China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

[Shrinivasan]

In 1962, IA/politicos slept thru the PRC build-up, I don't think this would be the case anytime in the future.

Surveillance then was worse in every way. Apart from a misplaced Nehruvian trust of the rizald

Agree 100% on all counts, I was just reading an article on Operation Brasstacks, planning and executing that in 1986-87 would have been a nightmare for IA HQ / Western Command HQ, they mobilized almost the whole army without Uncle or the aunties knowing (let alone the pukes) till the troops started charging towards the theater of ops in the desert.

In today's world with Satellites, ARC surveillance, Humint-Sigint, even a division getting mobilized would start ringing bells.

[Sean Rowe]

Myanmar president and Srilankan Foreign Ministers visiting Cihna,.Cnha Wu visiting maldives this month (Ctsy: Xinhua)

[rohitvats]

<SNIP> In 1962, IA/politicos slept thru the PRC build-up, I don't think this would be the case anytime in the future.

Of the many things that IA is responsible for in 1962 - especially, failure of higher command - it was not unaware of the danger posed by the Chinese. IA Generals are war-gamed PLA operations right down to the time table they would take to get over Indian defences. Lt. General Thorat did a table-top exercise way back in 1959 called "Lal Quila" and PLA followed his predictions to the letter T. And he was the one who told Nehru that PLA will not come down to Assam Valley as they are at the end of their logistic tail.

[Shrinivasan]

<SNIP> In 1962, IA/politicos slept thru the PRC build-up, I don't think this would be the case anytime in the future.

Of the many things that IA is responsible for in 1962 - especially, failure of higher command - it was not unaware of the danger posed by the Chinese. IA Generals are war-gamed PLA operations right down to the time table they would take to get over Indian defences. Lt. General Thorat did a table-top exercise way back in 1959 called "Lal Quila" and PLA followed his predictions to the letter T. And he was the one who told Nehru that PLA will not come down to Assam Valley as they are at the end of their logistic tail.

Rohit:Care to educate me on this? are you saying IA generals were aware of the PLA build-up?
if No, it is an intelligence failure
if Yes, it is a criminal negligence bordering on complicity to not have taken timely remedial action

PLA attacked India both in NEFA and Aksai Chin (which is more that 1000KM apart), so they had adequate buildup, Assam valley is in between these two sectors.

I knew there was abject negligence from the political leadership, but what did the Army do?

[Virupaksha]

The Indian Army was under Shri Nehru's chaheeta, PN Thapar, a nepotistic appointment.

The army as an institution knew that the "forward action", i.e. lines of pickets of army soldiers near our claim line without buildup at the back was a huge military mistake. But it was a political decision. It also knew that Indian army was weak, but the peaceful Nehru did not give the money for the expense of building the logistical chain.

Remember it was also the time when Ayub Khan came to power in Pakistan. So the Indian politicos took extra extra care that nobody in army can even think of challenging them on any decision.

[Shrinivasan]

More than the Military defeat on the ground, the "mental defeat" impacted the political class big time, baring few token sacrifices, the political class just shrugged the whole thing off. IMHO, the army made huge strides to correct multiple imbalances, all this became apparent in 1965, 1967 and in 1971.

The only "fly in the ointment" is 155mm tube artillery. (we have other sized artillery, we have MBRLs etc) but the sheer lacking of 155mm guns limits the fire power we can bring to bear on an invading force.
<<Update>> I modified my statement.

[svinayak]

Agree 100% on all counts, I was just reading an article on Operation Brasstacks, planning and executing that in 1986-87 would have been a nightmare for IA HQ / Western Command HQ, they mobilized almost the whole army without Uncle or the aunties knowing (let alone the pukes) till the troops started charging towards the theater of ops in the desert.
.

Why would be a nightmare for IA HQ

[Rahul M]

cheenum, recommend getting hold of Brig John Dalvi's book, many mid ranking IA officers did predict PLA moves based on military common sense, only to be ignored by nehru's hand picked brass.

[Klaus]

J-10B with AESA/PESA radar

J-10B
J-10B

The background is a leafy environment, somewhat suitable for EM absorption. The 2 signal boxes on either side of the aircraft have beacons and it looks like the photo shows the testing rig in its entirety. If I am not mistaken, the blue colored solar panel like objects on the far right are used to create a forward enclosure, so the AESA (PESA?) would be covered while testing.

There is a console like thing, resembles a 3 piece stand-alone drawer/cupboard, it is placed below the starboard in the first pic and on port in the second. Is it some kind of wiring clump feeding raw data to circuits at the back of the dark blue board with embossed pyramids?

I also see a fire engine partly covered by the heat-exchanger truck, near the signals box on the right.

Finally, what is the green rubber-hose like thingy placed on the starboard wing?

[Shrinivasan]

cheenum, recommend getting hold of Brig John Dalvi's book, many mid ranking IA officers did predict PLA moves based on military common sense, only to be ignored by nehru's hand picked brass.

Will do, I am currently in Khan land so have to scrounge for an eBook. any sources for this book?

lower echelons warning and seniors ignoring this is the bane of every armed forces. This is where a robust NTRO/NIA comes in.

[ramana]

Cheenum, You mentioned an article on Brasstacks. Who wrote it and can you give a link? If not a short summary. The reason is, if India mustered such a large force without being found out a la Yom Kippur, how would it have been a nightmare at Western Command which would be hub of activity directing the war? Seems a contradiction.

Second the IA after 1962 was not a defeated organization. The fact that in three years in 1965, they took on TSP and marched right up to Lahore and in 9 years in 1971 detached East Pakistan shows that.
Defeated armies take over three decades to restore morale. Political leadership panicked and listened to non-Indians about Indian options. Even IAF officers flew on armed Hunters waiting for orders to bomb the passes. But none came.

After Battle of Chusul, Indian army was ready to move forward and in 1967 at Nathu La gave a drubbing to PRC despite the nuke test in 1964. Please get informed as posting such half truths on BRF is not right. Rohitvats can supply more details.

BTW, In BRM there is an article on KRC report review. It shows a table of factors for surprise and how intelligence failures occur. Please read it.

[Shrinivasan]

Ramana, I didn't say IA was a "defeated Organization" it was more the political class which was defeated, they (political class) just atropied. The IA on the other hand "IMHO, the army has made huge strides to correct multiple imbalances."

I will give a write-up on Brasstacks over the weekend. I agree with all your points. I'll read the KRC report too.

In Brasstacks, Indian mobilized close to 400K soldiers. Probably initial signals were misread/ignored by world powers and only when the troops started marching towards the exercise zones did Pindi throw a fit.

[shiv]

Second the IA after 1962 was not a defeated organization. The fact that in three years in 1965, they took on TSP and marched right up to Lahore and in 9 years in 1971 detached East Pakistan shows that

Not to forget that they had successfully kicked out the Portuguese in 1961 and had essentially distinguished themsleves in WW2 and in the 1947-8 Kashmir ops. The IA was far from being a "defeated organization" and such expressions need to be used with due care of some explanation.

Apart from the terrain and logistics issues of 1962 and the lackadaisical attitide of the political class - the Air Power as employed in 1947-8, 1961, 1965 and 1971. But not in 1962. Weird, Weird.

[Don]

New class of Sub

[Shrinivasan]

Agree 100% on all counts, I was just reading an article on Operation Brasstacks, planning and executing that in 1986-87 would have been a nightmare for IA HQ / Western Command HQ, they mobilized almost the whole army without Uncle or the aunties knowing (let alone the pukes) till the troops started charging towards the theater of ops in the desert.
.

Why would be a nightmare for IA HQ

with the technology available in the 80s, it would be been a monumental challenge to achieve such a huge mobilization without letting the cat out of the bag. Pakees did not know about this till very late.

As promised a write-up on Brasstacks follows.

[Shrinivasan]

Rakshaks,
Deleted OT

[shiv]

Rakshaks,

I am assembling a Google Earth map(KMZ) depicting IAs ORBAT. I have already plotted the locations of Command, Corps, Divisions and even Brigades. I need information on division / Brigade level ORBAT info, anyone having this info can mail me @ shrinivasanm at google mail dot kaam.

Apart from being OT for this thread - needing to go into one of the other dedicated threads - is this sort of information that any army regularly makes pubic for sharing with enthusiasts? Just curious. I don't know what ORBAT or brigade mean. I'm not joking.

I was under the impression that in Op Brasstacks and again in Parakram the "disappearance" of some army formations and their reappearance in some other area caused some consternation to people who needed to watch those formations, so I have given myself the (perhaps mistaken) impression that the placement o army formations is better kept not so well known or better still marked by disinformation. But if there is to be disinformation the real positions need not be known. Everything can be cooked up.

Can someone educate me here? Unless Cheenum is a raagint looking for leaks .. No offence meant. It is possible.

[Rakesh]

Don: I believe that is the Chinese copy of the Kilo 877/636...looks similar. They are - I believe - the Type 41 Yuan Class. Someone please correct me if I am wrong.

Pakistan is getting the Yuan Class into her fleet. This was favoured because Mr 10 % (Asif Zardari) chose this over the German U214 which was quite close to contract signing.

[Don]

Don: I believe that is the Chinese copy of the Kilo 877/636...looks quite similar. They are - I believe - the Type 41 Yuan Class. Someone please correct me if I am wrong.

Pakistan is getting the Yuan Class into her fleet. This was favoured because Mr 10 % (Asif Zardari) chose this over the German U214 which was quite close to contract signing.

No You are wrong, that is not the Yuan class.

[Rakesh]

No You are wrong, that is not the Yuan class.

Oops! Which Class is it?

[shiv]

Not the Yuan class? Let me guess. The Renminbi class?

[Don]

No You are wrong, that is not the Yuan class.

Oops! Which Class is it?

Yuan



New Sub

[abhishek_sharma]

Sizing the Chinese Military
Asia Policy (July 2007)

The Future Force Structure of the Chinese Air Force
Phillip C. Saunders & Erik Quam

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is in the midst of a major modernization campaign aimed at retiring and replacing obsolete aircraft and building a modern air force. Despite fifteen years of modernization efforts, China’s air force is still in transition between the type of force fielded by the PLAAF over its first fifty years and the development of a “new PLAAF” with modern equipment, doctrine, and capabilities. The thousands of J-6 fighters that once made up the Chinese fighter fleet have been retired; about one thousand older J-7 and J-8 fighters remain in service. The aircraft that will comprise the future PLAAF have begun to enter service, including 32 Russian-built Su-27UBK multi-role fighters and 116 F-11 China assembled Su-27 variants, 73 Russian Su-30MKK fighters, and 62 of the new indigenously produced J-10 multi-role fighter. China is also developing and purchasing force multipliers including advanced transport aircraft, tankers, and early-warning aircraft.

...

The Chinese air force of the future will consist of fewer, but more capable, aircraft and support systems. Yet the total size and precise mix of foreign and domestic aircrafts remain open questions. This essay, drawn from a longer book chapter, seeks to illuminate the future force structure of the PLAAF by exploring the key decisions and trade-offs likely to shape the aircraft and capabilities that the Chinese air force will pursue. The emphasis is on the choices that will determine the future force structure of the PLAAF, with the goal of illustrating a range of possibilities and providing a guide to interpreting future developments.

Key Modernization Choices

Division of labor --- Missions such as air defense and conventional strike can be performed by several different types of weapon systems and assigned to different services or branches. The PLAAF has primary responsibility for air
defense and operates most of China’s fighters and long-range ground-based air defenses; however, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) naval aviation also operates air-defense fighters, and its ships carry increasingly capable
surface-to-air missile systems. Chinese air defenses must also defend against a range of potential threats, including cruise and ballistic missiles. Decisions about the division of air-defense responsibilities, the relative emphasis on
ground-based air defenses versus fighters, and how much effort to place into defending against cruise missiles and ballistic missiles will all have a significant impact on the force structure of the PLAAF.

Conventional strike, against both land and naval targets, is a second major area where decisions about the division of labor among PLA services and branches may have a significant impact. China is pursuing a range of conventional strike capabilities including ballistic missiles controlled by the Second Artillery; cruise missiles that can be fired from air, ground, and naval platforms; and strike aircraft (including both multi-role fighters and bombers). Chinese military
officers see value in possessing a range of conventional strike options, which will permit multidimensional attacks against targets such as aircraft carriers and provide for more flexible attack options in a Taiwan contingency. Nevertheless,
decisions about whether ballistic and cruise missiles can substitute for a new strategic bomber and about how the PLAN and PLAAF will divide maritime strike responsibilities will affect future PLAAF force structure.


Domestic production vs. foreign procurement --- Though China has historically sought self-reliance in military production, this goal has been infeasible. PLAAF weapon systems have mostly been reverse-engineered from Soviet/Russian systems, been purchased outright, or incorporated significant amounts of foreign technology. Chinese leaders must strike a balance between domestic production of less capable aircraft and munitions and the acquisition of more capable weapons from foreign suppliers (with attendant uncertainties about excessive dependence and future support).
Although the PLAAF’s initial purchase of the Su-27 was intended to gain experience operating and maintaining a modern fighter, the subsequent purchase of additional Su-27s, assembly of Su-27 kits as the “co-produced”
J-11, and procurement of Su-30s reflect an effort to build a significant combat capability based on Russian fighters.

...

Aircraft quality vs. quantity --- Though most air forces prefer more capable, high-technology aircraft, this preference is usually tempered by budget realities. The general trend is for air forces to decrease in size as they upgrade their fleet to more capable (and more expensive) aircraft. The PLA has historically sought to compensate for inferior quality by procuring large quantities of weapons but is now trying to upgrade the quality of its weapon systems. Within the fighter force there will be two key choices. The most important choice for the PLAAF will be whether to procure less-capable
aircraft such as the FC-1 fighter and the JH-7 attack fighter in large numbers. The PLAAF has been reluctant to purchase these aircraft, but procurement decisions may ultimately be made by civilian leaders with a wider range of priorities. The second choice will involve the mix of advanced Russian aircraft and Chinese fighters. Will the future PLAAF consist largely of Su-27s and Su-30s, or will the J-10 become the PLAAF’s mainstream advanced multi-role fighter? As China’s first indigenously developed multi-role fighter, the J-10 program involves major design and systems integration challenges. Although procurement of the J-10 will likely be significantly less expensive than Russian fighters, the aircraft will also probably be less capable.

Force multipliers vs. combat aircraft --- “Informationalization” involves efforts to improve collection of intelligence regarding the position of enemy forces from a variety of sources, share that information widely among command elements and operational units, and control forces in a networked manner to make effective optimal use of information for tactical purposes. As applied to the air force, informationalization implies a greater investment in intelligence collection, command and control, and support systems in order to help ensure that ground-based and air assets function in an integrated and
more effective manner. This emphasis suggests that the PLAAF will increase its investments in support systems—such as tankers, transports, AEW/AWACS, intelligence-collection platforms, and electronic-warfare systems— implying
less procurement of combat aircraft.

Some Potential Outcomes

PLAAF force modernization will most likely center on continued efforts to build a modern air force using a variety of means, including procurement of advanced aircraft from Russia, domestic efforts to design and produce advanced aircraft, and incorporation of imported engines, avionics, and munitions into Chinese aircraft designs. Chinese assessments of the international security environment and the resulting resource allocations for military and air force modernization will shape both the pace of modernization and the size of the Chinese air force. Three alternative possibilities illustrate other potential outcomes.

Efforts to maximize capability quickly --- If Beijing were to decide that China’s security environment was deteriorating, the Chinese leadership could accelerate air force modernization via such steps as increased procurement of foreign aircraft; redoubled efforts to acquire foreign AWACS, tanker, and transport aircraft; and accelerated production of both high- and medium quality indigenous aircraft. The PLAAF would shelve efforts to replace imported components with Chinese equivalents in favor of stockpiling critical foreign components. Because of procurement and training timelines,
the PLAAF would require at least two to three years to produce substantial gains in capability.

A high-tech air force --- This path would emphasize both advanced aircraft, support systems, and the C4I capabilities to integrate aircraft into informationalized operations. The PLAAF would focus procurement on Russian fighters (and possibly the J-10) and might also explore “codevelopment” of new advanced aircraft with Russian partners. The PLAAF
would retire older aircraft as more capable, advanced replacements entered the force. Investment in support aircraft such as AEW/AWACS and tankers would be a priority, along with renewed efforts to procure foreign platforms
and technology and to intensify indigenous development efforts.

A domestically produced air force --- This path would emphasize indigenous production and avoid reliance on foreign suppliers, implying less emphasis on procurement of Russian aircraft, increased purchases of J-10 fighters (and possibly FC-1 and JH-7 aircraft), and enhanced efforts to replace foreign engines and avionics with indigenous equivalents. Development of force multipliers such as AEW/AWACS, tankers, and transports would depend on how quickly the Chinese defense industry improves. This approach implies a more relaxed pace of modernization, but would lay a firmer foundation for future development of advanced aircraft. It would imply confidence that China’s security environment is improving and that a military conflict is unlikely in the medium term.

Although the choice of modernization pathways and decisions about trade-offs will have a significant influence on future PLAAF force structure, it is already clear that the PLAAF of the future will be a significantly smaller but more capable air force.

[Shrinivasan]

Rakshaks,

I am assembling a Google Earth map(KMZ) depicting IAs ORBAT. I have already plotted the locations of Command, Corps, Divisions and even Brigades. I need information on division / Brigade level ORBAT info, anyone having this info can mail me @ shrinivasanm at google mail dot kaam.

Apart from being OT for this thread - needing to go into one of the other dedicated threads - is this sort of information that any army regularly makes pubic for sharing with enthusiasts? Just curious. I don't know what ORBAT or brigade mean. I'm not joking.

I was under the impression that in Op Brasstacks and again in Parakram the "disappearance" of some army formations and their reappearance in some other area caused some consternation to people who needed to watch those formations, so I have given myself the (perhaps mistaken) impression that the placement o army formations is better kept not so well known or better still marked by disinformation. But if there is to be disinformation the real positions need not be known. Everything can be cooked up.

Can someone educate me here? Unless Cheenum is a raagint looking for leaks .. No offence meant. It is possible.

thanks for the education. i am taking off my request... my research stays with me.

[Shrinivasan]

Shiv,
No leaks... from side.. lips sealed.

[chackojoseph]

I have an observation. I have noticed that people post a chinese sub pic, even if it is a degraded Kilo, and everybody looks at it as a wonder machine or even a potential nuclear submarine kind of reverance. The same with the chinese a/c, j-10, j-20 etc. I may not be 100% right on the observation, but, I think I made my point.

[shiv]

I have an observation. I have noticed that people post a chinese sub pic, even if it is a degraded Kilo, and everybody looks at it as a wonder machine or even a potential nuclear submarine kind of reverance. The same with the chinese a/c, j-10, j-20 etc. I may not be 100% right on the observation, but, I think I made my point.

To add to your observations - I would like to use an analogy of a lock and a key. A lock needs a key to open it. In the same way information that is designed to cause fear, respect, confusion, admiration, anxiety etc (in other words information designed to cause dhoti shivering) needs a collection of people who are willing to indulge in dhoti shivering.

If the key does not open the lock - then the key is useless. if the information does not evoke dhoti shivering, it is not doing its job.

[chackojoseph]

You are right. We have "collective Dhoti Shivering"

Added Later

Indians looking at the Yuan pic : Brrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr.. What a submarine, must be nuclear, we are dooomed.

1000's of miles inside a Chinese submarine: Hmmmm.. I have put all the switches on, why isn't this damn thing starting. And oh, water is seeping inside bunks. I need to save my face.

[ashi]

I have an observation. I have noticed that people post a chinese sub pic, even if it is a degraded Kilo, and everybody looks at it as a wonder machine or even a potential nuclear submarine kind of reverance. The same with the chinese a/c, j-10, j-20 etc. I may not be 100% right on the observation, but, I think I made my point.

The thing is, how do you know it is a degraded kilo? You could be right, that thing may be a photoshopped product.

[Austin]

Asians Look To Counter Chinese Submarines

SINGAPORE — Concerns over China’s growing submarine fleet are leading Asian nations to invest in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability.

The Malaysian Navy uses six Westland SuperLynx helicopters for ASW, but wants ASW helicopters with more capability and plans to buy six, a senior official from the navy tells Aviation Week on the sidelines of this week’s Imdex naval defense show in Singapore. The government has included the requirement in the country’s 10th Malaysia Plan 2011-2015, he says.

The official says the navy wants medium-lift helicopters that have long range and endurance. He declines to name the helicopters in the running. But it is understood the contenders are the Lockheed Martin/Sikorsky MH-60R and the AgustaWestland AW159.

South Korea also uses SuperLynx helicopters for ASW missions, but it is also considering buying the MH-60R, a South Korean navy official tells Aviation Week. AgustaWestland also is in the running. Besides the AW159, AgustaWestland has the AW101, a much larger ASW helicopter powered by three engines. The AW101 is out of the Malaysia competition because it is too big for Malaysia’s ships.

In the next couple of months South Korea is expected to decide whether it will seek to buy the helicopters from overseas or go for a locally developed product, an industry executive familiar with the situation says. Industry executives anticipate a request for proposals will be issued at year’s end.

Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) is proposing a naval variant of the Surion, the utility helicopter that KAI is developing, for the Korean army, with help from Eurocopter. The Surion is due to enter service next year. But it will be a challenge for KAI to develop a naval variant within a schedule and cost that meets the navy’s needs. The country also has a requirement for airborne mine countermeasures helicopters.

Another procurement that is in the works, but will take a few years to become a firm deal is Indonesia’s requirement for ASW helicopters. Indonesia’s navy has no ASW helicopters but wants to buy some, an Indonesian navy official says. He was unable to say when the ASW helicopters will be purchased and says it is up to the government. The navy plans to station the ASW helicopters on its Sigma 9113-class corvettes, he says. Indonesia recently took delivery of four aircraft from a Dutch shipbuilder, and a fifth is under construction in Indonesia, with more to follow.

Thailand, meanwhile, plans to purchase ASW upgrade kits for its Sikorsky S-70-7 helicopters, a Thai Navy official tells Aviation Week. Thailand bought six of the helos in the late 1990s, but to save money it never purchased the ASW kits, which include dipping sonar.

Mark Jarvis, Lockheed Martin’s director of design and production on the P-3, disclosed late last year that Singapore had issued a letter requesting information on the aircraft.

If Singapore purchases the P-3, it is likely to get former U.S. Navy P-3Cs in a similar configuration to the P-3Cs that Taiwan is getting from 2012 onward, Jarvis says. Taiwan already has S-70 ASW helicopters.

Asian countries consider boosting their ASW capabilities an urgent matter because of China’s submarine fleet and increased assertiveness.

[chackojoseph]

The thing is, how do you know it is a degraded kilo? You could be right, that thing may be a photoshopped product

Please check few pages back. A comparission of Viet Kilo and Chinese Kilo has been posted. You can see what "is not" cleared for Chinese use by Russians. It includes weapon packages,electronics and equipment.

Added later......................

Chinese have inferior Kilo's from Russia

First, Vietnam's Kilo submarines will be fitted with land attack cruise missile 3M-14E latest type, with a range of 290 km. Missiles are not Russia's Defense Ministry approved the export to China. Apart from Vietnam, two other countries are exporting Russian 3M-14E missiles is India and Algeria.

Besides that, Kilo 636-MV submarine is equipped with radar-guided complex multi-effects post GE2-01 type. This has not been removed for export to China, the biggest advantage is minimizing the noise in the environment and help diversify measures directions.

Sonar system, Kilo 636-MK China submarines is equipped with sonar systems MGK 400E basic types. Meanwhile, the Kilo 636-MV submarines are installing sonar systems MGK 400E type improvements. Two sonar system has the same sounding range, but the sonar system type MGK 400E is equipped with improved signal processing speed and performance more digitized higher level.

On the periscope, both Kilo 636-MK submarine and Kilo 636-MV submarines are equipped with sounding optical system, but the periscope used for tasks Kilo 636-MV attack submarines are installation of additional equipment measuring distance from IR ray and TV monitoring systems, Meanwhile, Kilo 636MK submarines primarily use optical aiming device and no distance measurement beam from. That means fighting capability at night and the attack accuracy of the Kilo 636-MV submarine will be higher than Kilo 636-MK submarine.

[hnair]

A very dry sub, even a foot below waterline. And very crisp waves lapping its fine lines.....

Compared to this very wet and ugly beast that is being hoisted on us.
.

[rohitvats]

Rohit:Care to educate me on this? are you saying IA generals were aware of the PLA build-up?

If no, it is an intelligence failure. If Yes, it is a criminal negligence bordering on complicity to not have taken timely remedial action

PLA attacked India both in NEFA and Aksai Chin (which is more that 1000KM apart), so they had adequate buildup, Assam valley is in between these two sectors.

I knew there was abject negligence from the political leadership, but what did the Army do?

For someone who is not well read on the subject, you do make sweeping assertions and reach conclusions in haste. Please read up more on the matter. In the interim, some points on the 1962 war -

1. Lt.General SPP Thorat, Eastern Army Commander, has conducted an assessment in 1959 and a table-top exercise in 1960 called "Lal Quila" - he gamed the PLA offensive and given the status of IA and policy with China it (IA) was being asked to follow - lie Forward Defence - it surmised that PLA will have a walkover and even predicted their timetable for various stages of offensive. When the actual war broke out (he had retired by then), the PLA followed his predictions to the letter T. Thorat had forwarded the assessment of war-game to Menon - who called him a war-monger and alarmist. When there was a lull in the fighting (with PLA having overrun the NEFA), Nehru asked for Thorat and sought his advise on next likely course of action by PLA - especially, if PLA will enter Assam Valley. He replied in -ve and told him that they've outreached their logistics. He even showed his assessment from 1960 - to which Nehru asked in amazement as to why this was not shown to him earlier - Thorat replied, "You need to ask Menon for that".

2. General Thimayya had reccomended SPP Thorat's name for next COAS - which was declined in favor of General Thapar by Menon. And btw, the farewell speech from General Thimayya to his troops read, "I hope I'm not leaving you as canon fodder for the Chinese"

3. Thimayya and Thorat asked for NEFA to be included in operational responsibility of Eastern Command (it was manned by Assam Rifles) - which was declined by Menon.

4. Western Army (then responsible for Ladakh) had wargamed the scenario of PLA offensive in Ladakh Sector (I forget the name of the war-game) and realized that it required more troops. However, it was told not to touch formations from Punjab/Western border and no reinforcements were authorized. However, Western Command went ahead reinforced the sector on its own. Also, this was the sector which had least interference from political angle as well as from likes of BM Kaul. The senior leadership showed more foresight and left on its owne devices, did a far better job. In comparison, NEFA was a disaster - senior leaders simply refused to give order or owe up responsibility (when the war started) and people like Kaul (an ASC officer who has never seen comabat in his life and who had been made CGS) were directing about deployment upto platoon level sitting from hospital bed (prior to the shooting match) in Delhi.

5.The idiots sitting in MOD and GOI never realized that NEFA was a sideshow to capture Aksai-China. And btw, it was IB which was giving all the wrong info on PLA deployment and movement and BM Mullick was one of main proponents of Forward Policy. It was Mullick who had accused Thimmaya of planning a Coup and that SPP Thorat was part of the group - this was another reason Thorat was not made the COAS.

6. When Manekshaw was appointed GOC-in-C of IV Corps, the first order he gave was, "There will be no more retreat with-out my order and there will be no such order".

[chackojoseph]

Chinese troops have a good political education and don't talk : India

[Jaeger]

How about this then?
Lada

The new PLAN sub looks like the an evolutionary model based on their 636 Kilos - similar to the Russian Lada/Amur developments. My bet is that it's a Diesel-Electric with some form of AIP (with plenty of Rubin help). One of the big differences between this & the Lada is that the foreplanes are retractable into the bow, while the Lada has sail-mounted foreplanes... I would think it's about the same size as the Lada too, maybe about 20-30% larger? And yes, I think there's a good chance that this will be the class that is finally exported to the Pukes.

[chackojoseph]

How about this then?
Lada

The new PLAN sub looks like the an evolutionary model based on their 636 Kilos - similar to the Russian Lada/Amur developments. My bet is that it's a Diesel-Electric with some form of AIP (with plenty of Rubin help). One of the big differences between this & the Lada is that the foreplanes are retractable into the bow, while the Lada has sail-mounted foreplanes... I would think it's about the same size as the Lada too, maybe about 20-30% larger? And yes, I think there's a good chance that this will be the class that is finally exported to the Pukes.

This will help you: Russian's will never give latest tech to chinese. Russians are just taking money and giving the Chinese degraded stuff. Chinese totally depend on Russians for their weapons / designs and I don't see Chinese overtaking them in terms of technology.

[saip]

Rohit:

What part did Lt Gen B M Kaul play in this? I know he took a lot of blame for the debacle and when he wrote the book 'The Untold Story' he blamed everyone except himself for it. The joke I heard about the book was it should have been left untold!

[Shrinivasan]

Rohit:Care to educate me on this? are you saying IA generals were aware of the PLA build-up?

If no, it is an intelligence failure. If Yes, it is a criminal negligence bordering on complicity to not have taken timely remedial action

PLA attacked India both in NEFA and Aksai Chin (which is more that 1000KM apart), so they had adequate buildup, Assam valley is in between these two sectors.

I knew there was abject negligence from the political leadership, but what did the Army do?

For someone who is not well read on the subject, you do make sweeping assertions and reach conclusions in haste. Please read up more on the matter. In the interim, some points on the 1962 war -

1. Lt.General SPP Thorat, Eastern Army Commander, has conducted an assessment in 1959 and a table-top exercise in 1960 called "Lal Quila" - he gamed the PLA offensive and given the status of IA and policy with China it (IA) was being asked to follow - lie Forward Defence - it surmised that PLA will have a walkover and even predicted their timetable for various stages of offensive. When the actual war broke out (he had retired by then), the PLA followed his predictions to the letter T. Thorat had forwarded the assessment of war-game to Menon - who called him a war-monger and alarmist. When there was a lull in the fighting (with PLA having overrun the NEFA), Nehru asked for Thorat and sought his advise on next likely course of action by PLA - especially, if PLA will enter Assam Valley. He replied in -ve and told him that they've outreached their logistics. He even showed his assessment from 1960 - to which Nehru asked in amazement as to why this was not shown to him earlier - Thorat replied, "You need to ask Menon for that".

2. General Thimayya had reccomended SPP Thorat's name for next COAS - which was declined in favor of General Thapar by Menon. And btw, the farewell speech from General Thimayya to his troops read, "I hope I'm not leaving you as canon fodder for the Chinese"

3. Thimayya and Thorat asked for NEFA to be included in operational responsibility of Eastern Command (it was manned by Assam Rifles) - which was declined by Menon.

4. Western Army (then responsible for Ladakh) had wargamed the scenario of PLA offensive in Ladakh Sector (I forget the name of the war-game) and realized that it required more troops. However, it was told not to touch formations from Punjab/Western border and no reinforcements were authorized. However, Western Command went ahead reinforced the sector on its own. Also, this was the sector which had least interference from political angle as well as from likes of BM Kaul. The senior leadership showed more foresight and left on its owne devices, did a far better job. In comparison, NEFA was a disaster - senior leaders simply refused to give order or owe up responsibility (when the war started) and people like Kaul (an ASC officer who has never seen comabat in his life and who had been made CGS) were directing about deployment upto platoon level sitting from hospital bed (prior to the shooting match) in Delhi.

5.The idiots sitting in MOD and GOI never realized that NEFA was a sideshow to capture Aksai-China. And btw, it was IB which was giving all the wrong info on PLA deployment and movement and BM Mullick was one of main proponents of Forward Policy. It was Mullick who had accused Thimmaya of planning a Coup and that SPP Thorat was part of the group - this was another reason Thorat was not made the COAS.

6. When Manekshaw was appointed GOC-in-C of IV Corps, the first order he gave was, "There will be no more retreat with-out my order and there will be no such order".

Thanks Rohit... some of this I knew, some I did not. my question to gurus like you was to get me and other mango abduls like me, better educated.

[Rakesh]

A very dry sub, even a foot below waterline. And very crisp waves lapping its fine lines.....

Oh my goodness...that picture is photoshopped. I never realised that. That pic is a fake!! So much for that new Chinese sub!

[abhishek_sharma]

CHINA'S FUTURE NUCLEAR SUBMARINE FORCE
Insights from Chinese Writings
Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Winter 2007. Val. 60. No 1