Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

[Airavat]

Anti Taliban Ali Khels:

A direct interaction with Shia and Sunni Ali Khel families will reveal to any investigator that Shia Ali Khels were killed as well as injured in the suicide attack on the grand Ali Khel jirga in 2008. Over generations, the Shia and Sunni Ali Khels have intermarried. Therefore, it is not uncommon to find Ali Khels coming from mixed Shia-Sunni families. I have come across Ali Khels who were even ‘unclear’ about their sectarian affiliation. Such unclear Shia and Sunni Ai Khels also participated in the clashes with the Taliban.

The anti-Taliban resistance was a united Ali Khel tribal move beyond any sectarian differences. The Ali Khels proved with their blood that they have the ability to set aside any sectarian differences and stand up as a united tribe against the extremist Sunni Taliban. All Muslim societies across the world that may be affected by any Shia-Sunni tension could learn a lesson in sectarian harmony from the Ali Khels of FATA.

Mr Haider’s most misleading information about the Ali Khels is that the Pakistani state supported their resistance to the Taliban. The fact is that the state abandoned the Ali Khels by design so as to punish them for their anti-Talibanism. The Ali Khel tribe had encircled the Taliban, killed several of them and destroyed their centres. How could some soldiers of the professionally trained Pakistan Army not achieve what ordinary farmers and drivers from the tribe were about to achieve?

[Pranav]

US-Afghan negotiations for permanent bases: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/world ... ?ref=world

(NY Times now has a paywall, but it seems you can get past it by deleting cookies from nytimes.com)

[Prem]

http://my.firedoglake.com/jimwhite/2011 ... ghanistan/

Sounding less like a military leader than a long-suffering Cubs fan, Joint Chiefs Chair Admiral Mike Mullen made remarks in Afghanistan Tuesday as he prepared for meetings in Pakistan on Wednesday and Thursday. Remarkably, Mullen tried to tell us in a news release at the Joint Chiefs web site that the first eight and a half years of fighting in Afghanistan don’t really count:

Although the United States has been in Afghanistan for 10 years, the chairman said, only over the last 18 months has the effort been resourced correctly.

Those first eight and a half years don’t count because we didn’t resource the effort correctly. Kind of like when the Cubs blow their draft or trade away talent on washed-up big names. And we even get the Cubs’ yearly refrain of “Wait until next year”:

“The Taliban had a really tough year last year, and will have a tougher one this year,” he said. “I think we’ll know a lot more as to where this all stands … at the end of this fighting season.” The fighting season typically runs from spring through the end of September or early October, when colder weather closes in.Does Mullen even understand how many lives and how many resources are being wasted in this ridiculous losing effort?

Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper sees a central part of Mullen’s discussions in Pakistan to be on the efforts to disrupt the Haqqani Network despite its ties to ISI (Pakistan’s intelligence service):
The US Embassy says Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will spend Wednesday and Thursday meeting with Pakistani leaders.

Admiral Mike Mullen’s trip follows a visit to Afghanistan a day earlier in which he told reporters he would raise ongoing concerns with Pakistan army chief General Ashfaq Kayani, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff website.

Mullen praised cooperation between US and Pakistani troops in working jointly to combat the militant Haqqani network who target NATO forces in the Afghan east, but acknowledged “strain” caused by the insurgents’ ties with ISI.
Yup, if we can sign the free agent ISI, this could be the year! If only the stakes were merely bragging rights over the World Series instead of widespread death and destruction

[JE Menon]

hey don't blame Mullen, it's an American problem.

It's like a man who has fallen in love with a black-hearted whore, while knowing all the time exactly what she was. He don't care much for the lovin' no more, nor does he particularly appreciate her deteriorating looks, but does he remember the good times man, does he remember!!! Plus she has that weapon he once let her have, in an ecstatic moment of weakness and she's waving it around as years of whoring has diseased her mind, as it has her body. The man, though he knows it, cannot do the thing that must be done - abandon her to her frothing madness. You see he still remembers, he still hopes. Maybe one more payment and she will be in love with him all over again. Just like the good old days.

[A_Gupta]

http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semp ... b-ali.html

On Feb 25 the Higher Peace Council set up by Karzai to negotiate with the Taliban arrived in Ankara, and next day publicly requested Turkey to allow the Taliban to open an office in their country in order to facilitate peace negotiations. The Turks, aware of Pakistan’s opposition to such talks, were non-committal at the time, but their caution has been allayed by President Zardari’s April 13 statement in Ankara that Pakistan would not object to this.

A couple of days after Gen Pasha’s return from his failed Washington meeting a high powered Pakistani delegation, led by the Prime Minister and including army chief Kayani, Gen Pasha and several ministers, went to Kabul for a meeting with President Karzai and his top officials. The statements made by both sides after the meeting indicated that Pakistan was now going to facilitate and fully support Karzai’s peace negotiations with the insurgents, and would be part of the process. Even though there were nominal references to the US role, the inference was clear that Pakistan had now decided to fully back Karzai and cut the US out of the peace loop. Doubtless, Karzai gave the Pakistanis assurances regarding their security concerns.

It can be expected that the Taliban will soon be permitted to open an office in Turkey, and negotiations for an end to the Afghan war will proceed there between the regional parties, facilitated by the Turks. Even though this process would be based on the premise of an eventual withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan (with the resultant loss of US influence in the region), the US will find it difficult (on both domestic and foreign policy grounds) to oppose it.

[Prem]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20110425/pl ... mapakistan
Obama gathers top aides on Afghanistan, Pakistan

WASHINGTON (AFP) – US President Barack Obama Monday gathered top national security and intelligence staff for his regular review of Afghan and Pakistan strategy, amid signs of fresh tensions with Islamabad.The talks, in the secure Situation Room of the White House, went ahead amid a rumbling US disagreement with Islamabad on the fight against militants in the volatile Afghan-Pakistan border region.At Obama's side in the talks were Defense Secretary Robert Gates, UN ambassador Susan Rice, National Security Advisor Tom Donilon and James Clapper, his director of national intelligence.Vice President Joe Biden, top Afghan war General David Petraeus and the US ambassadors to Pakistan and Afghanistan joined the session via secure video-link, the White House said.The White House said that officials briefed Obama on the security situation in Afghanistan, efforts to build national Afghan forces and efforts to ensure cooperation with Pakistan in the fight against Al-Qaeda.

[ramana]

Is India's influence in Afghanistan waning?

From TOI and usual whining.

Its about MMS visit to Kabul.

Is India's influence waning in Afghanistan?

Indrani Bagchi, TNN | Apr 27, 2011, 01.50am IST

Tags:Taliban|Manmohan Singh|India in Afghanistan|Hamid karzai


NEW DELHI: Afghanistan is slipping out of India's sphere of influence. As a beleaguered Hamid Karzai, president of Afghanistan, looks for a way to achieve peace in his country when the US and other international forces draw down, there are signs that India might be kept at a distance.

In an effort to regain Indian influence, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh plans to travel to Kabul soon. Afghanistan is the only other neighboring country Singh travels to (apart from Bhutan) -- a sign of the importance this strife-torn country enjoys in India.

India wants to "do more" in the security sector in Afghanistan. While this does not mean boots on the ground, India wants to involve itself more in the building up of security institutions in Afghanistan. For the past few years India has been training almost 200 Afghan officers in Indian military institutions. India would extend this to training the police services. In the past, Afghanistan would consciously rebuff Pakistan's demands to train Afghan army officers. India is now more open about its offer, but Afghanistan may be a lot more circumspect about accepting it.

For many years, Afghanistan had asked India to involve itself in improving its fragile security structure by training its security services. India held back because it believed Pakistan would freak. The US, sources said, too actively discouraged India venturing into this area. As it was, Pakistan would boil over at the very mention of India's consulates. In fact, it took a long while to convince Islamabad that India had only five consulates and not 24 as they alleged -- one of Pakistan's top demands from Karzai has been the shutting down of two of India's consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad.

As the Afghanistan conflict moves to a decisive phase with the US intent on beginning a pullout in July, 2011, Karzai, like everybody else in the region is looking at the day after. Karzai has been pushing a reconciliation programme with the Taliban, but this will not go anywhere without the active participation of Pakistan. Almost all Afghan Taliban leadership -- at least the ones that matter like the Haqqanis -- are under Pakistani control.

The US is cool to the reconciliation bid, and would rather keep Pakistan out of it. Washington has asked Saudi Arabia to intercede, but Taliban's Al Qaeda affiliation continues to be a problem for Riyadh. The British on the other hand, according to sources involved in the exercise, are actively backing Pakistan's mediation with the Taliban. Karzai, under pressure, is apparently convinced that doing a deal with Pakistan, whom he had opposed for providing sanctuaries to the Taliban, could provide a measure of security that the US and the west may not be able to. It was the start of a rapprochement with Pakistan when Karzai famously referred to the Af-Pak relationship of conjoined twins.

The Afghanistan dilemma will feature prominently in India's conversations with Marc Grossman, US' new Af-Pak special envoy this week. India's view is the international community should help build institutions in Afghanistan, rather than pushing for a reconciliation and exit. But India is equally aware that western countries want out.

Last week Pakistan showed its determination to drive the exercise on its own terms, during a high profile visit to Kabul by PM Yousuf Raza Gilani, army chief Gen Kayani and Dg-ISI Shuja Pasha. Last year, Pakistan arrested Mullah Baradar of the Taliban's Quetta shura just when his talks with Karzai had entered a decisive phase.

Pakistan is running with its own agenda even as its relationship with the US heads south. At this point, as Karzai sees it, Pakistan holds the cards. But Pakistan will expect him to pay a price -- which might be a gradual distancing with India.

India will remain in Afghanistan in a big way -- building infrastructure and capacity. Fifteen Indian companies are considering forming a consortium -- with government help -- to bid for Afghanistan's biggest iron ore mine in Hagijak. But in the power play for influence, India will have to move fast to counter a Pakistan-Taliban onslaught.

The message for Karzai will be that Afghanistan needs a fully trained security force to take over when the West leaves. Second, by supping with the Taliban, Afghanistan could be opening itself to a future where the Taliban's forceful ideology could take over. Pakistan would then enjoy disproportionate influence in Afghanistan, which would be against India's interests.

Interesting article. I want more such articles which are realistic in what India can and cannot do. Any fall of Karzai regime will be known in advance and there will be signs of Taliban takeover. The Tajiks,Uzbeks, Hazaras and the Durranis and others would contest any Taliban takeover having seen what happened in the lost decade of the 90s.

India would be forced to ally with Iran if Taliban takeover Afghanistan and that not in US interests. So its in US interests to prevent such a takeover.

[shyamd]

^^ Alhough months late - PRC already offered a similar deal to Karzai late last year. I am quite impressed that MMS has decided to fight for Afghanistan, to me I feel its a lost case as Taleban has taken over most of south now thanks to the peace deal between unkil & talebs - although it has influence in most of afghanistan and is putting pressure in north too. Perhaps as SSS said - GoI is trying to win influence in taleb ranks. Makes sense. Chances of MMS meeting former KHAD head and help his new political party?

By the way, isn't this eerily similar to my scenario I posted of opening the front using the Tajik's (aka ANA)?

Lets see.

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Pakistan confronts U.S. Afghan strategy
M. K. Bhadrakumar
Share · Comment · print · T+

The Pakistani military leadership wishes to draw a redline for the U.S.' covert operations so that Washington will be compelled to deal with militant Afghan groups through the single window of the ISI.

In his 22nd visit also, Admiral “Mike” Mullen, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff of the United States armed forces, failed to achieve what he couldn't at the previous 21 calls he made to Pakistan since assuming his assignment in the Pentagon in October 2007. Yet, of all top U.S. officials, Mr. Mullen is projected by Washington as a dogged believer in America's cooperation with the Pakistani army leadership. As he proceeded to Islamabad last Wednesday, he spoke with extraordinary candour on the troubled U.S.-Pakistan relationship. “We have had a very turbulent time,” he told Reuters, but despite tensions, both the U.S. and Pakistan acknowledged that the relationship was vital. “I think that all of us believe that we cannot afford to let this relationship come apart. It's just too dangerous. It's too dangerous, in each country, for each country. It's too dangerous for the region.” The relationship was difficult, but “we walk away from it at our peril, quite frankly.” The U.S.-Pakistan relationship couldn't have been framed more aptly. But then, Mr. Mullen went on to make the stunning allegation that what caused tension most is the “relationship” between Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and the so-called Haqqani network of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.

Mr. Mullen couldn't have arrived at this realisation on the ISI-Haqqani nexus, which has been one of the worst-kept secrets of the Afghan bazaar, belatedly. The latest bunch of WikiLeaks cables pertaining to Guantanamo Bay actually reveals that the U.S. military, which Mr. Mullen heads, has all along listed the ISI as a “terrorist” organisation alongside the al-Qaeda, the Hezbollah, the Hamas and the Iranian intelligence! Surely, the issue is the timing of Mr. Mullen's statement. He deliberately upped the ante, holding the ISI directly and primarily responsible for the stalemate in the war; in effect, he challenged the Pakistani military leadership that it would be held accountable for the Taliban's summer offensive.

Mr. Mullen betrayed the deep frustration within the Barack Obama administration that the stalemate in the Afghan war cannot be broken militarily. A ferocious Taliban counter-offensive is expected and American officials are nervously anticipating a sharp escalation in war casualties, which may happen at an awkward time as the U.S. presidential election campaign begins to get livelier by the day. The war has become unpopular in the American public opinion and the political class doesn't have the stomach to continue with it. The U.S. coalition partners too (including Britain) are in a tearing hurry to exit.

Over and above, there is an acute “resource crunch.” David Ignatius of The Washington Post wrote recently that the current budget crisis “should force some hard decisions about America's foreign policy priorities ... Today, the U.S. is allocating about $110 billion annually for the Afghan war, about $3.2 billion for military and economic aid to Pakistan, and about $150 million in special assistance to help Egypt's democratic revolution. In terms of U.S. national interests, those spending levels don't make sense. The pyramid is upside down … we should spend less [on AfPak], going forward, as we move along the exit ramp. This will mean a smaller military footprint, more use of paramilitary forces and more emphasis on diplomacy.”

Prima facie, the Washington-Islamabad acrimony is due to the U.S. displeasure that the Pakistani military continues to baulk at launching operations in the North Waziristan region, where the Haqqani group is entrenched, while Islamabad opposes the manner in which the U.S. is conducting drone attacks and intelligence activities within Pakistan. However, the acrimony is quintessentially an attempt to set the bottom line of the Afghan peace talks. The Pakistani suspicion is that the U.S. is deliberately withholding its long-term Afghanistan strategy, which leaves Islamabad groping in the dark about American intentions.

Bypassing the ally

The fact of the matter is that the U.S. has been holding direct talks with the Taliban. It has been able to do this largely because of the extensive intelligence network it has created in Pakistan — which became possible because Islamabad allowed it to happen. That, ironically, enables Washington to dispense with the good offices of the Pakistani military and the ISI, and opt for direct interaction with the insurgent groups. The U.S. intelligence network within Pakistan has penetrated the range of insurgent groups — the Afghan Taliban, the “Pakistan Taliban,” and non-Taliban (Afghan and Pakistani) militant groups. Evidently, if the drone attacks are becoming more “result-oriented,” it is due to real-time intelligence inputs. During the six weeks of gruelling interrogation of U.S. intelligence operative Raymond Davis, the Pakistani military caught on to a host of home truths. By now, the Pakistani military would have a fair idea of the extent of the American intelligence network and its potential to play merry havoc by splintering insurgent groups, pitting one group against another, manipulating factionalism within groups, monitoring the terror network and, conceivably, even turning some of the insurgent groups into instruments of U.S. regional policies. (Tehran insists that the U.S. is indulging in covert operations in Pakistan and Iran.)

Suffice it to say the Pakistani military leadership wishes to draw a redline for the U.S.' covert operations so that Washington will be compelled to deal with militant Afghan groups through the single window of the ISI — within the parameters set by what old-timers call the “[Ronald] Reagan rules” during the Afghan jihad of the 1980s. There is hardly any leeway for Pakistan to compromise on this demand, which aims at revising the ground rules of the U.S.-Pakistan strategic partnership in the conduct of the Afghan war (based hitherto on unspoken, unwritten, ever-deniable and flexible templates of collaboration).

To be sure, Pakistan is insisting on the need to reset the ground rules as the endgame advances, in order to avoid the horrible prospect of its so-called “strategic assets” in Afghanistan — which it created at enormous cost and sacrifice and at great risk over the past three decades — getting systematically cannibalised by the American intelligence operatives scavenging the Pakistani territories, on one side of the Durand Line, and by the Special Forces under General David Petraeus relentlessly scouring the Hindu Kush, on the other — the famous “hammer and anvil approach.”

Therefore, Pakistan has done the logical thing by reaching out to Afghan President Hamid Karzai in an attempt to form a condominium to kick-start formal reconciliation with the Taliban in a swift sequential process, which would present Washington with a fait accompli. Mr. Karzai is willing to cooperate in this sideshow since he has his own problems with the Obama administration. The Washington establishment is annoyed with Mr. Karzai due to his inability (or unwillingness) to deliver a status of forces agreement that would effectively legitimise long-term American military presence on Afghan soil. On his part, Mr. Karzai expects a pivotal role in any peace process so that he doesn't become politically expendable by 2014, whereas Washington quietly incites the non-Pashtun elements to challenge his zeal for reconciliation with the Taliban. So, it is this congruence of interests between Kabul and Islamabad that manifests as their joint demand that any Afghan peace process should be Afghan-led and not “dictated from outside”.

The core of the U.S.' strategic dilemma is that the Pentagon desperately wants to perpetuate American military presence in Afghanistan, but knows that the majority of Afghans and the regional powers disfavour it. Therefore, the U.S. is opting for a strategy of selective reconciliation with “friendly” insurgent groups, which allows the drawdown of U.S. troops and gradually turns the war into a matter of Special Forces operations or pinpointed air strikes.[/b] The strategy aims at creating a political environment within which American forces can relocate themselves to the tranquil northern regions of Afghanistan (without having to fight and get killed or maimed), while vast areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan and the tribal tracts in the border regions lapse into “cold peace.”

Of course, Pakistan is justified in wondering what is there for it in this scenario. This wasn't how the war was supposed to end. Obviously, Washington's priorities will change once the intensity of the fighting declines. For one thing, the U.S. aid flow will decline. Once the U.S. strengthens its direct line to the insurgents, its dependence on the Pakistani military can only decline. But Pakistan's objective of gaining “strategic depth” in Afghanistan remains elusive. Equally, Pakistan will be left grappling with an assortment of militant groups along its long, disputed border with Afghanistan that have been highly radicalised by the U.S.-led war. These include some groups which have been alienated one way or the other by Pakistan's role as the U.S.' “key non-NATO ally.”

Pakistan faces an existential crisis in its Pashtun tribal tract that has borne the brunt of the U.S.-led war. As last Saturday's London Times report shows, there will be all sorts of attempts to muddy the waters. It suits the U.S. strategy to give the Afghan endgame the exaggerated overtones of an India-Pakistan turf war. The Indian establishment acted wisely to open dialogue with Pakistan in Mohali.

(The writer is a former diplomat.)

Besides minor caveats I have with the article. Its a pretty decent analysis by MKB.

[abhishek_sharma]

How al Qaeda Works.
Farrall, Leah.
Foreign Affairs, Mar/Apr2011, Vol. 90 Issue 2, p128-138

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ ... aeda-works

What the Organization's Subsidiaries Say About Its Strength

DESPITE NEARLY a decade of war, al Qaeda is stronger today than when it carried out the 9/11 attacks. Before 2001, its history was checkered with mostly failed attempts to fulfill its most enduring goal: the unification of other militant Islamist groups under its strategic leadership. However, since fleeing Afghanistan to Pakistan's tribal areas in late 2001, al Qaeda has founded a regional branch in the Arabian Peninsula and acquired franchises in Iraq and the Maghreb. Today, it has more members, greater geographic reach, and a level of ideological sophistication and influence it lacked ten years ago.

Still, most accounts of the progress of the war against al Qaeda contend that the organization is on the decline, pointing to its degraded capacity to carry out terrorist operations and depleted senior leadership as evidence that the group is at its weakest since 9/11. But such accounts treat the central al Qaeda organization separately from its subsidiaries and overlook its success in expanding its power and influence through them. These groups should not be ignored. All have attacked Western interests in their regions of operation. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has also long targeted the United States, but its efforts have moved beyond the execution stage only in the last two years, most recently with the foiled plot to bomb cargo planes in October 2010. And although al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has not yet attacked outside its region, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was reportedly involved in the June 2007 London and Glasgow bomb plots.

It is time for an updated conception of al Qaeda's organization that takes into account its relationships with its subsidiaries. A broader conceptual framework will allow for a greater understanding of how and to what degree it exercises command and control over its expanded structure, the goals driving its expansion strategy, and its tactics.

AL QAEDA'S LOST DECADE

ALTHOUGH AL QAEDA had tried to use other groups to further its agenda in the 1980s and early 1990s, Osama bin Laden's first serious attempts at unification began in the mid-1990s, when the organization was based in Sudan. Bin Laden sought to build an "Islamic Army" but failed. Al Qaeda had no ideology or manhaj (program) around which to build lasting unity, no open front of its own to attract new fighters, and many of its members, dissatisfied with "civilian work," had left to join the jihad elsewhere. Faced with such circumstances, bin Laden instead relied on doling out financial support to encourage militant groups to join his army. But the international community put pressure on Sudan to stop his activities, and so the Sudanese government expelled al Qaeda from the country in 1996. As a result, the group fled to Afghanistan.

By mid-1996, al Qaeda was a shell of an organization, reduced to some 30 members. Facing irrelevance and fearing that a movement of Islamist militants was rising outside of his control, bin Laden decided a "blessed jihad" was necessary. He declared war on the United States, hoping this would attract others to follow al Qaeda. It did not. A second effort followed in 1998, when bin Laden unsuccessfully used his newly created World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders to lobby other groups to join him. Later that year, al Qaeda launched its first large-scale attacks: the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which it hoped would boost its fortunes. But these, too, failed to attract other groups to join, with some instead criticizing al Qaeda for the attacks and its lack of a legitimate manhaj.

With no coherent ideology or manhaj to encourage unification under his leadership, bin Laden instead pursued a predatory approach. He endeavored to buy the allegiance of weaker groups or bully them into aligning with al Qaeda, and he attempted to divide and conquer the stronger groups. In the late 1990s, he tried and failed to gain control over the Khalden training camp, led by the militants Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi and Abu Zubaydah, and over the activities of Abu Musab al-Suri and Abu Khabab al-Masri, senior militant figures who ran their own training programs. Bin Laden's attempts in 1997-98 to convince Ibn al-Khattab, a Saudi militant who led an international brigade in Chechnya, to come under al Qaeda's banner also failed. His efforts in 2000-2001 to gain control over a brigade of foreign fighters in Afghanistan met a similar fate: the Taliban leader Mullah Omar, who had supreme authority over the brigade, instead handed the leadership of it to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, another group bin Laden was attempting to convince to align with al Qaeda. Around the same time, bin Laden also unsuccessfully lobbied the Egyptian Islamic Group and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group to join al Qaeda's efforts. And although al Qaeda supported the militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in his establishment of an independent training camp in Afghanistan, bin Laden was unable to convince him • to formally join the organization.

The only real success during this period was al Qaeda's mid-2001 merger with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, now al Qaeda's second-in-command. The merger was possible thanks to Egyptian Islamic Jihad's weakened position and its reliance on bin Laden for money. The decision was nevertheless contentious within Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and several of its members left rather than join with al Qaeda. In the end, al Qaeda's only successful merger during its Afghanistan years added just five people to its core membership. Compared to this dismal record, the past decade has been highly successful.

By 2001, al Qaeda still had no formal branches or franchises. Its membership included a core of just under 200 people, a 122-person martyrdom brigade, and several dozen foot soldiers recruited from the 700 or so graduates of its training camps. These numbers made al Qaeda among the strongest of the 14 foreign militant groups operating in Afghanistan, yet there was little unity among them. Relations were characterized by doctrinal debate on issues such as the legitimacy of fighting alongside the Taliban or recognizing Mullah Omar as "commander of the faithful." The lack of unity further hampered bin Laden's efforts to gain influence and control.

MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

HIS PREDATORY approach to unification having failed, bin Laden sowed the seeds of a new strategy. He concluded that al Qaeda could force unity among foreign militants and draw in new followers by carrying out "mass impact" attacks against the United States. The 9/11 attacks were designed to incite an armed retaliation that would get U.S. boots on Afghan soil, opening up a new front for jihad and--because the retaliation would confirm al Qaeda's status as the "strong horse" among Islamist militants--causing smaller groups to come under al Qaeda's leadership to fight against the invading Americans.

The strategy worked at first. The U.S. invasion began in October 2001, and in November, the leaders of the foreign militant groups remaining in Kandahar agreed to come under al Qaeda's command in an effort to defend the city. But the organization's control did not last long: in early December 2001, those foreign militants began to withdraw from Kandahar. Al Qaeda still lacked a cogent ideology and manhaj, which meant that bin Laden had nothing to convince these groups to fully commit to its cause.

After al Qaeda's flight from Afghanistan in December 2001, the group's Iran-based leadership and its members in the Arabian Peninsula sought to reverse the organization's fortunes by building a solid ideological foundation and a clear manhaj. This effort was intended to. support those already undertaking jihad in al Qaeda's name and end senior Saudi religious figures' criticisms of its lack of a manhaj. Around the same time, bin Laden also ordered that a new branch in the Arabian Peninsula--preparations for which had been undertaken in Khandahar before 9/11--be activated. AQAP is often referred to as an al Qaeda franchise, but it is better described as a branch. It was created by, and continues to operate under, the leadership of core al Qaeda members. Unlike those of al Qaeda's franchises, the leaders of AQAP did not swear an oath of allegiance to bin Laden in order to bring their organization under al Qaeda's umbrella. They were already al Qaeda members and established the branch on bin Laden's direct orders. Although AQAP commanders answer directly to al Qaeda's leadership, they have regional autonomy. But the relationship has not been without issues. Senior figures responsible for establishing the branch and some members in Iran had lobbied bin Laden to delay its opening and instead focus on developing an ideology and a manhaj. Bin Laden refused; nevertheless, between 2002 and 2004, AQAP's and al Qaeda's leaders intensified their efforts to consolidate the organization's ideological and tactical foundations to support the new branch and bolster al Qaeda's legitimacy.

They drew from takfiri thought, which justifies attacking corrupt regimes in Muslim lands, and on materials that outline the Muslim requirement to target the global enemy: in this case, the United States and the West. (This was framed in the context of defensive jihad, the need for which was reinforced by the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.) The hybrid ideology and manhaj that emerged make little distinction between targeting local enemies and targeting global ones and have a one-size-fits-all solution--jihad. Partnering with al Qaeda does not, therefore, require a local group to abandon its own agenda, just broaden its focus. This helped assuage other groups' fears that merging with al Qaeda would mean a loss of autonomy to pursue their own local goals.

The inclusion of takfiri materials gave al Qaeda another advantage, because this literature stresses the need for militant groups to unify. There are two main streams of guidance on how this should be done. One focuses on seniority and holds that newer groups should merge with the oldest group, regardless of the capabilities of each. The other emphasizes capability. Al Qaeda seems to have favored the seniority argument, and after its merger with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, it could-- rather dubiously--present itself as the senior militant group.

Newer groups were apparently willing to go along, even if they had greater capacity than al Qaeda. By late 2004, for example, Zarqawi's group in Iraq, Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, had eclipsed al Qaeda in terms of both resources and brand power. Even so, Zarqawi willingly-merged his group with the weaker al Qaeda and swore an oath to bin Laden, creating AQI. Zarqawi's ties to al Qaeda's senior leadership, which had been consolidated during time he had spent in Afghanistan and Iran and had been further strengthened when al Qaeda members arrived in Iraq after the U.S. invasion, also played a role in his decision. Zarqawi was also instrumental in convincing the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) to join, even though it had more members than al Qaeda. Significantly, the GSPC did not merge with Zarqawi's group, which was then the strongest Islamist militant group worldwide. Instead, in late 2006, after a lengthy negotiation process, the GSPC merged with the central al Qaeda organization, the most senior group, becoming its second branch, AQIM.

Although the development of a coherent ideology and manhaj helped al Qaeda acquire franchises, negotiations with most groups were nevertheless drawn out because it proved difficult to agree on the parameters of operational autonomy. Al Qaeda's focus was on integration, unity, growth, and gaining strategic leadership in the militant milieu. The group viewed external operations against the West; keeping the jihad going, no matter how incrementally; and strategic messaging as the way to achieve these objectives. So even as they pursued local agendas, the franchises were required to undertake some attacks against Western interests, and leaders of groups joining al Qaeda had to be willing to present a united front, stay on message, and be seen to fall under al Qaeda's authority--all crucial for demonstrating the organization's power and attracting others to its cause.

WHO'S THE BOSS?

AL QAEDA today is not a traditional hierarchical terrorist organization, with a pyramid-style organizational structure, and it does not exercise full command and control over its branch and franchises. But nor is its role limited to broad ideological influence. Due to its dispersed structure, al Qaeda operates as a devolved network hierarchy, in which levels of command authority are not always clear; personal ties between militants carry weight and, at times, transcend the command structure between core, branch, and franchises. For their part, al Qaeda's core members focus on exercising strategic command and control to ensure the centralization of the organizations actions and message, rather than directly managing its branch and franchises. Such an approach reduces the command-and-control burden, because al Qaeda need only manage centralization on a broad level, which, with a solid manhaj already in place, can be achieved through strategic leadership rather than day-to-day oversight.

Al Qaeda exercises command and control mostly in relation to external operations. It requires its subsidiaries to seek approval before conducting attacks outside their assigned regions and specifies that its branch and franchises seek approval before assisting other militant groups with external operations. For the most part, they appear to follow these stipulations. While Zarqawi was at AQI's helm, he reportedly sought permission to expand his area of operation to include Jordan, but it is not known whether permission was granted.

In times of sustained pressure, al Qaeda has delegated significant responsibility for external operations against the United States to its branch, AQAP. The first such action came in late 2002, when al Qaeda had exhausted its existing supply of operatives for external operations and was in the process of rebuilding its capacity from its sanctuary in Pakistan. Al Qaeda asked AQAP to carry out an attack on U.S. interests; AQAP devised a plot against U.S. subways and got permission to use a chemical device. (In 2003, just before putting the plan into action, AQAP asked al Qaeda for final signoff but was denied.) When the pressure on al Qaeda eased between 2003 and 2006, because the United States was focusing less on Afghanistan, the group was able to regenerate its capacity and intensify its planning for global operations. But the U.S. drone campaign against al Qaeda in Pakistan's tribal areas has again put pressure on it, and the group has again tapped AQAP to undertake external operations. It has also made similar requests of its franchises, particularly AQI. In 2008, for example, it asked AQI to carry out attacks against Danish interests in retaliation for a Danish newspaper's publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad.

When subsidiaries do carry out attacks outside their territories, al Qaeda requires that they be conducted within set parameters. For example, al Qaeda heavily encourages suicide attacks and repeated strikes on preapproved classes of targets, such as public transportation, government buildings, and vital infrastructure. Once a location has been authorized, the branch and the franchises are free to pursue plots against it. But al Qaeda still emphasizes the need to consult the central leadership before undertaking large-scale plots, plots directed against a new location or a new class of targets, and plots utilizing a tactic that has not been previously sanctioned, such as the use of chemical, biological, or radiological devices.

Al Qaeda has put these requirements in place to ensure that attacks complement, not undermine, its strategic objectives. Whereas AQAP appears to honor al Qaeda's authority, at times the franchises have acted on their own; AQI'S unapproved bombings of three hotels in Amman, Jordan, in 2005, for example, earned it a strong rebuke from headquarters. And a range of factors influence whether a franchise will attack an external target when al Qaeda asks it to. Chief among them is the franchise's capacity and whether the franchise is willing to dedicate resources to external operations instead of local activities. Another factor is the closeness of the ties between the subsidiary and the central organization; the tighter the ties, the more likely the request will be honored. AQI has a closer relationship with al Qaeda than AQIM. Still, AQIM has generally cooperated at least with requests to stay on message and present the image of a united and hierarchical organization. This emphasis on a unified appearance was clear when, in November 2010, AQIM's leader, Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, announced that France would have to negotiate directly with bin Laden for the release of hostages held by AQIM. Although in recent times, the capacity of both franchises has been weakened by intensified counterterrorism efforts against them, neither has shown any signs of abandoning al Qaeda's global agenda in favor of purely local goals.

Communication and coordination among al Qaeda's core, branch, and franchises occur mostly through their respective information committees, which have access to senior leaders, distribution networks to assist in passing information, and close ties to the operations section of each group, which is responsible for planning attacks (since attacks must be publicized). Messages from the branch and the franchises to the core then generally go through al Qaeda's second-tier leadership, which briefs Zawahiri, bin Laden, or both if the issue is urgent--that is, involves gaining permission for external operations or resolving a conflict between or within the subsidiaries.

Because al Qaeda's second-tier leadership manages most of the group's interaction with its subsidiaries, the removal of either Zawahiri or bin Laden would not overly affect the unity among the organization's core, branch, and franchises, nor would it impede communication among them. So long as al Qaeda can continue to demonstrate its ability to lead and provide strategic direction, its organizational dynamics will likely remain unchanged. The emphasis on unity in al Qaeda's ideology and manhaj and a desire to maintain the status quo will likely allow the organization to hold together, even as it comes under more pressure from the West.

FUTURE OUTLOOK

ALTHOUGH OPENING a regional branch and acquiring franchises has reinforced the position of al Qaeda and its ability to present itself as both the senior and the most capable Islamist militant group, it approaches new mergers warily. Al Qaeda learned a lesson about overreach in 2006, when it attempted to bring splinter groups from the Egyptian Islamic Group and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group under its umbrella. In an ill-calculated move, it portrayed the joining of the splinter factions as formal mergers with al Qaeda, which elicited heavy criticism from both groups' leaders, who opposed unification with al Qaeda. This criticism has, however, minimally impacted al Qaeda's appeal with its target audience--those already radicalized to its cause but not yet part of the organization--and other groups still seek to join under al Qaeda's banner. Al Qaeda is nonetheless wary of attracting criticism from other militants, so it is reticent to accept groups that have not demonstrated unified leadership within their areas of operation.

Al Shabab, a Somali militant group, has openly declared its allegiance to bin Laden in an effort to join al Qaeda as a franchise. But infighting between al Shabab and another group with historical ties to al Qaeda, Hizbul Islam, has thus far kept al Qaeda from accepting al Shabab. Recent reports that Hizbul Islam and al Shabab have unified may see a change in al Qaeda's position. Due to the significant ties between AQAP and al Shabab, any future merger would likely be negotiated with AQAP'S assistance.

Should al Shabab's popularity with foreign fighters continue to rise, and the group become more active in external operations planning, al Qaeda's hand may be forced. In 2009, a small group of Australian extremists (mostly of Somali descent) sought the permission of al Shabab leaders to carry out an attack in Australia. Although the plot was foiled, al Qaeda views this type of extraregional activity as potential brand competition. If al Shabab carries out a successful attack somewhere in the West, al Qaeda might more quickly move to bring the group under its umbrella, in order to control al Shabab's projection of power.

With the exception of al Shabab, al Qaeda is unlikely to acquire any new subsidiaries in the immediate future. It largely ignores Southeast Asia, despite the ongoing efforts of Islamist militants there to reach out to the organization. Al Qaeda was once linked to a splinter group of the Indonesian organization Jemaah Islamiyah, but Jemaah Islamiyah has since been decimated by Indonesian counterterrorism efforts. Should ties again be strengthened between al Qaeda and Indonesian militants--many of whom are now coalescing around a relatively new group, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid--the relationship would likely be limited to material support. A training group dubbed "al Qaeda in Aceh," which was linked to Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, adopted the al Qaeda name without formal permission and probably as a means of attracting material support. Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid has its own robust and regionally focused manhaj, making a formal merger unlikely.

In Lebanon, meanwhile, after several failed attempts to gain influence over groups there and in the broader region, al Qaeda seems to have settled for working with a group active in the area. The Abdullah Azzam Brigades, which are led by Saleh al-Qarawi, a senior figure with links to AQAP, AQI, and al Qaeda's core, are reportedly based in Lebanon but have a wide operational ambit in the broader region. The group has regional autonomy but ultimately answers to the central al Qaeda organization for strategic direction. Given the inability of the group to gain dominance in the region, it is unlikely to become an official franchise.

In the near term, aside from any efforts to bring al Shabab on board, al Qaeda is likely to focus on its existing subsidiaries. As it comes under continued pressure in Pakistan, al Qaeda will primarily focus on making sure that the centralization of the organization's actions is maintained through the external operations carried out by its subsidiaries and that the subsidiaries stay on message. Doing so will ensure that in the event the central leadership suffers greater losses, al Qaeda will have alternative means to project power and maintain influence.

Because al Qaeda will continue to encourage its branch and franchises to carry out attacks and will continue to use the reactions they provoke to pursue its goals, it is important that the strategic picture of al Qaeda accurately reflect the organization's broad operating dynamics instead of wishful thinking about the central organization's degraded capacity. A large attack tomorrow orchestrated by the central leadership would prove wrong any assessments of diminished capabilities. Meanwhile, the enduring goals that drive al Qaeda's strategies and tactics, which have allowed the group to expand during the past decade of war, continue to be overlooked. Until al Qaeda's interaction with its branch and franchises is better comprehended and taken into consideration, assessments of its capacity and organizational health will continue to fall short.

~~~~~~~~

By Leah Farrall

LEAH FARRALL is a former Senior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst with the Australian Federal Police and the author of the blog All Things Counter Terrorism.

[ramana]

Shyamd< It also means India is looking after her own interests.

[arun]

X Posted from the TSP News and discussion thread.

The United States of America’s “Major Non Nato Ally”, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan sticks a knife in America’s back.

The Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Yousuf Raza Gilani is reported by the Wall Street Journal as having lobbied Afghan President Hamid karzai “against building a long-term strategic partnership with the U.S., urging him instead to look to Pakistan—and its Chinese ally—for help in striking a peace deal with the Taliban and rebuilding the economy”:

APRIL 27, 2011

Karzai Told to Dump U.S.

Pakistan Urges Afghanistan to Ally With Islamabad, Beijing

By MATTHEW ROSENBERG

Pakistan is lobbying Afghanistan's president against building a long-term strategic partnership with the U.S., urging him instead to look to Pakistan—and its Chinese ally—for help in striking a peace deal with the Taliban and rebuilding the economy, Afghan officials say.

The pitch was made at an April 16 meeting in Kabul by Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, who bluntly told Afghan President Hamid Karzai that the Americans had failed them both, according to Afghans familiar with the meeting. Mr. Karzai should forget about allowing a long-term U.S. military presence in his country, Mr. Gilani said, according to the Afghans. Pakistan's bid to cut the U.S. out of Afghanistan's future is the clearest sign to date that, as the nearly 10-year war's endgame begins, tensions between Washington and Islamabad threaten to scuttle America's prospects of ending the conflict on its own terms. ……………………

Mr. Karzai is wavering on Pakistan's overtures, according to Afghans familiar with his thinking, with pro- and anti-American factions at the presidential palace trying to sway him to their sides. …………………….

Wall Street Journal

[shyamd]

Shyamd< It also means India is looking after her own interests.

Yup The boys in dilli are awake to what may unfold. Good.

The Hatf 9 test was specifically so that Bharat doesn't try anything. We know they have this capability, they know we have the capability to use nuke tipped gear.
They are telling our strategists no border skirmish will be tolerated as Using N tipped stuff is escalatory and they are saying to Dilli we will use it even if there is a border problem over next 2 to 3 years imo.

Things are unfolding as planned.

[Venkarl]

...They are telling our strategists no border skirmish will be tolerated as Using N tipped stuff is escalatory and they are saying to Dilli we will use it even if there is a border problem over next 2 to 3 years imo.

Things are unfolding as planned.

why would and should they tell/warn this to our strategists? when did we do a border skirmish since 1947? every time, it was them who skirmished which led to full on war....it should be other way around actually...we should be warning them about any border mischiefs by Paki ISI strategists would be escalatory......what is unfolding as planned?{am I missing some thing}

[shyamd]

why would and should they tell/warn this to our strategists? when did we do a border skirmish since 1947? every time, it was them who skirmished which led to full on war

I know! They have become paranoid post 71. This is how TSPA think.

....it should be other way around actually...we should be warning them about any border mischiefs by Paki ISI strategists would be escalatory......what is unfolding as planned?{am I missing some thing}

You need to read up on the posts in west asia and the scenario I had posted. You are missing out on what is currently unfolding.

[JE Menon]

Karzai, if he is doing what Pakistan is suggesting (and this by no means certain despite the rhetoric), would be foolish in the extreme. He should know that once he makes that break, his head will be the first that the ISI guns for - he should remember his father's fate. Also of his friend Abdul Haq. I don't think Karzai is that foolish.

Wait for a nice little surprise in coming weeks.

And Pakistan, playing the Chinese lapdog now, will find out the implications of openly double-crossing the Americans like this. Tactical brilliance as always, thank god.

[shyamd]

Karzai, if he is doing what Pakistan is suggesting (and this by no means certain despite the rhetoric), would be foolish in the extreme. He should know that once he makes that break, his head will be the first that the ISI guns for - he should remember his father's fate. Also of his friend Abdul Haq. I don't think Karzai is that foolish.

Wait for a nice little surprise in coming weeks.

And Pakistan, playing the Chinese lapdog now, will find out the implications of openly double-crossing the Americans like this. Tactical brilliance as always, thank god.

Nato, Afghan forces attack Pakistani check post; two wounded http://bit.ly/eoGjER

AoA. unkil/NATO won't do anything serious, but SF strikes at the heart is likely. But immy khan will extend his protests and increase pressure on ISAF.

[svinayak]

I know! They have become paranoid post 71. This is how TSPA think.

....it should be other way around actually...we should be warning them about any border mischiefs by Paki ISI strategists would be escalatory......what is unfolding as planned?{am I missing some thing}

You need to read up on the posts in west asia and the scenario I had posted. You are missing out on what is currently unfolding.

Pak is the one which has over stretched and has claims all over. They are trying to force the issue and is a revisionist state.

[ramana]

One should tie the TSP advice to Karzai along with the Encominc prespective thread news about PRC moving from $ reserves and the coming change in world economic order.

[saip]

Man opens fire on Americans in Kabul; 9 dead

http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/0 ... tml?hpt=T2

The Pilot appears to be a 20 year veteran. If you cannot trust this kind of guys, who can you trust? Another example of US failed policy in Afghanistan.

[ramana]

Nightwatch 4/26/2011

4/26/2011

Pakistan: Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan - the Pakistani Taliban -- claimed responsibility for the bomb attacks on two Pakistan Navy buses in Karachi which killed 4 naval personnel and injured more than 50.


Comment: This and similar attacks are executed to show that the guardians of the state are unable to protect themselves. That is a powerful terror message to everyday citizens. It is an old message, but still effective in undermining confidence in the forces of order.

Attacks against symbols of authority in Pakistan are important in demonstrating that the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban are not identical, do not share common goals, and do no operate under a single leadership.


The idea of a unitary threat against Pakistan and Afghanistan is contradicted by every attack such as that in Karachi. The Pashtun insurrection in Afghanistan overlaps into Pakistan, as do the Pashtuns themselves, but it is very different in composition, economic class and political direction from the Waziri fighters and bandits of the Pakistani Taliban who want to overthrow the government in Islamabad.

IOW the Waziri fighters are TSP controlled where as the TTP are rebels.

[Rudradev]

Ramana, that's right. N.Waziristan is totally ISI proxies + foreign Al Qaeda. S. Waziristan has ISI proxies Maulvi Nazir and Hekmatyar and also one TTP warlord, Wali-ur-Rehman. Other parts of FATA are mostly dominated by TTP (anti-Islamabad).

At present the TTP is attacking Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa from bases in Kunar/Nuristan (Afghanistan)... Pakistan alleges that the Afghan National Army is aiding the TTP in this!

It could be that the game of the last decade has been partially "turned" and is being played back against the Pakis. Initially it was Karzai + US holding Kabul against the assaults of Taliban based safely in Pakistan. Now it is Pakistan facing assaults by TTP based partially in Afghanistan... I wonder if US + Kabul are giving the TSPA/ISI a taste of their own medicine?

Also keep in mind the DAWN report today about NATO and ANA attacking a Pakistani border post in S. Waziristan: http://www.dawn.com/2011/04/27/nato-afg ... -post.html

No wonder the Pakis are desperate to get Karzai on their side now. They want an Islamabad-aligned Kabul + Waziri fighters coalition to be the "anvil", against which the TSPA "hammer" can break and subdue the TTP. And they want this to be a US-free alliance under Beijing's aegis.


Cross-posting from TSP thread:

A little snapshot I made of the GOAT on April 22, 2011.

[ramana]

Gen. P's post retirement job means TSP will get hot. We haven't understood the meaning of it.

[abhishek_sharma]

Petraeus’s optimism about Afghanistan not shared at CIA

http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts ... d_at_cia_0

Rearranging the deck chairs

http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/201 ... eck_chairs

Crocker: No end in sight for internal conflict in Afghanistan

http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts ... fghanistan



What's wrong with China becoming Afghanistan's main patron?

http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/po ... ain_patron

The problems of U.S. relations with the host government in counterinsurgency

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/20 ... insurgency

I was a year early on predicting that Ryan Crocker would become next U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, according to uber-reporter Karen DeYoung. I think he is terrific, so it's a good move, and quite a sacrifice on his part, given his 11 previous tours of duty: He has done time in Iran, Qatar, Tunisia, Iraq (twice), Lebanon, Egypt, Kuwait, Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. He also went to high school in Turkey, where his pop was serving in the Air Force. In 1983, when many of the little grasshoppers were not yet born, he was in the American embassy in Beirut when it was blown up.

Old Crocker's return to Kabul does make me think about something young Exum has pointed out, which is that we haven't figured out in American counterinsurgency what the U.S. government relationship with the host government is supposed to be.

[Anabhaya]

The impending Af-Pak Fuk-Ap!

[shyamd]

Gen. P's post retirement job means TSP will get hot. We haven't understood the meaning of it.

Lets see if they come to us for 120k troops. Rumour has it the file is still out and about - not permanently discarded. Lets see if MMS can pull off something off.

In relation to Kabul visit see MMS visit to Kazakhstan.

--------
Why central Asia matters to India

April 25, 2011 16:06 IST

India [ Images ] must create firm ties among the energy exporting states of central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and, if possible, Turkmenistan, says Harsh V Pant.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's [ Images ] recent visit to Kazakhstan is a reminder of how high stakes are in central Asia for Indian foreign policy priorities.

While the Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev needed legitimacy for his re-election victory that has been criticised in the western capitals, for New Delhi [ Images ] there are real issues in that part of the world that concern its national security and economic growth. Not surprisingly, the two main areas that were given serious consideration were the civilian nuclear cooperation pact and the situation in Afghanistan.

New Delhi and Astana signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement, which provides a legal framework for cooperation in this field including fuel supply, joint mining of uranium, reactor safety mechanisms and construction and operation of nuclear power plants. Nazarbayev also affirmed that his nation is on course to fulfil its commitment of supplying 2,100 tonnes of uranium to India by 2014.

On Afghanistan, the two sides agreed that "it was essential that renewed efforts were made to sufficiently build up the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces".

President Nazarbayev won his nation's overwhelming approval in the presidential election held in early April with more than 95.5 percent of the ballots but lost the vote of confidence he sought from the world community.

The 70-year-old Nazarbayev, who has been President for 20 years, won another five-year term -- with voter turnout of 90 percent -- after elections held two years ahead of time to lengthen his time in office. The elections were widely considered a sham as an absence of opposition candidates and a vibrant political discourse had resulted in a non-competitive environment.

Nazarbayev has ruled since 1989, when Kazakhstan was part of the Soviet Union and he was its party secretary. He is the country's only directly elected official. His domination has been so complete that no serious political competition has emerged and so adroit that much of the population reveres him.

Kazakhs credit him with keeping their country protected from the turmoil that has roiled other central Asian nations such as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Tajikistan endured a costly civil war, and Uzbekistan, where the President is as long-serving but far more ruthless, has suffered civil strife.

India's prime minister's visit to Astana gave Nazarbayev a much needed opportunity to showcase his international acceptability as the leader of a strategically vital state in central Asia. Major powers have competed for power and influence in central Asia since the 19th century and that 'Great Game' seems to be back with a bang.

The importance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation that has evolved into a forum for discussion on regional security and economic issues cannot be overstated in this context. It has become even more important post-September 11, 2001, because growing ethnic nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism is a major cause of concern for Russia [ Images ], China and the central Asian states.

Russia and China have been successful in using the strong aversion of the United States to terrorism after September 11 for their own ends to tackle Islamic insurgency within their territories. In the post–9/11 environment, the SCO serves as a means to keep control of central Asia and limit US influence in the region. In fact, the SCO denounced the misuse of anti-terror war to target any country and threw its weight behind the UN in an attempt to show its disagreement with the US-led war in Iraq.

India's growing interests in central Asia are well-recognised. There is a growing convergence between the US and Indian interests, especially their reluctance to see the region fall under the exclusive influence of Russia or China. India was worried in the 1990s when the Russian influence in central Asia weakened substantially with a commensurate rise in the Chinese influence. This negatively impacted upon Indian threat perceptions which stabilised only after the growing US presence in the region since 2001.

India views itself as a stabiliser and security provider in the region and with its growing economic clout, an attractive economic power. India's interest in securing reliable energy supplies and trade through central Asia remains substantial. There is a seamless logical web from the objective of ensuring central Asian stability and India's voice there to the conclusion that India must also ensure reliable energy access to oil and gas sources originating in central Asia.

The requirements of energy security also postulate not only a continuing positive relationship with Moscow [ Images ], even had the past 60 years not been one of unbroken friendship, and second, friendly ties to all the central Asian states.

India must create firm ties among the energy exporting states of central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and, if possible, Turkmenistan. It should be no surprise then that India's ties with the regional states are growing. Moreover the imperatives of getting Afghanistan right are stronger than ever today when the situation is rapidly deteriorating.

India had opened an air base in Ayni, Tajikistan in 2002 to guard against growing instability in the region though nothing much has happened on that front for long. India's ties with regional states are growing and moderate Islam of the region makes it imperative for India to engage the region more substantively. Other powers, barring China, have recognised this reality and have sought to harness India towards achieving common goals.

Russia, for example, supports Indian membership in the SCO and has talked about the possibility of India participating in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation.

A great power competition in central Asia will make it harder for India to pursue its interests. As such it becomes imperative for Indian diplomacy to work towards major power cooperation to bring some measure of stability to Afghanistan as well as the larger central Asian region.

The prime minister has made a good start by visiting Kazakhstan but the region should not now slip off India's radar.

[Johann]

Rudradev,

Yes thats correct.

America since the Summer of 2008 has overwhelmingly targeted the PA/ISI's Afghan clients with CIA drone attacks - al-Qaeda is no longer the primary target.

However it has had to pay the PA for the privilege of attacking what is nominally Pakistani territory.

The Pakistanis have responded with the stepped up attacks on NATO logistics passing through the border to Afghanistan.

The net result has been to reduce the Taliban/Haqqani/etc pressure on eastern Afghanistan, and strip AQ of a lot of its local protectors and force multipliers.

The problem is that the drone strikes do not address the Taliban safehaven across the Bolan Pass in northern Baluchistan.

That has to be dealt with by different, and far more covert means than a big robot plane in the sky raining down missiles. The Quetta question is one of the tensest issues in the 'frenemy' relationship between the US and Pakistan.

[shyamd]

Pakistan: Local Taliban commander ends truce with army after Bin Laden killing

last update: May 04, 18:45

Wana, 4 May (AKI) - By Syed Saleem Shahzad - A group loyal to a Taliban commander in South Waziristan launched an attack on an army camp in the northwestern Pakistani tribal area's main town of Wana late on Tuesday.

The attack by fighters loyal to Nazir Ahmed marked the first termination by a Taliban leader of a ceasefire agreement with Pakistan's army since Bin Laden's killing by US special forces on Monday.

"There is no information of any casualties, but the militants have made their point that they have terminated all ceasefire agreement with the army and they consider their presence in the tribal area as a hostile presence," a local tribal elder told Adnkronos International (AKI) by telephone.

"The whole night, militants rained down missiles and rockets over the main military camp in Wana while the Pakistani army returned fire," said the elder.

He was speaking to AKI on condition of anonymity because of a possible backlash by militants or the Pakistani administration in South Waziristan.

NATO forces have long view 36-year-old Ahmed's group as the biggest threat in the provinces of Paktika, Helmand and Zabul, in neighbouring Afghanistan, where he runs the largest jihadist network.

Ahmed, the Taliban's chief in Wana commands thousands of supporters but remained impartial in the 2009 military operation against Pakistani Taliban militants in South Waziristan.

Ahmed was considered as anti-Al-Qaeda and carried out the massacre of 250 members of the anti-Pakistan Army Islamic movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in 2007 in South Waziristan and expelled hundreds of their members.

However, during a recent visit to South Waziristan, Nazir told AKI he has never been opposed to Al-Qaeda and his differences with the IMU were of a local nature.

He said he has also recently re-established communication with IMU leaders.

See SSS article on mullah nazir's special interview. This is a must read.

Taliban and al-Qaeda: Friends in arms

By Syed Saleem Shahzad

WANA, South Waziristan - In the controversial debate over who is good and who is bad, Pakistan presents the al-Qaeda-linked Nazir Ahmed as a model "good Taliban".

Across the border in Afghanistan it is a somewhat different story: Nazir, leader of the Wazir tribe in Pakistan's South Waziristan tribal area, is viewed by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces as their "worst enemy" and behind all devastating attacks on NATO forces in Paktika province and the most successful recruiter of footsoldiers for the Taliban in Zabul and Helmand provinces.

All the same, NATO and the United States, as they attempt a


reconciliation process with the Taliban, still see Nazir as being in the "good" Taliban camp; they could not be more wrong.

Nazir, 36, also known as Mullah Nazir or Maulvi Nazir, spoke to Asia Times Online in his first-ever interview with an independent media organization (he has only previously spoken to al-Sahab of al-Qaeda). What clearly emerged is how al-Qaeda has nurtured a new generation; Nazir now evaluates everything through al-Qaeda's ideology and strategy.

Nazir holds exclusive sway in South Waziristan and even in parts of Paktika province across the border - his word is law. Until last year, he owned property in Kandahar province, the Taliban's heartland in Afghanistan.

Apart from a few instances, Nazir has never opposed the army's presence in South Waziristan. He has also never intervened with the Islamabad-backed administration in the main city of Wana, unless it tried to intervene in Nazir- or Taliban-related issues. During major military operations against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistan Taliban) in 2009, he remained neutral.

In 2007, he orchestrated the massacre of members of the anti-Pakistan army Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in which at least 250 Uzbeks were murdered and hundreds sent packing from the homes in South Waziristan they had established after fleeing Afghanistan during the fall of the Taliban on 2001.

From South Waziristan, his network stretches across southwestern Afghanistan including Paktika, Zabul, Helmand and up to Kandahar. Similarly, from his base in North Waziristan, Sirajuddin Haqqani runs the largest anti-coalition network in the southeastern Afghan provinces of Paktia, Khost, Ghazni and up to Kabul.

The Central Intelligence Agency's drones have on several occasions targeted Nazir, and he was injured during a strike in 2008. He attributes his escapes so far to the low profile he keeps as he does not appear in public.



Extremely loyal to Taliban leader Mullah Omar and a part of the Afghan Taliban, Nazir began as a conventional Talib guerrilla and a follower of the populist traits of the Taliban movement.

This changed in 2006, when, like many others including Sirajuddin Haqqani, Nazir became inspired by al-Qaeda and realized that fighting a war without modern guerrilla techniques meant draining vital human resources for no return.

That led to the advancement of the skills of Nazir's fighters, and it also came with rewards.

In Afghanistan, if a commander sticks solely to his relations with the Taliban, he will never climb the ladder to prominence and the Taliban can only provide a limited number of local tribal fighters and meager funds. But if a commander allies with al-Qaeda, he is given the opportunity for joint operations with top Arab commanders who arrange finances for those operations.

Similarly, breakaway factions of Pakistani jihadi organizations like the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Laskhar-e-Taiba and the Harkatul Mujahideen also supply an unending stream of fighters to those commanders associated with al-Qaeda.

Nazir's affiliation with al-Qaeda seems to have passed unnoticed by the United States and NATO, which are investing heavily in a reconciliation process with the "good Taliban" and they appear not to understand the drastic changes that have taken place among the top cadre of the Taliban.

"We are in favor of talks with the Americans. However, this is not the time to talk," Nazir said in a measured voice.

"At the moment, the Americans want breathing space. We don't want to allow them any at all." He paused, as if carefully weighing his words.

"At present, there is no reason for dialogue. Dialogue is possible only after the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan," Nazir said with a smile.

"What is the rationale of dialogue after NATO's withdrawal?" Nazir asked rhetorically. "Then, the Taliban and NATO can hold a dialogue on whether the Taliban would attack their interests all over the world or not, and what treaties should be undertaken in that regard."

Taken aback by this statement from a Taliban stalwart who is not perceived as being a global jihadi but simply a guerrilla fighting against occupation forces in Afghanistan, I intervened. "Hitting Western targets abroad might be al-Qaeda's agenda, but it is not the Taliban's, so why should the West negotiate that with the Taliban?"

"Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are one and the same. At an operational level we might have different strategies, but at the policy level we are one and the same," Nazir said, surprising me further.

"But you were considered anti-al-Qaeda. You expelled the [al-Qaeda-linked] Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan from South Waziristan."

Nazir's expression turned serious and he seemed a little tense, but in a fraction of a second he calmed down and replied with firmness.

"This is wrong that I am anti-al-Qaeda. I am part of al-Qaeda. Whatever happened between us and the Uzbeks was the result of our internal differences. I never did that on anybody’s instigation."

Nazir said that after the death of the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Tahir Yuldashev, killed in a drone attack in 2009, Nazir and Uzbek commanders were once again on talking terms and sorted out their differences.

"At the end of the day, all mujahideen are one and the jihad will not end up only in Afghanistan. It will go a long way. The monarchs and dictators of the Arab world are usurpers. The demonstrations against them are considered as pro-democracy, but eventually it will benefit the mujahideen. The situation has rapidly turned favorable for us and therefore the mujahideen from Afghanistan will join forces with the Arabs. Yemen is the first destination selected in this regard where we will send our men," Nazir said.

I turned the conversation back to reconciliation with the Taliban. "There is a lot of talk in the media about the Taliban's representative office in Turkey and talks that the Taliban have agreed on."

"I am a small mujahid [fighter]. I know politics only a little, but I know one thing, that NATO doesn't have any good intentions about the Taliban. This kind of office [in Turkey] is a conspiracy to understand the Taliban's network and their mobility patterns. I am a small mujahid or a commander so to speak, but I can say with authority that no commanders faithful to Mullah Mohammad Omar would fall into this trap - and nor would footsoldiers. The whole movement from top to bottom is united to reject this dialogue process," said Nazir, adding that all world powers played political gimmicks when they saw that a military victory was not possible.

"When the Soviets saw that they could not win militarily in Afghanistan [in the late 1980s], they engaged with northern Afghanistan's warlords, but that did not save them from defeat," said Nazir

My visit to South Waziristan coincided with the Taliban's declaration of the start of their annual spring offensive, so I asked, "Is there any new strategy for the offensive this year?"

"Dialogue," said Nazir, smiling.

"Dialogue with whom?" I asked.

"We have opened up dialogue with the Milli Urdu [Afghan National Army]. This is at different levels. We have an exclusive strategy this year that we will try our level best that Afghans do not kill Afghans unless it is inevitable."

"Does that mean you are speaking to the Afghan Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of Interior?" I asked.

"There is no negotiation with the political leadership. This communication is strictly between the field commanders of both sides. Before I came here to give this interview, I received a message that an important commander of the Milli Urdu wanted to speak to me. We simply urge them to stay away and let us fight against the foreigners and they are agreeing to that. At times they even facilitate us," Nazir said.

I then asked about the former Northern Alliance, the bloc in north Afghanistan that bitterly opposed the Taliban regime, in connection with the international peace efforts.

"They were very enthusiastic, but the Taliban made it clear to them that they would have to make some sacrifices too ... and they backed off." Nazir added that several top-level commanders of the Northern Alliance wanted to discuss a future political setup with the Taliban.

"They included all Panjshir [province in the north] commanders including Martial Fahim. They dished out a formula in which they would recognize any future government headed by Mullah Mohammad Omar and in which they were given the second-largest number of portfolios.

"We accepted their demand, saying we did not have any objections to offering them ministerial positions, but first they would have to resign from their present political offices and join forces with the Taliban against the foreign occupation. They backed off," Nazir said.

"But that was not the only peace offer. We have received under-the-table offers from foreigners as well. Last year, British forces in Helmand province send a message to the Taliban that all major operations were carried out by the Americans, so if we did not target them, the British forces would not target the Taliban," Nazir said.

I was on the point of asking for elaboration when Nazir said, "Why don’t you join us for lunch," indicating in the most polite but unmistakable manner that the interview was over.

(Note: This article was written before the death of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden on May 2.)

[RajeshA]

From Maulvi Nazir's interview, what I take home is that if the Americans do not establish a Pushtunistan State soon, with some government, receiving financial support from the international community, then the whole Pushtun nation is going to become Al Qaeda!

The Pushtuns need something to which they can belong to! It cannot be Pakistan and it cannot be Afghanistan, because Afghanistan is nothing more than a gory playground for Pakistan.

Americans should seriously start thinking about creating Pushtunistan joined in a confederation with Northern Afghanistan.

[Venkarl]

"But that was not the only peace offer. We have received under-the-table offers from foreigners as well. Last year, British forces in Helmand province send a message to the Taliban that all major operations were carried out by the Americans, so if we did not target them, the British forces would not target the Taliban," Nazir said.

......Nazir good at playing chess?

[shyamd]

Afghan Taliban likely to rethink ties to al-Qaida

(AP) – 30 minutes ago

KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — Osama bin Laden's death is likely to revive a debate within the Afghan Taliban about their ties to al-Qaida — a union the U.S. insists must end if the insurgents want to talk peace.

The foundation of their relationship is believed to be rooted in bin Laden's long friendship with the Taliban's reclusive one-eyed leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, who may now find it more palatable to break with al-Qaida and negotiate a settlement to the war. Much may depend on the newly chastened power-broker next door: Pakistan.

"I think now is an opportunity for the Taliban to end their relations with al-Qaida," said Waheed Muzhda, a Kabul-based analyst and former foreign ministry official under the Taliban regime that was toppled in late 2001.

Zabiullah Mujahid, a spokesman for the Afghan Taliban, said it was too early to comment.

But the death of the world's top terrorist gives momentum toward finding a political solution to the nearly decade-long war, according to analysts familiar with U.S. officials' stepped-up effort this year to push a peace agenda.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the Obama administration have said they will negotiate with any member of the Taliban who embraces the Afghan constitution, renounces violence and severs ties with al-Qaida. Informal contacts have been made in recent months with high-ranking Taliban figures, but no formal peace talks are under way.

The possible opportunity comes just as the spring fighting season is kicking into gear. The U.S.-led coalition hopes to hold ground in southern Afghanistan gained as a result of the addition last year of an extra 30,000 American troops. The Taliban's goal remains undermining the Afghan government, discrediting its security forces and driving the nearly 100,000 U.S. troops and other foreign forces out of the country.

Even before bin Laden was killed by Navy SEALs at a compound in Pakistan on Monday, the links between the al-Qaida and the Afghan Taliban had weakened during the 10 years since the Sept. 11 attacks, Muzhda said. Mullah Omar's refusal to hand over bin Laden after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon prompted the U.S.-led assault on Afghanistan that ousted the Taliban from power. By siding with bin Laden, Mullah Omar's hardline regime lost control of the nation.

The goals of the two movements are not closely aligned. While al-Qaida is focused on worldwide jihad against the West and establishment of a religious superstate in the Muslim world, the Afghan Taliban have focused on their own country and have shown little to no interest in attacking targets outside Afghanistan. The car bombing in May 2010 in New York's Times Square was linked to the Pakistani Taliban — an autonomous group on the other side of the border.

Al-Qaida has been the Taliban's bridge to funding and political connections in the Middle East, according to a Western intelligence officer. Mullah Omar's association with bin Laden also gave him clout, said the officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence. But some members of the Taliban's top leadership council have grown uncomfortable with al-Qaida, and a vocal minority want to distance themselves from the mostly Arab terrorist network, he said.

There are also cultural differences. Al-Qaida has viewed the Taliban as more backward, "kinda like West Virginia mountain folk — unrefined, uneducated," he said.

Breaking with al-Qaida would mean forgoing some reliable funding channels in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Syria. Al-Qaida also shares its technical expertise in explosives and helps the Taliban traffic narcotics made with opium poppies grown in Afghanistan, he said. For their part, the Taliban allow al-Qaida to come into Afghanistan on the backs of Taliban fighters.

Two other issues, he said, could affect the Taliban's internal debate about al-Qaida. While Bin Laden had personal connections to Taliban leaders, the man expected to replace him, Egyptian-born Ayman al-Zawahri, is a less charismatic, unifying figure. And top Taliban leaders now know that the U.S. might hunt them down in Pakistan even without the cooperation or knowledge of the Pakistani military — as was done with bin Laden.

In June 2010, CIA Director Leon Panetta estimated that there were probably only 50 to 100 al-Qaida fighters in Afghanistan — that most of the terrorist network was, without question, operating from the western tribal region of Pakistan. Last month, Gen. David Petraeus, the top commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, said that while some al-Qaida fighters have been searching for hide-outs in rugged areas of eastern Afghanistan, he did not think they were making a comeback inside the country.

Abu Hafs al-Najdi — a senior al-Qaida leader in Afghanistan and the coalition's No. 2 overall targeted insurgent in the country — was killed in an April 13 airstrike in Kunar province, a hotbed of the insurgency in the northeast. In the past several weeks, coalition forces reported killing more than 25 al-Qaida leaders and fighters.

While the military offensive continues, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said recently that the United States had accelerated a diplomatic push to craft a political solution to the war. Marc Grossman, the U.S. special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan who is heading up the effort, met with Afghanistan and Pakistan officials on Tuesday in Islamabad and agreed to set up a so-called Core Group for promoting the Afghan-led reconciliation effort.

With little known about the secret inner workings of the Afghan Taliban's governing council, called the Quetta Shura, analysts can only speculate about the group's plans.

"The killing of bin Laden might motivate them to sever their ties," said Brian Katulis, of the Washington-based think-tank Center for American Progress. "I think the signal that the Quetta Shura and others are getting from people in Pakistan in the security services will be key."

The U.S. has accused Pakistan's military-run spy service of maintaining links with the Haqqani network, which is affiliated with the Afghan Taliban and closely aligned with al-Qaida. Pointedly, the Americans did not inform Pakistan about Monday's helicopter raid that killed bin Laden until it was over.

That bin Laden's hideout turned out to be a three-story home a short drive from the capital, Islamabad, and close to various Pakistani army regiments has raised suspicions in Washington that the Pakistanis may have been sheltering him. For years, Western intelligence had said bin Laden was most likely holed up in a cave along the Pakistan-Afghan border.

The Pakistani government has denied suggestions that its security forces knew bin Laden was there. Pakistani officials have long argued that they have done their part in the fight against militants and denounce allegations that they are backing insurgents.

"The raid was obviously deeply embarrassing for the Pakistanis," Katulis said. "They could either redouble their efforts to try to cooperate more closely with the U.S. or they can continue to play their passive-aggressive game."

Don't expect a near-term divorce with al-Qaida, said Michael Wahid Hanna, an analyst with The Century Foundation, a New York-based think tank.

"It makes no sense for the Taliban to concede this point on the front end — without receiving any commensurate concession from the other side," Hanna said. "Some of the Taliban I have spoken to have made the point that as long as the military fight escalates, they will cooperate with other forces who are willing to assist them in their fight against the U.S.-led coalition. They portray any pre-emptive severing of ties as a type of unilateral, partial disarmament."

Seth Jones, a RAND Corp. political scientist who advised the commander of U.S. special operations forces in Afghanistan, said he suspects "the Taliban would interpret cutting ties with al-Qaida as kowtowing to the Americans."

Jones said that while the Taliban don't need al-Qaida to operate, they still retain ties with al-Qaida's senior leaders as they have for decades.

Former Afghan Deputy Interior Minister Lt. Gen. Abdul Hadi Khalid said some members of the Taliban want to split with al-Qaida. The fighting spirit of the Taliban has been dampened by recent brutal attacks around the country that killed scores of Afghan civilians — attacks he suspects were inspired by al-Qaida.

These Taliban members "feel they are going the wrong way," Khalid said.

However, Ahmed Wali Karzai, the half brother of the Afghan president, said top Taliban leaders directing the insurgency remain very closely associated with al-Qaida. Al-Qaida still helps train Taliban fighters, and foreign fighters aligned with al-Qaida continue to fight side-by-side with Taliban foot soldiers, he said.

"I don't know how they will be able to distance themselves," Karzai said.

Associated Press Writers Heidi Vogt, Solomon Moore and Amir Shah in Kabul contributed to this report.

[krithivas]

Afghans Rally to Oppose Karzai and Taliban Deal

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/world ... istan.html

More than 10,000 people gathered Thursday in Kabul to oppose reconciliation with the Taliban and the involvement of Pakistan in any peace deal, warning that it would be a betrayal of the Afghan people’s long fight against extremism.

[shyamd]

From Above link

KABUL, Afghanistan — More than 10,000 people gathered Thursday in Kabul to oppose reconciliation with the Taliban and the involvement of Pakistan in any peace deal, warning that it would be a betrayal of the Afghan people’s long fight against extremism.

The meeting, organized by the former intelligence director, Amrullah Saleh, and headlined as well by Abdullah Abdullah, a former presidential candidate, was a frontal attack on the current government’s policies, equating Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The organizers promised that if they were not listened to, they would “go to the streets and protest.”

Under the name “a gathering for justice,” the meeting was attended overwhelmingly by Afghans from the north and particularly from Panjshir Province, the home of the Afghan icon Ahmed Shah Massoud, who was killed by Qaeda-backed suicide bombers two days before the Sept. 11 attacks in the United States. Panjshir is also the home province of Mr. Saleh and Mr. Abdullah.

Both men are bitter rivals of the president: Mr. Saleh was dismissed by him as intelligence chief, and Mr. Abdullah withdrew from a runoff election against President Hamid Karzai in 2009 because, he said, the voting would be rigged. “The Taliban and Al Qaeda are terrorists,” said Mr. Saleh, as he looked out across the crowd, many of them young people. “They have destroyed our lands and houses, dishonored our wives and families.

Then he addressed Mr. Karzai: “You call them your brothers, this is oppression — to this nation; they are not our brothers,” said Mr. Saleh in a criticism of Mr. Karzai’s frequent reference to the Taliban not as enemies or terrorists but as “upset brothers” or “angry brothers.”

The meeting struck a strongly nationalist tone and seemed aimed at generating the kind of grassroots movement that has swept the Middle East. It was advertised on Facebook, radio and television, as well as in local newspapers.

Banners in Dari around the edge of the large tents were critical of the government: “The International Community should not support Karzai for deals with the Taliban”; “ Don’t step on our national interest by making deals with the Taliban”; “Every government organ is screaming with corruption, let’s root it out.”

The meeting was held in the parking lot of one of Kabul’s many immense wedding halls and the manager, who asked that his name not be used, said they had set out more than 10,000 chairs. Almost every one was filled and overflow crowds gathered outside to listen to the speeches over loudspeakers.

The dominance of northerners at the gathering raised openly the growing tension over the prospect of a peace deal with the Taliban and very different outlooks of the predominantly non-Pashtun north of Afghanistan and the overwhelmingly Pashtun south.

“As you know, one tribe, one circle has governed Afghanistan,” said Rasullah Paya, 22, a Kabul University student, referring to the Pashtuns, the ethnic group of Mr. Karzai. “From now on we don’t want one circle, one tribe, one nation, to run the government,” said Mr. Paya, who is from the Hazara ethnic group and is originally from Parwan Province, which is also in the north.

In fact the government’s senior figures come from all ethnic groups but perhaps because there is general frustration with day-to-day corruption and inefficiency, people feel deeply disenfranchised.

Others were even blunter. Abu Bakr, 32, from Panjshir Province, said, “We came today to participate in this gathering, to express our hatred of the Taliban and of the High Peace Council.”

The peace council, with more than 60 members, picked by Mr. Karzai, has been involved in reaching out to the Taliban and other insurgent groups to persuade them to lay down their arms and join the government.

Mr. Saleh worked for Mr. Karzai until last June when insurgents attacked a peace jirga held in Kabul with rockets. In the wake of the attack, Mr. Karzai forced both Mr. Saleh and the interior minister at the time, Hanif Atmar, to offer their resignations because they had not pre-empted the attack. While Mr. Saleh is a Tajik, Mr. Atmar is a Pashtun, and they have criticized the government’s failure to root out corruption and to take a tough stand against the Taliban.

Underlying the reason for the gathering and on the mind of many in attendance was Mr. Karzai’s recent meeting with senior Pakistani officials at which the two countries leaders pledged to work together to bring peace to the region. However, in private the Pakistanis pushed for changes in Afghan policies, urging the country to draw closer to China and implicitly distance itself from the United States.

In the wake of the meeting several local newspapers released purported lists of Pakistan’s demands to Afghanistan. While some were completely fabricated, others appear to have been mentioned at the meeting, and the overall lack of transparency coupled with the recent revelation that Osama bin Laden was living near a Pakistani military compound has exacerbated people’s suspicions of Pakistan.

The Guardian is more candid about Amrullah Saleh's moves.


Osama bin Laden death: Afghanistan 'had Abbottabad lead four years ago'

Afghanistan's former intelligence chief says Pakistan's then president Pervez Musharraf angrily rejected Osama hideout tip

Amrullah Saleh
Former Afghan intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh at a rally yesterday. Photograph: Kamran Jebreili/AP

Afghan intelligence believed Osama bin Laden was hiding in an area close to Abbottabad four years ago – but no action was taken after the claim was furiously rejected by Pakistan's president, Afghanistan's former intelligence chief has said.

Agents working for the National Directorate of Security (NDS), the country's intelligence service, worked out that the world's most wanted man must be inside Pakistan proper, rather than the semi-autonomous tribal areas, as early in 2004, Amrullah Saleh told the Guardian.

He said they believed Bin Laden must be there based on "thousands of interrogation reports" and the assumption that Osama – "a millionaire with multiple wives and no background of toughness" – would not be living in a tent.

"I was pretty sure he was in the settled areas of Pakistan because in 2005 it was still very easy to infiltrate the tribal areas, and we had massive numbers of informants there," he said. "They could find any Arab but notBin Laden."

Their intelligence became more precise in 2007 when they believed he was hiding in Manshera, a town a short distance from Abbottabad where the NDS had identified two al-Qaida safe houses.

But the former spy chief said that Pervez Musharraf, then president of Pakistan, was outraged at the suggestion that Bin Laden was hiding in such a prominent part of the country.

In a meeting with Musharraf and Hamid Karzai the Pakistani president became furious and smashed his fist down on the table. "He said, 'Am I the president of the Republic of Banana?'" Saleh recalled. "Then he turned to President Karzai and said, 'Why have you have brought this Panjshiri guy to teach me intelligence? '"

He said Karzai had to intervene as Musharraf got increasingly angry and began to physically threaten Saleh.

Afghanistan's former top spy – who has long been a hate figure in Islamabad among officials who believed he was implacably anti-Pakistani – also said he had no doubts that Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban movement, was hiding in a safe house owned by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Pakistani spy agency, in the city of Karachi.

"He is protected by ISI, General Pasha [Lieutenant-General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, director-general of the ISI] knows as I am talking to you where is Mullah Omar and he keeps daily briefs from his officers about the location of senior Taliban leaders, simple," he said.

Saleh was speaking to the Guardian soon after addressing a rally of several thousand Afghans in Kabul organised as a show of strength of what he called Afghanistan's "anti-Taliban constituency" who are alarmed at the prospect of peace talks with insurgents.

The killing of Bin Laden, who was sheltered by the Taliban regime in the 1990s, has prompted heady speculation that an "end game" to the 10-year conflict is now at hand, with the Afghan government and the Taliban-led insurgency striking a deal.

But "deal making" were dirty words to the crowd gathered in a huge tent in Kabul lined with banners saying "We didn't vote for Karzai to make deals" and "Don't sacrifice justice for dealing".

Speeches were interrupted several times by chants from the crowd of "Death to the Taliban! Death to the suicide bombers! Death to the Punjabis!" – a reference to the protesters' view that the Taliban are under the control of the ISI.

Saleh is a burly and comparatively young man who earned the respect of the CIA during his sometimes brutal leadership of Afghanistan's intelligence service. He received a rapturous reception from the flag-waving crowd when he marched into the tent

Saleh lambasted Karzai for calling the Taliban disaffected "brothers".

"They are not my brother, they are not your brother – those are our enemies," he declared, to cheers.

Saleh warned the government that his movement would not remain content with peaceful demonstrations if Karzai did not change course. Later he told the Guardian that if Karzai "sold out in order to bring the Taliban" there would be no choice but to "rise up".

"We have been exposed to a lot of weapons, it is not very difficult to resort to fighting and create influence," he said.

India's cards just opened up. And warning to Karzai has been issued.

[Venkarl]

Do Russians have any contact with Saleh?

[RajeshA]

India's cards just opened up. And warning to Karzai has been issued.

Amrullah Saleh and Abdullah Abdullah are the men in that order of importance if we are interested in bolstering Northern Afghanistan. India should help both consolidate Northern Afghanistan and not allow any Taliban to create a foothold there. Northern Afghanistan should be a no go area for Taliban and even Pushtun from the South!

But we need an alternate Pushtun strategy and for that we need to build bridges with the Pushtuns, on both sides of the Durand Line! Karzai is one leg of that strategy Another leg of the strategy could be to build relations with the Awami National Party and invite their leaders like Asfandyar Wali Khan to India, but we need to broaden our outreach to the Pushtun much more. We need to have open channels with the various warlords, tribal chiefs, moderate anti-Taliban Mullahs, Pushtun diaspora in West and India, remnants of PDPA or Hizb-i Watan Party of Mohammed Najibullah, President of Afghanistan before Afghanistan fell to the Communists, Pushtun journalists and writers. We also need to have relations with Taliban, and for that we can start with Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef who had this to say about Pakistan in his book “My Life With The Taliban”:

“Pakistan, which plays a key role in Asia, is so famous for treachery that it is said they can get milk from a bull. They have two tongues in one mouth, and two faces on one head so they can speak everybody’s language; they use everybody, deceive everybody. They deceive the Arabs under the guise of Islamic nuclear power, they milk America and Europe in the alliance against terrorism, and they have been deceiving Pakistani and other Muslims around the world in the name of the Kashmiri jihad.”

There are other Taliban who have made anti-Pakistan pronouncements!

[Ramin]

Bin Laden Death May Speed Afghan Talks: Experts

KABUL: While Osama bin Laden’s death may have little immediate impact on the Afghanistan war, it could bring a political solution closer by opening the door for Western talks with the Taliban, experts said.

The killing of the Al-Qaeda kingpin by US commandos could create enough political capital and space for foreign powers led by the US to “pivot towards a comprehensive political settlement”, as one academic put it.

But this looks unlikely to lead to foreign forces pulling out any faster than currently intended – limited combat troop withdrawals are due to start in July and a full drawdown is expected in 2014.

US-led forces invaded Afghanistan with fanfare in the wake of the September 11 attacks, accusing the Taliban of harbouring bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda leaders.

But Western public hostility to the war has grown over the past decade amid mounting troop deaths in recent years. Some now question whether the war should continue now that bin Laden is dead.

“I don’t think the death of bin Laden will directly impact the fighting capabilities of any of the parties engaged in the war in Afghanistan,” said Martine van Biljert of the Afghanistan Analysts Network think tank.

“I don’t think the US administration plans to use bin Laden’s death to orchestrate a speedy retreat from Afghanistan, but they may not be able to control where public opinion takes them.” Afghan defence ministry spokesman Mohammad Zahir Azimi said he was expecting “retaliation attacks in the short term” following the killing, before a longer-term stabilisation of the conflict.

But the decapitation of Al-Qaeda’s command could be more significant in the longer term if Western powers take the opportunity to push reconciliation efforts with the Taliban to a new level.

“Bin Laden’s death creates a new opportunity to begin real negotiations,” wrote Anne-Marie Slaughter, a former senior State Department official and current Princeton professor, in Foreign Policy magazine.

“The United States has already made clear that bin Laden’s death is not the end of the war in Afghanistan.”

“But it should now mark this moment as the beginning of the end, a moment that allows the coalition to pivot towards a comprehensive political settlement that will bring security and stability to Afghanistan”.

That could give fresh impetus to efforts that started last year when Afghan President Hamid Karzai tasked a peace council with finding ways to reconcile with Taliban elements, though there have been few signs of progress yet.

The United States has made overtures to the Taliban in recent months about the reconciliation process.

And soon after bin Laden’s killing, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told the Taliban: “You cannot defeat us. But you can make the choice to abandon Al-Qaeda and participate in a peaceful political process.”However, despite such calls and the US’s rationale for launching the Afghanistan war nearly a decade ago, links between the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda are limited, argued Thomas Ruttig of the Afghanistan Analysts Network.

He said there were no Afghans among the attackers on 9/11 and none in Al-Qaeda’s leadership.

Nor does the Afghan Taliban need to rely on Al-Qaeda, deriving its support instead from the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan and widespread state corruption, he added.

Nevertheless, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) says it has killed more than 25 Al-Qaeda figures in Afghanistan in the last five weeks.

“In jihadist terms, Al-Qaeda concentrates on the far enemy, i.e. the US and its allies on their own soil, while the Taliban fight the near enemy, the occupiers of Afghan Muslim land,” Ruttig said.

He also indicated that elements within the militant already had an eye on talks with the West ahead of a possible return to power in the years ahead after foreign troops leave.

“They (the Taliban) do not want to repeat their pre-9/11 mistake and risk complete isolation from the international community in case they return to power or participate in it at a time when Western interest in Afghanistan will have largely subsided,” he said.

For the moment, though, the Afghan Taliban’s message to the US and other Western powers is still decidedly hostile.

The group has cast doubt on bin Laden’s death, putting out a statement saying it was “premature” to comment on the news because “the Americans have not provided convincing documents to prove their claim”.

http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/05/bin-lade ... perts.html

[Ramin]

Karzai is one leg of that strategy Another leg of the strategy could be to build relations with the Awami National Party and invite their leaders like Asfandyar Wali Khan to India

him and Pashtuns are known to be pretty anti indian; how would it work?

[RajeshA]

Karzai is one leg of that strategy Another leg of the strategy could be to build relations with the Awami National Party and invite their leaders like Asfandyar Wali Khan to India

him and Pashtuns are known to be pretty anti indian; how would it work?

Who "him" - Karzai or Asfandyar Wali Khan?

[Samudragupta]

Karzai is one leg of that strategy Another leg of the strategy could be to build relations with the Awami National Party and invite their leaders like Asfandyar Wali Khan to India

him and Pashtuns are known to be pretty anti indian; how would it work?

Actually there is no reason for "him" to be anti-Indian ...neither he can afford it nor can he use it !!!!!

[nvishal]

Osama is dead. What is america to do in afghanisation now? Rebuilding the country will require long term occupation of security forces but pakistan wants unkil to leave asap. The attotabad incident was too perfect and maybe pakistan did sell out OBL. I just don't understand why they would give him up in a place like that safe house, just meters away from a PA training academy. Didn't the PA realise that it could implicate them? Or were they that desperate to force unkil to leave afghanistan?

But why is pakistan so desperate now? After almost 10 years? What happens to pakistan if unkil stays in AFG for at least another 5 years?

I say this because both unkil and PA are still continuing in their pretence mode even after the attotabad incident. Unkil still refuses to implicate pakistan. And pakistan still continues to claim ignorance.

What does this game mean? What is unkil waiting for? And why is pakistan so confident with its yahoo behaviour?

Its cause of pakistan's wild card isn't it?

[ramana]

nvishal, To make sense we need to break up the scenarios into consitiuent parts.

1. TSP did not know OBL was there and US pulled a strategic surprise.
2. TSP was protecting OBL and yet US managed to pull a strategic surprise
3. TSP sold out OBL and let US take credit in order to get palusible deniability

For each of these propostions will lead to different decision paths and need to see the outcomes for each.