Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

GuruPrabhu · Post by **GuruPrabhu** » 28 May 2011 05:55

Rudradev wrote:But what about the distinction between a radiological device and a fuski atimbum? What is the doctrine of retaliation in each case? A radiological device might well be far more damaging than a fuski atimbum, depending on what the radiological device contained vs. how much bang the fuski actually yielded up. Yet, a fuski atimbum must be construed as an attack with the intent of causing WMD devastation, even if it didn't work as planned because it was poorly designed.

A fuski atimbum is a complex case to evaluate. If there was some degree of fission chain reaction accomplished, then the isotopic byproducts may well be more deadly than a radiological weapon. But if it was a total dud then it reverts to the harmless (relatively speaking) case of a dispersion bum made from pure maal (HEU or WGPoo).

The good news is that a jehadi trying to fashion a radio-log-i-cal-bum from spent maal will commit premature soosai from rad-i-ation.

Amber G. · Post by **Amber G.** » 28 May 2011 07:36

GuruPrabhu wrote:
Rudradev wrote:But what about the distinction between a radiological device and a fuski atimbum? What is the doctrine of retaliation in each case? A radiological device might well be far more damaging than a fuski atimbum, depending on what the radiological device contained vs. how much bang the fuski actually yielded up. Yet, a fuski atimbum must be construed as an attack with the intent of causing WMD devastation, even if it didn't work as planned because it was poorly designed.
A fuski atimbum is a complex case to evaluate. If there was some degree of fission chain reaction accomplished, then the isotopic byproducts may well be more deadly than a radiological weapon. But if it was a total dud then it reverts to the harmless (relatively speaking) case of a dispersion bum made from pure maal (HEU or WGPoo).

The good news is that a jehadi trying to fashion a radio-log-i-cal-bum from spent maal will commit premature soosai from rad-i-ation.

Agree with that . As said before, (A few post ago)

How about exploding gamma ray sources ( Like Co-60... )?. Say drive a truckload full of these isotopes and blow it up ... again let me just say any significant quantity will make the Jhihadi, who carries it, die in milliseconds because of radiation. and if the Jhihadi wants to shield it with lead, it will be too heavy to drive)

Of course, even with no (or a small ) explosion (premature soosai), a guaranteed retaliation from where stuff came from (easy to pin point) should be the declared policy for deterrence.
(

VinodTK · Post by **VinodTK** » 28 May 2011 08:06

Pakistan's nuclear poker bet

Pakistan's "nuclear" missile flight test of the Hatf-9, or Nasr, on April 19 was billed as an answer to India's provocative Cold Start doctrine. Cold Start calls for India to be prepared to wage limited conventional warfare -- in response to Pakistani aggression or an attack from a Pakistan-based terrorist group -- in fast but shallow attacks that have punitive effects but stay beneath Pakistan's strategic nuclear threshold. It is intended as a deterrent against subconventional (terrorist) attacks originating in Pakistan. Since India and Pakistan went nuclear in close succession in May 1998, the group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) has inflicted two major attacks deep in India, on India's Parliament on December 13, 2001, and then the more spectacular and lethal assault on India's commercial capital Mumbai in November 2008.
:
Third, Cold Start threats could be reversed by the power that Pakistan leaders almost certainly have to turn off the subconventional warfare threat posed by groups like LeT, which is commonly regarded as a Pakistani government proxy. Cold Start's appeal is its promise to deter terrorist activities once focused in Kashmir but that have gone deep into India's heartland since 2001. Accordingly, Cold Start posturing would fold up fast if the provocation of subconventional warfare ceased. Obviously this does not mean peace would break out all over, and Pakistan surely would continue to maintain its conventional defenses and strategic deterrent for the foreseeable future. But the risks of conventional war and nuclear escalation would be reduced on Pakistan's eastern front, and stability would have a chance to take hold and widen, if the terrorist threat to India was removed from the equation

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 28 May 2011 08:20

From time to time we have discussed responses to a nuclear attack from Pakistan. In fact that is spelt out by our nuclear doctrine and perhaps the only debate is on details such as the questions posed by rudradev.

But I have been trying to look at actions that would dissuade Pakis from launching a nuke in the first place - apart from the "deterrence" factor of certain nuclear retaliation from India. The point here is that fear of punishment after launching a nuke is one factor that would stop them. But what can be done to create a fear of launching that first nuke itself. It has to be punishment whether or not they launch a nuke. Punishment for possessing and threatening the use of nukes.

Pakistan has to be forced into a form of Hobson's choice.
A. The will be punished for using a nuclear bomb
B. They will be punished for threatening to use a nuclear bomb

But the punishment for "B" should be less than that for "A". But threats should not go unpunished and the avoidance of threats could receive some reward. That is to say that Pakistan should get some benefit from not flaunting or threatening to use nukes. But leave alone first use, even threatening to use nukes should be punished.

Since Pakistan is threatening only India with a nuclear bomb - the need to stop that is felt most keenly by India. Not China or the US

Pakistan is threatening and blackmailing the US separately by playing a game in which the nuclear material is said to be at risk of being stolen by non state jihadis unless the US pays for the upkeep of the state jihadis of Pakistan.

The US has so far responded to blackmail in exactly the same way that India has responded. I need to explain that statement.

The story for India is that Pakistan threatens to nuke us, so we are unable to respond effectively to terrorism. We are being blackmailed into keeping quiet in the face of Pakistani terrorism because we would have to nuke Pakistan if they nuke us and it would be costly for us too. So playing this blackmail game is rewarding to Pakistan

The story for the US is that Pakistan' threatens the loss of nukes to non state jihadis - and the US - knwiwng that any action to destroy Pakistani nukes would be costly, succumbs to Pakistani blackmail and pays the state jihads of Pakistan, making it rewarding for them to play this game and ensure the survival of teh non state jihadis without whom this game cannot be played.

The most important lessons here are as follows

Pakistan is blackmailing India and the US separately
The nature of blackmail is different
Because the nature of blackmail is different it allows Pakistan to play India off against the US

I need to explain that too:

The threat to the US is theft of fissile material. To prevent that the Pakistan army asks for money and arms and tels the US to shut up as they use the arms to threaten India. The US has to shut up as long as the US's job (keeping fissile material out of non state jihadi hands) is done.

The threat to India is terrorism, followed by a nuclear attack if India threatens Pakistan with punishment for terrorism. Any Indian action is used by Pakistan as a threat that will allow non state jihadis to win - so any Indian action is used to scare the US which has to pay Pakistan and dissuade India.

Clearly there is scope for cooperation between the US and India here - because both are "aggrieved parties" as it were and are both being separately and successfully blackmailed by Pakistan. This where my earlier statement comes into play

Pakistan has to be forced into a form of Hobson's choice.
A. The will be punished for using a nuclear bomb
B. They will be punished for threatening to use a nuclear bomb

But the punishment for "B" should be less than that for "A". But threats should not go unpunished and the avoidance of threats could receive some reward. That is to say that Pakistan should get some benefit from not flaunting or threatening to use nukes. But leave alone first use, even threatening to use nukes should be punished.

Both the US and India could cooperate to punish Pakistan for threats and blackmail. Very conveniently for both India and the US there are numerous ways in which Pakistan can be punished - mostly economically.

The real rub is in the rewards that Pakistan gets for sanity and stability. US rewards to Pakistan are often anti-India or can be used for anti-India activities even if they are not intended this way. As regards the "rewards" that India can give to Pakistan - its not going to be Kashmir. But India is the only country that can support Pakistan's economy and make it viable. As long as US rewards to Pakistan work against India - India simply cannot assist stability in Pakistan. This is something that the US and India have to get right.

But a long term solution lies only in forcing Pakistan to step into line. The alternative is to Balkanise Pakistan. What are they going to do about it? Start nuclear war? That won't stop their nation of Islam from being destroyed forever. Apart from being Balkanized.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 28 May 2011 08:25

i think as Pak version of Nunn/Obama-Lugar the US could offer some assurance for TSP that they wont be facing a IA dash to Indus as part of some bilateral package.

saadhak · Post by **saadhak** » 28 May 2011 20:01

VinodTK wrote:Pakistan's nuclear poker bet

From the above link, the author doubts the Pakis have the know-how to mount a nuke in a 1-foot warhead

Although the dimensions of the missile and launcher type have not been publicized, the adaptation of an MRL platform suggests that Pakistan may have developed or acquired nuclear warheads small enough to fit inside a missile whose diameter is barely one foot. Some technical experts are skeptical whether Pakistan has accomplished this. Pakistan probably produced enough weapons-grade plutonium for a warhead only after the May 1998 tests and is not known to have tested nuclear weapons explosively since. Plutonium allows for lighter weapons than uranium, but designing an implosion assembly with a diameter less than 12 inches is a real feat. And any professional military is averse to using untested weapons. Nevertheless, dismissing this announcement as a bluff may be imprudent

Was discussed on BRF: viewtopic.php?p=1092453#p1092453
Hat-tip Shiv saar!

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 28 May 2011 20:11

key word is professional military.

TSPA is based on faith and jihad. So they will chance it. Besdies how do we know the 12 dia payload is not from PRC? Recall Wen Ho lee transferred nuke design codes. Based on that PRC might have designed a new fission weapon with their own test data. As such this one migh be a new proliferation act from PRC.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 28 May 2011 23:16

ramana wrote:key word is professional military.

TSPA is based on faith and jihad. So they will chance it. Besdies how do we know the 12 dia payload is not from PRC? Recall Wen Ho lee transferred nuke design codes. Based on that PRC might have designed a new fission weapon with their own test data. As such this one migh be a new proliferation act from PRC.

Ramana even that is unlikely - based on my limited knowledge. To get a 30 cm diameter nuke there is a trade off where the fissile material (always Pu) requires very little compression. That means that the amount of fissile material is almost critical to start with. Refs on the net speak of a minimum mass of about 10-13 kg of plutonium in a very very inefficient bomb that yields perhaps 1-2 kilotons. That is an enormous waste of fissile material for a very small bang. A "good" bomb maker would be able to make three 20 kt warheads out of that much plutonium - but each would be over 30 cm in diameter.

The Chinese have never had to restrict their tactical nukes to 30 cm as far as I can tell and I doubt if they will be gifting away 13-15 kg of Pu per bomb for a 30 cm, 1 kiloton tactical bomb in Paki hands. I am certain the Pakis do not have the Plutonium to waste on that apart from not having the technical expertise for that. The other thing is whether the same thing can be tried with reactor grade Pu. I don't know how much the Pakis have - but the resulting detonation - which will essentially be a pre detonation may be as little as 0.1 or 0.2 kt (100-200 tons TNT) for a lot of material.

Amber G. · Post by **Amber G.** » 28 May 2011 23:48

Shivji wrote:Ramana even that is unlikely - based on my limited knowledge. To get a 30 cm diameter nuke there is a trade off where the fissile material (always Pu) requires very little compression. That means that the amount of fissile material is almost critical to start with. Refs on the net speak of a minimum mass of about 10-13 kg of plutonium in a very very inefficient bomb that yields perhaps 1-2 kilotons. That is an enormous waste of fissile material for a very small bang. A "good" bomb maker would be able to make three 20 kt warheads out of that much plutonium - but each would be over 30 cm in diameter.

Shivji sir, FWIW, US tested, way back in 50's .. 15-20KT size bums (and one can see the ref's in open source as well as in museums here) where the size was less than 30 cms'c (11 inches - as the name of one implied..) (Length was about twice as long)... These were pre-cursors to famous design W54 (which itself, according to wiki, is about 38 cm in diameter)..
Check out tests at Eniwetok in 50's (keyword search for "swan" or redwing or something like that) ..

Added later: There were also reports of:
from http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/chron.htm

Several European press reports indicate that Pakistan was using Middle Eastern intermediaries to acquire bomb parts (13-inch `steel spheres' and `steel petal shapes').

Added later: I just saw that you (Shiv) did mention (.. these under 30cm small devices) on page 1 of this thread.. but, if am not mistaken, mentioning that the yield was 1kt or less..
Above one, for example are for actual tests.. measured above 15KT or so..
(For your reading pleasure.. look at pp 27 .. Inca, Mohawk etc..) http://docs.nrdc.org/nuclear/files/nuc_ ... 1a_121.pdf
(I just looked at one of the source, ... there were things - around the same time with 20 cm diameter tested with yield around 2KT)

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 28 May 2011 23:53

How about the opposite? Letting the Pakis think that they can get away with it and then counter with a wiping out response that they had been led to think would never come and "threatened"?

VinodTK · Post by **VinodTK** » 29 May 2011 03:01

Expert warns India on Pak's N-tipped missile

One of world's most authoritative voices on Pakistan's nuclear strength and American nuclear expert Hans Kristensen told TOI that a nuclear-tipped NASR seemed more like a weapon intended for use against Indian forces advancing into Pakistani territory.

"While that wouldn't threaten Indian survival in itself, it would of course mean crossing the nuclear threshold early in a conflict, which is one of the particular concerns of a short-range nuclear weapon,'' said Kristensen, who is also Federation of American Scientists' Nuclear Information Project director.

krisna · Post by **krisna** » 29 May 2011 03:35

TSPA leadership wants the enimity with India along with friendship with 3.5 friends to milk for whatever worth it is. They will threaten but not cross the threshold as they do know they will be lose all their power.

But the ghazis in lower rungs may not be that clever being too pure to be affected by power. They can take a new clear bum , do a Travolta as in broken arrow movie.
It should not be far fetched with the ghazis in tspa.

here state policies encouraged the ghazis indirectly , but the ghazis are the direct cause of the show down.

How will the others react- (non tsp actors).

1) Ok the reaction time is small as there will a furious reaction including decimation of tsp.
But
If the non tsp countries know this is due to ghazi warriors and not state leadership directly- will they stop decimating tsp and take in the blow. But balkanise and de nuke the tsp. Will some of the other 3.5 friends and tsp agree to it.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 29 May 2011 07:14

Amber G. wrote: Added later: I just saw that you (Shiv) did mention (.. these under 30cm small devices) on page 1 of this thread.. but, if am not mistaken, mentioning that the yield was 1kt or less..
Above one, for example are for actual tests.. measured above 15KT or so..
(For your reading pleasure.. look at pp 27 .. Inca, Mohawk etc..) http://docs.nrdc.org/nuclear/files/nuc_ ... 1a_121.pdf
(I just looked at one of the source, ... there were things - around the same time with 20 cm diameter tested with yield around 2KT)

Brilliant ref - thanks. I quickly went through the whole paper looking for key info and as you rightly said the main info with regard to small weapons is on pgs 26 - 27 in the "Redwing" series of tests. The ones less than 12 inches are marked in Orange font

Lacrosse test: 34.5 inches diameter. 8000 lbs weight, 40 kt
Cherokee test: 34.5 in dia, 6800 lb, 3.8 MT yield
Zuni - 39 in dia 12,000 lb weight
Yuma: boosted asymmetric Swift device 5 in diameter , 24,5 in length, did not boost, listed as ".19 kt" yield
Erie: 20 inch diameter, 2100 lb weight 14.9 kt
Seminole - 20 in, 1800 lb, 365 kt
Blackfoot: "Low yield air defense prototype boosted device, first use of PBX hi explosive, 11.5 in dia, 135 lb wt 8 kt
Kickapoo: "asymmetric device (Swallow) for air to air missile 8 in dia 1.49 kt
Osage: 17.4 in dia, 3150 lb weight, 1.7 kt
Inca: "Low yield boosted Swan device, progenitor of XW 45, 11.6 in dia" weight not mentioned 15.2 kt
Dakota , 20 in, 1.1 MT (weight not mentioned)

The following series - Plumbob and Hardtack are also relevant and it looks like the US developed the W54 warhead from these
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W54

The W54 was the smallest nuclear warhead deployed by the United States. It was a very compact implosion-type nuclear weapon design, designed for tactical use and had a very low yield for a nuclear weapon.
<snip>
There were four distinct models of the basic W54 design used, each with different yield, but the same basic design. These were:

* Mk-54 (Davy Crockett) — 10 or 20 ton yield, Davy Crockett artillery warhead
* Mk-54 (SADM) — variable yield 10 ton to 1 kiloton, Special Atomic Demolition Munition device
* W-54 — 250 ton yield, warhead for AIM-26 Falcon air to air missile
* W72 — 600 ton yield, rebuilt W-54 (Falcon warhead) for AGM-62 Walleye

Specifications
All four variants share the same basic core: a nuclear system which is 10.75 inches diameter (270 mm), about 15.7 inches long (400 mm), and weighs around or slightly over 50 pounds (23 kg).

The W54 core, based on the available photos (particularly of the Davy Crockett) was neither spherical nor elliptical. The best interpolated photographic match to its external dimensions is a center cylindrical section 11 inches in diameter and 5 inches long, with roughly 5.5 inch radius hemispherical ends.[citation needed]

Also the W45 warhead
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W45

The W45 was a multipurpose American nuclear warhead developed in the early 1960s, first built in 1962 and fielded in some applications until 1988. It had a diameter of 11.5 inches (292 mm), a length of 27 inches (686 mm) and weighed 150 pounds (68 kg). The yields of different W45 versions were 0.5, 1, 5, 8, 10, and 15 kilotons.

The "Swan Primary" for the W45 is shown in this pic

The real point to me here is that ~ 11 inches appears to be the lower limit for small yield devices and under 12 for higher yield devices. The design appears to be pretty sophisticated - requiring fancy engineering and it is worth noting the following info
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W54

By this time, the XW-51 / XW-54 design had been test fired more times than any preceding US nuclear weapon prior to its successful introduction in service, indicating the difficulty of successfully making this small and low yield design work reliably and safely.

The info below is also relevant here:

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/N ... #Nfaq4.2.2

Minimum Size

A low yield minimum mass or volume weapon would use an efficient fissile material (plutonium or U-233), a low mass implosion system (i.e. a relatively weak one), and a thin beryllium reflector (thickness no more than the core radius). Since volume increases with the cube of the radius, a thick layer of anything (explosive or reflector) surrounding the fissile core will add much more mass than that of the core itself.

Referring to the Reflector Savings Table 4.1.7.3.2.2-3 we can see that for beryllium thicknesses of a few centimeters, the radius of a plutonium core is reduced by 40-60% of the reflector thickness. Since the density difference between these materials is on the order of 10:1, substantial mass savings can be achieved. At some point though increasing the thickness of the reflector begins to add more mass than it saves, this marks the point of minimum total mass for the reflector/core system.

In general, minimum mass and minimum volume designs closely resemble each other. The use of a hollow core adds negligibly to the overall volume.

At the low end of this yield range (tens of tons) simply inducing the delta -> alpha phase transition in a metastable plutonium alloy may provide sufficient reactivity insertion. In this case a classical implosion system is not even necessary, a variety of mechanisms could be used to produce the weak 10-20 kilobar shock required to collapse the crystal structure.

Since the fissile core would be lightly reflected, and weakly compressed, a relatively large amount of fissile material is required: perhaps 10 kg for even a very low yield bomb. The efficiency is of course extremely poor, and the cost relatively high.

The absolute minimum possible mass for a bomb is determined by the smallest critical mass that will produce a significant yield. Since the critical mass for alpha-phase plutonium is 10.5 kg, and an additional 20-25% of mass is needed to make a significant explosion, this implies 13 kg or so. A thin beryllium reflector will reduce this, but the necessary high explosive and packaging will add mass, so the true absolute minimum probably lies in the range of 10-15 kg.

The W54 warhead used in the Davy Crockett had a minimum mass of about 23 kg, and had yields ranging from 10 tons up to 1 kt in various mods (probably achieved by varying the fissile content). The warhead was basically egg-shaped with the minor axis of 27.3 cm and a major axis of 40 cm. The W-54 probably represents a near minimum diameter for a spherical implosion device (the U.S. has conducted tests of a 25.4 cm implosion system however).

The test devices for this design fired in Hardtack Phase II (shots Hamilton and Humboldt on 15 October and 29 October 1958) weighed only 16 kg, impressively close to the minimum mass estimated above. These devices were 28 cm by 30 cm, Humboldt used PBX-9404 as the explosive.

None of this means that Pakistan does not have a less than 12 inch diameter tactical warhead. But it is highly unlikely - given that the US found it difficult to get very small warheads and need a lot of testing. It is also likely that these "small warheads" are heavy on usage of Pu and Pakistan's entire collection 450 kg Pu (by the year 2020) would last for only 40 or so low yield tactical warheads. I would be very wary of Pakistan's claims. It is possible that such claims are being made to try and stop a conventional attack by India using "Cold Start" but it may be a bluff. In any case the retaliation would be destruction of Pakistan

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 29 May 2011 07:21

All these are for war fighting. What does that have to do with down hill sking TSPA!

For jihadi use they need some thing of higher yield.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 29 May 2011 07:31

ramana wrote:All these are for war fighting. What does that have to do with down hill sking TSPA!

For jihadi use they need some thing of higher yield.

Good point ramana. But the 30 cm diameter Nasr with tactical warhead is a psy ops move from Pakistan to dissuade Cold Start. Those who need to know in India will know about the possibility of "Nasr" actually having a <30 warhead. but it is India's nervous public opinion (aka dhoti shivering) that is sought to be targeted by Paki claims.

As part of the general public info I think it is worth examining whether Pakistan is bluffing. To me the answer is that Pakis are bluffing about Nasr and its tactical warhead.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 29 May 2011 08:04

Cross post - Fantastic article

VinodTK wrote:Interview with Air Marshal T. M. Asthana; He was first Commander-in-Chief of India’s Strategic Forces Command. Gives some insight to Indian thinking.

Bomb from Pak: We will hit back

Q. It is being said that Pakistan is developing tactical nuclear weapons in a big way for use against India. Can these be special target of theft by terrorist groups, especially when they are said to have insider support in the Pakistan nuclear establishment, the armed forces or the ISI?
A. There are rumours, and also some reports, that they are developing tactical nuclear weapons. I doubt this very much. A tactical nuclear weapon is for use against enemy forces, not the population, and is a sub-kiloton device. Our policy is “no first use”. We won’t be the first to use nuclear weapons of any kind against any country. But the retaliation from our side will be massive if a nuclear device is used against us. I wonder if that is an acceptable risk for Pakistan to take — using a tactical weapon against India and inviting a massive retaliation.

Q. What can be India’s response in the event of a failed attempt by terrorists in Pakistan to steal fissile material or a nuclear device?
A. There is no requirement of a response from our side except to strengthen intelligence, our security systems, to have more than a single layer of security. Remember, our policy is only of retaliation against NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical weapons) strike. I think there is not even a small chance of that unless there is provocation from their side. Please remember, we will hit back massively even if Lashkar-e-Tayyaba or any of the terrorists drops a bomb on India. The principle remains the same. We will hit back.

Q. How safe are Pakistan’s nuclear systems — its production facilities and bomb storage sites? Pakistan’s weapons are said to be kept on the move in order to make them less susceptible to theft or attack. Doesn’t that make them susceptible to theft.
A. There is international hue and cry about Pakistan’s nuclear safety because of Taliban, Al Qaeda and others. But no one has said what the final answer is.

The director of strategic planning in Pakistan’s nuclear authority has said lately that the command authority is based on the “two-man rule”, ie clearance is required from two persons for mating and launch (bringing together the weapon and the trigger, and then the launching of it). They also say they have their own — not taken from the US — PALs (Permissive Action Links) to authorise mating and launch. They also claim to have a comprehensive and intrusive personnel reliability system which means screening of all employees before, during and after their stint in the nuclear area. I take this with a pinch of salt.

Anyway, these claims had not come to light earlier. Before, every time they spoke on these issues, they spoke of their doctrine of ‘first use’ (not hesitating to be the first to strike with a nuclear weapon). Apart from the security systems Pakistan now claims, there is always the standard stuff of phoney bunkers, dummy warheads to fool the enemy. In short, Pakistan is trying to say it is very difficult for unauthorised personnel to assemble a device.

Q. Can this be taken at face value?
A. There can be discussion about that. But we find it difficult to believe that any form of terrorist organisation is capable of assembling and launching a nuclear device unless they have insiders with them who have the knowledge. Even if they could steal a weapon, they will have to develop a trigger mechanism for it. A trigger doesn’t work unless the code and authorisation known. So, this scenario is extremely unlikely, although nothing can be ruled out.

Lalmohan · Post by **Lalmohan** » 29 May 2011 15:49

having read the different articles in this thread and others, it seems probable to me that pakistani bombs are fairly simple, large and still likely to be delivered by aircraft - and that too something akin to their RB57's or even C130's. Given how little they have tested and the general lack of sophistication in their engineering base, it is likely that they have built chinese warheads from CKD's and possibly copied a few of them. i would seriously doubt that they have 100's of warheads, or that they have small ones (even though China did supply a small warhead design to them - Corea's book)

more than likely they will launch all their missiles at us, and in the ensuing melee seek to sneak in a fidayeen air strike against a major indian city - amritsar, ahmedabad, jammu, chandigar, perhaps even go all out for delhi

beyond h&d this serves no purpose, since i am confident that we will have sufficient second strike (despite failures, confusion etc.,) to still wipe out pakistan - with perhaps no more than 20 warheads aimed at their principal cities and airbases (counter force strike)

the tactical warhead story is a ruse, if true it is highly destabilising - and the act of madmen (just like reagan's deployment of cruise missiles in europe was)

they may have a bomb, but as an indian guest on zaid hamid's show once said "aap ke bomb kya chal payenge?"

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 29 May 2011 21:09

VinodTK wrote:Expert warns India on Pak's N-tipped missile
One of world's most authoritative voices on Pakistan's nuclear strength and American nuclear expert Hans Kristensen told TOI that a nuclear-tipped NASR seemed more like a weapon intended for use against Indian forces advancing into Pakistani territory.

"While that wouldn't threaten Indian survival in itself, it would of course mean crossing the nuclear threshold early in a conflict, which is one of the particular concerns of a short-range nuclear weapon,'' said Kristensen, who is also Federation of American Scientists' Nuclear Information Project director.

American experts warn that F-16 supplied by US to Pakistan would threaten nuclear war against India

GuruPrabhu · Post by **GuruPrabhu** » 29 May 2011 21:35

This link may be useful for folks discussing compression of Poo:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allotropes_of_plutonium

Do we really believe that TSP has managed, in a short time, to learn to make the delta-phase metastable allotrope?

Here is a paper that may be of interest:

https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/316391.pdf

If brilliant chelas of the genius AQK are fooling around with this, I expect to hear about an accidental soosai IED in the neighborhood of Kahuta.

For those interested in an in-depth study, here is an old article:

http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/pur ... 311509.pdf

Studying stuff like this is what BARC folks do. Making midnight calls to order moo-shoo-pork take-out is what Kahuta geniacs do.

GuruPrabhu · Post by **GuruPrabhu** » 29 May 2011 21:44

^^^ in case it was not clear, the context is that amreeki designs may not apply to kahuta geniacs because there is poo and then there is poo.

Alternately, we can assume that whatever Panda has is transferred to TSP as needed. Studying packee capabilities is like trying to figure out whether a cat is contemplating quantizing gravity or simply staring at a bug.

Amber G. · Post by **Amber G.** » 30 May 2011 00:04

.. Last message went in a bit bucket

.. posting it again.

Shivji, Lalmohanji, Guruji ...
Given Pakis expertise in engineering/science, it is unlikely that they can design or "improve" a design for such a device. Slightest difference in amount/makeup/type in Pu and unless the device is stolen.. it is not going to work..

My point was, <30 cm designs are by no means "advanced". Probability of Pakis getting it is virtually nil, but not that much different than them having a "fat" design. Our leaders/policemen should know that there is no such magic number as 30 cm.. for such devices have been built and tested. Ironically some early designs (eg even thin-man , a name given by Serber) were quite "thin". .(my guess, for the lower limit, would be 20 cm or so)

(Also, if anyone who has seen James Bond's Octopussy, the bum there fit in a cannon.. NO?

)

Keep in mind, as everyone knows, needed Pu can fit in a coffee mug.. A 10cm diameter (cricket ball), even at 10% efficiency would give more than 10KT.. for practical purpose the "critical mass" for Pu is about 6Kg (about 300 mL) . Of course, one needs more, much more, than just 6Kg of Pu.

Sorry if this is all OT

BTW:

Shivji wrote:Amberji - I found and downloaded the Los Angeles primer

It is not "Angeles" /smile/ but it was available at LANL site but after 9/11 it was taken off from public view.. though it is widely available. Also there was a newer version (editing by Rhodes) of the book.

BTW in the movie "Fat Man and Little Boy" (where you can see the above book) the guy who played Serber was Politzer , a physicist who got a Noble prize later.

negi · Post by **negi** » 30 May 2011 00:11

I am least bothered about the rumour that Bakis might have got their hands onto yet another type of nuclear device ; the threshold for me was crossed when they got hold of the first nuclear bum from Cheena; if India's politicos are indeed true to their words and the doctrine really works then what difference does it make if Pakistan has a tactical nuke or not ? From my vantage point as I see things all this talk about pakis having tactical nukes is being fuelled by NPAs and even Unkil based groups to send a message to India i.e. don't even think on the lines of pulling a Abottabad like op for Pakis now have tactical nukes so even surgical strikes pose a dangel to fckng world peace.

I for one would be happy if Pakistan gets access to miniature nukes and a few go missing for as far as India is concerned nothing changes for us; however I shall see then as to how the 'original mofos' continue with their yak-yak.

pgbhat · Post by **pgbhat** » 30 May 2011 00:20

Anything coming out of Paqui military establishment (including "tactical" nukes or news about it) is first and foremost aimed at their own mango population to feed their delusions of grandeur.

krisna · Post by **krisna** » 30 May 2011 04:11

Signalling the launch of nuclear jihad!

After the Taliban’s daring raid on PNS Mehran, a heavily guarded naval base in Karachi, the world, and not only the US, has reason to worry, if not be alarmed. This is not just another incident of radical Islamists demonstrating their ability to strike terror with the help of brainwashed young men desperate to die in the hope of frolicking with 72 nubile nymphets in the other world; it signals enhanced capability on part of Pakistan’s terrorists to attack high security targets. As Prof Shaun Gregory, director of the Pakistan Security Research Unit at Bradford University (we shall return to him later) says, “This is a blueprint for an attack on nuclear facilities.”

With each passing day of blood-curdling violence — a suicide bombing here; a shootout there — the jihadis are inching closer to achieving their goal: Capturing the world’s only Islamic state with a nuclear arsenal.

( as in kirket accumulating runs while nearing the target, go for blitzkreig)

Till recently, Pakistan posed a different kind of problem. It was a terror-sponsoring state with little or no control over its Army and rogue institutions like the ISI. It was, as former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright famously said, “An international headache.” There was also the fear that unless terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and its affiliate organisations like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, treated as ‘strategic assets’ by the Pakistani Army, were brought under control (destroying them root and branch was never quite an option as the dragon’s teeth sown by Gen Zia-ul Haq, ironically with the help of the Americans, would ensure a fresh crop of jihadis after one lot had been put down) they would lay their hands on ‘strategic assets’ of another kind: Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

Every time that fear was expressed, Pakistan would retort with the standard response: “Our nuclear facilities are safe and secure.” There is also the other detail which would be touted in defence of Pakistan — nuclear bombs are not readymade gadgets that one picks up and detonates at will. True, that’s not how nuclear weapons are stored. The fissile core is kept separately from the device that triggers the explosion, which is not coupled with the launch vehicle. It’s only when the three are mated that you have a weapon of mass destruction.

If the Pakistanis (and their patrons in America) are to be believed, getting hold of the fissile core, the explosive device and the launch vehicle will not necessarily equip terrorists with a ‘nuclear bomb’; they would still need ‘Permissive Action Links’, a multiple set of codes, to activate the contraption. Unless those in the nuclear weapons command and control structure collaborate (a possibility that can no longer be entirely ruled out) the ‘Permissive Action Links’ will remain inaccessible, rendering the seized ‘bomb’ ineffective.

Both Islamabad and Rawalpindi will no doubt insist that there is no reason to doubt the integrity of the staff at these establishments or weapons storage facilities as they have been ‘vetted’. But that’s poppycock. AQ Khan ran a nuclear kala bazaar right under the nose of Pakistani authorities using military facilities, including planes that took off and landed at high security Army bases.

Second, there is reason to believe that Pakistan now has a ready-to-use stockpile of ‘tactical battlefield nuclear weapons’ — weapons that are designed to be used during a limited war and hence easily mated and extremely mobile. The jihadis could be hoping to lay their hands on these. What are meant to be weapons to be used against Indian forces in the event of a cold start war could end up being used against anybody anywhere.

The third possibility has long-term implications: Pakistan becoming captive in the hands of radical Islamists, either in form of a coalition comprising rogue elements of the Pakistani military/ISI and terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, or an Al Qaeda-backed conglomerate led by the Pakistani Taliban. In other words, jihadis getting hold of a readymade nuclear weapons state which they will then use to blackmail others or stage attacks elsewhere. Congressional testimonies and US documents suggest that in such a situation America would have no other option but to intervene. What is obvious but not stated is that intervention by then would be too late, apart from being fraught with untold danger.

Civilian nuclear weapons sites — those sites where Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are manufactured, assembled or taken for refurbishment — are typically less protected than military sites where nuclear weapons are stored, deployed and operated,” Prof Gregory wrote, adding, “The attacks at the Wah cantonment highlight the vulnerability of nuclear weapons infrastructure sites to at least three forms of terrorist assault: a) an attack to cause a fire at a nuclear weapons facility, which would create a radiological hazard; b) an attack to cause an explosion at a nuclear weapons facility involving a nuclear weapon or components, which would create a radiological hazard; or c) an attack with the objective of seizing control of nuclear weapons components or possibly a nuclear weapon. On the latter point, Pakistan’s usual separation of nuclear weapons components is compromised to a degree by the need to assemble weapons at certain points in the manufacture and refurbishment cycle at civilian sites, and by the requirement for co-location of the separate components at military sites so that they can be mated quickly if necessary in crises.”

Everybody thought Prof Gregory was exaggerating unfounded fears. He was not. The raid on PNS Mehran tells us so!

some realistic scenarios-

GuruPrabhu · Post by **GuruPrabhu** » 30 May 2011 04:47

negi wrote:I am least bothered about the rumour that Bakis might have got their hands onto yet another type of nuclear device ; the threshold for me was crossed when they got hold of the first nuclear bum from Cheena;

precisely. India should treat Panda-Packee axis as one entity. Which is why the Groper declaration of "attack on TSP is Attack on Tarrel Fliend" is a corollary to "attack on India will result in retaliation against Panda". Equal-equal onlee. Saadhe Teen understand this as well. Its just that no one is speaking out loud except for clowns like Groper.

TSP "arsenal" is part of Deepel Ocean's maal. Their reactors are Panda maal. Their mijjiles are Panda maal. Their Bandars are Panda maal. What is not Panda maal is Uncle maal.

This entity is beyond analysis. It is like trying to understand a (non-existent) shopping catalog of a pawn shop -- even the owner doesn't know his inventory on a day to day basis.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 30 May 2011 05:30

Amber G. wrote: Keep in mind, as everyone knows, needed Pu can fit in a coffee mug.. A 10cm diameter (cricket ball), even at 10% efficiency would give more than 10KT.. for practical purpose the "critical mass" for Pu is about 6Kg (about 300 mL) . Of course, one needs more, much more, than just 6Kg of Pu.

The only thing missing from this attractive "I can make a bomb too" idea is that I believe a 10 cm ball of Pu gets hot by itself and might even glow red in the air because it is "alive". And apparently its has 4 states alpha through delta and decides to go from one state to another with slight changes of temperature. And to make a "long thin" gun one would have to fire one lump of Pu into another faster (I suspect) than any gun yet designed to get a good bang. That leaves only one "long-thin" design open - i.e flying plate or some variation thereof. The actual composition of the Pu, the chemistry of the explosive, all have a bearing on whether the damn thing will go off at all. Fat man designs will get it over 30 cm very quickly. That is the whole point here - the Hatf/Nasr is 30 cm in diameter which is what set off this discussion. Pakistan claims that hey have tactical nuclear warheads which they claim they will fire at indian forces using the battlefield Nasr missile which is launched from tubes and has a diameter of 30 cm. That makes it essential for Pakis to have a less than 30 cm diameter warhead.

None of these need to be taken into account for saying "the Chinese will give it to the Pakis" Even the Chinese version won't work.

The word "advanced" is semantics I guess. The US did much of this in the 50s. But hey I have been using fiber-optic endoscopes for 27 years now. It's hardly new or "advanced" technology - but I would love to see how many countries are actually able to produce working, reliable fiber-optic endoscopes if their lives depended on it? That is the problem and the technology happens to be too advanced for most countries in the world.

But of course no semantics in Los Angeles. I should have typed Los Alamos

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 30 May 2011 06:09

koti wrote:
Rahul M wrote:cold start won't. ANY use of nukes against us or our forces immediately takes the game to the next level, massive retaliation. so, unless pakistan wants to commit collective suicide, they will stay off the tactical nuke option.

oh and btw, it is quite unlikely pakistan has the miniature warheads needed for use on systems like harpoon and this MBRL. check out the pakistan military thread.
What I am thinking is using a sub kiloton weapon on our advancing forces within Pakistani territory.
I used that tactic in Rise of Nations few years ago.

Technically, we will be given a choice of retaliating fully, as the textbook says risking several of our cities in the ensuring exchange. Or pulling back accepting the loss of few thousand troops.
That is going to be a very dangerous choice for us to make as civilians are not targeted and our territory was not attacked. If we retaliate, it will be like we are taking down say Karachi and its population first when none of our civilians our ground is attacked.

there is no such choice !
our doctrine is very clear on that, any such attack within our geographical area OR on our forces counts as first strike and would invite massive retaliation from us. that means a nuclear attack on ALL of pakistan's major population centres, military bases and production facilities. pakistan as we know would cease to exist.
(hint : real world is not quite like rise of nations or command and conquer generals

)
cfe http://www.deccanchronicle.com/editoria ... t-back-961

Q. It is being said that Pakistan is developing tactical nuclear weapons in a big way for use against India. Can these be special target of theft by terrorist groups, especially when they are said to have insider support in the Pakistan nuclear establishment, the armed forces or the ISI?
A. There are rumours, and also some reports, that they are developing tactical nuclear weapons. I doubt this very much. A tactical nuclear weapon is for use against enemy forces, not the population, and is a sub-kiloton device. Our policy is “no first use”. We won’t be the first to use nuclear weapons of any kind against any country. But the retaliation from our side will be massive if a nuclear device is used against us. I wonder if that is an acceptable risk for Pakistan to take — using a tactical weapon against India and inviting a massive retaliation.

step back and think on this a bit, if we start deliberating on whether on not to respond on an obvious nuclear attack on us (the distinction of military and civilian target is irrelevant, it's not as if military personnel are outside our citizenry) it will be stupidity of himalayan proportions. basically, it is saying to the pakis, go ahead and attack us, we won't do anything. next you know they will get bolder and launch the full plethora of terrorist and may be even conventional attacks with impunity.

understand this, the reaction you are showing is JUST what pakistan hoped for when they unveiled this system, even if it is a huge bluff (as is likely). they want India to limit its options and surrender more and more of its maneuver space. to that end they will continue portraying themselves as more belligerent and trigger happy and lower the nuclear redlines lower and lower so that we become completely paralysed and they are able to hit us by conventional or unconventional means whenever they feel like killing a few innocents.

The warheads are not that difficult for Pak to get its hands on. Our eastern neighbor has an established capability for similar sized warheads.

that does not mean china is happy to lend pakistan a weapon that can easily be used against them. the larger lob-toss bomb are easier to track and limited by delivery vehicles. there is no love lost between a major proportion of the islamists and china, china would be stupid to create a monster it can't control. they want a pakistan dependent on it, not one that can threaten it.

That said, may I have any source that details of the effectiveness of the NBC resistance features of our or any other armor

unless they are smack in ground zero the effect will be minimal, since all our armoured vehicles are capable of operating in an NBC environment. the blast radius of one of the larger tactical nukes (assuming pakis have one in the first place, which I seriously doubt and AM Asthana says the same thing), say a 5 kiloton one would be in the neighbourhood of a km, any major armoured formation is spread out on a much larger front than that.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 30 May 2011 06:10

Rhetorical question.

If Pakistan has ready made nukes of whatever type and India keeps its cores separate from warheads - India will not be able to respond instantly to a Pakistani surprise attack. It will be days before we can respond.

Of course those "days" may be important because it will allow the world media to see the damage done by a Paki nukes. If that does not happen and India responds instantly - it will be like the now forgotten 50 burned-alive kar sevaks whose deaths triggered off well known and often remembered riots.

But that delay will also put pressure on India in several ways. Every country on earth with satellite monitoring facilities will be tracking movements in India that may signal the readying of Indian nuclear retaliation and all sort of appeals and threats from all and sundry to stop India from nuking Pakistan. Of course any military action taken against India to take out Indian nuclear assets would be counter productive because it would prompt India to definitely use its assets before they are lost - but if the US (for example) decides to use conventional strikes to take out some Indian nuclear assets to stop nuclear war there might not be much we can do about it. Unlikely, but not impossible.

Of course in the case of "Cold Start" the nukes would be getting ready simultaneously - so Pakistan can expect nuking fairly quickly and hopefully the nukes too will be in place before anyone can react.

Just some random thoughts.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 30 May 2011 06:19

Folks - I have been remiss. I really should have done this earlier but forgot. There have been two articles linked off this forum in the last 7-10 days saying that Pakis have been moving and shifting around their nuclear assets a lot. If any one recalls them or finds them please post here. The other thing is an article from an Indian outlet that says that for reasons of "strategic depth" and security Pakis have hidden their nuclear maal in the very areas that s seeing Taliban/non state jihadi action.

Important to recall these data points when we speak of Paki nuclear capability/vulnerability.

Amber G. · Post by **Amber G.** » 30 May 2011 07:39

shiv wrote:
Amber G. wrote: Keep in mind, as everyone knows, needed Pu can fit in a coffee mug.. A 10cm diameter (cricket ball), even at 10% efficiency would give more than 10KT.. for practical purpose the "critical mass" for Pu is about 6Kg (about 300 mL) . Of course, one needs more, much more, than just 6Kg of Pu.
The only thing missing from this attractive "I can make a bomb too" idea is that I believe a 10 cm ball of Pu gets hot by itself and might even glow red in the air because it is "alive". <snip>

Sir ji, there was no " I can make bomb too".. at least not in my message. Simple fact that 10cm Diameter ball of Pu will be about 10Kg ... and 6Kg of Pu is about 300 ml good enough to fit in a coffee mug..Nothing more than what is already widely known...

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 30 May 2011 08:09

>> India keeps its cores separate from warheads

not necessarily true from what little we know.

GuruPrabhu · Post by **GuruPrabhu** » 30 May 2011 08:16

Amber G. wrote:[
Sir ji, there was no " I can make bomb too".. at least not in my message.

Amber-ji,

I am with you on that. I have noticed this phenomenon over decades. Folks read obvious propaganda websites and then figure out that they know "bomb design".

There is a simple psychological play here. Websites that furnish weapon designs make it simple -- and people who read them buy it hook, line and sinker about stuff like critical mass, low-yield nukes, weapon diameter and what not. People who read papers immediately figure out that it is way too complicated for a non-expert.

I have tried to post papers on this thread and others to point to this basic problem.

Having said that, here is what I find inexplicable: why do folks on BRF, who are normally quite skeptical about Uncle, buy these propaganda pieces?

How come there are no French, or Russian, or Chinese, or Indian websites explaining "weapons for dummies" kind of designs? Why only Uncle websites? Or, before that, why only Uncle sponsored archival papers?

Isn't that a dead giveaway that all this "public domain" info is pure simplified crap? Worse, it is a well calculated distortion to keep snooping eyes away from the real designs.

So, yes, I agree with you that deciphering designs and capabilities is pure hogwash.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 30 May 2011 08:40

Amber G. wrote:
shiv wrote:
The only thing missing from this attractive "I can make a bomb too" idea is that I believe a 10 cm ball of Pu gets hot by itself and might even glow red in the air because it is "alive". <snip>
Sir ji, there was no " I can make bomb too".. at least not in my message. Simple fact that 10cm Diameter ball of Pu will be about 10Kg which is about 300 ml good enough to fit in a coffee mug..Nothing more than what is already widely known...

Chillax AmberG-ji - I never implied that. My reply was not meant to be an accusation that you were saying things that you did not say. I am just trying to create a small gap between scaremongering and reality and I am not even implying that you are scaremongering.

If you tell the truth that 6 kg Pu is enough for a bomb, ten thousand people will tell you that Pakistan has 450 kg Pu (also not true yet IMO) - therefore Pakistan has 75 bombs. But not one of those ten thousand will ask if there is any gap between owning 6 kg of Pu and making one successful bomb. I have been trying to get that message across time and again.

Just see what is happening on this forum

Pakistan launches 60 km range, 30 cm diameter Hatf/Nasr and says it will use tactical nukes in this missile
The media start going apeshit and saying "Pakistan has tactical nukes"
Not a single person asks whether Pakistan can make a 30 cm nuke.
Pointing out that achieving <30 cm nuke is not easy receives the reply "Oh the Chinese will give them that"
Saying that making 20 cm diameter nukes is possible and the US did it in the 1950s may be true but it does not mean that Pakistanis have done it or can do it

The fact that it is not easy to make any nuclear bomb leave alone a 30 cm diameter bomb is something that only a very small group of people in the world understand. The rest of the world seems to think that it is easy-peasy.

Does Pakistan have a <30 cm diameter nuke today. My opinion is "Unlikely". That means that this Nasr as a response to cold start is a bluff. The bluff is a response to cold start.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 30 May 2011 08:58

There is a lot of open source material on how the US made its first bomb. There is very little material on why it is not easy to make a bomb.

Because of this everyone thinks that Pakistan can make all sorts of bombs easily. Everyone also thinks that the bomb designs that the US has the Chinese also have and the Chinese hand it to the Pakis. QED.

Now who will say that this is not possible? Who can say why it is not that simple? Unless someone says that it will be assumed to be fairly easy.

I don't see anyone saying that. Every "expert" is saying what is possible, and what the US has done and what everyone can do. Only "armscontrolwonk" and a few others ask if everyone really can or cannot do that.

The information available is easier used for scaremongering and less easy to be used for reassuring. Scaremongering seems to be the order of the day.

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 30 May 2011 09:09

Rahul M wrote:>> India keeps its cores separate from warheads

not necessarily true from what little we know.

In fact from what little we do know, the cores are kept separate from the warheads..Bharat Karnad wrote about it as late as 2008 in his book, and I havent seen/read anything to the contrary...

However, the decision to use nuclear weapons isnt a digital (0,1) matrix - its not taken in one instance...There are varying levels of threat perception in the political outlook, and at some level, the warheads and cores will be kept mated..At a higher level, they would even load them up on delivery platforms...While kept separate, the mating of core, warhead and delivry platform will not be a time consuming exercise...

About the Paki TNWs, besides the issue of technical capability, the key issue is of doctrine (or the shorsightedness of it)....Basically with Nasr and TNW, Pakistan is saying that its "first strike deterrence" is useless..It expects the Indians to react conventionally through Cold Start principles (shallow strikes across the border), and the only credible response they have to that is to use a TNW on a formation...In short, the Paki deterrence has broken down - by definition, after all, deterrence is about "not having to fight a war"..With TNWs, Pakis are introducing nukes as battlefield augmentation weapons, in the same vein as (say) a daisy cutter or an extra armoured divsion...In terms of scenarios, they use TNWs on (say) 1 Armoured, we as per stated doctrines, respond with a massive retaliatory strike on 2-3 major cities, and then international pressure is brought to bear to tkae both sides back..Net result? India loses a couple of hundred tanks, Pakistan loses Islamabad and Lahore for the next 30 years...Above all, deterrence is broken down..

If anything, it should raise questions on how good Pakistan's actual strategic capability really is..Despite all the recent alarmism by NPAs, is it a case that the Paki "nukes" are far less than advertised, or under certain debilitating constraints, or maybe techincally not upto there to really assure "deterrence" in the face of a planned Indian BMD? If anything, Paki policymakers should be more concerned about this, not Indians...

A question to GP, Amberg et al on the whole concept of delivering a nuke from a range of 60 km (ange of NAsr)..How practical is it? I mean how does the unit delivering the weapon scoot in time to prevent any bloback of radiation to hit itself? Or is it that a sub-kiloton weapon cannot blow radiation back to that distance?

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 30 May 2011 09:16

Pakistan may not care to be economical with it's Pu because most of it is donated anyways. The MBRL version doesn't mean Pakis will have dozens of <30cm diameter nukes. It could just be that they will use a couple of them on advancing Indian units augmented by Uranium based nukes.

Secondly what is the guarantee that Unkil did not provide these pencils to Pakis to "maintain parity" with a stronger India? After all Unkil is bankrolling Paki military for past 60 years.

Another point is that we cannot expect normal behavior from Pakis. They have defied common sense and human behavior for too long and too often.

GuruPrabhu · Post by **GuruPrabhu** » 30 May 2011 09:16

I see cognitive dissonance setting in.

negi · Post by **negi** » 30 May 2011 09:20

I think we should limit the discussion to Paki propaganda about having tactical nukes, deterrence part can be moved to the relevant thread.

RamaY lets not bring in the Unkil angle here , Unkil has done what it had to long back i.e. looked the other-way when Cheena was arming the TSPA with the bum and mijjiles. It need not do anything of this sorts on it's own specially when paranoids in DC are now loosing sleep over Baki nukes (why do you think CIA and Blackwater types are all over the TSP territory) .

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 30 May 2011 09:26

A question to GP, Amberg et al on the whole concept of delivering a nuke from a range of 60 km (ange of NAsr)..How practical is it? I mean how does the unit delivering the weapon scoot in time to prevent any bloback of radiation to hit itself? Or is it that a sub-kiloton weapon cannot blow radiation back to that distance?

the later. at least not in any militarily significant amount.
the problem with this scenario is that pakistan would need literally dozens of moderately largish tactical nukes to stop even one major formation, IA is toying with about 10 such formations now. even that doesn't guarantee that India would stop, if anything it will force India to respond with even more force. would pakistan really spare 100's of kg for a rather questionable scenario ?

In fact from what little we do know, the cores are kept separate from the warheads..Bharat Karnad wrote about it as late as 2008 in his book, and I havent seen/read anything to the contrary...

believe what you will.

negi · Post by **negi** » 30 May 2011 09:32

Hey what does one mean by keeping core separate from warhead ? Wasn't Shakti-II a 15kt class pu fission 'warhead' ? In the present context what is a core and a warhead ?