Managing Pakistan's failure

[surinder]

The words actualy are: "jaani, yeh bachon key khelney ki cheez nahin. Haath kat jaye to khoon bhi nikal jaata hai."

[ramana]

Yes you are right. But was parphrasing. It is a long time since I saw the movie.

[A_Gupta]

http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/E ... /en/15.pdf

THE FUTURE OF THE SINO-PAKISTANI
ENTENTE CORDIALE
John W. Garver

Post-9/11 events constituted a windfall for China's interests in South Asia. First and foremost, Pakistan was brought out of deepening international isolation and back under the wing of U.S. patronage. By 2000, Pakistan's links with and support from the United States and its key allies had collapsed under the cumulative weight of Islamabad's nuclear weapons programs, its links with the Taliban, and the 1999 military overthrow of Nawaz Sharif's elected civilian government. The end to U.S. support combined with deepening economic and social problems within Pakistan to create a dangerous situation for China. Pakistan's comprehensive national strength might decline so precipitously that it would succumb to Indian domination. Were Pakistan to collapse economically, fragment along ethnic and regional lines, disintegrate into pervasive crime and/or religious extremism, or become unable to sustain defenses pending adequate to keep up with India, Pakistan might become unable to resist Indian pressure. Pakistan might be compelled to resign itself to living under India's sway. The existing balance of power in South Asia between India and Pakistan would thus be overturned.

Under pre-9/11 conditions, the burden of preventing this from happening by sustaining Pakistani capabilities to resist Indian domination fell largely on China. In the event of an India-Pakistan confrontation in which India seemed bent on a definitive subordination of Pakistan, Beijing would probably have given Pakistan all support short of belligerency - supply of munitions, support in the United Nations and other world political fora, threatening words combined with ominous actions along the border, and so on. Were such moves inadequate to sustain Pakistan, Beijing would have faced a major dilemma: war with India, or overthrow of the existing South Asian balance of power favorable to China. Either course would have been costly and risky for China.

A revolution in the South Asian balance via Pakistan's acceptance of Indian preeminence would have seriously adverse consequences for China. It would enhance Indian military capabilities and Indian strategic confidence regarding Tibet. It would strengthen India's ability to compete with China on the global scene. And it would stunt the future development of Chinese ties with the other small countries of
South Asia.

The political lesson of Indian subordination of Pakistan would be: if even the most powerful South Asian nation other than India, Pakistan, could not resist New Delhi, what chance did smaller countries have?

On the other hand, a war with India could easily become protracted, disrupt China's economic development drive, and rouse apprehensions about China among all its neighbors.

The renewal of U.S. patronage to Pakistan after September 11 ended the previous period of dangerous Pakistani exclusive dependence on China and consequent Chinese vulnerability. Once again Pakistan became an important ally of the United States: it began receiving U.S. economic support and could call on a degree of U.S. political support. China was no longer Pakistan's only supporter among the major powers. This was an important if fortuitous gain for Beijing. It removed a lot of pressure which might otherwise have destabilized the Sino-Pakistani entente.

U.S. re-engagement with Pakistan after September 11 also served China's interest in keeping India away from alignment with the United States. By the end of 1999 Chinese analysts had perceived a major shift in U.S. South Asian policy, viewing the United States as tilting toward India as a way of containing China. President Bill Clinton's visit to India and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's visit to the United States, in March and October 2000 respectively, were seen as reinforcing this development. U.S. re-engagement with Pakistan after 9/11 countered this dangerous trend of U.S. alignment with India. Moreover, renewal of the U.S.-Pakistan alliance angered India and created new problems for India-U.S. relations by putting the United States in the middle of India-Pakistan relations. It also made it more difficult for the U.S. to deny Pakistan support in the face of Indian pressure. In addition, the renewal of U.S. support for Pakistan eased the onus Beijing bore in New Delhi because of China's support for Pakistan. China's support for Pakistan was no longer an anomaly, but, Beijing could argue, part of a broad trend in the international community. How could New Delhi object to strong Chinese support for Pakistan when even the United States provided such support? Indian anger and pressure would thus be less focused on China and seem less reasonable. India would also have less incentive to move toward the United States as a way of punishing China for its support to Pakistan. Indeed, it might work the other way. U.S. re-engagement with Pakistan could create incentives for India to tilt toward China in retaliation for U.S. support for Pakistan.

U.S. re-engagement with Pakistan also served China's interest in checking the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in that country. More radical Islamicist elements within the Pakistan Army and Inter-Services Intelligence were ousted after 9/11, and some radical Islamicist organizations were also limited. Secular forces within Pakistan's elite may also be encouraged to roll back the rising tide of Islamicism. Moreover, the United States will do the dirty work in this regard; it was the United States that pushed Pakistan in these directions and thus bore the onus for "interfering in the internal affairs of a developing country" by pushing Pakistan in a less Islamicist direction. This will further tarnish the image of the United States among the developing countries that China courts as a constituency able to constrain perceived hegemonist tendencies of the United States.

The consequences of September 11 for China were not all positive. Most of the negative consequences for China had to do with Central Asia. Chinese analysts and leaders were deeply apprehensive of a possible long-term U.S. military presence in
Central Asia as a result of 9/11. The new U.S. involvement in Central Asia also disrupted a carefully constructed structure of Sino-Russian cooperation with Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Instituted as the 'Shanghai Five' in April 1996, this structure of Chinese, Russian, and Central Asian cooperation was premised on common opposition to Islamic fundamentalism and cross-border terrorism. In June 2001 it was transformed into the Shanghai Cooperative Organization when Uzbekistan joined.9 After 9/11, however, the whole structure of the Shanghai Five-Shanghai Cooperative Organization seemed obsolete. The United States was now the major anti-terrorist partner of Russia, Uzbekistan, and perhaps even of China itself . The logical next step would be for the United States to join the 'Shanghai' forum, making it the 'Shanghai Seven'. Beijing, of course, would see that as bringing another region of China's periphery dangerously within the U.S. global imperium, raising the specter of U.S. encirclement - particularly as Russia is again moving closer to the West after 9/11. This Chinese fear will reenter our discussion later when we consider India's tilt toward the United States as a way of pressuring Beijing over its close links to Pakistan.

[svinayak]

Bogus arguments and bogus info in the above article.

[ramana]

Acharya, For sake of those who don't know please point out the egregious wrong statements.

[RajeshA]

VikramS ji,

I appreciate very much your efforts to highlight the need to game the development of China-Pakistan relations after US influence in Pakistan retreats, as so often the wish is expressed here on BRF!

To be frank, I don't have the answer to this mystery, why others are not charged (as in awake, or electrified) with this issue!

Till today, those who favor US withdrawal of support to Pakistan, in my humble view, have either not succeeded or have not tried to make a cogent argument,

"Why a Pakistan aligned with only Chinese national interests, is less of a danger to India, than a Pakistan having a dual loyalty to both USA and China?"

In the Managing Chinese Threat Thread, many aspects of this issue were taken up by me. These are still to find traction in the jirga! The India-Pakistan-USA dynamic seem to obsess much of BRF, though understandable, is to the detriment of looking at a wider picture!

[svinayak]

Acharya, For sake of those who don't know please point out the egregious wrong statements.

I will but no time now!

[shiv]

The problem was that India put herself in a situation, where it had very little leverage to stop the TSP from doing what it was doing. That situation did not arise overnight; it was a result of choices made over time. Either the Indian leaders ignored the outcomes or were just no interested in the consequences. Blaming India's strategic isolation on some fake certification in the US Congress simply deflects the attention from the fundamental issue.

Perspective is all important. Indians made choices. Those choices were based on a particular moralistic viewpoint that Indians still hold.

There is a naive assumption especially among those who see the world through the eyes of the dominant power, the USA that India's moralistic viewpoint is wrong and that India too should be pragmatic and worldly wise like the USA. But India is not going that way anytime soon - and the fallout of that is going to be a long term antagonism between an Indian world view, which exists and an American worldview that is pushed as being the best.

India's moralistic stance is a consequence of Indian ethos and could well be a millstone, but that is the way India works. Complaining about the US and the lies told by its greatly admired leaders whose lies last 4 years and who are absolved after that is part of the Indian way. "Complaining" is the first step towards thinking up ways to change things. If, instead of complaining about the US, we were to admire the US blindly as some Indians spend their lives doing, believing that complaints are wrong, we would not be able to imagine that part of the Pakistan issue can only be by addressing or subverting Washington.

Like I said - we have deep disagreements and it will continue that way as far as I can foresee. I am going to let it rest at that. But I accept your viewpoints as valid. On this forum there has been a tendency to diss the likes of Sagarika Ghose for seemingly being sympathetic to the Pakistani army. Clearly sympathies to various entities who are not necessarily India-friendly like the USA or China need to be accepted as part of the norm, as part of the wide range of opinions that people on this forum hold.

[shiv]

"Why a Pakistan aligned with only Chinese national interests, is less of a danger to India, than a Pakistan having a dual loyalty to both USA and China?"

This is a question that needs a serious answer. But please don't mistake my tactics on this forum.

As I see it - any effort to answer this question is, in my view, going to dilute the attention devoted to the anti-India aid given to Pakistan by the US. If we are going to end up talking about Chinese influence and "forget about the US" or "absolve the US's egregious role " it would be a serious error. Since it is easy to ask questions with convoluted words a few questions would be

"In what ways was Pakistan less of a danger to India between 1947 and 1965 when it received only US aid?"
and
"What did the USA, that placed sanctions on India after the 1974 tests do to stop the transfer of nuclear technology and material from Europe and China to Pakistan in events that are known to have been well known to US intelligence services?"
and
"In what ways has US diplomatic support to Pakistan been less of a problem for India than China's role"
and
"What were the reasons for the US declaring terrorists to be freedom fighters when they were terrorizing India alone? Could they once again return to that state by concentrating their attention on India alone? Would the US gain less or more than India if that happened?"
and
"If Pakistan is a danger to India, and Pakistan receives aid from both the US and China, can we declare one of these nations as being benign and honorable? On what grounds can we do that?

As long as we can be even and see the US as being at least as negative in its role towards India as China I have no objection to talking about China. If the US's role is less negative - bleating repeatedly that this is the case is not good enough. Someone needs to put his money where his mouth is and lay down cogent arguments to try and prove his point. Changing the subject to China is a cop out. We spend a great deal of effort on this forum to diss China or fear China. How come we pretend that the US is not to be feared and imagining that being critical of the US is "needless whining or complaining"

There is clearly a double standard that we are following that in my view tends to sideline any egregious role that the US plays in favor of highlighting and tomtomming the role played by China. Even by making such a statement I am subjected to appeals and excuses that want me to rethink my stand by weak arguments that say that the US was negative and that China is "more negative" or that "China is a bigger danger and the US is our friend". All these are valid viewpoints for people to hold but do not change the fundamental fact that the US has played a huge role in adding to India's military-economic problems by arming and aiding Pakistan. A rapist remains a rapist whether he commits one rape or many, and a philanthropic rapist cannot be let off on grounds of philanthropy.

As long as there is an open acceptance that the US too has played a negative role with regard to India, I would be happy to address the fact that there is a China problem as well. It is only when I am asked to favor the US role in comparison to China that alarm bells ring in my mind. In my view we cannot ignore one and say let's talk about the other only. Excuses offered on behalf of US aid to Pakistan do not cut any ice as far as I am concerned.

[VikramS]

shivji:

I respect your efforts to highlight US role in keeping TSP alive. That history is a necessary and essential lesson to define the current context. Most people in the Indian establishment are very well aware of history of US assistance to the TSP.

However the current context can not just be based on historical actions; it has to take the present situation and also expectations about the future into account? A singular focus on one side of the triangle deflects attention from the other two. From the Indian POV, the other sides are perhaps more relevant because they are neighbors.

The moralistic vision which you highlighted should be a guiding principle or the foundation of India's policy. However India's foreign policy can not ignore real-politics. In fact I feel that the moralistic vision is cop-out for the failure of Indian strategic thinking along multiple dimensions. I am not sure how far that attitude will take India in the modern world.

The destructive capability of humans has reached levels, which may have been unimaginable a few centuries ago. The sheer size which helped defend Indic faiths can no longer be counted on to defend it. Further the rate and ability at which change can occur is orders of magnitude higher than it has ever been in human history. The traditional pacifist acceptance of activities which chip away at the core of Indic nation is going to be a lot more costly than it was ever before.

At BR we feel the anxiety due to EJ activities. But as a nation we do very little to help fix the fundamental problems which provide the EJs with a fertile ground. Your Know your India thread was a step in the right direction, but I see very little urgency in strengthening the core. I do not know what the source of that apathy (udaseenta) is but my guess is that that moralistic acceptance of the inequities has a big role to play.

BTW, your next project could be an ebook on understanding China.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding your comment about recognizing that the US role was as bad as China:

I think there is very little doubt that historically the US' strategic positioning was not in India's favor. However from what I understand, the positioning was rarely a direct objective; it was more of a side-effect of the US doing deals with unfriendly countries while ignoring Indian interests.

OTOH Chinese hostility towards Indian interests is an active effort, a direct objective.

That difference in policy goals and objectives is essential to digest.

[habal]

What is China's Geopolitical weight ? It hasn't even been able to secure it's oil futures in Africa, even there we see various dubious revolutions which replace the regimes figurehead and open a chance to annul China's oil contracts. China doesn't even have a history in these regions . . whereas the unkil+poodle have extensive role in region-shaping and associated influence, while the Chinese first deals to learn the language in which to speak to some North African berbers! Extend this to any ally solely supported by China viz North Korea and it's legitimacy in the international context and a tyrant regime supported by unkil+poodle combo which has acceptability worldwide. How many countries trade with Israel and how many trade with North Korea.

China may be a player in the future, or may be accepted as a player by south east asian countries and asia-oceanic australia. But for the rest, it is just beginning or doesn't even matter.

[VikramS]

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 4#p1036694
KS' interview quote:
"The two non-democratic forces, China's authoritarianism and Pak's fundamentalism, are allied with each other. China is the only major power in the world that is not democratic. It is a question of democratic versus anti-democratic forces."
...
"The real question is: Is the future world order going to be governed by democratic values or one party state values."

I have been trying to say that too in some posts too...

When trying to study US vs China, we can not ignore those. Both the Islamists and the Communists cultures have shown a propensity to kill in enormous numbers with little to no regard for collateral damage.

[RajeshA]

"In what ways was Pakistan less of a danger to India between 1947 and 1965 when it received only US aid?"
and
"What did the USA, that placed sanctions on India after the 1974 tests do to stop the transfer of nuclear technology and material from Europe and China to Pakistan in events that are known to have been well known to US intelligence services?"
and
"In what ways has US diplomatic support to Pakistan been less of a problem for India than China's role"
and
"What were the reasons for the US declaring terrorists to be freedom fighters when they were terrorizing India alone? Could they once again return to that state by concentrating their attention on India alone? Would the US gain less or more than India if that happened?"

shiv saar,
These questions pertain to the past! We know the past, and hopefully sometimes we manage to see through its various layers also.

My question is more related to the future!

To rephrase it, one could ask?
"How do I know, that I am not jumping from the frying pan into the fire?"

We all have not really seen the fire. But when we feel it by having made the jump, it is too late to rethink the decision of jumping.

What we need to ensure is to make the jump out of the frying pan, but to land outside both the frying pan and the fire, on solid benign ground! Question pertains to both increasing our capacity to make a proper jump - taking an inrun, strengthening our muscles, putting on some aerodynamic clothes, shaving our beard, doing some training, doing some reconnaissance of how far the solid benign ground really is, etc., but we also need to consider the matter of timing - when to make the jump. A delay would mean both that we fry a little longer, but also that we prepare ourselves a little longer, or be on the lookout for the right opportunity, when wind is blowing in our backs!

As long as we can be even and see the US as being at least as negative in its role towards India as China I have no objection to talking about China. If the US's role is less negative - bleating repeatedly that this is the case is not good enough. Someone needs to put his money where his mouth is and lay down cogent arguments to try and prove his point. Changing the subject to China is a cop out. We spend a great deal of effort on this forum to diss China or fear China. How come we pretend that the US is not to be feared and imagining that being critical of the US is "needless whining or complaining"

There is clearly a double standard that we are following that in my view tends to sideline any egregious role that the US plays in favor of highlighting and tomtomming the role played by China. Even by making such a statement I am subjected to appeals and excuses that want me to rethink my stand by weak arguments that say that the US was negative and that China is "more negative" or that "China is a bigger danger and the US is our friend". All these are valid viewpoints for people to hold but do not change the fundamental fact that the US has played a huge role in adding to India's military-economic problems by arming and aiding Pakistan. A rapist remains a rapist whether he commits one rape or many, and a philanthropic rapist cannot be let off on grounds of philanthropy.

As long as there is an open acceptance that the US too has played a negative role with regard to India, I would be happy to address the fact that there is a China problem as well. It is only when I am asked to favor the US role in comparison to China that alarm bells ring in my mind. In my view we cannot ignore one and say let's talk about the other only. Excuses offered on behalf of US aid to Pakistan do not cut any ice as far as I am concerned.

AFAIK, I think nobody on this forum really questions the fact that US support to Pakistan, and in fact to China itself, has had an extremely negative impact on India.

But I think, for the posed question, one is being asked to compare not US role till date with Chinese role till date, but rather

US role today with a Chinese role of the future!

Now the problem is, that nobody has really seen the future, and a historical fact based comparison does not suffice. It is not just a question of whether the Guns and Aircraft supplied to Pakistan by USA would do us more harm or the Nukes supplied by China would do us more harm. Even such a comparison takes only the past into account .

So in order to build a model of Chinese role of the future in Pakistan, one has to take the information one has and extrapolate it, and see how it affects India!

What VikramS alludes to, and what I have been saying, and others too, is that we need some assurance that we do not jump from
American appeasement of anti-India Pakistan, unfavorable to India
to
Anti-Indian Chinese dictation to anti-Indian Pakistan, to do harm to India!

For simplicity more qualifiers have been left out.

[A_Gupta]

To me it seems very simple, from the Chinese point of view. If the US steps away from Pakistan, then a big barrier - the US-Pakistan relationship - to a strong alignment of India with the US to contain China vanishes. (There are other barriers, such as India's leftists.)

If China makes too much mischief via Pakistan, the case for Indian alliance with the US becomes so much stronger - at some point, internal Indian objections are washed away. Therefore China will hold back on Pakistan in return for India not aligning with the US in an effort to contain China.

On the other hand, if India allies with the US, then China has nothing to lose by supporting Pakistan to the hilt.

[RajeshA]

A_Gupta ji,

If US breaks away from Pakistan, several new dynamics come into play!

1. If China does not fill the gap, Pakistan itself may not be left with any option than to fall in line with India, leading to an Indian domination of the whole region, something China would want to avoid.

So China would align with Pakistan regardless of the fact whether India is close to USA or not.

2. USA has its own equation with China, and would not jeopardize it, so can intervene only marginally in an Indian confrontation with the Sino-Pak combo.

[A_Gupta]

A_Gupta ji,

If US breaks away from Pakistan, several new dynamics come into play!

1. If China does not fill the gap, Pakistan itself may not be left with any option than to fall in line with India, leading to an Indian domination of the whole region, something China would want to avoid.

So China would align with Pakistan regardless of the fact whether India is close to USA or not.

Nothing new here. China was, is, and will be aligned with Pakistan. The claim that things will get much worse if the US steps away, however is highly disputable.

2. USA has its own equation with China, and would not jeopardize it, so can intervene only marginally in an Indian confrontation with the Sino-Pak combo.

The real prize for China - at least for the forseeable future - is East Asia - it is the Yellow Sea, not the LOC (sacrificing geographical accuracy for a pun). China will simply want to secure its flanks, so to speak, while it consolidates its supremacy, challenged by the US on its main front. It will want no trouble in Tibet and Xinjiang, and a neutral India, which it will try to get by calibrating its support to Pakistan with the Indian support to the US cause. China will not take its eye off the prize; if it can avoid any hot confrontation on the Indian front, it will.

[shiv]

IMO

1) The US will not step away from Pakistan, it can only be driven out by Islamists
2) The Islamists can only take over Pakistan if they subvert and/or win over the Pakistani army
3) The Pakistani army has hitherto supported the US and China against the Islamists
4) If the Islamists take over China will not get an automatic walkover because the takeover can only come by subverting the Pakistan army which is what China has allied itself with

There is a possibility of an Islamist colonel conducting a coup and then declaring allegiance to China. China could take advantage of such a situation and recognise the new government and pledge to continue firm ties and fulfil all commitments. This is the theory. But in practise the Pakistan army is currently not in control in the North west and Baluchistan. If its power is toppled by a coup in Islamabad - its control over Pakistan will be even more shaky. That would be an opportunity for India to play some diplomatic cards too, but with a weak army in Pakistan all the other centers of power will be relatively stronger and the fallout would be unpredictable. At best, the Pakistan army will show nominal allegiance to an Islamist form of government and its anti-US stance will automatically earn sanctions that put a lot of US supplied arms at risk of obsolescence. If there is violence and strife in Pakistan, Chinese arms too might not play a stabilizing role and China might be hard pressed to bring stability to a country that has been socially spinning out of control because of mismanagement despite a powerful army and close allies supporting that army.

Not one of Pakistan's close friends has ever concerned itself with the fact that national stability can ultimately only come from social stability and not military strength. But hey, who cares.

[RajeshA]

IMO,

There is a good chance of the Pakistani Army transitioning to a form, where it feels as ideologically and strategically aligned and in sync with the Islamists, and together they set up a political system with Sharia, as the Islamists wish.

The introduction of Islamic piety as a feature of Pakistani Army officers by Zia ul-Haq, means a transition to an overtly pious Pakistani Army espousing even Pan-Islamic causes (aka Hizb ut-Tahrir, or Al Qaeda), as well as institutionalized anti-Americanism means that the marriage of Pakistani Army and the Islamists would happen naturally. The conflict between TTP and Punjabi Taliban on the one hand and Pakistani Army would come to an end.

A retreat by USA means a lot less money would be flowing in into Pakistan, but if the people can be kept at a lower orbit of expectations and in control by the Islamist political system, then a measure of stability can be achieved in Pakistan, even with a poor economy.

Such a Pakistan would be an ideal ally for China!

So a retreat by USA from Pakistan is no guarantee for more instability, failure, collapse or breakup of Pakistan.

[A_Gupta]

A Pakistan ruled by an explicitly Islamist army would be an ideal ally for China IF and ONLY IF this Islamist country did not destabilize Xinjiang or the Central Asian States.

As I've said before, the resources arrayed against India {Pakistan, China, USA} are only diminished if it reduces to {Pakistan, China}.

There is no guarantee for Pakistan's failure. At any time, they may wake up.

[brihaspati]

Mullahcracy is quite flexible - in fact they take great pains to prove the hated qufr's adage : "nripaniti barangana sama". As I have persisted in saying from the days of the previous thread on strategic scenarios, the Pakjabi-Talebjabi army/state could have lived off parasitically on the US and now on PRC for its initial survival. But this does not mean that they have to remain loyal to the same client.

Mullahs are unparalleled examples of political prostitutes, and should be obvious with every step of history of Islamist politics. They betray their rulers, they conspire and aspire constantly, they plot and machinate, and they kiss any feet that makes them feel that it is possible to become extinct if mullahcracy continues to resist or oppose.

I have insisted, that mullahcracy never, ever takes the fight to that intensity where there is a possibility to get wiped out completely with all institutions and bases. Typically in all of Islamic history, mullahcracy splits into two camps where one camp aligns with the new regime/power, and the other part remains detached or distant. In this way they preserve their basic institutions from which they will fight back for control.

So even if USA leaves, and PRC fills in the blanks, we should keep in mind that the mullahcracy has basically won the battle if not the war. They managed to checkmate both the feudals and the military and staked out a share of the state's function - by keeping the Dawa in their own hands. Feudal refusal to give agricultural taxes, both feudal and mullahcracy reluctance to allow modernization of education from the practical point of potential loss of control meant no strong indigenous industrial development, meant the state was unable to generate resources in-country for development and modernization. They therefore had to compromise with the mullahcracy to carry out relief operations instead of any real modernization, and the Dawa networks became the means by which state dispensed its responsibilities.

No one targets the mullahcracy and their Dawa, but both feudals and the army face constant political and other pressures and attacks - internal as well as external. So over time it is the mullahcracy alone which does not lose its legitimacy and remains a viable centre of power that can take up the role of the state. So even if Pak collapses formally or not , USA or PRC or both withdraw or not, over time only the mullahcracy will get stronger and take over more of the functions of the state - unless they and their institutions are specifically targeted for destruction.

[RajeshA]

As I've said before, the resources arrayed against India {Pakistan, China, USA} are only diminished if it reduces to {Pakistan, China}.

IMHO, that is wrong maths.

Pakistan has had a calculus till now for its survival viz-a-viz India. We need to look into how that calculus, that dynamic will change once China enters the stage as the primary benefactor of Pakistan.

Pakistan retains its nuclear shield. Pakistan retains a veto in UNSC in its favor. Pakistan retains its influence in the Muslim world. Its conventional fire-power may or may not get used. But its Jihadist forces can become China's mercenary army to attack India incessantly. Its Islamist networks can become China's arm to sow conflict within India's minorities.

If China is providing the money, weaponry and international support to an Islamist Pakistan, Jihadists and Islamists can in return offer China their services against India.

[Karna_A]

How many people in TSP can be fed with say $1 billion a year aid?
Wheat is around $350 per metric ton.
one metric ton (2,205 lbs.) would feed approximately eleven people per year. (average person in the Western world eats about 200 lbs of grain annually) (So maybe more people in TSP)
Total: 31,428,571 (3 crore)
So around $5 billion in aid would feed 15 crore people(guessing rest can feed on their own)
If we include cost of all three (Roti, kapda and a Jhuggi Jhopri) it may be 3 times at that. Around $15 billion

I guess it's easy for Chipanda to spend that amount of money, and you could see why TSP is expecting $30 billion from Unkil. $15 billion for mango abdul and $15 billion for RAPE buying villas in France and castles in UK.
In 25 years if whole of TSP becomes one big refugee camp, world can expect around $30-40 billion a year to feed the bottom 99%. I am guessing India with 7 trillion economy can maintain that, and employ 4 crore hard working Bangladeshi Indian immigrants to feed the mango Abduls and also teach them some culture. By 2071 this is a distinct possibility, 100 years from Bangladeshi independence.

[VikramS]

It is great to see at least some mind-share gain to this important issue. Before we go into the details let us step back a bit to define the context.

What does China have?
What does China need?
What does China want?
What does China surely does NOT want?


Economic Point of View:
China needs access to natural resources: Energy, Food and Basic Materials. It is deficient in most of them.
China wants alternate routes to the sea route from the IOR
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Strategic Point of View:
China wants a continued extension of its semi-soft borders: It got Tibet, Mongolio, Aksai Chin in to its borders half a century ago and contained the West in Korea. With the so called impending decline of the US, it wants to reassert its role and expand on the consolidation of the past 50 years.

China needs to ensure a greater grip on all anti-China forces on the Western Extreme (Tibet, Xianxing).

China surely does not want the anti-China forces to find a stomping ground and consolidate near its current borders.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
China would like to become the undisputed #1 power. However, they do not want too many alarm bells ringing so will go slow, till the emerge #1 because they is no other option.

China also realizes that their mercantile policies of the past two-three decades are potentially hitting the peak. It will try to look inwards and regionally instead of at the West going forward when it comes to markets. The West is already so dependent on China that they can not pull the plug over night. However, the West is also reaching an enough is enough point and the negotiations with China going forward will tend to be tilted towards more concessions from China than the other way round. Again no dramatic change but a shift in stance.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
China's economic and geo-strategic focus will shift towards its neighborhood (the former 3rd world) since that is what offers the greatest potential when it comes to not only finding resources but also future markets.

Like the British and the American empire before them, the Chinese will use their economic power to secure their interests. They are not strategic nincompoops and will be willing to spend as long as the rewards help them justify the expense.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHINA and her satellites.

Some Chinese diplomats have called N.Korea and the TSP as China's Israel. We might laugh at the comparison, but from the strategic point of view, these satellites are a lot more valuable to China than Israel to the West. The Wests' attachment to Israel is more from ethno-religious-emotional perspective, and less from an economic/geo-strategic perspective.

N. Korea served the purpose of keeping NATO off Chinas borders. It is essentially one large military garrison, protecting China from the West.

TSP on the other hand is a spear-head. It is a nation which can fulfill a lot of things which the China wants and needs for the future. Further it can help control the negative forces which China does NOT want to grow.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
USA, TSP and China
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
One might argue that the TSP earnestly started looking East post 1971 when the US, in spite of all its blustering could not prevent the TSPA from splitting the country. The TSP-China relationship started growing stronger from that point onwards. Perhaps the TSPA realized that the US would never commit boots to save the TSP and it needs someone much closer to provide the ultimate defensive shield.

The Chinese could never compensate for the glitter of the West; but they provided an existentialist guarantee to the TSP. The guarantee of course is in the form of the nuclear/missile shield with the TSPA achieved within 15 years of Pokhran-I.

The Afghan War and 9/11 were of course key events in the US-TSP relationship. The Afghan war offered the chance for TSP to milk both the West and the Chinese. The West provided the glitter and the jazz. Another generation of RAPEs would have a playground to sow their oats. The Chinese provided the protective shield; they got away with it since the West was too enamored with the FSU to worry about the longer term consequences.

As shiv, hnair and others have put it, the decision making cycle in the West has a short term focus (2-4 years); very few have an interest in longer term consequences. There is supposedly some continuity provided by the core interests of the establishment. However, this so-called continuity has become a stone around the US' neck. The establishment obviously wants to preserve the status quo; and the politicians do not have the time to turn the establishment around before they leave.

The US-TSP special relationship effectively ended with the fall of the FSU. For a decade the TSP was rambling about being dumped; one Abdul managed to fly all the way to Langley to show his frustration at the gates of the CIA HQs. 9/11 of course was the ultimate revenge. Something which forced the US to bring TSP back on the front-burner, the game has been on.

While the TSP and the US have been doing their dance, the Chinese have been working quietly. Post 9/11 the Chinese realized that the US was back in play so they stepped back. The sense of pain in the US was too strong for the Chinese to jostle with the US. They gave up on Gwadar.

Their objective, as aired so often by the TSPA, is let TSPA wear the US out in Afghanistan till the point where the US claims victory and leaves. It is not without a reason that the TSPA claims that they are in the process of defeating two super powers. They might be the tip of the spear but they have perfected the art of letting other powers decide where to point to spear.

The Chinese being ultimate Value For Money people, will wait it out till the US leaves. Why not let the cowboy ride into the sunset and then take over?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Why is China interested in the TSP
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

There is an inherent assumption on BR that because all the fissures in the TSP, the Chinese will never be interested economically in the TSP. It is some what analogous to the Western procrastinations about how India will split because of the diversity. Fissures exist in all societies; they become relevant only when they reach a tipping point. The tipping point comes either #1 with the assistance from a foreign power or #2 due to an extreme internal event. In most of the #2 cases, an element of #1 is also present.

While the fissures are very visible in the TSP, they by almost everything in human world (and nature) are cyclical in nature. In some cases the system breaks apart till a new point of equilibrium is reached. Most of the time the system just continues with some minor changes.

My belief is that if the US cedes to China, the Chinese influence will be a calming influence. A new equilibrium will be reached which will be consistent with Chinese objectives. A TSP firmly under Chinese influence will help the Chinese achieve almost all the goals which I listed in the beginning.

Further it will help the Chinese exert influence to keep any Xianxing related issues firmly under control. The Chinese are helped by the geography which is not a porous region unlike the India/TSP borders.

Further, the Chinese will find the return on investment worth it to them. There are multiple reasons:

-> The Chinese think longer term so the ROI will not be measured against the current election cycle.
-> The Chinese will start small, and force the TSP to "Show Me" you are worth it
-> The TSP will be forced to dance, since they do not have any other alternative, even if the rates they command will go down.
-> The Chinese may control some of the buttons on the crown-jewels and their influence there will be nothing compared to what the TSPA has ever dealt with
-> The Chinese role will be hands-on role. It will not be a "let us deal with the RAPE and let them handle it" situation. The RD affair is an indication of how much significance the TSPA attaches to keeping the West's access to the Abduls/Jehadis contained. The Chinese may not deal with the Abduls directly but they also not stay away at an arm's length.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Fissures and the Breakup of the TSP
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The US presence in the AfPak region have bought the fissures within the TSP to the surface. US goals are directly in opposition to the TSPA's goals. If the TSPA does not play ball, and the US has the willingness to fight it out, IMHO the chances of the TSP meeting her 72 go up.

There is an OUTSIDE chance that the US is able to convince China that a TSP which has met her 72, will probably help serve long term Chinese interests; and that a TSP left to her own devices will eventually find a way to bite China also. The Chinese will agree to it only if they are given a big role in reshaping the pieces to their own liking. With the US so far on the side of the Sunnis, the Chinese have been courting the Iran-shia combo. The US will have to compromise on Iran and allow the Chinese to tap into those interests. The events in Baharien, Egypt etc. are signalling some kind of shift. How far and how soon those waves travel will be interesting to watch.

From the Indian POV, TSP meeting its 72 under the auspices of all the major powers, with a focus on destroying the rabid dogs and securing the trade routes would probably be the best realistic outcome.

[VikramS]

To me it seems very simple, from the Chinese point of view. If the US steps away from Pakistan, then a big barrier - the US-Pakistan relationship - to a strong alignment of India with the US to contain China vanishes. (There are other barriers, such as India's leftists.)

If China makes too much mischief via Pakistan, the case for Indian alliance with the US becomes so much stronger - at some point, internal Indian objections are washed away. Therefore China will hold back on Pakistan in return for India not aligning with the US in an effort to contain China.

On the other hand, if India allies with the US, then China has nothing to lose by supporting Pakistan to the hilt.

The above calculus is based on the assumption that the Chinese see a US-India alliance as a major threat to their core interests. IMHO a US which cedes the region and appoints India as its watch-dog is a LOT more preferable to the Chinese than a US with a core presence in the region.

Modern India does not have a very strong record when it comes to forming alliances. Like the US the democratic system ensures that there is a lack of continuity in strategic issues. Unlike the US, the core-interests constituency while emerging is quite small. Further it seems to be focused on preserving the status quo and ensuring peace at all costs, instead of any following any aggressive strategic postures.

There is a reason why the so-called declining powers are not rushing to India bearing gifts. India has yet to show the strength and strategic resolve to offer a truly viable alternative to China. OTOH it is nothing like the TSP whose loyalties can be bought by a couple of billions in the right accounts. There is very little for China too fear from India if the US rides away.

A Pakistan ruled by an explicitly Islamist army would be an ideal ally for China IF and ONLY IF this Islamist country did not destabilize Xinjiang or the Central Asian States.

The Islamists will not mess with the CCP. The PLA general in Xianxing gave it 5x back (5 Ujigir dead for every PLA casualty). The Islamists know and respect force, and post WW-II the PLA has been the most blatant demonstrator of the use of ruthless force, even on her people.

And if the CCP is the primary strategic benefactor of the TSP then why will they bite the hand which protects them. The KSA will
continue to feed them; but it will not protect them.

The real prize for China - at least for the forseeable future - is East Asia - it is the Yellow Sea, not the LOC (sacrificing geographical accuracy for a pun). China will simply want to secure its flanks, so to speak, while it consolidates its supremacy, challenged by the US on its main front.

China has been doing that for the past fifty years and has succeeded. All of S. East Asia is under her economic sphere of influence. In fact if anything, the situation is becoming so one-sided that it is China which is now using its economic influence to further her geographical reach. All the dormant issues are being ignited and the Chinese are being very assertive. China is no longer on the defensive in the Yellow Sea. It is in fact on the offensive; perhaps more offensive than it needs to be.

It is on the Western flank where the next prize is. And the Western flank being a land-border provides a much greater challenge. It is also borders on the regions where the PLA's hold is not the strongest. If and when the US cedes the space, the Chinese are going to be a lot more aggressive in claiming it than what they have been in the past.

[A_Gupta]

^^^^^^ Right, Taiwan has unified with the mainland, and the US bases ringing China have been quietly dismantled. The Pacific is a Chinese pond, ASEAN is dancing China's tune, S. Korea is a Chinese client like No.Ko., and Australia is colonized by the Chinese.

Sorry, India and the western flank of China is not the center of the Chinese world.

[shiv]

Doing business with Pakistan remains an attractive option for the US and China (It would be for India too if circumstances were different, and vice versa)

The difference between business and military conquest are the profit margins and the extent of local cooperation.

To illustrate two extremes one can look at a peaceful tribal settlement where the people feed and clothe themselves and produce an excess of some product - say pots or bamboo that they use for trade with someone else. The survival of that group - its food and water sources, law and order etc do not matter to the trader who trades with them he takes the produce and pays with some acceptable exchange.

At the other extreme is a concentration camp or a labor camp in which people are collected together and made to work at something. But a concentration camp is not a self sustaining society. It requires inputs like food and clothing and a means of exerting control (security, punishment) and ways of getting rid of dead bodies.

The cream/leaders of Pakistani society have survived on the fact of Pakistan being a settled self-sustaining society that more or less looks after itself with little external input. That fundamental basis provided them with the tools to do various things. But there is nothing unique in that. Powerful industrial societies have been built out of these building blocks - and Pakistan definitely had all the building blocks that were needed to do that. Those foundation stones have been frittered away as Pakistan built up a powerful army that fought its own wars and others wars as well. The army is still powerful, but society has grown large and is becoming less self sustaining. The absolute increase in the number of people (Pakistan has more people today that East and West Pakistan combined in 1947) is leading to crisis situations in the availability of basic life support items like food, water and fuel. Typically crises occur in winter and during natural disasters in which a segment of the population gets badly affected and changes from a "productive self sustaining society" to a society that needs aid for basic amenities. As the population increases - the numbers of people needing this and the areas in the country that are affected in this way keep on increasing and a national government simply must set aside resources for these things if it wants to have control over the people in the long term. The Pakistani army has never done that. The US cannot do that for Pakistan but has at least pointed out that it needs to be done. China has not done that for Pakistan, and to my knowledge has never lectured publicly Pakistan about the need to do that.

This is the Pakistan that the Pakistani army, China and the US have to deal with. The less you have to do with such a country - the easier it is. With India currently relatively isolated from Pakistan, we worry only about our safety. We do not have to worry about the safety of our sons and investments in Pakistan because no such thing exists. Both the US and China have enjoyed more isolation from Pakistan than India, but they now have to feel the pain of security of humans and investments in Pakistan. Serves them right. If they can set Pakistan right, more power to them. But I am constantly told that the US is a democracy. The US is a reasonable country. The US means well. And that the US is better than China. If so - why can the US not stop supplying anti-India arms to Pakistan? Anyway we can do nothing about Chinese arms supplies. We can at least request the US no? And we have. But the US has not complied. Fine - so let the US and China set Pakistan straight.

[VikramS]

^^^^^^ Right, Taiwan has unified with the mainland, and the US bases ringing China have been quietly dismantled. The Pacific is a Chinese pond, ASEAN is dancing China's tune, S. Korea is a Chinese client like No.Ko., and Australia is colonized by the Chinese.

Sorry, India and the western flank of China is not the center of the Chinese world.

My hypothesis is that the Eastern Flank of China is more secure than it has ever been since the creation of the PRC. And security is different from dominance. Instead of dismissing it, it would help if you point out the holes in my hypothesis.

The Eastern flank was the center of the Chinese world. It is a lot more secure than it every was; they can now devote their resources to the other flank.

From the Chines point of view, there is no pressing need for the Taiwan-China political reunion. The economic union is already taking place and Taiwan is gradually moving into China's economic sphere.

Historically, Taiwan may have served as a spring-board for anti-PRC forces but those times are fast disappearing. There is no foreign power which will want to challenge the Chinese in their back-waters and the Taiwanese are in no mood to raise Chinese ire by even allowing those thoughts.

ASEAN is increasingly intertwined economically with China. What they fear is Chinese hegemony, and potentially allowing US and other powers a place-holder. There is a difference between being scared of a super-power and been antagonist to a super-power.

Pacific is too big to be any single power's pond in a multi-polar world. However there is nothing which is happening in the Pacific which challenges China's interests (primary secure shipping lanes).

And regarding Australia: It has become China's mines without firing a single shot. And the Chinese can arrest Aussie businessmen with impunity. Indians are under increasing physical attack in OzLand while the Chinese do not seem to be safe. You figure it out.

[VikramS]

shiv:
Could you please articulate your pearls without a dig at the US? I know you do not want anyone to forget about US perfidy but it simply shifts the focus from another aspect which we are trying to analyze. Let the mullah in you do some taqiyah for some time. Thank You.

Your comments about the TSP losing its ability to sustain itself is a very pertinent observation. It is very much relevant to India because if the US dumps, and the CCP ignores, the Jehadis will have to look East to find the land and water. It may result in that grand compromise, but given the Pakjabi penchant for always being against the status-quo, it might result in one last aar-paar war.

I very much doubt that the West or CCP will just dump the TSP armed with nukes and churning them out at a faster rate than any one else. It is just too risky. This does bring up the question that if TSP is too weak to survive on its own and too dangerous to be left alone. If splitting it up into smaller manageable pieces is considered a viable solution, then what will the different players want to achieve that? Is there anyway the CCP can be co-opted to that solution?

[Dhiman]

Those foundation stones have been frittered away as Pakistan built up a powerful army that fought its own wars and others wars as well. The army is still powerful, but society has grown large and is becoming less self sustaining. The absolute increase in the number of people (Pakistan has more people today that East and West Pakistan combined in 1947) is leading to crisis situations in the availability of basic life support items like food, water and fuel ... a national government simply must set aside resources for these things if it wants to have control over the people in the long term. The Pakistani army has never done that. The US cannot do that for Pakistan but has at least pointed out that it needs to be done. China has not done that for Pakistan, and to my knowledge has never lectured publicly Pakistan about the need to do that.

There is a lot of inertia associated with countries having large populations, i.e if you want to emerge as a "normal" country 30 years from now on, you better start acting normal now, because rest assured it will take 30 years of effort to overcome or morph current inertia. When China started on the path of economic reforms, it was pretty much clear that they would emerge as an economic powerhouse 30 years from now, but no sooner. When India started its economic reforms, it was pretty much clear that India would emerge as an economic powerhouse by 2020, but no sooner.

Is Pakistan in a process of changing its path for the better that would see it emerge in some kind of "better" form 30 years from now on? I think the simple answer to that question is NO. Everything that is happening today in Pakistan and everything that has happened in last 10 years in Pakistan only indicates that this country is going to the dogs in next 30 years. If someone comes to any other conclusion then my only question to them is whether it is magic they believe in or whether it is miracles that that they believe in. In fact some Pakistani's that I have come across believe that it is because of some god-given miracle that this country is surviving when everything is going wrong.

The path that Pakistan is on today and the path that Pakistan has been only indicates that this country will continue to make trouble for India in foreseeable future (next 30 years). So unless we enjoy having this trouble, the task at hand should be how to get rid of this country.

There is nothing to indicate that Pakistan will emerge as a stable, pluralistic democracy. There is nothing to indicate that Pakistan can be "reformed". Any reasoning along this line is purely wishful and not based on facts on ground.

This does bring up the question that if TSP is too weak to survive on its own and too dangerous to be left alone. If splitting it up into smaller manageable pieces is considered a viable solution, then what will the different players want to achieve that? Is there anyway the CCP can be co-opted to that solution?

Splitting Pakistan up into more manageable pieces is the only solution, the best solution (not just for the world, but also for common Pakistanis), and also the solution that would have least resistance. Reforming Pakistan on the other hand is extremely hard work: for that one has to first apply breaks on the current path that Pakistan is taking and then ensure that it starts traveling on the right path. Even if one wants to "reform" Pakistan, it is easier done in smaller, more manageable, pieces, then in one large unit with old entrenched power structures.

Pakistan can continue to exist in a lower state of existence (like Somalia, Sudan, etc) for decades and that is where it will be 30 years because that is the only possible scenario based on everything that has happened in Pakistan over the last 10 years and everything that is happening in Pakistan now.

So the key question in my mind is how to dismantle Pakistan with minimal side-effects. The moment will come and at that movement, if GoI is sitting around doing nothing, China will have a land route through a piece of territory that is legally Indian into the anti-India Pakjabi heartland. Not only that China will have influence in a degenerated Afghanistan as well by proxy. Chinese influence on Pakistan also means, blocking India access to Central Asia.

[shiv]

So the key question in my mind is how to dismantle Pakistan with minimal side-effects. The moment will come and at that movement, if GoI is sitting around doing nothing, China will have a land route through a piece of territory that is legally Indian into the anti-India Pakjabi heartland. Not only that China will have influence in a degenerated Pakistan that is anti-India.

Dhiman I agree with most of your post - which is a good one. The part I have quoted above is definitely possible and needs to be kept in mind as one possible outcome. But I must point out that for China to have a "safe corridor" through Pakistan access to a port must be good and that port must not be vulnerable to interference by maritime powers, near or far. This is the bane that China faces from the US navy and pretty much the problem that Karachi suffers from - leading to the choice of Gwadar.

If China is looking for transport through a rump state of Pakjab - having roads and railways within 100 Km of the Indian border though a country that deliberately provokes India might be a fun and macho thing to do, but might be less of a good business investment.

But, as a recent article pointed out (Lieven) Pakjab has 56% of the population, but contributed to 75% of the Army's manpower and has 75% of the Industry. In other words Pakjab has already been benefiting the most from Pakistan's foreign aid givers. That in fact could well explain why the other provinces are "more rural" and less well developed.

What would those other provinces do for an economy if they were to "break away"? Interestingly Lieven's statistics tell a story. The other provinces do not have that much of a stake in the so called "national economy". They have 44% of the population but 25% of the industries and contribute only 25% of people to the army. In other words being cut off from Pakistan's "National economy" is the norm for them. Perhaps it could get a bit worse, but it could get better.

If it got worse, they would be unlikely to split from Pakjab because they would see their current situation as being better. But they might complain and fight for a better share which they have not yet got. If their situation had any chance of being much better by splitting then they would have the incentive to split away. So the situation of the provinces is that as long as Pakjab is throwing mere scraps at them, their chances of survival are better than if they tried to break away because even those scraps will not come from Pakjab - but they will be attacked by the powerful Pakjabi army. And no one else can help. Afghanistan can't help them. Iran won't help them. India can't help them.

You might want to feel sorry for those provinces - but first look at what the US and China are doing. They are feeding and fattening the Pakistani army. For their "national interest" the do not give a rat's ass about the provinces as long as the Pakjabi dominated army does the work required by them. So the US and China are both complicit in helping to perpetuate the internal imbalances in Pakistan as well as the power and dominance of the Pakjabi army. That is exactly what is showing up in Pakistan today as "instability". Pakistan is fighting a lot of wars and achieving a lot of "world famosity" in nucular bums, IT, defeating superpower etc. But only Pakjab is getting fat. The actual condition of non Pakjabis is not getting better. And nobody has been able to make Pakjabis feel a sense of "national duty" towards improving the lot of non Pakjabis because Pakjabis think Pakistan is all a Pakjabi kingdom.

So how much longer will the US and China benefit from making Pakjab fatter and fatter and fatter when Pakjab's problems are because of the fact that they are getting fatter and are attracting attention from others who want a share of the loot. If the US and China have found a fantastic solution to this, it must be secret because all that they are doing is feeding their Pakjabi pig as if that will somehow make things better.

In fact I personally believe that neither China nor the US have any "solution" they can apply to Pakistan. They are struggling and don't know the way forward. How could they? Even Pakistanis don't know the way forward. Both the Chinese and Americans are doing what they have always done hoping that everything will somehow settle down. China and the US do not have the foresight, guts or conscience to tell the Pakjabis what to do and have painted themselves into a corner in which the Pakjabis dictate things to them and not the other way around..

And here we are imagining these countries to be great prescient superpowers who know everything.

[RajeshA]

The path that Pakistan is on today and the path that Pakistan has been only indicates that this country will continue to make trouble for India in foreseeable future (next 30 years). So unless we enjoy having this trouble, the task at hand should be how to get rid of this country.

<snip>

Splitting Pakistan up into more manageable pieces is the only solution, the best solution (not just for the world, but also for common Pakistanis), and also the solution that would have least resistance. Reforming Pakistan on the other hand is extremely hard work: for that one has to first apply breaks on the current path that Pakistan is taking and then ensure that it starts traveling on the right path. Even if one wants to "reform" Pakistan, it is easier done in smaller, more manageable, pieces, then in one large unit with old entrenched power structures.

<snip>

So the key question in my mind is how to dismantle Pakistan with minimal side-effects.

Dhiman ji,
thanks for highlighting the only solution to Pakistan.

Many BRFites have hypothesized that the break up of Pakistan would happen when the Pushtuns of Pakistan split away from Pakjab by doing away with the Durand Line, either in the garb of Pushtun Nationalism or in the garb of independent-minded Talibanism. Another weak point we see is the Baluchistan struggle for freedom.

In my view these are not the keys to the dismantlement of Pakistan. These movements would keep the periphery politically distanced from Pakistan, and decrease Pakjabi control over these territories, but does not break up Pakistan, simply because these regions are not allowed to establish their own political system independent of Pakistan, these regions are not recognized by the international community as independent, and these regions move in and out of enhanced Pakjabi control, depending on the strength of the TSPA at any given moment. TSPA's nuke stash and its political and military alliances with big powers would ensure that these regions do not attain freedom any time soon.

The key to dismantling of Pakistan lies in breaking away Sindh from Pakistan.

The break away of Sindh would finally allow the other provinces - Pushtunistan, Baluchistan, Gilgit, Baltistan to succeed in finding their own destiny outside Pakistan, and Pakistan crumbles like a pack of cards.

A landlocked Pakjab would by itself not pose any serious threat to India, and would be forced to dismantle its nuclear arsenal in exchange for trade, transit, and better relations, but chiefly because its dream as a power of any consequence would have come to an end, just as it did for Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

So as long as there is no viable model for splitting Sindh away from Pakjab, hopes of a breakup of Pakistan are premature.

I would like all to imagine a sustained popular movement in Sindh against the Pakistani Army and in favor of breaking away from Pakistan.

How to trigger such a movement, was the subject of my ebook!

Edited later: correction in phrasing!

[shiv]

^^
Rajesh don't forget to post a link to your ebook every time you mention it.

[VikramS]

shiv ji:

I think you are putting too much emphasis on maritime security vis a vis China's decision regarding TSP. The days of one major power interdicting another major power's supply lines are done with. There is too much economic interdependence. The last time the US tried it, it resulted in Pearl Harbor and the US being dragged into WW-II. As the post WW-II showed, the wars between reasonably rational players will be Cold; the dirty work being left to rabid dogs.

The capability to interdict does provide some amount of leverage; the ability to collect a hafta or a compromise somewhere else. But any direct and persistent interdiction, is tantamount to a declaration of war and is not happening unless there is war.

This fear of maritime interdiction is unlikely to be a major factor in the calculus to construct a new road or open up an alternative trade route. Land routes in fact are much more vulnerable to ad-hoc interdiction. You can not sink a ship without creating a major event but torching a few trucks or blowing up a rail-track is much easier.

With relation to Gwadar, both the TSP and China would have wanted to avoid Karachi. Karachi is TSP's main port and the freedom to create a greenfield port there would be limited. Gwadar is also close to Iran and Persian gulf. IIRC the local geography of Gwadar makes it a hard target to attack. TSP got another port for free. I doubt Indian ability to interdict shipping lines to Karachi were a major factor for China; it might have been one for TSP.

[VikramS]

Both the Chinese and Americans are doing what they have always done hoping that everything will somehow settle down. China and the US do not have the foresight, guts or conscience to tell the Pakjabis what to do and have painted themselves into a corner in which the Pakjabis dictate things to them and not the other way around..

And here we are imagining these countries to be great prescient superpowers who know everything.

While the Pakjabi's may be dictating to the US, I see no signs of the same happening with China. And if Lal Masjid was truly carried out on the orders from PRC, then I see that as a strong sign of TSPA willing to go all out to please its new masters.

A super-power can only veto certain actions; especially when it comes to nuclear armed state with multiple super-patrons. It is very hard to dictate when another super-power is there to take the other side, until the stakes truly rise. And the stakes have not risen so far...

[RajeshA]

^^
Rajesh don't forget to post a link to your ebook every time you mention it.

shiv saar,
thanks for the suggestion!

I just think it is not appropriate to have it in the public domain, so it was emailed to the interested BRFites only.

[shiv]

With relation to Gwadar, both the TSP and China would have wanted to avoid Karachi. Karachi is TSP's main port and the freedom to create a greenfield port there would be limited. Gwadar is also close to Iran and Persian gulf. IIRC the local geography of Gwadar makes it a hard target to attack. TSP got another port for free. I doubt Indian ability to interdict shipping lines to Karachi were a major factor for China; it might have been one for TSP.

Does it make a difference? China wants a port through TSP. Karachi won't do and Pakistan wants a new, safe port. China has no choice. It has to be Gwadar, not Karachi. Guess whose dictation is being folowed and whose choice?

[shiv]

While the Pakjabi's may be dictating to the US, I see no signs of the same happening with China. And if Lal Masjid was truly carried out on the orders from PRC, then I see that as a strong sign of TSPA willing to go all out to please its new masters.

My reply here:
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 0#p1037760

[RajeshA]

X-Posted from The US and China in Pakistan - their respective roles Thread

Published on Sep 19, 2010
The story of two Kashmirs: Organiser

Now, on to how China handled Xinjiang, its Kashmir and integrated it with its mainland. Xinjiang has a population of 20 million plus. The Uighur Muslim constitute 45 per cent, other Muslims 12 per cent and Han Chinese 41 per cent. What was the Han population in Xinjiang in 1949? Just six per cent. In six decades it has risen by seven times. This change did not occur by itself. China did not just trust army or administrative control of its territory in Xinjiang. It trusted only its people. It ensured that the Han Chinese slowly began populating Xinjiang. The result is self-evident. But the 41 per cent Han Chinese population does not included defence personnel and families, and unregistered migrant Chinese workers.

The reason, I've posted this article is to show that the Chinese have a strategy on how to get control over Xinjiang (East Turkestan) and its Uyghur minority.

1. Demographic Reengineering in East Turkestan
2. Strategic Relationship with Turkey
3. Patronage of the TSPA/Islamists in Pakistan
4. Keep the Uyghur Conflict under the radar of the Ummah

There are several reasons why the bonhomie of the Americans and the Islamists could not last, and they had a fall-out!

1. Historical baggage - Crusades, Colonialism by West
2. American support to dictators in Middle East
3. American boots in Saudi Arabia
4. American support to Israel
5. American cultural invasion of the conservative Muslim societies
6. Afghanistan Invasion and Occupation
7. Iraq Invasion and Occupation

Can the Chinese also show a similar CV?

What can be a point of conflict is if too many Chinese workers in Pakistan follow "decadent Western" lifestyles in Pakistan, e.g. putting up massage parlors open to Pakistanis, etc, which in fact led to the Red Mosque crisis. Another scenario for possible conflict is if gangs, Islamist groups, which are at variance with the Government in Pakistan, which too can be fully Islamist, so it is no certainty that such conflict should exist, decide to kidnap Chinese workers to put pressure on the "Islamist" authorities.

In an anti-American Islamist Pakistani political setup, the conflict between the Government and other Islamist groups "should decrease", decreasing also the possibility of too much internal instability. Also the Chinese can be asked to restrict their "decadent values" footprint in Pakistan, and they do not lose much by complying.

I don't see why the Pakistani Islamists and the Chinese cannot lead a happy married life?!

[A_Gupta]

2009: China pulls out of Gwadar refinery
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KH14Df02.html

2010: Dispute over port charges shuts port
http://www.fizanews.com/2010/05/31/sing ... adar-port/

2010: Scrap deal with Singapore:
http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDe ... 10/27/2010

2011: In Pakistan Supreme Court
http://www.dawn.com/2011/01/05/gwadar-p ... t-psa.html

The Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) informed the Supreme Court on Tuesday that its contract to run the Gwadar Port has been challenged in the court not in the public interest but to protect the interests of a Karachi-based cartel.

“The Karachi-based cartel of stevedores has launched a media campaign against development of the port by presenting incorrect and distorted facts to the media and the court,” alleged a voluminous reply submitted by the PSA to a three-judge bench.

2011: traffic at Gwadar
http://www.blackseagrain.net/about-ukra ... wadar-port

Total 0.1 million tons fertiliser will be imported through Gwadar Port in the next 10 days, from February 20 to 28. This was stated by officials of the Ministry of Ports and Shipping on Saturday in the meeting Senate Standing Committee on Ports and Shipping which met here with Senator Gulshan Saeed in the chair at Parliament House.

Senators Dr Abdul Malik, Tariq Azim Khan, Dr Muhammad Ismail Buledi, and Almas Pareveen, the Secretary, Ministry of Ports and Shipping, the Chairman, Port Qasim and others attended the meeting. The Committee showed serious concern over the functioning and infrastructure of Gwadar Port and asked the Ministry to provide details of the agreement with Singapore Company.

Not clear to me that Gwadar is economically viable.

[VikramS]

With relation to Gwadar, both the TSP and China would have wanted to avoid Karachi. Karachi is TSP's main port and the freedom to create a greenfield port there would be limited. Gwadar is also close to Iran and Persian gulf. IIRC the local geography of Gwadar makes it a hard target to attack. TSP got another port for free. I doubt Indian ability to interdict shipping lines to Karachi were a major factor for China; it might have been one for TSP.

Does it make a difference? China wants a port through TSP. Karachi won't do and Pakistan wants a new, safe port. China has no choice. It has to be Gwadar, not Karachi. Guess whose dictation is being folowed and whose choice?

It is not dictation, it is negotiation and compromise. Both parties get something from it.

A-Gupta:
Gwadar is a project on hold. It will remain on hold as long as the US is in control.