Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

[brihaspati]

Thats a superb spin on "ground realities". Its Clinton who cannot wait the Taliban out - while the Talebs very much can. The urgency is all on US part - the reason that US talks of increasing the pressure on "extremists". They need to declare victory so that they can leave in good order.

[Prem]

This is why i said Hil- Gaye ( shaken, loosen or lost) Clinton .

[ManishH]

Marc Grossman is expected to replace Holbrooke as US Special envoy to Af-pak.

What do people make of the fact that Mr. Grossman is Jewish ?

If Obama was hedging his exit strategy on sweet talking with Taliban, the last person he'd appoint is of Jewish origin (not because anything is wrong
with Jews, but because Taliban and Pak will mistrust any of his moves).

That indicates to me that Obama has planned some tough moves ahead in
Af-Pak.

Pictures of Kayani and Grossman shaking hands are certain to infuriate
those in Pak who have taken the pure path ...

[Pranav]

Thats a superb spin on "ground realities". Its Clinton who cannot wait the Taliban out - while the Talebs very much can. The urgency is all on US part - the reason that US talks of increasing the pressure on "extremists". They need to declare victory so that they can leave in good order.

US is not planning to go anywhere soon - they are in fact discussing permanent bases with Karzai.

[brihaspati]

A bottle of Tequila for you if you are right!

Of course they will talk of "permanent bases"! They cannot appear to have given up. But look at the logistics problem, the political problem, and the overall regional problem. US is shamming and covering for an honourable retreat. It is only a matter of time and withdrawal will efffectively be at an even faster rate than is being claimed.

[Pranav]

A bottle of Tequila for you if you are right!

Of course they will talk of "permanent bases"! They cannot appear to have given up. But look at the logistics problem, the political problem, and the overall regional problem. US is shamming and covering for an honourable retreat. It is only a matter of time and withdrawal will efffectively be at an even faster rate than is being claimed.

US needs to reach a modus vivendi with Russia and Iran ... or another approach could be to replace Pakistan with Balochistan as the gateway to Central Asia.

[Gagan]

Documentary made by Dutch TV - in English on the exit strategy on Af-Pak.

Exit Afghanistan - What really happened.
Part 1: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lQmuUhdApEg
Part 2: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=adwtrLnRrFg
Part 3: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rDjFRtF1qs0
Part 4: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S7NiBXWLh-0

Essentially gora ouiropeans trying to understand where the current Af-Pak problem is. Several different POVs coming out. Interesting to watch.

[shyamd]

Amrullah Saleh has started a grass roots movement from the Panjsheer Valley. He wants to create a national movement. India should support him.

[abhishek_sharma]

It Takes a Network: The new frontline of modern warfare.: BY STANLEY A. MCCHRYSTAL

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2 ... _a_network

[abhishek_sharma]

How Obama Lost Karzai: The road out of Afghanistan runs through two presidents who just don't get along: BY AHMED RASHID

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2 ... ost_karzai

[RajeshA]

X-Posted from TSP Thread

RD affair should be carefully analyzed, it is several layers like an onion.
<snip>
3. Then I feel that there is a message, including to countries like India that Unkil can do diddly squat about things like pressurizing Pakis to rein in terror or bring Mumbai perpetrators to justice when Unkil is powerless to rescue his own man.

This has a lot to do with Pakistan feeling over-confident that as long as USA is in Afghanistan, there is not much America can push Pakistan on.

America has allowed Pakistan to dictate:

• American boots on the ground, as incursions from the Afghan side, are not acceptable.
• Incursion of American attack planes and helicopters into Pakistani air space, are not acceptable.
• America does not get to expand the drone strikes into Northern Baluchistan, Quetta, even if senior Taliban leadership live there.
• Targeting of Pakistani security personnel manning the border is not acceptable, even if they are complicit in letting in Afghan Taliban to the safe sanctuaries on the Pakistan side.

Often the annoyance with the Americans has been expressed by burning trucks carrying supplies to the Americans in Afghanistan by road. Raymond Davis is a new means of controlling the Americans.

Considering the Pakistani's success in restraining America, it is but natural that they get over-confident.

The Americans make a big mistake in giving in to the Pakistani demands.

The Americans need to go back to their original formulation of policy in the AfPak battleground. Either Pakistan cooperates, or they will be bombed to the stone age!

When the Americans first started taking Pakistani complaints and requests into account, it was there and then that the downward slide began in America's effectiveness in controlling the war theater. It was when the drama thought out for public consumption about Pakistan being an ally in the GWOT started playing, it was then that Pakistan knew they were off the hook. Now USA needed to keep the pretension.

Al Qaeda committed 9/11. Taliban gave sanctuary to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Pakistani Army created Taliban and controlled them (which they still do).

So basically Pakistani Army is responsible for 9/11!

This is the basic fact that the Americans need to always keep in view, when dealing with Pakistanis.

The Americans need to reformulate their stance towards Pakistan so that it better represents the reality of their relationship - that America gave Pakistanis a chance to redeem their substantial guilt in 9/11 and they blew it!

America needs to designate Pakistan as a terrorist country on parole. A terrorist country on parole has no rights to make nuclear weapons. As of now the international community should take custody of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Furthermore Pakistan has to visibly, transparently and credibly decommission its jihadi networks.

Pakistan will never do the needful by appeasement, only through credible threat, the taste of whose punishment is meted out to Pakistan on a regular basis.

That America could not do well in Afghanistan considering the restrictions, the world and the American citizenry would forgive and forget! Afghanistan is a side-show and no victory there needs to be found or declared. There is no loss of face, if America leaves Afghanistan. But if America messes up Pakistan big time, then the world will not forget that!

America needs to put Pakistan in the cross hairs again!

[abhishek_sharma]

The Battle for Marjah, Reviewed

http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/20 ... h_reviewed

[abhishek_sharma]

FP slide show of Hamid Karzai's tumultuous nine years as president of Afghanistan

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2 ... litary_man

[kmkraoind]

U.S.-Russia air transit deal

The Russian Parliament on Friday ratified an agreement with America on air transit of military cargoes to Afghanistan.

The agreement allows the U.S. Air Force to fly weapons, military property and personnel to Afghanistan via the Russian air space free of navigation charges and sets the ceiling of 4,500 flights annually.

After its signing in July 2009, the agreement was in force as a temporary arrangement pending ratification. It opened a new supply route for the 140,000-strong Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as the Taliban stepped up attacks on the NATO convoys moving through Pakistan.

The U.S. has sent 780 planes across Russia to date, ferrying 115,000 troops and 19,000 tons of cargoes, said Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov presenting the pact in the State Duma, the Lower House.

The transit agreement helped Moscow win Washington's cooperation in fighting the narcotics threat from Afghanistan, Russia's top diplomat told the legislators.

“Such cooperation would have been difficult to secure without the transit deal,” said Mr. Ryabkov.

[abhishek_sharma]

Abdul Rahim Wardak, Defense Minister of Afghanistan (Interview)

http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/11507

[RajeshA]

Published on Feb 25, 2011
By Saleem H. Ali
Saleem H. Ali is a professor at the University of Vermont and the author of Islam and Education: Conflict and Conformity in Pakistan's Madrassahs.
The Islamic Republic of Talibanistan: Foreign Policy Magazine

Although the West and its allies in Pakistan and Afghanistan have been terrified by the specter of a second Islamic republic, there is a way to mitigate the threat: the creation of a semiautonomous region where Islamists can exercise their draconian system of law -- if that is what the people agree to impose upon themselves. Just as the creation of Pakistan involved a migration, or hijrah, the radical elements in both countries who yearn for an Islamic emirate can be allowed to migrate to this hinterland and help build their new political order.

Of course, the terms of such a divorce would have to be very carefully negotiated because radical Islamists like the Taliban have traditionally had expansionary tendencies. They would need to reject international terrorism and give assurances to neighboring states that they would not intervene in those countries' territories. Under those conditions, the new area could maintain its economic relations with the rest of the region, depriving the territory's Islamist rulers of the excuse that they are suffering unfairly from having been made an economic pariah.

Just as Washington has acknowledged that it cannot simply disregard popular support in Egypt for the Muslim Brotherhood, the West must also come to terms with the Taliban's base of support. If a proper referendum were held in Afghanistan -- something that the Taliban says it would support -- it's possible that in some parts of Waziristan and in eastern Afghanistan a majority of the public would favor Taliban rule.

Because of Islamist evangelism and population growth, an increasing number of Pakistanis and Afghans are disposed to favoring an austere version of sharia law as well. In Pakistan's frontier province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Islamists were freely elected into power in one recent election. A poll conducted in Waziristan by the New America Foundation in September 2010 revealed not only that more than 87 percent of the local population opposes the West's military presence, but that parties with Islamist inclinations (Pakistan Tehreek-Insaaf, Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat Ulema-e Islam) would gain almost half of the votes in a free and open election.

My comment:

I see this as the only way to bring about peace in Af-Pak region, and the only honorable way for the NATO to leave Afghanistan.

This is a very good idea indeed, however for it to really work, one would have to allow all Pushtun majority areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan to partake in this referendum, which includes FATA, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Northern Baluchistan, and Eastern Afghanistan. If all these regions are not included, the Taliban would continue with their violence against its neighbors.

It is however important that while any such Talibanistan is being contemplated, Pakistan should not be forced to lose land access to Central Asia. This can however be secured if districts such as Chitral, Kohistan, Swat, Upper Dir, Malakand, Mansehra, Battagram, etc lying in East Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, which have not been traditionally Pushtun are retained in Pakistan. This would afford Pakistan access to the Tajik region of Afghanistan.

Similarly in the East, Pakistan should retain a corridor passing through Baluchistan and South-Western Afghanistan into Central Asia.

The creation of Talibanistan would enable Pakistan to stabilize itself and to prosper.

It should perhaps be noted, that through the creation of Pakistan, it finally allowed India to find peace and prosper as well.

Gentlemen, please feel free to give your comments on the article at Foreign Policy Magazine.

[shyamd]

2 things that come to mind after reading this article.. Raids into Pak - looking for Yindu cooperation to scare TSP and secondly West Asia, India is due to have major exercises with Oman and Saudi military's in India this month. I would talk more about the latter than former.

India and the US Central Command

The Army chief, General V K Singh’s planned visit to the headquarters of the US Central Command in Tampa, Florida (see report in ‘The Indian Express’ on February 28) during his trip to the United States next week will mark an important milestone in the evolution in Indo-US defence ties.
Until now, India has warily watched as the CENTCOM became a powerful spokesman for Pakistan’s interests in the Pentagon. It is the PACOM, or the Pacific Command headquartered in Honolulu, Hawaii, that deals with military cooperation with India. The dividing line between the operational responsibilities between the two major American theatre commands runs along the India-Pakistan border.

PACOM sees India's centrality in ordering a new Asian security system amid the rise of China and has been pressing for greater sensitivity in Washington to India’s regional interests.

But it is the CENTCOM, which deals with the ongoing American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which has tended to prevail in Pentagon when it comes to issues between India and Pakistan.

In all capitals, the urgent always drives out the important. After all, Pakistan is critical to the success of the current American military operations in Afghanistan while India's importance in East Asia is only of long-term significance for the United States.

Recall the US commander of the Afghan forces, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, endorsing in 2009 the Pakistani position that the Indian presence in Afghanistan is destabilising. It underlined the fact that CENTCOM, so focussed on engaging Pakistan, has not heard let alone understood India's views on Afghanistan.

Given India's problems with Pakistan, its high stakes in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, it made little sense for Delhi to limit its interaction with the Pentagon to the PACOM alone.

In the early years of the last decade, the Bush Administration, as part of its effort to intensify the military engagement with India, offered to link the Indian military establishment with the CENTCOM.

Washington suggested that India could post an officer at the CENTCOM for military liaison. An ultra-cautious Delhi turned down that offer.

That India has chosen to pick up the threads and send a brigadier to the CENTCOM underlines more than pragmatism. It underlines the recognition in Delhi of the need to establish a professional military conversation with the United States on Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Gulf at a time when the regions to the west of us are undergoing a period of great turbulence.

[ramana]

Never Fight a Land War in Asia

Stratfor

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, speaking at West Point, said last week that “Any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined.” In saying this, Gates was repeating a dictum laid down by Douglas MacArthur after the Korean War, who urged the United States to avoid land wars in Asia. Given that the United States has fought four major land wars in Asia since World War II — Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq — none of which had ideal outcomes, it is useful to ask three questions: First, why is fighting a land war in Asia a bad idea? Second, why does the United States seem compelled to fight these wars? And third, what is the alternative that protects U.S. interests in Asia without large-scale military land wars?

The Hindrances of Overseas Wars

Let’s begin with the first question, the answer to which is rooted in demographics and space. The population of Iraq is currently about 32 million. Afghanistan has a population of less than 30 million. The U.S. military, all told, consists of about 1.5 million active-duty personnel (plus 980,000 in the reserves), of whom more than 550,000 belong to the Army and about 200,000 are part of the Marine Corps. Given this, it is important to note that the United States strains to deploy about 200,000 troops at any one time in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that many of these troops are in support rather than combat roles. The same was true in Vietnam, where the United States was challenged to field a maximum of about 550,000 troops (in a country much more populous than Iraq or Afghanistan) despite conscription and a larger standing army. Indeed, the same problem existed in World War II.

When the United States fights in the Eastern Hemisphere, it fights at great distances, and the greater the distance, the greater the logistical cost. More ships are needed to deliver the same amount of materiel, for example. That absorbs many troops. The logistical cost of fighting at a distance is that it diverts numbers of troops (or requires numbers of civilian personnel) disproportionate to the size of the combat force.

Regardless of the number of troops deployed, the U.S. military is always vastly outnumbered by the populations of the countries to which it is deployed. If parts of these populations resist as light-infantry guerrilla forces or employ terrorist tactics, the enemy rapidly swells to a size that can outnumber U.S. forces, as in Vietnam and Korea. At the same time, the enemy adopts strategies to take advantage of the core weakness of the United States — tactical intelligence. The resistance is fighting at home. It understands the terrain and the culture. The United States is fighting in an alien environment. It is constantly at an intelligence disadvantage. That means that the effectiveness of the native forces is multiplied by excellent intelligence, while the effectiveness of U.S. forces is divided by lack of intelligence.

The United States compensates with technology, from space-based reconnaissance and air power to counter-battery systems and advanced communications. This can make up the deficit but only by massive diversions of manpower from ground-combat operations. Maintaining a helicopter requires dozens of ground-crew personnel. Where the enemy operates with minimal technology multiplied by intelligence, the United States compensates for lack of intelligence with massive technology that further reduces available combat personnel. Between logistics and technological force multipliers, the U.S. “point of the spear” shrinks. If you add the need to train, relieve, rest and recuperate the ground-combat forces, you are left with a small percentage available to fight.

The paradox of this is that American forces will win the engagements but may still lose the war. Having identified the enemy, the United States can overwhelm it with firepower. The problem the United States has is finding the enemy and distinguishing it from the general population. As a result, the United States is well-suited for the initial phases of combat, when the task is to defeat a conventional force. But after the conventional force has been defeated, the resistance can switch to methods difficult for American intelligence to deal with. The enemy can then control the tempo of operations by declining combat where it is at a disadvantage and initiating combat when it chooses.

The example of the capitulation of Germany and Japan in World War II is frequently cited as a model of U.S. forces defeating and pacifying an opposing nation. But the Germans were not defeated primarily by U.S. ground troops. The back of the Wehrmacht was broken by the Soviets on their own soil with the logistical advantages of short supply lines. And, of course, Britain and numerous other countries were involved. It is doubtful that the Germans would have capitulated to the Americans alone. The force the United States deployed was insufficient to defeat Germany. The Germans had no appetite for continuing a resistance against the Russians and saw surrendering to the Americans and British as sanctuary from the Russians. They weren’t going to resist them. As for Japan, it was not ground forces but air power, submarine warfare and atomic bombs that finished them — and the emperor’s willingness to order a surrender. It was not land power that prevented resistance but air and sea power, plus a political compromise by MacArthur in retaining and using the emperor. Had the Japanese emperor been removed, I suspect that the occupation of Japan would have been much more costly. Neither Germany nor Japan are examples in which U.S. land forces compelled capitulation and suppressed resistance.

The problem the United States has in the Eastern Hemisphere is that the size of the force needed to occupy a country initially is much smaller than the force needed to pacify the country. The force available for pacification is much smaller than needed because the force the United States can deploy demographically without committing to total war is simply too small to do the job — and the size needed to do the job is unknown.

U.S. Global Interests

The deeper problem is this: The United States has global interests. While the Soviet Union was the primary focus of the United States during the Cold War, no power threatens to dominate Eurasia now, and therefore no threat justifies the singular focus of the United States. In time of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States must still retain a strategic reserve for other unanticipated contingencies. This further reduces the available force for combat.

Some people argue that the United States is insufficiently ruthless in prosecuting war, as if it would be more successful without political restraints at home. The Soviets and the Nazis, neither noted for gentleness, were unable to destroy the partisans behind German lines or the Yugoslav resistance, in spite of brutal tactics. The guerrilla has built-in advantages in warfare for which brutality cannot compensate.

Given all this, the question is why the United States has gotten involved in wars in Eurasia four times since World War II. In each case it is obvious: for political reasons. In Korea and Vietnam, it was to demonstrate to doubting allies that the United States had the will to resist the Soviets. In Afghanistan, it was to uproot al Qaeda. In Iraq, the reasons are murkier, more complex and less convincing, but the United States ultimately went in, in my opinion, to convince the Islamic world of American will.

The United States has tried to shape events in the Eastern Hemisphere by the direct application of land power. In Korea and Vietnam, it was trying to demonstrate resolve against Soviet and Chinese power. In Afghanistan and Iraq, it was trying to shape the politics of the Muslim world. The goal was understandable but the amount of ground force available was not. In Korea, it resulted in stalemate; in Vietnam, defeat. We await the outcome in Iraq and Afghanistan, but given Gates’ statement, the situation for the United States is not necessarily hopeful.

In each case, the military was given an ambiguous mission. This was because a clear outcome — defeating the enemy — was unattainable. At the same time, there were political interests in each. Having engaged, simply leaving did not seem an option. Therefore, Korea turned into an extended presence in a near-combat posture, Vietnam ended in defeat for the American side, and Iraq and Afghanistan have turned, for the time being, into an uncertain muddle that no reasonable person expects to end with the declared goals of a freed and democratic pair of countries.

Problems of Strategy

There are two problems with American strategy. The first is using the appropriate force for the political mission. This is not a question so much of the force as it is of the mission. The use of military force requires clarity of purpose; otherwise, a coherent strategy cannot emerge. Moreover, it requires an offensive mission. Defensive missions (such as Vietnam and Korea) by definition have no terminal point or any criteria for victory. Given the limited availability of ground combat forces, defensive missions allow the enemy’s level of effort to determine the size of the force inserted, and if the force is insufficient to achieve the mission, the result is indefinite deployment of scarce forces.

Then there are missions with clear goals initially but without an understanding of how to deal with Act II. Iraq suffered from an offensive intention ill suited to the enemy’s response. Having destroyed the conventional forces of Iraq, the United States was unprepared for the Iraqi response, which was guerrilla resistance on a wide scale. The same was true in Afghanistan. Counterinsurgency is occupation warfare. It is the need to render a population — rather than an army — unwilling and incapable of resisting. It requires vast resources and large numbers of troops that outstrip the interest. Low-cost counter-insurgency with insufficient forces will always fail. Since the United States uses limited forces because it has to, counterinsurgency is the most dangerous kind of war for the United States. The idea has always been that the people prefer the U.S. occupation to the threats posed by their fellow countrymen and that the United States can protect those who genuinely do prefer the former. That may be the idea, but there is never enough U.S. force available.

Another model for dealing with the problem of shaping political realities can be seen in the Iran-Iraq war. In that war, the United States allowed the mutual distrust of the two countries to eliminate the threats posed by both. When the Iraqis responded by invading Kuwait, the United States responded with a massive counter with very limited ends — the reconquest of Kuwait and the withdrawal of forces. It was a land war in Asia designed to defeat a known and finite enemy army without any attempt at occupation.

The problem with all four wars is that they were not wars in a conventional sense and did not use the military as militaries are supposed to be used. The purpose of a military is to defeat enemy conventional forces. As an army of occupation against a hostile population, military forces are relatively weak. The problem for the United States is that such an army must occupy a country for a long time, and the U.S. military simply lacks the ground forces needed to occupy countries and still be available to deal with other threats.

By having an unclear mission, you have an uncertain terminal point. When does it end? You then wind up with a political problem internationally — having engaged in the war, you have allies inside and outside of the country that have fought with you and taken risks with you. Withdrawal leaves them exposed, and potential allies will be cautious in joining with you in another war. The political costs spiral and the decision to disengage is postponed. The United States winds up in the worst of all worlds. It terminates not on its own but when its position becomes untenable, as in Vietnam. This pyramids the political costs dramatically.

Wars need to be fought with ends that can be achieved by the forces available. Donald Rumsfeld once said, “You go to war with the Army you have. They’re not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” I think that is a fundamental misunderstanding of war. You do not engage in war if the army you have is insufficient. When you understand the foundations of American military capability and its limits in Eurasia, Gates’ view on war in the Eastern Hemisphere is far more sound than Rumsfeld’s.

The Diplomatic Alternative

The alternative is diplomacy, not understood as an alternative to war but as another tool in statecraft alongside war. Diplomacy can find the common ground between nations. It can also be used to identify the hostility of nations and use that hostility to insulate the United States by diverting the attention of other nations from challenging the United States. That is what happened during the Iran-Iraq war. It wasn’t pretty, but neither was the alternative.

Diplomacy for the United States is about maintaining the balance of power and using and diverting conflict to manage the international system. Force is the last resort, and when it is used, it must be devastating. The argument I have made, and which I think Gates is asserting, is that at a distance, the United States cannot be devastating in wars dependent on land power. That is the weakest aspect of American international power and the one the United States has resorted to all too often since World War II, with unacceptable results. Using U.S. land power as part of a combined arms strategy is occasionally effective in defeating conventional forces, as it was with North Korea (and not China) but is inadequate to the demands of occupation warfare. It makes too few troops available for success, and it does not know how many troops might be needed.

This is not a policy failure of any particular U.S. president. George W. Bush and Barack Obama have encountered precisely the same problem, which is that the forces that have existed in Eurasia, from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in Korea to the Taliban in Afghanistan, have either been too numerous or too agile (or both) for U.S. ground forces to deal with. In any war, the primary goal is not to be defeated. An elective war in which the criteria for success are unclear and for which the amount of land force is insufficient must be avoided. That is Gates’ message. It is the same one MacArthur delivered, and the one Dwight Eisenhower exercised when he refused to intervene in Vietnam on France’s behalf. As with the Monroe Doctrine, it should be elevated to a principle of U.S. foreign policy, not because it is a moral principle but because it is a very practical one.

The Empire is dead! KS garu said large wars will be difficlut to prosecute to successful conclusion.

Arms peddlers want India top buy US weapons which require such a long logistic tail!

[shyamd]

^^ ramanaji, what do u mean by long logistical tail?

From what army walla's hace told me, today's warfare is fought by strong air force, coastal defence navy and smaller army.

[ramana]

See the comment about how many mechanics to keep a helicopter in the air.

I think the US in both WWI and WWII used balance of pwer strategy of the Britsh and intervened in European wars to keep the continent on the side of the Anglo-Saxon/Deomcracy/Representative govt walas with minimal costs to themselves. They then carried that wrong lesson to other places with bubble power.

OBL was a master grand strategtist or had some good guidance when he chose to bring down those two towers. With it collapsed the bubble power.

[shyamd]

But Ramanaji, the US would argue and say look at yindu russian equipment, it spends more time in maintenance than in the air...

Agree with rest of the comments.

[svinayak]

Never Fight a Land War in Asia

Arms peddlers want India top buy US weapons which require such a long logistic tail!

Cancel all american contracts!

[Ravi Karumanchiri]

^^^^^^^

I've always thought that a part of the American interest in providing the TSP with arms, was to provide India with insecurity, thereby necessitating Indian purchase of American arms. Think of it as a sort of vicious/virtuous cycle (depending on whether you're Indian or American).

If it were up to me, I would buy French or Russian for the MMRCA, if for no other reason than this. If Americans see their shenanigans costing them business, and actually profitting the French or Russians, they just might reconsider supplying TSP.

[krisna]

India and the US Central Command

Until now, India has warily watched as the CENTCOM became a powerful spokesman for Pakistan’s interests in the Pentagon. It is the PACOM, or the Pacific Command headquartered in Honolulu, Hawaii, that deals with military cooperation with India. The dividing line between the operational responsibilities between the two major American theatre commands runs along the India-Pakistan border.

Indian sphere of engagement/influence is around the Indian subcontinent(centcom) and not with east asia(pacom).
It looks totally stupid and out of place that PACOM and CENTCOM dividing line line is Indo Pak border.
I wonder what was the reason for this division.

[ramana]

They think TSP is part of Middile East. Its code for Islmaic conutry.

[RajeshA]

Indian sphere of engagement/influence is around the Indian subcontinent(centcom) and not with east asia(pacom).
It looks totally stupid and out of place that PACOM and CENTCOM dividing line line is Indo Pak border.
I wonder what was the reason for this division.

Its not about what engagement India has or what influence India exerts, but what role USA wants these countries to play.

Clearly USA needs Pakistan for its West Asian strategic theater, while USA needs India for its East Asian strategic theater.

[NRao]

split PakiLand and then we all can rest in peace.

[krisna]

They think TSP is part of Middile East. Its code for Islmaic conutry.

Its not about what engagement India has or what influence India exerts, but what role USA wants these countries to play.
Clearly USA needs Pakistan for its West Asian strategic theater, while USA needs India for its East Asian strategic theater.

USA may offer roles to India and TSP in their games but it is still a mystery why they separated the 2 nations into different divisions.It is quite astounding if uncle thinks that TSP is part of middle east, however one looks both TSP and India are intertwined by history.TSP might like to be part of middle east but it deals with India every second of its existence.
IMHO - Common sense dictates that the 2 countries should be in centcom only.

[abhishek_sharma]

Echoes of the Soviet Surge: The West's war in Afghanistan increasingly resembles the Soviet Union's.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2 ... viet_surge

[ramana]

The FP guys are very good at seeing analogs when they are not there. The FSU had the US going hammer and tongs at them thru the Afghan Mujhadeen, the KSA oil production, the TSP logistic chain with TSP military officers leading the Mujh units.

US doesnt have any such a group of forces arrayed against them. The oil price is high due to ME turmoil for democracy. The US economy is in doldrums due to self goals and non-regulation of fraudsters. The TSP is still providing logistics and training to Afghan Mujahdeen now renamed as Taliban!

[svinayak]

USA may offer roles to India and TSP in their games but it is still a mystery why they separated the 2 nations into different divisions.It is quite astounding if uncle thinks that TSP is part of middle east, however one looks both TSP and India are intertwined by history.TSP might like to be part of middle east but it deals with India every second of its existence.
IMHO - Common sense dictates that the 2 countries should be in centcom only.

Why this is a surprise. The British Army split between India and Pakistan at the time of partition similar to this. This gives the colonial power to tilt the rivalry either side to keep the balance of power. India was weak in 1947 and had leaders who trusted goodwill of people and did not understand the scheme of the British to support Pakistan in 1948 war in Kashmir and keep the Indian army without supplies at eh right time.


The current CENTCOM and PACOM role will be similar to keep the Pakistan state from collapsing in the event of a large scale war, or a small local border war or any other contingencies. The role is a kind of a overarching supervisor and it is a simulated war gaming between these two wings of PENTAGON. They will give the notion of support to PA in the event of a war to show that US will protect it. This is also another way to ensure that escalation does not lead to nuclear war. US wants to keep its role in the upperhand and wants to have the final say in the outcome of the future in the region. The region is under the simultaneous work of social engineering, state militarization, social radicalization, global war against terror and geo political game changer.
India has to protect its national interest.

[Johann]

Echoes of the Soviet Surge: The West's war in Afghanistan increasingly resembles the Soviet Union's.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2 ... viet_surge

America has advantages the Soviets never had;
- international diplomatic support for its role in Afghanistan
- the support of major ethnic groups within Afghanistan, and large areas that are insurgency-free
- greater density of combat forces in insurgent areas because of the previous two factors.
- supply lines to Afghanistan from both north and south
- very limited threat to air superiority
- the ability, until the Raymond Davis issue to hit targets within Pakistan

The problem is that none of these are even taken all together are sufficient for victory, although most of them are necessary.

The Obama plan (designed by Bruce Reidel's team) is to provide a surge of US forces to buy time, train up the Afghan forces (with long term US logistic, intelligence and airpower support) to take responsibility from US combat forces. Meanwhile the US would intensify a secret war within Pakistan.

The secret war has run in to the fundamental problem of just why the ISI and PA would allow the US to really go after their most valuable assets, no matter how much they're paid.

On the overt side of the war, i.e. the Afghan side of the Durand line the key issue is going to be whether the Afghan National Army holds together and performs counter-insurgency effectively.

The Soviet plan to get our of Afghanistan in 1979 (and every year after that until 1992) wasn't so different from the Obama plan, but it fell down because the Afghan Army suffered tremendous desertion at the conscript level, and tremendous infighting and intriguing at the general officer level.

[brihaspati]

Why should the Afghan national army, comprising Afghans - at all feel any great zeal to finish off the insurgents in a civil war? It might have worked if all the insurgents were seen by the Afghans as Pakistanis perhaps (seeing them as Americans or Russians or Jews might have worked miracles).

There is no real motivation from within Afghanistan to really go against the insurgents. Neither religious nor tribal-ethnic-"nationalist" motivations.

[ramana]

Bji, ANA is mostly Tajiks, Uzbegs and other folks from non-Pasthun areas. Hence they want to make sure its weak. Yes there are few Pashtuns but not in any numbers for there still mistrust of the Taliban era.

[NRao]

They think TSP is part of Middile East. Its code for Islmaic conutry.

Its not about what engagement India has or what influence India exerts, but what role USA wants these countries to play.
Clearly USA needs Pakistan for its West Asian strategic theater, while USA needs India for its East Asian strategic theater.

USA may offer roles to India and TSP in their games but it is still a mystery why they separated the 2 nations into different divisions.It is quite astounding if uncle thinks that TSP is part of middle east, however one looks both TSP and India are intertwined by history.TSP might like to be part of middle east but it deals with India every second of its existence.
IMHO - Common sense dictates that the 2 countries should be in centcom only.

Do not worry. PakiLand is very good at shooting self in foot. Or "Self goal" as some here would call it. The US cannot prevent such a self wound. And when she collapses they will have to split her. The KEY is to ensure that China does not get any part.

We will see.

[abhishek_sharma]

‘Menon told Ahmadinejad his predictions came true’

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/-Meno ... ue-/760369

[ramana]

This will embolden Iran to support its fellow Shias in Af-Pak. Most likely we will see a clash between TSPA and Iranians one of these days.

[ManishH]

This will embolden Iran to support its fellow Shias in Af-Pak. Most likely we will see a clash between TSPA and Iranians one of these days.

I think Iran is feeling claustrophobic with US presence on east and west. So it's most probably looking for allies in the neighbourhood to add to faint whiffs of support from Rus and Cheen. Iran is unlikely to annoy Pak in anyway but rather would collaborate in the short term with Pak to ...

a) Suppress insurgency in Baluch (both in Iran and Pak)
b) Coax some nuke tech transfer from Khan research labs on the sly

If one things from Ahmadinejad's perspective, I think support for Pak shias will be made secondary to above two objectives.

All this is bad for us. We'd ideally want conflict between Pak and Iran. There are no easy ways I see that we can force that conflict today. However much we pray for democracy in Iran, if we openly support democratic movements in Iran, it just breaks whatever little influence we may with the current administration.

One thing we can do is use our good offices to facilitate a secret detente between Israel and Iran. A sort of truce as far as attacking each others mainland is concerned. That may break away Iran's stupid focus on Israel and bring them into natural conflict with Wahabiism (of Pak and KSA).

[Samudragupta]

I think Ahmedinejad has taken up the mission from Attri ji , To Aryanise the world....afterall the iranians fancied themselves as Aryans....

[brihaspati]

Current Congress policy is to try and thicken it up with Islamist demands and targets in the ME as mucha s possible to try and keep Pak as isolated as possible. This is not a strategy of foreisght. It assumes that the Islamist mullahs and their backers outside the ME are fools. The Islamists will simply use India's overt gestures as much as possible to stengthen their demands over ME carving out and erasure of Israel, and then they will support Pak against India. They know that India tries to play shy of power projection and allies with none - hence India will not get any support from those with the muscle when the Islamists are finally able to turn their attention to India after clearing the Palestine issue.