into play. In the case of India, apart from the politician in the form of the CCS the others are NSA, NCA, SFC, DRDO, AEC and various branches of the armed forces. The more mature these institutions and processes are the more difficult it becomes for the politician to make a decision in a vacuum. The politician will be surrounded by men, who dream and breathe these destructive scenarios all their living lives. On this dreaded day is when their expertise is called for. While one may never be sure of the "will" of the politician, one should not doubt the will and training of the mad men charged with these responsibilities.

As time goes on and these institutions mature, through successive governments, these type of decisions get institutionalized, leaving little room for the politician to maneuver. Politicians who do not listen to such expert professional advice by men trained to do exactly such a thing risk their nations fortunes, as history has proven so many times.

[NRao]

Tokyo Governor urges Japan to develop nuclear weapons for self defence

[shyamd]

Deterrence is an old strategy - relates to Balance of Power theory. Some say that this theory was proven false when USSR failed. You gain more from becoming friends and trading.

[NRao]

What happens when one of the traders becomes too rich/powerful? China?

[SSridhar]

The whole body of deterrence literature grew out of a specific case of USA-USSR Cold War confrontation. Thus, it cannot be assumed as generally applicable to all cases. Moreover, many analysts feel that there were many other factors, apart from deterrence, that stopped war. In the present India-Pakistan deterrence, many aspects are different from the Cold War experience. For example, the Cold War deterrence was ideological in nature, not territorial. In our case, it is both territorial and ideological. Even in this ideological difference, it is only Pakistan that has given it an ideological colour and that too a highly flammable religious colour. In the case of US-USSR, neither side was reckless (in spite of the Cuban Missile crisis) as they knew the horrendous fallout of a nuclear exchange. In our case, Pakistan is certainly reckless because as they are often heard saying that the Muslims love death. Their casual references to using nuclear weapons and even nuclear signalling through blackmail conveyed to Indian Prime Ministers at various times testify to that. The widespread and increasing jihadi fervour present among military personnel adds to the fear of recklessness. Also, the fear of unauthorized access and launch is ever increasing in the case of Pakistan.

[shyamd]

I think the Indian strategists today are becoming more and more modern. The whole idea of demilitarising kashmir, joint control, peace etc is all about money and economics. The school of thought today is invest in concessions and diplomacy, money spent on military is money not spent well (well the example given to support this theory is Japan - small air force, small defence force etc why haven't they been attacked?). This is what MMS wants, India doesn't want war at this juncture as it will become a choice of losing money/economy vs gains of battering Paki's. So India is dodging and allowing things to happen in PRC border, Pak border etc.

26/11 was about TSP asking us to hit at them. We should respond in a different way that is not direct.

When we say, why does the UK, France etc invest in deterrence, its because their strategists went to school a long time ago.

[ASPuar]

Japan's situation is utterly different to ours.

1. They share no Land boundaries with anyone
2. They are under the protection of the US nuclear Umbrella
3. They have US forces deployed on their soil
4. They have a different place in the World geopolitical order than we do

Folowing the Japanese model is suicide for us. Only a rank newcomer, full of naivete would ever formulate such a strategic scenario. Sadly, these are the people running our country today.

[shyamd]

ASPuar. Agree with some of your points. Do you honestly believe US will be in the middle of a nuclear war?

Anyway, their answer to your point is nope, its the same. Invest in good diplomacy. Which is what our relationship with Washington is about, despite their track record.

I really think this is India's strategy with Pak and MMS concurs with this view.
This view is what the new breed of strategists across the world and in particular the US are being taught.

MMS would rather let people make money than goto war with Pak.

[ASPuar]

The whole point of a nuclear umbrella is, do the Chinamen really want to find out if the US will drop a nuke in response to a Chinese one on Tokyo?

Relationship with Washington is Bakwas. When the shooting starts, no one will save us except ourselves.

MMS may like to do this, or like to do that, but like Pt. Nehru, if the Chinese dont agree with his plans and start a fight, he'll be left holding the bag, and crying for help, if he weakens the armed forces any further.