Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): Feb. 12, 2011

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 20 Feb 2011 19:15

Re Operation Parakram, there was a cover story in India Today then about the potential Indian military attacks and why they were called off..Posting in full (cant find the link)..

When India Came Close To War

Twice this year, in January and June, India was on the verge of striking against Pakistan. Here's why it didn't.

By Shishir Gupta

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Last Christmas, fighter pilots of the Indian Air Force's No. 1 Tiger Squadron of Mirage-2000 H aircraft were not in celebratory mode. Moved a week earlier from home base Gwalior to the forward base Adampur near Jalandhar, the Tigers packed pistols, high-protein Swiss chocolates and a quarter-inch map of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK). These would come in handy in case any of them was shot down behind enemy lines.

Their comrades in arms, the Indian Army's para-commandos, looked like the US marines with war paint, MP-5 sub-machine guns, infrared night-vision devices, Kevlar bulletproof jackets and hi-tech frequency-hopping radio sets. For the past week, the two elite forces had been secretly conducting mock raids in the hills of Jammu and Kashmir. This was not a routine exercise. It was preparation for war. Just how close India actually came to war, not once but twice, is emerging only now, and India Today was able to piece together key details.

It all began on December 13, 2001, when Pakistan-based terrorists of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked the Indian Parliament, killing nine people. As the real intent of the strike sunk in and evidence of Pakistan's involvement mounted, Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee made it clear that India's patience had worn thin. At a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) and the three service chiefs on December 15, Vajpayee asked the service chiefs, "Can we do something quickly?" All three responded in the affirmative. The CCS-comprising Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani, the then external affairs minister Jaswant Singh, finance minister Yashwant Sinha, Defence Minister George Fernandes, Planning Commission Chairman K.C. Pant and National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra-agreed on a strike against PoK-based terrorists.

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Vajpayee wanted stikes on PoK-based terrorists, but Pakistan cleverly shifted their camps, limiting India's options

THE CAUSE

> The December 13 attack on Indian Parliament by Pakistan-based LeT and JeM jehadis that left nine dead.
> Pakistan's use of cross-border terrorism as state policy and ISI's abetment of terrorist groups in Jammu and Kashmir.
> The extremely low post-9/11 global tolerance for terrorists posing as freedom fighters.

THE BUILD-UP

> Government directs force mobilisation on December 18, 2001.
> Defensive corps in the western and southern sectors mobilised by December 28, 2001, the largest build-up since the 1971 war.
> IAF deploys 272 jets in the western sector; the navy moves its eastern fleet to the Arabian Sea.

THE D-DAY PLAN

A Mirage-2000 H, MiG-27 fighters to hit PoK-based terror camps with precision munition.
B Artillery guns to fire across the LoC targeting Pakistani troop bunkers and terrorist launch pads with laser-guided bombs.
C Under cover of artillery fire and air support, special forces to be para-dropped behind enemy lines to destroy terrorists and camps.

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INDIA'S OFFENSIVE

> To use air-land battle to open various fronts on the LoC and stretch Pakistani forces in PoK.
> To push in a brigade of army commandos into PoK while regular troop formations retain tactical heights on the LoC against enemy offensive.
> To gain control over terrorist infiltration routes in PoK, destroy terrorist communication network and launch pads near the LoC.
> To stretch Pakistani forces at strategic Haji Pir pass and try to link up the Uri-Poonch axis.
> To occupy dominant heights on the LoC in Siachen, Kargil and in Poonch-Rajouri sectors.
> To hold on to PoK territory near the LoC and use it for future talks on Kashmir.

PAKISTAN'S COUNTER

> Packs the eastern sector with troops by moving two Peshawar-Corps divisions to Muzaffarabad and Punjab. Beefs up the Lahore area to counter the Indian attack in PoK.
> Places the Mangla-based Army Reserve North on red alert. Plans to launch a counter-offensive in Akhnoor sector.
> The focus of the Pakistani Air Force is on the Indian Western Command with 200 jets ready to counter the IAF fighters.
> The Pakistani Navy moves its key war assets from Karachi to Omara, Gwadar and Pasni ports.

THE US FACTOR

> Called for Indian restraint but conceded Delhi's right to respond to Islamist terrorist attacks.
> In case of a war by Pakistan, India would be hampered by the US forces in Pakistan and in north Arabian Sea.
> Declared LeT and JeM as terrorist outfits and put the heat on Musharraf to publicly renounce terrorism in Kashmir.
> Feared Musharraf would go nuclear after the Indian strike.

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WHY THE STRIKE WAS CALLED OFF

> Indian war planes would have to cross international borders as Pakistan, fearing strikes, moved terrorist camps from PoK to northern areas in Pakistan.
> The global community aligned firmly with India, realising for the first time that Kashmir was facing Pakistan-sponsored terrorism and not a freedom struggle.
> On January 12, Musharraf banned LeT and JeM and announced regulation of madarsas in his speech.
> Delhi's fear that Pakistan would launch full-scale war and call for global intervention in Kashmir.

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January 14, 2002
First Chance

Orders were immediately issued to mobilise troops-more than those in the runup to the 1971 war. Considering that it would take three to four weeks for deployment on the western borders, the armed forces planned action for the second week of January 2002. After much debate, the service chiefs opted for a limited offensive against the terrorists' training camps in PoK. It would essentially entail air force strikes to pulverise zones with a high concentration of camps-that's where the Tiger Squadron came in. A limited ground offensive by special forces of the army would further neutralise the camps and help occupy dominant positions on the loc (see graphic on previous page). D-day was tentatively fixed for January 14.

In Delhi's war calculus, limited action in PoK made sense as it would not only convey the Indian resolve to Pakistan but also keep international retribution to manageable levels. India, after all, was only taking a leaf out of the ongoing US action against Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaida terrorists in Afghanistan. The daunting prospect of Pakistan launching an all-out offensive in response to the Indian action weighed heavily on the CCS. But the intelligence assessment that the Pakistani Army was not well prepared loaded the dice in India's favour. This meant that the chances of Pakistan launching a full-scale war were minimal. The Indian plans were also backed by a sound economy that was bolstered by low inflation, high forex and petroleum reserves. Sinha went on record saying the economy was prepared for war even though it was the last option.

A limited strike was a clever tactical option. The build-up indicated to the world, especially the US, that India was serious. If Pakistan wasn't reined in, India would have no option. Delhi also stepped up the diplomatic offensive, recalling its high commissioner and banning civilian flights from Pakistan. Picking up the war signals, Pakistan went into hypermode: it began mobilising forces and exchanged frantic calls with the US, getting President George W. Bush into the act. Secretary of State Colin Powell called India and Pakistan to cool down temperatures. British Prime Minister Tony Blair even flew to India in the first week of January to say that they were leaning on Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf. As proof, the US declared LeT and JeM as terrorist groups. Advani, meanwhile, flew to the US on January 8, where he was briefed on the contents of Musharraf's impending landmark speech. The speech finally came on January 12, when Musharraf declared that terrorism in the name of Kashmir was unjustified. Practically giving in to Indian demands, he also announced plans to regulate madarsas and ban known terrorist groups operating out of Pakistan.

Besides Musharraf's speech, there was another factor that shot down the CCS plans of an immediate war when it met on January 13. Satellite imagery revealed that Pakistan had moved out most terrorist training camps from PoK in January, implying that the Indian forces would have to cross the international borders to achieve militarily significant results. This was risky as it would show India as an aggressor and could invite global intervention on Kashmir. So the CCS decided to give Musharraf another chance but keep the armed forces fully mobilised for war. And in a symbolic gesture on January 14, the Tiger Squadron destroyed an "enemy" bunker at Pokhran in Rajasthan with a laser-guided bomb.

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THE CAUSE

> Terrorists attack an army camp at Kaluchak on May 14, leaving 22 dead.
> Cross-border infiltration rises after a low spell in February and March.
> Musharraf fails to deliver on his January 12 speech.
> Pakistan-based jehadis become active in Kashmir, PoK camps return.

THE BUILD-UP

> CCS favours action against terrorists at its May 18 meeting.
> Plans to move Strike Corps I at Northern Command by June 3; Corps II moves between Suratgarh and Punjab; Corps XXI from Barmer to Rann of Kutch.
> Contingency plans firmed up by May 27 for second-strike against Pakistan's nuke attack.

THE D-DAY PLAN

A Backed by IAF jets, Stirke Corps 1 to launch attack from Akhnoor-Pathankot secotr.
B Simultaneous division-level hits in Kargil, Uri and Rajouri.
C Strike Corps II and XXI to engage the Pakistani counter-offensive from Multan-based Army Reserve South and target Pakistani economic assets in Singh if needed.

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INDIA'S OFFENSIVE

> Synergised attack by the Northern Command to split Pakistan's Army Reserve North and provide an opening in PoK.
> The Indian Navy fleet led by aircraft carrier INS Viraat to engage Pakistani warships and target economic assets. Karachi harbour to be blockaded if Pakistan launches a war.

PAKISTAN'S COUNTER

> To block Indian thrust in PoK, launch counter-offensive in Punjab and Rajasthan.
> Cause maximum attrition in the Indian forces and wait for monsoon stalemate.
> Use Agosta submarines to delay the Indian flotilla.

THE US FACTOR

> A full-scale India-Pakistan conflict could hamper the US operations against bin Laden's Al-Qaida terrorists in Afghanistan.
> The US told India it was putting pressure on Musharraf to permanently end cross-border infiltration in Kashmir.
> War could damage the growing Indo-US cooperation in nuclear energy, space, hi-tech equipment and defence.

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THE NUCLEAR FACTOR

> The US conveyed to India it was unsure about Pakistani
nuclear threshold, particularly after Musharraf and his UN representative
Munir Akram threatened to use nukes against India.
> India began exploring its second-strike options after Pakistan tested
N-capable Ghauri missile on May 25.
> Intelligence reports indicated that Pakistan had mobilised strategic
assets post-Kaluchak. Despite Indian military's assurance, the nuke
threat bothered Delhi.

WHY THE STRIKE WAS CALLED OFF

> Musharraf's May 27 speech assuring nothing was happening on the LoC; infiltration dipped to a new low in May and June.
> A big complication was the oncoming monsoons that could bog down the forces.
> US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage assured India on June 6 that Musharraf would end infiltration in Kashmir and dismantle terrorist infrastructure in PoK.
> Nuclear blackmail by Musharraf raised Indian fears that in case of war, the global community would intervene in Kashmir.

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June 10, 2002
Second Shot

The readiness strategy paid off when Pakistan's terrorist groups struck again on May 14. Storming into the army residential quarters at Kaluchak cantonment in Jammu, they killed 22 women and children. Even before the killings, India had accused Pakistan of failing to keep its promise on ending cross-border terrorism. A day after the massacre, a visibly tense Vajpayee told Parliament, "Hamein pratikar karna hoga (We will have to counter it)." On May 18, Vajpayee, along with Fernandes, was briefed on military preparedness by Director-General Military Operations Lt-General S.S. Chahal and Military Intelligence Chief Lt-General O.S. Lochab. Later, after a two-hour meeting, the ccs favoured military action against terrorists in Pakistan.

The political leadership apparently wanted limited action similar to the one in January. But after evaluating various military options, it was decided that action in PoK was not viable as Pakistan had beefed up its forces across the loc. Any action limited to forays across the loc would translate into minimum military gains and would risk attrition in the Indian forces. The military, however, favoured an all-out offensive that would stretch Pakistani troops across the international borders and give India an opening in PoK. So the armed forces came up with a daring plan: destroy Pakistan's war-waging potential and pulverise the terror factories in PoK. The June canvas was bigger than the January one, since Pakistan had packed areas north of Chenab with forces and military logic dictated the battle should not be confined to the loc. But there were serious limitations to the plans that worried the political bosses. With the monsoons imminent, the armed forces warned that the window for attack was extremely narrow. Any miscalculation could see the offensive bogged down with disastrous consequences.

Even as the debate raged, the military made its plans. The launch of the offensive was entrusted to Strike Corps I led by Lt-General J.J. Singh, who had directed military operations in Kargil war. The IAF, along with Strike Corps I, would initiate action in the Shakargarh bulge and engage Pakistan's Army Reserve North (ARN) spread from Muzaffarabad in PoK to the Shekhopura-Lahore area. The idea was to lock Pakistan's key strike corp in battle that was essentially a boxer's feint. The real offensive would be in PoK by strike formations moved in from the east and tasked to capture strategic points used by Pakistan to push in terrorists (see graphic).

The period considered for limited strikes was between May 23 and June 10. On May 22, at Kupwara brigade headquarters near the loc Vajpayee declared that "it was time for a decisive battle". A day later, the CCS met to assess the readiness of the country's key sectors in the event of a war. An economic review was also undertaken: Sinha said India's economy was a hundred times stronger than Pakistan's to bear hostilities, and RBI Governor Bimal Jalan pointed to a low inflation rate of 1.56 per cent and all-time high forex reserves of $55 billion (Rs 2,64,000 crore) to tide over the crisis. The crude oil and petroleum stock reserves, which should sustain the country for more than a month in a war, were also sufficient.

With the CCS endorsing a strike, Vajpayee wrote to Bush, Blair, Russian President Vladimir Putin and French President Jacques Chirac, saying Musharraf had failed to deliver on his January 12 speech and that India's patience was running out. Hectic diplomacy followed as Bush, Putin, Blair and even Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi called and pleaded with Vajpayee not to take the extreme step. The global community conveyed to Delhi that it would impress on Musharraf to clarify his promise on stopping cross-border infiltration.

That June was an option considered seriously by the Vajpayee Government is borne out by the Defence Ministry's SOS for defence supplies to Israel during the month. But the global community urged restraint as it was worried Pakistan would use the nuclear card to address its conventional asymmetry against the Indian armed forces. Musharraf had already played the nuclear brinkmanship-hinting he would use nukes against India-in an interview to German magazine Der Spiegel in April. Pakistan had even tested three missiles-Ghauri (N-capable), Ghaznavi and Abdali-between May 25 and 28 as a deterrent to India's posture.

This belligerence forced India to review its N-capability to strike back-Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman Anil Kakodkar and Defence Research and Development Organisation Secretary V.K. Aatre reportedly participated in a CCS meeting in late May. In the absence of any formalised strategic force command, the nuclear strategy was handled on a need-to-know basis by Mishra, who reportedly attended an AEC meeting on May 24 in Chennai and later flew to Manali to brief Vajpayee.

Pakistan's nuclear theatrics also led to Powell calling Musharraf five times in the last week of May and reading the riot act to him. Bush sent Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to Pakistan on June 5. He apparently asked Musharraf three times whether he would "permanently" end cross-border infiltration and help dismantle the terrorist infrastructure. He conveyed Musharraf's commitment to Powell while flying to Delhi on June 6, and to India, on arriving. On June 10, Powell disclosed Musharraf's promise to the world, by which time India had already called off its strike plans. The political logic was understandable as a full-frontal attack would translate into war. It was better to give Musharraf another chance. Or perhaps, the build-up was a shrewd ploy by India, not only in June but also in January, to force Pakistan as well as the world community into action.

Last week, Fernandes denied (to India Today) that India had been on the brink of war, claiming that at no point had the ccs given directions to the armed forces to take action against Pakistan. He, however, did not put it beyond the army generals to prepare for contingency plans. Mishra, on the other hand, reiterated that India had indeed been "close to war" in January and May. While refusing to disclose dates, he pointed out that on June 23, Vajpayee had said in an interview to the Washington Post that it was a "touch and go affair".

The Tiger Squadron, on its part, did have its share of action. On August 2, four Mirage fighters evicted Pakistani intruders 800 m across the loc in Machhil sector of Kashmir. In Washington, it was dubbed Kargil II. The Tigers know that given the murky Indo-Pak relations, all it will take is another carnage for them to be back in air, in action.

Lack of requisite conventional "edge" does not come in the discussion...But the nuke dimension comes, again and again and again...

Brad Goodman · Post by **Brad Goodman** » 20 Feb 2011 19:30

Have seen tons of articles in past 2 days bashing GOI and diplomacy. I am definately not supporting talks at this stage here but my question to learned members of this forum is. Compare paki actions from 1980 - 1989 then from 1990 - 2000 then 2001 - 2002 and 2003 - current. Now paki adventurism started in 1st phase with Punjab and then escalated n 90's in Kashmir. Post 9/11 we have seen Kashmir pretty much wind down. Would we not consider this an acheivement for diplomcy. MEA has been able to convince unkil & world to reign in pakis. I agree 26/11 needs a strong response but least for now what r we losing by talking its not like any one is going to give or take anything from these secretry level talks.

JwalaMukhi · Post by **JwalaMukhi** » 20 Feb 2011 20:38

Talking to pakis is endorsing Unkil's sleeping with the terrorists (albeit those in uniform). Talking to pakis is meant to take pressure off of unkil, who is deeply in bed with terrorists and desperately needs to act as spokesperson for them. Isn't it hilarious when unkil periodically uses the new clear threat by pakis, as a blackmail for India to endorse its sleeping with terrorists.
Every so often unkil's spokespersons are reduced to warning about attacks on India, as a blackmail to talk to paki terrorists. Once India starts talking, the embarrassment to unkil is reduced, mainly because they do not have to speak on behalf of their favorite whore... All ij well, unkil can freely indulge in gifts to the terrorists, and everyone is happy because India and pakis are talking peas process.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 20 Feb 2011 20:54

JwalaMukhi wrote:Talking to pakis is endorsing Unkil's sleeping with the terrorists (albeit those in uniform). Talking to pakis is meant to take pressure off of unkil, who is deeply in bed with terrorists and desperately needs to act as spokesperson for them. Isn't it hilarious when unkil periodically uses the new clear threat by pakis, as a blackmail for India to endorse its sleeping with terrorists.
Every so often unkil's spokespersons are reduced to warning about attacks on India, as a blackmail to talk to paki terrorists. Once India starts talking, the embarrassment to unkil is reduced, mainly because they do not have to speak on behalf of their favorite whore... All ij well, unkil can freely indulge in gifts to the terrorists, and everyone is happy because India and pakis are talking peas process.

But Jwalamukhi I see a significant number of people on here who believe that the US's role is more benign than the role of China might be and its aid in terms of military aid to Pakistan is insignificant in the sense that it neither constitutes a threat to India nor is it useful to fight an insurgency and merely constitutes a "bribe" for Pakistanis. With the US exerting such a positive role in Pakistan, what harm is there in going along with the US? After all India is impotent and weak it is sensible to bandwagon with someone strong. What could be more noble than bandwagoning with the world's most powerful nation, the USA, especially when the world's second most powerful nation is also an adversary who has always defeated us, and outsmarted us?

I sometimes feel that there are some people who want to see the US humiliated by India and blindly oppose any Indian action that they see as being dictated by the US. But is the US's advice so bad for India? what can go wrong? Do you have any idea?

To me it can only be absurd emotions like heartburn and jealousy and a feeling of inadequacy that makes people demand that India should show some spine. India need not show any spine. The US, with its good offices will take care of us.

sum · Post by **sum** » 20 Feb 2011 21:00

This information, which was revealed to the media by a senior Indian official, raises serious concerns about the privacy of tourists on India territory. If the personal cellphone of a person of Rahat Fateh Ali Khan’s stature can be tapped by the Indian authorities, then the common man visiting India has no privacy whatsoever.

At least now the visiting "tourist" Poaks will be thinking 10 times before trying their local contacts here/do whatever anti-India stuff they came to do here...

sum · Post by **sum** » 20 Feb 2011 21:02

Re Operation Parakram, there was a cover story in India Today then about the potential Indian military attacks and why they were called off..Posting in full (cant find the link)..

Thanks for the article....had never read this one.

If only we had acted with alacrity in the 80s ( and few of the powers had supported us instead of ganging up against us), this situation of backing off due to the Paki N-factor wouldnt have arisen and Pak would have got multiple jhapads by now.

James B · Post by **James B** » 20 Feb 2011 21:19

From Paki Chai Ghar

Pakistani Intelligentsia’s ‘Cowardly’ Silence

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 20 Feb 2011 21:26

sum wrote:
Re Operation Parakram, there was a cover story in India Today then about the potential Indian military attacks and why they were called off..Posting in full (cant find the link)..
Thanks for the article....had never read this one.

If only we had acted with alacrity in the 80s ( and few of the powers had supported us instead of ganging up against us), this situation of backing off due to the Paki N-factor wouldnt have arisen and Pak would have got multiple jhapads by now.

One thing I find difficult to swallow in that article is the following sentence which, to me sounds like utter meaningless trash although it is probably meant to sound like an exciting and heartwarming piece of information.

Pakistan's nuclear theatrics also led to Powell calling Musharraf five times in the last week of May and reading the riot act to him.

What the hell does that mean? The author of the article writes as if he is unable to confirm some things from the Indian side - but he is sure of five phone calls from Powell to Musharraf. And what the heck is the "riot act"? What would the US do? Why would Pakistan bend to the reading of a mythical riot act?

If it is true then it means that the US has influence on Pakistan that needs to be noted and used by us if possible. If not it's all journalistic time-pass. I am inclined to believe that it is the latter. We love fairy tales where someone will rescue us. 10 years after Parakram we have a good idea of how much influence the US has over Pakistan, post bribes.

JwalaMukhi · Post by **JwalaMukhi** » 20 Feb 2011 22:01

shiv wrote: I sometimes feel that there are some people who want to see the US humiliated by India and blindly oppose any Indian action that they see as being dictated by the US. But is the US's advice so bad for India? what can go wrong? Do you have any idea?
To me it can only be absurd emotions like heartburn and jealousy and a feeling of inadequacy that makes people demand that India should show some spine. India need not show any spine.

India doesn't have to make any effort for US to be humiliated. Having pakis as their friends is in and of itself a humiliation. The problem with US's advice is it is not just unsound, but is contradictory. The fall out of the advice is:
1) The policy of no negotiations with terrorists is the first casualty. - This is unimportant to India.
2) It is giving unsound ideas to all around, including to the terrorists. This is most concern for India. In a globalized world, somehow Unkil is trying to convince itself, others and the terrorists that the terrorists are local phenomena only. If anything, terrorists are going to be globalized much faster anything else. This maybe due to unkil has lost plot on this and trying to cover it up by saying the pakis have issues only with India. pakis are as globalized as it is possible and will continue to be a global phenomena. unkil has no control over that, but want to convince otherwise and hence all benevolence talk of it not for them pakis will become globalized.

To prove that pakis are local phenomena, there is vested interest in both the aids givers and aids receivers to demonstrate as such. What better way to do it than to launch periodic attacks on India. Everyone and his unkil will be convinced that pakis are local phenomena by that, and if only India could share some chai biskoot it will be even more solid proof that it is a local phenomena only.

The US, with its good offices will take care of us.

There are many truths in the above statement. The don will always take care of (as in problems - India), by arranging good solution to suit the don. Leave it to don to fix it.

CRamS · Post by **CRamS** » 20 Feb 2011 23:44

arun wrote:Pakistan has no friends in region: Ahmed Rashid

Wonder what he means when he says:

However, he was optimistic that Pakistan still had a geo-political advantage in the Gulf, Central Asia and South Asia – only if exploited wisely by the security establishment.

GuruPrabhu · Post by **GuruPrabhu** » 21 Feb 2011 00:03

Brad Goodman wrote: I agree 26/11 needs a strong response but least for now what r we losing by talking its not like any one is going to give or take anything from these secretry level talks.

My analysis after reading a lot (but not posting much) is that a set of members here distrust the MMS/Sonia regime, and some section of MEA, to the extent that while no one will say that there is a loss in talks per se, they fear that someone will "sell out" and give away something. There is no response to such fears except historical data as you have attempted. However, I suspect that such historical evidence will be junked in the face of genuine fears.

GuruPrabhu · Post by **GuruPrabhu** » 21 Feb 2011 00:33

shiv wrote:
Pakistan's nuclear theatrics also led to Powell calling Musharraf five times in the last week of May and reading the riot act to him.
What the hell does that mean? ... And what the heck is the "riot act"? What would the US do? Why would Pakistan bend to the reading of a mythical riot act?

It is just an expression. I use it occasionally too.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riot_Act

"... the expression "to read the Riot Act" entered into common language as a phrase meaning "to reprimand severely", with the added sense of a stern warning. The phrase remains in everyday use in English."

As for "Why would Pakistan ...?" type of questions, there are no answers. An answer would assume a degree of rationality in a packee head. There are no historical data to support such assumptions.

GuruPrabhu · Post by **GuruPrabhu** » 21 Feb 2011 00:42

IMO, US influence over TSP will increase only after US leaves Afghanistan. TSP has only one lever, the supply routes. US has learnt a serious lesson regarding its ability to project power. TSP has gathered valuable data points on how US responds to blackmail.

If the evaluation were limited to just the bilateral US-TSP equation, one would conclude that TSP is winning handsomely. It is rather clever of some folks to couch US losses as a planned Chankian exercise against India. If only they were so clever.

CRamS · Post by **CRamS** » 21 Feb 2011 00:53

GuruPrabhu wrote: My analysis after reading a lot (but not posting much) is that a set of members here distrust the MMS/Sonia regime, and some section of MEA, to the extent that while no one will say that there is a loss in talks per se, they fear that someone will "sell out" and give away something. There is no response to such fears except historical data as you have attempted. However, I suspect that such historical evidence will be junked in the face of genuine fears.

What do mean nothing is given away. Could you have imagined in your wildest dreams that MMS will give TSP the "saffron terror" stick to beat India with, as a way of whitewashing 26/11? Thats not a huge sell out? Mine is not a fear. It is based on MMS's track record. Granted, he is not going to Lal Chowk and surrender Kashmir in the glare of the media. What he is attempting to do is to put in motion a chain of events that might appear as nothing being given away, but in fact, by cutting a deal with terrorist Mush on joint love-making in Srinagar, he has effectively signed off on Kashmir. Finally, MMS's "South Asia" predilection as opposed to India first makes him suspiscous in my eyes.

Muppalla · Post by **Muppalla** » 21 Feb 2011 01:13

GuruPrabhu wrote:
Brad Goodman wrote: I agree 26/11 needs a strong response but least for now what r we losing by talking its not like any one is going to give or take anything from these secretry level talks.
My analysis after reading a lot (but not posting much) is that a set of members here distrust the MMS/Sonia regime, and some section of MEA, to the extent that while no one will say that there is a loss in talks per se, they fear that someone will "sell out" and give away something. There is no response to such fears except historical data as you have attempted. However, I suspect that such historical evidence will be junked in the face of genuine fears.

The contrary is also true. Some members think that whatever they do is always in ther interests of India and even if the evidence is contrary it has to be either understood as some chanikyan or inevitability in the global geopolitics or economics take precedence over everything.

VikramS · Post by **VikramS** » 21 Feb 2011 01:13

shiv:

I feel the same way about your opinions, woefully inadequate and stuck in a box, unable to think outside of it.

You dismiss all the possibilities I raise (If this then what..) by saying that "If" is not possible/feasible. Perhaps your viewpoint is too clouded by all the internal fissures you see within TSP. What you however fail to see that there are certain themes which unifies them also. More importantly, the issues which cause fissure can dissipate.

Suppose the TTP disappears tomorrow, and all Taleban become good. Will your conclusions change? How come those internal fissures where not present when the US was out of the picture (1990-2000)?

A trade corridor built right along the Indus is not the same FATA/NWFP/Balochistan where the writ of TSP(A) exists in name only. Take a map and plot where the attacks on transportation infrastructure occur. FWIW the heartland along the Indus is fairly secure by TSP standards. Acess controlled highways, by their very nature are significantly isolated from the people who live along them.

Also please take the current Chinese view point with a pinch of salt. Why would they put money into the TSP when the US is running the show??? They built the KKH and the sea-infrastructure when their economy was one-tenth its current size. They lost grip when Uncle came back. However, if and when Uncle cedes the space, why do you think that the Chinese will NOT try to fill in the vacuum?

And what about the nature of boots on the ground and the 160 million SDRE? What is so dramatically different about the mango Abdul in TSP which will stop the Chinese from exploring opportunities when they did so successfully in war-torn Africa, Afghanistan and Central Asia? TSP is a next door neighbor after all; and no Abdul, even the purest of them all, says no to money.

The primary reason I bought up the issue of the CCP boots on the ground, because you bought up the question of "wasteful expenditure". I found your analysis woefully inadequate and frankly, on the verge of being condescending to the Chinese strategic intellect. And yes the issue of the world second largest economy is IMPORTANT because it allows the CCP to have a lot more of the wasteful expenditure to pursue her strategic goals.

And more significantly, you are underestimating the chameleon capability of the RAPE to morph. Some elements of the RAPE are proud of their Mongol birth-marks and the Chinese looks are close enough to the Mongols to make them their new mai-baap.

You are simply wishing away uncomfortable alternatives, with little analysis. The PLA is now parked in POK and that still does not ring a bell; I do not know what will.

GuruPrabhu · Post by **GuruPrabhu** » 21 Feb 2011 02:01

CRamS wrote:What do mean nothing is given away. Could you have imagined in your wildest dreams that MMS will give TSP the "saffron terror" stick to beat India with, as a way of whitewashing 26/11? Thats not a huge sell out?

We have different thresholds for things like "given away". I don't perceive any sticks and any beatings. Those are intangibles. In terms of measurables, there has been nothing "given away". I am not criticizing your choice of "given away" scale. I was simply explaining to Brad what I thought was the "loss in talking" as perceived by others. For the record, I am in favor of talking and more talking.

Brad Goodman · Post by **Brad Goodman** » 21 Feb 2011 02:16

CRamS wrote: What do mean nothing is given away. Could you have imagined in your wildest dreams that MMS will give TSP the "saffron terror" stick to beat India with, as a way of whitewashing 26/11? Thats not a huge sell out? Mine is not a fear. It is based on MMS's track record. Granted, he is not going to Lal Chowk and surrender Kashmir in the glare of the media. What he is attempting to do is to put in motion a chain of events that might appear as nothing being given away, but in fact, by cutting a deal with terrorist Mush on joint love-making in Srinagar, he has effectively signed off on Kashmir. Finally, MMS's "South Asia" predilection as opposed to India first makes him suspiscous in my eyes.

CRamS lets look at 26/11 closely. It happened in 2008. From then till 2010 (good 600 + days) there was no saffron terror. What did we acheive? Ok now thanks to diggy raja we have given pakis a stick but either ways pre saffron terror they were dilly dallying saying we need more proof now they say we have terror on both sides. Nothing has changed. Congress and Madam did not invent saffron terror to let pakis walk out of the corner it was invented so that in next election yuvraj can be projected as messiah of minorities protecting them from brute majority. The side effect of this was that pakis can now use the same logic to tell their mango abduls that see India is no better. Thats all to it. This equal equal tamasha between mumbai & samjhauta is just playing to gallery. I am not worried with secretry or FM level talks worst outcome is SMQ making a tamasha and SMK saying its OK. Pakis claiming hollow victory press blowing it hot & cold for few weeks and end of day its status quo. I am more worried abt this so called track two diplomacy. Where we have no clue what they talk. The people who talk have no accountiblity to what so ever. The worst harm to Foreign relations happened during IK Gujral times and then that was not FM level talks but this track two and unilateral adventurism that led the moron to stop all RAW activities. ( dont know what the idiot was smoking) perhaps hallucinated about a nobel prize or something. Why is it that every ex paki track two guy says they were so close to solving kashmir either they are lying or there is some element of truth and since no Indian ever refutes these stories I feel the latter argument has more strength and we have no clue what they mean that they had solved it. So lets give MMS his due. Least I havent seen anything worse that he has done compared to what some of his predecessors have acheived. We are having talks since time I can remember politics. They happened when Rajiv Gandhi was around they happened when PVNR was around and no one has created any stage of surrender. Its just wait and watch till pakis consume themselves.

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 21 Feb 2011 03:47

CRamS wrote:
arun wrote:Pakistan has no friends in region: Ahmed Rashid

Wonder what he means when he says:

Poor Man dont realize , Poaks have lovers like Hos have clients. Why does he need friends.?

A_Gupta · Post by **A_Gupta** » 21 Feb 2011 03:53

Henry Kissinger, "White House Years", 1979:

In my view, India had survived its turbulent history through an unusual subtlety in grasping and then manipulating the psychology of foreigners. The moral pretensions of Indian leaders seemed to me perfectly attuned to exploit the guilt complexes of a liberal, slightly socialist West; they were indispensable weapons for an independence movement that was physically weak and that used the ethical categories of the colonial power to paralyze it. They were invaluable for a new country seseking to vindicate an international role that it could never establish through power alone.

I was looking to see what the US thought of India's threat to West Pakistan in 1971 {someone here had written that there was no threat expressed}. Kissinger notes this about the Nixon-Mrs. Gandhi dialog:

Mrs. Gandhi stressed the congenital defects of Pakistan so insistently that she implied that confining her demands to the secession of East Pakistan amounted to Indian restraint; the continued existence of West Pakistan reflected Indian forbearance.

About Nov 22, 1971, which Kissinger took as the Indian initiation of the 1971 war, he wrote:

There was no question of "saving" East Pakistan. Both Nixon and I had recognized for months that its independence was inevitable; war was not necessary to accomplish it. We strove to preserve West Pakistan as an independent state, since we judged India's real aim was to encompass its disintegration. We sought to prevent a demonstration that Soviet arms and diplomatic support were inevitably decisive in crises.....

...if we acted with sufficient daring, we might stop the Indian onslaught before it engulfed and shattered West Pakistan.

After Nov 26, Nixon sent a presidential letter to Yahya Khan and to Mrs. Gandhi.

The letter to Yahya sought to discourage him from attacking India from the West, where the bulk of the Pakistani army was located. Even though such a move was also doomed to failure, desperate leaders might feel it required by their honor. We were concerned that a Pakistani attack in the West would merely supply the final pretext for India to complete the disintegration of all of Pakistan.

A_Gupta · Post by **A_Gupta** » 21 Feb 2011 03:57

Kissinger further writes, about December 7, 1971:

A report reached us from a source whose reliability we had never had any reason to doubt and which I do not question today, to the effect that Prime Minister Gandhi was determined to reduce even West Pakistan to impotence: She had indicated that India would not accept any General Assembly call for a cease-fire until Bangladesh was "liberated"; after that, Indian forces would proceed with the "liberation" of the southern part of Azad Kashmir - the Pakistani part of Kashmir - and continue fighting until the Pakistani army and airforce were wiped out. In other words, West Pakistan was to be dismembered and rendered defenceless. Mrs. Gandhi also told colleagues that if the Chinese "rattled the sword", the Soviets had promisted to take appropriate counteraction.

A_Gupta · Post by **A_Gupta** » 21 Feb 2011 04:17

From 1990 to 9/11, Pak had a free run in Af.....

If that is what is called a free run, then India has nothing to fear from it. From 1990-94, when the Taliban emerged, Pakistan was not successful in getting its proxies into power in Kabul. In 1996, the Taliban took Kabul; also the Northern Alliance was formed. Ahmed Shah Massoud and the alliance stood in the way of the Taliban until 9/9 when he was assassinated. Maybe if the Pakis had been content with 9/9 and eschewed 9/11, they would be in full control of Afghanistan now. But from 1990 to 9/11 perhaps only 2 days, 9/10 and 9/11, was there a chance of Pakistan getting its way.

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 21 Feb 2011 04:33

IMHO, after 2022, it will be completely irrelevant who sides with Poaks, whether China or USA. If Poaks want to contrrol kabul , they will earn the ire of every Afghan who Btw has very low opinion of Pakjabis.

jrjrao · Post by **jrjrao** » 21 Feb 2011 05:41

Previously, when the Pakis ordered rail engines from their taller than tallest and deeper than deepest friends, the engines turned out to be wider that the widest allowable dimension. Which had required the Pakis to take giant chinese made shaving razors, and shave off concrete strips from their railway platforms in order to accomodate the wide-assed rocomotives.

Now, having gotten wiser, the taller and deeper have been shunned by the Pakis for the next order:
Pakistan to purchase 50 GM 3000 Horse Power Locomotives from S.Korea

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 21 Feb 2011 06:45

A_Gupta wrote:If that is what is called a free run, then India has nothing to fear from it. From 1990-94, when the Taliban emerged, Pakistan was not successful in getting its proxies into power in Kabul. In 1996, the Taliban took Kabul; also the Northern Alliance was formed. Ahmed Shah Massoud and the alliance stood in the way of the Taliban until 9/9 when he was assassinated. Maybe if the Pakis had been content with 9/9 and eschewed 9/11, they would be in full control of Afghanistan now. But from 1990 to 9/11 perhaps only 2 days, 9/10 and 9/11, was there a chance of Pakistan getting its way.

The die was cast for Najib the day Soviets left...And ditto for our influence as well...Remember the number of Afghan mujahideen that came into Kashmir in the early '90s...While it took a few years for Pak proxies (taliban was hardly the first of them) to capture Kabul, effectively Pak was setting the agenda there..

GuruPrabhu wrote:IMO, US influence over TSP will increase only after US leaves Afghanistan. TSP has only one lever, the supply routes. US has learnt a serious lesson regarding its ability to project power. TSP has gathered valuable data points on how US responds to blackmail.

Guruprabhu-ji, I wouldnt be so sure of that...If the US leaves Af, they are basically washing their hands off the entire region..they dont have to pander to Paki interests anymore...Look at the entire decade of the '90s - the US aid to Pak dropped like a stone...This time, Pak will have China stepping in where US leaves, they will themselves have MUCH lesser need for the US as their backstop...

The TTP-types have been constantly targeting the Pak military, and families..Why is it that Pak establishment is still so quarter hearted about confronting them? To me, its because they are preparing for an end game without the US...Once the US leaves Af, there would be no more pressure on Pak to oppose the Taliban-types..The strategic assets will then revert to being just that, rather than the temporary threats they are today..China is already making the opening gambits - the billion dollar investmnt in that copper mine in Af....Stationing soldiers in PoK..entering into sweet deals with the Islamist groups to buy their acquiescence..

If we still think that the primary problem is a few NVGs and F16s sold to Pak, we are missing the woods for the twigs...

Dipanker · Post by **Dipanker** » 21 Feb 2011 07:03

somnath wrote: The die was cast for Najib the day Soviets left...And ditto for our influence as well...Remember the number of Afghan mujahideen that came into Kashmir in the early '90s...While it took a few years for Pak proxies (taliban was hardly the first of them) to capture Kabul, effectively Pak was setting the agenda there..

Pre Taliban Pak proxy was Hekmatyar who was a loser, he never captured anything. Pre Taliban, Kabul was not under the rule of Pak proxies.

Also the die was not cast or Najib the day Soviets left. Soviets had left by may of 89. Najibullah regime did not fall until March of 1992. The die was only cast after the fall of Soviet Union in 1991 when the military aid of the order of over a $1 billion /year coming from Soviet Union stopped.

Anyway OT fior this thread, should be discussed in Afghanistan related thread.

Vivek_A · Post by **Vivek_A** » 21 Feb 2011 07:04

Hey Chidanand Rajghatta..India's own crack reporter...(i.e. person who trolls BRF and steals terms like non-prolif ayatollah)...remember your crack reporting on Raymond Davis and the drone attacks?

FAIR WARNING: source is the nutty nation. ...so put down your coffee/tea before your click.

Drones are back

At least six people were killed in a US drone attack in Azam Warsak area of South Waziristan, reported a private TV channel late on Sunday. According to sources, three missiles were fired at a house located in Azam Warsak. After the attack, the drones continued their low flights in the areas which caused more fear among the residents, the sources added.

It is pertinent to know that it is first drone attack since Raymond Davis has been arrested for killing two Pakistanis in Lahore last month.

arun · Post by **arun** » 21 Feb 2011 07:15

How does this square with the “ Jihad fi Sabilillah” or translated “Jihad in the Path of Allah” part of the motto “Iman, Taqwa, Jihad fi Sabilillah” or “Faith, Piety and Jihad in the Path of Allah” which is used by the Army of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan?

How is it legitimate from an Islamic standpoint for an Army claiming pursuit of Jihad in its motto to kill fellow Muslims who are likewise claiming to pursue their Islamic duty of Jihad?

Pakistani Troops Kill 15 Militants in Gunbattle

arun · Post by **arun** » 21 Feb 2011 07:25

Reports on the status of US "Diplomat" "Raymond Davis". Sources are annoymous and Pakistani

.

The UK’s Guardian:

American who sparked diplomatic crisis over Lahore shooting was CIA spy

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan’s rabid English language newspaper The Nation :

Davis CIA’s acting chief in Pakistan

Dipanker · Post by **Dipanker** » 21 Feb 2011 07:28

VikramS wrote:
Suppose the TTP disappears tomorrow, and all Taleban become good. Will your conclusions change? How come those internal fissures where not present when the US was out of the picture (1990-2000)?

Pakis always had internal fissures, whether US was out of picture (1990-2000) or not. Creation of Bangladesh is one example of existence of such fissures. Baluchistan, Sindhudesh etc. will follow.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 21 Feb 2011 07:34

VikramS wrote: You are simply wishing away uncomfortable alternatives, with little analysis. The PLA is now parked in POK and that still does not ring a bell; I do not know what will.

I apologize for not expanding all my analyses in response to every question of yours. It is not possible to say more than an "I agree" or" I disagree."

We are just going to disagree. I do not believe I have reached my conclusions in a vacuum and if you believe that you have not reached your conclusions in a vacuum that is fine by me. I was only answering questions that you put to me because you demanded an answer by saying that you are still waiting for a reply. In my view there are quite few loopholes in what you are saying and if your view about my thinking is a mirror image of that there is no sense in trying to make viewpoints meet. They are not going to meet.

The topic is vast and there is plenty of scope for disagreement - and I think your particular series of posts was sparked off by what I see as a different viewpoint that is prevalent among people who live abroad - whose information and world view are necessarily different from the information and world view I develop from where I live. The two simply are not the same and so there might never be a meeting point in the way I view things and the way you do. We have to move on nevertheless. I will do that.

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 21 Feb 2011 07:34

Re. the possible extent of China's role in Pakistan, and whether it would be 'enough'

There's really two components here; the PRC's ability and willingness to sustain the PA's military potential, and the amount of cash it can or will infuse in to the Pakistani economy in general.

There seems to be no question over the fact that the PRC will be able and willing to maintain nuclear and conventional arms transfers to Pakistan.

The most profit driven of the PRC's industries are not going to commit to Pakistan on a large scale, that's for certain.

On the other hand, they don't commit to North Korea either, despite the DPRK's attempts to set up "special export zones". What the Chinese government does supply is just enough cash, wheat and oil to prevent mutiny and collapse.

Obviously the order of magnitude larger population in Pakistan is going to cost a great deal more than North Korea, but then the Chinese government is investing far, far more in Pakistan and Afghanistan in terms of infrastructure than North Korea.

China has made the biggest foreign physical investment in Pakistan since the end of British rule, and its only getting bigger in an era when Chinese foreign aid is less ideological and proportionately less generous than during the Mao era, and when insecurity and instability in Pakistan is mounting.

Why is China doing what its doing when it has far fewer illusions than the Americans about Pakistan's stability and sanity, and is far tighter with foreign aid? It seems like a question that is worth asking.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 21 Feb 2011 07:41

GuruPrabhu wrote:
shiv wrote:What the hell does that mean? ... And what the heck is the "riot act"? What would the US do? Why would Pakistan bend to the reading of a mythical riot act?
It is just an expression. I use it occasionally too.

Saar it is a rhetorical expression that is derived from British literature where there was a law known as the "Riot act" where the police got power to disperse crowds or arrest them. The "riot act" was read out and then the group was broken up/punished/arrested if they did not comply.

The same riot act is used humorously in other situations "Ramesh was drunk and misbehaving when Ravi sir came up and read him the riot act"

In the context of an article that claims to be talking of nuclear war between Pakistan and India that expression has zero meaning. Was Powell going to arrest Musharraf? Or lathi charge him? Or was the US going to grab Paki nukes, or was the US going to nuke Pakistan? So what is this "riot act" business? These details are all fudged and covered up by saying that the "riot act" was read out.

ArmenT · Post by **ArmenT** » 21 Feb 2011 08:10

For those bird watchers who have been missing the National Bird, a sighting was reported after an absence of 28 days:
Droneacharya scores 5

Note that the national bird sightings had stopped after Jan. 24th, around when the Raymond Davis affair first started.

GuruPrabhu · Post by **GuruPrabhu** » 21 Feb 2011 08:20

shiv wrote:Saar it is a rhetorical expression that is derived from British literature where there was a law known as the "Riot act" where the police got power to disperse crowds or arrest them. The "riot act" was read out and then the group was broken up/punished/arrested if they did not comply.

The same riot act is used humorously in other situations "Ramesh was drunk and misbehaving when Ravi sir came up and read him the riot act"

That adds zilch to what I already stated and posted a wikipedia link to.

In the context of an article that claims to be talking of nuclear war between Pakistan and India that expression has zero meaning. Was Powell going to arrest Musharraf? Or lathi charge him? Or was the US going to grab Paki nukes, or was the US going to nuke Pakistan? So what is this "riot act" business? These details are all fudged and covered up by saying that the "riot act" was read out.

Saar, an expression when it enters the common diction is just that, an expression. No need to read too much into a reading of the riot act

If the article had stated that "Powell was frothing at the mouth" would you have brought out your froth-o-meter to measure the froth level?

If the article had stated that "Powell saw red", would you have brought out your red-filter photometer to check the accuracy of the claim?

If the article had stated that "Powell was seriously pissed off", would you have contemplated the choice of bringing your piss-o-meter or alcohol blow-a-breath meter?

Expressions are expressions. Let them be and you will find peace.

skumar · Post by **skumar** » 21 Feb 2011 08:26

somnath wrote:Lack of requisite conventional "edge" does not come in the discussion...But the nuke dimension comes, again and again and again...

The nuke dimension is a reason for India not to strike back (our fault nonetheless), it is not THE reason for the Pakis to strike which caused the problem in the first place. You could argue that the Pakis anticipated our response but they would not have done that without having a fair degree of certainty of their position in a limited war.

While I would not give too much credence to a story in a DDM, if you see, all the points under Pakistan's counter are non-nuclear and only one point under "Why the strike was called off" relates to the nuclear gamble (which is something we should have anticipated anyway).

GuruPrabhu · Post by **GuruPrabhu** » 21 Feb 2011 08:28

somnath wrote: Guruprabhu-ji, I wouldnt be so sure of that...If the US leaves Af, they are basically washing their hands off the entire region..they dont have to pander to Paki interests anymore...

Precisely, they won't have to pander. That's it. But, "leaving" only implies withdrawing the oh so delicate US troops. Dronacharya will stay, of course.

And that, dear sir, will ensure increased influence.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 21 Feb 2011 08:47

Brad Goodman wrote:Compare paki actions from 1980 - 1989 then from 1990 - 2000 then 2001 - 2002 and 2003 - current. Now paki adventurism started in 1st phase with Punjab and then escalated n 90's in Kashmir. Post 9/11 we have seen Kashmir pretty much wind down. Would we not consider this an acheivement for diplomcy. MEA has been able to convince unkil & world to reign in pakis. I agree 26/11 needs a strong response but least for now what r we losing by talking its not like any one is going to give or take anything from these secretry level talks.

Brad, the response to the bolded portion is a plain NO.

Code: Select all

Jammu & Kashmir

Year  No. of Incidents  No. of SFs killed  No. of Civilians killed  No. of Terrorist killed
2008     708                        75                     91                           339
2009     499                        64                     78                           239
2010     254                        34                     20                           114
(Upto June 30 only)

The above is the official figure stated in the Parliament. In the latter part of c. 2010, it went up again. In c. 2006, the total no of deaths in J&K (security forces + civilians + terrorists) was 1116, and in 2007 it was 777. Nadimarg (March 2003), Kaluchak (May 14,2002), Vaishnodevi (July 2003), and Kulhand (June, 2006) attacks are seminal events in the genocide of Hindus and Sikhs in J&K.

Elsewhere, in fact, more audacious attacks have taken place after 9/11 such as the suicide attack on J&K Assembly, Parliament Attack, series of blasts in Mumbai in Dec 2002 & Jan 2003, Mumbai Commuter Train attack (July 11, 2006), the twin Kabul attacks, serial attacks in Bengaluru, Ahmedabad in July 2008, the Delhi blast in Sep 2008, the Jaipur blast in May,2008, the 26/11 urban warfare, the German Bakery bombing in Feb. 2010 directly linked to the 'Karachi project' etc.

The terror training camps are continuing to function in Pakistan, the printing & circulation of FICN is continuing unabated, Pakistan continues to deny it has any links with terrorism, nuclear & terror threats continue to be issued regularly by Pakistani leaders and military men. Terror alerts have been issued by the US & other western countries about possible attacks on India and they have also shared information with us, possibly leading to thwarting many such attacks.

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 21 Feb 2011 08:48

GuruPrabhu wrote:Dronacharya will stay, of course

They will, and so would a significant military presence as well..the US has been in the game far too long to do otherwise...

Which is good from our perspective..As long as the US is there, Pak/China does not have a free run in the region..and we can work out our options below that umbrella...It doesnt please the "US is evil" crowd, but it is perhaps the most plausible scenrio!

GuruPrabhu · Post by **GuruPrabhu** » 21 Feb 2011 08:53

somnath wrote:
GuruPrabhu wrote:Dronacharya will stay, of course
They will, and so would a significant military presence as well..the US has been in the game far too long to do otherwise...

Which is good from our perspective..

Where I differ with you is that a "significant military presence" is good for India. A significant presence requires supply routes and that is the only handle TSP has on the US. A minimal presence with a massive airpower support is in India's interest.