China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

[shiv]

Any air war over Northern Arunchal Pradesh (called by dhimmis as Tibet) will demand air superiority for India. "Why China wont get air superiority" is a question only the IAF is competent to answer. China would certainly try to get air superiority. But they would face some serious threats form the IAF.

No war is predictable. The best we can do is prepare for the worst. As best we can.

But if we follow one line of reasoning that we are fond of following - I can predict the outcome right now. It's as follows:

No matter how much we get in terms of military hardware and aircraft we cannot overtake China in numbers for the next 10 years (certainly) and perhaps never. Chinese quality is getting better. Under the circumstances can any Indian make a good argument that India will not lose the next (conventional) war if and when it occurs? No. No such prediction can be made. Therefore India will any war with China from now (2011) until 2021 (definitely) and 2021 to 2051 (most probably)

If we talk so much about Indians and smartness and brains and "strategic thinking" what is the solution? Shining India and all what? It cannot be making/acquiring more arms because the starting premise is that we cannot catch up in 10 years and will probably never catch up.

Frankly I am bored of people warning Indians on this thread that we are weaker and we will lose any war. That is probably correct. Why keep repeating it. It's not going to go away by constant repetition and clearly India is never going to catch up.

Does any clever "startegic thinker" have any good ideas? Lets hear that for a change. No all these boring dhoti shivering warnings that I have been seeing in various media for 40 years at least. BRF is just the latest whine point.

[D Roy]

Sidor,

Ask yourself these questions:

1. What is the max payload that the the CAF flankers can take off with from their five operational airfields?
2. How many of these flankers have thrust vectoring?
3. How many of them are multi-role and have true BVR capability?
4. Are they based in Tibet permanently or do they come their for an exercise once in a while? if so why?
5. What are the reports of the MTBF of both Russian and Chinese engines equipping these flankers?
6. How many refuellers do they have?
7. How long will those refuellers be alive against our air dominance flankers?
8. what is the accident rate of the Su-27sk in CAF service? and why indeed have so many crashed since they were inducted?
9. How many Su-30 MKKs would the CAF be able to divert from Shenyang MR which is where they keep their best hardware?
10. How many troops face Taiwan and how many are kept across the border from North Korea?

Hint: don't waste time typing out the answers. take a deep breath and relax. as I did.

They are deterred. otherwise they wouldn't have let the Pukes go nuclear.

[rohitvats]

Sir ji, IMO, the larger threat is in laddakh as there is full infra - including roads all the way into pok. This is also where our troop concentration is thin and infra almost non existant. There is more to the chinese troops in pok than just infra construction, and I would not be surprised if there is a tacit deal between the pukis and the cheenees to hand over all disputed pok to cheenees in Liu of weapons and protection. the cheenees need pok more than auranchal as they can connect to/already are connecting to gwader, .

I would agree with this part. Any fighting in AP would be a diversion.

But the thing to repember is that any Indian who is sees a war in PoK and then says "Oh look at this dead body. i'ts a chini in PoK. Let us not touch our cousins the Pakis" would be a fool. War in PoK means an attack to split Pakjab followed by the threat of nukes by Pakistan. Both the Chinese and the Pakis are asking for nuclear war.

In such a war anyone who feels he can win is a blithering idiot. India certainly won't win. but neither will Pakistan or China. But overall Indians will shiver more in their dhotis no matter what the outcome. That might be what is stopping us from making war.

Funny thing is, this is one sector India can re-inforce the fastest.

[shiv]

Regarding the advance notice of Chinese troops massing on border is a red herring. It over estimates our capabilities. Just as most of the major wars have been war of attrition, the 1 month sustainability of 5 lakh PLA troops is significant. Please note inpite of having over 11 lakh strong IA, we will not be able to position all of them against any incursions against Chinese. Some will have to be positioned on the Durand line. Some will have to be held in reserve.

Could you please explain to me the meaning of "the 1 month sustainability of 5 lakh PLA troops is significant." You are quoting huge numbers but have said nothing about how 500,000 troops will be sustained.

I dispute this statement and I think you are wrong. Wrong by a long way. You have made the statement,. It is up to you to support it. It is not up to me to try and disprove it.

I am looking for a serious analysis if you can provide that with some information on the tonnage of logistical requirements of 500,000 troops and related in Tibet. The number of trains required to provide that tonnage. What sort of heavy equipment will those troops need. Please quote some estimates of fuel and maintenance for that equipment when you say what equipment and what numbers. (tanks. artillery, ammunition, food, earthn moving equipment, construction equipment. Please also mention what proportion of 500,00 troops will be "teeth" (combat troops) and what proportion will be support troops - engineers, cooks, porters, drivers, medics et.Typically there will be 5 support troops for every one attack soldier. How does that affect your 500,000 number. They all have to eat and the attack troops are furthest from the food.

Please mention which train lines will be used. Alternatively mention the names of air bases, the altitude and the number of transport sorties required for maintenance given that high altitude landings will be required. Please say what alternative supply lines can be used if (for the loss of 20 aircraft) the IAF manages to knock out two crucial bridges that paralyse train lines for 15-30 days.Please give an estimate of the number of chinese Su-27s needed for 24x7 combat air patrol over Norther Arunachal Pradesh (Tibet if you like) to cover a 500X500 km area (25000 sgaure km). Remember that the nasty Indians will attack as soon as they detect that Chinese Su 27s are not protecting the musharrafs of their troops. So it has to be 24x7. What is the endurance of the Su-27? How long can it patrol over the area. How many are required over the area to protect against a massed attack of 4 Indian Jags and 4 Su-30s. trying to take out a key bridge in the mountains.

Are 2 Su 27s enough for 25000 sq km vs 8 Indian aircraft? Or will they need at least 4. If 4 Su-27s can patrol for 2 hours each - they will need 4x12 Su-27s for 24x7 cover. That means 48 Su-27s for just one day of cover. Or 24 in 2 shifts a day. How do they cover for 30 days? Can 4 of them prevent the loss of crucial logistics assets. The chinese have to protect supply lines over at least 50,000 sq km and it has to be 24X 7

Please. Lots of people write good stories on this forum Please do us a favor and write a good convincing yarn about how all this can be done. Thanks. I am not for one femtosecond saying that it will be easy for India. But please don't make it out like it will be a walk in the park for the Chinese.

[rajrang]

I would like to post a few counterpoints, and i would request readers not to say things like "Do not underestimate your enemy" and "China has a 2 trillion dollar reserve" etc . I realise that and I make my points without attempting to "underestimate" China or anyone else. For those who want proof that I have paid obeisance to China and given the necessary salutations and pranaams in China's direction to please see this post of mine linked below. I kid you not.

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 7#p1078197

War in North Arunachal Pradesh (Tibet in other words) is always going to be hampered by terrain, weather and human limitations. The Chinese - in case of offence will be coming from a height of 5000 meters -. Troops who need to fight at 5000 meters need 15 days to 1 month of acclimatization. If we assume a Chinese offensive bringing in just 250,000 men (half the potential "500,000" men) there would be plenty of warning even if they did it "quickly" - because it would take something like 1-2 months to collect up the force and acclimatize them. If the do it slowly we would even now be hearing of an increase in the number of troops permanently stationed in Tibet and have aerial recce/sat photos of large camps where acclimatized troops would be housed.

I might be wrong but China has some railway lines leading to Lhasa and another leading to the area north of Arunachal Pradesh. The train lines to Lhasa are "oxygen enriched" Altitude sickness is a real problem at those altitudes.

Any Chinese attempt at incursion would have to be accompanied by visible signs of massing of troops and material and a clear increase in the number of trains and flights. The ability to gather such information in 2011 (as opposed to what happened in 1962) would be the prime factor is preparing for a Chinese misadventure.

The interesting thing about any Chinese attack on India is that they will eventually pour down into the plains from the mountains. In the plains there will be no altitude sickness and they will be able to function efficiently provided their logistics lines is intact. One of the reasons why the roads in AP were kept rudimentary is that any attacker who breaks through a defending line will be bale to make rapid progress on existing road infrastructure. The absence of roads will bog an attacker down and make his logistics lines ad his position vulnerable to air attack. Supply helos taking off from Tibet will be lifting off with limited loads from 5000 meters, while helos on the Indians side - taking off virtually at sea level are in a better position.

So while it is important to recall the threats that come from China it is completely absurd if anyone feels that no one has been preparing all these years.

Shiv - Thanks for your counter points - but let me add some comments/questions:

Acclimatization: Since the Chinese come from a cold climate, their acclimatization will be only with respect to altitude not temperature. Indian forces, with the exception to a minority of forces who grew up in cold climate (i.e. Dogras, Gorkhas, Garwalis ..) will have to get used to both altitude and cold temperature, and therefore will need more time. Can one ever completely get used to very cold weather?

Number of forces: I was not thinking as much about all the 34 divisions being deployed against India (though planners ought to take that also into account). I was thinking of China suddenly sending two to four divisions (50, 000 of their best men) to a specific geographic location - such as Tawang - and capture a few thousand square miles mainly to humiliate! I was also thinking of a few years down the road when their infrastructure will be much more developed and they could do something like this within days. An Indian rapid deployment corps that could react equally fast will prevent China from considering this possibility. One can also assume that the above (small relative to 34 divisions) Chinese force being sent to a location have already been acclimatized at multiple discrete locations far from the Indian border.

The reason someone could feel that India may not be preparing adequately for a foriegn threat (in this case from China) is rooted in history. We also do not need to go back centuries or even 1962. Think of Kargil! Being taken by surprise every generation or two seems to happen to India often! I would like to share your optimism that modern Indian thinking is different.

[Rakesh]

rajrang: That counter argument of yours with regards to acclimatization is hillarious. Please think before you post such gems.

to all BRFites: Having been at the receiving end of Shiv Saar's replies, I can say it stings HARD

[rajrang]

rajrang: That counter argument of yours with regards to acclimatization is hillarious. Please think before you post such gems.

to all BRFites: Having been at the receiving end of Shiv Saar's replies, I can say it stings HARD.

The crux of my question is that the Chinese are more used to living year round in a relatively colder climate that most of the Indian forces. Does this provide some advantage? Acclimatization includes both altitude and temperature. Similarly if the Chinese had to fight Indian forces in the Thar desert, then Indians would have an advantage for opposite reasons! I am sorry to hear that you have been at the receiving end of Shiv's comments. I thought we are all civilized on BR.

[Rakesh]

The crux of my question is that the Chinese are more used to living year round in a relatively colder climate that most of the Indian forces. Does this provide some advantage? Acclimatization includes both altitude and temperature. Similarly if the Chinese had to fight Indian forces in the Thar desert, then Indians would have an advantage for opposite reasons! I am sorry to hear that you have been at the receiving end of Shiv's comments. I thought we are all civilized on BR.

Rajrang, I live in a cold climate....6+ months out of the year. However I will not survive one day in the high altitudes of the Himalayas without some serious training. The issue is not with the weather but rather with altitude. And on altitude, the Indian Army is well versed in that aspect.

On the issue of fighting in the Thar Desert, have you heard of the successes of the Afrika Korps in World War II? This is from a country that has no desert in its own geographical landscape. Where there is a will, there is a way. They lost in the end to Hitler's histrionics, which was the doom of all his military campaigns.

I was referring to Shiv's reply to Christoper Sidor and not your post. Relax

[rajrang]

Rajrang, I live in a cold climate....6+ months out of the year. However I will not survive one day in the high altitudes of the Himalayas without some serious training. The issue is not with the weather but rather with altitude. And on altitude, the Indian Army is well versed in that aspect.

On the issue of fighting in the Thar Desert, have you heard of the successes of the Afrika Korps in World War II? This is from a country that has no desert in its own geographical landscape. Where there is a will, there is a way. They lost in the end to Hitler's histrionics, which was the doom of all his military campaigns.

I was referring to Shiv's reply to Christoper Sidor and not your post. Relax

Thanks for your views on altitude and climate. I have lived in a cold climate for years and I still hate the cold. It has been many years since I read about Rommel and the Afrika Corps. But my recollection is that the Germans had superior forces in several respects - this was evident throughout Europe during the first part of WW II. That is an excellent analogy!

[hnair]

HAPE is incredibly difficult to deal with at an individual level. The minute you cough that cough, you know the mountain made you its b!tch. You just walk down fast. The downhill skiing term in BRF is most apt here. Forget fighting, you are dead if you just stay for some more time. There are no easy and timely ways to prevent it. PLA most certainly never showed even the marginal organizational skill that even the pakis have shown around K2.

The "chinese autobahns in Tibet border will kill us" argument is something that is useful only upto a certain point. It is a double edged weapon and something that only PLA commanders who has to "show something" at the end of his day to CMC will go that route. Same for railways. It is one thing to claim you are hauling lead (toys) to Uighuir children for "peace and prosperity", but it is another to claim it can be used for moving around 500,000 troops. To put in perspective, 500k is the average size of a Tier II city in India. Imagine of all of them are not SDRE living in shanties and eats a huge amount to be ready for a fight. Just the task of feeding and keeping them fighting fight for even a day. How many trains are required for that? How safe can they ensure the trains work? Dump massive pileup of consumables like what US did for GW1 near Dhahran? I mean, you can squirrel into a mountain side for hiding a launcher or two, even a mid-size ammo dump, but not a giant consumables dump. So wont that be like, Muntho Dhalo revisit for IAF?

The need for roads in Indian side also needs to be tempered down with the above consideration. Also (as Shiv saar has pointed out in another context) what if the chinese breach one point and makes vast inroads due to our (hypothetical) "excellent roads".. It is good to have roads for some key areas that may lack them right now, but ultimately we need massive airlift capability(I dont have preferences - C17 or Ruslan or AN225, get them all if need be!!), if we need flexibility in engaging the PLA in Tibet or our borders. The day they order a huge amount (their current IL76 order multiplied by 5 - about the size of a khan-lite) is the day we need to really shiver. Otherwise, we politely applaud and marvel at the, as Shree Lalloo P puts it "as smooth as the cheeks of Mamata K" roads.

in Indian territory, they can expect to get diddley squat logistics help from Indian civilians, unlike us in Tibet.

[Rakesh]

HAPE is incredibly difficult to deal with at an individual level.

For all of you who do not know what HAPE means....enjoy!

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_altit ... nary_edema

[shiv]

HAPE is incredibly difficult to deal with at an individual level.

For all of you who do not know what HAPE means....enjoy!

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_altit ... nary_edema

These questions come up again and again on the China mil thread every few months. I had posted a series of articles on the problem that the Chinese military faces and what they are doing in the old china mil watch therad.

Will post them here too in one massive post (and will put them in the FAQ thread)

http://www.comhaha.com/blog/524004-f-11 ... -in-tibet/

PLA F-11 fighters flying over the exercises in Tibet.

LONDON August 10 report, according to Global Strategic Network 6 reported that the Chinese F -11 fighter flight training for the first time in Tibet. J -11 is the most advanced system of planes in China. Although 90 years since the last century, China is only less than 150 which built fighter planes, but they have appeared in many unexpected places. Reported that the Chinese Air Force planes stationed in Tibet is not, despite the old F -7 regular fighters often fly in the area, but mainly in large commercial airport, temporary assignments.

Report, said the past five years, the model of friction between China and Russia to become one of the reasons. In 1995, the price of 25 billion won from the construction of 200 Russian Su -27 fighter permissions. Russia is responsible for providing engines and aerospace electronic equipment, while the Chinese side is responsible for the drawings and specifications in accordance with the Russian construction of other parts. However, the construction of 95 Su -27 fighter, the Russian side to cancel this agreement. Russia says China has used Su -27 fighter procurement project from the knowledge gained, the construction of its replica of the Soviet Union -27, that is, F -11 fighter. Russia warned that China simply copy the Russian technology, can build a low-quality aircraft. Obviously, China does not think so, its use of technology to the development of the Chinese fighter J--11.

It is believed that F -11 fighter is now more advanced equipment, including aerospace electronic equipment and some other Chinese design improvement. China to produce F -11 fighter most of the parts, the main problem is its still has to import engines. China believes that in the next five to ten years, it will get rid of dependence on Russian military aircraft engines. At present, China imports two Russian engines - priced 3.5 million U.S. dollars of the AL-31 (Su -27/30, F -11, F -10) and Unit 2.5 million U.S. dollars of the RD-93 (MiG -29 dispensed RD-33 engine in a version).

Reported that the People's Liberation Army Air Force fighter planes stationed in Tibet is not the main reason was the region's high altitude, large quantities of fuel costs as well as in Tibet and other supplies required for the maintenance of aircraft. At present, only one railway to Tibet (made recently built), and one of the few passable roads for heavy trucks.

Moreover, the PLA officers and men of altitude sickness in Tibet is the Chinese presence in Tibet fighters to a major problem. When people who grew up from the plain areas (most of the world population is so) migrate to the high mountain areas, will be insufficient oxygen due to air in such a reaction occurs. This "mountain sickness," the main symptoms of shortness of breath, a sense of direction, confusion, nosebleeds, nausea, dehydration, decreased quality of sleep and eating problems, headaches, etc., if there is "Altitude Sickness" and stay at altitude for too long time loss of labor force will slow.

Reported that the average altitude of Tibet 4100 meters. Most people can adapt to local environment, but some people can not. Most of the soldiers came to the Tibetan plateau need to spend a few days or weeks to adjust to the local environment. But if they overworked, especially long exertion, still prone to altitude sickness. This has weakened the combat effectiveness of the Chinese troops stationed in Tibet.

Researchers recently found that in the past 3 1000-6 thousand years, Tibetans have evolved to adapt to this environment. The reason these people will become the main inhabitants of Tibet, mainly because they are more robust at high altitudes. Almost all Tibetans have this gene (control red blood cell activity, to maintain adequate oxygen levels). Low elevations, but very few Chinese people these genes.

Reported that the Chinese army is now putting in a lot of time, money and effort to solve this problem. Now, most of China's Chengdu Military Region, troops are deployed in the basin of the eastern half of the points. In Chengdu, western Tibet, China has deployed 52 and 53 Mountain Brigade, and strive to maintain the ability to perform tasks of 5,000 troops. The event of emergencies, like two years ago, as 13 and 14 near the army to its base in the lowlands to send troops overseas. However, once reached heights of more than 20% of soldiers are suffering from high disease, leading to disruption of work, but commanders have been trained to adapt to this situation.


Now, based in the plateau (the Sino-Indian border highland 4,500 meters) of the Chinese troops have the training room, training room in one of 1,000 square meters, and another 3,000 square meters, the training room are in oxygen-rich state. In the training room for training of soldiers, soldiers of the body can increase the oxygen content in the blood and reduce the prevalence of risk of altitude sickness. In this way, the soldiers deployed there can stay healthy. In addition, the Department of soldiers in high altitude patrol the border areas, usually carry oxygen bottles and breathing masks.

However, so far, China can only alleviate altitude sickness, not eradicate. Taking into account the aircraft maintenance personnel awareness of requirements, and the pilots prepare for flight, coupled with logistical problems, the PLA Air Force has announced timely training in Tibet, but not the air force deployed there. However, perhaps one day the Chinese Air Force will have to fight over in Tibet, so they should be there for related training

http://www.uyghurnews.com/tibetan/Read. ... 0611109346

China builds oxygen-rich barracks for soldiers in Tibet

Saibal Dasgupta, TNN
Times of India
June 27, 2010

BEIJING -- The People's Liberation Army in Chinahas come up with the first batch of ecologicaloxygen-enriched barracks for use by troops postedin the oxygen deficient mountain regions of Tibetacross the Indian border. It means lesserdependence on oxygen cylinders and higherperformance for soldiers, the PLA research team has reported.

This is one of the several recent innovations reported by Chinese defense establishment that include reduction in take-off time for ship-based helicopters, reorganizing the layout formulti-functional training ground in the slopes ofInner Mongolia and running digitalized medical services, according to the official media.

Oxygen enriched barracks built at a height of4,500 meters at the Naqu Military Sub-Command inTibet involved using plants to generateadditional oxygen in a special activity room andbarracks with floor space of 1,000 square metersand 3,000 square meters, respectively. Soldiersusing these facilities during exercise were foundto have 10% higher oxygen level in the blood ascompared to the outdoors and relieved of the problem of plateau anoxia.

The harsh environment with 48% oxygen as comparedto the hinterland has been a cause of worry forthe PLA, which found a large number of soldierssuffering from altitude diseases as alopecia andnail dent. Ecological experts including botanistsand altitude disease pathologists were brought infor an on-the-spot investigation in the largelyunpopulated area. This is what resulted in thecreation of barracks that use plants to generateadditional oxygen, the official media said.

http://www.eso.org/sci/facilities/alma/ ... ode25.html

the key to reducing the negative effects of high altitude will be the provision of oxygen enrichment in the site buildings and other enclosures such as transporter vehicle cabins and antenna receiver cabins, and the use of lightweight portable oxygen units where appropriate. An increase in the oxygen concentration in the buildings from the natural value of 21% to 26% will provide workers with an environment equivalent to that at an altitude of 3500m, which should be acceptable. The choice of 26% is a compromise between competing requirements: improved performance would be achieved with a higher concentration, but it would reduce the degree of acclimatization for indoor workers who must also work outdoors, and it would increase the cost and fire hazard. Oxygen enrichment is now feasible and economical because of the availability of molecular seive technology - it is no longer necessary to use liquid oxygen in bottles. The effective annual cost of oxygenation in a two-man office is about $500 per worker, a small fraction of an annual salary, and it would be still more economical if used on a larger scale. Oxygen enhancement produces an increased fire risk, which is particularly dangerous at high altitude because of the increased risk of asphyxiation. Inhaled smoke decreases an already diminished oxygen supply, so the time required for evacuation is reduced. In addition, the reduced oxygen causes combustion to be less complete, increasing the levels of carbon monoxide. Thus, special care must be taken in the design of the buildings, to provide adequate smoke detection sensors and emergency exit routes. The proposed oxygen concentration of 26% is within accepted standards (including those for the Space Program), and will not cause an unacceptable fire hazard.

For outside workers, particularly those who must perform tasks which are mentally or physically particularly demanding, portable oxygen units will be available and their use should be required. A light weight, back mounted oxygen tank feeds a nasal cannulas. With an oxygen supply rate equivalent to an altitude of 3500m and by using a demand regulator which supplies oxygen only when the user breathes in, a system weighing only 4 kg will supply oxygen for more than eight hours. A nasal cannula is preferred over a mask because it makes communication easier and is less intrusive. Such portable devices are widely used by medical patients and have been used for research and mining work at high altitude.

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htatri ... 00710.aspx

Researchers recently discovered that most Tibetans evolved in the last 3-6,000 years to deal with this problem. It appears that the most of the people moving to, and staying in, highland Tibet, where those with the rare genes that made them resistant to altitude sickness. These people became the dominant population in Tibet, mainly because they were healthier at high altitudes. Nearly all Tibetans have this gene (which controls how their red blood cells operate, to maintain sufficient oxygen levels). Very few lowland Chinese have these genes.

The Chinese military is spending a lot of time, effort and money trying to solve this problem. Currently, most of the troops in the Chinese Chengdu Military Region are in the eastern, lowland half. In the western portion (Tibet), they station the 52nd and 53d Mountain Brigades, and struggle to keep these 5,000 troops fit for duty. If there's an emergency, as there was two years ago, the nearby 13th and 14th Group Armies can send troops from their lowland bases. Over 20 percent of these troops will be hampered by altitude sickness once they reach the highlands, and commanders are trained to deal with that.

Chinese troops operating at the highest altitudes (4,500 meters, on the Indian border) now have access to exercise rooms (one of 1,000 square meters and another of 3,000 square meters) that are supplied with an oxygen enriched atmosphere. Troops exercising in these rooms increase the oxygen in the blood, and are much less likely to get hit with a case of altitude sickness. Thus the troops can stay in shape without getting sick. For border patrols at high altitudes, troops usually carry oxygen bottles and breathing masks.

So far, the Chinese have only been able to limit the attrition from altitude sickness, not eliminate it.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/c ... 259413.htm

BEIJING, April 20 (Xinhua) -- Altitude sickness poses the biggest challenge for rescuers from the military and armed police in their quake-relief efforts in northwest China's Qinghai Province, a senior military officer said Tuesday.

Wang Zhenguo, an officer with the Yushu quake-relief headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) and armed police, said at a press conference that no casualty had been reported among the quake-relief soldiers and armed police so far despite the difficulties.

However, all quake-relief soldiers and armed police suffered altitude sickness including dizziness, short of breath, fatigue and coma, said Wang.

Two soldiers had pulmonary edema after catching colds and were being treated in hospital, he said.

But the majority of the quake-relief soldiers only had slight symptoms such as dizziness and short of breath as most of them were young and had previously participated in military tasks on plateaus, according to officers attending the press conference.

To cope with altitude sickness, most of the soldiers were told to carry more medicine as well as oxygen concentrators and tanks, Xie Weikuan, an officer with the PLA General Logistics Department, said at the same press conference.

As of Tuesday, the PLA General Logistics Department had supplied 5,000 portions of medicine, 100 oxygen concentrators and 145 oxygen tanks to help soldiers cope with altitude sickness, Xie said

http://www.business-standard.com/india/ ... s/39474/on

Army to induct cost-effective indigenous Hapo bags
Press Trust of India / Jammu June 07, 2008, 16:17 IST

Cost-effective indigenous Hapo (High Altitude Pulmonary Oedema) bags will soon replace imported ones in Jammu and Kashmir's Ladakh sector, Defence sources said today.

Each imported bag costs Rs 15-20 lakh while its Indian counterpart, developed by Bangalore's Defence Bioengineering and Electromedical Laboratory last year, costs only Rs 1 lakh.

An order has been placed for 3,000 such bags from manufacturers in Kolkata, Barkhi in Pune and Revari in Rajkot following successful field trials in the Khardungla and Siachen — some of the highest glacier belts in the world.

"A batch of 1,300 Hapo bags will reach Armymen in J&K soon," Lt Col S D Goswami said. "In the first phase, the portable one-man lifesaver would be deployed in Siachen, Kargil, Dault-Beigh-Oldi, Chashul, Leh and Kashmir plus some counter-insurgency areas in North-East and Pirpanjal range."

A Hapo bag typically absorbs carbon dioxide from the body of a patient suffering from pulmonary oedema, a condition in which water accumulates inside his lungs, by increasing surrounding temperature and pressure and pumping in oxygen.

Erythropoietin is the hormone in the body that causes an increase in oxygen carrying red blood cells during high altitude acclimatization.

Maybe there is a business opportunity there. Here are the world's Erythropoietin producing companies. Mostly SDRE


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erythropoi ... iomedicine


* Epogen, which is made by Amgen
* Epotin, which is made by Gulf Pharmaceutical Ind. (JULPHAR)
* Betapoietin, which is made by CinnaGen and Zahravi
* ReliPoietin, which is made by Reliance Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd
* Erykine, which is made by Intas Biopharmaceutica Pvt. Ltd
* Shanpoietin, which is made by Shantha Biotechnics Ltd
* Zyrop, which is made by Cadila Healthcare Ltd.

[shiv]

The need for roads in Indian side also needs to be tempered down with the above consideration. Also (as Shiv saar has pointed out in another context) what if the chinese breach one point and makes vast inroads due to our (hypothetical) "excellent roads".. It is good to have roads for some key areas that may lack them right now, but ultimately we need massive airlift capability

In fact the old story of the Battle of Longewala has even more nuances that the current records indicate - but much of it is OT for this discussion. Fact is the Pakis were fooled by Kuldip Singh Chandpuri's bravado and the guts of his men in staying put rather than evacuating as they were given the option of doing. Expecting a large defending force the Packees halted for the night. If they had not done that they would have used the good metalled road from Longewala to head inland and would have achieved their aim of "Ramgarh for breakfast and Jaisalmer for lunch". Tanks, trucks and even towed artillery can move so much faster on good, well prepared roads.

On the other hand Indian troops were held back on the outskirts of Lahore in 1965 by a huge canal as the Pakis destroyed their own bridge across the canal to halt the Indian advance in its tracks. I think Indian records show the canal as the "Ichogi canall" and the Pakis describe their great victory of keeping the short, thin, cowardly, dark, rice eating kafir Indians out of Lahore by destroying the bridge over the "DRB canal"


Good roads are a two edged sword that need to be planned carefully.

[shiv]

Acclimatization: Since the Chinese come from a cold climate, their acclimatization will be only with respect to altitude not temperature. Indian forces, with the exception to a minority of forces who grew up in cold climate (i.e. Dogras, Gorkhas, Garwalis ..) will have to get used to both altitude and cold temperature, and therefore will need more time. Can one ever completely get used to very cold weather?

I believe that you are not suffiiciently acquainted with what "high altitude sickness" actually means.

Number of forces: I was not thinking as much about all the 34 divisions being deployed against India (though planners ought to take that also into account). I was thinking of China suddenly sending two to four divisions (50, 000 of their best men) to a specific geographic location -

What is the meaning of "sudden"?
Ten minutes?
Two days?
One week?
One month?

If you pick any of these you will also have to say how much force can be brought to bear for an attack in that much time, how many men will need to back the attacking force, where the logistics supplies will come from. If you can look at that now in peacetime - you will be better informed.

I was also thinking of a few years down the road when their infrastructure will be much more developed and they could do something like this within days. An Indian rapid deployment corps that could react equally fast will prevent China from considering this possibility. One can also assume that the above (small relative to 34 divisions) Chinese force being sent to a location have already been acclimatized at multiple discrete locations far from the Indian border.

How many days? How many men? What support material? What equipment? Tonnage of fuel and supplies? Where are the supply dumps? How will those dumps be protected from air attack? What is the PLAAF deployment pattern in Tibetan Air bases? Are they ready to do something "in days"?

The reason someone could feel that India may not be preparing adequately for a foriegn threat (in this case from China) is rooted in history. We also do not need to go back centuries or even 1962.

The reason why Indians continuously shiver in the pants while thinking of China is 1962 combined with a total lack of awareness of what India has been doing since then and a feeling that most other Indians are probably idiots who have their heads buried in the ground.

Think of Kargil! Being taken by surprise every generation or two seems to happen to India often! I would like to share your optimism that modern Indian thinking is different.

Kargil is an excellent example that I can demolish in a few minutes and a few paragraphs. You are NOT thinking. You are basing your anxieties and fearful statements without thinking. Are you trying to say that Kargil was similar to the scenario YOU have described above. I quote what you wrote
"I was thinking of China suddenly sending two to four divisions (50, 000 of their best men) to a specific geographic location"

Exactly what was Kargil? What scenario are you thinking about? Have you done all the reading about what happened in Kargil? Not just Pakdef. Exactly how does Kargil compare with "Two to four divisions sent suddenly"? I have already asked you the meaning of sudden

[saadhak]

Sharing from my experience of high altitude trekking in Tibet.
The oxygen content in Tibet at heights of 15,000 feet is approximately 50% of what we are used to at sea level. As is known, it is quite difficult for the body to acclimatise to the lower oxygen content.
For acclimatisation, we spent about 5 days gradually reaching the height of 15,000 feet.

The key point we were told was that if the trek needed to be completed, there is no alternative to your body getting acclimatized to function under low oxygen levels. While oxygen cylinders/masks were there, they were for use in emergency only.

The tour guide explained that if after 5 days of acclimatization, with your body getting used to working in a lesser oxygen environment, if you were to be give an increased oxygen supply, the accrued benefits of acclimiatization would be lost. In other words, after taking oxygen support, the body cannot be put back into an oxygen deficient environment. This is because the body would revert back to functioning as it does at sea level and the patient would need more oxygen to sustain.
So if there is a case of mountain sickness needing the administration of oxygen, it is a sign that the person will have to be sent to lower altitudes - either permanantly or to begin the acclimatization again.

Peace time postings for a few months with the continued oxygen support is fine if affordable. In a war scenario, unless the Chinese devise a way to miniaturize oxygen supplementing equipment that can be carried by their soldiers 24x7, it is impossible to sustain for long periods if the men are not able to acclimatize.

[rajrang]

Acclimatization: Since the Chinese come from a cold climate, their acclimatization will be only with respect to altitude not temperature. Indian forces, with the exception to a minority of forces who grew up in cold climate (i.e. Dogras, Gorkhas, Garwalis ..) will have to get used to both altitude and cold temperature, and therefore will need more time. Can one ever completely get used to very cold weather?

I believe that you are not suffiiciently acquainted with what "high altitude sickness" actually means.


Rajrang's response: I was discussing acclimitization of which high altitude sickness is one part. The other is the cold weather. We cannot dismiss cold weather as being irrelevant. Regarding cold weather is it not correct that the Germans had a tough time in the Russian winter during WW II? This had nothing to do with altitude. Napoleon earlier encountered the same cold weather problem. I also realize that the example of Afrika Korps is a good one in which unfamliar (hot) climate did not stop the Germans.

Number of forces: I was not thinking as much about all the 34 divisions being deployed against India (though planners ought to take that also into account). I was thinking of China suddenly sending two to four divisions (50, 000 of their best men) to a specific geographic location -

What is the meaning of "sudden"?
Ten minutes?
Two days?
One week?
One month?

Rajrang's response: Please read the subsequent sentences - I have given this estimate as - "days"


If you pick any of these you will also have to say how much force can be brought to bear for an attack in that much time, how many men will need to back the attacking force, where the logistics supplies will come from. If you can look at that now in peacetime - you will be better informed.


Rajrang's response: I agree these are important considerations - I had mentioned 2 to 4 divisions.

I was also thinking of a few years down the road when their infrastructure will be much more developed and they could do something like this within days. An Indian rapid deployment corps that could react equally fast will prevent China from considering this possibility. One can also assume that the above (small relative to 34 divisions) Chinese force being sent to a location have already been acclimatized at multiple discrete locations far from the Indian border.

How many days? How many men? What support material? What equipment? Tonnage of fuel and supplies? Where are the supply dumps? How will those dumps be protected from air attack? What is the PLAAF deployment pattern in Tibetan Air bases? Are they ready to do something "in days"?


Rajrang's response: By "days" I was thinking of something less than 10 days or so. Otherwise I would have said "weeks." Your questions about resources to support an attack is valid. I would assume that some of the resources would have been assembled prior to such an attack the balance transported during the attack.

The reason someone could feel that India may not be preparing adequately for a foriegn threat (in this case from China) is rooted in history. We also do not need to go back centuries or even 1962.

The reason why Indians continuously shiver in the pants while thinking of China is 1962 combined with a total lack of awareness of what India has been doing since then and a feeling that most other Indians are probably idiots who have their heads buried in the ground.


Rajrang's response: That is your subjective opinion. This may not be true for all Indians?

Think of Kargil! Being taken by surprise every generation or two seems to happen to India often! I would like to share your optimism that modern Indian thinking is different.

Kargil is an excellent example that I can demolish in a few minutes and a few paragraphs. You are NOT thinking. You are basing your anxieties and fearful statements without thinking. Are you trying to say that Kargil was similar to the scenario YOU have described above. I quote what you wrote
"I was thinking of China suddenly sending two to four divisions (50, 000 of their best men) to a specific geographic location"


Rajrang's response: I am sorry you seem to be getting upset. I disagree with your assesment that I am not thinking. I do agree that there is some anxiety in my comments. It is better to fear an enemy and over-prepare than to be the other way around. The US as the world's only superpower in the 90s painted Iraq to be a serious military (and nuclear) threat to the world including the US! You can claim that they were shivering in their pants. Maybe they had other reasons. The British were concerned about the Russians invading Afghanistan and then India during the 19th and early 20th centuries. You can also claim that the British were shivering in their pants. Maybe they also had other reasons. But then don't forget that during the nearly 200 odd years the British were in India, the traffic through the Khyber pass was in the opposite direction to what it often had been in past centuries. Were they were overly concerned about a threat that did not really exist? By the way, my reference to Kargil was not meant to be analogous to several divisions of Chinese troops attacking India. It was simply an example of how India was taken by surprise after invaders occupy some territory.


Exactly what was Kargil? What scenario are you thinking about? Have you done all the reading about what happened in Kargil? Not just Pakdef. Exactly how does Kargil compare with "Two to four divisions sent suddenly"? I have already asked you the meaning of sudden

Please see my responses to your various comments within the text above. The text below is my response to your last paragraph.

I have answered about Kargil in the previous paragraph. I have never been to the Pakdef forum. (By the way, I do not know what you are implying by this comment.) I have not done "all" the reading about Kargil, but I did read about it sometime back whenever I had the time. I also recall a thesis from someone from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey CA. I thought that the Indian forces did a fantastic job of dislodging the intruders entrenched at commanding heights. By the way I do not underestimate the Indian soldier or Indians in general at all. Their courage though the centuries from the battle against Alexander till Kargil is awe-inspiring.

It is better for India to over-prepare a bit than to be under-prepared.

[shiv]

Rajrang's response: Please read the subsequent sentences - I have given this estimate as - "days"

Rajrang's response: I agree these are important considerations - I had mentioned 2 to 4 divisions.

Rajrang's response: By "days" I was thinking of something less than 10 days or so. Otherwise I would have said "weeks." Your questions about resources to support an attack is valid. I would assume that some of the resources would have been assembled prior to such an attack the balance transported during the attack.

Rajrang's response: I am sorry you seem to be getting upset. I disagree with your assesment that I am not thinking. I do agree that there is some anxiety in my comments. It is better to fear an enemy and over-prepare than to be the other way around.

You'll have to excuse me for getting upset. I am beginning to sense that you are asking others to be "over prepared" without understanding some basics yourself. You are under prepared as regards your own knowledge, you admit that you are anxious, and yet you are able to offer the patronizing advice that "We should over prepare". That is rich sir.

You do not seem to know what preparation is, but you are able to make suggestions.

The few hundred men and paltry equipment in the Kargil heights were placed there surreptitiously over months because large movements of men are noticed. Minor movements may go unnoticed. But there is a huge difference in preparations required between a few hundred infiltrators perched on heights and 50,000 men with heavy equipment attacking in a formal invasion. You also need to know that 50,000 men attacking need 200,000 men in the rear as support. All need food and water every day. All need supplies amounting to dozens of trainloads per day and huge dumps of food, water, fuel, clothing ammunition and equipment. If a train can carry 2500 men (25 bogies, 100 men each bogey) - you will need 200 train journeys to get 50,000 men up to the area. For 250,000 men you will need 1000 train journeys.. And this for men alone. You will need 5 times that number of trains for equipment. That is 6000 train journeys. If 10 trains are run a day it will still take 600 days to get all these men and material where they are needed. Have you checked how many trains go to Tibet in a day? The information is there on the internet

Are you trying to state that 3-4 divisions - about 60-80,000 Chinese will attack in a matter of less than 10 days. Do you believe that those men can be hidden and made to appear in a few days? Do you believe that India has no surveillance assets at the Chinese border? In other words - when you ask that we should "over prepare" you seem unaware of the level of preparation that exists. To me sir that is hypocritical and an insult to people at the border. Despite your words to the contrary. You seem to think that movement of 60-900.00 men can be done secretly and we won't find out and they will attack in days. You sir are underprepared yourself. May I suggest that you prepare adequately, let alone over prepare.

have answered about Kargil in the previous paragraph. I have never been to the Pakdef forum. (By the way, I do not know what you are implying by this comment.) I have not done "all" the reading about Kargil, but I did read about it sometime back whenever I had the time. I also recall a thesis from someone from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey CA. I thought that the Indian forces did a fantastic job of dislodging the intruders entrenched at commanding heights. By the way I do not underestimate the Indian soldier or Indians in general at all. Their courage though the centuries from the battle against Alexander till Kargil is awe-inspiring.

It is better for India to over-prepare a bit than to be under-prepared.

There you go again. You have not done preparation yourself. You had no idea about altitude sickness and are still talking about the cold. You admit to not reading. You admit to being anxious. But you have advice to give. Nice.

Are you asking for allaying of anxiety or a discussion of cold facts? We can discuss facts but no one will be able to ally your anxieties. But if you want to discuss cold facts you have to look at physical constraints of transporting men and material at heights that require acclimatization and the time constraints imposed by all these factors. If you ignore that for China, and imagine that they can do magical things and choose to be anxious you are definitely going to get me upset because you are uninterested in cold facts and are more interested in stating your anxieties.

Please set your anxieties aside. And please hold the sanctimony of "We must be over prepared". Heck if you knew what "preparation" meant or had some facts at your fingertips you might have some justification to lay on the advice. "We must over prepare" That belongs in the genre of "Do not underestimate the Chinese". I did request that such empty rhetorical statements should not be made. Any fool knows that one is better off over preparing. Do you really need to give that advice? Do you seriously believe that nobody knows? I am upset alright.

[asprinzl]

Well said doc. If anyone on here want to get an idea of how and what in planning an invasion one must read Napoleon's meticulous preparations to invade Russia or the German General Staffs' preparation to invade Russia in WW2. The requirements, details etc etc are so mind boggling and complicating that one can only look at the people involved with awe and admiration for the logistics departments.

[rajrang]

x

[rajrang]

-

[rajrang]

-

[rajrang]

You do not seem to know what preparation is, but you are able to make suggestions.

The few hundred men and paltry equipment in the Kargil heights were placed there surreptitiously over months because large movements of men are noticed. Minor movements may go unnoticed. But there is a huge difference in preparations required between a few hundred infiltrators perched on heights and 50,000 men with heavy equipment attacking in a formal invasion. You also need to know that 50,000 men attacking need 200,000 men in the rear as support. All need food and water every day. All need supplies amounting to dozens of trainloads per day and huge dumps of food, water, fuel, clothing ammunition and equipment. If a train can carry 2500 men (25 bogies, 100 men each bogey) - you will need 200 train journeys to get 50,000 men up to the area. For 250,000 men you will need 1000 train journeys.. And this for men alone. You will need 5 times that number of trains for equipment. That is 6000 train journeys. If 10 trains are run a day it will still take 600 days to get all these men and material where they are needed. Have you checked how many trains go to Tibet in a day? The information is there on the internet

Are you asking for allaying of anxiety or a discussion of cold facts? We can discuss facts but no one will be able to ally your anxieties. But if you want to discuss cold facts you have to look at physical constraints of transporting men and material at heights that require acclimatization and the time constraints imposed by all these factors. If you ignore that for China, and imagine that they can do magical things and choose to be anxious you are definitely going to get me upset because you are uninterested in cold facts and are more interested in stating your anxieties.

I thought I was offering suggestions not advice. Maybe my language did not make that clear. Actually I thought I was offering a strawman suggestion - offered more as a place to start looking for ideas. I also agree with you that facts are far more useful in a discussion than anxieties.

When I stated something to the effect "it is better to be overprepared a bit" it was not my intent to pontificate, rather to bring to attention an (obvious) assumption.

Regarding facts, I did not realize that 2 to 4 divisions meant 250,000 men! In any case your kind computations indicate moving 250,000 men could take 600 days based on todays railway infrastructure. Then, moving 50,000 men would take 120 days. This is based on today's infrastructure. However, what about tomorrow's (i.e. 10 years from today) infrastructure. Should we divide 120 days by just 2? or by 5? This is a question for which I do not have an answer. Again the figure 50,000 is just a suggestion. Maybe it would take less than that? In any case I agree with your estimates that moving 50,000 men in 10 days is unrealistic today. I should also thank you for your computations - if definitely set at rest my anxieties!

Regarding cold temperatures I do have any more to add.

Cumulatively, I have read frequently about military matters over the years, including Kargil. I am interested in this subject, that is why I read BR. However, there are many on this forum who are very knowledgeable and often their facts and insights are illuminating. One excellent example in this category is rohitvats!

I hope you will become less upset!

[rohankumaon]

@Shiv Sir - I have been following your post on BR over a long time and I am huge fan of your post. I have a request for you. Since I think you have a lot of knowledge of India's preparation for Chinese, I request you to give the other side of picture of India's preparation to tackle Chinese aggression or if you have already have given, please direct me to relevant post. Thanks in advance!

@Rajrang - I request you to read Vivek Ahujha's post in Possible Indian Military scenarios and see the Indian response. That is the fictional scenario but it is really well written and quite realistic. Also, see the Indian response in 1987 to Chinese aggression. I know that China is strong but India is not of 1962. Force multipliers in Indian Armed Forces such as Brahmos integrated on SU 30 MKI is serious threat to any critical targets.

[rajrang]

@Shiv Sir - I have been following your post on BR over a long time and I am huge fan of your post. I have a request for you. Since I think you have a lot of knowledge of India's preparation for Chinese, I request you to give the other side of picture of India's preparation to tackle Chinese aggression or if you have already have given, please direct me to relevant post. Thanks in advance!

@Rajrang - I request you to read Vivek Ahujha's post in Possible Indian Military scenarios and see the Indian response. That is the fictional scenario but it is really well written and quite realistic. Also, see the Indian response in 1987 to Chinese aggression. I know that China is strong but India is not of 1962. Force multipliers in Indian Armed Forces such as Brahmos integrated on SU 30 MKI is serious threat to any critical targets.

Thanks I will. I also recall India's robust response in 1987 and also in Sikkim around 1967.

[yantra]

I agree with Shiv's assessment over any eventual war with China. India will find it very difficult to prevail and win. What India can do is make the cost of such an aggression as high as possible and use it as a deterrent (even if it is a short war).

In the current world scenario, even for the 'mighty' United States defeating Iraq comprehensively and sustaining that win is difficult. In that context, no major powers or countries would venture to go to an open war. Even limited, open conflicts can have serious, long-term economic consequences. A limited China-India war will cause the shipping costs from these countries shoot through the roof and the cost of prices of goods will cause wide-spread inflation globally.

We have also got to think that the window for China is only after the ascension of Xi Jinping in 2013 as next President and the new team taking over. So the earliest window could be 2013-2014.

JMT.

[sarabpal.s]

Well it is true that aggression is quit headache but sustaining one is nightmare.

So same for china if they attack and after sometime they{if} gain upper hand like 62 after than they may go back there original position just to show whole world his might power as well as humiliating India.

[NRao]

For acclimatisation, we spent about 5 days gradually reaching the height of 15,000 feet.

This is a problem for Indian troops too. Even during Kargil it was adequately reported. IA has a well established game plan for such events - they better do. Kargil was perhaps an exception, where both the IA higher ups and the political wing were not even close to being prepared.

IIRC IA has a supply of some type of tents/bags in which troops jump into in the event they get sick. ????

On another note, fully expect IA to be fairly active behind Chicom lines.

Finally I am not quite convinced that PLA is willing to take risks. They are best at leaving candy wrappers and now a days with the internet, clicking high res photos. All to appear to threaten.

[manum]

Well it is true that aggression is quit headache but sustaining one is nightmare.

So same for china if they attack and after sometime they{if} gain upper hand like 62 after than they may go back there original position just to show whole world his might power as well as humiliating India.

man do you ever read read?

[shiv]

Regarding facts, I did not realize that 2 to 4 divisions meant 250,000 men!

Your objection is valid. In case you missed that part of my post - when 3-4 divisions (say 60,000 men) attack - the actually "cutting edge" of men who are in the frontline doing the shooting/fighting is only about 10,000. the rest are rear echelons. This is true for every army. But I deliberately repeated the point because most people (and possibly you too, i don't know) think that 3-4 divisions means 50,000 men doing the running down slope shooting. If you want 50,000 men attacking, you need 200,000 in the rear.

This should give people an idea of what is happening in war. While those 10,000 men are available for attack along various parts of a frontline, the 40-50,000 at the back are doing various things - like communication, logistics and other support duties. For any attack to succeed there has to be a continuous unbroken line between the "frontline" of troops doing the dying and the rear echelons sending the food, spares and fuel and receiving the wounded.

The "cutting edge" frontline can at best have no more than 2 days worth of rations and ammunition at any give time. So if the link between front and back is broken - the frontline will stop fighting in 2 days. In the case of China the "rear echelons" will be in Tibet - 5000 meters up. The link between rear and front is on mountain slopes. And it will get longer the further the Chinese move. That link will have to be cut off and the cutting edge picked off and shot at leisure.

All wars mean attrition. There will be massive losses in the first few days of the war when there will be an effort to achieve local air superiority, if not complete air dominance. That will mean intense attacks against all sorts of targets to punish the rear lines - the logistics lines, fuel dumps. bridges and railway lines, trains and infrastructure.

What will happen in 10 years time when China is even stronger? More of same. We will be stronger too. And with any luck we may not have any Pakistan to bother about.

[Gaur]

IIRC IA has a supply of some type of tents/bags in which troops jump into in the event they get sick. ????

Just a temporary measure to simulate higher atmospheric pressure. But after the patient is stabalized, he has to be sent down for further treatment.
So its not like the soldiers lie down in their bags whenever they are feeling wrong and then jump back fighting fit after some time. This is just a preliminary measure.

[shiv]

IIRC IA has a supply of some type of tents/bags in which troops jump into in the event they get sick. ????

Just a temporary measure to simulate higher atmospheric pressure. But after the patient is stabalized, he has to be sent down for further treatment.
So its not like the soldiers lie down in their bags whenever they are feeling wrong and then jump back fighting fit after some time. This is just a preliminary measure.

Yes. In the context of this thread - the Indian comes down 5 km. The Chinese has to go 500 km to go down Fun onlee.

[yantra]

The more I read the comments, the more I am convinced that it is VERY expensive for China to even conduct a limited, overt war. Their $2 tn will disappear into thin air and very few will further do any business with them (at least not as many countries). The economic cost will shoot further up if the war turns ugly and becomes nuclear (beyond a certain point, you reach a point of no return). It will put China behind at least, by 10 years. Of course, India too will suffer, may be a worse fate.

Certainly any overland aggression into India will be met with stiff defense, despite our babu-dom. Any naval aggression will mean - India will cut off their supply routes as well - which will not only choke China, but will cut-off Chinese trade with Europe, Australia and Middle-East and partly US. I am sure Unkil and other will bear on India/China to come to the table within 4-5 days, since even safety pins come from China. Within the first week of action, both sides have the capability to make inroads into the each-other's territory - China through Sikkim/Haryana/Uttarkhand region (?) and India via Arunachal Pradesh and Kashmir. At current pace, India is well equipped defend the naval territory and even score brownie points over Chinese navy in a few other areas. India will certainly be able to establish local air-superiority over certain pockets over China and support its ground troops.

For China to absolutely dominate and control the war, it would take them another at least 10 years - but India is modernizing as well. China will only needle/instigate Pukes and may be amass troops to lend them moral support. I am never going to lose sleep over a war with Pukes - it is going to be decisive, whenever there is next time.

Looking at all the scenarios, China will only release Hi-Res pics (as Shiv put it) and hope dhoti-shivers will prevail. They will engage in energy, economic and business wars. Will prevent India from getting a UN Seat/slow India's growth with Pukes help. At this point in time, or for the next 4-5 years, the cost of war will not be affordable for them. Beyond that, it will be too late for them to do anything to India.

[manum]

more you wait...less is the chance of war...and then it happens...
If you start analyzing all the data in the world then you'll be never be able see a war happeing in all the sanity...
War is anything but sanity...so Lets keep guessing what China can do, and why, when,where it can go to war...worst thing to happen is to buy an idea that war is unreasonable in all the respect...
So lets generate more possibilities of biiter battle...
Consider a situation war is inevitable in some time

[UBanerjee]

Don't take the US invasion of Iraq as indicative of every other war. It was a particular type of war- one with very badly defined political aims. That, in a nutshell, is why it was such a giant mess. The actual military defeat of the Iraqi state was a formality- over in a few weeks. The whole nation-building tamasha- that was an idiotic political goal, and an idiotic political goal means a costly protracted war with a high chance of failure.

War is an extension of politics. It is how well you craft your policy that is crucial to determining the success of a war. Sure- you may lose even with the most brilliantly conceived conflict. But if you have a badly conceived conflict, you will have to pull teeth to break even.

Thus 1962 was a win for China. 1971 was a massive win for India. And so on. Political goals for the Chinese in 1962 was limited- as they realistically had to be. Similarly if China attacks again, it will probably be a war with very clearly defined, limited aims, and in that, they might succeed, or they might not. If their war aim is something broad, vague and/or stupid, they will never succeed.

However, I doubt China will actually make a direct aggressive move until the US has somewhat disengaged from the Asian heartland. Till then they will expand their use of Pak as a rentier state. After that, all bets are off.

[merlin]

@Shiv Sir - I have been following your post on BR over a long time and I am huge fan of your post. I have a request for you. Since I think you have a lot of knowledge of India's preparation for Chinese, I request you to give the other side of picture of India's preparation to tackle Chinese aggression or if you have already have given, please direct me to relevant post. Thanks in advance!

@Rajrang - I request you to read Vivek Ahujha's post in Possible Indian Military scenarios and see the Indian response. That is the fictional scenario but it is really well written and quite realistic. Also, see the Indian response in 1987 to Chinese aggression. I know that China is strong but India is not of 1962. Force multipliers in Indian Armed Forces such as Brahmos integrated on SU 30 MKI is serious threat to any critical targets.

Thanks I will. I also recall India's robust response in 1987 and also in Sikkim around 1967.

Robust response in Sikkim in 1967 was only limited to military response. The political response was one of chickening out and backing down.

[Sean Rowe]

If it wanted stay as a power to reckon with US should never abandon Asia. US will try to quickly wrap up it's engagement in Afghan, Iraq. It will wait till it gets out of economic crisis for serious engagement in Asia. It will reverse balance of trade with China. The bigger war in 21st century will be faught in economic sphere. US will try every thing possible to keep Dollar as world's default currency whereas China will challenge it. Moreover, India needs to carefully watch Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), how it will evolve, How Russia and china are consolidating their relationship, and their relation vis-a-vis Pak. Myanmar has the potential to completly change balance of power. Just now top chinese miliatary leader concluded Myanmar visit

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/c ... 875519.htm

YANGON, May 15 (Xinhua) -- Vice Chairman of China's Central Military Commission Xu Caihou wrapped up his four-day official goodwill visit to Myanmar and left Yangon Sunday.

During his trip in Nay Pyi Taw, Xu met with Myanmar President U Thein Sein and exchanged views with him on issues of common concern.

The two sides vowed to strengthen the friendly and cooperative ties between the two nations and make contribution to the development and stability of the regional countries.

Xu also met with speaker of the House of Parliament of Representative (Lower House) of Myanmar U Shwe Mann.

The two sides pledged to make joint efforts to consolidate the two countries' "paukphaw" (fraternal) friendship, further develop the cooperative and friendly ties and strengthen the multi-lateral cooperation in the international community.

In addition, Xu held talks with Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Defense Service General Min Aung Hlaing with both sides, underlining that the exchange and cooperation between the two countries in various sectors continuously deepened and made rich achievements, and appreciating the development of the two countries' friendly and cooperative ties under the new situation.

Xu raised a three-point proposal for cooperation and development of the two armed forces which was agreed by Min Aung Hlaing, who hoped that the existing close relations and exchange should be maintained to well safeguard the peace and stability of the two countries and the region.

Xu arrived Nay Pyi Taw Thursday on an official goodwill visit to Myanmar at the invitation of General Min Aung Hlaing.

[Don]

Latest on the Varyag

[shiv]

Latest on the Varyag

Why is it riding so high in the water? I have never seen a ship riding so high - has there been some photoshopping here? (See area enclosed by yellow rectangle)

[Prasad]

I dont think its photoshop Shiv. See here - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:USNWC_Varyag02.jpg

[shiv]

I dont think its photoshop Shiv. See here - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:USNWC_Varyag02.jpg

hmmm - clearly there is a lot more that is underwater that helps this thing float. I tried asking my uncle to show me a pic of the Varyag out of water. But no luck. My uncle does tell me that the Varyag displaced 67,000 tons. This ship looks a lot less - its floating so high.

A lot more weight is going to have to be added to equip this boat if it is to float anywhere near the water mark line. Thousands of tons more I would guess. Some of it will be fuel. I don't know if they put ballast in such ships. But I am guessing it's going to have a lot more stuff installed. I don't think men, food and aircraft weigh much. 1000 men - and their stuff - 100 tons. 30 aircraft - Su 27 class - 1000 tons.

This ship is going to need some sea-going trials first.

There is a ship just next to the Varyag that is fully out of the water. Either it is supported on a solid support below or on some kind of floats. I wonder if the Varyag too has some such stuff - its only meters away