Surviving a 50 to 100 nuke bomb attack on India

[JwalaMukhi]

Some random thoughts that come to my mind (after a scenario of a 50-100 parmanu attack, as envisaged in this thread):
1. Could a list of scientists, physicians, economists etc. be made up on these lines (for rebuilding of the country after such an attack): Tier 1 - list of most important people who definitely need to be saved by immediately transferring them to parmanu shelters even at the mere possibility/eventuality of an intended parmanu attack, Tier II: not as important as tier I but nevertheless important, tier III....

This would be counter productive. Keeping a list and identifying people is not advisable: because it is like having a list of targets. This list would be what the enemy would love to get hands on. India was built primarily based on freedom of collective. India would be rebuilt by Indians who largely will rise to the occasion. Because what is lost at that moment is not people who can build spaceships, what is truly lost is the characteristics of being a dharmic human - drive to live and defend. Preserving sword/spaceship building capability in future is not going to automatically reverse that important lack of character to uphold and defend (what is right) dharma.

BTW, the often quoted refrain, that economic power will lead to being powerful is a myth. India was a richest country and that did not make it powerful. It fell to bunch of looters. One could be in deep debt without any economic prosperity, but a liberal cojones (ability and will) to rape, pillage and scorch earth will generate power (however ephemeral). Spain was in deep debt, but had cojones to behave in asuric (non-dharmic) way.

The most important thing to develop is a spine and will to see asuric ways in no uncertain terms and counter that. That will not come just by hoping economic success will automatically help that deficit. To counter asuric way, one has to hold saner world hostage so asuric tendencies are nipped in the bud, else saner world would go down, if India goes down. That in jist would be how to go paki to deal with this kind of extraordinary situation.

Prior to that, if one pauses for a moment, 50 -100 lobbed is not going to be local skimrishes. It would be a true momentously paki moment for India. Once such an event occurs, the primary objective of Indians would be not about rebuilding India, it would be to unleash the forces of pralaya to occur, so life as one knows it and appreciates it would be impossible for other jeevans (big and small alike) on this bhumi. Because at that point, it no longer is question about Indians, it will be loss of faith in humanity and an invitation to end humanity. Allowing 50-100 to be lobbed is suicidal vest donned by humanity. Period.

What is most worrisome is 1 or 2 lobbed, which Indians (leadership) would take it in stride in Jingopura, and continue to watch and worry if Dhoni scored 100 runs or if some bollywood actress had nescafe for breakfast.

Take home message: develop spine, cojones ityadhi... one can address 1 bum or 1000s bums. Lack that cojones, one can't address anything. All else is secondary.

[pran]

Any decapitating nuclear strike on India is directed to achieve the following objectives :-

• Destroy knowledge based power.
• Destroy Industrial infrastructure.
• Destroy Defense infrastructure.
• Destroy political cohesion.
• Destroy economic security.
• Destroy social cohesion.

The problem scenario can be analyzed in two broad sections.
Pre-incident
Deterrence & Defense preparedness.
Infrastructure planning and redundancy.

• Communication
• Energy
• Road & Rail Transport

Knowledge distribution and redundancy.
Economic incentives for NBC infrastructure (Great idea from RajeshA)
Long term Food Water Medicine storage facilities and technology.
Start school education and Public awareness campaign and response allocation.
Nuclear incident response planning and exercise to identify actions,options and bottlenecks (Nuclear war book)
Enable citizen participation and community drills. (Public war book)
Every cell phone should work as a MW/SW radio as it is reaching a large population.
Post-incident
Identify incident and announce action within 12 hours.
Defensive/Offensive action by Armed forces.
Emergency administration at the federal, state and local level.
Follow war book for life and infrastructure preservation.
Mass communication and transport of affected people to safety.
Avoid politics in help distribution.

[ShauryaT]

From a TSP standpoint, the most effective would be to figure out how to kill/maime 200 million Hindus with 100 Nuclear Bombs. I am assuming, they would be able to do a boosted fission weapon with with the help of their new plutonium weapons. Do not place much value on incapacitation of Indian counter response assets and controls or the incapacitation of the state, as it is not feasible by TSP. India is simply too large, diversified and well organized for that. Annihilation of the enemy - not just the state is the purpose of nuclear weapons.

So, the top 20 cities will be the preference. Top choices are

NCR
Mumbai
Bengaluru
Chennai
Amritsar
Ludhiana
Ahmedabad
Nagpur
Lucknow
Kolkatta
Hyderabad
Pune
Patna
Lucknow
Allahabad
Surat
Kanpur
Jaipur
Indore

[chaanakya]

Shaurya Would they not like to neutralise our first or second strike capability while lobbing 100 nukes at us? if so then target composition would be different.
They might also have a look to avoid targets which would put them under threat of radiation fall out. May be they would look at weather pattern and wind pattern before considering the targets.( I have Amritsar and Ludhiana in mind).

While your list is comprehensive, it leaves out some states like Chattisgarh, Orissa and Jharkhand, just to name a few. Any specific reason for that. May be we could relocate Command and control centres.

Just a loud thinking.

[RajeshA]

Tax Benefits for Nuclear Shelters (cont.)

In such a scenario, tenants of apartments and individual houses should also get some benefit. How about including their rent money as part of a savings plan as an idea, thereby fetching them some tax-benefits as well!

Klaus ji,
thank you for more good ideas!

Extending my earlier proposal, I'd like to add.

One can have tax benefits for

1. those who own apartments or houses with an adjoining nuclear shelter.
2. those who live in apartments or houses with an adjoining nuclear shelter (both owners and tenants).
3. those who construct apartments or houses with an adjoining nuclear shelter. (construction companies)

If construction companies are taxed less on the revenues from those construction projects, where they built nuclear shelters, then the construction companies would often try to push their clients to have adjoining nuclear shelters built. They will be earning more because of the added nuclear shelter construction, and they will be saving more due to tax benefits on all such revenues.

The clients, the building owners, they may have to pay more for the construction of the nuclear shelters, but they too would be able to save money later on, as they too would be able to claim tax benefits for owning nuclear shelters. They could also earn more through higher rents from their tenants. If they have no tenants, they still get additional tax benefits if they themselves live there.

The tenants may be paying more for apartments with adjoining nuclear shelters, but they will get tax benefits also.

This way the government can "subsidize" the construction of nuclear shelters, by offering tax benefits, but without paying anything or much up front for the construction of such nuclear shelters.

[rkirankr]

One of the ways to avoid this would be, to keep on doing the aman ki tamasha thing now and then. But however develop enought assets in pakistan to create turmoil. What pakis are trying to do to us we should do to them. Interfere everywhere and create a mess. Create 3 to 4 nations out of pakis and try to remove nuclear weapons from some of these in exchange for lot of moolah, free trade etc. Ofcourse the country which has the pakjabs will not fall in line.

A little bit of faked irrationality such as, we will attack all those who helped pakis. We will attack all those countries who have paki military bases, we will attack the military bases of those countries in asia who have military agreement with pakis. Ofcourse as some one said, these need not be said by GOI, but talked about in seminars papers etc.

Inside the country I do believe there must be an awareness and education for the populace.

PS: Why do I feel that this is one more piskological thread by Shiv sir. Anyone else started this kind of thread would have been laughed out of this thread. But Shiv saar? ....... something more lurks here

[vilayat]

When yindus here talk of retaliation to 100 parmaanu bum attack, do they restrict themselves to retaliation by aanvik only? Why no talk about jaivik and raasaynik retaliation. The jaivik option can be preemptive and relatively quite and easy to contain than rasaynik and aanvik in that particular order..

has the dhaga ishtarter taken these options in consideration?

[shiv]

No rkirankr - the reason for the thread is in the first post itself.

I believe we are living on "high hopes" that nuclear war can somehow be avoided. Fine. I would be as happy as the next guy to know that nuclear war will not occur - but I refuse to allow myself to be fooled by "hope".

What is the information we have that nuclear war will not occur? If you look at the news - there is no information there to suggest that nuclear war between India and Pakistan will not occur.

As I stated in the deterrence thread - if someone else's deterrent is credible - it means that we will be deterred and be scared and not attack them with nukes. If our deterrent is credible, others will not attack us. If you look at opinions on BRF - the vast majority of opinions expressed are pessimistic of our deterrent and confident about others' deterrents. Logically this means that others wil not be deterred from attacking India and guess what that means?

Third - you find that the government actively speaks of BMD, armed forces are being equipped with NBC capability and there is the continuous improvement in the creation of a triad. None of this can be interpreted as a sign that nuclear war is unlikely.

Finally Pakistanis have threatened India will nuclear war on several occasions and have even readied their weapons for a strike on more than one occasion.

Under the circumstances how can we as a nation be so nonchalant and imagine that nuclear war can be laughed off. Even if you accuse the government of not being forthright with the public, we on BRF - a community that purports to discuss "strategic issues" should have our heads fixed firmly on our shoulders and read the signs. Nuclear war is possible and Indians should talk about it. And we should talk about life after nuclear war, for I believe that life can and will continue in India after a 50 to 100 bomb attack on India.
It's another matter that the world will also face the consequences of fallout. Not our problem. We are not even threatening anyone with nuclear war. It is we who are going to get hit. And its is the worlds superpowers who have armed Pakistan to hit us.

If there is anyone who should be talking about the effects of nuclear war on India it is us. Laughing it off is denial. I can't blame people to want to be in denial, but it's tough

[ShauryaT]

Shaurya Would they not like to neutralise our first or second strike capability while lobbing 100 nukes at us? if so then target composition would be different.
They might also have a look to avoid targets which would put them under threat of radiation fall out. May be they would look at weather pattern and wind pattern before considering the targets.( I have Amritsar and Ludhiana in mind).

While your list is comprehensive, it leaves out some states like Chattisgarh, Orissa and Jharkhand, just to name a few. Any specific reason for that. May be we could relocate Command and control centres.

Just a loud thinking.

For an effective counter force strategy, which can take on the size and dispersed assets that India has at its disposal, you would have to increase the number of nuclear weapons by about a factor of 10 or so and also develop significant capabilities to cover about 2000*2000 KM of territory. Even with zero defensive or offensive capabilities, a counter force strategy to target India's nuclear, non nuclear and command and control military assets is out of scope for TSP. Hence, the only thing they can possibly go for is a counter value strategy to target population centers. This view is also supported by many other analysts/observers.

I have a serious flaw (deliberately) in the numbers in my post. Although, TSP would wish to kill 200 million, even assuming 100% destruction of the 20 most populous cities of India, the numbers do not exceed 80 million.

Now, I have been very generous to TSP, giving them the benefit of doubt that they would have higher yield weapons by way of a boosted fission weapon, that 100% of their weapons will work, that 100% of their weapons will be able to make its target, escaping Indian air and missile defenses and that 100% of their delivery platforms will be able to launch undetected and without opposition.

More so, that Indian civil preparation for such an eventuality would be zero and all of us would simply wait to be vaporized. So the theoretical maximum is less than 80 million dead/wounded. Certainly not a level, which assures destruction of the people and the state.

Since a counter force and value Indian response is guaranteed, leading to an assured destruction of TSP as a state, deterrence theorists can conclude their own lessons from such a scenario. Going into that aspect, would be OT for this thread.

The question is, assuming TSP will launch a nuclear attack with 100 war heads, what are the Indian reactions to such a scenario, to minimize its losses, so that the results of such an action are as close to the theoretical minimum of zero.

IMO, it would be in the following order.

1. Preemption: India has enough IRSAT, other aerial, signals and human assets to be able to detect such a preparation by TSP. Preemption against these vehicles or kill on boost phase and their command structures (counter force) would be part of the Indian response to reduce the number of vehicles that can be launched

2. Air and Missile Defenses would do their part in a well defended air space. In due course, would not rule out lazer weapons to eliminate such threats.

3. Our weakest area is preparation of the civilian infrastructure to cope and then manage the after math of such an attack. This would be the area to invest in. Both, in terms of being able to better withstand such an attack on our cities and manage its aftermath. While plans exist, to manage the aftermath, the last mile or first responders being trained and under sufficient "active and coordinated inter agency" command and control to act and reduce the effects of such an attack is critical and can make a huge difference.

It is this last area, that is of most concern and should be the focus of the thread, IMO.

The issue is one of priorities and one of our model of governance and associated structures and how they work. When the population did not react sufficiently enough to throw out the government in power, after some serious failures in security in some states, what hope is there that politicians will make a threat such as this a priority and invest in prevention and reduction of damages from the nuclear threat?

Amritsar and other places in Punjab are a priority for the Pakjab army, they are part of the counter value, due to historical and cultural enmities and geographical proximity. Radiation fall out is a possibility but with a KT level device and with the winds usually traveling west to east, a blast on Amritsar can be managed. Ludhiana is almost 100 miles away and fallout to TSP is unlikely.

[shiv]

Shaurya Would they not like to neutralise our first or second strike capability while lobbing 100 nukes at us? if so then target composition would be different.
They might also have a look to avoid targets which would put them under threat of radiation fall out. May be they would look at weather pattern and wind pattern before considering the targets.( I have Amritsar and Ludhiana in mind).

While your list is comprehensive, it leaves out some states like Chattisgarh, Orissa and Jharkhand, just to name a few. Any specific reason for that. May be we could relocate Command and control centres.

Just a loud thinking.

For an effective counter force strategy, which can take on the size and dispersed assets that India has at its disposal, you would have to increase the number of nuclear weapons by about a factor of 10 or so and also develop significant capabilities to cover about 2000*2000 KM of territory. Even with zero defensive or offensive capabilities, a counter force strategy to target India's nuclear, non nuclear and command and control military assets is out of scope for TSP. Hence, the only thing they can possibly go for is a counter value strategy to target population centers. This view is also supported by many other analysts/observers.

I have a serious flaw (deliberately) in the numbers in my post. Although, TSP would wish to kill 200 million, even assuming 100% destruction of the 20 most populous cities of India, the numbers do not exceed 80 million.

I would tend to agree with Shaurya.

For several weeks now I have been (on an off) trying to re read refs that I was reading 2 years ago to find some info that I seem unable to find. It is there somewhere because I have archived a lot of stuff that I found on the net fearing that it would be taken offline.

Basically counter-force - the doctrine of knocking out the other guy's nukes is easier said than done even if you have 1 megaton plus nukes. This is simply because anything that requires to survive a nuclear attack is put underground and anything that is underground requires that the earth above the hidden asset is subjected to huge "overpressure" in the region of 20-25 psi (IIRC- my figures from memory may be wrong) so make sure that the underground facility is crushed. Unfortunately such huge overpressures are achieved only immediately under airbursts and extend to a distance perhaps 1.5 times the actual fireball radius. Now even with a 1 megaton bomb the actual fireball radius itself is no great shakes - perhaps a km or two. So if one must destroy underground fortification you must know there exact location within 1 km and your missile must be accurate enough to hit within that radius.

The problem is compounded by the fact that any sensible entity would hide its nukes underground in widely dispersed facilities well away from inhabited areas. If a country wants to destroy 50 underground facilities in another country and the locations are not known accurately the only way would be a random launch of 100 nukes to try and get them. Even that may not work - because a miss of as little as 2 km may render the attack useless. But by the time those 100 nukes are launched, most countries in the world other than US and Russia) will be running out of nukes. And nobody has that many megaton nukes any more. With smaller nukes you need to know the exact location and hit with pinpoint accuracy.

Counter force against nukes is a problem- except perhaps for knocking out airfields and known missile launch sites. Counter value - where you take out cities ad kill and maim is the way to go. For anyone hiding in a bunker outside islamabad, life should not be worth living after he emerges from his bunker. But that is OT for this thread.

[Klaus]

When yindus here talk of retaliation to 100 parmaanu bum attack, do they restrict themselves to retaliation by aanvik only? Why no talk about jaivik and raasaynik retaliation. The jaivik option can be preemptive and relatively quite and easy to contain than rasaynik and aanvik in that particular order..

has the dhaga ishtarter taken these options in consideration?

Vilayat ji, could you please elaborate on this in the future strategy thread for the benefit of abduls not intricately familiar with this line of thought? You seem to have thought a bit about this aspect.

Thanks in advance!

[ManishH]

Nuclear war surviving skills ...
http://www.oism.org/nwss/

[Vinit]

Given a scenario where such an attack has occurred, (am not going into deterrence / reasons / buildup etc, as the thread author probably intended), the elements required for the nation to survive are in three categories, below. I've also included my personal, arbitrary, unsubstantiated estimate of where we probably stand on each of these.


(1) Leadership: who would be in charge and take decisions/interact with the armed forces and the rest of the world?
Estimated Current level of preparation: high Chains of command etc have probably been set up.

(2) Military: assuming that half of the attacks would be on key military infrastructure (air and naval bases, army concentrations) how would an effective conventional / non-conventional defence or offence be mounted?
Estimated Current level of preparation: high Assumption is that our military planners have wargamed this repeatedly.

(3) Civilian: assuming that half of the attacks would be on key cities (Shaurya’s list above) how would the aftermath be handled?
Estimated Current level of preparation: very poor.

I'll go further and say that not much can actually be done for (3) Civilian. Any preparations will incur cost to create and maintain, which has to be offset against the likelihood of such an event and other priorities. Even developed economies struggle to cope with disasters such as the Japan tsunami or Hurricane Katrina, and what we're talking about here would far surpass those.

[Vinit]

One can have tax benefits for

1. those who own apartments or houses with an adjoining nuclear shelter.
2. those who live in apartments or houses with an adjoining nuclear shelter (both owners and tenants).
3. those who construct apartments or houses with an adjoining nuclear shelter. (construction companies)

This way the government can "subsidize" the construction of nuclear shelters, by offering tax benefits, but without paying anything or much up front for the construction of such nuclear shelters.

I'd like to offer a different opinion. Such shelters would only help in one restricted way - reduce immediate casualties in a scenario where there is adequate warning of an attack. For effective use of these shelters, you have to consider:

- timely communication to people of impending attack (questionable)
- speed of response of said people, to reach the shelters (usually poor)
- efficiency of the shelter in shielding people from blast, heat, fire, and radiation (the only benefit of a shelter is to reduce - not eliminate - the lethal radius of the weapon)
- dealing with the aftermath (people would emerge from the shelters after a few hours and would have to deal with destruction, injuries, fire, poisoned water and food, etc)

For those who can afford it (very few), such shelters might be good to have. I doubt their effectiveness, though.

Think of a typical day (just an example for a flat in an apartment block): elderly parents at home, hubby & wife at work, kids at school. Suddenly TV channels start putting out a warning of attack in 5/10/15 min. How many people would actually get to the shelter in that apartment block?

Even assuming that we have shelters all over, and assuming that everyone's watching TV, and assuming that they are well rehearsed in drills (too many assumptions!!) not many people will make it. And even if the kids are in the school shelter, the parents in the work shelters, the elderly in the apartment shelter ... what's going to happen when they emerge to find the city in ruins, no knowledge of where the others are, and having to cope with fires, injured and dead people on the streets, radiation, smashed buildings, busted roads, zero communications...

[RKumar]

Bhuvan Services

Disaster Services
The Disaster Management Support (DMS) Program of ISRO, commits to providing timely support and services from aero-space systems, both imaging and communications, for strengthening the resolves of disaster management in the country. These include creation of digital data base for facilitating hazard zonation, damage assessment, etc., monitoring of major natural disasters using satellite and aerial data, development of appropriate techniques and tools for decision support, establishing satellite based reliable communication network, deployment of emergency communication equipments and R&D towards early warning of disasters.

The Decision Support Centre (DSC), set up at NRSC under the DMS program, is the single window of ISRO to provide the information for efficient disaster management. It operates on 16x7 basis during normal time and on 24x7 basis during disasters. Similarly, all information on disasters generated by DSC is ported onto Bhuvan for the use of the common man. Active forest fire incidents derived using MODIS Terra/ Aqua and DMSP-OLS data disseminated through NRSC's web site (INFFRAS) is also shown on Bhuvan on a daily basis.

[Guddu]

Tax Benefits for Nuclear Shelters (cont.)

Is there any evidence that nuclear shelters work ?, I would think not, any more than the drills they used to have in the US, where students were asked to go under the tables and duct tape windows...In the Indian setting it would be impossible to accomodate the millions into any kind of shelter, provide food, water, sanitation.

[ShauryaT]

Even assuming that we have shelters all over, and assuming that everyone's watching TV, and assuming that they are well rehearsed in drills (too many assumptions!!) not many people will make it. And even if the kids are in the school shelter, the parents in the work shelters, the elderly in the apartment shelter ... what's going to happen when they emerge to find the city in ruins, no knowledge of where the others are, and having to cope with fires, injured and dead people on the streets, radiation, smashed buildings, busted roads, zero communications...

Vinit ji: You can guarantee a huge difference in how the population reacts, the preparedness of a nation to deal with a disaster and how they cope with its aftermath. Look no further than the latest earthquake/tsunami in Japan. A near 9.0 richter scale earthquake is no small affair and the years of preparation that the Japanese have had clearly made a difference. More important they are able to cope with its aftermath with some level of preparation.

[jagga]

In Pictures: Nuclear Shelter

[rsingh]

Metro system can be used as shelter during nuclear attack.
Therefore stations are to be big and equipped.
All the entrances to the station are to face outward i.e.away from city center. Because N bombs are to be dropped at center of city and by facing metro gates to the other way from center can save people from shock waves.
Any new city must be planned on" cart wheel design". In this way we can minimize destruction by shock waves by channeling the main thrust in to empty roads radiating from center. JMT

[shiv]

Here is a table to help people to think happy thoughts and make plans. Nuclear bomb yield versus radius of destruction classified conveniently into severe damage, moderate damage and light damage.

[Vinit]

Vinit ji: You can guarantee a huge difference in how the population reacts, the preparedness of a nation to deal with a disaster and how they cope with its aftermath. Look no further than the latest earthquake/tsunami in Japan. A near 9.0 richter scale earthquake is no small affair and the years of preparation that the Japanese have had clearly made a difference. More important they are able to cope with its aftermath with some level of preparation.

ShauryaT, I agree. My argument is not that we do not prepare. All I'm saying is that shelters are not an effective means of preparation for nuclear attack on major cities due to the reasons I've listed above.

This does not mean we do not look at other preparations that can be made.

[Vinit]

I'd said earlier that "surviving a nuclear attack" involves preparations for continuity at the leadership, military, and civilian levels. The first two would hopefully have been done.

For the third - civilian (i.e. attacks on major cities), I will be frank and say there isn't much that can be done, not only in India but anywhere. This is why even the US and Europe gave up on shelters etc for civilians after the 1970s. What can be done are simpler steps to cope with the aftermath, such as:
(a) training doctors to cope with post-attack injuries,
(b) forming rapid response assistance and cleanup teams based in non-critical cities,
(c) having plans to ensure that administrative functions and some key infrastructure can be rerouted to reduce disruption as far possible.
(d) having a plan to deal with any morale etc issues in the nation post the attack. After a major attack takes out the top 20-30 cities, the population would still need to believe in the state.

[vera_k]

One effort that can be undertaken is to distribute potassium iodide (KI) tablets through the PDS. They have a long shelf life (on the order of 10 years), so a distribution program of 100 million tablets a year should be enough to cover all of the population.

[abhischekcc]

Godhra train burning and post-Godhra riots proved that Indian people will act and react even in this day and age without caring about what state leadership does or does not do.

Wow!

The current agitation against corruption is also because Indian people do not look to their government for all the direction, but can make it bend.

[shiv]

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142 ... lenews_wsj

But Islamabad's decision to field tactical nuclear weapons is an irresponsible response to an as-yet unrealized limited conventional threat. Yes, it will make "Cold Start" a much more challenging proposition for India's military. Indeed, the doctrine might very well be dead on arrival—which is what Pakistan intends. Yet the unintended effect here is to make future violence on the subcontinent more likely. Islamabad will see little need to clamp down on terrorists operating from within its borders. India will then suffer from future attacks, leaving it anxious to retaliate one way or the other.

New Delhi is not going to blithely accept a situation where its preferred military response to a terrorist attack is undermined. Since Islamabad seems intent on unleashing its nuclear weapons in response to even a limited Indian retaliatory offensive, India will have to prepare for the possibility of a nuclear exchange. One logical outcome will be for India to devote more generous resources to its future missile defense shield. Another will be for India to deploy its own tactical nuclear weapons. While the Indian Army's 150-kilometer-range Prithvi-I missile is not believed to have a nuclear role at present, it is nuclear-capable and could be tasked to that mission.

Confident in its missile defenses, India will then be able to retaliate. But because tactical nuclear weapons, which are difficult to counter, will continue to negate the effectiveness of its ground forces—and thus the "Cold Start" option—India will likely need to rely on a wider air campaign aimed at bombing Pakistan into submission. Rather than a shallow incursion into its territory, Pakistan will be faced with air strikes against military targets (perhaps including infrastructure) throughout the country.

[satya]

off the radar .

[Johann]

The UK put a lot of money in to nuclear civil defence in the 1950s and early 60s - in proportional terms much more than the US, in part because of the experience of the Blitz and near-invasion of WWII.

There was an emphasis on maintaining what the Americans called Continuity of Government (CoG) from the national down to the regional and local levels. The second was estimating and trying to plan for the much larger needs of shall we say viable surviving population, especially in terms of food, fuel.

CoG stuff wasn't just a matter of bunkers, or identifying key personnel and setting up evacuation procedures. It was closely tied to early warning.

As the bulk of the Soviet deterrent switched to from bombers to missiles, especially ballistic missiles, warning times kept shrinking. When combined with the massively growing size of the anticipated strike (no. of warheads and yield), planning anything more than perhaps second strike and the decision making machinery required to ensure it seemed more and more futile in the 1970s and 80s.

Let's assume (and I think this is reasonable based on what is in the public domain) that the GoI has focussed on CoG at the national level, what is the most pressing remaining challenge?

I would say it is the dependence on ports, and on oil and gas imports. A nuclear strike of the size Shiv is envisioning would probably wreck both refineries and port facilities needed to keep undamaged provincial and rural India rolling after a week or two. There's also the problem of the funds, authority and communications necessary to manage contracts/deliveries should one or two facilities be lucky enough to survive, although I can see a thriving small scale industry of small traders moving oil from places like Sri Lanka or Bangladesh. One option would be to vest a measure of CoG for these kinds of external affairs in particular Indian embassies abroad, with provision to shift funds to them if a massive attack looked imminent.

It would also be important to look at how much of the power generating capacity would survive, and the transportation networks that kept the coal coming in to the thermal plants.

Similarly, although India is self-sufficient, what would be the challenges in getting food from the bread baskets to the remaining population centres?

To discuss these things in detail requires looking at targeting in detail, and I am not sure a public forum is the best place for that. The Pakistani Strategic Plans Division probably shouldn't have BRF's finest minds working for them, unless you want to assume that the Chinese have already delivered the best possible nuclear strike plan to them already.

The general problem of oil import dependency, and the issue of distribution is probably safe....

[Amber G.]

Johann - But we (US) had these clips ...
I am surprised that no one has posted this yet.
(It is a serious clip, almost all who were in US around 1950's-60's (it was still shown in 70's and 80's(?) too) have seen this - watch the whole clip - about 9 minutes.)

[Amber G.]

This is one of the UK series...
(IIRC some of these clips were classified (?) )

[Amber G.]

Another from UK series:

[hnair]

And Shree Brad Bird's tongue in cheek look at childhood during those times....


(movie: Iron Giant, the best work of Bird yet)

[shiv]

Johann - But we (US) had these clips ...
I am surprised that no one has posted this yet.
(It is a serious clip, almost all who were in US around 1950's-60's (it was still shown in 70's and 80's(?) too) have seen this - watch the whole clip - about 9 minutes.)

Thanks for posting.

My initial reaction - in the first 2 minutes was that both this video and this thread are ridiculous. But I later realised that the Americans took nuclear war very seriously and were aiming to survive and win. In their own way the Amir-khans were out-doing Mao and his bluster of losing 300 million. The Americans were not talking about how many will die but working out how many an survive and how.

These are some of the attitudes that need admiration - these are the attributes of a winner.

[Johann]

The idea of serious nuclear civil defence really didn't last very long - it was just too hard to sustain when there was no threat of physical invasion/takeover, and the number and size of nuclear weapons as enormous as they were.

Nevil Shute's "On the Beach" probably did more to sink the idea of a 'winnable' nuclear war amongst the American public than any other single person

The unsustainability of the psychological burden of trying to be a 'winner' after the devastation of a major thermonuclear exchange is *exactly* why Reagan latched on the idea of 'Star Wars'.

Its no coincidence that this came after the crisis of 1983, and was followed by serious negotiation with Gorbachev to downsize nuclear arsenals and to reduce the threat of nuclear war.

Its too much to ask from people year after year, decade after decade.

[shiv]

The idea of serious nuclear civil defence really didn't last very long - it was just too hard to sustain when there was no threat of physical invasion/takeover, and the number and size of nuclear weapons as enormous as they were.

Nevil Shute's "On the Beach" probably did more to sink the idea of a 'winnable' nuclear war amongst the American public than any other single person

The unsustainability of the psychological burden of trying to be a 'winner' after the devastation of a major thermonuclear exchange is *exactly* why Reagan latched on the idea of 'Star Wars'.

Its no coincidence that this came after the crisis of 1983, and was followed by serious negotiation with Gorbachev to downsize nuclear arsenals and to reduce the threat of nuclear war.

Its too much to ask from people year after year, decade after decade.

No argument with this except to point out that it was a process of social evolution - from believing that one could prepare for nuclear war and teaching hundreds of thousand of children to prepare for that eventuality to a realization that it was probably pointless.

What is (naturally) left out of this perfectly correct assessment is the sort of effect that a "We are preparing for nuclear war" mentality has on an adversary nation that is planning to nuke you. In this case the USSR, already engaged in an arms race with the US was in addition burdened with the psychological handicap of being informed that he US was going to fight and continue after nuclear war. The effect on them could hardly have been cheering as they too would have to initiate measures for at least the most important social structures to survive nuclear war.

This is an important aspect. I does not matter if it seems pointless to try and prepare for nuclear war. The act of preparing to fight and win is itself likely to put pressure on an adversary. There is a horrendous gloating boast in the act of preparing for nuclear war that says "Bring it on we are ready". It is important to have that effect. That is the effect Mao had when he made his 300 million boast. That is undoubtedly the effect the US had on others.

In my view, preparing for life after nuclear war should be a natural and unavoidable corollary of the act of developing nuclear weapons to punish a nuclear armed adversary. The fact that others have "been there done that" has been used as a justification for preventing others from developing nuclear weapons. But once those nukes become a fait accompli, the next logical step must be to prepare for nuclear war and then go through the evolutionary cycle of deciding that it was not worth it. The lesson of the US and Russia are not necessarily illuminating for the India Pakistan context any more than the lessons of Hiroshima and Nagasaki prevented the US and USSR from contemplating nuclear war.

[Johann]

Hi Shiv,

I dont disagree with you either - I entirely agree that lessons have to be taken in context, and that contexts differ.

The kind of nuclear civil defence at the individual and family level in the 1950s came in the aftermath of the mass mobilisation for total war in WWII.

Mao's threat came in the aftermath of the unimaginable struggles of the civil war, the Japanese invasion and the Korean war.

This kind of mobilisation faded as the war receded in to the past.

Nuclear civil defence cant deter the opponent unless its built on the back of national consensus that supports your deterrent posture. Otherwise you will have peace candidates winning elections, promising to reduce tensions.

Look at the protests already underway against civil nuclear plants, and consider what preparing the masses for a nuclear war will produce. This is part of what turned Germany so intensely anti-nuclear - the perfect awareness that Germany was likely to be the first, and possibly last place that got nuked if the cold war turned hot.

What survived the 1950s were institutions like FEMA that concentrated on disaster management planning, survivable communications, early warning, continuity of government etc. All of these things in addition to strengthening a credible deterrent have enormous practical value in dealing with other massive disasters, Katrina notwithstanding.

The big structural questions of how India would find the fuel to stay rolling after a strike of your size are practical ones that can produce positive outcomes. For example, would a number of distributed regional strategic petroleum reserves well away from cities make sense? Would they have additional benefits in cushioning energy price shocks from other types of events?

[shiv]

IDSA COMMENT
Pakistan’s ‘First Use’ in Perspective ---- Ali Ahmed

After 2-3 re readings, I would judge this as an excellent article and is further confirmation that people withing "strategy making" circles do think out complex issues and all their ramifications. Lovely - it makes me so much comfortable with any similar thoughts I may have.

It seems that Pakistan is seeking to play a game of nuclear escalation from "small hits" to bigger hits to massive retaliation.

Pakistan is, in other words "inviting India" to play a game that allows Pakistan to escalate in steps. Pakistan will not say what will cause it to use nukes but is saying "At any point we may use small nukes, and then bigger nukes - or we may use the biggest threats right away. We are not telling you. Come join the game"

India would do well not to join the game but stick to its resolve to nuke Pakistan out of existence the minute Pakistan uses a single nuke. The alternative - that is to escalate slowly and allow Pakistan the chance of using all its nukes is too stupid to contemplate. The Indian response will be to nuke Pakistan out of existence even if Pakistan nukes a single Indian armored column simply because Pakistan, by using the first nuke is saying "We have started the game, we want you to play it by our rules". India will not play by Pakistan;s rules but nuke it out of existence.

But this still leaves India at one disadvantage - and that is it allows Pakistan to conduct terrorist attacks and Kargil like intrusions with he threat of nuclear retaliation if India escalates conventional war. The structure of Pakistan's strategy is as follows

1. We will nuke you if you attack us.
2. We will attack you and taunt you to attack us back, which you cannot do because we will nuke you first.

Pakistan is playing a game of Russian roulette -. Actually this game is called "swerve". Swerve is a game in which two people are approaching each other in a car at high speed and are bound to collide disastrously hurting both parties. The one who swerves first is the "loser" because the other has his way. Pakistan seeks to conduct operations against India and stop India from attacking Pakistan (by "swerving")

This game can only go so far. If India is pushed hard enough it will not swerve and nuke the Paki-shits out of existence. That is why we need to prepare fro nuclear war.

[NikhilB]

India would do well not to join the game but stick to its resolve to nuke Pakistan out of existence the minute Pakistan uses a single nuke.
....

This is the best strategy we can have, and we should make it clear loudly.

I remember one movie scene, dont know movie name or actor now. Here there are about 10-15 gangsters with knives in their hand surrounding a man (hero) trying to kill him. Hero has one knife also. There is no way that hero can fight all 15 people at same time. He says "I know I am going to die, but remember, whoever is going to hit me first is certianly going to die with me". And he somehow survives.

Doesn't apply here, as analogy for comparative strenghts is not applicable here. In fact we have much more strenght than this lone person in above story, but what is important is declaring it loud.

[Prem]

India would do well not to join the game but stick to its resolve to nuke Pakistan out of existence the minute Pakistan uses a single nuke. ....

You cant do it unless you have 500-800 targetted at China. Lets hope India have already achieved these numbers in ready to go inventory or close enough in such numercial strength . The middle course is to strip Poaks from any Deeper Taller friends /relation providing cover to them. Once Puke know they will be alone in the game , Punjabi Muasalman's Hekri will disappear in no time. Subtle or overt display of capacity and threat of Obliterating their whole civilizational values from the planet will add to their woes in underworld too.

[Karna_A]

You cant do it unless you have 500-800 targetted at China. Lets hope India have already achieved these numbers in ready to go inventory or close enough in such numercial strength . The middle course is to strip Poaks from any Deeper Taller friends /relation providing cover to them. Once Puke know they will be alone in the game , Punjabi Muasalman's Hekri will disappear in no time. Subtle or overt display of capacity and threat of Obliterating their whole civilizational values from the planet will add to their woes in underworld too.

Nooking TSP in retaliation of Nooking India is like trying to prosecute computer virus instead of the person who coded the virus, and person who taught the coder how to write such a program.
You kill one virus after huge financial cost, the coder and his guru will create another one.

The Nookes and delivery systems were provided by Chipanda. Chipanda has to pay greater price for any misadventure. Any TSP nook on India should mean 2 on TSP and 3 on Chipanda and 4 on KSA.

Unless you eliminate the person who codes such viruses, just fighting individual viruses doesn't make any sense.

[shiv]

Attack on Pak will be attack on China: report

Attack by Pakistan is an attack by China on India.

Absolutely. I think there is a need to hit Beijing with Indian nuclear bombs in retaliation for any Pakistani nuclear attack on India. This statement from China (if true) brings out the stark reality that China is Pakistan's current father and lover.