India Nuclear News And Discussion

[arnab]

? We are arguing in circles now. It was argued yesterday that we can get these estimates from reliability engineering and scientists who study earthquakes. These will be rough estimates, so we can over/underestimate the dangers. But it is still better than assuming a probability of zero.

Why is it so difficult to understand? I did not say insurance. Yesterday, I explained with a toy example that a surcharge (based on liability calculation) should be added to the electricity cost. The surcharge would go to the government. If an accident happens, the reserves from this surcharge would be used for compensation. If there is no accident, then it could be used for other purposes.

If our probabilities are way off the mark, then it would lead to "distortions". On the other hand, if we could estimate them correctly, then we are closer to the true cost of electricity and the victims would get fair compensation. Is that too bad?

This should be done for all sources of electricity, not just nuclear.

Didn't you read the interview of the USGS scientist I put up on the reliability of predicting earthquakes?

Sir why complicate all this issue about surcharges etc - when all this will merely be a recipe for further increase of the administrative burden, corruption, litigation & complication about what is the amount of surcharge each individual must bear (obviously everyone shouldn't pay the same amount). Isn't it better if GOI indemnifies catastrophic costs rather than imposing these on citizens? And then every citizen gains a greater benefit from the activity?

[abhishek_sharma]

I disagree. Let us move on.

[arnab]

I disagree. Let us move on.

fair enough. Just as an aside, I was reading the other day that in India the 'Department of Salt' (yes it exists) spent Rs 17 crore in administrative expenses to collect Rs 3 crore of salt cess. So hope you understand the context.

[Sanku]

May be they are but if anyone has sold us down the river wrt to LWR it has to be the NDA / Russian combo, right? We are talking about India right? not whether one is a BJP shill / Russian shill or a congress shill So shouldn't we examine sell outs on a case by case basis?

Oh no Sir-ji; this is last ditch pointless effort, the whole LWR issue came up primarily due to the sell out called 123.

Here is Bramha Chellany pointing out more OBVIOUS truths poor shills they will have to spin more now

http://www.livemint.com/2011/03/1621361 ... F.html?h=B

The spectre of India’s Fukushimas

India’s imported plants—the US-built Tarapur and the much-delayed, Russian-supplied Kundankulam—are located by the ocean, as are all the new nuclear parks. All the foreign-origin plants, including the planned imports, are light water reactors (LWRs). These, with their once-through cooling process, are the greatest water guzzlers in the world. Building LWRs inland in water-stressed India is thus not a viable option. But despite a large coastline, India has no suitable vacant seaside sites for LWRs. Building nuclear plants by the seashore thus means displacing residents and running into grassroots opposition, as symbolized by Jaitapur, Haripur and Mithi Virdi. And as the late-2004 Indian Ocean tsunami showed by inundating and shutting down the Madras Atomic Power Station, seaside reactors are vulnerable to natural disasters. This could be a serious concern going forward: A climate change-driven paradigm will not only make storms, hurricanes and tsunamis more frequent, but also lead to a rise in ocean levels, making seaside reactors even more vulnerable.

[arnab]

Oh no Sir-ji; this is last ditch pointless effort, the whole LWR issue came up primarily due to the sell out called 123.

How? Do LWRs become magically safer without 123?

[Sanku]

Oh no Sir-ji; this is last ditch pointless effort, the whole LWR issue came up primarily due to the sell out called 123.

How? Do LWRs become magically safer without 123?

Sir-jee LWRs were not coming in, in any numbers without 123. I thought the obvious did not need to be spelled out.

Guess not though.

[Sanku]

Oh no Sir-ji; this is last ditch pointless effort, the whole LWR issue came up primarily due to the sell out called 123.

How? Do LWRs become magically safer without 123?

And while you are at it, lets blame Homi Bhabha for sell out for getting Tarapur too, after all that was also a LWR.


No boss, the difference between one and 100000000000000000 is not lost on anyone.

[arnab]

Sir-jee LWRs were not coming in, in any numbers without 123. I thought the obvious did not need to be spelled out.

Guess not though.

but Russian LWRs came in without 123 right (with full Indian liability, despite Chernobyl)? That was a sellout no?

[Sanku]

Sir-jee LWRs were not coming in, in any numbers without 123. I thought the obvious did not need to be spelled out.

Guess not though.

but Russian LWRs came in without 123 right (with full Indian liability, despite Chernobyl)? That was a sellout no?

As much as one tarapur was. You are deliberately not looking at the reality. One vs 1000000000000000000000000000.

[arnab]

As much as one tarapur was. You are deliberately not looking at the reality. One vs 1000000000000000000000000000.

tarapur predated chernobyl, NDA accepted full liability even after knowing the consequences of chernobyl, right? Incidentally, your world view says LWR is unsafe, so in your world view Bhabha should be a sell out, right?

[GuruPrabhu]

arnab saar, my apologies, but did you miss this post of mine?

Thanks, arnab, for bringing out the logic of the situation. However, it will be lost on the holier than thou individual

[Sanku]

tarapur predated chernobyl, NDA accepted full liability even after knowing the consequences of chernobyl, right? Incidentally, your world view says LWR is unsafe, so in your world view Bhabha should be a sell out, right?

You see the issues involved with LWR did not need a Chernobyl to be known (to some here maybe but we are talking of intelligent well informed people)

Tarapur was bought as ONE OFF case in 40 years, exactly like the other thingy you are so bothered about.

Trying to compare one off decision to a systematic destruction of Indian nuclear policy is well --

laughable

to say the least.

[abhishek_sharma]

Regarding Three Mile Accident: One US politician was saying on TV that no one was able to prove in court that their relative died due to radiation. The trial lawyers were that "good".

So all this discussion about liability is maaya onlee.

[somnath]

As the Jaitapur project is in the eye of most criticisms, some reactions from the atomic energy establishment..

http://www.deccanherald.com/content/146 ... tists.html

[Sanku]

OK. So what are the lessons you see in this disaster that are applicable to India?

Sir; the ones also on Nuke thread

1) Use only AHWR/PHWR.
2) Always reprocess fuel
3) Drill for the worst, regularly, evacuation plans etc etc.
4) Have a independent watch dog over all nuclear entities, basically two equally powerful Nuclear Czars to maintain checks and balances
5) Have public (under RTI) safety audit of all plants which are in civilian space (which IAEA can access)
6) Have a massive public awareness and safety equipment distributed in open public space around the plant. The people around the plant should KNOW transparently all key parameters that effects them.

===========

PS> Dont trust IAEA and other alliances one single phooti kaudi; for any practical help; none of them will be remotely visible after the yellowcake hits the fan. They are only snoops to inform others of where you are. They have zero utility in terms of actually helping practically.

[ramana]

Pioneer Op-Ed

We dont need nuke plants

[arnab]

You see the issues involved with LWR did not need a Chernobyl to be known (to some here maybe but we are talking of intelligent well informed people)

Tarapur was bought as ONE OFF case in 40 years, exactly like the other thingy you are so bothered about.

Trying to compare one off decision to a systematic destruction of Indian nuclear policy is well --

laughable

to say the least.

Ok so maybe Bhabha wasn't intelligent or well informed Fukishima can also be argued as a one off case? right? If Tarapur was one off, the Russian LWRs bought by NDA would be the second such instance, right? Why did such 'intelligent and all knowing' people have to sell out India by accepting the risk of full liability despite knowing chernobyl happenned?

[arnab]

Bringing up the AHWR is a red herring. Any one of the designs that can passively handle shutdown heat removal would do.

This tells us that EPRs are able to passively handle heat removal.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/5165182.stm

The characteristics of Generation III+ designs include:


Modular construction - components are built elsewhere and shipped to the reactor site Evolutionary design - years of experience operating reactors has allowed engineers to simplify designs and cut construction and generation costs, while improving safety measures Passive safety features - in the event of a "severe accident", safety systems use natural forces such as gravity, circulation and evaporation, rather than "active" systems such as pumps, motors and valves Waste - industry experts say the new more efficient reactors, over their design lives, will generate only 10% of the waste the UK's entire nuclear sector has produced to date

[somnath]

Arnab,

Passive systems are no panacea...There are always design compromises to be made, and decisiosn maken between costs, increased margin of safety and operating ease...

I posted a link earlier - it has a pretty clear exposition of the sort of discussions and decisions taken on the various safety systems, including passive ones, in EPR UK...Posting again..

http://www.epr-reactor.co.uk/ssmod/libl ... eering.pdf

[arnab]

Arnab,

Passive systems are no panacea...There are always design compromises to be made, and decisiosn maken between costs, increased margin of safety and operating ease...

I posted a link earlier - it has a pretty clear exposition of the sort of discussions and decisions taken on the various safety systems, including passive ones, in EPR UK...Posting again..

http://www.epr-reactor.co.uk/ssmod/libl ... eering.pdf

I agree , but it is 'one more' redundency that is built in. So in that sense more is better (ceterus paribus). However it makes more sense to analyse systems rather than randomly claim (P)HWR is superior to LWR without telling us why

[vera_k]

This tells us that EPRs are able to passively handle heat removal.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/5165182.stm

There's differences in the Gen III+ designs, so taking a general blurb about Gen III+ designs and using it for the EPR is misleading.

According to the IAEA document, the EPR is not classified to have passive shutdown heat removal. Other designs are. Now it may be possible to retrofit the EPR design with passive systems like the BWRs at Tarapur reportedly have been, but the question needs to be examined afresh.

[arnab]

There's differences in the Gen III+ designs, so taking a general blurb about Gen III+ designs and using it for the EPR is misleading.

According to the IAEA document, the EPR is not classified to have passive shutdown heat removal. Other designs are. Now it may be possible to retrofit the EPR design with passive systems like the BWRs at Tarapur reportedly have been, but the question needs to be examined afresh.

Check Slides 13 and 14 in this presentation

http://www.ne.doe.gov/pdffiles/eprttsus ... atures.pdf

p.s Incidentally that BBC link also lists EPR as one of the contenders for the UK nuke industry Gen III+ reactors.

[vera_k]

Check Slides 13 and 14 in this presentation

http://www.ne.doe.gov/pdffiles/eprttsus ... atures.pdf

It says that active cooling would be needed after half a day.

Active cooling is not required for ~12 hours to maintain containment pressure within design limits

[arnab]

Check Slides 13 and 14 in this presentation

http://www.ne.doe.gov/pdffiles/eprttsus ... atures.pdf

It says that active cooling would be needed after half a day.

Active cooling is not required for ~12 hours to maintain containment pressure within design limits

True - it is a design issue. Presumably if you increase the cooling area you can increase the time to > 12 hours. Need to weigh costs vs benefits I suppose. Can the other reactors (those certified by IAEA) completely dispense with the active cooling features?

[somnath]

It says that active cooling would be needed after half a day.

Vera-ji, that is true for any passive system...I dont think any passive system can work ad infinitum in cooling a nuclear core..If it were possible, then even on a BAU basis, there would be no need for an active cooling system! Just scale up the scope of the passive cooling enough in order to achive the objective even when the reactor is running...

For any industrial system (any system), things cannot be stated in absolutes...Everything has a "capacity", and will fail in case it is stretched beyond that capacity...

[vera_k]

Some of the designs are getting there, so it may just be a matter of some more design and engineering. That doe.gov site posted earlier is a treasure trove. Check out this one that claims to have more than 72 hr passive cooling.

ESBWR design parameters
AP1000 design

[arnab]

Some of the designs are getting there, so it may just be a matter of some more design and engineering. That doe.gov site posted earlier is a treasure trove. Check out this one that claims to have more than 72 hr passive cooling.

ESBWR design parameters
AP1000 design

Yes they look good. But they are US models (GE & Westinghouse), so folks might get an allergic reaction from these May be stick to EPR.

[vera_k]

The Westinghouse design is the one selected for Gujarat.

[somnath]

^^^Yes, the designs at least look good..

I didnt know that Westinghouse has alreay been "selected"...If yes, it only fimrs up the view that India is going in for as many different LWR tech platforms as possible..There areflipsides to that, but the gains on tech absorption will be enormous...

[abhishek_sharma]

React on reactors: MV Ramana and Suvrat Raju

http://www.hindustantimes.com/React-on- ... 74637.aspx

[ramana]

Westinghouse is the original PWR supplier in US. The others were Combustion Engineering and Babcock and Wilcox who both left the business.

Westinghouse tech was licensed to KWU of Germany and Areva in France.

[abhishek_sharma]

We should probably see that our reactors are not similar to these:

Fukushima wasn't the only nuclear accident waiting to happen. From Bulgaria to New York, here are five other nuclear power plants to keep an eye on.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2 ... tomic_dogs

[Murugan]

This is very disturbing piece of Report from Brahma Chellaney

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/new ... ms?curpg=1

Ghost Return to Haunt Nuke Deal

The unfolding nuclear disaster in Japan actually is a Made-in-USA crisis: All six of the reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi plant were made by General Electric . The prototype of this reactor model - known as the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Mark I - was supplied to India by GE, which built the twin-reactor Tarapur station in the 1960s on a turnkey basis. Tarapur, one of the world's oldest operating nuclear plants, has some of the same risk factors that played a role at Fukushima.

Since the Fukushima crisis erupted, several countries have announced steps to scale back or review nuclear power, with Germany temporarily shutting down seven of its pre-1980 plants and Switzerland suspending plans to build and replace nuclear reactors. Even China, known for its lack of respect for safety issues, has announced that it is suspending new plant approvals until it could strengthen safety standards.

In contrast, New Delhi's response has been to launch a public-relations campaign to say Indian nuclear plants are safe and secure. The very persons who blurred the line between fact and fiction in the debate over the controversial Indo-US nuclear deal are again engaging in casuistry.

A smarter, wiser and more-credible course for authorities would be to acknowledge that, given the gravity of the Fukushima crisis, India must review its nuclear-power policy and systems to ensure that long-term risks of nuclear accidents are contained.

To be sure, India - given its low per capita energy consumption -needs to generate far more electricity to economically advance. So it must tap all sources of power, including safe and cost-competitive nuclear power.

The consequences of a nuclear accident in a large, densely populated country like India are going to be greater than Japan. The economics of reactor imports is also a key issue because the Indian taxpayer must not be burdened with more subsidies.

Yet those who pushed the nuclear deal through without building a national consensus are now too invested in that deal to be able to take an objective view of cost competitiveness and long-term safety. One indication of that has been the brazen manner in which a nuclear park has been exclusively reserved, without inviting bids, for each of the four chosen foreign vendors.

The WikiLeaks disclosures over the cash-for-votes scandal only confirm what has been well known - the role of big money in lubricating the nuclear deal. Now big money is influencing the opaque contract making.

Still, India's nuclear safety - and the wisdom of a massive import-based expansion - will now come under closer scrutiny. Given the way India handled the Bhopal gas catastrophe that killed at least 22,000, Fukushima holds important implications. Although the exact sequence of events at Fukushima is still not clear, consider some obvious nuclear dangers in India:

The chain of incidents engulfing all six Fukushima reactors was triggered by their close proximity to each other. With a flare-up at one reactor affecting systems at another, Japan has ended up with serial blasts, fires, spent-fuel exposures and other radiation leaks at the Fukushima complex. The lesson: a string of events can quickly overwhelm emergency preparedness and safety redundancies built into reactor systems.

This seriously calls into question India's decision to approve construction of six to 12 large reactors at each new nuclear park.

The Fukushima spent-fuel fire and other problems shine a spotlight on the spent-fuel challenges at the sister plant in Tarapur, where the discharged fuel has been accumulating for over four decades because the US has refused to either take it or allow India to reprocess it. At the so-called Spent Fuel Storage Facility, the Tarapur spent-fuel bundles are kept under water in specially engineered bays.

This mounting, highly radioactive spent fuel poses major space problems and safety and environmental hazards that are greater than at any other plant in the world. In fact, the spent-fuel rods - unlike the reactor - have no containment structure. Yet New Delhi has shied away from exerting pressure on Washington to resolve an issue that threatens environmental and public safety in India's commercial heartland.

The operating license of the ageing Tarapur BWRs has been periodically extended by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board . Despite safety and equipment upgrades at Tarapur, the fact is that first-generation reactors have generally some dangerous weaknesses. In fact, much before the Fukushima incidents, several US experts had warned that this BWR model was susceptible to explosion and containment failure.

The power shortages in the Mumbai area have influenced the decision to keep the two BWRs in operation up to 2030. But in the US, the utility running a BWR plant of the same vintage as in Tarapur - at Oyster Creek in New Jersey - recently decided to close it in 2019. And the Vermont State Senate last year voted to stop the less-old Vermont Yankee BWR plant from operating past next year.

From the resurrected cash-for-votes scandal to a rigged process favouring four foreign vendors - and from new safety concerns to the special legislation that caps the foreign suppliers' accident liability by burdening the Indian taxpayer - the nuclear deal's future looks more troubled than ever.

(Brahma Chellaney is professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research)

[GuruPrabhu]

folks, google-come-lately arguments are fine in isolation. But can we narrow down to what are the important issues? There is a cacophony of views being presented in some random sequence.

[abhischekcc]

There is no cacophony of views - all amount to saying the same thing - that adequate safety measures have not been taken the world over regarding nuclear reactors/material.

In India, the problem has been compounded by a political system compromised by corruption.

[krishnan]

Already posted?

http://www.sify.com/news/German-bank-pu ... o=obinsite

New Delhi, March 15 (IANS) Greenpeace Tuesday said that a German bank had pulled out of the proposed Jaitapur nuclear power project in Maharshtra citing 'sustainability and reputational risk'. The decision was made prior to the Japan disaster, it said.

[amit]

There is no cacophony of views - all amount to saying the same thing - that adequate safety measures have not been taken the world over regarding nuclear reactors/material.

I'm not really sure how you come to this conclusion. Apart from Chernobyl which was a case of ineptitude as it was a safety drill gone horribly wrong, nuclear power, in terms of gigawatts of power produced to fatalities has the best track record among all major power generation systems which allow for high base load.

Even in this case, we have a 40 year old plant with Gen I technology. Yet the reactors survived an earthquake which was 7-8 times more intense that its supposed designed limitations. From all available news, the reactors automatically powered down and the cooling process started. The problems started when the cooling system power generators were washed away. Wasn't that a more a case of bad placement of these systems, rather than a design fault?

And even today, one week after the incident, despite all the chest beating and wailing, not a single person has died nor has anyone been exposed to a level radiation that can cause permanent damage. This is no Chernobyl and things will most probably be brought under control.

The problem is nuclear power plant accidents are like airplane crashes in terms of visibility (I must stress not in terms of deaths). Airplane crashes hog all the limelight, yet its statistically proven that you have a higher probability of being run over while crossing the road than dying in an airplane crash.

I also think that this debate between LWR and PHWRs is simply a red herring. As one of the posts above show Gen 3 LWRs all have passive cooling systems built in. We can't compare today's PHWR tech with Gen I LWR tech (which the Fukushima plants are).

Compare Gen III LWR designs with PWHRs if you want.

[somnath]

One of the other points that become moot is the whole concept of "nuclear parks"...Brahma Chellaney makes the point as well - world over, multiple reactors have been built in the same site..Someone here went on and on sometime back about how 10 PHWRs can be put onto one spot rather than 1 LWR!

Given the really small capacity of PHWR/AHWR (still a paper reactor), LWRs are the only model with capacities of 1000 MW and more, and hence scalable...

The debate between PHWR and LWR are completely stupid - no one's making those comparison, not India's nucke establishment either..Barrign some grandees in BRF!

[amit]

Already posted?

http://www.sify.com/news/German-bank-pu ... o=obinsite

New Delhi, March 15 (IANS) Greenpeace Tuesday said that a German bank had pulled out of the proposed Jaitapur nuclear power project in Maharshtra citing 'sustainability and reputational risk'. The decision was made prior to the Japan disaster, it said.

The problem for Angela Dorothea Merkel is similar to the one faced by MMS - coalition politics. Her Govt is dependent on the Greens for survival. Hence all these stupid moves to shut down nuke plants and stop funding. The fact that Greenpeace is announcing this should be a pointer!

However, it shouldn't be too much of sweat to find alternative funding.

[Sanku]

One of the other points that become moot is the whole concept of "nuclear parks"...Brahma Chellaney makes the point as well - world over, multiple reactors have been built in the same site..Someone here went on and on sometime back about how 10 PHWRs can be put onto one spot rather than 1 LWR!

Let me quote what BC actually said

This seriously calls into question India's decision to approve construction of six to 12 large reactors at each new nuclear park.

Clearly he is talking only of LWR in NEW parks (which are basically scams to pay back for keeping Congress in power) -- notof PHWR and 4-5 PHWR in one park.

Basic comprehension lessons for you

6-12 != 4-5

PHWR != LWR