India Nuclear News And Discussion

SwamyG · Post by **SwamyG** » 16 Mar 2011 21:41

Balance. That is the key. We should not jump with joy like a six-year would upon hearing the words "ice cream" on hearing "nuclear energy". And neither should we sulk like a six-year would upon hearing the words "karela" {bitter gourd}. The 'energy' could become a real WMD, and we should pause every now and then on its uses.

SwamyG · Post by **SwamyG** » 16 Mar 2011 22:06

Geologists raise concern over India's N-security

K.S. Valdiya, a renowned geologist at the Jawaharlal Nehru Centre for Advanced Scientific Research in Bangalore, is one of those who believe that complacence will be harmful.

According to C.P. Rajendran of the Centre for Earth Sciences at the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore, the biggest earthquake threat to India is from the Himalayas

This Vineet Gahalaut senior geologist at the National Geophysical Research Institute (NGRI) in Hyderabad:

Gahalaut added: "When death toll and economic losses in such a technologically advanced country like Japan may reach so high, imagine a country like India, where there is no law on building codes and almost no public awareness."

Vinod Gaur, a renowned seismologist and former director of NGRI, said that earthquake and tsunami threats are technologically manageable. However, "India's record of managing even low-intensity hazards is dismal".

For one time, a news article in Indian media that quotes several experts and not just one.

Amber G. · Post by **Amber G.** » 16 Mar 2011 22:30

(Ex?) BRFer Saurav in TOI:
PHWR is a better bet than BWR, in terms of safety.

Sanatanan · Post by **Sanatanan** » 16 Mar 2011 23:13

In page 72 of this thread smonath-ji wrote: There is this other notion doing the rounds that Indian PHWRs are somehow "superior" in design to LWRs in safety...Based on what?

Sorry for this long post. So many pages of this thread have flown by in the time I took to prepare this reply!! I have not had a chance to read recent posts even!!

My response to above quote:

Canada's "CANTEACH Project" has much resource material pertaining to CANDU design basics and design features which could be referred to by students. Virtually all of the concepts and information covered therein would be applicable to India's PHWR designs too. From these resources I have tried to collate information which might throw some light on the query quoted above. For brevity, I have given below only the relevant sentences that cover the aspect under discussion. All font decorations, mine.

1. CANDU Safety #17 - Severe Core Damage Accidents By Dr. V.G. Snell, Director Safety & Licensing
[quote]
Observations {applicable to CANDU}
* severe core damage in CANDU is very different from LWRs
* low power density (16 MW/Mg of fuel at full power)
* long heat-up times (hours)
* gradual collapse of the core into a coarse debris bed
* dispersion of the debris in the large calandria
– shallow molten pool about 1 metre deep
* presence of two large sources of water in or near the core
* potential to stop or slow down the accident at two points:
– channel boundary (moderator)
– calandria boundary (shield tank)

Conclusions {applicable to CANDU}
* severe accident mitigation requirements for new reactors stress the importance of two design measures:
– core debris spreading area
– ability to add water to cool debris
* CANDU has built them in: calandria spreads the debris, and shield tank provides cooling water
* long time scales allow for severe accident counter-measures and emergency planning
* some potential design enhancements for future plants:
– independent makeup to moderator and shield tank
– backup containment heat removal
[/quote]

2. Nuclear Power Symposium Lecture No 11: Accident Analysis By J. D Sainsbury, Head Safety Section
[quote]
This discussion of emergency cooling leads directly to one of the most significant safety features inherent in the pressure tube reactor. The heavy water moderator is contained In a stainless steel calandria vessel and separated by the calandria tubes from physical contact with the pressure tubes. This design confines the high temperature coolant to relatively small channels. The heavy water moderator and reflector which surround these channels are at a relatively low temperature and the pressure Is only a little above atmospheric. As a result, they act as a heat sink in the event of a reactor accident. This distributed heat sink in the core is an Important safety feature o[ the CANDU reactor because failure of emergency core cooling does not lead to a core melt-dcwn. This la not the case In pressure vessel reactors because both coolant and moderator are discharged through a pipe break. The very serious consequences of a core meltdown are a large part of the reason for concern about the reliability and effectiveness of emergency cooling systems in the pressure vessel reactors.[/quote]

3. Introduction to CANDU 6 - A Six Lecture Course - Overheads for a course presented at Xi'an Jiaotong University, 1998-09-22 to 25 by D.A. Meneley and Y.Q. Ruan, Lecture 5 Special Safety Systems

[quote]
{I have omitted the image of CANDU Reactor Lattice Cell here}

From this view of a cross-section of the CANDU fuel channel, it can be seen that the hot fuel is very close to the cool moderator water.

If the emergency core cooling does not work it becomes necessary to understand what will happen next in this core geometry, which is entirely different from the PWR geometry.

Many experiments, done over the past 20 years, show that this extreme accident situation is controlled inherently by this geometry. With no water in the channel, the decay heat raises the pressure tube temperature until it expands and touches the calandria tube. Heat then is transferred to the moderator water at a rate which guarantees that no fuel melting occurs.

Severe accidents in CANDU are, therefore, not so severe as they are in the PWR. It has been shown that controlled conditions can be maintained even under more severe conditions than this.[/quote]

4. Introduction to CANDU 6 - A Six Lecture Course - Overheads for a course presented at Xi'an Jiaotong University, 1998-09-22 to 25 by D.A. Meneley and Y.Q. Ruan Lecture 1 Comparison of PHWR and PWR

[quote]
* Reactor meltdown is almost impossible in the CANDU-PHWR

* Because PWR refuelling is done only once a year, a lot of extra enrichment must be put in to
balance reactivity loss during operation. The excess reactivity requires dissolved boron in the moderator - a possible safety hazard. {Now a days, apart from B in moderator, Gd is probably used in the fuel for balancing reactivity loss during operation.}

* The big pressure vessel is difficult to manufacture except in big, industrialized countries. Also, the pressure vessel is sensitive to local temperature changes, and to steel embrittlement in the long term.

* The power coefficient in PWR is strong and negative. Big control movements needed to raise power.

* Many operator actions are needed whenever a PWR is shut down -- these actions must be done precisely, on time. (A CANDU can be shut down to zero-power hot conditions by computer alone.)

* The neutron lifetime is short {In PWR}, so power increases very fast with positive reactivity addition.

* If coolant is lost from the reactor for any reason, the fuel melts very quickly {In PWR}. This is a big safety question.

* Here is shown a CANDU 6 reactor on the left and a PWR with approximately the lame output on the right. Each of these is drawn to the same scale. (I have omitted the figure here}

* The two reactors occupy about the same volume. The PWR core is more compact, but the surrounding pressure vessel uses a lot of space outside the core. Also, the top and bottom connections of instruments and control rods use even more space

* The low-pressure PHWR reactor tank is surrounded by a second tank filled with light water, which is used for radiation shielding. (As a result, the reactor vault in which the reactor is placed needs no water cooling to protect its concrete. All control rods, and instruments are placed m the low-pressure moderator.

* If a big accident happens, the CANDU reactor is surrounded by a large amount of cool water which can absorb fission decay heat over many hours. After a similar accident, emergency water must be supplied to the PWR immediately, to prevent fuel melting.[/quote]

5. I believe that BARC's 300 MWe AHWR has even more safety features incorporated than the conventional PHWR. One such aspect is: AHWR does not require any external equipment (pumps, diesel or electric driven) to cool the reactor in the shut down mode (remove decay heat), but depends only on natural forces such as thermo-syphon. I believe that thermo-syphon is the mode of heat removal even when the reactor is in normal operation, producing full power. I also understand that similar passive features are implemented in the design for containment cooling in the event of an accident. The AHWR is said to be capable of withstanding a "station blackout" (that is, all off-site and on-site electric power lost) condition for a much longer duration than the 540 MWe PHWRs at Tarapur 3 & 4.

Sanatanan · Post by **Sanatanan** » 16 Mar 2011 23:34

In page 72 of this thread vera_k-ji wrote: One thing is still not explained. The US nuclear industry paid a heavy price for Three Mile Island. Why is it that they haven't switched to PHWR tech by now? Just inertia? Certainly there are no proliferation concerns about building a HWR in the US.

As I remember, may be a few decades back, Canada did try to get its CANDU designs qualified for construction in the US. I believe that the nuclear manufacturing industry in the US effectively nixed this. I am tempted to think that unlike in India where we tend to denigrate whatever little our achievements we have had, in favour of "phoren" technology, (instead of persisting with it trying to become better and better at it) in most other countries they try to protect their investment (time, effort and money) in development of technology. Any way, by the time Canada attempted to get US certification for CANDU, US had lost interest in setting up new npps. Moreover, the US had large spare capacity for enrichment of Uranium and hence use of Nat U was not favoured by their commercial interests. Finally, US has not invested in large capacity Heavy water production and would have had to rely on Canada for importing this critical raw material.

I think that one technical reason why US nixed Canada may be that, the US nuclear industry had managed to get for itself regulatory design codes and guides that would suit its own manufacturing capacities as existed at that time. This would have tended to preclude licensing of CANDUs in their country -- for example, the manner in which the CANDU coolant tubes are mechanically fastened to their mating components would not be acceptable in the US as per American Nuclear Pressure Vessel Codes unless Canada was prepared to spend a lot of money in terms of experimentation and analyses to convince the Regulators to modify their design rules. Finally, the neutronics of CANDU has a feature looked down upon by the American Regulators. If interested, one can get more information on this aspect from these articles:

1) Safety and Liability (of CANDU)

2) Why do CANDU reactors have a "positive void coefficient"?

3) How do CANDU reactors meet high safety standards, despite having a "positive void coefficient"

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 16 Mar 2011 23:49

I just came back to check the thread, thanks Sanatanan!! I believe similar materials have been posted many a times before, but I am sure the question will be asked again.

Amber G. · Post by **Amber G.** » 16 Mar 2011 23:57

^^^Thanks for references.... I was just going to comment/ask about Candu positive-void coefficient (I mentioned about negative coefficient required by US law in another thread.- No expert on nuclear reactors - but I do know a little about nuclear physics) I remember at the time of Chernobyl, it was mentioned by all (then) that CANDU is a positive-void coefficient ( graphite moderated reactor at Chernobyl was also that - Russia changed the law after that).

(Have heard about how control rods may have independently powered electromagnets or gravity powered rods.. but still LOCO (loss of coolant) is serious enough to really think it through.

For perspective, if I am not mistaken (too lazy to check references right now, may be some one can correct me) a failure (LOCO, partial meltdown) in Sodium Reactor (experimental) in 1960's (or late 50's) in California actually released more (much more) radioactivity than Three Mile. (Unlike Three Mile, it did not became a big news then)

Editred: Just checked, my recollection is correct.
http://www.energy.ca.gov/nuclear/california.html
or:
http://www.etec.energy.gov/History/Majo ... ident.html
or
http://www.etec.energy.gov/library/SRE_ ... /sre-C.pdf
(Thanks google!)

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 Mar 2011 00:15

AmberG, Clinch River plant was a bigger Sodium cooled FBR that was not operationalised due to safety concerns during Carter admin.

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 17 Mar 2011 02:10

Japan-like scenario unlikely here, scientists tell Manmohan

http://www.hindu.com/2011/03/17/stories ... 791400.htm

Top officials of the nuclear establishment on Wednesday assured Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that a nuclear catastrophe similar to the one that is devastating Japan is most unlikely to happen here.

National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon said the officials noted at a meeting with the Prime Minister on Wednesday that the design of India's nuclear plants were different, as was its method of storing spent fuel.

...

However, Mr. Menon, who was interacting with journalists at the Indian Women's Press Corps here, added a cautionary note, stressing that it was an “evolving situation” and that the Indian scientists, who were asked what lessons could be learned from the Japanese experience, had said that they would continue closely studying the situation in Japan through a detailed review of the safety factors and come back with more “conclusive answers” later.

They were hoping to learn from it to further strengthen India's nuclear safety measures, Mr. Menon said.

Dr. Singh's meeting with the scientists comes two days after he announced in Parliament that he had ordered an immediate technical review of all safety systems of the country's nuclear plants by the DAE and its agencies, including the Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL), “particularly with a view to ensuring that they would be able to withstand the impact of large natural disasters such as tsunamis and earthquakes.”

Relook

Meanwhile, in the context of fresh fears about the proposed nuclear plant in Maharashtra's Jaitapur, Minister of State for Environment and Forests Jairam Ramesh said: “The NPCIL is relooking at its safety systems, relooking at the design. This appropriately is a subject that has to be dealt with by the AERB, and based on the technical reviews that the NPCIL does, additional safeguards will have to be built in as part of the environmental clearance.”

....

China Slows Nuclear Power Plans

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/17/world ... china.html

arnab · Post by **arnab** » 17 Mar 2011 03:49

Sanku wrote:
arnab wrote: scalability advantages offered by LWRs far outweigh any risks or any other comparable technology available today. And these cannot be replicated by any other energy 'cottage industry' - solar, gobar gas what have you. However you are entitled to your opinion.
You left out (as fully expected) the real scalability options, PWHRs, mega coal, et al.

But thats ok. The important thing is to stop the latest scam first.

Then why focus on MMS / America sirjee?

The real scamsters appear to be the Russia / NDA combine. Using your world view about LWRs being a scam, they are the only ones who would have made money so far and exposed indians to serious liability risk. Perhaps we need to redefine what constitues a 'nationalist' party

. Let us concentrate on breaking that contract first. What mega coal sir? is this different from 'clean coal' ? Does having a nuclear option preclude the use of coal (till it lasts anyway)? Is the scalable options for PWHR available today? Or do we twiddle our thumbs while we hope that the technology will become available?

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 17 Mar 2011 06:49

Flaming nuclear reactors + choking coal = natural gas boom

http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/po ... l_gas_boom

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 17 Mar 2011 07:07

EU energy chief wants regional nuclear "stress tests"

http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOil ... 7320110315

http://rothkopf.foreignpolicy.com/posts ... ear_future

Secretary Chu made it absolutely clear in remarks before the Congress, that while the U.S. must learn from the Japanese crisis, nuclear must remain part of America's on-going energy mix.

In addition, the apparent inability of the TEPCO managers to reach local fire and other emergency response officials due to the damage caused by the earthquake also suggests an area in which redundancies ought to be obligatory everywhere. The reality is that most of the new nuclear projects under way in the world today are in emerging markets, developing countries with fewer resources than in Japan. This is worrisome and the international community needs to recognize a special obligation not only to help set and maintain standards but to have rapid response capabilities in place to augment the ability of these countries to deal with emergencies.

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 17 Mar 2011 07:32

Sanatanan-ji,

On the point (LWR v/s PHWR), seems that the opinion is biased by the "source" of the info, as is perhaps to be expected...So Canada will obvioulsy sponsor "nicer things to say" about the CANDU design...There are contrary opinions as well..

1. http://www.usnuclearenergy.org/pdf_libr ... esigns.pdf

Inspectors of nuclear power plants have a preference for plants such as the LWRs that are refueled in batches rather than the continuous fueling of PHWRs. Batch refueling allows the fate of spent fuel to be more easily monitored and occurs at intervals of one to two years

Google should yield many more different perspectives...

To (my untrained mind), the key issue seems to be around active cooling systems, that depend on a dedicated power supply and passive cooling systems that dont...Obvioulsy in a natural catastrophe one would rely more on the latter...But the new gen LWRs, like Areva's PWR are doing exactly that, arent they?
http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downlo ... Teller.pdf

Not just AReva, but a lot of the so-called "third gen" LWRs are using the similar philosophies...
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf08.html

The greatest departure from second-generation designs is that many incorporate passive or inherent safety features* which require no active controls or operational intervention to avoid accidents in the event of malfunction, and may rely on gravity, natural convection or resistance to high temperatures.

* Traditional reactor safety systems are 'active' in the sense that they involve electrical or mechanical operation on command. Some engineered systems operate passively, eg pressure relief valves. They function without operator control and despite any loss of auxiliary power. Both require parallel redundant systems. Inherent or full passive safety depends only on physical phenomena such as convection, gravity or resistance to high temperatures, not on functioning of engineered components, but these terms are not properly used to characterise whole reactors.

So really, to argue whether PHWR is "better" in safety terms than LWR is perhaps disregarding the advances made in both types of tech...

Add that to actual data on "fatalities" on nuke reactor operations, as well as the scalability of the LWR designs, and the question becomes even more nebulous...

On fatalities, an interesting piece of data here..
http://www.iancas.org/April%202006.pdf
Abhishek-ji, you might want to note

Immediate fatalities for the period 1970-92, normalized to deaths per TWy of electricity generated is 342 for coal, 85 for natural gas, 883 for hydro and 8 for nuclear

So there is data that at least indicates that nuclear power is the "safest" mode of power generation...

Further, the question is not just about US certifications...EVen Europe, where the environmental movements have much greater poltiical say, LWRs have been worked upon and refined upon, in preference to PHWRs...South Korea stopped constructing any more CANDU types reactors some time back...

Finally, to be honest, our preference for PHWRs had nothing to do with safety per se...It was to cater to our state of infrastructure (PHWRs use Ntural Uranium compared to LWRs that need enriched Uranium - big factor in our limited enrichment capacity)..Also the fact that spent fuel from LWRs with imported fuel cannot be (legally at least) used for the strategic programme...And of course, the whole 3-cycle plan...Its a widely documented story, and safety almost never comes in as a variable...So putting that up as a "badge of honour" is a bit facile IMHO...

Lastly,

arnab wrote:Then why focus on MMS / America sirjee

Arnab-ji, this is a facetious discussion - MMS/America/favouritism/scam...In case anyone didnt notice, there isnt a single American reactor that is even under discussion yet for purchase...The ones that seem somewhere in discussions are the French AREVA and Russian (follow-up to the Kudunkulum) designs...Even more facetious is a discussion of coal v/s nuke v/s diesel (!!!!) with people who have no understanding of either electricity/energy economics or even basic scientific intuition, most importantly even a willingness to learn...

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 17 Mar 2011 07:35

The Dirt on Nuclear Power

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commen ... l1/English

Nuclear safety demands clarity about terms. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the United States generally separates unplanned nuclear “events” into two classes, “incidents” and “accidents.” Incidents are unforeseen events and technical failures that occur during normal plant operation and result in no off-site releases of radiation or severe damage to equipment. Accidents refer to either off-site releases of radiation or severe damage to plant equipment.

The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale uses a seven-level ranking scheme to rate the significance of nuclear and radiological events: levels 1-3 are “incidents,” and 4-7 are “accidents,” with a “Level 7 Major Accident” consisting of “a major release of radioactive material with widespread health and environmental effects requiring implementation of planned and extended countermeasures.”

Under these classifications, the number of nuclear accidents, even including the meltdowns at Fukushima Daiichi and Fukushima Daini, is low. But if one redefines an accident to include incidents that either resulted in the loss of human life or more than $50,000 in property damage, a very different picture emerges.

At least 99 nuclear accidents meeting this definition, totaling more than $20.5 billion in damages, occurred worldwide from 1952 to 2009 – or more than one incident and $330 million in damage every year, on average, for the past three decades. And, of course, this average does not include the Fukushima catastrophe.

Indeed, when compared to other energy sources, nuclear power ranks higher than oil, coal, and natural gas systems in terms of fatalities, second only to hydroelectric dams. There have been 57 accidents since the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. While only a few involved fatalities, those that did collectively killed more people than have died in commercial US airline accidents since 1982.

Another index of nuclear-power accidents – this one including costs beyond death and property damage, such as injured or irradiated workers and malfunctions that did not result in shutdowns or leaks – documented 956 incidents from 1942 to 2007. And yet another documented more than 30,000 mishaps at US nuclear-power plants alone, many with the potential to have caused serious meltdowns, between the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania and 2009.

Mistakes are not limited to reactor sites. Accidents at the Savannah River reprocessing plant released ten times as much radioiodine as the accident at Three Mile Island, and a fire at the Gulf United facility in New York in 1972 scattered an undisclosed amount of plutonium, forcing the plant to shut down permanently.

At the Mayak Industrial Reprocessing Complex in Russia’s southern Urals, a storage tank holding nitrate acetate salts exploded in 1957, releasing a massive amount of radioactive material over 20,000 square kilometers, forcing the evacuation of 272,000 people. In September 1994, an explosion at Indonesia’s Serpong research reactor was triggered by the ignition of methane gas that had seeped from a storage room and exploded when a worker lit a cigarette.

Accidents have also occurred when nuclear reactors are shut down for refueling or to move spent nuclear fuel into storage. In 1999, operators loading spent fuel into dry-storage at the Trojan Reactor in Oregon found that the protective zinc-carbon coating had started to produce hydrogen, which caused a small explosion.

Unfortunately, on-site accidents at nuclear reactors and fuel facilities are not the only cause of concern. The August 2003 blackout in the northeastern US revealed that more than a dozen nuclear reactors in the US and Canada were not properly maintaining backup diesel generators. In Ontario during the blackout, reactors designed to unlink from the grid automatically and remain in standby mode instead went into full shutdown, with only two of twelve reactors behaving as expected.

As environmental lawyers Richard Webster and Julie LeMense argued in 2008, “the nuclear industry…is like the financial industry was prior to the crisis” that erupted that year. “[T]here are many risks that are not being properly managed or regulated.”

This state of affairs is worrying, to say the least, given the severity of harm that a single serious accident can cause. The meltdown of a 500-megawatt reactor located 30 miles from a city would cause the immediate death of an estimated 45,000 people, injure roughly another 70,000, and cause $17 billion in property damage.

A successful attack or accident at the Indian Point power plant near New York City, apparently part of Al Qaeda’s original plan for September 11, 2001, would have resulted in 43,700 immediate fatalities and 518,000 cancer deaths, with cleanup costs reaching $2 trillion.

To put a serious accident in context, according to data from my forthcoming book Contesting the Future of Nuclear Power, if 10 million people were exposed to radiation from a complete nuclear meltdown (the containment structures fail completely, exposing the inner reactor core to air), about 100,000 would die from acute radiation sickness within six weeks. About 50,000 would experience acute breathlessness, and 240,000 would develop acute hypothyroidism. About 350,000 males would be temporarily sterile, 100,000 women would stop menstruating, and 100,000 children would be born with cognitive deficiencies. There would be thousands of spontaneous abortions and more than 300,000 later cancers.

...

Benjamin K. Sovacool, a professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, is the author of Contesting the Future of Nuclear Power and co-author of the forthcoming The International Politics of Nuclear Power.

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 17 Mar 2011 07:42

somnath wrote: Abhishek-ji, you might want to note

I have noted. I just do not understand why the question of calculating full costs causes so much takleef, if the data would suggest that we should use more nuclear power. Since nuclear energy is very safe, you guys should be more than happy to analyse and compare it with other sources. Instead I just get arguments (e.g., "costs should be shared by the society", "we do not have numbers, we cannot calculate full risks") which suggest that we are pushing things under the carpet.

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 17 Mar 2011 07:49

^^^Not at all...Just that no enterprise can be set up (not just nuke plants) with costs of black swan events built in...Mathematically impossible to estimate the costs with impute probabilities....

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 17 Mar 2011 07:51

somnath wrote:^^^Not at all...Just that no enterprise can be set up (not just nuke plants) with costs of black swan events built in...Mathematically impossible to estimate the costs with impute probabilities....

Right. That is why we should assume that these events occur with probability zero.

vera_k · Post by **vera_k** » 17 Mar 2011 07:53

somnath wrote:Not just AReva, but a lot of the so-called "third gen" LWRs are using the similar philosophies...
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf08.html

This report says the EPR design wouldn't have protected against this type of accident. Check the post-shutdown decay heat removal table. The only designs listed are APR1400, CAREM-25, SWR 1000, ABWR-II, AHWR, IRIS, VK-300, ACR-700.

http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downlo ... Paper5.pdf

arnab · Post by **arnab** » 17 Mar 2011 07:56

abhishek_sharma wrote:
somnath wrote:^^^Not at all...Just that no enterprise can be set up (not just nuke plants) with costs of black swan events built in...Mathematically impossible to estimate the costs with impute probabilities....
Right. That is why we should assume that these events occur with probability zero.

Why???

'cannot be estimated' != 'cannot occur'

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 17 Mar 2011 08:12

It is interesting that many firms do not acknowledge stock options as an expense until they are "exercised" to improve their balance sheet. In that case too, the argument is "we do not know what it will cost us". It is clear that their value is not zero. Otherwise no one would want them.

So hiding behind "lack of information/knowledge" is not surprising. This type of "creative" accounting is very common for finance kids.

arnab: The argument is "We do not know the probabilities, we will not include them, we will not use rough estimates." This implies that they are not included in the calculations.

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 17 Mar 2011 08:19

Tarapur reactor like Japan’s, but safer: atomic energy chief

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/tarap ... ef/763561/

arnab · Post by **arnab** » 17 Mar 2011 08:24

abhishek_sharma wrote:arnab: The argument is "We do not know the probabilities, we will not include them, we will not use rough estimates." This implies that they are not included in the calculations.

Calculations for what? If the cost-benefit analysis is about building a nuke plant or a massive hydroelectric dam. The catastrophic consequence of a melt down or a dam collapse is assumed to be negligible because you try to anticipate and cater for such eventualities 'to the best of your knowledge and available technology at the time'. So benefit > cost based on the risk.

However, if the analysis is about a 'blank cheque insurance' policy in case of a catastrophic event occuring, the insurance companies will either want a premium to cover these events (however unlikely) or will simply not offer the cover. Since they are not in the business of charity (therfore it falls on society aka govt to do the needful).

I don't think 'stock options' based on estimated profits and an unlimited insurance payouts are comparable. The former will never take the firm to the cleaners, the latter is a payout after all other financial liabilities have been taken into account.

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 17 Mar 2011 08:26

vera_k wrote:This report says the EPR design wouldn't have protected against this type of accident. Check the post-shutdown decay heat removal table. The only designs listed are APR1400, CAREM-25, SWR 1000, ABWR-II, AHWR, IRIS, VK-300, ACR-700

Vera_k-ji, its an interesting compliation...Though its a bit too little in terms of info to conclude that "EPR design wouldn't have protected against this type of accident"...For example, the EPR design is encased inside two layers, compared to one in the Fukushima reactors...The design compromises are different for different designs I guess- for example, the EPR seems to have incorporated more features to absorb missile shots...The final analysis of which design is more robust againt what outcome is therefore inconclusive...

And one comment on the AHWR - its not an operational design, not yet...It currently claims to incorporate every single safety mechanism conceiveable (as per the report)...We need to see what that trasnlates into in terms of economics of power generated from the design...

abhishek_sharma wrote:It is interesting that many firms do not acknowledge stock options as an expense until they are "exercised" to improve their balance sheet. In that case too, the argument is "we do not know what it will cost us". It is clear that their value is not zero. Otherwise no one would want them

Sorry, thats NOT true..All stock options granted need to be expensed out in the same year - there are clearly laid down rules in all countries on how they need to be done..and it is something that can be achieved with reasonable amount of accuracy...

dont see how stock options and black swan events are related - unless stock options today are equivalnet of black swans

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 17 Mar 2011 08:32

arnab wrote: Calculations for what? If the cost-benefit analysis is about building a nuke plant or a massive hydroelectric dam. The catastrophic consequence of a melt down or a dam collapse is assumed to be negligible because you try to anticipate and cater for such eventualities 'to the best of your knowledge and available technology at the time'. So benefit > cost based on the risk.

However, if the analysis is about a 'blank cheque insurance' policy in case of a catastrophic event occuring, the insurance companies will either want a premium to cover these events (however unlikely) or will simply not offer the cover. Since they are not in the business of charity (therfore it falls on society aka govt to do the needful).

I don't think 'stock options' based on estimated profits and an unlimited insurance payouts are comparable. The former will never take the firm to the cleaners, the latter is a payout after all other financial liabilities have been taken into account.

Even if the probabilities are negligible, we should include them (for both dams and nuclear). Since the liability is huge, probability*liability is finite and substantial. I understand that our knowledge about these issues is imperfect, but we could improve it over time.

I have already said that we should pass the costs to the customer. So that we know the true costs of all sources of energy. I have repeatedly stated that it is possible that nuclear energy could come out with flying colors.

The 'stock option' case is comparable because in both cases, people are trying to hide their costs for gaining advantage over others.

GuruPrabhu · Post by **GuruPrabhu** » 17 Mar 2011 08:33

arnab wrote:
Sanku wrote: You left out (as fully expected) the real scalability options, PWHRs, mega coal, et al.

But thats ok. The important thing is to stop the latest scam first.
Then why focus on MMS / America sirjee? The real scamsters appear to be the Russia / NDA combine. Using your world view about LWRs being a scam, they are the only ones who would have made money so far and exposed indians to serious liability risk.

Thanks, arnab, for bringing out the logic of the situation. However, it will be lost on the holier than thou individual

arnab · Post by **arnab** » 17 Mar 2011 08:34

abhishek_sharma wrote:Tarapur reactor like Japan’s, but safer: atomic energy chief

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/tarap ... ef/763561/

From the above link by abhishek

“There is no human activity in which we can say that we are totally free from any possibility of an accident. It is a question of judgement of what is the probability of an accident and what are the benefits,” he said, pointing out that in the 60-year history of nuclear power generation, only about 55 people had died in incidents involving radiation or nuclear accidents.

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 17 Mar 2011 08:36

somnath wrote: Sorry, thats NOT true..All stock options granted need to be expensed out in the same year - there are clearly laid down rules in all countries on how they need to be done..and it is something that can be achieved with reasonable amount of accuracy...

See this book written by a Nobel-prize winner. It has a whole chapter on this issue. (page 115-139).

somnath wrote: dont see how stock options and black swan events are related - unless stock options today are equivalnet of black swans

See response to arnab.

vera_k · Post by **vera_k** » 17 Mar 2011 08:46

somnath wrote:Vera_k-ji, its an interesting compliation...Though its a bit too little in terms of info to conclude that "EPR design wouldn't have protected against this type of accident"...For example, the EPR design is encased inside two layers, compared to one in the Fukushima reactors...The design compromises are different for different designs I guess- for example, the EPR seems to have incorporated more features to absorb missile shots...The final analysis of which design is more robust againt what outcome is therefore inconclusive...

To be more precise, the EPR would meltdown in a power loss situation. The other designs would not.

somnath wrote: And one comment on the AHWR - its not an operational design, not yet...It currently claims to incorporate every single safety mechanism conceiveable (as per the report)...We need to see what that trasnlates into in terms of economics of power generated from the design...

By this logic, we have to wait for the EPR as well, since it is not operational either

. But yes, the AHWR is unlikely to be of immediate help because the size is so small. The South Korean design looks promising though. There's also the Canadian cousin to the AHWR.

arnab · Post by **arnab** » 17 Mar 2011 08:48

abhishek_sharma wrote: Even if the probabilities are negligible, we should include them (for both dams and nuclear). Since the liability is huge, probability*liability is finite and substantial. I understand that our knowledge about these issues is imperfect, but we could improve it over time.

I have already said that we should pass the costs to the customer. So that we know the true costs of all sources of energy. I have repeatedly stated that it is possible that nuclear energy could come out with flying colors.

The 'stock option' case is comparable because in both cases, people are trying to hide their costs for gaining advantage over others.

Well I don't know, but from your above statement: negligible*huge = ?, still does not give me a quantifiable number

So exactly what advantage does GOI gain by hiding the true cost of building say the bhakra nangal dam (by ignoring the possibility of its collapse)? What about 'true benefits' - the hospitals / homes lit - lives saved, education provided, food grown? Exactly at what point do you stop counting advantages (or costs). I'm sure millions of gobar gas plants would have generated the same amount of electricity without destroying the environment / hinterland that the dam undoubtedly did. So why have the dam at all? gobar gas is far less risky.

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 17 Mar 2011 08:52

arnab wrote: So exactly what advantage does GOI gain by hiding the true cost of building say the bhakra nangal dam (by ignoring the possibility of its collapse)?

I guess the GoI cannot pay suitable compensation if it collapses. We could have used the surcharge to build a huge reserve for the compensation.

If the dam/reactor never malfunctions/collapses, then the amount is not lost. The GoI could use it for some other purpose.

Example: 0.0000001 * 500000000 = 50 (regarding that negligible * huge question)

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 17 Mar 2011 08:56

Jairam admits conflict of interest in N-development

http://www.hindustantimes.com/Jairam-ad ... 74205.aspx

arnab · Post by **arnab** » 17 Mar 2011 08:59

abhishek_sharma wrote:
arnab wrote: So exactly what advantage does GOI gain by hiding the true cost of building say the bhakra nangal dam (by ignoring the possibility of its collapse)?
I guess the GoI cannot pay suitable compensation if it collapses. We could have used the surcharge to build a huge reserve for the compensation.

If the dam/reactor never malfunctions/collapses, then the amount is not lost. The GoI could use it for some other purpose.

Example: 0.0000001 * 500000000 = 50 (regarding that negligible * huge question)

What are the basis for those numbers? Why should we take them to be correct?

I don't understand how GOI would have used 'reserves'. What reserves? You are proposing that GOI (as owner of the asset) takes out insurance on the bhakra nangal dam. The insurance co quotes a huge premium (because of black swan). The GOI funds this premium through imposing a surcharge on the potential affectees / consumers. So where is a 'reserve' being generated? We are just raising the cost of doing business based on an unlikely event. GOI is better off not building the dam as are the people who are being forced to pay the premium.

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 17 Mar 2011 09:02

abhishek_sharma wrote: See this book written by a Nobel-prize winner. It has a whole chapter on this issue. (page 115-139).

Its an old book abhishek-ji...In the '90s, stock options were a novelty, and no one really knew how to value them..So their ttreatment was all over the place...All of that changed in the late '90s...Stock options valuations are very very stringently applied by regulators now - just go through the annual report of any large company - you will get details on how they have expensed options granted in a year..

vera_k wrote:To be more precise, the EPR would meltdown in a power loss situation.

Cant conclude that at all...

This is another perspective..
http://www.epr-reactor.co.uk/ssmod/libl ... eering.pdf

The design compromises between various active/pasive systems are calibrated well there...Passive systems are no "silve bullets" - implementation of various systems will need other compromises that might jeopardise some other aspect of plant safety...

This is what AEC has to say about EPR..
http://www.hindu.com/2011/03/15/stories ... 601400.htm

S.P. Bhardwaj, director (technical) NPCIL said EPR had four independent systems of safety features and the control system had improved. It was also pointed out that the one of the main reasons for choosing Jaitapur was that the location was 25 metres above sea level. EPR was the third or third-plus generation of reactors and even if an aircraft crashed into it, it would be safe, Dr. Banerjee said. It had a lot of diverse systems and its design was based on the several reactors operating in Germany and France

as for operationalisation, must say that the operationalisation of EPR is at a FAR more advanced stage than AHWR!

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 17 Mar 2011 09:07

arnab wrote:GOI is better off not building the dam as are the people who are being forced to pay the premium.

That is precisely true...Its done by many companies as well..In my bank in India for example, the company-owned cars given as perks to employees do not have any motor insurance, as the bank found out that motor insurance premia outstripped total claims! So it makes sense for the bank to simply re-imburse claims on a "pay as you go" basis...It works out better for the employee too, as all clims are refunded in full, rather than with depreciaiton in normal insurance

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 17 Mar 2011 09:17

somnath wrote: Its an old book abhishek-ji...In the '90s, stock options were a novelty, and no one really knew how to value them..So their ttreatment was all over the place...All of that changed in the late '90s...Stock options valuations are very very stringently applied by regulators now - just go through the annual report of any large company - you will get details on how they have expensed options granted in a year..

I don't think it changed in late 90s. The book cites how Microsoft, Yahoo, Cisco, Starbucks and Intel boosted their profits in 2001 (using these techniques). It was an issue in 2000 elections in US. The book was published in 2003.

If it had changed in late 1990s, then many firms would not have not collapsed in the dot com burst. This creative accounting was an important factor. A new law was passed in 2002, but Stglitiz believes that it is not enough.

vera_k · Post by **vera_k** » 17 Mar 2011 09:21

somnath wrote:This is another perspective..
http://www.epr-reactor.co.uk/ssmod/libl ... eering.pdf

The design compromises between various active/pasive systems are calibrated well there...Passive systems are no "silve bullets" - implementation of various systems will need other compromises that might jeopardise some other aspect of plant safety...

It says they rejected the passive cooling system in favour of relying on better containment when meltdown occurs.

Although the passive RHR system has the potential advantage of easy operation, it was not retained for the EPR because it failed to meet the criteria of design simplicity or to achieve an adequate safety improvement.

somnath wrote:This is what AEC has to say about EPR..

The thing that is strange about this response from the AEC is that it does a fine job of avoiding the question of what happens to the EPR in a power loss situation.

somnath wrote:as for operationalisation, must say that the operationalisation of EPR is at a FAR more advanced stage than AHWR!

Bringing up the AHWR is a red herring. Any one of the designs that can passively handle shutdown heat removal would do.

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 17 Mar 2011 09:29

arnab wrote: What are the basis for those numbers? Why should we take them to be correct?

? We are arguing in circles now. It was argued yesterday that we can get these estimates from reliability engineering and scientists who study earthquakes. These will be rough estimates, so we can over/underestimate the dangers. But it is still better than assuming a probability of zero.

arnab wrote: I don't understand how GOI would have used 'reserves'. What reserves? You are proposing that GOI (as owner of the asset) takes out insurance on the bhakra nangal dam. The insurance co quotes a huge premium (because of black swan). The GOI funds this premium through imposing a surcharge on the potential affectees / consumers. So where is a 'reserve' being generated? We are just raising the cost of doing business based on an unlikely event. GOI is better off not building the dam as are the people who are being forced to pay the premium.

Why is it so difficult to understand? I did not say insurance. Yesterday, I explained with a toy example that a surcharge (based on liability calculation) should be added to the electricity cost. The surcharge would go to the government. If an accident happens, the reserves from this surcharge would be used for compensation. If there is no accident, then it could be used for other purposes.

If our probabilities are way off the mark, then it would lead to "distortions". On the other hand, if we could estimate them correctly, then we are closer to the true cost of electricity and the victims would get fair compensation. Is that too bad?

This should be done for all sources of electricity, not just nuclear.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 17 Mar 2011 09:49

arnab wrote: Then why focus on MMS / America sirjee? The real scamsters appear to be the Russia / NDA combine.

Because of this dear boy, because of this. If a person is not a congress Shill, the fact that this govt is selling India down the river is obvious to the blindest, and diversonary tactics are pointless.

putnanja wrote:Satish Sharma aide showed U.S. Embassy employee cash to be used as ‘pay-offs’ in confidence vote

Wasn't Sant Chatwal given padma award last year? For services to the congress party

And why the need to tell Americans that buy out plans were in place? Clearly it was their own money their hired minions were showing them to explain the sell off was in place.

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 17 Mar 2011 09:54

About Earthquakes in India: Be very scared

http://www.hindustantimes.com/Be-very-s ... 74221.aspx

arnab · Post by **arnab** » 17 Mar 2011 09:57

Sanku wrote:
arnab wrote: Then why focus on MMS / America sirjee? The real scamsters appear to be the Russia / NDA combine.

Because of this dear boy, because of this. If a person is not a congress Shill, the fact that this govt is selling India down the river is obvious to the blindest, and diversonary tactics are pointless.

May be they are

but if anyone has sold us down the river wrt to LWR it has to be the NDA / Russian combo, right? We are talking about India right? not whether one is a BJP shill / Russian shill or a congress shill

So shouldn't we examine sell outs on a case by case basis?