Indian Military Aviation

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 23 May 2011 23:03

As far as I know, the Navy is not writing off the Dhruv, but rather shelving it till the program matures to resolve the emergent navy specific issues. I hope a medium lift helicopter is in development, using lessons learned from Dhruv..

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 23 May 2011 23:09

Rahul M wrote:Austin, dhruv was meant to be a sea king replacement even though it belonged to a different class. only when it became clear that won't be possible that IN released a RFP for medium helo's.

Dhruv is in Sea Lynx class , how can it ever replace a Sea King and for a chopper that was never designed for Naval role

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 23 May 2011 23:10

there is one in development but I am not too optimistic about when it will be completed. I expect speed will pick up once the dhruv's WSI version matures. unfortunately they haven't said anything about the choice of international partner yet. so work doesn't seem to have begun in earnest.

http://livefist.blogspot.com/2010/08/ex ... irole.html

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 23 May 2011 23:13

http://www.business-standard.com/result ... er/427533/

A recent bus. std. article by LtCol Ajai Shukla (Retd). Neatly paraphrases the Air Force's feelings about Dhruv in Siachen. Ergo, my surprise at BSF's stand. Its possible they have some issues which the paper has not been able to carry forward effectively. Maintenance may be a problem, HAL has been known to be a bit inefficient at times in that Dept. But still, given that IAF, and IA are not suffering (at least vociferously) from these issues, argues against it.

In Siachen, Dhruv proves a world-beater
Ajai Shukla / Bangalore Mar 07, 2011, 00:48

It was a brutal test of helicopter and pilot. As the Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) shuddered towards the icy helipad on a 21,000-foot ledge overlooking the Siachen Glacier, the pilots could see wreckage from earlier helicopter crashes dotting the base of the vertical ice walls on either side. Ahead lay the Indian Army’s infamous Sonam Post, the highest inhabited spot on earth, and an extreme example of why the military so urgently wants the Dhruv, which has been customised by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) for high altitude operations.

Very quickly, the Dhruv demonstrated its superiority over the military’s tiny, single-engine Cheetah helicopters, which can barely lift 20 kilos of payload to Sonam. Touching down on a tiny H-shape formed on the snow with perforated iron sheets, the Dhruv’s pilots signalled to one of the soldiers on Sonam to climb aboard. Effortlessly, the Dhruv took off, circled the post and landed again. Another soldier clambered onto the helicopter and the process was repeated, then with a third, and then a fourth soldier. Even with all Sonam’s defenders on board, the twin-engine Dhruv — painted incongruously in the peacock regalia of the IAF’s aerobatics team, Sarang — lifted off and landed back safely.

“This helicopter is simply unmatched at high altitudes,” says Group Captain Unni Nair, HAL’s chief helicopter test pilot, who flew the Dhruv that August morning during “hot-and-high” trials at Sonam. That term means flying at extreme altitudes in summer, when the heat-swollen oxygen is even thinner than usual. “The army wanted the Dhruv to lift 200 kilos to Sonam; we managed to carry 600 kilos.”

Powering that world-beating performance is a new helicopter engine, called the Shakti, which HAL commissioned French engine-maker, Turbomeca, to design for operations along India’s high-altitude borders. It is this engine that makes the new Dhruv Mark III — the first five of which were delivered to the army this month — far superior to the Mark I and Mark II Dhruvs, which were built with a less versatile engine. The Shakti, which will start being built under licence at HAL soon, will now power an entire family of HAL-built helicopters: an armed version of the Dhruv; the Light Combat Helicopter (LCH); and the single-engine Light Utility Helicopter that is still on the drawing board.

The Shakti-powered Dhruv Mark III is changing the operational dynamics on India’s high-altitude Himalayan defences. The capability to airlift soldiers will allow far-flung posts to be manned with fewer soldiers. In a crisis, jawans can be airlifted quickly from lower altitudes to threatened areas, and casualties can be evacuated.

HAL Bangalore has already begun handing over Dhruv Mark IIIs to the Leh-based 205 Aviation Squadron for operations in Siachen. With the military demanding 159 Dhruvs in quick time, HAL can hardly build these helicopters fast enough. This year’s production rate of 25 Dhruvs will be accelerated from 2012 to 36 helicopters annually. The current order includes 54 weaponised Dhruvs — termed Advanced Light Helicopter — Weapons Systems Integrated, or ALH-WSI — armed with anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, rockets and a 20-millimetre turret gun. The ALH-WSI is scheduled to begin weapons trials in Orissa in April.

The success of the ALH programme, heralded by the Dhruv Mark III, comes after years of struggle and criticism. Last August, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) noted, “Ninety per cent of the value of material used in each ALH is still imported from foreign suppliers.”

But HAL chief Ashok Nayak and his helicopter chief, Soundara Rajan, point out that indigenisation does not mean building every component of an aircraft. Citing the example of the Dhruv’s HAL-built mission computer, Rajan asks whether the imported microchips inside make the mission computer any less indigenous. He sums up HAL’s helicopter strategy as follows: “We will design our helicopters; develop the critical technologies of helicopter transmissions; manufacture composites; and integrate and assemble the helicopter. We will outsource the manufacture of sub-assemblies and components and structures to any vendor on the globe that offers us cost-effective solutions.”

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 23 May 2011 23:19

you should also check out Gp Capt (retd) Hari Nair's extremely informative posts in the LCH thread.

nachiket · Post by **nachiket** » 23 May 2011 23:29

My two cents regarding this issue. 2 possibilities spring to mind-

1. The BSF Dhruvs may not be powered by the Shakti engines which give the Dhruv its excellent high altitude performance. But even with this limitation I find it impossible that the Dhruv would give problems to the BSF at altitudes which they operate at.

2. Who services and maintains these Dhruvs? If the BSF itself does it, then they may not have the same level of technical facilities and manpower for servicing them as the IAF or IA aviation does. The BSF AFAIK never operated any helicopters of its own before this.

srai · Post by **srai** » 23 May 2011 23:47

ASPuar wrote:http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news ... ss/794597/

BSF writes to govt on 'Dhruv' choppers
Agencies
May 21, 2011
New Delhi

The Border Security Force (BSF) has written to the Government for replacing indigenous 'Dhruv' helicopters saying they did not fulfil its operational requirement.

"The Advanced Light Helicopters- Dhruv-- are not helpful in our operations like casualty evacuation and troop reinforcements. They are useless for us. Most of the times these helicopters are under servicing and there are issues about its capabilities to fly beyond a certain height," BSF sources said.

"We have informed the Home Ministry in this regard. The helicopter keeps developing regular snags," they said.

The air wing in these naxal-affected areas is under the command of the Border Security Force (BSF) and is used by the personnel of CRPF, ITBP, SSB and state police forces.

The BSF air fleet at present has six ALH 'Dhruvs' and two more will soon be inducted.

...

"These helicopters will be in place by June this year and will help security forces deployed for anti-naxal operations,"the sources said.

The present fleet of 'Dhruvs' placed in Raipur (Chhattisgarh) and Ranchi (Jharkhand) are also out of work due to reasons of want of spare parts or requirements of servicing.

...
Whats the deal here? ...

It sounds like HAL needs to do a better job in customer after-sales support, which includes pilot/maintenance crew training, parts inventory management, HAL technicians fielded on-site etc. I don't know if HAL is doing this.

From the recent US C-130J deal, it seems like they provide a 3-year "service entry" support at the start as part of the deal itself. This includes pilot/maintenance crew and logistics training, LM experts on-site to rectify issues such as technical defects, part-supply management, detailed documentations, etc.

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 24 May 2011 01:01

Has BSF ever proven that it can run it's air wing without glitches? Even the Mi-17 - one of the most reliable copters - were grounded in Delhi.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 24 May 2011 01:18

it seems everytime I read something about BSF's air wing, either it is "will induct" or "grounded".

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 24 May 2011 01:52

Isn't the Navy now thinking of a unmanned Dhruv??

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 24 May 2011 02:27

Juggi G · Post by **Juggi G** » 24 May 2011 11:03

Indian Air Chief Watches Demonstration Flight of FGFA

In the course of UpGradation the MiG-29 fighters in Service with IAF their Avionics will be Unified with the MiG-29K deck based fighters for the Vikramaditya aircraft carrier (former Gorshkov), including Systems Developed by HAL and Bharat Dynamics and French companies, according to a United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) release, the umbrella organisation of Sukhoi and MiG Corporations.

VinodTK · Post by **VinodTK** » 25 May 2011 05:51

Good Artical

China vs. India: Wars in Space as 21st Century Conflicts

Never before have two modern military powers -- China and India -- confronted one another across a mountain range like the Himalayas. The wars fought by Europeans across the alps and Pyrenees would appear as minor skirmishes compared to it.
:
A conventional war fought between these two rivals at very high altitude would superficially resemble the fighting between India and Pakistan during the 1999 Kargil conflict, when Pakistani infiltrators took control of some mountaintops on terrain claimed by India. Although they were eventually expelled by Indian forces in a month-long campaign fought in some of the most difficult conditions in the history of war, it is likely that a new confrontation here would quickly escalate into something far more intense. The extreme difficulty of resupplying ground forces fighting among the highest mountains in the would, for example, would rapidly make air superiority even more decisive than usual.
:
Another mode of warfare, dogfighting in high mountains, is a highly specialized art that is little understood outside a few places where it is essential to national survival. The Swiss Air Force has spent more than 70 years perfecting its ability to fight in the Alps. The main lesson it has learned is that training and maneuverability count for more than electronics or advanced weapons. A pilot who has flown into the same valley, or around the same mountain crest, hundreds of times will probably beat a pilot flying in the same environment for the first time, even if that pilot has been able to practice in a simulator.
:
If a conflict did erupt, both sides might believe that it would be to their advantage if they destroyed the other side's space systems. Even if the advantage of being the first to attack, using anti-satellite weapons, were short lived, it might last long enough to have a decisive military effect, especially if both sides came under diplomatic pressure to agree to a cease fire "in place."

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 26 May 2011 07:58

IAF to deploy direction finding equipment at Tawang and Zero in Arunachal Pradesh

wig · Post by **wig** » 26 May 2011 09:25

interesting article in the tribune on The IAF dilemma: To upgrade its Mirage fleet or buy new jets

The Indian Air Force has a dilemma: should it go ahead and upgrade it’s 51-strong Mirage fleet or purchase new fighters for Mirages’ specific role? Talks between the Ministry of Defence and Mirage’s French manufacturer Dassault are in the final stage and a decision is expected soon.

Upgrade of the French Dassault M2000 fighter aircraft would cost a whopping Rs 14,400 crore but it does not include the cost of procuring new weaponry worth Rs 80 crore.

If the Defence Ministry and the manufacturer sign the agreement, Dassault will supply four upgraded aircraft and kits to upgrade the remaining 47 aircraft to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. Roughly Rs 4,500 crore is to be spent by HAL on the upgrade. It will also charge nearly Rs 900 crore for the furnished items.

A section of the IAF top brass feels that the upgrade cost is too high as the officers say that buying a new fighter would work out cheaper.

“Avionics and weaponry are complementary but their capabilities don’t always match. The upgrade process is very complicated and thorough and has to be very convincing for it to be approved,” said Air Marshal (retired) D. Keeler - hero of the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars. Mirage fighters were inducted in the IAF during Keeler’s tenure in the mid-eighties. “Upgradation is always planned on the future lifespan of the airframe and engines,” he added.

New weapons required to be fitted in the proposed upgraded aircraft include BVR (RF) MICA missiles, IR MICA missiles, conventional weapons and smart guided weapons with standoff capabilities, and air-to-surface weapons.

Incidentally, Dassault fighter Rafale has been shortlisted along with Eurofighter Typhoon in the over $10.5 billion deal for 126 Medium Multi Role-Combat Aircraft (MMRCA). Two American, one Swedish and one Russian rival firm are out of the race.

The Eurofighter is said to having an edge over Rafale. Dassault sees this as a ‘win-win situation’: If it fails to get the MMRCA deal, it is confident of clinching the Mirage upgrade deal. Purchasing new Mirages is not an option now as France has closed the production line, presumably to avoid competition between Mirage 2000 and the Rafale. When last produced in 2007, the estimated price of a Mirage 2000-09 was Rs 30-35 million.

The first batch of 40 Mirage aircraft was delivered during 1986-87, the second batch of nine during 1988-89 and the third batch of 10 aircraft during 2003-04. Of these 59 aircraft, only 51 are now in the fleet. The rest have been lost.

The proposal is to upgrade all 51 aircraft to extend their operational life and update their capability. The ‘cardinal points’ of the proposal include: no airframe modifications, no changes to major aircraft systems, no modification to equipment bays, limited cockpit modifications, minimum retrofit line modification facilities/activities, and, most significantly, it does not cover the cost of supply of weapons.

As the purpose of the upgrade is to bring the IAF’s Mirage 2000 fleet up to the standard of the Mirage 2000-5 Mk2, which is used by the French and sold as the Mirage 2000-09, would it not be a better option to ascertain whether any country wants to sell some or all of its inventory at a more competitive cost than that represented by the upgrade, questions the anti-upgrade lobby within the IAF.

India had reportedly talked to Qatar, which was looking to sell its Mirage 2000-09 fleet of 12 aircraft. The talks failed as Qatar’s price expectations could not be met. Some senior officers are of the view that this setback does not preclude the attempt to identify another source, provided that the price is reasonable and that there is sufficient service life remaining to justify the acquisition.

India must negotiate and conclude contracts for the upgrade of Mirage fighters and procurement of weapons simultaneously, advise senior IAF officers. OtOtherwise, they warn, weapon manufacturers will dictate their ‘expensive terms’ later.

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2011/20110526/main2.htm

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 26 May 2011 09:53

Prem, Qatar Mirages again! Maybe Pranabda can talk what happened?

Above article is ridiculous. If there are no one to sell their stocks how is that an option?

karan_mc · Post by **karan_mc** » 26 May 2011 10:03

A flying lemon

http://idrw.org/?p=2155#more-2155

The anger in Washington policy circles when the US fighter planes — the Lockheed-Martin F-16IN and the Boeing F-18 Super Hornet did not make it to the Indian Air Force’s Medium-range Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) shortlist, was a thing to behold. It was as if an ungrateful India had reneged on a done aircraft deal — just rewards for easing India’s entry on to the verandah of the five-country nuclear weapons club.

The American incomprehension with the Indian decision is itself incomprehensible. Lockheed and Boeing actually believed they would win with platforms of late 1960s vintage jazzed up with a downgraded Raytheon APG-79 (or even a de-rated “81”) version of the Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) look-down, ground-mapping, radar. The Indian Air Force is not the most advanced but its leadership, despite its flaws, knows when it is being palmed off with yesterday’s goods. Had Washington offered the Joint Strike Fighter, the F-35 Lightning II, the IAF would have jumped at it and the decision would have been hurrahed along by the Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh. In the event, the French Rafale and the EADS (European Aeronautic Defence and Space) Company’s Typhoon Eurofighter progressed even as Lockheed and Boeing were sought to be pacified with two transport aircraft deals — the one for the C-130J making sense, the other for the C-17 not. Russia, likewise, was mollified with collaboration on the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). To my consternated friends in Washington who sought an explanation, I offered an analogy. Some two decades back, the Daimler-Benz car company entered the Indian market with older Mercedes models, convinced the cash-rich yokels would splash good money for anything with the three-cornered star on the bonnet. The old cars, remained unsold and the investment in production jigs and tools in their factory in Pune went waste. The Germans quickly corrected course, offering the newest Mercedes models, available in Dusseldorf, in Delhi.

The sale of Rafale or Eurofighter to India is a lifeline to both the Dassault Company and the French aviation sector generally and the four-country consortium producing, so far unviably, the latter aircraft that an expert acquaintance dismissed as something “Germany doesn’t want, Britain can’t afford, and Spain and Italy neither want nor can afford!” But, leverage-wise, it affords India traction with four European countries instead of just France in case Rafale is taken. But is either of these aircraft genuinely multi-role?

Dr Carlo Kopp, an internationally renowned combat aviation specialist, deems the Typhoon, a non-stealthy, short-range (300 nautical miles) air defence/air dominance fighter optimised for transonic manoeuvres, more a “lemon” than a “demon”. Italian Air Force Chief Gen. Vincenzo Camporini, moreover, declared in 2008 that this plane was incapable of an “attack role in an economically sustainable manner”, in part because EADS has no AESA radar. It hopes to develop one with the infusion of Indian monies if Typhoon is selected. Realistically, India will not get the strike variant until well into the 2020s as the Royal Air Force and the German Luftwaffe, for starters, will have the first lien on it. In short, for over a third of its lifetime, the IAF will have to make do with the more limited air defence version which, in effect, is an avionics-wise souped-up, ergonomically improved, MiG-21! Moreover, to expect timely, coordinated, supply of spares and service support from 20-odd countries (including Croatia!) roped into the Eurofighter programme will be a compounded logistics and maintenance nightmare.

Rafale is a smaller, semi-stealth plane with slightly better un-refuelled range than the Typhoon but, equipped with the RBE-22A AESA radar, can undertake ground attack, including nuclear weapon delivery. Critically, it has finessed the algorithm (patented, incidentally, by an Indian scientist) for more effective fusion of data from numerous on-board and external sensors (such as satellite) better than the Eurofighter. Except, as late as 2009, Rafale was ruled operationally inadequate perhaps because it is less agile in “dogfighting” — a role the IAF brass remains enamoured with long after advanced tactical missiles have made close-quarter aerial battle history. Rafale and Typhoon nevertheless cost a bomb, with the MMRCA eventually coming in at around $20 billion.

The F-16 was rejected because, in part, the Pakistan Air Force flies it. By this reckoning, Pakistan may also access Typhoon and Rafale. EADS is trying desperately to sell the Typhoon to Turkey. If it succeeds, PAF will end up familiarising itself with it, if not actually benefiting from surreptitious transfer of its technologies. Trying to ramp up its defence sales, France has explored the sale of Rafale to Pakistan as has Russia the MiG-35 in order to compete with China for influence in Islamabad (which is not barred by any provision in the FGFA deal with India).

The MMRCA is a rubbish acquisition. The defence ministry followed up the questionable decision with a singular display of lack of negotiating savvy. With the MiG-35 option on the table, India could have played the Europeans off against the Russians to secure the best terms, even if ultimately for Rafale/Typhoon. Instead, there’s the appalling record of defence ministry officials and service officers repeatedly muffing deals, worse, acting as patsies for, or playing footsy with, the supplier states, resulting in treasury-emptying contracts that have fetched the country little in return.

Learning from the past, defence minister A.K. Antony had better instruct his negotiators to insist on only phased payments linked to time-bound delivery of aircraft and full transfer of technology (including source codes and flight control laws for all aspects of the aircraft), and on deterrent penalties that automatically kick in at the slightest infringement or violation of clauses deliberately tilted to favour India. Considering Delhi — prior to signing the deal — is in a position to arm-twist almost anything out of the supplier firms using the threat of walking out on the deal, the litmus test of a “successful” MMRCA transaction will be whether, by way of offsets, and notwithstanding the initial problems with absorbing advanced technology, the Indian defence industry has gained top-edge technological-industrial competence across the broad combat aviation front (rather than rights to mere licenced manufacture as in past deals).

Bharat Karnad is professor at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi

pragnya · Post by **pragnya** » 26 May 2011 18:08

Pogosyan said he believes joint civilian aviation programs will be coming after last military and transport aviation ventures maturing between two countries.

http://igorrgroup.blogspot.com/2011/05/ ... ndian.html

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 26 May 2011 22:57

VinodTK wrote:Good Artical

China vs. India: Wars in Space as 21st Century Conflicts
Never before have two modern military powers -- China and India -- confronted one another across a mountain range like the Himalayas. The wars fought by Europeans across the alps and Pyrenees would appear as minor skirmishes compared to it.
:

Fake article. War on such altitudes really do not yeild anything and comparing with europe is a false comparision.

A conventional war fought between these two rivals at very high altitude
This is putting words to describe when there is no "rival" situation. This is a psy ops article.

. In spite of the understandable refusal by both governments to make it official, the rivalry between them is already shaping the geopolitics of the 21st century.
30 years of western support to PRC and Pakistan has created problems than anything India or PRC have done to each other

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 27 May 2011 09:40

DGCA certifies Dhruv helicopter simulator to Level D

“We are very proud of achieving Level D certification for the world’s first simulator representing the indigenously developed HAL Dhruv helicopter,” said Wg Cdr (Retd) Chandra Datt Upadhyay Vr.C., Chief Executive Officer of HATSOF. “We look forward to welcoming the Indian Air Force and other civil operators of the Dhruv in offering simulation-based training that will undoubtedly prove to be a safe and cost-effective method for training Dhruv helicopter aircrews.”

Additional cockpits for the Indian Army/Air Force variant of the HAL-built Dhruv and the Eurocopter Dauphin will be added to the HATSOFF training centre over the next year.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 27 May 2011 13:09

continued here http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 1#p1098191

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 29 May 2011 10:40

The Strategic Role of Airpower: An Indian Perspective on How We Need to Think, Train, and Fight in the Coming Years*

Air Commodore Arjun Subramaniam
Indian Air Force
Air & Space Power Journal - Fall 2008

The application of airpower to further a nation's strategic objectives has gained momentum over the last few years, ever since it was used with telling effect in Operations Desert Storm, Allied Force, Iraqi Freedom, and Enduring Freedom. The advent of sensors that provide accurate target intelligence, coupled with precision-guided munitions (PGM), has led to effects-based operations' gaining predominance in speedy conflict resolution, with minimum attrition and collateral damage. The Indian Air Force (IAF) is in the midst of a radical change in mind-set and reorientation of its force structure that will enable it to conduct parallel warfare and simultaneously influence operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. In light of these developments, we need to think, train, and fight with a strategic focus.

Conceptual Development

The use of airpower to further a nation's strategic aims and objectives has come a long way since the pounding of Nazi Germany's ball-bearing factories by Allied bombers and the obliteration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, both of which events had a significant effect on the outcome of World War II.

...

Next came the redefinition of platforms to prosecute the strategic air campaign and the consequent understanding that the campaign became better focused when one looked at the effect of destruction on a nation's ability or will to wage war rather than concentrating on the target and platform itself. The choice of attack platforms today also represents a radical shift from the strategic-bomber concept. Role reversal of strategic and tactical aircraft commenced in Vietnam, where B-52s carried out missions in support of ground operations while F-4s and F-105s flew against strategic-interdiction targets deep inside North Vietnam. Years later, eight F-16s, primarily considered tactical platforms by the United States Air Force (USAF) and Israeli Air Force, destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in a classic strategic strike. The final fillip to the case for strategic airpower is, without doubt, the emergence of highly accurate PGMs, coupled with real-time intelligence and just-in-time targeting, which enable a nation to exert its will on another without committing ground forces, thus paving the way for negotiated settlement of conflicts without unnecessary collateral damage and loss of life. An apt example of this redefinition, perhaps not palatable to the counterair purists, would be the destruction of Arab aircraft on the ground in 1967 during the counterair campaign launched by the Israeli Air Force. Were not the effects strategic in terms of breaking the Arab coalition's ability and will to fight? Enough has been written over the years about the spectacular success of the coalition air forces in Desert Storm, wherein an effects-based strategic air campaign, conceived by Col John Warden and executed by Gen Charles Horner, helped achieve Pres. George H. W. Bush's strategic objective of driving Iraq out of Kuwait with minimum attrition. If one were to pinpoint one failure of the use of strategic airpower in recent years, it would be that of the USAF to eliminate Osama bin Laden and the top Taliban leadership-one of the main strategic objectives of Enduring Freedom. If mass, tonnage, widespread area bombing due to lack of hard intelligence, collateral damage, and indiscriminate loss of life were the prime characteristics of the strategic air campaign of yesteryear, then stealth, precision, intense shock effect, speedy capitulation of the enemy, and achievement of objectives characterize the twenty-first-century strategic air campaign.

...

One cannot overemphasize the case for further developing the IAF's strategic air capability in the coming years in light of India's emergence as a potential economic superpower with global energy interests and markets.

...

Understanding Paralysis, Asymmetry, and Parallel Warfare

The three main objectives of any military campaign-coercion or intimidation, incapaci tation or dismemberment, and annihilation or destruction-have always focused on achieving a nation's geopolitical goals in any dispute or conflict. Warfare in the twenty-first century is slowly moving towards using annihilation or destruction as a last resort in legitimate war-fighting scenarios. That said, two airpower theorists from the USAF-Col John Boyd and Colonel Warden-propounded path-breaking theories of paralysing the enemy by strategic application of airpower. While Boyd talked about paralysing the enemy psychologically and weakening his will to fight, Warden emphasized the need to paralyse the adversary physically by attacking leadership, infrastructure, communication links, and fielded forces as part of his now-famous "Five-Ring Theory," based on Clausewitz's centres of gravity, which formed the heart of the air campaign in Desert Storm. The cornerstone of this process is the high probability of pounding an enemy into submission without inflicting too many casualties and reducing the intensity of battles by driving his leadership underground, blinding him, rendering his senses (eyes and ears) ineffective, and destroying his reserves as well as follow-on forces by carrying out deep precision strikes. Although the strategic air campaign that aims at paralysis is based on the overwhelming asymmetrical technology advantage that US forces will likely enjoy in any conflict scenario, policy and strategy planners in India must understand the tremendous advantages of creating an asymmetry vis-à-vis potential adversaries by building up a potent strategic air capability built around technology, force multipliers, and multitheatre capability. That does not mean that airpower and strategic air campaigns alone can win wars, but by applying the principles of asymmetry and paralysis, we can hasten the capitulation of an enemy by incapacitating him and reducing his military potential, as mentioned earlier, rather than destroying him. Airpower can do all this-and simultaneously support the surface campaign by conducting parallel warfare at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.8 Building such an ability calls for a change in mind-set and significant alterations in asset allocation. In the Indian context, we cannot restrict build order to justify a leaner air force. We would need to supplement these factors with sufficient numbers of aircraft and platforms to conduct parallel warfare on multiple fronts. This obviously calls for a strong case to progressively beef up the number of combat squadrons in the IAF from a projected 29-30 by the end of 2008 to at least 40 by 2015. The progressive induction of additional Su-30 MKI squadrons and 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) will likely fill the void created by phasing out platforms such as older variants of the MiG-21 and -23.

Role Definition in the Twenty-first Century

The emergence of invisible enemies, such as terrorists, and unconventional targets involving material and human resources will increase the difficulty of classifying the roles performed by strategic air assets over the next few decades. Perhaps the most critical characteristics of airpower that might occupy centre stage for the IAF in years to come would include flexibility, reach, precision firepower, and interoperability, with other characteristics such as surprise and shock effect serving as age-old, time-tested corollary benefits. What aspects of these four characteristics make them the focus of a study to define the IAF's strategic-airpower roles for the twenty-first century? The ability of a platform to switch effortlessly from a tactical to a strategic role is an inescapable imperative, as is its reach in performing interventionist roles with appropriate combat-support elements, thousands of kilometers away from its launch base. Having reached its target, the platform must be able to neutralise it with precision attacks and minimum collateral damage. The platforms and crews used for prosecuting the strategic air campaign must operate in international airspace with varied sensors and possibly with aircraft/aircrews of multinational task forces, especially in conflicts involving United Nations or multinational forces. They also need to be well integrated with elements of the surface forces involved in strategic interventions so as to synergistically apply the principles of asymmetry in conflict resolution. Having broadly spelled out the framework, we can now turn to the broad strategic roles and missions that the IAF can take on with a force structure that utilizes aircraft such as the Su-30 MKI, MMRCA, Mirage 2000 (M-2000), IL-78, IL-76, and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). Although we could easily ape the USAF by formulating a strategic air campaign and force that emphasize centres of gravity, nothing would be more divorced from the reality of the Indian situation. The IAF would need to answer two major questions:

1. Do we have the resources to prosecute such a campaign?

2. Are we likely to be faced with an Iraq-like situation of waging war in a foreign land and over such a prolonged period?

The answer would obviously be no! Until now, people have viewed the IAF as a predominantly tactical air force with limited deterrent capability. The advent of platforms such as the Su-30 MKI, weapon systems such as the Brahmos cruise missile, and force multipliers that include aerial-refueling platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and AWACS creates a need to "think big" and "think far." We must replace conventional roles with those that cater to the following scenarios:

. power projection

. strategic intervention over limited distances and duration

. proactive strikes and elimination of threats

. humanitarian intervention

. peacekeeping/enforcement missions in a lead role

. protection of energy and economic resources as well as the Andaman, Nicobar, and Lakshadweep island territories

. antiterrorist and antihijacking operations

. protection and evacuation of human resources

. enforcement of no-fly zones

In many of the scenarios and roles indicated above, the navy and army would continue to form key components of a joint task force, but airpower would provide immediate intervention. Although the tsunami-relief efforts of 2004 highlighted the speed and responsiveness of Indian airpower in terms of providing succour to the affected areas at home as well as in neighbouring countries such as Sri Lanka, they also revealed the need for additional resources such as heavy-lift helicopters and transport aircraft for disaster-relief operations. This assertiveness and articulation of the IAF's strategic reach may not appear very large from a US perspective; however, one must view it in the light of India's emergence as a responsible regional power and global economic powerhouse with expanding markets and interests.

Targeting for Strategic Air Strikes

Targeting philosophy has also changed significantly over the years, dictated mainly by the nature and duration of wars, capability of platforms, accuracy of munitions, and quality of intelligence. The slow and sequential effect of strategic bombing during World War II-and to some extent during Vietnam-did contribute significantly to the final outcome, owing to repetitive attacks. This involved thousands of sorties against the same target sets without worrying much about civilian casualties and collateral damage. The main aim called for systematically undermining industrial capability and psychologically numbing an adversary into submission. Closer to home, the surgical strike by IAF MiG-21s on the governor-general's residence in Dhaka in December 1971 did make a significant dent in the morale of the East Pakistani leadership, ultimately resulting in its capitulation only days later. Conventional wars and conflicts in the twenty-first century are likely to be short and swift, necessitating extremely quick and effective targeting without having to resort to repetitive attacks. The same, however, cannot be said of subconventional wars, which could last several years. One need look no further than the conflicts in Jammu and Kashmir, sensor-to-shooter loop is unavailable; and the IAF realizes that most nonstate actors, actively aided by neighbouring states, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The demands on airpower to shift focus from conventional strategic targeting to subconventional targeting at short notice would have to be met by leveraging the same strategic characteristics of airpower, discussed earlier in this article, and adapting them for irregular warfare. Terrorist or insurgent leadership, communication networks, and safe havens in sympathetic countries would comprise typical strategic targets in subconventional scenarios. The USAF and Israeli Air Force actively engage such targets, but the IAF has not yet done so, primarily because the limited availability of precision weapons hampers operations in densely populated urban environments; the real-time intelligence needed to speed the operate in Indian territory, mingling freely with the local population. These factors also help explain why Indian political leadership is hesitant to use offensive airpower to address subconventional targets. We may have to reassess this mind-set in years to come if India has to effectively prosecute the war on terror. Typical changes in target profiles over the years include the following:

World War II Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003
population centres enemy leadership
industrial capability command, control, communications, and
intelligence (C3I) systems and sensors
manufacturing centres fielded forces and reserves
hydroelectric and
power generation sites for nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction

Thus, the targeting focus has shifted from people and the economy to leadership and military capability. Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force greatly redefined targeting for the strategic application of airpower, with significant additional refinements occurring during Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Iraqi Freedom in 2003. The Gulf War of 1991 featured a fairly rigid set of targets defined by perceived centres of gravity and folded into a largely individualistic and much publicised strategic air campaign. The "Shock and Awe" strikes unleashed during Iraqi Freedom, however, saw simultaneous engagement of a number of strategic targets by platforms as varied as the B-2 bomber and the F-16, armed with PGMs and a wide variety of smart weapons. The estimated 42,000 sorties flown during Desert Storm expended approximately 210,000 unguided bombs and around 17,000 PGMs. This low percentage of PGMs (less than 10 percent) stands in stark contrast to the bombing during the initial part of Iraqi Freedom, when PGMs made up more than 65 percent of the air-to-ground weapons used by coalition forces. Another interesting change in US strategy has lessons for the IAF; specifically, rather than tying the strategic air campaign during the 2003 Iraq war to a traditional timetable, as in Desert Storm, planners instead fit it like a glove around simultaneous land and naval campaigns, giving more impetus to the importance of synergy and joint operations. Another interesting lesson from Iraqi Freedom for the IAF concerns the role played by PGMs in reducing the size of strike packages and the number of revisits to a target system, as compared to related actions during Desert Storm. This resulted from improved weapon performance and enhanced real-time battle damage assessment facilitated by advances in space-enabled reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and acquisition technologies.

Bolstering Indian Strategic Air Capability

The present IAF force structure offers limited capability for strategic intervention. Only aircraft such as the Su-30 MKI, M-2000, and IL-76/-78 meet the various criteria laid down for such intervention. Given India's growing global aspirations, we need to address our force-structure requirements for strategic force projection, intervention, and even coercive diplomacy. While delivering the Air Chief Marshal P. C. Lal Memorial Lecture in March 2006, Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, defence minister of India, acknowledged the primacy of airpower in future conflicts and linked the reorientation of the IAF to India's rapid economic growth and the need to protect its security interests extending from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca. He went on to highlight the need to emphasize strategic thinking, joint operations, and asymmetric warfare, all of which have been discussed in this article. Some of the essential ingredients for bolstering our strategic air-war-fighting capability include not only tangible assets such as hardware resources and technology, but also intangibles such as leadership and political will.

Platforms

Amongst the numerous aerial platforms presently in use worldwide as part of strategic forces, the most important ones from an Indian perspective are fighter aircraft, heavy-lift/medium-lift transport aircraft, multirole helicopters, and force multipliers such as the AWACS, air-to-air refuelling (AAR) platforms, and early warning aircraft. We need to back up these platforms with providers of real-time information such as satellites with image resolution of less than one meter and rapidly deployable UAVs with multiple sensors, adequate loiter time, and even limited firepower. Although the Su-30 MKI, with its phenomenal reach, awesome firepower, and multicrew/multimission capability, is an ideal platform to prosecute a strategic air campaign, we must clearly understand that we can neutralise strategic targets by effectively employing essentially tactical platforms such as the M-2000 and the MMRCA, 126 of which are in the pipeline. Even older platforms such as the Jaguar can supplement the Su-30, M-2000, and MMRCA; however, their use in strategic air campaigns would require greater coordination, support, and precision. Strategic strike capability without strategic airlift capability leaves a gaping hole in a nation's ability to project, sustain, reinforce, and, if required, extricate strategic forces over vast distances. The IAF's only strategic airlift platform, the ageing IL-76, needs to be supplemented by a newer-generation heavy-lift aircraft in the same or larger category and a medium-lift aircraft with a payload of 15-20 tons. As far as helicopters are concerned, destruction of C3I nodes, elimination of leadership, insertion/extrication of special forces, and interdiction of reserves and follow-on forces are all strategic tasks in the context of effects-based operations. We must quickly address the yawning deficiency in this area.

Force Multipliers

With the induction of the IL-78 AAR platform and impending induction of the AWACS, the IAF will take the first step to becoming a truly self-reliant air force with global-intervention capability. However, this should not lull us into a false sense of bravado that the journey ends here. A look at the geographical extent of our country reveals that the number of refueling and AWACS aircraft would barely suffice to address tactical needs in multiple theatres, leaving very little for any meaningful strategic intervention. We need to fill this limitation and void with additional platforms to create an exclusive force that thinks, trains, and fights strategically. The introduction of UAVs into the IAF and exploitation of civilian space technology also add significant punch to our capability and require careful integration into our intelligence framework.

Intelligence Gathering to Support Strategic Air Operations

Presently, sharing of intelligence between the military and other agencies leaves much to be desired, and turf battles have resulted in less-than-optimal sharing. No longer static, targets for strategic intervention range from elusive enemy leadership to highly mobile tactical weapon systems whose destruction can break an enemy's will to continue fighting. Classic examples include the continued US air attacks against mobile al-Qaeda leadership, with limited success, in conjunction with special forces, and the destruction of Serb surface-to-air-missile sites during Allied Force by airpower alone. Too many agencies currently receive, process, interpret, and disseminate intelligence, and a pressing need exists for a lean intelligence structure to support strategic air operations. (See the figure for a broad requirement that doesn't dissect the structure too critically.)

Figure. Intelligence network for strategic air operations

With the phasing out of the MiG-25 strategic reconnaissance aircraft, the onus of providing accurate intelligence for strategic targeting has shifted to space-based sensors. Even in the absence of dedicated military satellites, capabilities of civilian remote-sensing technologies like the Ikonos (US) and the Indian-technology experimental satellite permit resolutions as low as one meter. With possibilities of further improvement in resolution, the gap between civilian and military capability is diminishing. (For typical resolutions required to examine possible strategic targets, see the table.)

Table. Typical resolution requirements (in meters) for targeting

According to Prof. U. R. Rao, a pioneer of India's satellite programme, the only way to exploit space for strategic intelligence in the absence of a dedicated military satellite programme is to foster greater synergy between the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and defence users such as the three services, the Research and Analysis Wing, and the Intelligence Bureau. He goes on to say that all requirements for strategic reconnaissance have to be met indigenously, with the ISRO capable of satisfying the need for enhanced resolution. Needless to say, the success of any strategic air campaign depends on the accuracy of intelligence and training in a realistic environment similar to that conducted by coalition forces in Desert Shield, prior to Desert Storm. Common sensor and communications programs in UAVs, manned aircraft, and even satellites are vital to mission effectiveness, along with a single processing, analysing, and disseminating agency such as the aerial common-sensor programme being adopted by the US armed forces.

Communication Requirements

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Political Will and Intent

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Changes in Philosophy and Doctrine

...

The key issue, however, involves fostering an understanding of the capabilities of strategic strikes and interdiction. Despite the politico-strategic procrastination over using airpower during the Kargil conflict of 1999, the IAF's "never done before" high-altitude interdiction air campaign did contribute significantly to the strategic objective of evicting Pakistani regulars and mujahideen from the heights that they had stealthily and audaciously occupied. The application of airpower against tactical targets such as dug-in troop emplacements and mountain supply dumps at elevations of 16,000-18,000 feet created a strategic effect and forced the intruders to vacate all the dominating heights and retreat into Pakistan. It also forced the Pakistani military leadership to reassess its apparent strategy of waging a proxy war against India. Offensive air operations also silenced critics within India who felt that airpower was essentially escalatory in nature. In fact, the introduction of airpower proved decisive in de-escalation and conflict resolution. With that as a template, nothing prevents the formulation of a cohesive interdiction campaign, even in subconventional scenarios, provided that surface forces realise the tremendous payoffs of a well-planned strategic-interdiction campaign.

Training

The next logical step, after displaying political will and changing existing mind-sets regarding the advantages of airpower in the furtherance of India's strategic objectives, calls for training and thinking to fight strategically. The present IAF training pattern for aircrews, controllers, and support elements is heavily skewed towards a tactical orientation and rather defensive in nature due to our reactive doctrine since we have never wanted other nations to see us as an aggressive and expansionist country. Without drastically altering our training methodology, we need to train continuously in strategic roles. We can introduce a strategic orientation at the training stage itself after implementation of the Hawk advanced jet trainer, which we can use to expose trainee pilots to AAR and long-distance missions in the final phase of their instruction. Additional training areas that demand immediate attention include the following:

. Creation of simulated target systems like those in the Negev Desert of Israel, which cater to scenarios ranging from evacuation of personnel to destruction of key installations and elimination of terrorists. Our aircraft should engage these targets across the country in different seasons and terrains.

. Formation of a pool of aircrews specially trained on varied platforms. Primarily, they should have tactical proficiency but should also undergo periodic specialist capsules and training in execution of strategic missions. This core group needs periodic exercising and frequent international exposure.

. Conducting of periodic exercises involving joint task forces at varied locations, ranging from deserts to hilly terrain and island territories. We should regularly plan long-distance missions involving AAR as well as change in control zones, altitudes, and time zones. Such exercises should also introduce sleep deprivation and fatigue orientation at regular intervals.25

. Introduction of multiple aerial refuelings and engagements spread across theatres at various levels of squadron training.

. Encouragement and periodic exercising of strategic airlift capability and helicopter operations with special forces.

. Continuation of exercises with a few foreign air forces, with simulation of contingencies in mutually acceptable third countries.

. Creation of strategic task forces with centralised decision making, independent component commanders, and decentralised execution.

Conclusion

The IAF finds itself in the midst of a modernization process likely to take 10-15 years, by which time it will possess significant strategic capability in terms of platforms and force multipliers. The upgrading of infrastructure and communications requirements to support such operations is accompanying this modernization. The IAF's mind-set is also shifting from that of a tactically oriented and proficient force to one that has the confidence to influence strategy and doctrinal changes. At a time when nations are increasingly reluctant to commit ground forces due to the likelihood of mounting casualties, the ability to engage strategic targets with minimum collateral damage and maximum effect has made airpower a most preferred option in swift, conventional conflict resolution. From the imprecise aerial attacks of World War II to the precision with which modern aircraft engaged targets in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003, the strategic air campaign has come a long way. Having realized that the strategic effects of airpower application make themselves felt across the spectrum of conflict, ranging from limited and high-intensity conventional warfare to subconventional and irregular warfare, we know it is time for the IAF to put together a blueprint for building a credible strategic aerial-intervention capability over the next decade.

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Notes

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Juggi G · Post by **Juggi G** » 29 May 2011 17:57

Film on Indo-Pak 1971 War

May 29, 2011

J P Dutta has approached the Defence Ministry for necessary clearance and logistical support to recreate the Indo-Pak war of 1971 in his next flick, which will be a sequel to his 1997 blockbuster movie Border.

Dutta has chosen the story of Second Lieutenant Arun Khetrapal, who was awarded the highest gallantry award Param Vir Chakra (PVC), as the basic plot for the movie, which will also focus on the role played by the Indian Air Force (IAF) during the war, PTI reported. "His (Dutta's) proposal is being studied. He has sought permission to use Old Tanks and Aircraft to shoot the movie," Defence Ministry officials said here today.

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 29 May 2011 19:58

I just hope Sunny Deol is not playing the role of 2nd Lt Arun Khetrapal. And if he is, he needs to stop screaming and be melodramatic.

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 29 May 2011 20:01

It will be a bollywood formula war movie

don;t expect anything better.

only a handful of movie makers have the guts to stick to reality

negi · Post by **negi** » 29 May 2011 22:02

We need someone like Nihalani to do justice to the plot like he did with 'Vijeta'.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 29 May 2011 22:05

farhan akhtar was not too bad.

pgbhat · Post by **pgbhat** » 29 May 2011 22:21

Rakesh wrote:I just hope Sunny Deol is not playing the role of 2nd Lt Arun Khetrapal. And if he is, he needs to stop screaming and be melodramatic.

I am hoping JP Dutta will throw in an item number with Sunny-pa ji, at least that way nobody will watch it......

why can't it be Farhan Akhtar?

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 29 May 2011 22:28

JP Dutta believes he makes good war films...reality is otherwise. I still laugh when I see Sunny Deol waving out to Jackie Shroff, while the latter is way up in the sky flying his Hunter.

Farhan Akthar creates beautiful movies, but he needs to have a script.

Samay · Post by **Samay** » 29 May 2011 22:47

^Then a movie co-directed/co-produced by both these men would have a good masala of another blockbuster
JP dutta creates script with farhan and includes his mass scale spielberg like effects

and farhan does the good direction needed, and we would see a hollywood class bollywood movie

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 30 May 2011 10:09

An-32 flew to India after modernisation in Ukraine ( rian.ru )

May 27.The solemn ceremony of departure of the first five military transport aircraft An-32 Indian Air Force, which had been modernized in the Ukraine, was held May 27 in the GP plant 410 of Civil Aviation.

These aircraft were the first batch of aircrat assigned to the customer as part of a contract for repair, life extension and modernization of 105 aircraft An-32 Indian Air Force, which was signed in 2009 between Ukraine and India.

During a solemn ceremony, General Director - President - Chief Designer SE Antonov Dmitry Kiva gave commanders Indian crew of An-32 certificates for renewal of their term of service aircraft and wished them a successful flight.

He also said that the Indo-Ukrainian cooperation will develop successfully, since "we have other orders," but did not specify which ones.

As reported earlier, on May 18 in Kiev were signed acts of receiving the transfer of work on the first batch of five aircraft between the holder of the contract, GP Spetstehnoeksport and Air Force of the Republic of India. Until the end of 2011 is scheduled shipment of two more batches of updated aircraft.

Contract for the repair, life extension and modernization of aircraft An-32 Indian Air Force was signed by the parties in June 2009. Under the contract, 40 aircraft will be refurbished and modernized in Ukraine and 65 - in India. In Ukraine, the work is performed by GP ARZ № 410 of the Civil Aviation and the State Enterprise "Antonov".

Shrinivasan · Post by **Shrinivasan** » 30 May 2011 14:43

Ajatshatru wrote:Though as far as JP's direction is concerned, I feel the direction in 'Border' was slightly better than in 'LOC Kargil' (more taut direction in the former)....Also, JP should do away with some of those typical Bollywood songs as they hamper the flow in such war movies....

I think Lakshya is a very good war movie. If you can fast forward the Delhi days of our hero, the Kargil portions are amazing. Very realistic too (other than the mountain scaling part which i think would be done by special XXX than #2 Punjab. we can forgive him for that.

Gaur · Post by **Gaur** » 30 May 2011 15:35

cheenum wrote: I think Lakshya is a very good war movie. If you can fast forward the Delhi days of our hero, the Kargil portions are amazing. Very realistic too (other than the mountain scaling part which i think would be done by special XXX than #2 Punjab. we can forgive him for that.

Not necessarily. Our Infantry units are more than sufficiently trained for these kind of Mountain Operations.
I think this will be of interest to you:
Grenadier Yogender Singh Yadav

Also, to get a gist of mountain climbing capabilities of Indian Infantry, this is an excellent program:
http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/jai-hi ... ool/198623

Shrinivasan · Post by **Shrinivasan** » 30 May 2011 16:29

Gaur wrote:
cheenum wrote: I think Lakshya is a very good war movie. If you can fast forward the Delhi days of our hero, the Kargil portions are amazing. Very realistic too (other than the mountain scaling part which i think would be done by special XXX than #2 Punjab. we can forgive him for that.
Not necessarily. Our Infantry units are more than sufficiently trained for these kind of Mountain Operations.
I think this will be of interest to you:
Grenadier Yogender Singh Yadav

Also, to get a gist of mountain climbing capabilities of Indian Infantry, this is an excellent program:
http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/jai-hi ... ool/198623

Guar, you seem to be agreeing to my point, it is not regular troops but "Ghatak commando" who is a special soldier and not a regular Infantry. Thanks for the write-up on Grenadier Yegendra Singh Yadav, his heroics have been imitated by our hero.

Anyway, its a movie, they show much details about the IA (more than what they have already shown).

Gaur · Post by **Gaur** » 30 May 2011 16:47

^^
My reply here:
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 1#p1099981

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 31 May 2011 09:31

Decks cleared for purchase of 10 C-17s with offsets

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 31 May 2011 09:39

The Cabinet Committee on Security on Wednesday will consider a revised proposal for purchase of C-17s which, for the first time, outlines the offsets including a High Altitude Engine Test Facility and Trisonic Wind Tunnel Facility valued at $510 million, for the Defence Research & Development Organisation.

India’s access to advanced technology air tunnel would be important as it has depended on Russian test facilities to evaluate the indigenous Kaveri jet engine, which was to be used in the LCA project.

AOA. C17 amar rahe. hamara neta kuan hai? C17 ! C17 ! *10,000 goths beat their spears on oxhide shields and shout hu hu hu hu as the C17 resplendent in bronze helmet and red robe, wearing alaksindrs helmet rides a white charger down the line, outstretch wing (sword) clanking against the line of raised spears*

ps. a vacuum test facility for ISRO rocket engines is also a must-have (would have revealed a GSLV flaw) and perhaps should be tagged either with this deal , or the next tranche of P8I or the MRCA definitely (germany and france would surely have it for Ariane work)

Nikhil T · Post by **Nikhil T** » 31 May 2011 13:15

Russia delivers 5 more MiG-29K fighters

MOSCOW: Indian naval aviation has acquired new teeth with induction of nine MiG-29K carrier-borne fighter jets from Russia with an extended range of 3,000 kms and capable of firing air-to-air and air-to-sea missiles.

The Russian MiG Aircraft Corporation has delivered the second batch of five MiG-29K fighter jets to the navy, to add to its four, for which it has raised the new "Black Panthers" squadron.

India along with Russia, the manufacturer of the naval fighter, are the only countries to have acquired these fighters, which will be deployed on the INS Vikramaditya (former Gorshkov) aircraft carrier, under re-fit in Russia.

The newly acquired Russian carrier-operated MiGs are considered to be far superior to Indian Navy .s current Sea harrier jump jets.

Under the Gorshkov aircraft deal inked between the two countries in 2004, Russia is to supply 12 single-seater MiG-29K fighters and four two-seater MiG-29KUB trainer-cum-combat jets.

According to a MiG release first of four MiG-29Ks and MiG-29KUBs delivered to India have been formally inducted by the Indian Navy's "Black Panthers" squadron in February 2010.

MiG Corporation has also delivered flight simulator and other technical equipment to the Indian Navy.

In March 2010, Russia and India signed another USD 1.5 billion contract on the supplies of 29 additional MiG-29K Fulcrum-D carrier-based fighter jets and the deliveries are scheduled to commence next year, about the time Moscow is expected to deliver retrofitted Gorshkov aircraft carrier after serious delays.

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 31 May 2011 13:22

Singha,

Your posts suggests that you had a troubled adulthood

that you still wish to return to the bliss of being a child.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 31 May 2011 13:34

adulthood is like being locked up in a cage with bread and water, wearing soiled diapers.

childhood is the last time when one is allowed to think freely, have zero responsibility, no log-kya-kahenge and no deliverables.

its no surprise the biggest breaks occur when one starts thinking like a child, without the "conditioning" and "rules" forced down our gullets as adults.