ManuT wrote:Rudradev wrote:
Evidence? Rather than go after Pakistan for the 9-11 attacks with Indian help, the US preferred:
1) To allow itself to be sidetracked by a long ground war in Afghanistan, with full and continuing Pakistani support to their enemies.
2) To ignore the role of Pakistan in creating the Taliban and supporting the OBL group all the way up to the murder of Ahmad Shah Massood.
3) To facilitate the survival of ISI assets that were crucial to the Taliban's operations, by allowing the Kunduz airlift.
4) To ignore the proliferation of nuclear weapons by the Pakistan government, labeling it the work of a "rogue AQ Khan network" and saying "the past is the past" even as proliferation continued into the future.
5) To pump billions of dollars of aid into Pakistan even as Pakistan continued to support the Taliban against US forces in Afghanistan.
6) To arm Pakistan with modern weapons systems that were completely and entirely India-specific.
7) To ignore future attacks against Western interests and citizens, including Daniel Pearl, the London and Madrid Subways and many more that were still carried out with the full support and facilitation of Pakistan.
8 ) To warn, caution and threaten India against retaliating for Pakistani terrorist attacks in India, and counsel that India should instead stabilize a dysfunctional Pakistan by giving away J&K to Pakistan.
The truth is that EVEN IF the West changes its mind after another Pakistani terrorist attack in a Western country, EVEN IF the US decides to punish Pakistan militarily for this... they will still seek to avoid any Indian involvement whatsoever. It is vitally important to the US that India should not gain from the aftermath of any Western action against Pakistan. For now, that means that India does not have to counsel restraint.
Restraint is automatically built in to any Western response towards Pakistan, and will be for the foreseeable future, because the West's desire to prevent India gaining is far greater than the West's desire to punish Pakistan. Whether we counsel restraint or not doesn't matter at all.
Onlee, contrary to a preference for TSP, there was a quid-pro-quo between Mush and Amritraaj that TSP's GUBO was conditional to keeping India out of any Afghanistan solution.
What you are saying here is a version of the narrative that was very often repeated by CNN and the New York Times as justification for "US compulsion to keep India out of any Afghanistan solution." It is a very convenient justification for the US, which was no more willing than Pakistan to have India play a military or political role in any Afghan solution. It would have thrown all of Washington's geostrategic calculations out of whack if India gained influence in Afghanistan as a result of Op Enduring Freedom... something far more important in the long term than "catching Bin Laden."
We know that Armitage threatened Mush with Pakistan being bombed back to the stone age if he did not comply. Add to this the fact that Pakistan's economy was, as always, in the toilet and could only stand to gain from any sort of economic and military aid from the US. Does that seem as if Pakistan was in any position to be dictating terms or "imposing conditions" on the US for its GUBO? I don't believe that for a minute. It is all very well for the US to say "oh, we kept India out of Enduring Freedom because Pakistan wanted it that way," when in fact the US also wanted it that way, at least as much as the Pakistanis did.
Let me put it like this.
1. At the time of 911 US was ignorant. The narrative of the Indian subcontinent was held by TSP, because that is what happens when you allow others to tell your narrative. There was no Indian narrative in the beltway (because no one was invited). TSP had the long institutional awareness of the US, because of its past alliances and the Soviet-Afghan War. The narrative only started to change from the middle of Kargil after IA started evicting NLI. (Before that US, UK wanted India to declare a ceasefire because frankly they did not believe IA would get them evicted). The first milestone was reached on 4 Jul, 1999 when NS was made to wait for an appointment with Bill Clinton. Though Jaswant Singh helped, 2001 was too less of a time frame to break TSPs instituational linkages with US. Besides, India (prone to self goals), itself had legitimised Musharraf by inviting him to Agra summit, weeks before 911.
Again, I have heard too many times about how the US was ignorant, delusional, naive, stupid, far too trusting and bhola-bhala in believing that Pakistan would be its loyal friend and ally against the Taliban.
Unkil did not become Unkil by being naive or ignorant. The US knew, and observed, and attempted to influence events in Afghanistan right since the end of the Soviet occupation... even though it is their popular media narrative (propaganda) that they had just forgotten all about Afghanistan and "ignored the region until 9-11." They were in fact very much present, setting up Kekmatyar against Mojadeddi, blessing (if not actively helping) the Benazir/Aslam Beg program to bring Afghanistan under Pakistani influence via the Taliban, inviting the Taliban for TAP pipeline talks in the US under the Clinton Administration, and carrying on a dialogue with the Taliban via a team of State Dept. interlocutors headed by Robin Raphel, even after OBL had been given shelter there as a wanted fugitive from US law following the African Embassy bombings.
The US went along every step of the way, and every step was calibrated to maximize Pakistani influence via the Taliban in Central Asia. Even terrorism against US citizens and economic interests was not allowed to risk or compromise this larger goal in any way. Today they say "oh, we ignored the region from 1989-2001", because that sounds like a far less damning mistake than "oh, we relentlessly and continuously supported the same people who came back and bombed our world trade center, and will continue doing so in the name of geostrategy."
There is absolutely no way the US did not know what it was going in for by forming an alliance with the TSPA in 2001. Any notion that they imagined having full and honest support from the TSPA/ISI... whom they knew so very well... simply does not hold water.
That we choose to believe this hogwash about poor ignorant US being taken for a 10-year, 18 billion dollar ride by the wily Pakis, ignoring ground realities, forgiving nuclear proliferation, and absorbing terrorist attacks on their own interests shows only one thing. It's not the US, but we who are still delusional about this.
2. TSP has not kept part of its deal for US to continue to hold any part of its side. In the meantime TSP is practically being frog marched to the point of exhaustion.
So everyone says. People were holding their breath for a total collapse of Pakistan when Baitullah's merry men were overrunning Swat. Did it happen?
TSP as a nation state in the conventional sense, hit the point of "exhaustion" long ago, by any international yardstick... they are an invalid state kept alive by continuous transfusion of funds and aid. Yet their claims on Indian territory are taken seriously by certain powers, and calls are made for India to be generous and "resolve Kashmir."
Meanwhile, the TSPA, ISI and the jihadi tanzeems are stronger than ever, flush with western funds, armed to the teeth with India-specific weapons by the west, manufacturing India-specific nukes by the hundred. That's because TSPA/ISI/tanzeems
are != the state of TSP. They are an armed camp, or kabila, that is kept strong for the express purpose of serving Western geostrategic interests. The "exhausted" country of TSP is nothing but the foraging ground of this kabila... and why does an armed camp need to forage if it is being supplied for free from abroad?
3. Anyways, looking to the future. US after 10 years is more than aware of the duplicitous game of TSP. It has used drone to wreck every peace deal between taliban and TSPA that ISI has tried to manufacture.
They were always aware of it, and always preferred it to any chance of India having a role in the military-political dispensation of post-Taliban Afghanistan. No matter how bad or costly the duplicitous game, it was preferable in their geostrategic worldview. Drones are a palliative measure designed to inflict harm on specific proxies who are undermining the US' mission in Afghanistan. They are only controlling a symptom. Nothing is being done against the "cause" of the disease, because it is still an article of faith in US foreign policy making circles that this "cause" is necessary to sustain and support for long-term geopolitical purposes.
4. As wikileaks have pointed out, regular US Army officers were reporting back to their superiors of TSPA's double game. But CIA covered for TSP. (I am disappointed though that the State Dept has clamped down on it employees officially to read about them)
Why are you disappointed? State Dept with CIA input formulates US foreign policy, and backing TSPA/ISI as a geopolitical proxy for West and Central Asia is an absolute cornerstone of US foreign policy. You are only disappointed because you assumed otherwise to begin with.
Moreover, despite what the regular US Army officers have been saying, there is no question that the Pentagon (see the statements of Mullen and Fallon among others) is solidly and consistently covering for TSP as well.
Support for Pakistan in US foreign policymaking circles is not a matter of a few isolated pockets. It is across the board, particularly when it comes to ensuring that India should not gain as a result of any disturbance of subcontinental status-quo. That is the game... Islamic terror/sherror is only a sideshow.
5. That has changed since the RD affair (and streaming out of other operatives as were disucss). TSP has made some enemies in the last pillar of institutional support in the US. This means more than awareness, the linkages are breaking apart. I do not think the US intel community will be forgetting the RD affair in a hurry. Going forward the dice is loaded against TSP.
In the matter of a few weeks since the RD affair you expect things have changed? I'm afraid you are going to be disappointed again.
Rudradev wrote:
You're not seriously comparing a nuclear test by Indian institutions using Indian resources on Indian territory, to military operations against a foreign government on another continent... are you? However you look at it, the latter is far more contingent on our receiving a willing "invitation" than the former.
1. The point is about 1974 to 2005. No 2005 deal without 1974 Pokharan 1 (and consistent clean record in nuclear non-proliferation).
I don't see how this has any relevance to my original point, which is that India was not invited, and its participation was not encouraged, in any military enforcement of a NFZ in Libya... so on what basis were we going to go in? Were we going to ask to join, and then be told "no thanks?" For all you know this might have been exactly what happened, even before the UNSC vote. End result, we're not invited and we're not there... so it makes eminent sense for us not to have committed ourselves politically in favour of the whole adventure.
2. Inspite, of the quid-pro-quo of keeping India out, it has more street credibility and milestones in the eyes of Afghans than US-TSP combined, and could not be kept out of the Afghan solution, even after killing of its Attache.
India *always* had more credibility and appreciation among Afghans than the Pakis or the US. We have tried to play our cards there as well as we can, following the removal of Taliban. Thanks to our friends in Karzai's regime we have been able to maintain a presence with economic, humanitarian and developmental aid which has enhanced our goodwill.
But we do not have any influence on the military-political dispensation in Afghanistan, and in that sense we play a negligible role in the "Afghan solution". We were relegated to the back-bench during the London conference on Afghanistan, and kept entirely out of the Turkey summit. I simply can't believe that this was only because of the demands of a third-rate beggar nation like Pakistan. It was because this suits the geopolitical priorities of the West... period.
Rudradev wrote:
How would sending medics have established our power projection capabilities, exactly? ..
"All are welcome" is very well in theory, but the fact is, leadership of the UN mandate invariably devolves to members of the P5-- in this case the US, UK and France. They are the ones who ultimately decide the composition of the task force and delegate the roles to be played within it. They have made no secret of wanting GCC armed forces to get involved in the Libyan NFZ, but again, I haven't heard a word from them encouraging Indian involvement... only sniping by their pet mongrels in the media about "BRIC" hypocrisy, etc.
1. I am just curious to know the where it is on the scale, other than a 0. Sending medics, would at the very least, shown solidarity to the people of Libya. IMO there was a need to take sides. What India is saying is that is OK with dictators. In all likelyhood someone from Indian Oil is still holding deeds worth $4B from Saddam's era. (Same for ONGC for gas from Burma)
Firstly, it is by no means obvious that the people of Libya are unanimous in wanting Gaddafi overthrown.
Secondly, could you please explain what exactly is wrong in being "OK with dictators?"
I mean, it seems like India just cannot win. If we play an idealistic role of altruism in our foreign policy, then we are idiots who put moral principles first before securing our interests with realpolitik (like America does.) On the other hand, if we accommodate dubious regimes in order to secure our legitimate interests, then we are acting like hypocrites instead of being a beacon of freedom and democracy (like America is.)

Whose narrative is this anyway?
2. I do not care for the pet mongrels or blame them becuase they are in 1 of the 2 categories - 1 those feel let down by India's non-performance and want to know What are India's strategic objectives and What is India willing to do, to attain them.
The other are who are paid to be ignorant, who really not critical of India's abstention at UNSC per se, but India itself. They should also, not be allowed to hold the narrative.
We agree on this point. We do not need to answer to any foreigner who demands to know what India's strategic objectives are or what India is willing to do to attain them. When the time comes the foreigners will find out.
3. P3 out of P5 because wikileaks do not happen with the other 2. If they did, not difficult to imagine the fate of the people who will do that, same day firing squad.
Not sure what you are saying here. Yes, I agree it is P3 out of P5 who are leading the Libyan operation, but where does wikileaks come into the picture?
Rudradev wrote:
To devise a game effectively we must have intimate knowledge of the gameboard. The Pentagon's New Map is exactly that... a realistic assessment of the gameboard at the time of writing, plus a vision of how the gameboard should ideally appear, in order to best serve US interests. Only on that solid foundation can strategies be devised and implemented to go from point A to point B.
Do we have a South Block's New Map? Let's start by making one. I would suspect that on such a gameboard, Libya (given the stakes, risks and rewards) would simply not be in play for any of our opening moves. Bahrain, on the other hand, might be... we will have to watch that carefully.
I would see it as a failure of policy, in case, US punishes TSP militarily and without India getting a piece of the action from the start. Because, per Mirza Alsam Beg, TSP would nuke India, anyways. For India to then join the fight after having missed all opportunities to shape - prevent or limit - the battleground.
Also, for the same reason, I would also see it as failure of strategy and its inability to in case India decides to punish TSP without US on board, only because the job will get done quicker. If TSP is solved for India, for the US, Iran with a pretense of nuclear weapons, ceases to be a threat too.
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It seems that what you are saying is that Indian foreign policy only succeeds if India punishes TSP with US help. If India punishes TSP by itself, or US punishes TSP without India on board, then India has somehow "failed"?
Well, if what you say is true, we should reconcile ourselves to failure. The US will never, ever, ever allow India to benefit from any punishment of TSP that the US undertakes unilaterally. That is, unless something occurs to drastically alter US geostrategic calculations at the most foundational level. I cannot even imagine what that might be (even Paki nuclear proliferation to Iran/Libya/North Korea and the loss of NYC's twin towers were not enough.)
Likewise, if the US punishes TSP with any Indian help of any kind, it will STILL insist on complete control of whatever happens in Pakistan afterwards. Any cursory glance at history reveals that the US has no use for allies... only subsidiaries, and subsidiaries don't get any say in dividing the spoils. The only way we will be able to assert our influence in Pakistan in that situation will be to oppose the US once the job is done, as the Soviets did following the end of WW2. Do we have the "dum" for this?
In fact the only way at present, that we have any guarantee of controlling the post TSPA/ISI dispensation of Pakistan is to do the job ourselves, and without the US having any locus standi in the matter.