UNITED STATES-PAKISTAN DENOUEMENT: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA
United States –Pakistan denouement in their so-called strategic partnership currently underway was inevitable as this relationship was never founded on the basis of sound long-lasting strategic convergences or shared values. Both the United States and Pakistan over the last five decades enjoyed only spasmodic proximity and that too when tactical expediencies on both sides prompted such a proximity.
The First United States-Pakistan involvement in Afghanistan in the 1980s emerged with the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in1979. The United States and Pakistan had a strategic convergence in working together to see the exit of the Soviets from Afghanistan, and they succeeded.
The Second United States-Pakistan Involvement in Afghanistan arose from United States ultimatums and coercion applied to Pakistan to combine in US Global War on Terror against the Al Qaeda and the Taliban, both entities having been given facilities and infrastructure in Pakistan-Occupied Afghanistan till 2001. Tactical expediency dictated Pakistan succumbing to American dictates, but not without Pakistan Army double-timing the United States all along since 2002.
The United States and Pakistan had not only different strategic agenda but one could say opposing agenda. The Pakistan Army’s end-game in Afghanistan this time was to bide time, induce combat fatigue in United States war effort and thereby prompt a military exit of the United Sates from Afghanistan. Thereafter the Pakistan Army could once again reclaim Afghanistan as its strategic depth against India, once again through the Taliban nurtured in Pakistani safe-havens.
This decade of the 2000s also witnessed the tangential impact on India of the United States-Pakistan Army troubled relationship. The United States in a vain bid to keep the Pakistan Army on its right side so that it does not impede the US war effort in Afghanistan and also to keep US logistics routes through Pakistan to Afghanistan open, indulged in unabashed policies of pressurizing the Indian policy establishment to what can be termed as appeasement policies towards Pakistan Army’s strategic sensitivities.
The Indian policy establishment throughout this decade of 2000s kept succumbing to United States pressures to keep resuming the India-Pakistan Peace Dialogues which India kept calling off after every major terrorist strikes from Pakistan against India, the last notable one being the nationally traumatic 26/11 commando-trained attack on Mumbai.
Pointedly asserted in my Papers on this issue repeatedly in the last few years was the fact that the Indian Prime Minister in pursuance of his pro-American policies was succumbing to American pressures on policies designed to appease Pakistan Army's strategic sensitivities. This approach was in a state of severe disconnect with Indian public opinion which wanted no truck with Pakistan until it resiled from terrorism.
Currently when the United States itself perceives that United States-Pakistan relations may have headed towards an irretrievable damage, it becomes pertinent to point out to the Indian policy establishment that its Pakistan policy postulations would need serious revision. After all the architecture of India’s policy formulations on Pakistan in the past decade were crafted from Washington’s perspectives than India’s national security interests.
This Paper intends to focus broadly on the issue of overall United States-Pakistan denouement and its strategic implications for India with a discussion under the following heads:
* United States-Pakistan Denouement: The Major Issues of Friction
* Breakdown in Relations Between United States and Pakistan Intelligence Agencies
* US Secretary of State Recent Observations on Pakistan Analyzed
* United States Follow-up Pakistan Policy Options: Perspectives
* Strategic Implications for India Arising From United States Follow-up Pakistan Policy Options.
United States-Pakistan Denouement: The Major Issues of Friction
Pakistan’s tainted reputation as an opportunistic and readily available as a ‘rentier state’ and a ‘regional spoiler state’ affected its image as a dependable state and a durable ally of the United States when the Pakistan-China strategic nexus is considered. As reiterated in many of my Papers, if when the chips are down and Pakistan is forced into making a strategic choice between China and the United States, Pakistan would align with China.
United States stabilization of Afghanistan and its continued embedment there is a United States strategic imperative of the United States. This is diametrically opposite to Pakistan Army’s fixative obsession to reclaim Afghanistan for its strategic depth strategy. Hence Pakistan Army’s continued hosting of the Afghan Taliban Shura, keeping the Pakistan-Afghanistan border porous for Taliban operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan Army Chief’s continued refusal to launch military operations in North Waziristan.
On all of the above contentious issues of concern to the United States, it is the Pakistan Army and its ISI which is the central actor and controlling authority. Why is then the United States tolerating Pakistan Army’s shenanigans? Why is it that the United States instead of ‘disciplining’ the Pakistan Army continues to pressurize India to yield to Pakistan Army’s dictates to the United States that India should yield on Kashmir, India should demilitarize Kashmir by withdrawing troops, and that the United States should not allow India to effect a presence in Afghanistan?
Break down in Relations between United States and Pakistan Intelligence Agencies
The bedrock of the United States-Pakistan relationship, irrespective of the varying intensities had been the close links and close cooperation between the CIA and the ISI, the respective intelligence agencies of the United States and Pakistan.
US Secretary of State’s Recent Observations on Pakistan Analyzed
She is reported to have observed that Pakistan faces major instabilities at home and that Pakistan should stop fomenting anti-American sentiments and that shocking and unjustified anti-Americanism will not resolve Pakistan’s problems.
Such remarks emanating from the highest level of United States foreign policy establishment indicates that something has seriously gone amiss in United States-Pakistan relations.
The Davis case seems to be only a pretext for the Pakistan military establishment to a tipping point where the United States yields further to Pakistan Army blackmails or failing which the United States is forced to a military exit from Afghanistan.
It needs to be reiterated that Pakistan’s foreign policy on United States, Afghanistan and India is under direct control of the Pakistan Army Chief General Kayani. Therefore, deductively it can be stated that the downslide in United States-Pakistan relations currently underway and the lowest point that has been reached as observed by Secretary Clinton, has taken place with the full knowledge of the Pakistan Army Chief.
It is not without purpose that in Pakistan media reports, General Kayani is being attributed as having observed that Pakistan is the most bullied ally of the United States and that ‘the real aim of United States strategy is to de-nuclearize Pakistan’. Such assertions by General Kayani can whip up nationalistic fervor and also position General Kayani in Pakistan’s political space.
And its strategic implications for India cannot be far behind especially when India’s Pakistan policy is so much enmeshed in serving Washington’s strategic interests in Pakistan.
United States Follow-up Pakistan Policy Options: Perspectives
The Hard Option of the United States could initially involve strong use of political, economic and diplomatic coercion, including cut- off of military and financial aid, to make the Pakistani establishment yield on all American demands extending from the Davis episode to launching of Pak Army offensives in North Waziristan and secure logistics to Afghanistan. It is premature to visualize military intervention against Pakistan at this stage. It would be an extreme last resort arising more from another 9/11 against the United States.
The Soft Option would be to maintain the status-quo of the frayed US-Pak relationship and perpetuate the myth of a strategic partnership. Pakistan would be cajoled to release Davis from captivity and his exit from Pakistan. United States would continue business as usual with the Pakistan Army, at least till 2014.
The Pakistan Army establishment is likely to read it(soft option) as American capitulation and persist in its blackmailing tactics.
Strategic Implications Arising for India from United States Follow-up Pakistan Policy Options
This constancy of strategic implications arise from the hostile and confrontational Pakistan Army attitudinal approaches towards India manifested as follows (1) Proxy war in Kashmir (2) Widened and enlarged terrorist attacks all over India (3) Unprovoked border incidents and clashes along the LOC (4) Pak-China strategic nexus as an anti-Indian strategy (5) Hostile propaganda internationally against India over Kashmir and alleging India’s aggressive instincts.
The Pakistan Army strategy of blackmailing USA to pressurize India has been successful with the present Government in New Delhi repeatedly succumbing to resume dialogues with Pakistan after every major terrorist attack against India, unmindful of India’s national security interests
Pakistan’s five manifestations of its hostile stances against India spelt out above did not cease despite Indian Government’s succumbing to US dictates favoring Pakistan. In fact Pakistan Army since 2007 has stood further emboldened under General Kayani to be more hostile to India secure in the belief of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence and United States keeping India pressurized against any retaliation against Pakistan.
( hope the GOI knows this all the time and not succumb to uncle-pak machinations.)
In terms of United States follow-up Pakistan policy options, whether the Hard Option or the Soft Option, the crucial deduction that emerges is that in either case Pakistan stands threatened by the prospects of internal strife, Talibanization of Pakistan and possibly civil war and fragmentation.. In such an ensuing scenario where both anti-US and anti-India war hysteria is likely to be whipped up to frenzied levels, the strategic implications for India suggest heightened security vigilance, enhancing India’s war preparedness, and increasing and qualitatively improving India’s strategic weapons inventory.
(Very important and well known observation indeed)
If United States adopts the Soft Option as a follow-up strategy then India can expect even much more United States pressures on India to yield on the Kashmir issue, demilitarization of Kashmir and end to Indian involvement in Afghanistan’s reconstruction, as per Pakistan Army demands. The United Sates in the follow-up phase would be doubly prompted to increase pressures on India to re- rehabilitate itself with the Pakistani military establishment.
The Indian policy establishment needs to ask itself the serious question that irrespective of the health of United States-Pakistan relations, in the event of an India-Pakistan military showdown for whatever provocation would the United States standby with India against a Talibanized Pakistan? Also another critical question as to whether the increased Indian military equipment purchases from the United States would become subject to US sanctions in the event of an India-Pak conflict in the future?
Lastly, is it a strategically sound option for the Indian Prime Minister to keep acceding to repeated resumption of Peace Dialogues with Pakistan, when the very existence of Pakistan is in question? Peace Dialogues with Pakistan under US pressures can neither ensure peace for India nor swing the United States strategically in favor of India.
It is strange that leading policy advisers of US President Obama should be writing best seller books entitled “United States Deadly Embrace of Pakistan” and the US Administration in a doublespeak pressurizing India to go in for a “Deadly Embrace with the Pakistan Army”.
Concluding Observations
In the 1950s and 1960s when India was strategically infirm, India followed an independent policy on Pakistan. Today when India is strategically powerful and strong, the Indian Prime Minister of seven years standing has remained silent on the crucial issue as to what strategic advantages accrue to India by repeated resumption of Peace Dialogues with Pakistan under United States pressures.
India would have to enhance its security vigilance, achieve high levels of war -preparedness and be politically ready for strong deterrent actions to counter any Pakistan Army adventurism. This is all the more necessary especially when the Pakistan Army is headed by a Pakistan Army Chief who openly flaunts that he is “India-Centric” and stands rated by US intelligence establishment as the most anti-Indian Pak Army Chief ever in Pakistan’s history.