Indian Army: News & Discussion

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 26 Mar 2011 17:32

The fact remains that low capability missiles were procured by compromising the Army’s requirements in spite of availability of better missiles in the global market as BDL could not produce them. Further, Army has failed to formulate GSQR for third generation missiles for over three years.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 26 Mar 2011 18:59

ShauryaT wrote:The reason we buy low-quality missiles
The fact remains that low capability missiles were procured by compromising the Army’s requirements in spite of availability of better missiles in the global market as BDL could not produce them. Further, Army has failed to formulate GSQR for third generation missiles for over three years.

I was surprised to find the Milan being displayed with pride at the BDL stall in Aero India 2005 or 2007. For years before that we had been following and discussing the Nag saga. Technology is tough. We are not there yet. The biggest mistake I see being made by Indians in general not just BRF but army and tech people of DRDO (at least in the past) is a feeling that technology is easy

DRDO says (used to sa): "Oh we can do it". But they couldn't
Armed forces say/used to say "You are all useless. Foreigners are doing it easily" But either the firangis were promising more than they gave, or gave a lot but held on to our balls by sanctions or costs.
Jingos say (used to say):" Oh give it to Indian private enterprise. They can do it easily" They can't. They don't have a clue. DRDO is better

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 26 Mar 2011 20:44

shiv wrote: Jingos say (used to say):" Oh give it to Indian private enterprise. They can do it easily" They can't. They don't have a clue. DRDO is better

The idea here is to change this situation, is it not? Cannot have an MIC without private participation in India. DRDO is better because there is no one else.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 26 Mar 2011 20:59

ShauryaT wrote: DRDO is better because there is no one else.

Actually it is more complex (worse) than that. It is unprofitable to sink money into some technologies. It so happens that private companies in the west sank money and developed those technologies during wars (WW1, 2 and Vietnam) when it was profitable to do so. In India - in the current situation it is unprofitable to do that.

One of DRDO's complaints has been that they have devleoped a host of technologies but there are few private companies to absorb that. The same complaint came up this year in terms of offsets when the Swedes (or was it the French?) said that they were willing to supply tech but no company had the wherewithal to absorb that tech and use it. By "ability to absorb" I suspect it refers to machines, processes and techniques that do not exist at all in Indian in the private domain. Offering the knowhow becomes useless when that knowhow is something that has been developed over and above the processes and techniques that are absent in the first place.

It is of course getting better - not least because of Indian private companies acquiring foreign firms and giving orders to those firms from India (eg Mahindra buying Aussie company to see their a/c here). That is not a transfer of tech strictly speaking but an exposure to exoertise which is likely to pay dividends sometime down the line.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 26 Mar 2011 21:01

Oh! I had a heated discussion with Karan M on this issue many moons ago.........it is exactly attitude like this which breeds the services-DRDO ( scientific community) divide....this is one clear example of arm twisting and we had people give arguments to the effect that IA got something they otherwise did not have!!!

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 26 Mar 2011 21:17

shiv wrote:
ShauryaT wrote: DRDO is better because there is no one else.
Actually it is more complex (worse) than that. It is unprofitable to sink money into some technologies. It so happens that private companies in the west sank money and developed those technologies during wars (WW1, 2 and Vietnam) when it was profitable to do so. In India - in the current situation it is unprofitable to do that.

Precisely. Private industry should not make bad investments. But, it will be difficult to get convinced that with the vast needs we have, profitability is not a virtual guarantee, if we have a deliberate policy to disinvest the production PSU's and large parts of DRDO over a period of time.

The MIC will have to nurtured and will not just come up magically. This means a deliberate policy to not buy foreign maal, unless absolutely essential. This means the boys with the toys may have to do with less than super duper, sometimes. Notice how BDL, HAL and other production agencies are more excited about producing for foreign firms. There is a stench there.

Luxtor · Post by **Luxtor** » 26 Mar 2011 23:53

It is easy to think of military tech in the same league as consumer tech and say if it is profitable or not to produce it locally. For most part that is ok but some critical tech (as well as some mundane tech) needs to be researched and developed in-country because foreign suppliers would arm twist us at the critical time with demands for more cash or sanctions etc. Some techs, no matter how hard and time consuming it becomes, we should soldier on with their research and development within India.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 27 Mar 2011 03:01

Luxtor wrote:It is easy to think of military tech in the same league as consumer tech and say if it is profitable or not to produce it locally. For most part that is ok but some critical tech (as well as some mundane tech) needs to be researched and developed in-country because foreign suppliers would arm twist us at the critical time with demands for more cash or sanctions etc. Some techs, no matter how hard and time consuming it becomes, we should soldier on with their research and development within India.

This should be restricted to the absolute essential items, which have no scope for a market either due to agreements that restrict its market such as MTCR and Strategic weapons or other items, which are pure research (from an Indian perspective).

The rest have to have a commercial basis or there is no going forward. PSU's and DRDO alone are not going to make our MIC, with tit bits added by private sub contractors.

India is not some tiny bit nation of Europe like France or Sweden, which has to continuously seek other markets for its own military industrial complex to survive. Although, once India nurtures such an industry, foreign markets would help the commercials, which in turn would help the maturity of products.

For crying sake, look at tiny puny Israel! Let us not hide behind the fact that Israel got western help. The fact is they have something going for them in many areas in their MIC that they are proud of and export to many nations.

If India has to have its own MIC then the Production PSU's and a large part of the existing DRDO have to be privatized. I have seen through the debate for many years now and see no reason to change this long held view.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 27 Mar 2011 06:27

ShauryaT wrote:
If India has to have its own MIC then the Production PSU's and a large part of the existing DRDO have to be privatized. I have seen through the debate for many years now and see no reason to change this long held view.

Shaurya - this is what seems to be happening. But only recently.

DRDO has been both developer and manufacturer. In the last 10 years or so there has been an increasing recognition that DRDO has to divest itself from manufacture of some items and hand it over to private industry. For private industry to take up manufacture there has to be:
1) Transfer of DRDO technology to private industry
2) Some earthly use for that technology so private industry can vie for orders and get business for items manufactured using that transferred technology.

That means that private industry has to be able to supply manufactured goods using DRDO tech to the companies that need them. But the companies that need them have so far been DRDO companies. For example (hypothetical) BEML Bangalore, and MDN Hyderabad produce gearboxes and alloys respectively that HVF Chennai uses to make tanks. It is a closed loop internal market. I think government procedures need changing so that when a DRDO company needs a technology enhanced item, they should be able to procure that from private companies who are able to supply that item. And government tendering and payment procedures have to be streamlined. Entrepreneurs who have small private manufacturing units - some of whom are friends of mine can get very good business if the government actually orders from them - but can get ruined by the delays and governmental red tape and the ubiquitous need to bribe government servants. Private company owners in India say the government has to be bribed. Shooting dead a lot of government people who take bribes would be a good idea because this is not changing soon enough. The right to bear arms would certainly help. But what about bribe givers?

Of course we are seeing that more frequently nowadays with names like Maini cropping up in the defence business, also Tata and Mahindra as well as L&T. Even Infosys and their ilk are in it in different ways. But we need 10,000 companies doing that and not 1000.

The other thing is privatization of DRDO. Privatization cannot be done for a loss making firm because no private investor will want to buy it unless it offers him and his shareholders a clear route for profit. Very often a government company has been badly run and is not producing any item of note but the workers are on government payroll producing 20 year old tech at low prices being forced down the throat of the armed forces - like that Milan story above. This cannot be privatized.

The only DRDO companies that can be privatized are the ones making a profit. For that management and workforce have to be galvanized. Profit making government enterprises end up getting a "Navratna" tag. For example ONGC is not a DRDO company but it has a Navratna tag. HAL has a Navratna tag. When a company has that tag teh government can propose to sell shares to the public and up to some percentage - where the government continues to own a majority stake. Often this is opposed by the workforce who may fo on strike. The old "relaxed" government companies had drivers, peons. errand boys, file pushers and general dogsbodies with an assured job for life and jobs promised to relatives if they kicked the bucket. After privatization the demands of shareholders will ensure that all the excess fat is trimmed and government staff often go on strike - supported by Labor unions and our friends in the left parties. Some of these organizations are like a government mandated mini-Soviet Unions in the middle of a capitalist society.. This needs to change.

So entire mountains have to be moved and while we are busy trying to move mountains we get Pakis and chinis coming across those mountains and we have to quickly purchase some equipment from phoren, making Indian companies even less profitable. It's a friggin set of Augean stables.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 27 Mar 2011 08:38

shiv wrote:It's a friggin set of Augean stables.

Shiv Ji: Thank you for the elaboration and you are a far more acute observer than I have been. This gobar is not to be cleaned but wiped away - all we need now is a Hercules!

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 27 Mar 2011 08:53

shiv wrote:DRDO has been both developer and manufacturer. In the last 10 years or so there has been an increasing recognition that DRDO has to divest itself from manufacture of some items and hand it over to private industry.

This is a very big issue. DRDO is not actually the manufacturer, but, it is increasingly seen as one.

Services have bee putting the onus of delivery in DRDO in case of smaller numbers. Then, DRDO has become default deliverer in case of Arjun Tank. DRDO was supposed to deliver some x amount of Arjun Tanks and then Avadi was supposed to take over. But, our folks at Avadi messed with the tank settings and the "onus" of deliver has fallen back on DRDO. In case of smaller items with large production runs, the DPSU;s and OFB's have finally taken over.

D Roy · Post by **D Roy** » 27 Mar 2011 09:07

@ Rohitvats

I know this has been talked about before.

But once again - will the new raisings in the NE lead to an increase in the manpower strength of the army over time?

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 27 Mar 2011 09:44

chackojoseph wrote: This is a very big issue. DRDO is not actually the manufacturer, but, it is increasingly seen as one.

This model, of DRDO as a tech/design house while manufacturing is with DPSUs, is passe IMO...Its a kind of a replica of the erstwhile design bureaux in the Soviet Union...the problem with the approach for a vast majority of systems (especially tactical systems like tanks, ATGMs etc) is that accountability becomes diffused...Are the problems with Arjun's QC an OFB issue or is the design itself too complicated? DPSUs on the other hand ave little incentive to promote "indigeneous" tech..As far as they are concerned, a license production run is also "indigeneous"! Cant think of too many countries where R&D for tactical systems is divorced from the manufacturing house...Even in Russia, the design bureaux have been amalgamated into large integrated companies with the manufacturing units...the result has often been slow production runs, QC issues and so on - as late as 2008, Bharat Karnad wrote that India's ballistic missile production was slower than Pak's! One doesnt know if Agni production has been handed over to BDL yet...

Maybe the DRDO, which has no "companies" under its tutelage - only departments/laboratories, should concentrate on strategic systems - ballistic/cruise missiles, ABM - while rest of the tactical labs are integrated with a relevant DPSU or spun off into a separate company...So LRDE should be merged with BEL and so on...Brahmos is a good model to follow, where R&D and production is integrated in a single company...

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 27 Mar 2011 11:13

D Roy wrote:@ Rohitvats

I know this has been talked about before.

But once again - will the new raisings in the NE lead to an increase in the manpower strength of the army over time?

Yes, and as per media reports, CCS has already approved it. There will be net increment in the strength of IA and I dare say, pretty large one, if all the numbers talked about wrt new raisings come true. And then, it is additional raising of armored formations as well.

ParGha · Post by **ParGha** » 29 Mar 2011 06:19

jai wrote:The "Fauji's" of yesteryears were certainly not as tech savvy as the current generation, which, by the way for an average "Fauji" is still way behind in terms of an understanding of contemporary defence technology. I am not sure if this is because the training systems so far focussed only on the largely antique equipment in use over the last 50 + years. This is more so for Army than the other two forces.

You are also right in stating that they will have to change with time, and some welcome change is now coming thanks to frequent exercises with foreign militaries and with better modernization budgets/acquisitions/changes in threat perceptions and modernization of our potential enemies. IMO, this is the lesser of the issues that exist.

Among the Indian officer corps, I notice that they are generally more likely to have a technical education than their Western counter-parts, but less likely (or just about the same) as the East Asian officer corps. It will be interesting to see in which direction Indians will change.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 29 Mar 2011 07:25

ParGha Ji: My reply is in the DRDO thread.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 29 Mar 2011 08:50

ParGha wrote: Among the Indian officer corps, I notice that they are generally more likely to have a technical education than their Western counter-parts, but less likely (or just about the same) as the East Asian officer corps. It will be interesting to see in which direction Indians will change.

India's entire education system is moving towards the technical education side and is also trying to mimic the Korean/Japanese/Chinese "drive your kids mad studying" model rather than the Western "Let your kids absorb what interests them" model. I predict that more technically educated people will be the norm.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 29 Mar 2011 10:38

^^^It is not strictly about technical education but awareness, per se.

From officer down to the johnies, people are more aware...the technology they see in armed forces is not something they come across the first time..although it is of higher scale. The familiarity with technology is better and hence, the ability to absorb it. It is this advent of technology which is driving some of the perceptible changes in the IA environ. It is that much difficult to get a BSc. graduate to do "grass cutting" jobs....in certain areas, the environ in IA is going the IAF way.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 29 Mar 2011 11:40

chackojoseph wrote: But, our folks at Avadi messed with the tank settings and the "onus" of deliver has fallen back on DRDO.

Thank you for finally saying this Sir. I remember the heat I have faced for saying exactly this for so many years.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 29 Mar 2011 12:04

^^^ To be fair to the services, the best of anything is useless if the production run is beset with QC issues. It goes for domestic as well as foreign maal. The DPSU engaged in production need to really really upgrade their standards...it will always stand in the way of Services accepting the domestic stuff.

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 29 Mar 2011 12:30

The other view is that its easier to make proven phoreen maal as they have standard procedures, toolings etc. Naya desi maal requires the learning curve and DPSU's find that difficult.

Gaur · Post by **Gaur** » 31 Mar 2011 16:39

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/patna/11-per-cent-Armymen-are-from-Bihar/articleshow/7829670.cms

According to the League president , the number of Army personnel from Bihar has increased from 3.5 per cent to 11 per cent now as the Centre has fixed the quota of recruitment in Army population-wise from each state.

Does anyone know more about this?

merlin · Post by **merlin** » 31 Mar 2011 17:54

chackojoseph wrote:The other view is that its easier to make proven phoreen maal as they have standard procedures, toolings etc. Naya desi maal requires the learning curve and DPSU's find that difficult.

Can't do or won't do?

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 31 Mar 2011 18:17

merlin wrote:Can't do or won't do?

More of won't. Personal experience is that folks don't like "changes", "redesigning" etc. The quality issues, blame games, unions etc. Even the top management is combative.

I'll give you another example. Few years ago, IIT chaps were recruited as techno-commercial sales men at nations aircraft producers. They were so harassed that they quit in a year or so.

DRDO too said that. I had mentioned that in 2007

The most important aspect is that these weapons, are not designed keeping Indian environment, tactics, operational doctrines or user’ preferences in mind. They are not customized for the convenience of the Indian Armed Forces. Even then, they are accepted by the Services based on their maturity level. Even in those cases where partial quantities are produced in the country, mostly in Indian Ordnance factories (OFB) and Defence Public Sector Units (DPSUs), there is hardly any technology transfer taking place. These items would already have been produced in large quantities in their respective countries and would have reached end of production life for their own use. Many times, the tooling will be transferred to Indian production line accordingly. Though the products are subsequently made in India, most of the raw materials and components still have to come from the parent country and the value addition by Indian Industry is very small, varying from 10% to 30%. Even then, this is a preferred route for the OFB’s and DPSUs as there is no risk for them. They have assured product line and order quantities from the Armed Forces. Most of time, the critical high end system’s technology is not passed to India.

ParGha · Post by **ParGha** » 31 Mar 2011 18:50

Gaur wrote:
... Centre has fixed the quota of recruitment in Army population-wise from each state.
Does anyone know more about this?

The GoI has been trying to make the armed forces, especially the Army, more representative of the country since the 1950s -- both as a national integration effort and as way of ensuring that no region/community has to bear massive losses in event of a truly industrial-scale war. To this end, it comes up with an idealized quota based on each state's population. In real world it rarely works out as per the ideal because of culture, social attitudes, economics and other reasons; and even those are always in flux. Still, it is a good objective to aim for in the long run.

nelson · Post by **nelson** » 31 Mar 2011 19:16

^ The percentages are laid down on the basis of recruitable male population in each of the state and has sub divisions on the basis of religion and caste also. Also various regiments/ corps have percentages laid out for enrollment on the basis of ethnicity.

VinodTK · Post by **VinodTK** » 03 Apr 2011 05:07

Gurkha troops in Congo betrayed

Leopoldville, April 2: That there was a deliberate and definite conspiracy by some key officers in the United Nations command to discredit India — a policy pursued by leading Western Embassies here, is revealed in a startling dispatch informing how Gurkha troops in Congo had been betrayed.
Congolese soldiers at gunpoint today prevented Gurkha troops from entering Ndjili airport through the main gate.

The Gurkhas, on orders to move to Kamina military base in Katanga, however, entered the airfield through a side entrance used by American Embassy planes. Afro-Asian diplomats here expressed surprise as to how a top secret military decision of the United Nations Military command, taken late last night to fly Gurkhas of the Indian military contingent to Kamina, came to the knowledge of the Congolese command for them to be able to send reinforcement and put a cordon round the main airport entrance.

Aaryan · Post by **Aaryan** » 04 Apr 2011 00:27

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/fil ... 58-190.pdf

Just found it... May be u guys like it!!

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 04 Apr 2011 16:54

I saw a video today of a mine clearing vehicle called Grizzly - based on a M1 chassis, it has no turret but a boxy cabin with thick glass windows for the operator. features the usual heavy plough system extended in front but also 3 flat panel ground penetrating radars atop the plough to detect mines (!) does not look like a survivable place to mount such delicate eqpt (since mines can and will explode under the plough even if detected and ploughed into)...no idea if its a natgeo psyops proto or a real weapon in the field.
http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product909.html

added later - cancelled in 2001
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... rizzly.htm

jai · Post by **jai** » 04 Apr 2011 19:53

Aaryan wrote:http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/fil ... 58-190.pdf

Just found it... May be u guys like it!!

A very interesting and thought provoking article Aaryan. Thanks for sharing this. Wonder if there are similar studies on Paki forces also where this one came from ? Would you be able to check and share them as well if any exist ? Thanks again !

Would have liked a better assessment of Paki capability as well. The flavor is that India is making a mistake by creating this doctrine - I would have liked the authors to apportion the blame and responsibility where it belongs - Pak is responsible for creation of this enhanced capability offensive doctrine of India as it has been using terrorism against India, and would therefore be responsible for its consequences. An Institution of Harvard's stature which influences international opinions is letting Pak off on terror in this assessment - GOI need to wake up and double our own lobby efforts as we would like Harvard / US /World to be bashing the pakis and not us.

That our politicians are scared shitless of letting the defense forces acquire the required equipment (Artillary for one) and leadership (CDS) needed for the cold start out of their fears of loosing control is a big worry - and goes to show why key equipment acquisitions are being delayed / going through the hoops in various ministries for years, and that CDS will continue being a pipe dream. Though this was well known/feared internally so far, Harvard study mouthing it globally will only strengthen our enemies moral to keep fingering India - knowing our politicians don't have the balls to hit back - nor would they let the defence forces ever get ready to do anything about it. Indeed, those who do not learn from history are forced to undergo the humiliation of a repeat. Hope better sense prevails in pukistan and we have no more 26/11's.

Some interesting - yet debatable observations in the article -

a) The independent military operations envisioned by Cold Start, however, are not necessarily conducive to the degree of control India’s political leadership has exercised in the
past. Under the new doctrine, rapid political decision making and effective crisis management will have to become the norm. Unless India’s political classes can either provide timely command and control to rapidly unfolding military operations or increase their comfort with devolving authority to junior officers in the field who take independent initiative, Cold Start will face significant political barriers to employment.

b) A combination of bureaucratic infighting, political disagreements, and concern about concentrating so much military authority in a single office, however, has prevented a chief of the Defense Staff from ever being appointed. The Integrated Defense Staff is instead headed by an officer who would be the vice chief of Defense Staff, should a chief ever be appointed. In this capacity, rather than being their leader, the present head of the Integrated Defense Staff is actually subordinate to the chiefs of the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force, and
therefore has little ability to force the services to adopt a joint approach to war
fighting. The appointment of a chief of Defense Staff would be an important organizational signal that India was getting serious about its joint war-fighting capabilities and therefore enhance its ability to implement Cold Start.

c) The forward deployment of integrated battle groups and other offensive elements capable of undertaking Cold Start operations requires the construction of new support infrastructure to house not only the units themselves, but also the logistical “tail” that supports them.
At this point, there is no indication in open source materials that these required facilities are being developed.

d) Similarly, Cold Start would require the extensive prepositioning of ammunition, fuel, and spare parts to allow for rapid and continuous offensives. There is a lack of evidence that these facilities have been expanded to house the necessary stocks of war materials.

e) The Indian Army faces significant shortages of key equipment to implement Cold Start.The integrated battle groups will require organic self-propelled artillery to have the mobility and firepower necessary to accomplish their mission. Yet, by one estimate, the army possesses only 10 percent of the self-propelled guns it needs. The army’s tank corps suffers from a low operational readiness rate, as much of its equipment is at the end of its service life. Finally, there are serious questions as to whether the army possesses the mobility and logistical capability to implement Cold Start. It is estimated that only 35 percent of the army is equipped to move about India, and an even smaller portion possesses the mobility to mount cross-border operations. Limited supplies of spare parts, primitive logistical networks, and inadequate maintenance facilities will also hinder offensive operations.

f) A conservative institutional culture that is resistant to change and where subordinate units are tightly controlled by higher command does not foster the initiative and creativity demanded by maneuver warfare. It requires a long period of time to cultivate junior leaders who can take risks and adapt to changing circumstances rather than mechanically execute a scripted battle plan, and the army has just begun that process.

g) Interservice and civil-military tensions remain significant barriers to the doctrine’s acceptance. this plan runs counter to the Indian Air Force’s own concept of joint operations, which involves the services fighting wars separately, but according to a coordinated plan.
Furthermore, the air force believes that attaching aircraft to specific ground units in a defined geographic space, as the integrated battle group concept requires, is a fundamental misuse of airpower that fails to leverage the air force’s numerical superiority over its Pakistani counterparts. This issue is unlikely to be resolved quickly, as the air force continues to focus its efforts on air-to-air combat and strategic bombing while downplaying the importance of close air support as a core mission. An operational Cold Start capability would therefore require the air force to support the doctrine at a level at which it has heretofore been unwilling to do.

IMO -This is why the Army needs a very strong Aviation arm of its own which is capable of CAS.

h) The Indian military’s success in integrating advanced sensor systems into its nascent network-centric warfare capability highlights a significant shortcoming, however—limited communications bandwidth. According to one analyst, the exercise suggests that a large-scale conflict in South Asia could require 3.3 gigahertz of bandwidth for military use alone.

i) While this Cold Start doctrine represents a significant advance in India’s conventional capabilities, it also risks provoking or escalating a crisis on the subcontinent that could
breach the nuclear threshold. The persistent disengagement of India’s political leadership from security issues is a cause for concern, for they may turn to a limited war strategy during the next crisis without having evaluated the potential consequences. At present, Cold Start remains more of a concept than a reality. Relative conventional parity has been a cornerstone of the ugly stability that exists on the subcontinent. Not only does enhanced war-fighting ability threaten that stability, but as the Indian Army progresses toward a Cold Start capability, the political pressure to employ such a strategy in a time of crisis only increases.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 04 Apr 2011 20:45

jai wrote: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/fil ... 58-190.pdf

Just found it... May be u guys like it!!

A very interesting and thought provoking article Aaryan. Thanks for sharing this. Wonder if there are similar studies on Paki forces also where this one came from ?

i) While this Cold Start doctrine represents a significant advance in India’s conventional capabilities, it also risks provoking or escalating a crisis on the subcontinent that could
breach the nuclear threshold. The persistent disengagement of India’s political leadership from security issues is a cause for concern, for they may turn to a limited war strategy during the next crisis without having evaluated the potential consequences. At present, Cold Start remains more of a concept than a reality. Relative conventional parity has been a cornerstone of the ugly stability that exists on the subcontinent. Not only does enhanced war-fighting ability threaten that stability, but as the Indian Army progresses toward a Cold Start capability, the political pressure to employ such a strategy in a time of crisis only increases.

There are several problems with this report.
The basic assumption is that they know the Supreme interest of India which without extensive historical information cannot be factored in.

This report makes a blanket statement of "disengagement of India’s political leadership from security issues" and this kind of analysis for a large country is not realistic.
This report is another form of "nuclear flashpoint" propaganda. "Relative conventional parity has been a cornerstone of the ugly stability that exists on the subcontinent. "

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 04 Apr 2011 21:07

That article is BS peppered with some known issues of higher defense management in India.

He relies on open source material to comment on the aim and objectives and conduct of various exercises but then goes on to preach how these were not successful? And how did he come to this conclusion? Did some one in DGMO brief him? Getting hold of exercise objectives and learnings is one of the top most priority of MI of any country. So, how does this idiot know that there was confusion and lack of co-ordination? And the fact that he thinks troops with Strike Coprs are some sort of 'elite' formations in IA and hence, to be held to higher standard shows how much he knows about IA.

Take the good point - but don't rely on this to form an opinion in CSD.

VinodTK · Post by **VinodTK** » 05 Apr 2011 03:15

Ajai Shukla: Promoting crisis in the military

Today, the commanders of several army divisions and corps – combat formations that are headed by major generals and lieutenant generals, respectively – are serving extended tenures since nobody is being promoted to relieve them. The Indian Army’s elite 1 Corps, which strikes deep into enemy territory in war, currently has no commander. Two major general posts in the crucial Military Operations Directorate and one in Military Intelligence Directorate are lying vacant.

Such a situation is unthinkable in India’s security environment, where a combat-ready military is regarded as the deterrent that holds back more Mumbai-style terrorist attacks. Even before terrorism became a factor in our security calculus, the military valued smooth succession at higher levels of command. When former army chief and India’s military legend General S H F J Manekshaw found the MoD dilly-dallying on the appointment of one of his army commanders, he unilaterally issued an order posting a suitable general and asked the MoD to regularise it in due course.

But that was a different era and Manekshaw was Manekshaw. Since then the MoD has asserted its supremacy, especially in the 1998 sacking of navy chief Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat for refusing to implement the government’s appointment of Vice Admiral Harinder Singh as deputy chief of naval staff.

Craig Alpert · Post by **Craig Alpert** » 05 Apr 2011 07:10

Army Imparts Lessons on Kashmiri Language to Troops

"Through our programmes for our officers and jawans we make them understand the culture, religion, living standards, quality of life, the sensitivities of the people here," General Officer Commanding of Srinagar based 15 Corps Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain told reporters here, 85 kms from Srinagar.

sum · Post by **sum** » 05 Apr 2011 08:16

^^ Really nice clips of IA Dhruv in action on yesterday's NATGEO Mission Army show.... also had a flew clips of SF guys doing insertions using the Dhruv.

Gaur · Post by **Gaur** » 05 Apr 2011 09:35

Rocky & Mayur at Commando Training School, Belgaum
http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/jai-hi ... dos/195138

Pratik_S · Post by **Pratik_S** » 05 Apr 2011 16:44

sum wrote:^^ Really nice clips of IA Dhruv in action on yesterday's NATGEO Mission Army show.... also had a flew clips of SF guys doing insertions using the Dhruv.

Yup, A nice video of Dhruv which skiding on its skids.

biswas · Post by **biswas** » 05 Apr 2011 19:59

I'm looking for some live fire videos of infantry soldiers? My friend who was in the Singaporean armed forces is interested. I've Googled everything I can find but it all seems to be small clips etc, would appreciate if someone could link me to some footage? Thanks

Gaur · Post by **Gaur** » 05 Apr 2011 20:16

biswas wrote:I'm looking for some live fire videos of infantry soldiers? My friend who was in the Singaporean armed forces is interested. I've Googled everything I can find but it all seems to be small clips etc, would appreciate if someone could link me to some footage? Thanks

This program contains footage of IA soldiers performing live fire exercises at CIJWS. Off hand, this is the best live fire footage of IA that comes to my mind.
http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/jai-hi ... ool/132612

Following is an Episode of a program on IA filmed by Natgeo. It also contains some live fire footage.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FNxwqz7AV6U

biswas · Post by **biswas** » 05 Apr 2011 20:52

Gaur wrote:
biswas wrote:I'm looking for some live fire videos of infantry soldiers? My friend who was in the Singaporean armed forces is interested. I've Googled everything I can find but it all seems to be small clips etc, would appreciate if someone could link me to some footage? Thanks
This program contains footage of IA soldiers performing live fire exercises at CIJWS. Off hand, this is the best live fire footage of IA that comes to my mind.

Looked it up, looks great

Thank you, much appreciated