News - Osama Bin Laden - killed In Pakistan

[abhishek_sharma]

THE OSAMA BIN LADEN FILE: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 343

The Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden, killed in Pakistan by U.S. special operations forces yesterday, ranked as “one of the most significant financial sponsors of Islamic terrorist activities in the world” as early as 1996, according to declassified U.S. documents posted on the web today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University (www.nsarchive.org).

The Osama Bin Laden File includes the CIA’s 1996 biographic sketch [Transcription], the infamous President’s Daily Brief from 6 August 2001 warning “Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US,” a State Department issue paper from 2005 reporting that “some Taliban leaders operate with relative impunity in some Pakistan cities,” the 400-page Sandia National Laboratories profile of Bin Laden focusing on the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the 2006 State Department cable on the Taliban’s regrouping in Pakistan’s tribal areas making them “a sanctuary beyond the reach of either Government,” the demands made on Pakistan right after 9/11 by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, and the only known conversation between the U.S. government and the Taliban leader Mullah Omar.

* * *

One of the earlier publicly available documentary mentions of Bin Laden comes from a 1996 CIA bio sketch entitled “Usama Bin Laden: Islamic Extremist Financer” [Transcription]. It describes Bin Laden, “who joined the Afghan resistance movement in 1979,” as “one of the most significant financial sponsors of Islamic extremist activities in the world.” According to The New York Times, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the CIA actually helped Bin Laden – who supplied construction equipment from his family’s company in Saudi Arabia – to construct the Tora Bora complex as a base to fight the Soviets. According to Bin Laden, “The [Mujahidin’s] weapons were supplied by the Americans, the money by the Saudis.”

Almost a decade later, Bin Laden would make good use of his earlier investment. A 1997 State Department cable reported that he had likely retreated into hiding at Tora Bora, stating "bin Ladin had lived in caves south of Jalalabad in Tora Bora and the Taliban had become suspicious." In December 2001, US troops engaged in a fierce firefight at Tora Bora, hoping to smoke out the Al Qaeda leader. The Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters were overrun but Bin Laden was not among the killed or captured.

The earlier CIA bio indicates that after the 1989 victory over the Soviets, Bin Laden, while living in Saudi Arabia and Sudan, created “a network of al-Qaida recruitment centers and guesthouses in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan and has enlisted and sheltered thousands of Arab recruits.” The document also accused Bin Laden of “providing financial support” for the 1992 bombings against US servicemen in Somalia, “at least three terrorist training camps in Sudan” and one in Afghanistan, and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.

In mid-1996, Bin Laden moved from Sudan to Afghanistan where he lived and operated under the umbrella of the Taliban. From there, he plotted the August 1998 bombings of two American embassies, in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed hundreds and wounded thousands more. In response, President Bill Clinton authorized the first U.S. official attempt to kill him. The problem was how to find him. While CIA and U.S. military personnel tried to come up with actionable intelligence on his whereabouts, American diplomats in Afghanistan attempted to persuade Bin Laden’s Taliban hosts to give him up. A State Department cable provided an unusual window into the bizarre negotiations, including recording the suggestion by a Taliban intermediary that the U.S. “arrange for bin Laden to be assassinated” because the Taliban could do nothing to prevent it.

In 1999, Sandia National Laboratories compiled a 400-page profile of Bin Laden – far more comprehensive than the CIA’s brief 1996 sketch, and no doubt reflecting his stratospheric rise in importance to the United States. The report found that the African embassy attacks did not take the U.S. by surprise, given its existing counterterrorism intelligence capabilities. It added that the retaliatory cruise missile strikes orderd by Clinton – which unfortunately destroyed a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant and killed several suspected terrorists training in Afghanistan instead of their intended targets – “did little to help solve the problem posed by bin Laden and may ultimately prove to have done more harm than good.” The Sandia analysts concluded – chillingly – that the bombings showed “The ‘war’ on terrorism will never be ‘won.’”

On 25 January 2001 the National Security Council’s senior counterterroism adviser, Richard A. Clarke, sent a now-famous memo to incoming National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice which warned, “al Qida is not some narrow, little terrorist issue that needs to be included in broader regional policy.” The memo referenced the Al Qaeda suicide attack on USS Cole in the Yemeni port of Aden, which killed 17 sailors and injured 39 others. Clarke recommended that the United States “respond at a time, place, and manner of our own choosing,” pleading, “we urgently need … a Principals level review on the al Qida network [emphasis in original].”

Less than nine months later, nineteen Al Qaeda operative hijacked four planes and struck the World Trade Center and Pentagon.


Sandia National Laboratories, "Osama bin Laden: A Case Study," December 6, 1999
Between 1996 and the summer of 2001, the United States pressed the Taliban more than 30 times to expel Bin Laden from Afghanistan, according to a July 2001 State Department Report. Two days after the 1998 Cruise missile attack on Bin Laden’s camp, Mullah Omar initiated a phone call to Washington – the U.S. government’s only known direct contact with the Taliban leader – claiming that he did not believe “bin Laden had engaged in or planned any terrorist acts while on Afghan soil,” and that “getting rid” of him “would not end the problems posed to the US by the Islamic world.”

The following month, the President’s Daily Brief included one of the most famous documents that would come out on the Al Qaeda leader – the 6 August 2001 memo entitled “Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US.” The document was marked “For the President Only” – perhaps a sign of a missed opportunity for intelligence sharing – and stated that FBI information “indicate[d] patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.” In testimony to the 9-11 Commission, Rice insisted that the PDB did not amount to a real warning. “[It] said nothing about an attack on America,” she testified. “It talked about intentions, about somebody who hated America – well, we knew that.”

Once 9/11 happened, the administration’s attitude lurched about abruptly. On 13 September 2001, two days after the attacks on New York and Washington, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage handed Pakistani Intelligence (ISI) Chief Mahmoud a list of seven terse demands, including stopping al-Qaeda at the border, proving blanket landing rights to conduct operations, providing intelligence, and helping the US to “Destroy Usama bin Laden.”

But the stepped-up pressure failed to produce all the desired results, and Pakistan soon became protected territory for the Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Immediately after September 11, according to an unnamed Pakistani security official, “the tribes were overawed by US firepower.” But by the time this quote was made to a senior State Department in Islamabad (reported in an embassy cable on 13 November 2002), “that window had closed.” The Federally Administered Tribal Areas were once again “no go areas.”

Three years later, in late 2005, the situation had not changed. Despite Pakistan’s formal denials that it was a safe haven for anti-American forces, a State Department Issue Paper for the Vice President confirmed that indeed “some Taliban leaders operate with relative impunity in some Pakistani cities, and may still enjoy support from the lower echelons of Pakistan’s ISI.”

It was because Bin Laden enjoyed this protection in "the sanctuary beyond the reach of [the Afghan or Pakistani governments]" that President Obama on May 1, 2011, ordered a team of Navy SEALs to secretly and unilaterally attack the Al Qaeda leader at his Abbottabad compound. The US government finally succeeded in killing the “terrorist who was responsible for the murder of thousands of innocent men, women, and children” – without the knowledge of its Afghan or Pakistani allies.

[ManuT]

April 2011. DC

Ding Dong:
Panetta: Who's this?
Pasha: It's me Pasha, you loyal trusted ally. I gwot the letter for baksheesh, came to collect the $25 million.

Panetta: What letter?
Pasha: (shows the letter) This one with the great American eagle seal.

Panetta: You idiot, that is a court's notice for you to show up in NY. Your money We fedexed it already in a box as your President requested. He said that he was at the Turkey Burger Place, and if we deliver it there, he was 90% sure he could deliver it to you at the Islamabad.
Pasha: Damn dus percenti, now what face will I show to the Crore Commanders. Will be lucky to see $20 million of it.

Ding Dong: Who
Voice: US Marshals ...
Panetta: Quick out of the window.

Pasha: But we are on the 4th floor.
Panetta: Mard ko dard nahin hota. Now get going or you might gitmo. ISI already on the radar there.

Turkey Burger Place
Cling Cling.
A bandaged Pasha comes in.
Zardari: Pasha you here, what happened?

Pasha: I heard you have a package for me.
Zardari: Pasha, you faujies don't trust bloody civilians. I take offence, I have usools. I had all 22.5 million of it sent through my khaas ADC to your boss.

Pasha: To my wife? Ya allah. Crore Commanders will have me shot. She must have blown it up by now. I must take your leave now saheb, taxi to the airbase.
Zardari: No I meant your work boss. Kiya nahi. Aah! I see where you got confused. Call your old boss Musharraf sometime, he.. he.. a call to him can do wonders. See I was getting divorced...

Pasha's Empty chair...


GHQ
Thak Thak:
Kiya nahi eating pindi chana.

Kiya nahi: Enter.
Breaded Pasha (enters in haste): Sir, did you get the money?

Kiya nahi: What money, I thought you were sent to get it.
Pasha: Did you get from box Zardari.

Kiya nahi: I do not open boxes. Don't you know who I am?
Pasha: Yes sir, Kiya nahi.

Kiya nahi: No I am the COAS, name is Kiya nahi mumble ... mumble .. I ... wonder ..why...
Pasha: What sir? The money sir, Zardari said, Panetta sent him 22.5 million. Panetta said the sent $25 million.

Kiya nahi: Pasha. That's too much of he said she said. Find it, put your best men on the case, and make sure they tail you too.
Pasha: But why sir.
Kiya nahi: I do not know who's lying. And why 25 million, is OBL dead?

Pasha: Should I include you also in the list of suspects.
Kiya nahi: Please yourself, but you know who I am.
Pasha: Yes sir.


Abottabad, Moonless night
OBL: I feel like having goat today. Get the fresh one.
Mrs OBL #4: What about me?
OBL: I'll have you later.
Mrs OBL #4 gets the goat.

OBL: This goat feels different.
DT6: It's a dog, you pig. zuk. zuk.


Ding Dong.
Panetta: Who's this?
Pasha: It's me Pasha, you loyal trusted ally.
Panetta: Why are you here. Didn't you get the money?
Pasha (GUBOs): Not here for the money.

[abhishek_sharma]

Pakistan's Bin Laden Policy

Washington, D.C., May 5, 2011 - As the discovery of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, raises fresh questions about U.S.-Pakistan relations, newly released documents show that as early as 1998 U.S. officials concluded the Government of Pakistan "is not disposed to be especially helpful on the matter of terrorist Usama bin Ladin." According to previously secret U.S. documents, Pakistani officials repeatedly refused to act on the Bin Laden problem, despite mounting pressure from American authorities. Instead, in the words of a U.S. Embassy cable, Pakistani sources "all took the line that the issue of bin Ladin is a problem the U.S. has with the Taliban, not with Pakistan."

The documents in this compilation – part of the National Security Archive's developing Osama Bin Laden File – were obtained by the Archive through the Freedom of Information Act. They reveal a history of "disappointment that Pakistan … a good friend of the U.S., was not taking steps to help with Usama bin Ladin (UBL.)"

As an ally to both the Taliban and the United States, Pakistan was balancing conflicting policies towards the Bin Laden question. Islamabad continued to support the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, an organization protecting the al-Qaeda leader, while simultaneously promising U.S. leaders it was "taking the bin Laden matter very seriously," and would cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Portending momentous events to come, U.S. officials in 1998 lamented that getting Pakistani help in apprehending bin Laden would be "an uphill slog."



Read the Documents

Document 1 – Information Memorandum – August 21, 1998
To the Secretary of State from Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Karl F. Inderfurth, "Pakistan: Reaction to Afghanistan Strikes," August 21, 1998, U.S. Department of State, Confidential, 3 pp. [Excised]

The day after U.S. missile strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan in response to al-Qaeda attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, U.S. President Bill Clinton calls Pakistani President Nawaz Sharif. Despite the "cordial" nature of their conversation, a senior State Department official reports that Islamabad has "decided to take a hard line against the strikes." Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Karl F. Inderfurth states that the Pakistani Foreign Ministry has called American officials to "protest the illegality of the U.S. action," and adds that he does "not expect the negative Pakistani reaction to subside." According to Inderfurth's memo, the Sharif government "operates in an environment dominated by conspiracy theories and paranoia," and remains unlikely to defend Washington. The reason for Islamabad's lack of support for U.S. actions may be rooted in the complexity of Pakistani politics, according to the memo. Embassy personnel believe the Sharif government cannot condemn bin Laden without alienating key social and political groups in Pakistan, noting that, "The most sincere reaction of the government of Pakistan to the Bin Laden strikes is exasperation at the unneeded difficulties this event has created for them in dealing with their domestic political situation, and in particular, in keeping the religious parties happy and relatively off the street."

Document 2 – [November 1998]
Talking Points, Undated [Likely November 1998], U.S. Department of State, Secret/NODIS, 2 pp. [Excised]

According to this set of State Department talking points, U.S. officials "have exerted diplomatic pressure on the Taliban directly and through the Pakistanis to expel Bin Laden to a country where he will be brought to justice for his actions, but these diplomatic efforts have not yet been successful." The bin Laden issue will be pushed further at an upcoming high-level meeting between U.S. President Clinton and Pakistani President Nawaz Sharif on December 2, 1998. Despite increasing U.S. pressure, the Taliban are unwilling to surrender bin Laden, according to the document, in part due to "UBL's close ties to key Taliban leaders, including Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar," while Pakistan has similarly not been supportive of U.S. efforts to neutralize bin Laden. The memo concludes that "time for a diplomatic solution may be running out."

Document 3 - Islamabad 09215
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Usama bin Ladin: Pakistan Seems to Be Leaning Against Being Helpful," December 18, 1998, Secret, 4 pp. [Excised]

Following a meeting between U.S. President Clinton and Pakistani President Nawaz Sharif in Washington on December 2, 1998, the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad is getting the clear impression the Government of Pakistan "is not disposed to be especially helpful on the matter of terrorist Usama bin Ladin." In a cable to the State Department, Embassy officials report that various Pakistani sources "all took the line that the issue of bin Ladin is a problem the U.S. has with the Taliban, not with Pakistan." Islamabad is loath to involve itself in America's campaign to get bin Laden. Citing a December 18 news article by a journalist with connections to Pakistani intelligence, the cable notes that the opinion expressed in the article that Pakistan does "not want to have anything to do with Washington's anti-Osama crusade" reflects the general opinion of Pakistani officials at that time. The embassy says it will continue to try to convince Pakistan to help in the pursuit for bin Laden but adds that "it's an uphill slog."

Document 4 - Islamabad 00138
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Ambassador Reviews Again GOP [Government of Pakistan] Policy on Afghanistan," January 7, 1999, Secret, 9 pp. [Excised]

This heavily excised document discusses a meeting between U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan William Milam and Pakistani Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz. Amid increasing concerns regarding Osama bin Laden, the U.S. "urged the GOP [Government of Pakistan] to get active in trying to convince the Taliban to expel terrorist Usama bin Ladin" and to change its pro-Taliban policies. The Ambassador notes that "Aziz listened carefully, but his response contained little that was new."

Document 5 - Islamabad 04254
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Usama bin Ladin: U.S. Points Delivered to Taliban and Pakistani Government," May 29, 1999, Secret, 4 pp.

As Taliban "chargé d'affaires" Syedur Rahman Haqqani describes Osama bin Laden as a "bomb" waiting to explode, U.S. government officials grow increasingly frustrated with Pakistani and Taliban officials who have little to offer on the issue of Osama bin Laden. Although both Taliban and Pakistani authorities are reportedly courteous to U.S. diplomats, the embassy expects little, if any, action to result. The Pakistani government reiterated that it "was taking the bin Laden matter very seriously," while admitting that officials are in fact "preoccupied" with a very different issue – "the recent increase in Indo-Pakistani tensions over Kashmir."

Document 6 - State 221643
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "U/S Pickering Discusses Afghanistan, Democratization and Kashmir in NY with [Excised]," November 20, 2000, Confidential, 5 pp. [Excised]

Less than a year before September 11, 2001, U.S. Under Secretaryof State Thomas Pickering meets with Pakistani officials to press Islamabad on the bin Laden question. Pickering "opened the meeting by expressing disappointment that Pakistan, whom he called a good friend of the U.S., was not taking steps to help with Usama bin Ladin (UBL)."

Underscoring the discrepancy between what Taliban officials say and do, Pickering rejects Pakistan's oft-repeated claims that "engagement was the only way to change the Taliban's behavior." The U.S., he says, is going to pursueharsher measures, including sanctions. America "would always act to protect U.S. interests at a time and place of its own choice," he adds. In the coming months, Islamabad would continue to defend the Taliban regime, but due to the increasing violence associated with al-Qaeda's anti-American activities, the U.S. had very little faith in Taliban claims that bin Laden posed no threat.

[Anujan]

Such options would have been unavailable to the Pakistan army because they would have immediately been seen by the LeT/HuM and Taliban as attacking Osama rather than defending him. The sellout would have been known instantly. Even now it looks like a sellout anyway.

if there is an iota of intelligence displayed by the US in this episode it is in realising that the Pakis cannot be trusted on this.

Shiv-ji

I agree with you. In addition, I am now convinced that Unkil has penetrated the ISI left, right and center. There is absolutely no way on earth a CIA team had holed up 100 meters from the Bin Laden compound without making sure that someone did not warn them before they were likely to be raided. Ashphuck went to PMA 2 weeks back (1 week before the raid) and I am sure the place was crawling with ISI-types who were sweeping the area for yahoos.

I also find it hard to believe that a CIA "tapped a courier who then led the team to OBL compound" story. Absolutely no way on earth CIA is going to give out how they located OBL. They still need to locate Zawahiri and other yahoos. This is only going to tip them off about the methods CIA uses. And CIA followed the courier back to the compound, kept him under surveillance for many many months without ISI coming to know about it? this is nandi droppings. ISI is likely to have followed *all* CIA teams, browning their shalwars that the CIA was after their Afghan assets or nuke bums.

The most possible scenario is that the CIA offered some greeback to a mid-level ISI types and cultivated him for years. That Paki in turn, when he rose up to the right level, found a list of all ISI safe houses and passed it on to massa. CIA checked each one of them out, and zeroed in on this compound as the most likely place OBL was holed up in. The "I followed the courier who led to OBL compound" is nonsense. The "conciliatory" tone from massa is to protect their own assets inside ISI -- maybe even till the day when their asset becomes ISI chief. This is the bigger prize that massa has scored, OBL is small fry.

[ramana]

Well, the shop owner turned out to be an Afghan dude....and when he found out that I was Indian he became genuinely warm towards me. He had reserved the choicest gaalis for the Pakis. Saying that those b@$t@rds, not only have they created problems in our part of the world but the whole world in general and its good that the entire humanity are experiencing their misdeeds.....he also said that India is the best country in the region and he hoped it becomes even better

The hatred of Afghans for TSP for what they have done to their country is IMO underestimated. India would be around in Afghanistan long after US leaves. US should take note of that. 

The dislike Pashtuns have for Hamid Gul.

http://www.pashtunforums.com/world-news ... sue-16832/

[ramana]

Thanks Shiv for the points on TSP. Will put them together and add to them.

BTW dal me bahut kala hain.

[suryag]

What a smasher RDji. Pranaams to you. Btw was it Mast Gul and Chrar-e-sharief siege that you were referring to our was it indeed the Hazratbal siege you were referring to when you said "Dost Gul occupied the Hazratbal shrine"

[ramana]

Suddenly Paki supporters(eg. Zake baba) who see India-TSP as zero sum game are pushing the idea that India shouldn't gain nor TSP be let down.

When topic is Pak perfidy why bring in India on CNN etc

But Bharata vidahata is taking care.

[Prem]

Look like Intelligence deficit between Pakistan and rest of the normal world is widening like the TFTA Musharraf of Pakistan. It will be interesting to watch how super intelligent Poakachoos wiggle their way out of this mess and which eastablishements ruch to support them.

[Anujan]

How Pasha's trip to the US was arranged.

Ashphuck at PMA Kakul:

Ashphuck: Kitne aadmi the?
Cadets: Sardar, Tees aadmi the.
Ashphuck: Aur Tum Kitne the?
Cadets: Teen hazar Sardar.
Ashphuck: Woh Tees, aur Tum Teen hazar?! SUAR KE BACCHOOON!!!
Ashphuck: Kya Socha? Sardar Khus Hoga? Saabasi dega kya?!
Ashphuck: Are O' Athar, Kitne inaam rakhe hain Massa Sheikh par?
Athar Abbas: 25 Million$ Sardar!
Ashphuck: Pure 25 Million!! Aur yeh inaam isliye hai, ke yahaan se pachaas pachaas khos door, plane main koi bachcha rota hai to maa kehti hai "So ja bete, nahin to Pakistani aa jayega"
Ashphuck: Is ke liye saja milegi, zaroor milegi!!

Walks up to a shivering Pasha:

Ashphuck: Ab tera kya hoga Paashaaa?
Pasha: Sardar, Sardar, main ne aap ka namak khaaya hai Sardar!!
Ashphuck: ha ha, heh heh he, Aab US jaa!!

[Prem]

Pasha was asked if he can take Tarbooz and carry one for Kiyani !!
Instead of water boarding he was given Tarbooz whoarding treatment. No doubt he was crying like mottu in photu.

[abhishek_sharma]

The Cost of bin Laden: $3 Trillion Over 15 Years: Osama bin Laden cost America more than any villain, ever—which is exactly the way he wanted it.

http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine ... s-20110505

[svinayak]

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/news/binladen/

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/video/

They are looking for charismatic leaders who they can project worldwide as ALQ leaders

[Klaus]

The most possible scenario is that the CIA offered some greeback to a mid-level ISI types and cultivated him for years. That Paki in turn, when he rose up to the right level, found a list of all ISI safe houses and passed it on to massa. CIA checked each one of them out, and zeroed in on this compound as the most likely place OBL was holed up in. The "I followed the courier who led to OBL compound" is nonsense. The "conciliatory" tone from massa is to protect their own assets inside ISI -- maybe even till the day when their asset becomes ISI chief. This is the bigger prize that massa has scored, OBL is small fry.

Agreed. When we speculate that OBL was given up by the Pakis because Unkil had something worse on TSP, we fail to realize that TSP had a distinct probability of calling Unkil's bluff if it was related to TSP's nukes, that something worse had to be a mole in the org who would immediately compromise and undermine the org (ISI). A smaller apple at post-ripe stage needed to be given up so that a bigger and ripe apple wouldnt be laid to waste.

The story of USSR and Nazi Germany with Stalin, Hitler, Martin Bormann and Beria come to mind.

[Manmeet]

Zahid Hamid's new videos

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AXi0rIRc ... gU&index=3

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pfMyRxFR ... er&list=UL

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j9N4e2bK ... re=related

[abhishek_sharma]

The bin Laden aftermath: Pakistan's militant milieu

Osama bin Laden's death at the hands of U.S. Navy SEALs ignited debate about al-Qaeda's future as well as the future of militancy in Pakistan, where various outfits retain the capability to strike locally and globally. In the near term, analysts expect al-Qaeda Central's leaders in Pakistan will seek to ensure their security and execute a succession plan in the wake of bin Laden's capture, necessitating a communications lockdown and forestalling any direct retaliation. Instead, al-Qaeda Central is likely to rely on other outfits to respond on its behalf, either locally or globally. It already has called on fellow Muslims in Pakistan "to rise up and revolt to cleanse this shame that has been attached to them by a clique of traitors and thieves who sold everything to the enemies."

The threat of retaliation comes from a mélange of militants from various established outfits, splinter groups and independent networks. The internecine nature of this confederation also means that even if bin Laden's demise does provide space for a political resolution in Afghanistan, the threat from militants in Pakistan is unlikely to disappear. Despite understandable frustration, the United States must continue to engage with Pakistan. But the nature of that engagement should change, with a view toward the longer term, which means a greater focus on building civilian as opposed to military capacity.

Taking Stock of the Major Players

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has already promised retribution in Pakistan, which is understandable given that it has acted as a stalking horse for al-Qaeda in the past. Although the TTP has been on the front end of attacks in Pakistan, bin Laden's organization is believed to have been pulling some of the strings behind the scenes. Militants formerly associated with Punjabi outfits, such as Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), could contribute to a fresh round of attacks, as they have to previous operations in the past. These groups forged ties with al-Qaeda during the 1990s and some of their members began working with it to launch attacks in Pakistan soon after 9/11. Thus, at precisely the same time the army and ISI can expect additional (and deserved) pressure from the U.S. to stop playing favorites and crack down on all of the militants on Pakistani soil, the country may also be poised to witness a new wave of violence.

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the group responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, maintains the most robust transnational networks of any Pakistani militant outfit and is viewed as an increasingly global threat. However, despite the fact that its above-ground wing Jamaat-ul-Dawa organized street demonstrations to mourn bin Laden, it is far from certain the group would be willing to launch an operation on behalf of al-Qaeda. The army and ISI are believed to be putting significant pressure on LeT's leaders to refrain from overtly engaging in attacks on Western interests abroad. Unless Pakistan wants a showdown with the United States this is unlikely to change. However, this also presumes a level of organizational coherence and control that may be at odds with the ground reality. LeT militants are present on both sides of the Durand Line, meaning not all of them rely on safe haven in Pakistan. Furthermore, individuals or factions within LeT can utilize its infrastructure as well as transnational capabilities to pursue their own operations without the leadership's consent. Enhanced organizational integration with other outfits heightens the opportunities for freelancing, with former LeT members acting as an important bridge to al-Qaeda as well as other militant outfits.

Al-Qaeda is not a significant military force in Afghanistan, and any organizational turmoil it experiences is unlikely to impact the start of the spring fighting season. Neither the Taliban nor the Haqqani Network, the two most prolific actors in the Afghan insurgency, has embraced out-of-area attacks or operations in Pakistan, though the latter has supported actors that do. The bigger question is how bin Laden's demise will impact their respective Pakistan-based leaderships.

The army and Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) are unlikely to end their support for either entity, both of which are considered essential to protecting Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan. However, America's ability to unilaterally strike bin Laden's compound in the heart of Pakistan provides it leverage, in part because the operation raised questions about the ability of the army and ISI to protect senior leaders in the Taliban and Haqqani Network. More importantly, although al-Qaeda's connection to both of those entities goes deeper than just bin Laden's history with either outfit, that personal relationship was an important one. Osama's demise creates space for a political reconciliation in Afghanistan, in the event the U.S. chooses to pursue such a path. Problematically, there is no guarantee the army and ISI could, or would attempt to, dismantle the militant infrastructure in its entirety even if Afghanistan is settled according to Pakistan's interests.

The Protean Militant Milieu

Historically, there were three loci in which militants in Pakistan were active: Afghanistan, Indian-administered Kashmir and sectarianism attacks at home. Two new areas of activity have emerged during the past several years: a revolutionary locus manifested by the insurgency against Pakistan, and a global locus characterized by out of area attacks against America and its allies. Sectarian attacks continue, and have become a means of destabilizing the state. The Kashmir jihad has stagnated, though LeT remains committed to that cause and to attacks against India. Afghanistan, on the other hand, has become a focal point for every major militant outfit as well as a host of smaller networks and splinter groups.

Regardless of official army and ISI policy vis-à-vis militants on its soil, any political settlement in Afghanistan is likely to have positive and negative ramifications at the ground level. With the Kashmir jihad moribund, the abatement of the Afghan insurgency would mark the first time in decades that Pakistani militants were not faced with active open fronts on which to fight. A solution deemed acceptable by the Taliban would provide an impetus for many militants to demobilize and would rob jihadist leaders of a valuable rallying cry. However, those unwilling to lay down their arms could drift further into the sectarian, revolutionary or global orbits. Furthermore, whereas the Taliban might be willing to break ties with al-Qaeda, other actors might not. At this point the country is host to a consortium of established outfits, splinters, networks and freelance operators whose most enduring feature is its protean nature. These actors will continue to pose a threat to Pakistan, its neighbors and the West until the entire militant edifice is torn down.

Too Big To Fail

The response in Pakistan has not been promising. By focusing on the raid into Pakistani territory and glossing over the fact that bin Laden was living on Pakistani soil, the army appears to be doubling down on obstinacy. Nor is it helpful that the government says it will refuse the U.S. access to those who survived the raid. The one glimmer of hope thus far was the statement earlier this week by the Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S., Husain Haqqani, that the government would launch an investigation into how bin Laden managed to live for so long in Abbotobad and whether his support system included any serving officials. It now appears the military has taken charge of the investigation, which does not bode well for transparency. None of this is particularly surprising; even after being humbled by the U.S. raid the army remains the most powerful institution in the country, and regardless of what misgivings they may have, those in the civilian government have a history of circling the wagons in times like this.

Despite all of this, the United States must continue to engage Pakistan: first, because the Pakistani populace should not be punished for the behavior of its military leadership; second, because the United States cannot degrade the militant threat emanating from Pakistan on its own; third, because doing so would help to disprove the narrative in Pakistan that American will abandon it after objectives vis-à-vis al-Qaeda are achieved; and fourth, because Pakistani stability is necessary for greater stability in South Asia, a region in which the United States will continue to have equities for a long time to come.

...

Stephen Tankel is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the author of the forthcoming book, "Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba."

The bin Laden aftermath: inside the Pakistani Taliban

The bin Laden aftermath: what now for Afghan reconciliation?

"As for duplicity, I would say that diplomacy is not single tracked. We all follow many different tracks; sometimes, apparently, working against each other," a retired senior official from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) told me and my colleagues during a private gathering in Islamabad in July 2010 that was organized as part of The Century Foundation's International Task Force on Afghanistan. "Double games or triple games are part of the big game."

[Altair]

^^ Kindly edit out those ZH links. It is unbecoming of a BRFite. He is a lunatic and does not deserve a place here.

[rajithn]

Post deleted by moderator. User warned.

Please note that language of this sort is not allowed on the forum.

[svinayak]

http://mangalorean.com/news.php?newstyp ... sid=237108

An old friend's innocuous, catch-up phone call to Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, the main Pakistani courier for Osama bin Laden, led US forces to his hideout in Pakistan, according to a US media report.

The call marked a key moment in the decade-long US search for Al Qaeda's founder, the Washington Post reported citing US officials.

US intelligence agencies had been hunting for Kuwaiti for at least four years. The call with the friend gave them the number of the courier's cellphone. Using a vast number of human and technical sources, they tracked Kuwaiti to the compound, it said.

The main three-story building, which had no telephone lines or internet service, was impenetrable to eavesdropping technology deployed by the National Security Agency. US officials were stunned to realise that whenever Kuwaiti or others left the compound to make a call, they drove some 90 minutes away before even placing a battery in a cellphone, the Post said.

[svinayak]

edited.

[aditya]

I heard they collected 2.7 TERABYTES of data. Or may be they just added up all the capacities of the hard drives, thumb drives, cds and came up with that figure.

I don't understand why this information was released in the public domain? Why let the enemy know that you are onto them? It's not as though this is a Rashtriya Rifles or BSF operation in Jammu & Kashmir after which they display the grenades and rifles recovered from dead jihadis.

Some possibilities IMO:

1. Little or no data was collected in the 40-minute operation, but making the claim helps inflate the image of the mission in the eyes of the public: SEALs didn't simply take out a symbolic figurehead but got a treasure trove of intelligence on Al-Qaeda.

2. Although no data was recovered, US wants to deliver a psychological blow to remaining jihadi lynchpins and scare them.

3. Following the success of the operation and recovery of useful data, US officials have got drunk in jingopura and don't care: "We gaat'iiim!! And we're coming after yer' asses!!"

[svinayak]

http://abcnews.go.com/WN/slideshow/navy ... k-13519037

Navy SEALs perform Advanced Cold Weather training to experience the physical stress of the environment and how their equipment will operate, or even sound, in adverse conditions in this Dec. 14, 2003 file photo in Kodiak, Alaska. (Photographer's Mate 2nd Class Eric S. Logsdon/U.S. Navy/Getty Images)

[abhijitm]

No plan of taking down OBL could be without any holes in it. Its just that what events led it to the conclusion and during the events what best could US thought of doing. In last couple of days I am literally swinging between 'ISI was informed' and 'ISI was kept in dark'. Its impossible to know the fact but the probability which convinced the mind is the theory of Rudradev, however speculative that may be.

This thread is getting best out of the veteran BRFites and a newbie like me is thoroughly intrigued and indulged. Thanks.

[amdavadi]

eye-s-eye was playing with obl's goat when SEAL knock on the door.

[KLNMurthy]

Why does US have to threaten to vaporize TSP in a cooperation scenario? As shiv notes, that is a bluff the pakis can call. But if they simply threatened to cut off the money if pakis didn't stop whining about RD plus stand by and let the US take out OBL, that would be a plausible way to get passIve cooperation. As to anujan's point about this being against echandee, if we look at the GUBO record of TSPA we can see echandee barking is only for SDREs.

[Johann]

I don't know why people find it so hard to believe that US acted unilaterally in Pakistan - it does it all the time.

Drone strikes used to be preceded by notification to the Pakistanis. That was abandoned when the program expanded, given the problems that it caused.

What the Americans have done is issue a blanket warning to Pakistan that they will hit targets in Waziristan whenever they have intelligence to back it without prior notification.

The Pakistanis hated the change, but they had to live with it, even as they complain about it both publicly and privately.

American special forces raids in to Pakistan have taken place on a number of occasions - there were confrontations with Pakistan in 2008 whenever they were detected.

The Americans got much more serious about doing things silently.

Pakistan has had to live with this as well, even as they hate it and complain about it privately.

Obama had said publicly as well as privately that it would act if it found intelligence. So in that sense, like the drone strike policy, Pakistan had a general notification well in advance. The fact that that they didn't take it seriously is another matter.

The Bin Laden raid was not different because it was deep in the heart of Pakistan, but because it was a black operation that had a 64 megawatt spotlight turned on it in the aftermath, a spotlight intended to both highlight Obama and America's triumph, and Pakistan's role in all of this. Not even drone strikes in Waziristan have such direct attribution by the USG.

This is what was truly new, and what PA GHQ was utterly unprepared for as much as the raid itself.

[Johann]

I shall be a tiresome bore and repeat a couple of things I've said here a number of times over the last few years because this little American jaunt to Abbottabad brings them all in to such sharp relief.

- America's secret war within Pakistan (and with the PA's jihadi allies) is escalating

- The political costs of that secret war are becoming more and more unbearable for the Pakistani Army

- The PA will be ultimately forced to sever the public alliance with the America in order to retain its legitimacy and authority in Pakjab, the most important basis of its domestic power.

- Pakistani Army reliance on China and the Saudis will increase.

The PA and ISI *really* want to limit the American secret war, but the Americans are not willing to deliver aid without either effective Pakistani action, or reasonable levels of Pakistani acceptance (even ex post facto) of unilateral American action.

The PA is not yet willing to give up on the money they would have to forfeit if they really want to say no, but theyre getting there.

[svinayak]

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3036789/

Check out what Dr Dr brzezinski has to say on Bin laden

[vina]

- Pakistani Army reliance on China and the Saudis will increase.

No Unkil. No Saudis. Saudis are even more GUBOed than the Pakis. Unkil lifts a finger, Saudis will withdraw from Condomistan!

No oil at interest free financing and deferred payments. Game immediately up. The Chinese are not going to throw cash at Pakis, though they will give all "Moral " and "echandee" support.

[abhishek_sharma]

(Video) Highly unlikely nobody in Pakistan knew: Former Pakistani ambassador to the UK Dr Akbar Ahmed

[Johann]

Vina,

Don't want to go off topic here, but the US-Saudi relationship is much more like one of peers with give and take.

For example right now Obama is deferring to the GCC on Bahrain and Yemen, because of their enormous anger over the US role in Egypt and Tunisia. Tacit GCC support for NATO intervention Libya was made conditional on US support for the Saudi intervention in Bahrain.

Pakistan has been Saudi Arabia's back up security provider for 3 decades in situations where America is unable, unwilling, unsuitable or untrustworthy. That is not going to change any time soon - if anything the relationship is deepening.

[Aditya_V]

- Pakistani Army reliance on China and the Saudis will increase.

No Unkil. No Saudis. Saudis are even more GUBOed than the Pakis. Unkil lifts a finger, Saudis will withdraw from Condomistan!

No oil at interest free financing and deferred payments. Game immediately up. The Chinese are not going to throw cash at Pakis, though they will give all "Moral " and "echandee" support.

We often look at Paki Chinese relationship only from the Indian point of view we forget that apart from being a good proxy against India, the TSP elite with thier connections with Arab leaders Like Saudi and Libya etc are the only bridge with which Chinese could reach Arab leaders to make business and weapons sale deals.

So it is entirely possible that No Uncle for Pakis can mean NO Saudi which could inturn mean NO China also.

See when India Developed NUkes, in order to an equal equal Uncle had to just look the other way without actively arming them with NUkes

[GuruPrabhu]

Pakistan has been Saudi Arabia's back up security provider for 3 decades in situations where America is unable, unwilling, unsuitable or untrustworthy. That is not going to change any time soon - if anything the relationship is deepening.

I agree with this, mainly because of the nuke angle. There have been speculations that TSP has already transferred some nukes to Saudi. However, there may be some built in controls that TSP has retained in order to ensure that Saudis can not use the nukes without TSP cooperation.

[shyamd]

The Bahrain incident showed the US that KSA doesn't need them. Will explain when I get some time. They categorically told Unkil to F Off. It was Unkil that came on board. This is not the first time that this has happened. August 2001 a similar incident happened.

KSA was unhappy with Zardari, so held off with interest free oil and all benefits. But PAk got desperate, so KSA told Pak we'll match US $ for $ in aid.

Johann is indeed correct. TSP is not the only one with such a relationship with the GCC. KSA doesn't trust the US.. Will need to do a post explaining the nuclear angle and all that.

[abhishek_sharma]

AFTER BIN LADEN: RECALIBRATING U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer

In our book we wrote that Pakistan had perfected the “art of the guilt trip” in negotiating with Americans. It often tried to make the United States feel that it owed Pakistan something because of its infidelity, as Pakistan saw it. In this case, it may be the other way round.

...

The Achilles heel of the relationship has been the gap between U.S. and Pakistani strategic objectives. This has existed for decades, and will not be erased quickly at a time when both countries have profound and compelling questions about each other’s intentions. Perhaps, in these circumstances, the “recalibration” needs to take a different tack. Both countries may need to focus for a time on more modest goals and more concrete “deliverables.” Success in a few negotiated “transactions” may help create a mutually satisfactory track record on which the two countries might eventually build the broader partnership that is out of reach at the moment.

[IndraD]

http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2011/ ... olicy.html

can some one catch the dialogue?

[UBanerjee]

I heard they collected 2.7 TERABYTES of data. Or may be they just added up all the capacities of the hard drives, thumb drives, cds and came up with that figure.

I don't understand why this information was released in the public domain? Why let the enemy know that you are onto them? It's not as though this is a Rashtriya Rifles or BSF operation in Jammu & Kashmir after which they display the grenades and rifles recovered from dead jihadis.

Some possibilities IMO:

1. Little or no data was collected in the 40-minute operation, but making the claim helps inflate the image of the mission in the eyes of the public: SEALs didn't simply take out a symbolic figurehead but got a treasure trove of intelligence on Al-Qaeda.

2. Although no data was recovered, US wants to deliver a psychological blow to remaining jihadi lynchpins and scare them.

3. Following the success of the operation and recovery of useful data, US officials have got drunk in jingopura and don't care: "We gaat'iiim!! And we're coming after yer' asses!!"

Why does it matter? Those who are the next targets would be browning their pants anyway since they know the data was taken, whether US announces it or not.

probably announced it for domestic political reasons.

[A_Gupta]

Does the Taliban "Quetta Shura" feel any less safe in Pakistan after the US raid to kill Osama Bin Laden?

[saip]

According to Osama's wife, she and Osama just went into the bedroom and 'Switched off the lights'. That puts an end to the rumor that power has been cut off to Abbotabad area by Pakis. But still some DDMs insist on referring to the Xinxua's story. Why?

http://www.samachar.com/Osama-had-just- ... jehga.html

Amal al-Sadah has told officials that she had just moved with her husband to their bedroom and switched off the lights when they heard gunshots.

Before Osama could reach out for his Kalashnikov, the commandos burst in and shot him, she said, reported Dawn.

http://www.samachar.com/India-acts-matu ... cgdje.html

It is that at least a section of the Pakistan Army was aware of Operation Geronimo, which was why power supply was switched off in Abbottabad

[Guddu]

Guys can we have a thread for the cartoons of Pak treachery

where is that India today cartoon of years ago which showed the bombs being passed on

I need all in one place for easy dessemination

I like this idea, about having a dedicated thread for paki cartoons. A picture is worth a thousand words, can be shared easily.