Indian Army: News & Discussion

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 06 Jun 2011 16:05

thanks. what about the T-90's ?
also, shouldn't they get arty too ? something light like the m777 ?

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 06 Jun 2011 17:17

Rahul M wrote:thanks. what about the T-90's ? also, shouldn't they get arty too ? something light like the m777 ?

Arty support must be from 54 Div arty brigade while MBT should come from 33rd Armored Division. Although, the same (arty regiment*1) and may be upto a Squadron (or a Regiment, if we can manage) should be part of the Brigade Orbat. All of them need to train together and be familiar with the nuances of maritime operations to become a cohesive fighting unit. Ad-hoc attachments will not be useful in this case. Men and material need to properly exposed and trained for these kind of operations.

rajeshks · Post by **rajeshks** » 06 Jun 2011 17:28

rohitvats wrote: If you see the above pic, the troops sitting in Stallion are most probably from Madras Regiment (which one of the report clearly says are part of the brigade) and their vehicle also has same tactical number as BMP-II (268). So, my guess is, these BMP-II are integral to these infantry regiments. May be, upto a company level.

I have seen few BPMs parked inside the army area but the number was less. There is one unit from Madras regiment and another one from Gorkha Rifles based in Trivandrum. Sometime back I read about some excersise that went wrong and they lost a good number of rifles in sea. AFAIK the third unit in the brigade is based in bangalore.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 06 Jun 2011 17:45

^^^Yes, the regiment spread is correct. Exactly as per the news report which I had read. IIRC, the third unit is from Sikh or Sikh LI.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 06 Jun 2011 18:03

>> Although, the same (arty regiment*1) and may be upto a Squadron (or a Regiment, if we can manage) should be part of the Brigade Orbat. All of them need to train together and be familiar with the nuances of maritime operations to become a cohesive fighting unit. Ad-hoc attachments will not be useful in this case. Men and material need to properly exposed and trained for these kind of operations.

precisely my view too and any news of this happening (or not happening) will tell us what IHQ actually thinks about this issue.

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 09 Jun 2011 19:55

Mumbai bench of armed forces tribunal launched

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 10 Jun 2011 08:19

Himalayan task ahead

A policy of playing the China threat in a low key makes sense if it is supplemented with a marked build-up of deterrent conventional military capability. But when India has no mountain divisions for offensive warfare on the Tibetan plateau worth the name and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) can marshal as many as 28-35 divisions inside of a month, courtesy the Qinghai-Lhasa railway connecting the Chinese mainland with its western periphery, then we have a problem. We need a minimum of nine offensive mountain divisions — stalwart commanders deem 13-14 such divisions as barely adequate for the mission of credibly fighting the Chinese PLA on their ground. According to the general officer commanding one of the two new Army divisions expressly raised for offensive operations in the mountains, his formation is at present reduced to “protecting newly built border roads”. What is the guarantee that these minimal additions to the extant force, or even the full complement of 9-14 mountain divisions, equipped with light howtizers, light tanks (to debouch from the Demchok Triangle), and assault helicopters whenever these are obtained, will actually be deployed for aggressive action against China, rather than as a strong backup for the defensively arrayed formations along the border, given that the Indian armed services as a whole have, over the years, grown as passive-defensive and risk-averse as the Indian government?

Reorienting the Army to take on the PLA, however, involves much larger issues than merely raising new strike divisions for the mountains. It requires transformative ability which, in turn, depends upon organisational agility — something the Army — the senior service and a habitual laggard in these matters — is simply not good at, having undergone just two major restructurings in the last 60-odd years even as the methods and nature of war, and India’s threat reality changed radically. The first transformation happened after the shock of the 1962 war with China; the second in the late-Eighties with Gen. K. Sundarji pushing to make the Army mobile warfare capable. Assuming the government cannot increase defence spending beyond 2.5 per cent of the gross domestic product level, the manpower and financial resources necessary for an offensive capability in the mountains will have to be freed up by finessing the Army’s armoured might into a consolidated strike corps plus. There’s no way to escape making hard choices.

These and other issues were discussed at a June 3 seminar hosted by the HQ Central Command in Nainital with the Army Chief, Gen. V.K. Singh, present. One hopes Gen. Singh will initiate measures to make the Army relevant for tomorrow’s contingencies, otherwise a bigger military humiliation awaits the nation in the Himalayas.

chetak · Post by **chetak** » 10 Jun 2011 10:27

Received by email.

India can’t do a ‘Geronimo’

There are major fault-lines

by Lieut-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)

Consequent to American operation ‘Geronimo,’ at Abbottabad in Pakistan to eliminate Osama bin Laden, many in civil society have been asking whether India can go ahead with a similar operation. ‘Geronimo’ involved painstaking intelligence work spread over many years, though the final ‘fine- tuning’ took seven months or so. Detailed intelligence work and application of cutting edge technology apart, it required an enormous amount of co-ordination among those in the higher echelons of the civil administration and military high command as well as with the one who was to control the mission. The entire planning was closely monitored by the Chiefs of Defence Staff, the CIA chief and the President himself, who is also the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.

For months they worked on the plan, disseminating information strictly following the principle, ‘need to know’. A mock-up of the ‘Osama house’ would have been erected and an operation rehearsed a number of times by the designated team of helicopter crews and Seals, and the latter had otherwise been undergoing one of the most vigorous training schedules. Only then was it possible to complete the mission with clock-work precision. It was the President who had to take the final call and gave written orders.

Since intelligence is the most essential input for such an operation, can Indian intelligence agencies measure up to this basic requirement? Weaknesses of Indian intelligence have repeatedly surprised the nation, be it the Chinese road across Ladakh, the scale of aggression in 1962, and mass infiltration in 1965 in J and K followed by the attack in Chamb-Jorian. Kargil was a major intelligence failure and so was the attack on Parliament where there were security lapses too. It was repeated at Mumbai, in spite of some early leads. More recent are the cases of lists of terrorists in Pakistan and the CBI team arriving in Copenhangen with an out-dated warrant of arrest. The list is endless.

Accurate and actionable intelligence is fundamental to the success of covert operations, whereas it remains our weakest point. In fact, in the case of Indian intelligence agencies, it is not the case of the left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing but the little finger not knowing whom the index finger, of the same hand, is fingering?

At the national level we have the NSG, especially trained and equipped for such operations. At Mumbai these commandos first took too long to arrive and later too long to complete the operation. Equally, are the NSG commandos equal to the job? Just recall the visuals of a commando holding his weapon well above his head and firing at supposedly some terrorists! This visual was repeatedly shown on the American TV, where we saw the drama unfold. The NSG was commanded by an army officer, invariably an ex-commando, but now it is a police officer with no ground-level experience of commando operations. Grabbing jobs, irrespective of the suitability of the appointee, is another feature of Indian setting.

There was no centralised control over the operation and the entire scene around Taj Hotel appeared one of a ‘circus,’ with apparently no one knowing what to do. The details of ammunition and grenades expended by the commandos in this action would give an idea of the operation and our suspicion of possible collateral damage.

Both the Indian Navy and the Indian Army have special forces which can carry out missions of the type conducted by the US naval Seals at Abbottabad. They are organised and trained for such missions and have the best of leadership. Quality of intelligence inputs apart, it is the joint operations where more than one service is to take part and then problems arise. There are major fault-lines in the field of coordination and meshing together of various aspects of such an operation between the two Services taking part in the operation. This lack of ‘joint-ship’ has been the bane of Indian defence forces, which essentially is the handiwork of the politic-bureaucratic combine. The policy of ‘divide and rule’, and ‘turf-tending’ over national interest has been the dominant feature of the Indian defence apparatus.

In the case of the Abbattobad raid, in spite of the complete integration of the defence forces in the United States, the Naval Seals had their own helicopters to ensure total involvement and commitment of those taking part in the operation. In the case of India, helicopters meant for carrying such troops are with the Indian Air Force rather than the Army! So, the total commitment required on the part of all those taking part in the operation will not measure up to the level required in an operation of the type conducted at Abbottabad. In fact, discord has often appeared when two Services had to operate together. It surfaced in rather an ugly form during the Kargil operations.

In the Indian political setting, a clear direction and the will to go for the kill will continue to be lacking. At Kargil, troops were told to carry out a ‘hot pursuit,’ but were forbidden to cross the Line of Control. This is when Pakistan had violated, on a very wide front and to great depth, India’s territorial integrity and the situation called for and justified a befitting response. However, India’s timid and inappropriate reaction resulted in frontal attacks up those impossible slopes, with avoidable casualties. Pakistan suffered no punishment for its blatant act of aggression. Consequent to attack on Indian Parliament, ‘Operation Parakaram’ kept the troops in their battle locations for months and ended in a fiasco. Indian reaction to these two incidents conveyed to Pakistan that it can take liberties with India and the latter carries no deterrence for the former. At the same time, it demonstrated that Indian political leadership will never have the stomach to order an operation of the ‘Geronimo’ type, no matter how provocative the action of the other country may be.

Civil society has suddenly woken up and is now seeking answers to searching questions on these issues, having closed its eyes and switched off its mind to national security issues all these decades. The inescapable fact is that the full potential of various components of the defence forces just cannot be realised without adopting the concepts of Chiefs of Defence Staff and “Theater Commands” along with the integration of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Services headquarters on the lines of the Pentagon. What has currently been carried out by way of amalgamation of Defence Headquarters with the MoD is a joke and a fraud on the nation. Yet civil society has remained a silent spectator. The Arun Singh Committee Report continues to gather dust, as it stands consigned to the archives of the Indian government.

Besides the above fault-lines in the Indian security establishment, it is the watertight compartments in which various organs of the state work. Foreign policy is evolved and practised in isolation of national security considerations and consultations. Intelligence agencies are never made accountable and have inadequate interaction with the defence Services.

The writer is a retired Deputy Chief of the Army Staff.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 10 Jun 2011 11:34

That article by Bharat Karnad is more of a whine than anything else....'yeh nahin hai, woh nahin hai.....'. I would like to see these so-called think-tanks and strategic experts to clearly formulate the threat from PLA/PLAAF with bare-bone analysis than whine about how PLA is just going to over-run IA. It is the same story in all such articles and I've not seen anything being added to general body of knowledge. 28-35 divisions in a month using single railway line of far-less number of bogies as compared to normal train? Sure.

As for the defensive mind-set of the IA, well, it seems he has not studied Op.Parakram and yet made the grandiose statements. Too much self flagellation.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 10 Jun 2011 11:41

Just recall the visuals of a commando holding his weapon well above his head and firing at supposedly some terrorists! This visual was repeatedly shown on the American TV, where we saw the drama unfold

ah a classical example of "loss of face" and "log kya kahenge". he was referring to the picture from jewish house wherein a trooper was doing this, probably to test for a response or covering someone else's movement.

http://bindassindia.files.wordpress.com ... _6_420.jpg

to get the proper SWAT look to impress Karnad sir perhaps he should have climbed a ladder and adopted the classical shooting position and exposed his whole body.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 10 Jun 2011 11:53

btw what are his qualifications to be a member of the NSAB and to pontificate on military matters? did he serve in the forces at some point?

to me it seems many of these 'experts' are little better than us 'BR experts' - ie firmly bookish knowledge and vocal in words and demands but no practical experience

but atleast BR being a mobthink forum quickly weeds out the wild ideas and converges on something reasonable than a person out on his own.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 10 Jun 2011 13:15

^^And this when they have access to proper channels and information sources to undertake proper analysis. Shows the bankruptcy of ideas.

pragnya · Post by **pragnya** » 10 Jun 2011 15:43

Singha wrote: to get the proper SWAT look to impress Karnad sir perhaps he should have climbed a ladder and adopted the classical shooting position and exposed his whole body.

just a nitpick. the article you are quoting is authored by Lieut-Gen Harwant Singh (retired Deputy Chief of the Army Staff.) and not Bharat Karnad.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 10 Jun 2011 16:04

heh heh I stand corrected, but my question stands = was the NSG guy doing a wrong thing ? and why is he so worried about what was shown on american tv (I assume he means CNN) ?

VinodTK · Post by **VinodTK** » 11 Jun 2011 01:35

India to hold massive war game this winter

Though army chief General V.K. Singh has denied the existence of a "Cold Start" doctrine, he did acknowledge that it had plans for speedy mobilisation in case a conflict loomed.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 11 Jun 2011 07:01

rohitvats wrote:That article by Bharat Karnad is more of a whine than anything else....'yeh nahin hai, woh nahin hai.....'. I would like to see these so-called think-tanks and strategic experts to clearly formulate the threat from PLA/PLAAF with bare-bone analysis than whine about how PLA is just going to over-run IA. It is the same story in all such articles and I've not seen anything being added to general body of knowledge. 28-35 divisions in a month using single railway line of far-less number of bogies as compared to normal train? Sure.

As for the defensive mind-set of the IA, well, it seems he has not studied Op.Parakram and yet made the grandiose statements. Too much self flagellation.

Rohitvats: I am surprised at your reaction. The article is written for a newspaper, and usually have real estate constraints, so authors have to do a very fine job of expressing a higher level idea and not dwell into the details. But, the obvious critique is, where are the details?

The rapid modernization of the PLA/AF is well on its way. Now, you can nitpick on the quality and/or numbers they can bring to bear, but the fact remains that with increasing modernization of PLA/AF and access to high quality infrastructure presents to India a new dimension of the threat from PRC. A threat recognized by our government and them scrambling to fill the gaps by way of infrastructure and additional procurement of men and arms of our own.

If you have followed Karnad, he is a maximalist in terms of Indian security interests. Thank God, for there are extremely few in the country like him and the country needs men like him. To a person like me, this maximalist position is the most rational and safest position in the neighborhood, we live in. He is not satisfied with a defensive posture on the Tibetan front, he wants India to arm, to be "capable" of being in an offensive position.

Now to your specific critique of the number of divisions that can be transported to the region - along with - the help of the new rail line and other road and air means. There are reports abound of China's capacity to move an entire brigade in a single air lift, operation stride, where they moved 50,000 men and materials over 1600 miles. Moving about 30 divisions in a month is no mean feat, however China would get a capacity to do so is in little doubt. Now, one may nitpick and say, many things and put in holes but the overall message is clear. PRC's investments in infrastructure and their men and weapons, gives them an ability to shorten their logistics tail.

On the whining part, there is good cause. If you have read, Gurmeet Kanwal's book on vision for the Army 2020 and compare, where we are today then I would say there is good cause for these whines in these times of 2-2.50% of GDP spend on defense.

The analysts have a legitimate role to play and even the best of the best from the forces - who do an excellent job of representing their individual force views and objectives, such as Gurmeet Kanwal or Adm Raja Menon or Arun Prakash, fall short in this overall view of strategic security interests. We need more men like him, not less. People who know enough details to not get lost in them yet can connect the dots to other areas of national interests and an ability to articulate them.

Some more whine from another "analyst". Enjoy.

This paper examines the defence reforms process in India. It begins by briefly examining previous efforts at defence reforms and the factors that led to the post-Kargil defence reform. Next it analyzes the Kargil Review Committee and its follow up, the Arun Singh Committee and describes some of the debates therein. While examining the implementation of defence reforms it then argues that despite some incremental progress they have failed the vision of their architects. This is primarily due to bureaucratic politics and the unique features of civil-military relations, which can be more accurately described as an “absent dialogue.” The penultimate section describes recent calls for re-visiting the defence reforms process but argues that without political will this is unlikely. The research methodology relies on interviews with key decision-makers, reports of the Parliamentary Standing committee and other secondary sources.

Failing to Deliver: Post-Crises Defence Reforms in India, 1998-2010

Bala Vignesh · Post by **Bala Vignesh** » 11 Jun 2011 07:06

rohitvats wrote: For example, the arty divisions are supposed to have Prithvi and Brahmos equipped brigades along with rocket artillery and tube artillery. Now, would that make Prithvi/Brahmos strategic or tactical?

Rohit Sir,
The org chart i have, dated to Nov 2007, does not show any of the arty divisions holding Prithvi or Brahmos units. I couldn't find brahmos or prithvi listed in any of the divisional org charts.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 11 Jun 2011 07:14

I have a spider feeling the PLA will go the route of stockpiling (pre-positioning) of POL, weapons, ammo at some points in Tibet same way usa maintains some stockpiles in saudia and kuwait. ofcourse it will be costly to duplicate tanks and trucks which units need in normal stations but it can be done at extra cost and heavy greasing. with this, the logistical issue for a short war becomes getting enough manpower into the area and having them acclamatise for 2 weeks into high alt ops. they could likely setup some huge "thin air tents" in mainland bases and have people live in them for 2 weeks secretly before a planned attack to get the acclamatization thing pre-done before transport planes land in tibet...catch us napping.

we should keep an eye on development of storage stockpiles in tibet and reports of thin air acclamatization facilities in mainland bases on the periphery of tibet. at present they can fly in lots of people using civilian airliners but lack the strategic airlift to fly in lots of military hardware by air - thats why the focus on a revised AN70 based design with a Mtow of 200t...it will take tanks and SAM units. the An124T is also something they might look to purchase in bulk for heavier MBTs and elements of missile launchers and S300 system units.

Shrinivasan · Post by **Shrinivasan** » 11 Jun 2011 09:45

Bala Vignesh wrote:The org chart i have, dated to Nov 2007, does not show any of the arty divisions holding Prithvi or Brahmos units. I couldn't find brahmos or prithvi listed in any of the divisional org charts.

Bala, I beg to disagree, both 40th and 41st hold 1 regiment of Brahmos (861 and 862 i presume) and a 1-2 missile group of Prithvi SS-150 (which might get upgraded).

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 11 Jun 2011 11:21

VinodTK wrote:India to hold massive war game this winter
Though army chief General V.K. Singh has denied the existence of a "Cold Start" doctrine, he did acknowledge that it had plans for speedy mobilisation in case a conflict loomed.

Southern command. Hope to see Arjuns there.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 11 Jun 2011 11:43

Who owns the night?
Every soldier must have an NVD
Letter from the Managing Editor

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 11 Jun 2011 13:33

546 Gentlemen Cadets pass out of Indian Military Academy in Dehradun

Atri · Post by **Atri** » 13 Jun 2011 02:05

Army wants 50% increase in officers

I think I had asked this question once long ago to RayC ji and do not remember of getting a response. If GOI can open new IITs and IIMs why not few more NDAs and IMAs?h

WHy not each state have 1 NDA and few more IMA's... Bliss to enlighten.. IA has been shouting for lack of officers. IA demonstrated that an officer in Indian army leads from front. The participation of commissioned officers in Kargil war was very high, so was their veer-gati ratio vis-a-vis a jawan. Why not replenish them and expand the cadre rapidly?

ManuT · Post by **ManuT** » 13 Jun 2011 02:33

Atri wrote:Army wants 50% increase in officers

I think I had asked this question once long ago to RayC ji and do not remember of getting a response. If GOI can open new IITs and IIMs why not few more NDAs and IMAs?h

WHy not each state have 1 NDA and few more IMA's... Bliss to enlighten.. IA has been shouting for lack of officers. IA demonstrated that an officer in Indian army leads from front. The participation of commissioned officers in Kargil war was very high, so was their veer-gati ratio vis-a-vis a jawan. Why not replenish them and expand the cadre rapidly?

What you think is not the problem, the shortage is because the vacancies are not getting filled up.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 13 Jun 2011 17:04

A 50% increase in the strength of the IA points to sure-shot increase in the strength of IA...so, all the talk about and news about new divisions (+Corps HQ) to be added to the IA are for sure true.....As I said some where else, this decade (2010-2020) will be the game-changer for the Services.

merlin · Post by **merlin** » 13 Jun 2011 17:20

It won't be unless they can attract more people with the requisite qualities *or* dilute their standards.

nachiket · Post by **nachiket** » 13 Jun 2011 17:30

rohitvats wrote:A 50% increase in the strength of the IA points to sure-shot increase in the strength of IA...so, all the talk about and news about new divisions (+Corps HQ) to be added to the IA are for sure true.....As I said some where else, this decade (2010-2020) will be the game-changer for the Services.

Correct me if I am wrong but isn't the current officer shortfall due to lack of applications? If they are having problems filling up the current sanctioned strength, how are they planning to fill that up plus get 50% more officers?

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 13 Jun 2011 18:26

nachiket wrote: Correct me if I am wrong but isn't the current officer shortfall due to lack of applications? If they are having problems filling up the current sanctioned strength, how are they planning to fill that up plus get 50% more officers?

Lack of suitable applications. The rejection rate at the SSB is still well over 90%.

ManuT · Post by **ManuT** » 13 Jun 2011 20:56

Singha wrote:heh heh I stand corrected, but my question stands = was the NSG guy doing a wrong thing ? and why is he so worried about what was shown on american tv (I assume he means CNN) ?

Considering NSG guys have to be able to hit 9 of 10 shots I won't worry about how the NSG guy was holding or shooting his gun or for what purpose, the video does not tell us that.

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 14 Jun 2011 01:12

When was the last time IA had complete officer strength?

I see that the line "lack of interest from youngsters" being repeated ad nauseum ... but is this quantified? If that were the case then why is army opening new OTA in Gaya?

brvarsh · Post by **brvarsh** » 14 Jun 2011 01:40

Who says NSG has to hit 9/10 shots? If there is such a thing then it is when the target(s) are visibly pinned. Its just a nit picking sitting on a couch analyzing why this commando was shooting over the head. Don't you open fire in a direction just to block a escape? May be the movement of the terrorists were such that their exit had to be blocked. May be the terrorist had identified him as a target and you can not expose your body but still open fire in that direction just to deter him. What options were there for NSG that day? The entire building was not hostile so it could not be blown up. There were undetermined number of hostages inside and there locations were not known. What should they have done? used gas? So at the end of the day these SSG trained pigs were sent where they belong.

ManuT · Post by **ManuT** » 14 Jun 2011 02:33

brvarsh wrote:Who says NSG has to hit 9/10 shots? If there is such a thing then it is when the target(s) are visibly pinned. Its just a nit picking sitting on a couch analyzing why this commando was shooting over the head. Don't you open fire in a direction just to block a escape? May be the movement of the terrorists were such that their exit had to be blocked. May be the terrorist had identified him as a target and you can not expose your body but still open fire in that direction just to deter him. What options were there for NSG that day? The entire building was not hostile so it could not be blown up. There were undetermined number of hostages inside and there locations were not known. What should they have done? used gas? So at the end of the day these SSG trained pigs were sent where they belong.

I didn't have to go far for this. This is from BR site, special forces section.
Refer to the last line

The probation grind saps the toughest of recruits and the drop out rate is 50 - 70%. For starters there is a 26-item, 780-metre obstacle course, with a qualifying time of 18 minutes. If a person completes the course in 25 minutes, he is deemed fit. The best do it in less than nine minutes. The obstacles have to do with heights, horizontal gaps and vertical scaling and are difficult to tackle in sequence. As if this is not enough, there's a target shooting session at the end of the obstacle course meant to test the aspirants' performance under severe stress and exhaustion. Those who complete this course are recruited to the unit and sent for advanced training. Some operators are sent to Israel for advanced training. Though it is not known exactly what training they receive, it could probably be the CT/HRT course with Unit 707. The unit also cooperates with Israel's Shabach, for training in VIP protection.

One of the hurdles in a 26-item, 780 meter obstacle course. The qualifying time is 18 minutes but experienced operators take around 9 minutes.

In the Combat Room Shoot, the combatant enters a dark room, adjusts to the darkness and engages the target with either a torch light or a compatible laser image intensifier - all within 3 seconds. And not just in darkness but under the strobe lights of a discotheque as well, which are some of the most difficult shots to take. "We train them to take only head shots. And two at a go - the double tap system. It's to ensure neutralisation of the target. In the close hostage-terrorist situations we face there is little scope for body shots," says Colonel Dutta. To hone shooting skills the training centre has an Electronic Combat Shooting Range built at a cost of over Rs.1 crore. Divided into 11 zones and spread over 400 metres, a recruit has to cover this distance in just six minutes, 30 seconds and fire at 29 targets along the way.

The target exposure time is between two and three seconds and the targets are of all kinds - vertically rising, popping out, moving and rotating. The faster a person engages the target the more points he scores. It is not just non-reactive targets that they practice against. In twin room shooting, rival combatants enter contiguous rooms and watch each other's movements on a screen. They are supposed to neutralise each other by shooting at the screen. The exercise test the combatants' response time and accuracy under near-field conditions. The men are also put through a battle inoculation program where they have to stand right next to the target while one of their partners shoots at it. "They have to become used to live bullets flying under their noses.

Also the person shooting is conscious that if he misses by even a couple of inches the bullet is going to hit his partner." says an instructor. They don't wear the kavach either, a bullet-proof vest, designed by Colonel Dutta himself. The vest can withstand an AK-47 or a 7.62mm carbine shot at point blank range. Members of the unit are assigned partners soon after completion of basic training and they train and even go on leave together. But as crack professionals, they are under orders to shoot their partner if he makes a single threatening step detrimental to the security of a VIP. On an average, a commando fires 2000 rounds of live ammunition during practice sessions throughout the year. This is apart from the two months that units have to spend in alert status and for whom it's a daily stint at the range. "I did more firing in a week of alert status than in my entire 10-year stay in the Army," says an NSG Officer. On average a person fires close to 14,000 rounds over a period of two months in alert status. The target strike rate has to be above 85% for a person to remain in the force.

(In trying to click the quote button, I might have clicked the little red ! button, in error, so request to mods is to ignore it)

brvarsh · Post by **brvarsh** » 14 Jun 2011 05:11

Thanks BRFite for the paragraph, I understand it. But that does not mean to kill 9 terrorists he has to only use 10 bullets. What I mean is people questioning around firing over the head possibly on oblivion. This is all situational and any analysis done should keep that in mind.

ManuT · Post by **ManuT** » 14 Jun 2011 07:02

brvarsh wrote:Thanks BRFite for the paragraph, I understand it. But that does not mean to kill 9 terrorists he has to only use 10 bullets. What I mean is people questioning around firing over the head possibly on oblivion. This is all situational and any analysis done should keep that in mind.

I think we are saying the same thing.

ManuT wrote:Considering NSG guys have to be able to hit 9 of 10 shots I won't worry about how the NSG guy was holding or shooting his gun or for what purpose, the video does not tell us that.

Just to clarify, the article from which kind of raised the question, is on the previous page.
Regards

ks_sachin · Post by **ks_sachin** » 14 Jun 2011 11:35

rohitvats wrote:^^^Yes, the regiment spread is correct. Exactly as per the news report which I had read. IIRC, the third unit is from Sikh or Sikh LI.

Bihar at present....

Bala Vignesh · Post by **Bala Vignesh** » 14 Jun 2011 11:54

16th bihar to be precise.

chetak · Post by **chetak** » 14 Jun 2011 11:56

Bala Vignesh wrote:16th bihar to be precise.

Edited

Thanks onlee.

Bala Vignesh · Post by **Bala Vignesh** » 14 Jun 2011 12:17

-----Self Deleted-----

rajrang · Post by **rajrang** » 14 Jun 2011 12:41

ShauryaT wrote:
rohitvats wrote:That article by Bharat Karnad is more of a whine than anything else....'yeh nahin hai, woh nahin hai.....'. I would like to see these so-called think-tanks and strategic experts to clearly formulate the threat from PLA/PLAAF with bare-bone analysis than whine about how PLA is just going to over-run IA. It is the same story in all such articles and I've not seen anything being added to general body of knowledge. 28-35 divisions in a month using single railway line of far-less number of bogies as compared to normal train? Sure.

As for the defensive mind-set of the IA, well, it seems he has not studied Op.Parakram and yet made the grandiose statements. Too much self flagellation.
Rohitvats: I am surprised at your reaction. The article is written for a newspaper, and usually have real estate constraints, so authors have to do a very fine job of expressing a higher level idea and not dwell into the details. But, the obvious critique is, where are the details?

The rapid modernization of the PLA/AF is well on its way. Now, you can nitpick on the quality and/or numbers they can bring to bear, but the fact remains that with increasing modernization of PLA/AF and access to high quality infrastructure presents to India a new dimension of the threat from PRC. A threat recognized by our government and them scrambling to fill the gaps by way of infrastructure and additional procurement of men and arms of our own.

If you have followed Karnad, he is a maximalist in terms of Indian security interests. Thank God, for there are extremely few in the country like him and the country needs men like him. To a person like me, this maximalist position is the most rational and safest position in the neighborhood, we live in. He is not satisfied with a defensive posture on the Tibetan front, he wants India to arm, to be "capable" of being in an offensive position.

Now to your specific critique of the number of divisions that can be transported to the region - along with - the help of the new rail line and other road and air means. There are reports abound of China's capacity to move an entire brigade in a single air lift, operation stride, where they moved 50,000 men and materials over 1600 miles. Moving about 30 divisions in a month is no mean feat, however China would get a capacity to do so is in little doubt. Now, one may nitpick and say, many things and put in holes but the overall message is clear. PRC's investments in infrastructure and their men and weapons, gives them an ability to shorten their logistics tail.

On the whining part, there is good cause. If you have read, Gurmeet Kanwal's book on vision for the Army 2020 and compare, where we are today then I would say there is good cause for these whines in these times of 2-2.50% of GDP spend on defense.

The analysts have a legitimate role to play and even the best of the best from the forces - who do an excellent job of representing their individual force views and objectives, such as Gurmeet Kanwal or Adm Raja Menon or Arun Prakash, fall short in this overall view of strategic security interests. We need more men like him, not less. People who know enough details to not get lost in them yet can connect the dots to other areas of national interests and an ability to articulate them.

Some more whine from another "analyst". Enjoy.

This paper examines the defence reforms process in India. It begins by briefly examining previous efforts at defence reforms and the factors that led to the post-Kargil defence reform. Next it analyzes the Kargil Review Committee and its follow up, the Arun Singh Committee and describes some of the debates therein. While examining the implementation of defence reforms it then argues that despite some incremental progress they have failed the vision of their architects. This is primarily due to bureaucratic politics and the unique features of civil-military relations, which can be more accurately described as an “absent dialogue.” The penultimate section describes recent calls for re-visiting the defence reforms process but argues that without political will this is unlikely. The research methodology relies on interviews with key decision-makers, reports of the Parliamentary Standing committee and other secondary sources.
Failing to Deliver: Post-Crises Defence Reforms in India, 1998-2010

Very well said!

Recently I tried to echo similar sentiments to yours, though on a smaller scale than the 30 divisions that BK has referred to, and got attacked by our BR colleague, was convicted of "dhoti shivering" - and spent my limited time entangled in the details of such possibilities including acclimatization. I did not have the time or eloquence to write in the way you have. As you have pointed out unfortunately "maximalist" view points are not taken seriously in India. I wonder if this is why India has got invaded repeatedly throughout history. Do you know how many days it took China to move 50,000 men over 1600 miles. Was altitude a factor?

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 14 Jun 2011 13:42

ShauryaT wrote:Rohitvats: I am surprised at your reaction. The article is written for a newspaper, and usually have real estate constraints, so authors have to do a very fine job of expressing a higher level idea and not dwell into the details. But, the obvious critique is, where are the details?

The rapid modernization of the PLA/AF is well on its way. Now, you can nitpick on the quality and/or numbers they can bring to bear, but the fact remains that with increasing modernization of PLA/AF and access to high quality infrastructure presents to India a new dimension of the threat from PRC. A threat recognized by our government and them scrambling to fill the gaps by way of infrastructure and additional procurement of men and arms of our own.

You have read my comment on the article by BK in a wrong way.

I'm not questioning the threat from PLA but the series of articles which seem to parrot the same line without giving any sanity check on what they are writing. This example of ~30 odd divisions in a month using example of a single railway line is prime example of that. Now, ask yourself this question - the IA has same number of divisions and some more. Can the entire IA move 1000+kms using a single railway line in a month? And what about logistics to support at least 300K soldiers in the region?

It is this oft-repeated cliches that I have problem with. All it does is create a scare scenario and then the same inflicts everyone who reads it and then forms a opinion on how PLA is going to simply over-run the Indians.

Now to your specific critique of the number of divisions that can be transported to the region - along with - the help of the new rail line and other road and air means. There are reports abound of China's capacity to move an entire brigade in a single air lift, operation stride, where they moved 50,000 men and materials over 1600 miles. Moving about 30 divisions in a month is no mean feat, however China would get a capacity to do so is in little doubt. Now, one may nitpick and say, many things and put in holes but the overall message is clear. PRC's investments in infrastructure and their men and weapons, gives them an ability to shorten their logistics tail.

All the above is the prime example of oft-repeated phrases becoming the truth - and something which gets parroted by Indian media as well - including the like of BK. All one has is some article here and there and thats it - suddenly PLA is going to emerge from behind every rock along the LAC.

Everyone seems to take the Chinese reports at face value - have you tried questioning that 50K number and how is it possible to achieve that? Airlifting 50K soldiers@150 soldiers per airplane will require 333 aircraft? You think China/PLAAF has that many aircraft? And BTW, that 150 troops per a/c is for A320 type a/c...military transporters are bad at these numbers. So, number of a/c will be still more. Even uncle will be stretched to achieve these numbers with his huge airlift fleet.

The best assessment that I'm aware of is PLA's ability to move one infantry division at one go....which itself is a formidable capability and which IMO, will stretch them. They still lack true strategic airlift capability.

As for PLA getting capacity to move 30-divisions in a month - I'm sure in due course of time they can do that. But not by using one single railway line. And they are not going to surprise India - if that is the import of the one-month figure. Chinese could take 6months to build up forces in Tibet and it will not matter. Unless,we have guts to pre-empt any build-up by taking unlilateral action.

We mobilized the entire IA in less than that period and had them sitting on western border in Operation Parakram. The bigger deal is to sustain these troops in forward areas and prepare logistics to fight a full scale war once these formations land up in their respective locations. And here, for the Chinese, they will have to forward store everything in Tibet - there is no short-cut to this part.

On the whining part, there is good cause. If you have read, Gurmeet Kanwal's book on vision for the Army 2020 and compare, where we are today then I would say there is good cause for these whines in these times of 2-2.50% of GDP spend on defense.

There is no disputing the above fact. My point of contention is different.