Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Rudradev · Post by **Rudradev** » 04 Jun 2011 00:51

Heh heh. Looks like Rajesh A-ji's vision of an "IA Foreign Legion" in Afghanistan may not be far from crystallizing!

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 08 Jun 2011 03:14

Russia 'key player' in move towards Afghanistan Taliban talks

Attempt to overhaul UN sanctions regime hangs on Russia, India and China dropping objections, says German diplomat.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/ju ... iban-talks

wig · Post by **wig** » 08 Jun 2011 11:49

Susanne Koelbl of the german magazine spiegel interviewed R D Spanta of Afghan Intelligence. He talks lucidly of the madrassa network in pakistan providing an inexhaustible supply of motivated terrorists

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Afghan President Hamid Karzai has given NATO an ultimatum. Angered by civilian casualties, he has said that Afghans will start regarding Western soldiers as occupiers if they continue to conduct airstrikes on private homes. Are German soldiers still welcome in Afghanistan

Rangin Dadfar Spanta: This is his final word on this matter, and it should be taken seriously. We have the impression that people in Washington have understood it. If nothing changes, sentiments among the population will start turning against NATO.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: There have recently been three deadly attacks on German soldiers and on General Daud Daud, the police chief of northern Afghanistan. Why has the situation there gotten worse?

Spanta: A network of the Taliban, al-Qaida and their Pakistani supporters are behind this. They are pursuing a new tactic after having been forced to give up a number of areas last winter. They're trying to hit senior figures.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: American special forces have taken out a number of Taliban leaders in the north. Who are the new attackers?

Spanta: Even if European countries refuse to acknowledge it, the resistance is now being orchestrated by terrorist centers in Pakistan, the Quetta Shura (editor's note: the innermost circle of Taliban leaders), the Haqqani network, the group of (Gulbaddin) Hekmatyar and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No. 2 in the al-Qaida leadership. There are 40,000 madrassas -- or religious schools -- in Pakistan, and even if only a small fraction of them support the terrorists, the stream of new fighters is almost endless. There will only be peace in this region when this source has been dried up.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Can negotiations with the Taliban solve the problem?

Spanta: They could be helpful if Pakistan were willing to support the peace process. But that's not the case. Pakistan has a different strategy: The West is obviously weary and will soon withdraw. Then, in one or two years, Pakistan can finally move into Afghanistan and use it as a strategic area. That's what this is all about.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Did Pakistani leaders know that Osama bin Laden was hiding out in Abbottabad?

Spanta: I am convinced that top-level officials had been informed. Without institutional, state support, Osama bin Laden wouldn't have been able to hide in Pakistan for so long. A few years back, our intelligence chief gave General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's president at the time, exact coordinates on where Osama bin Laden was staying. But Musharraf only ridiculed him. But now it has emerged that the information was only a few miles off from the place where bin Laden was actually found.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Should the Bundeswehr, Germany's military, stay or go?

Spanta: It's understandable that the Germans are discussing whether they want to keep on investing their money and the lives of their soldiers in this conflict. We view it as a common cause; we have the same goal. Though even my name is on the terrorist hit lists, I will remain here and fight for peace here in my homeland -- even if the others pull out.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/wor ... 74,00.html

Y I Patel · Post by **Y I Patel** » 08 Jun 2011 11:54

Things have been moving along quite predictably ever since Obama announced his deadline for withdrawal, with Pakisatan getting comfortable in the role of Cambodia-analogue.

However, the latest version of Arab Spring in Bahrain and Syria has potential to have a major impact on Afghanistan. These two countries are rapidly becoming a trial of strength for Iran's foreign influence, with Saudi Arabia explicitly taking the Sunni side in Bahrain and asking for Pakisatan to contribute to troops. After the experience in Egypt, Saudis' trust in reliability of US as an ally has been severely shaken up. On the other side, Iran has high stakes in Bahrain and Syria. This developing Shia-Sunni contest has the potential to extend to Afghanistan once US influence wanes. The Great Game will get even more complicated now.

KrishnaK · Post by **KrishnaK** » 09 Jun 2011 10:45

US policy to blame for trust deficit with India: Musharraf

Highlights:
Also blaming what he called the "malicious role of India and the Afghan government itself in maligning Pakistan's military and intelligence" Musharraf said: "We know what Indian consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad especially are doing."

"We also know that Afghan intelligence, military and foreign service personnel go for training in India," he alleged asserting "Not a single one comes to Pakistan, despite Pakistan's longstanding offer of free training since my time in office."

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 09 Jun 2011 11:07

Well TSP gives them IT training.

arunsrinivasan · Post by **arunsrinivasan** » 09 Jun 2011 18:37

Question for the gurus - Ryan Crocker is being appointed the new US Ambassador to Afghanistan. Any thoughts on what this means for Afghanistan / India / TSP ? Is he Pro / Anti TSP?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 09 Jun 2011 20:16

He was there in Iraq. So most likely to manage the drawdown.

Patni · Post by **Patni** » 12 Jun 2011 14:58

Alarm in Delhi as West moves to separate Taliban, Qaeda in UN list

Alarm bells have begun to ring in New Delhi after the US and European countries recently moved a draft UN Security Council resolution to separate the Taliban from al-Qaeda in the UN sanctions regime, which could make it easier to “de-list” entities in future.
The consolidated sanctions list under UNSC Resolution 1267 on the ‘al-Qaeda and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities’ as of now also contains India-specific groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba, its key individuals, and the Jaish-e-Mohammed. They have been put down as al-Qaeda affiliates.

The political objective behind the move, sources said, is to aid the reconciliation process with the Taliban in Afghanistan after communication channels were established with some Taliban leaders. But India is concerned that this change could dilute the well-established UN sanctions regime.

The concern stems from the fact that the proposal on the table has a sunset clause, which conditions continuation of the regime to periodic reviews. This could mean that India may have to continuously provide fresh information to keep someone like Lashkar founder Hafiz Mohammed Saeed on the list.

The proposal has sparked a heated debate within the sanctions committee, which is made up of all 15 members of the UN Security Council.

India is not worried so much about the larger objective as about the manner in which these changes might be executed. Sources explained that splitting up the list would not be easy, given that these entities overlap in many ways on the ground. Presumably, the de-listing process in the Taliban list could be made easier for political purposes, and might conceivably be misused.

India has had problems getting entities listed under the 1267 regime, with China still to lift its official hold on proscribing JeM chief Maulana Masood Azhar and LeT members Azam Cheema and Abdul Rahman Makki. China had even put a hold on listing Hafiz Saeed and Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, but had to withdraw after the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks. Any break-up or dilution of the regime could provide more avenues for either delaying or denying immediate action on an entity.

While these are still early days in the debate, it is learnt that India has already warned against diminishing the impact of the sanctions regime. Resolution 1267 guarantees the most comprehensive collective action against terror entities.

Once designated by this committee, all states are required to freeze the assets of the individual or entity concerned, prevent entry or transit through their territories and prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale and transfer of arms and military equipment to any of these entities.

“The primary responsibility for the implementation of the sanctions measures rests with member states and effective implementation is mandatory,” states the Resolution, which was came about in 1999 but was given more teeth through a series of resolutions after 9/11.

Over the years, cases have been filed in various human rights courts, particularly in the European Union, against aspects of the sanctions regime. Courts, sources said, have often taken a sympathetic view on persons who are old or dead but continue to be on the list. An office of the ombudsman has been created within the 1267 sanctions committee to remove such persons from the list.

But clearly, many European powers want further “safeguards”.

More detail on the story

U.S. Asks UN to Separate Taliban, al-Qaeda as Step Toward Deal

The U.S. is asking the United Nations Security Council to distinguish between Taliban and al- Qaeda followers in enforcing sanctions, a bid to encourage Taliban reconciliation with Afghanistan’s government.
The U.S. mission to the UN has circulated two draft resolutions to council members that would split what has been a combined list of Taliban and al-Qaeda adherents subject to the travel ban and asset freeze imposed in 1999, according to three diplomats who spoke on condition of not being identified because the texts haven’t been made public.
The goal of adopting the measures on June 17 would be to send a message to the Taliban that they may escape sanctions by entering into negotiations with the government in Kabul, the diplomats said. Legal and political considerations have complicated efforts to remove selected members of the Taliban from the list in recent years, discouraging reconciliation, they said.
The sanctions list includes 138 Taliban members and 350 al- Qaeda individuals and organizations. The Afghan government’s preconditions for peace talks with the Taliban include a pledge by the Taliban to sever all ties with al-Qaeda.
“We support this step,” Zahir Tanin, Afghanistan’s ambassador to the UN, said in an interview. “It will give us more flexibility for success of the process, making it easier to get delisted by treating the two groups separately.”
Support Reconciliation
U.S. diplomats, who wouldn’t speak publicly about the initiative, said they’re seeking to adapt the sanctions regime to demonstrate support for Afghan reconciliation efforts.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai was in Islamabad today seeking the help of Pakistan’s leaders in pursuing peace talks with the Taliban, which has bases on Pakistani territory.
The visit comes two months after the governments agreed to form a commission to support a peace process. Concern over the rising U.S. debt has led to growing calls in Congress for the Obama administration to withdraw a substantial number of U.S. troops from Afghanistan beginning next month.
A Karzai-appointed Afghan peace council, which includes former Taliban officials, says it has opened secret contacts with the guerrillas.
The U.S. has about 97,000 troops in Afghanistan fighting alongside almost 50,000 soldiers from 47 other nations in an effort to degrade the Taliban in its southern Afghanistan stronghold while building up the central government’s ability to secure the country.
The troops have been there since the U.S. toppled the Taliban regime because of its support for al-Qaeda terrorists who planned the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks.
Adoption of the resolutions would establish separate committees of the Security Council to enforce the sanctions, while extending for 18 months the mandate of the UN offices that monitor the lists and deal with delisting requests.
To contact the reporter on this story: Bill Varner at the United Nations at wvarner@bloomberg.net

So USA is moving away from Good/Bad Taliban and ball on pull out from Afghan has started rolling and advantage pakis as now they will have all India specific non-state terror assets be declared as taliban and out of UN sanction list!

Kakkaji · Post by **Kakkaji** » 13 Jun 2011 06:13

Exclusive: Obama's Secret Afghan Exit Formula

By July 15, President Obama will unveil a plan to reduce U.S. forces in Afghanistan by upward of 30,000, but to withdraw them slowly under military guidance over 12 to 18 months, according to administration officials.

In sum, the quick exiters get the big 30,000 or so number, and the die-harders get one last year-plus at near full strength to weaken the Taliban.

Of equal import, he’s got to lay out a diplomatic strategy of containing and deterring extremism in Afghanistan by partnering with India, China, Russia, Pakistan, and even Iran. These are all states that can partner around their shared fear of Taliban religious extremism and the drug trade.

rajanb · Post by **rajanb** » 13 Jun 2011 14:32

http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=97284

The empty words of Karzai

We believe, there is a genuine concern in Pakistan over the massive Indian engagement and presence in Afghanistan which definitely has specific objectives. The Indians are spending $2b in the name of reconstruction in Afghanistan and have established Consulates in cities along Pakistan border including in Jalalabad and Kandahar. Through these Consulates, India is indulging in spying activities and promoting acts of terrorism in FATA and Balochistan. Some of the extremist elements are enjoying Kabul’s hospitality and they visited India to meet their families there. In addition India has established a huge network of spies in other cities under the pretext of reconstruction activities and for the security of the staff. There is no check on their movement and interaction with the Afghan nationals who are being hired, trained, financed and then sent to Pakistan for acts of terrorism. As for his assertions about cross border attacks in Upper Dir and Bajaur,

If even 50% of this is true. AoA

Samudragupta · Post by **Samudragupta** » 14 Jun 2011 07:50

India’s Strategic Challenge in Pakistan’s Afghan Hinterland

A defining characteristic of U.S. and Western foreign policy during the Cold War and its aftermath before 9/11 was its failure to integrate counter-terrorism into strategic perceptions, policies, and goals. Terrorism was hived into a compartment of its own where it was not seen as a necessary part of a nation’s grand strategy and was attacked with a half-hearted combination of law enforcement, war-like actions, and turning a blind eye. Some argue this has changed since the pre-9/11, Cold War era, but there is room for doubt. Good evidence that Western leaders and bureaucracies are still locked in this Cold War approach lies in Afghanistan, where the operating assumption of the United States and NATO seems to be that all countries share the same strategic interest in ensuring Afghanistan becomes a secular, democratic and pro-Western state. This assumption - based on the error that two nations can have identical interests - has led the West to allow any and all nations to play a role in Afghanistan of their own choosing, a policy that will ultimately help undo Western interests there. The best example of the destructiveness of the “we’re all in this together” policy is the role India is being allowed to play in Afghanistan; indeed, when Islamists again rule in Kabul, they should send New Delhi a hearty thank you note.

When a suicide car-bomb was detonated near India’s Kabul embassy on July 7 – killing four Indian officials and more than 40 other people – the world was aghast (CNN-IBN, July 20). International sentiment was horrified further when “U.S. intelligence sources” said that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) supported the attack (Times of India, August 4). This reaction was predictable, but the more reasonable reaction would have been to ask: “Why did such an attack take so long to happen?” To ask that question would have been to recognize that the United States and NATO have allowed their Kabul surrogate, President Hamid Karzai, and the Indian government to use the supposedly selfless project of Afghan reconstruction as a tool with which to destroy one of the historic tenets of Pakistan’s national security policy.

How so? Well, since it inception more than 60 years ago, Pakistan’s government and military have, with reason, regarded India as a moral threat to the country’s survival. India defeated Pakistan in several wars - seizing East Pakistan, today’s Bangladesh, in 1971 - and acquired nuclear weapons long before Pakistan. Islamabad’s national security strategy, therefore, has been and is India-centric. It focuses on three core requirements: 1) an ability to place most of its military on the Indo-Pakistani border; 2) the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent (accomplished in 1998); and 3) the maintenance of a quiet western border with Afghanistan to give Pakistan a kind of strategic depth so it would not face a two-front war. These requirements were met until September 11, 2001; the next day, only the nuclear deterrent remained.

Immediately after 9/11, President Musharraf allied Pakistan with the United States and helped it and NATO remove the Taliban regime from power, thereby wrecking one-third of Pakistan’s national security strategy by dethroning a pro-Pakistan, Islamist, and Pashtun-dominated Afghan government and unsettling the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Musharraf then sent military forces into the country’s tribal regions, where they were defeated by the Taliban and Pakistani Pashtuns. Finally, the Pakistani military’s prolonged operations in the tribal regions have so angered the never very pro-Islamabad Pashtun tribes that warfare between them and the army continues, a situation that has given birth to a Pakistani Taliban. This unrest has revived the Pashtuns’ long-dormant interest in seceding from Pakistan and creating a nation – called Pashtunistan - comprised of tribal lands straddling the border. Such an event would leave Pakistan as a narrow strip of territory that could not be defended against India.

Needless to say, none of these developments pleased Musharraf’s fellow general officers, but at least there has been a payback for Pakistan - $10 billion dollars in U.S. aid and the chance for Islamabad to buy a new generation of F-16s. Until recently it seemed certain that the United States and NATO would not stay in Afghanistan forever and that Pakistan’s western border could be quieted after they left.

The Indian government, however, recognized a key strategic, anti-Pakistan opportunity when it saw one and is trying – with President Karzai eagerly assisting - to permanently deprive Pakistan of a quiet western border. Since the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, India has been in the forefront of the Afghan reconstruction effort. India has now pledged about $1.2 billion in aid and is the fifth biggest donor after the United States, the UK, Japan, and Germany (khabrein.info, August 3). New Delhi also has deployed between 3,000 and 4,000 Indian nationals to Afghanistan to assist in road-building and other infrastructure projects (Indian Express [Mumbai], July 29).

In addition, Kabul has given New Delhi permission to establish an historically unprecedented Indian diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, with an embassy in Kabul, and consulates in Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Herat (Power and Interest News, March 23, 2007). Finally, New Delhi has created programs to inculcate pro-Indian views among Afghans, such as the provision of full scholarships for Afghan bureaucrats to train in India’s technical institutions and for Afghan students to attend Indian universities (Times of India, August 4).

Indian leaders and Karzai – who was schooled in India – have taken the high road, using rhetoric about India’s “no-strings-attached” activities in Afghanistan, identifying them as efforts to “fight terrorism” and bring a “pluralistic and democratic society” to Afghanistan (Indian Express, August 5). Indian commentators, however, have felt no need to disguise India’s strategic gambit as altruistic. Most gloat over India’s Afghan successes and some argue that because Pakistan supports the Taliban and al-Qaeda, India must field a far greater military presence in Afghanistan:

"Several hundred miles from New Delhi and Islamabad, India-Pakistan hostility is spilling over into another country – Afghanistan. Here the two countries are engaged in an unacknowledged bid for supremacy [in] their bilateral relationship with Afghanistan. For the moment, India seems to be winning this new version of the great game effortlessly" (The Hindu, November 9, 2003).

"Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency is a global curse. The massive and callous July 7 blast outside the Indian embassy in Kabul … has exposed Pakistan’s hollowness and duplicity for orchestrating the nefarious act. … The Government of India was well aware about ISI’s deceitful maneuverings some months ago. No less a person than Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai had cautioned India about what was going to befall and mar Indian interests in Afghanistan. His assessment has proved correct. Pakistan has exhibited its classic example of hate-India relationship with gusto, and this time in a foreign country" (Asian Tribune, July 26).

Given the word “paranoid” seems to have been created for how New Delhi and Islamabad perceive each other’s intentions, the response of President Musharraf and the Pakistan government toward India’s actions in Afghanistan is not surprising – they view them as a mortal threat to Pakistan’s national security. “India’s motivation in Afghanistan is very clear,” Musharraf has said, “[it is] nothing further than upsetting Pakistan. Why should they [India] have consulates in Jalalabad and Khandahar? What is their interest? There is no interest other than disturbing Pakistan, doing something about Pakistan” (Asian Tribune, July 26). Musharraf also has claimed that Islamabad is “1,000 percent certain” that India’s diplomatic posts in Afghanistan are really bases for Indian intelligence to collect data about Pakistan and to provide paramilitary support for dissidents in Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province. He also has said that the United States, India, and Afghanistan are trying to weaken Pakistan and its armed forces by conspiring to destroy ISI (Daily Times [Lahore], August 5; The News, August 4).

Adding substance to the fears of Musharraf and Pakistan’s general officer corps is the reality of Washington’s growing military and nuclear cooperation with India and its support for New Delhi’s regional assertiveness. The U.S. government has urged India “to assume greater responsibility as [a] stakeholder in the international system, commensurate with its growing economic, military, and soft power” (Asia Times, August 9). India has built a military airbase at Ayni in northwestern Tajikistan, a site within striking distance of Pakistan (Asianews.it, September 13, 2006).

Much of Pakistan’s media has agreed with Musharraf – paranoia about India often unites Pakistan’s very politically partisan newspapers – describing a “trilateral consensus between Kabul, Delhi, and Washington on Islamabad alone being the primary and near-exclusive troublemaker in Afghanistan” (The News, August 6). The Indian presence in Afghanistan, according to the anti-Musharraf Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, has resulted in “[Kabul] replacing Kashmir as the main area of antagonism [and] as the main area of [Indo-Pak] antagonism” (Asia Times, August 9). At the same time, a stridently Islamist newspaper has railed against “India’s malicious intentions against Pakistan … [and] its efforts [that] aim to sabotage Pakistan-Afghanistan relations” (Ausaf [Islamabad], July 31).

If Pakistan’s ISI was involved in the 7 July bombing in Kabul, it probably will not be its last participation in anti-Indian attacks in Afghanistan. The West often forgets that intelligence services – without exception – are responsible only to their own governments and for protecting their country’s national interests. Clearly, Islamabad’s military and civilian leadership have decided that India’s expanding and U.S.-sanctioned presence in Afghanistan is a serious threat to Pakistan’s survival. “The Indian and Afghan intelligence agencies,” wrote a commentator summarizing the Pakistani view, “are engaged in undermining Pakistan’s security from two fronts. They are busy using the Baluch card and the [Pashtun] militant card,” both of which feed what is for Pakistan an intolerable secessionist fervor in the country’s western border provinces. That commentator also claimed – probably correctly -- that Pakistan now believes it has no choice but to “play as clean as the world around it” (The News, August 6).

India’s strengthening presence in Afghanistan puts the Pakistani government and military – at least in a de facto manner – on the same side as the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and Pakistan’s Islamist Pashtun organizations. The latter well remember India’s long history of supporting Soviet barbarism in Afghanistan; the Afghan communist regime of Muhammad Najibullah; and the Northern Alliance’s war with the Pashtun Taliban. In fact, the Pakistani Taliban already has said that “India is an eternal enemy of the Ummah [Islamic community] and would be confronted after defeating the allied forces stationed in Afghanistan” (The News, August 5). While a decision to increase aid to Arab and Pashtun mujahideen will anger Washington and NATO, Islamabad will do so because it believes a pro-Indian government in Kabul, and the likelihood it would permit a permanent Indian presence in Afghanistan, poses an existential threat to Pakistan’s survival. Thus, the West’s lingering Cold War confidence that all nations can have the same interests in promoting peace and prosperity has crumpled in Afghanistan. It has, moreover, created a new venue for a possible confrontation between South Asia’s two paranoid nuclear powers.

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/s ... no_cache=1

What a looser

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 14 Jun 2011 09:24

You can never get the Pakiness out of a British person. They still blame Gandhi for losing the empire!

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 14 Jun 2011 23:31

LINK

Nightwatch reports:

Pakistan: According to a report in The Express Tribune, the government plans to urge local tribal elders and tribesmen in North Waziristan to form lashkars (tribal militias) to target al Qaida militants as well as the Tajik, Uzbek and Chechen militants hiding in the tribal agency. An unnamed Pakistani military official said US CIA Director Panetta and Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Kayani discussed the idea of facilitating the formation of pro-government tribal laskhars.

The anti-US and anti-Afghanistan insurgent syndicate led by the Haqqanis, however, will not be targeted. Islamabad's priority is to remove anti-Pakistan government militants from the area first. Another source said once Pakistan enlists the aid of the tribes, it will be easier for the army to drive the militants out of North Waziristan.

Comment: There is less here than the report suggests. The constitutional provisions governing the seven Federally Administered Tribal Areas, of which North Waziristan is one, restrict the Army from operating freely in the tribal agencies, except by invitation, in the event of an insurrection and to defend the national borders. The tribal leaders already have the authority, working through the federal government's political agents, to invite the Army to operate or to form tribal militias. The major drawbacks are concerns about local autonomy and lack of organization, financing, weapons and training.

Musharraf used lashkars to help suppress anti-Pakistan groups in the agencies, but they usually tipped off the targets of federal operations. They all live together in the neighborhood under Pashtun hospitality customs.

The announcement of the plan is mostly for public relations purposes, but the exemption of the Haqqanis as targets proves the point that Pakistan has no quarrel with anti-Afghanistan groups who operate from Pakistan but otherwise cause no trouble for Pakistan. These groups include Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Moreover, a crackdown on the large Afghan Pashtun population in Pakistan risks causing even more unmanageable internal instability.

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 15 Jun 2011 03:37

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/foc ... story.html
Focus of Afghan war is shifting eastward

The intense U.S. focus on the south has meant that there are about 38,500 troops in that region, compared with 31,000 in eastern Afghanistan. But those in the east have borne a disproportionately high share of casualties in recent months, and some territory held by the Afghan government has fallen back into Taliban hands after U.S. troops pulled out of their small outposts. By concentrating more on the east, U.S. military officials hope to confront the cross-border flow of Taliban and Haqqani network fighters who operate from Pakistan’s poorly governed tribal districts. The higher priority would mean more intelligence capabilities, such as surveillance drones, as well as more Afghan soldiers for the region.“It’s the last place we will be fighting,” a senior U.S. military official said, speaking on the condition that he not be identified by name. “And the Afghans will be fighting there in perpetuity. It’s a bad neighborhood.”
The problems in the east start with Pakistan, whose tribal border districts have long provided refuge for Afghan insurgents. Fighters for the Taliban, as well as al-Qaeda and the Pakistani group Lashkar-i-Taiba, can move from Pakistan into places such as Konar province, which has cultivated a toxic mix of fighters in remote mountain valleys. U.S. military commanders recognized last year that they were likely never going to have enough troops to pursue a strategy built around protecting the Afghan population.

krisna · Post by **krisna** » 15 Jun 2011 04:43

US establishes contact with Mullah Omar

The US has established contacts with Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar to negotiate an end to the conflict in Afghanistan, a media report said on Tuesday.
Abdul Haqiq, a former Afghan Taliban spokesman who used the alias Mohammad Hanif, played a key role in helping Washington reach out to Mullah Omar, The Express Tribune newspaper quoted a source as saying.

Several claims have been made so far by the US about negotiations with the Taliban but Islamabad and Kabul were never taken into confidence over the talks, the report said. The US reportedly offered the Taliban control over southern Afghanistan, leaving the north for other political forces under American influence.

However, this was rejected by the Taliban. "The acceptance of such a proposal could not be possible for the Taliban as it could lead to the disintegration of Afghanistan," said former Inter-Services Intelligence chief Hamid Gul.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 15 Jun 2011 15:45

Kashmiri may not be dead

The death of Ilyas Kashmiri continues to remain a mystery and as per agencies in India, he is still alive since there is no credible confirmation regarding his death. Two weeks back, news had broken out stating that Ilyas Kashmiri was killed in a drone attack. Barring the Harkat-ul-Jihadi, no other agency including the United States of America were able to confirm the news and it remains a status quo till date.
Indian agencies when contacted say that there are three aspects to the news relating to Ilyas Kashmiri. Following the David Headley revealations at the Chicago court, the heat was on Kashmiri. Moreover the United States of America too had made it clear that after the death of Osama Bin Laden, the man most wanted on their list was Kashmiri. The US had also gone to the extent of telling Pakistan to act against Kashmiri.
Once this directive was given to Pakistan, the ISI found itself in an extremely difficult situation since they could not afford the death of another high profile terrorist after Osama Bin Laden. Pakistan following the death of Laden has already been facing the heat from terrorist groups. The death of Kashmiri at the hands of US forces would have only meant that the retaliatory measures would have been terrible for Pakistan.
According to Indian agencies the death of Kashmiri appears to be a rumour either floated by the ISI or Kashmiri himself. Had the US drones killed Kashmiri, they would not have hesitated to declare it since it would have been another feather in their cap in their war on terror.
Both the ISI and Kashmiri were aware that the US were closing in on him. Hence the best way to have avoided any such onslaught was to float such a rumour regarding his death.
At first it was believed that the ISI may have killed him. This could have been easily true considering the fact that Kashmiri has been saying that the Al-Qaeda has managed to infiltrate into the Pakistan army which ultimately resulted in the success of the Mehran attack. However the intercepts now trickling in suggest that the plan to eliminate Kashmiri was called off and the ISI managed to force a truce with the man. Indian agencies feel that the truce between the two would have dealt with outflow of information and Kashmiri could have been told to remain silent. In addition to this, Kashmiri is still an important man for the ISI since he is the one who trains new cadres who can carry out precision attacks.
This prompted Kashmiri himself to float the rumour regarding himself stating that he was dead. Through his parent outfit HuJI, he attempted to confirm the news to the rest of the world. Although none were sure of this, the heat surely died down and resources were spent in confirming the news than tracking him down. This gave him ample time to change his hideout.
Indian agencies say that this is for the second time Kashmiri and the ISI managed to hood wink the world. Similar news regarding his death had emerged a couple of years back too. However at that time even the US forces made the mistake of confirming his death only to realise that he was alive and had very well managed to change his base.
According to the intelligence bureau, deaths of high profile terrorists at the hands of the establishment is nothing new. The ISI tends to eliminate persons who start generating heat which ultimately falls on Pakistan from the rest of the world. There are two more similar instances regarding the death of terrorists. Shahid Bilal of the Hyderabad twin blasts fame was eliminated by the ISI when it was realised that his hiding in Pakistan was doing no good for them. Although the father of Bilal confirmed his death after seeing photographs of Bilal on the internet, the case is not the same for Riyaz Bhatkal, the Indian Mujahideen big wig. There was a claim that he was killed by members of the Chota Rajan gang, but till date there is no confirmation either from our own agencies nor from Pakistan. Indian agencies say that these are the types of games that the ISI plays in a bid to reduce heat. It is extremely difficult to get such things confirmed since Pakistan has a lot at stake either to confirm or even deny the news.

sum · Post by **sum** » 15 Jun 2011 16:28

However the intercepts now trickling in suggest that the plan to eliminate Kashmiri was called off and the ISI managed to force a truce with the man. Indian agencies feel that the truce between the two would have dealt with outflow of information and Kashmiri could have been told to remain silent.

Awww...no more PNS Mehran style mischief by miscreants?

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 15 Jun 2011 16:58

J.P. Morgan's hunt for Afghan gold

devesh · Post by **devesh** » 15 Jun 2011 22:29

^^^
the above activities might be indirectly supported by GOTUS. their Paki monetary policy of printing money has probably drained all the Gold from official govt reserves. its simple Gresham's Law. bad money drives out good. India should be prepared to tackle any such moves by US on Indian gold. they will try to create artificial crises to get their hands on some much needed gold. it is a necessity now. they thought they could control fiat regimes, but dream is down the drain. it looks like Fiat currencies won't stay on for long. this means they need hard commodities, preferably Gold, in large quantities. if they're caught off guard by any financial Panics, they will need Gold. if they don't, it can be full fledged run on the currency itself. that is a one-way road to hyperinflation.

Rudradev · Post by **Rudradev** » 15 Jun 2011 23:50

Time to connect some dots, I think.

1) On May 3, OBL is killed in a US raid on his compound in Abbotabad.

2) On May 22 (the Night of the Onions in PNS Mehran,) news reports started circulating with all kinds of rumors about Mullah Omar. These included:
-Mullah Omar was moved from Quetta by the ISI
-Mullah Omar was killed in a drone strike
-Mullah Omar was killed by the ISI while being moved
-Mullah Omar was killed by the US while being moved by the ISI, along with Hamid Gul

Notably, all this seemed fragmented and didn't draw much attention given the Night of the Onions fireworks already in progress. Various denials ensued from different quarters, including Hamid Gul who turned out to be alive and well.

3) On May 28, Hillary Clinton gave Pakistan a list of most-wanted terrorists that they must deliver by July. The list includes Zawahiri, Ilyas Kashmiri, Atiya Abdel Rehman and Siraj Haqqani. Mullah Omar is conspicuous by his absence.

4) On May 31, Syed Saleem Shehzad was found murdered after publishing one part of an Asia Times article related to PNS Mehran. His killing may not have been related to the Mehran case per se, but to other information he had received from his ISI sources, possibly linked to the other items on this list.

5) On June 3, ISI and HuJI declared that Ilyas Kashmiri (on Clinton's list) had been killed in a drone strike. Rehman Malik later revised the certainty of Kashmiri's death downwards to "98%."

Casting more doubts on the veracity of these reports, ISI tried to pass off a photograph of one of the dead Mumbai pigLeTs as a picture of the dead Ilyas Kashmiri.

5) On June 10, a court in Chicago found T.H. Rana not guilty of abetting the LeT in the Mumbai attacks. Had he been found guilty, the ISI links to that attack would have come under intense scrutiny. His acquittal spared the ISI a great deal of embarrassment and worse.

Some have contended that the acquittal was just a consequence of the normal functioning of the American justice system; that there cannot have been any hidden agenda behind it. I don't buy that at all.

In the US criminal justice system, DAs (state prosecutors) are required to prove the guilt of the accused *beyond reasonable doubt*. If reasonable doubt exists in the minds of the jury, the accused is nearly always acquitted.

For those who have been following the trial, there is every reason to believe that the Chicago DA's office was woefully under-prepared to make the case of Rana's guilt in the Mumbai attacks, beyond all reasonable doubt. Many reports indicate that the DAs in question stumbled over issues of language and seemed confused over the identities of many principals, as well as the connections between those principals.

This need not be because there was Maino-style pressure applied to DAs, judges or police. The fact is, in order to build a case like this, the Chicago DA's office was entirely dependent on evidential data and supporting expertise that had to be sourced from Federal institutions under GOTUS control: the NSA, CIA and so on.

Had the GOTUS wanted to nail Rana for Mumbai, they would have made every effort to ensure that the Chicago DA's office was well prepared to make the case... by sending expert witnesses, coaching DAs on the minutiae and big-picture aspects of ISI-LeT collaboration, providing visual aids and powerpoints, etc.

In the event, it appears that the Chicago DA's office did not receive this kind of help from Washington, as evidenced by their lack of preparation. It is quite possible that Washington institutions dragged their feet, delayed the delivery of evidence, or even "misplaced" evidence (a-la Mumbai 1993 blasts) which could otherwise have helped the Chicago DA's office build a far stronger case.

Ultimately, the Chicago DA's office did not care: from their point of view, they had enough to send Rana to jail on the Copenhagen plot, so it made little difference to them if they were unable to prove the Mumbai case. So they may not have gone out of their way either.

Given the resulting shoddy presentation by the Chicago DA's office, it was inevitable that the Jury were very confused (and hence, full of "reasonable doubt") regarding Rana's involvement in 26/11. Here the role of the Judge is also interesting; when asked by the Jury to provide many points of clarification, including whether Pasha was a leader of ISI or LeT, the Judge denied the Jury such clarifications!

In the end, "reasonable doubt" was a fait accompli, and one effected through inaction (with plausible deniability) by the GOTUS. The ISI's skin was saved by their Washington friends once again.

So: what was the other side of that quid-pro-quo?

6) Yesterday, June 14, we received a hint as to the answer.

US Establishes Contact with Mullah Omar

Connecting the dots, here's my theory.

Firstly: Mullah Omar. Was he killed or not, on May 22?

And, does it matter?

That may seem like a funny question to ask, given the amount of publicity with which the US surrounded its discovery and killing of OBL at Abbotabad. But we must realize that there are important differences between OBL and Mullah Omar in terms of public profile, and hence, in terms of the propaganda value of publicizing their deaths.

OBL had a very visible public profile, right up to the end, for someone in hiding from the world's most powerful intelligence agencies. He would consistently send out public messages inspiring his followers to jihad, all across the Muslim world. Everybody knew who OBL was, and what he looked like. Everyone had seen his videos and heard his voice. Jihad-pasand youths from Indonesia to Morrocco would buy posters of him. OBL was a *brand*.

The psychological victory and symbolic propaganda value of killing OBL, for the US, was immense. Not just in terms of domestic political gains for the Obama administration, but internationally across the regions known to be jihadi recruiting grounds.

Compared to OBL, Mullah Omar is an enigma. Except for one grainy photo of a man with an eyepatch, few people have any idea what he looks like.

Even among the Taliban, the number of people who knew him and interacted with him personally, has been very much depleted over the last decade.

By now, those who could identify him visually are either dead, or they are senior Quetta Shura leaders living as guests/hostages of the ISI. Only very few of the Taliban who once interacted personally with Mullah Omar, still survive independently of ISI control. Mullah Abdul Salaam Zaeef is one of them, and he may or may not have been "turned" by the CIA during his stay at Gitmo.

The bulk of Taliban commanders, especially the younger ones currently doing battle in Afghanistan, may have never met or seen Mullah Omar in person. Neither have they seen his likeness on videotape nor heard his voice in recordings. To them, he is mostly a shadowy figure of legend from whom orders are conveyed indirectly.

Who else knows what Mullah Omar looks like? The wider Arab/Muslim world neither knows nor cares... they have never seen him on video. Afghans who got a glimpse of him in the 1996-2001 era may barely even remember what he looked like.

So, apart from a few Taliban leaders mostly living under ISI control... only a subset of ISI officers, plus a handful of people in the CIA/Western Intelligence agencies, are actually capable of identifying Mullah Omar by sight.

What could this mean? Well, if Mullah Omar was actually killed, and a joint US/ISI plot was contrived to replace him with some other one-eyed Ghilzai Pashtun from Pakistan... almost no one would be able to successfully deny it.

The real Mullah Omar can be killed, and a false "Mullah Omar" can be produced to negotiate with the US on behalf of the "Taliban." As long as ISI and ISI-controlled Taliban leaders proclaim that this new "Mullah Omar" is genuine, most Afghan Taliban commanders active in the field will swallow it too. Denying that this negotiating "Mullah Omar" is the genuine item, will only bring skepticism, engender divisions and lower morale among the ranks of the Taliban... so, even if they suspect anything, will Afghan Taliban commanders have any choice but to go along?

Secondly: this perfidy can only exist as long as the parties who can actually identify Mullah Omar by sight: ISI, CIA and those few senior Talibs living under ISI control, all contrive to maintain it.

This means that a cast-iron compact between the US and the ISI, is critical to the US' ability to negotiate a settlement and begin their pullout of troops from Afghanistan. After all... some "Mullah Omar" has to be available to cut a deal with the US on Taliban's behalf... and everyone who is in a position to know better, must agree that this "Mullah Omar" is the genuine item.

Accordingly: it is very conceivable that the ISI received certain rewards and assurances in exchange for going along with this charade. One of those may have been the acquittal of Rana on the Mumbai attacks. Hence, the quid-pro-quo.

Thirdly: it is possible that SSS got wind of this information, and had to be killed. Maybe he was one loose cannon who could actually have identified the "real" vs. "fake" Mullah Omar by sight, and who also had enough public credibility that he could be dangerous if he blew the whistle. That would have been far more reason to kill SSS than any story about Ilyas Kashmiri's involvement in attacking the PNS Mehran naval base.

Fourthly: ISI, in typical Paki fashion, may have been trying to take advantage of the Americans' dependence on them, by putting on the charade of Ilyas Kashmiri's "death." Ilyas Kashmiri is not dead, but he has been told to lay low until the US withdraws from Af-Pak... after which, he will be launched against India onlee. The story of Ilyas Kashmiri's "death" has been manufactured by ISI to relieve US State Dept pressure on the Pak Govt. ("listed of most wanted terrorists" etc.)

The Americans may or may not actually believe that Ilyas Kashmiri is dead, but since they are relying on the ISI's collaboration to advance their "Mullah Omar" charade, they are pretending to believe it.

Fifthly: if the US is depending so heavily on ISI's collaboration to carry out a charade of negotiating with "Mullah Omar" (genuine or fake), in order to cover its military pullout from Afghanistan... this cannot but be bad news for India. I have a feeling that acquittal of Rana on the 26/11 attacks was only a "good faith" gesture of reassurance to the ISI... there may be much worse in store for us.

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 16 Jun 2011 00:11

interesting linkages, and some questions being raised.

Who is actually the leader of the afghan taliban?
We Know about Haqqanis, who else?
How much was Mullah Omar in control over them, because at the end of the day, even if an agreement with "fake MO" is made, that has to be implemented on the ground. If he has day-day involvement, we can forget that this scheme will succeed as the involvement requires interaction with multiple people.

If MO is only conversing through couriers with the operational leaders, the couriers will be the most suseptible, because their approval forms the most important link of this "impersonator king" scheme.

There are parallels of such types of impersonation which worked out well over 3 years as king in Iran.

Actually, your argument gives me a compelling reason to think that MO is right now under the "US protection"

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Jun 2011 00:17

N^3 always used to maintain Mullah Omar is a ISI officer on deputation to lead the Taliban. And now he could even be a fake one!

ravi_ku, The Taliban have two major groups: Quetta Sura with Mullah Omar as leader and the Haqqani faction based in WANA.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is another miscreant but more like a dacoit then a political faction leader.

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 16 Jun 2011 00:40

thinking out loudly.

if we think afghan taliban as two different entities, haqqani (Waziristani) and Quetta Shura.
Would an agreement with one be followed by the other?

Is there a Irani angle involved in this? Is the US thinking that Quetta Shura can used in Iran?

Zawahiri - Waziristani Shura, all his reportings have been from that area
Ilyas Kashmiri - ISI prop
Atiya Abdel Rehman - Libyan head
Siraj Haqqani - Waziristani Shura

absolutely no demand for any pure Quetta Shura or someone who actually was part of the original taliban.

Have the original taliban been neutralized? Have the reported captures during jan-march last year, marked the end of the taliban as we knew it?

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 16 Jun 2011 00:46

ravi_ku wrote:Is there a Irani angle involved in this? Is the US thinking that Quetta Shura can used in Iran?

Report posted in Iran thread says that an Iranian citizen from Zahedan was arrested in Qandahar along with a man from Paki-occupied Baluchistan. Together they were allegedly planning a suicide attack operation against foreign forces.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 16 Jun 2011 01:21

Rudradev ji,

I just love the strings you weave through all sorts of dots and beads! Great Going!

Frederic · Post by **Frederic** » 16 Jun 2011 01:31

Rudradevji,

*How does the PNS Mehran attack tie into this Mullah Omar scenario? Even if we go by your earlier hypothesis that the burning of the Orions was just for show and effect, something did happen on that night?

Best Regards
Fred

Rudradev · Post by **Rudradev** » 16 Jun 2011 01:31

Ravi_ku ji,

As Ramana garu confirms, the "Afghan Taliban" currently has two leadership circles. The Haqqanis in North Waziristan and the Quetta Shura including Mullah Omar. Both are under ISI control... Haqqanis willingly, the Quetta Shura possibly under partial duress (remember Mullah Baradar!)

Haqqani leadership is directly involved at a day-to-day, operational level with combat in Afghanistan. Quetta Shura seems to work more in the shadows, and communicates indirectly with battlefield commanders in Afghanistan. In that sense Quetta Shura are more of a symbolic, inspirational and policy-making leadership than an operational leadership... relative to, say, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The Quetta Shura are the ideal candidates to represent the "Taliban" at political negotiations with the US... they may not be perfect, since the Taliban itself has fragmented into a number of autonomous groups, but they are by far the closest thing to an umbrella leadership.

As far as MO's "couriers" are concerned: quite unlike OBL/"Al-Qaeda", the Taliban have always been a creature of the ISI from day one, and all their operational logistics, including messengering, are ISI facilitated. If ISI goes along with the "MO-impersonation" scenario, the couriers will also go along.

So in answer to your questions: since Quetta Shura and Haqqanis are both under ISI control, if ISI goes along with MO-impersonation, both of these will go along as well.

The hold-outs if any, are likely to be the anti-Pakistan/anti-ISI factions of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan: the guys named in BLUE in the below figure, plus others aligned with them.

It may be in reigning these guys in, that Ilyas Kashmiri will be useful to ISI. Hence he is playing "dead" for now but both US and Pakistan know that he is merely being kept in cold storage for the post-negotiation scenario that will emerge. At that time, he will consolidate the uber-jihadi elements of TTP and redirect them in an all-out anti-India jihad in J&K. Ilyas Kashmiri would be useful in playing this role, because even though he is an ISI man, he has immense credibility with the "global-jihad" elements (he was mentioned as a possible successor to OBL as head of Al Qaeda!)

You see, the main motivation of TTP in fighting the TSPA/ISI is that TSPA/ISI is supporting the US in Afghanistan. If US withdraws from Afghanistan after a negotiated settlement with Taliban, which gives Taliban control over part or all of Afghanistan... then TTP has no more reason to fight. They can join in the Taliban victory and share in the spoils.

So, if my scenario is right, this is how it will look at the end.

1) US withdraws from Afghanistan.

2) Taliban shares power in Kabul, gains control over some or all of Afghanistan. Karzai goes along with this or gets thrown under the bus. Taliban rules Afghanistan as an ISI proxy, and Indian interests in Afghanistan are firmly quashed.

3) US is happy because it claims to have killed OBL, saved its H&D and exited Afghanistan ending the war.

4) TSPA/ISI is happy because it has regained Pakistan's "strategic depth."

5) Because the US depends on ISI to keep the peace in Afghanistan from this point onwards, it will continue to provide aid to Pakistan... including military aid which will be used against India. Furthermore, US will turn a blind eye to continuing ISI terrorism against India... Rana trial was just the first indication of this.

6) Because TSPA/ISI depends on US aid to survive, they will continue to ensure that no anti-Western terrorism is launched from an Afghanistan under their control via Taliban proxy.

7) Haqqani and other ISI-loyal members of Taliban leadership will be rewarded with high positions in Kabul, so they will be happy.

8 ) TTP will have a share of the new Afghanistan. Their most jihad-pasand elements will be channeled against India by Ilyas Kashmiri; so they will be happy.

9) China will be effectively checkmated by this US-ISI-Taliban understanding. They will be kept out of Kabul and points south.

China may yet have some cards up its sleeve to disturb this cozy understanding. Recently, PLA had offered to arm and train the Hekmatyar militia; a pro-PRC rebellion by Hekmatyar might throw a spanner in the works of the negotiated Kabul arrangement.

Also, if Afghanistan is partitioned with the South going to Taliban and the North going to anti-Taliban parties, China may draw closer to Iran and Russia in supporting the North.

10) India, as always, will be left in the cold to fight its own global war against jihadi terrorism.

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 16 Jun 2011 01:43

Rudradev wrote: You see, the main motivation of TTP in fighting the TSPA/ISI is that TSPA/ISI is supporting the US in Afghanistan. If US withdraws from Afghanistan after a negotiated settlement with Taliban, which gives Taliban control over part or all of Afghanistan... then TTP has no more reason to fight. They can join in the Taliban victory and share in the spoils.

I dont think this will happen. Would you(Pakjab) allow someone(Pakiban) a share in the spoils if they have actually worked against you?

Mahendra · Post by **Mahendra** » 16 Jun 2011 01:48

ravi_ku wrote:
Rudradev wrote: You see, the main motivation of TTP in fighting the TSPA/ISI is that TSPA/ISI is supporting the US in Afghanistan. If US withdraws from Afghanistan after a negotiated settlement with Taliban, which gives Taliban control over part or all of Afghanistan... then TTP has no more reason to fight. They can join in the Taliban victory and share in the spoils.
I dont think this will happen. Would you(Pakjab) allow someone(Pakiban) a share in the spoils if they have actually worked against you?

It is in the green colour

If bangladeshis can cheer for PackeE-Colis barely a few decades after being raped and pillaged then in the greater interest of Khilafat anything is possible.

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 16 Jun 2011 01:49

I also have a doubt, the afghan leadership of taliban has been decimated. Only NWFP/ Pakistani leadership of taliban remains, i.e. the taliban from being a afghan protege of Pak became a Pak protege itself. What are its affects? Would the durranis/western afghans accept this leadership?

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 16 Jun 2011 01:52

Mahendra wrote:
ravi_ku wrote: I dont think this will happen. Would you(Pakjab) allow someone(Pakiban) a share in the spoils if they have actually worked against you?
It is in the green colour

If bangladeshis can cheer for PackeE-Colis barely a few decades after being raped and pillaged then in the greater interest of Khilafat anything is possible.

Mahdi,

the piskology of green actually says different.

No doubt that Pakiban will be more than glad to accept spoils, but the victor green piskology is never give spoils.

Rudradev · Post by **Rudradev** » 16 Jun 2011 01:53

Frederic wrote:Rudradevji,

*How does the PNS Mehran attack tie into this Mullah Omar scenario? Even if we go by your earlier hypothesis that the burning of the Orions was just for show and effect, something did happen on that night?

Best Regards
Fred

Fred ji,

We can't really be sure. There are two different things here:

1) Attack on PNS Mehran, which may have been because
a) As SSS intimated, to free PN officers who had been arrested by Naval Intelligence for Al-Qaeda links. Sounds like gobar to me.
b) A show of strength on the part of Ilyas Kashmiri/Islampasand-ISI/AQAM, to show that even a base like Mehran can be penetrated and shot up at will. If this was the reason, Orions may have been symbolically destroyed as part of it.
c) Some other unknown reason for the op, which we still don't know, such as snatching a nuke. If this is true, Orions were destroyed only as a diversion from the real purpose. Some suggest that the Orions were being fitted for nuke delivery, but that again is a matter of conjecture.

Attack on PNS Mehran may have been for any or all the above reasons. Accordingly, Orions may have been destroyed only for symbolic value or as a diversion.

2) Mullah Omar kidnapping or murder from Quetta. Possibly as a prelude to some kind of "impersonation" scenario as I've suggested above.

There is no way to know for sure if (1) was staged only or partially to provide diversion from (2), or had no connection to (2), or (1) may have been committed by a different party than (2) entirely.

If I'm right, (2) was committed by Amreeka-Pasand-ISI and CIA, as a prelude to replacing the real Mullah Omar with an impersonator for "negotiation" purposes. Would these parties also have carried out (1), the Mehran attack? Or was that an Ilyas Kashmiri op that happened coincidentally at the same time? The available data do not permit any firm conclusions.

Rudradev · Post by **Rudradev** » 16 Jun 2011 01:58

ravi_ku wrote:
Rudradev wrote: You see, the main motivation of TTP in fighting the TSPA/ISI is that TSPA/ISI is supporting the US in Afghanistan. If US withdraws from Afghanistan after a negotiated settlement with Taliban, which gives Taliban control over part or all of Afghanistan... then TTP has no more reason to fight. They can join in the Taliban victory and share in the spoils.
I dont think this will happen. Would you(Pakjab) allow someone(Pakiban) a share in the spoils if they have actually worked against you?

Of course. This is how things work in that part of the world. Taqqiyya, Hudaibiyya, bribery, blackmail, shifting alliances etc. etc. all for the greater good of jihad. Everything is understood, everything is forgiven, as long as it is by a brother Muslim and can be directed against a Kaffir in the long term.

Ilyas Kashmiri has also worked "against" TSPA if he committed the PNS Mehran attack, and worked with TTP before; will TSPA forsake him if he aligns with them against India in J&K?

For that matter, it has emerged that ISI-LeT coordinated the Mumbai attacks in the hope that IA would respond militarily against Pakistan... thereby making TTP stop its attacks on TSPA, and join together with TSPA in joint jihad against India. Would ISI-LeT (Pakjab) have ever made such a calculation, if they were never prepared to forgive or reconcile with TTP??

Also: why do you think the TSPA has always reached "negotiated settlements" when possible with the TTP, such as with Baitullah Mehsud? They have never gone in for the kill with those guys... only the US has actually killed TTP leaders with drone strikes. That's because TSPA/ISI very much want to keep alive the possibility of using those TTP guys as proxies in the future.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 16 Jun 2011 02:04

Published on Jun 14, 2011
By Abdul Salam Zaeef  and Hekmat Karzai
Reconciliation with Taliban is hard, but necessary: The Hill

In December 2009, President Obama sent an additional 30,000 troops to confront the growing violence in Afghanistan. Though the impact of the U.S. military and diplomatic surge continues to remain uncertain for the present, we can nevertheless conclude that 2010 had been by far the most violent year in the decade-old conflict.

The Taliban’s response, however, was a surge of its own, which it launched through bold attacks and targeted assassinations of senior Afghan government officials. Those efforts have clearly had an impact on the ground.

The last three decades in Afghan history are filled with violence. Indeed, Afghans are now tired of this violence and want to live in peace. They want to live in a country where their children can go to school and live a normal life.
The process of reconciliation has become an important demand of Afghans, and most are convinced that the only way to end this bloody conflict is through a political settlement with the Taliban.

Clearly, there are some who claim this bloodbath should continue till the defeat of the Taliban, but their arguments are divorced from the reality. There are also signs that the Taliban wishes to engage in dialogue.

The Afghan government has taken the initiative and created a 70-member High Peace Council. The HPC has become the body leading reintegration and reconciliation efforts, and its mandate is to reach out and engage with the Taliban.

Nonetheless, what is desperately needed is a home for the Taliban, from which to represent themselves and open channels for transparent face-to-face interaction.

From the outset, coordination of efforts by the international community has been a major challenge in Afghanistan. Governments and major international organizations have always acted on their own interests and policies rather than the demands of the Afghan people.

Gen. David Petraeus, commander of the International Security Assistance Force, described the posture of the international community vis-a-vis the political process as “reconciliation tourism.” This insinuates that most influential players on the ground are busy establishing contacts with the Taliban. As a result, there is much confusion about the process and its direction.

There are countries that see a political settlement in Afghanistan as an opportunity for an early exit. So, naturally, they have redirected their efforts. But the question they are not asking is: Shouldn’t Afghans be taking a leading role in any future settlement?

What makes matters worse is that many countries lack an understanding of the complex process and the players involved. Their actions are not well-thought-out. A case in point is the high-level meetings that were held in Kabul with a “shopkeeper.”

The most important advantage of establishing a home for the Taliban would be to combine the reconciliation efforts currently under way into one channel. There are currently several players wishing to play the role of a facilitator and uniting these efforts could contribute to a more successful process.

Second, many speculate about what kind of Afghanistan the Taliban aspire to live in. The Taliban’s clear concern has been against foreign forces. What about human rights, education and other important issues? It’s time to find out. This reconciliation process can help clarify that.

Third, different groups carry out various acts across Afghanistan, and at the end most of these acts are attributed to the Taliban. It must be noted that there are actors who take advantage of and misuse the identity of the Taliban. Representation of the Taliban can specifically put an end to this.

Fourth, it is estimated that around 35 percent of the schools in southern Afghanistan are closed. In addition, there are areas in Afghanistan where the implementation of a simple vaccine poses a grave danger for the beneficiary. A coordinated effort that reaches consensuses with the Taliban can tackle these issues, and humanitarian assistance can be delivered to the people who are in urgent need.

Lastly, if the Taliban is provided a home and treated in an acceptable manner, the Afghan government and the international community can hold it responsible for specific behaviors and demand an explanation for its actions.

2011 is a crucial year for Afghanistan. The international community can continue with more of the same, which will lead to further violence and loss of innocent lives, or embark on strategic thinking by supporting a home for the Taliban. Naturally, the choice is clear for the Afghans.

Zaeef was the former ambassador of the Taliban to Pakistan and author of My Life With the Taliban. Karzai is the director of the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS) in Kabul. Both are active supporters of a peace process in Afghanistan.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 16 Jun 2011 02:06

Mullah Omar is dead. Nobody knows who this new Mullah Omar is? Most probably some ISI man!

The Taliban are being taken for a ride by both Pakistan and USA!

Rudradev · Post by **Rudradev** » 16 Jun 2011 02:08

ravi_ku wrote:I also have a doubt, the afghan leadership of taliban has been decimated. Only NWFP/ Pakistani leadership of taliban remains, i.e. the taliban from being a afghan protege of Pak became a Pak protege itself. What are its affects? Would the durranis/western afghans accept this leadership?

Taliban was always a Pak protege and Afghans always knew it. They accepted it in 1996, knowing it was a Pak protege. What are they going to do about it now? Only the US was able to empower Afghans (mainly the Northerners) to expel the Taliban. Do the Durranis/W.Afghans have any mechanism to avoid another Taliban govt. being foisted on them in collusion with TSP and the US?

Also, you are making a distinction between NWFP Pathans and Afghan Pathans, i.e. assuming that the Durand Line makes a difference. To most Pathans it doesn't. Tribal allegiances across the Durand line are of much more consequence than conceptual separations along the Durand line.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Jun 2011 02:22

ravi_ku and all, For quite a few years we on BRf have been thinking, speculating, connecting dots etcs till we are blue inthe face.

For example in 2007 we started teh Pastun Civil War thread to gather reports of clashes inside TSP NWFP area.

In it also there is a report about OBL posted by Mupplla!

If anyone wants to help, they should use ArmenT,'s post consolidator and systematically extract the info into one page format and mind map the threads.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 17 Jun 2011 02:39

The games Zawahiri will play

Posted on June 16, 2011 by Vicky Nanjappa

Photo caption: Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama Bin Laden. Photo courtesy: http://barcelonavsmachesterunited-road.blogspot.com/
Although it was a well known fact, the news has been made official today- Ayman al-Zawahiri has been chosen to lead the dreaded Al-Qaeda as per the posting on a jihadi website called Ansar al Islam.

The death of Osama Bin Laden had left a vaccum in the Al-Qaeda. Although they were very sound when it came to execution and operations, what they lacked was a idelogical figure to whom people could look up to. This gap will now be filled in by Zawahiri.

Zawahiri like Bin Laden will continue to focus his resources on the United States of America. However the lurking danger is that he would want to carry out something spectacular in a bid to announce his arrival.

Indian agencies point out that the Al-Qaeda has never been much of a worry for India since the ISI has always ensured that the likes of the Lashkar-e-Tayiba focus its resources on the Indian soil. However despite the Al-Qaeda not carrying out any attack on the Indian soil, the inspiration for the Indian jihadi has always been this outfit and never the Lashkar. During the recruitment process in India, videos of Al-Qaeda operations especially the 9/11 attack would be shown. During the interrogations conducted on several terrorists in India, the revealation has always been that Bin Laden is their biggest inspiration as they believe that he took on the mighty US single handedly.

Although Zawahiri has made it clear that jihad against the US would continue despite the death of Laden, Indian agencies suspect that he may try and play a role in Kashmir, the next biggest thing for jihadi factions after the US. Zawahiri may not try and stage a big attack against the US at the moment, since he is very high on their wanted list. Moreover the think tank within the Al-Qaeda would have advised him to go slow on the US at least for the time being.

Zawahiri is not new to the job and this take over cannot be considered as sudden. Although Laden was the face of the Al-Qaeda, he had taken a back seat for the past five years thanks to a falling out with Zawahiri. According to the Indian agencies, Zawahiri had side lined Laden as he felt that the latter did not have the resources to finance the group any longer. Although there was no major war of words between the two of them, Laden had been told by Zawahiri to lie low and not involve himself too much with the outfit. Laden’s health was failing and there was so much heat on him that it had become virtually impossible for him to move about. Hence it was a known fact that Zawahiri would be the next in line.

With this take over, the structure of the Al-Qaeda would appear a bit changed. Under the directions of Zawahiri, newer tie ups had been formed. The 313 brigade was given absolute control over the trainings wing of the Qaeda while the Haqqani Network was roped in for the job of operations.When one looks at these two wings, it is clear that both have a keen interest in Kashmir since their leaders started out their battle over there. This gives one the suspicion whether Zawahiri may also permit the Al-Qaeda to play a bigger part in Kashmir.

Moreover what has also been worrying the Indian agencies is that the recruitments for the Al-Qaeda have been taking place on a large scale from India and all this was with the blessings of the new leader.

The new leader although not as charismatic as Laden, does enjoy a lot of clout within the outfit. The very fact that he became their undisputed leader is a testimony for the same. However the worry for the Al-Qaeda would be whether he would be able to rope in the new faces into the outfit. He is a powerful speaker, but he will try and go the Laden way to ensure that he too is viewed as a hero like Laden was in the jihadi circles, Indian agencies also point out.

India could be key target of new al-Qaeda chief

Praveen Swami

Al-Zawahiri under pressure to establish power over jihadists

PHOTO: AP

NEW HELMSMAN: Al-Qaeda, which has suffered a mortal blow in the death of Osama bin-Laden at the hands of the U.S. special forces, has selected its long-time No. 2, al-Zawahiri, to succeed him. In this file photo, al-Zawahiri (left) and Osama are seen at Khost in Afghanistan.

NEW DELHI: India could be one of several new theatres targeted by al-Qaeda's newly-appointed chief to establish his authority over the jihadist group and its allies, intelligence sources say.

The appointment of Osama bin-Laden's long-standing lieutenant to lead al-Qaeda was made public on Thursday, in a three-page online communiqué, which announced “the undertaking of responsibility of the amir [supreme leader] of the group by Sheikh Dr. Abu Muhammad Ayman al-Zawahiri.”

Perceived by many within the jihadist leadership as aloof, even arrogant, the 1959-born former Egyptian surgeon is under intense pressure to demonstrate that al-Qaeda has survived bin-Laden's killing by the United States special forces last month.

Long-standing problems between the Egyptian jihadist circles led by al-Zawahiri and their Yemeni and Saudi counterparts, though, mean he could turn to Pakistani jihadists to execute his plans. Fakir Muhammad, a top jihadist commander who has repulsed multiple military campaigns to retake his strongholds in northwest Pakistan's Bajaur agency, is among al-Zawahiri's closest allies.

Hatred against India runs deep amongst Pakistan's Islamists, and targeting it could prove a means for leaders like Fakir Muhammad to win domestic legitimacy, as well as draw cadre away from organisations that have been reined in by Pakistan since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, like the Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Fears that al-Qaeda will choose India as a theatre to expand have been mounting since last summer, when al-Zawahiri's former deputy released an audiotape claiming responsibility for the 2009 bombing of a café in Pune.

“I bring you the good tidings,” al-Masri said in the audiotape, “that last February's India operation was against a Jewish locale in the west of the Indian capital [sic.].”

Muhammad Ilyas Kashmiri, a Pakistani jihadist, reported — but not proven —to have been killed in a drone strike earlier this year, was announced to have set up a special unit to stage the Pune bombing and future strikes.

Al-Zawahiri was among the first international jihadist leaders to mention India, writing in a manifesto published in 2001 that his cadre had “revived a religious duty of which the [Muslim] nation had long been deprived, by fighting in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Chechnya.”

The theme was taken up by bin Laden himself in 1996, when he issued a declaration condemning “massacres in Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, the Philippines, Pattani, Ogaden, Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.”

Later, in September 2003, al-Zawahiri again invoked India to warn Pakistanis that their President, General Pervez Musharraf, was plotting to “hand you over to the Hindus and flee to enjoy his secret accounts.”

Thursday's communiqué is believed by experts to have followed a meeting of al-Qaeda's 10-member General Command, though it is unclear whether its scattered members communicated through couriers or cast their votes online.

The statement also called on “the Muslim people to rise and continue resistance, sacrifice and persistence [until] full and anticipated change comes, which will not be achieved except by the Islamic nation's return to the law of its Lord.”

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Regarding SSS killing, Ali Chishti mentioed that this Major Aziz (paki medical corps wala) who was arrested by ISI as CIA agents involved in OBL op along with 5 people was well known to SSS (i.e. a source). Is there a link? Major Aziz's house was supposedly used by CIA to spy on OBL compound.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 Jun 2011 07:04

Any terrorist attack on India should be seen from quo bono? who benefits?

Whether its LeT, ISI, AlQ or Martians it will be TSP that benefits.

So regardless of who attacks India the onus is on TSP to prove their innocence.

shyamD, you could have something there.

ISI thought S^3 was part of the chefs group in TSP. They killed him and arrested the other five.

Who is Ali Chisti?