Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

[shiv]

Hi Shiv -

I will take a stab.. (Take it for what ever it worth - I will not go in details) (From what I know with basic physics principles and reasonable guess)

WRT to U235 (or HEU) , the interesting quantity (for Pak) is about 15 Kg. They can't make it less. OTOH with this much (or a little more) of U the probability that they can make it go, is something we should worry about and keep our eyes open. (IOW, it could be that much less, even with primitive triggers)


Smaller amount (or Pu ) is highly unlikely. (It is like compressing water with hands/fingers without letting the water slip through your fingers).

Thanks

[GuruPrabhu]

This is the problem with studies of bum design. It starts out simple and before you know it, the whole thing is more complicated than your SHQ.

Critical mass is not a magic number, but a derivative of the equation of state (EOS). Folks may recall the EOS for an ideal gas: PV = nRT. But, nothing is ideal and every system has a complicated EOS - U or Poo at *extremely* high pressure is especially complicated.

Isentropic compression simply means a decrease in the volume of a system such that there is no change in its entropy. It is essentially the same as an adiabatic compression in which no heat leaves the system. (Delta-entropy = heat/temperature). Zero heat = no entropy change, i.e., isentropic.

The critical mass of interest has to be calculated at the densities achieved at the *end* of the compression. Hence, there is no magic number -- it depends on how high a density one can achieve.

For our purpose, it is safe to assume that no green paint brush weilding packee will ever come near a Hugoniot curve for Poo.

Here is a primer: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rankine%E2 ... conditions

For those interested in more masala: https://www.llnl.gov/str/Holmes.html

In case we think only uncle has this sort of fun, here is a fairly recent desi paper:

http://journals.cambridge.org/action/di ... aid=210342

Here's one from 1992 -- RC is talking about Hugoniot curves among other things: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/conten ... a752356951

[shiv]

For those interested in more masala: https://www.llnl.gov/str/Holmes.html

This is a great link for people like me who know nothing. Thanks.

But back to Pakistan now..

[Gagan]

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons and Missile Storage Sites

North Pakistan


Central Pakistan


Southern Pakistan

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Havelian Cantt & Missile Complex





Possible Missile Bunkers: 1-6











___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
N Weapons & Missile Storage Kamra


___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

N Weapons Manufacture & Storage, Wah



___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Sargodha Missile and Ammo Storage Depot


































__________________________________________________________________________________________________________

N Weapons Storage, Quetta














__________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Khuzdhar Missile Complex












__________________________________________________________________________________________________________

N Weapons Storage, Karachi

[Ravi Karumanchiri]

^^^^ GREAT PICS GAGAN!

(... and thanks for switching lat/long format to 'Decimal Degrees'.)

[shiv]

What bomb design did China give to Pakistan?
This link says that the particular design was used in China's 4th nucelar test and was a warhead that could be fitted on a missile. It also says that it was a design that used "a nealry solid sphere of enriched Uranium with a tiny hollow core surrounded by a tamper and high explosives. Such a design would require about 15 kg of enriched Uranium.

G.Parthasarathy on the other hand says in the following link:
http://www.southasiamonitor.org/index.p ... &Itemid=75

It is now acknowledged that by 1983 China supplied Pakistan with enough enriched uranium for assembling two weapons, together with the designs for a 25-kiloton bomb. China thereafter provided Pakistan with ring magnets and reengineered, more efficient inverters for uranium enrichment.

More significantly, this cooperation continued even after China signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT). During the past two decades, China has collaborated with Pakistan in the construction of plutonium reactors and reprocessing plants in Khushab for manufacturing lighter and more lethal nuclear weapons. These weapons are designed for delivery by ballistic and cruise missiles of Chinese origin, capable of targeting population centres all across India.

There is evidence to establish that with the passage of time, China has supplied Pakistan with a range of nuclear weapons designs. We are all asked to believe by the Americans that Dr A.Q. Khan single-handed transferred nuclear weapons designs and knowhow on centrifuge uranium enrichment technology to North Korea, Libya and Iran.

A list of Chinese nuclear tests is below and the 4th test is listed as follows:
http://archive.greenpeace.org/comms/nuk ... ead11.html

27/10/66 atmospheric 12 kt

Of course the question remains - what other designs did Chinese fliends hand their beloved plostitute?

[GuruPrabhu]

x-posted from Indian nuclear thread:

Let me quote the last few lines from an old message (from 20th century ) , which I thought was very good, and it, justifiably, received many kudos.

Link:<link>

I suppose this topic has been discussed to death, but I have had questions about the "Pu sample from Chagai" issue. Has anyone who is commenting (I don't mean on BRF) ever seen this data? Finding Pu in a U weapon test should not be unusual -- when you bombard U-238 (supposedly 5-8% in HEU) with neutrons you are bound to produce U-239, which decays to Neptunium which decays to Pu-239. After all, this is the basis of making maal in a reactor.

So, black lentils will depend on the isotopic content of Pu that was measured from Chagai. The fingerprint would be different based on whether one started with a U or a Pu weapon. I have never seen an analysis like this. Just saying Pu was detected doesn't prove anything.

[Amber G.]

^^I am curious too, so would like to hear from those in the know..
After all, if physical samples are collected, isotopic content could certainly be fingerprinted using NAA..and no doubts will remain.

[Gagan]

I haven't heard this video in full yet, have just started viewing it, but here it is because it talks about the possibility of a Dirty Bomb Attack.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nu4l9Er5BDU

The real stuff starts after 5:00 after the intro bakwaas.

Featured Speaker
The Hon. Jane Harman
Chair, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment
Committee on Homeland Security
U.S. House of Representatives

Moderator
Peter Bergen
Co-Director, Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative
New America Foundation

[shiv]

Once again I went through this entire thread and new refs to asses the amount of fissile materia that Pakistan might have.

Very approximately it could be 120 to 150 Kg of Plutonium and maybe 2000 kg HEU. Of course these are guesstimates and the actual figure could be higher or lower.

Theer have been various estimates of the amount of HEU Pakistan will need for a bomb. Those estimates vary from 15-25 kg. (Xerox Khan stated that China gave 50 kg HEU - enough for 2 bombs) I would take 20 kg as a reasonable compromise.

In 2011 - with this material Pakistan may have enough fissile material for about 120 bombs or so. (My estimate)

The questions that arise (to me) are - are these all assembled and ready? In they are - they are unlikely to be deployed and ready to fire. Which means they are probably stored at some place where technicians and engineers can do the mating of warhead with delivery system. More likely - all may not be assembled. Perhaps half are. Just a guess.

[Gagan]

They've reportedly given two bombs to KSA along with pakistan modified Chinese M-18s (Shaheen missiles)
They might have given more to KSA.
They might be holding some within Pakistan as KSA reserve.

Kamra is where they hold the maal for KSA. That airbase reportedly has KSA transport aircraft based there to take weapons if tensions rise on KSA's borders.

[Gagan]

Shiv saar, GP, Amber G gurus.
How expensive is it to maintain N weapons?

How frequently do they have to service the bombs?
Do they have to change the cores after a few years because they deteriorate after a time period due to decay?
How effective can old weapons be after say a decade or other similar time period?

How are bums stored? Do they need specialized Airconditioned or atmospheric controlled clean environment to store them?

Many such questions, could you add to this and answer them please?

[Lalmohan]

gagan

perhaps you are asking rhetorical questions, however - if you think about the complex machinery involved in a bomb, it will have batteries, explosives and electro-mechanical components, plus the core itself, which will be radio-active and need suitable management, perhaps power, cooling, air filtering, etc., etc.. there is therefore a finite time for the warhead components to remain useable and it will also require significant servicing in quite controlled environments

one hopes that the paquis have such facilities, if only for them to not rad themselves up and any unfortunate mango's in the area

[shiv]

Shiv saar, GP, Amber G gurus.
How expensive is it to maintain N weapons?

How frequently do they have to service the bombs?
Do they have to change the cores after a few years because they deteriorate after a time period due to decay?
How effective can old weapons be after say a decade or other similar time period?

How are bums stored? Do they need specialized Airconditioned or atmospheric controlled clean environment to store them?

Many such questions, could you add to this and answer them please?

Gagan very little of this information is shared in public. Here is some information.
http://www.fas.org/rlg/dev_no_test.htm

Although other nations have not indicated how they maintain
their nuclear weapons, the U.S. in recent years has been
quite open(55) about its procedures, which involve the dis-
mantling of 11 (footnote says:The magic number, 11, is cho-
sen to provide 70% probability of detecting a flaw that
affects 10% of the weapons in the stockpile.
)weapons of each type, taken at random from
the stockpile, every year(56) with close inspection for po-
tential flaws. High resolution radiography is used as well.
The non-nuclear components such as batteries, valves, fuzes,
detonators for the high explosive are all tested, and if a
flaw is found, a wider inspection for that fault in the in-
spection may be conducted.

Age-related problems will not affect all weapons of the same
type at the same instant, and so there is ordinarily time to
remedy the problem by refitting a component of the same or
of an improved type. In some cases, such as a battery or
capacitor, the system can be tested initially and frequently
after installation, in order to ensure that one has not in-
troduced a new problem.

The fissile materials are an exception, because to subject
them to high-explosive or more severe shock, is to destroy
them. This would be no different from that of testing a
valve or power device driven by high explosive, in which one
obtains information about the device no longer in existence,
but also about the population from which that was drawn.
Worse, to test them in the operational configuration means
that one will obtain a nuclear yield of a kiloton, plus or
minus a factor 10. But this means that one must greatly
change the environment of the tested fissile "pit", for in-
stance, in order not to violate a CTBT.(57)

One could in this way trephine a sector of the pit and fire
it with close observation of its internal surface, but with-
out approaching criticality.(58) Alternatively, when the
surface or the dimensions of the pit are no longer well
within the variation accepted thus far in the stockpile, one
would remanufacture the pit to the original specifications.
One way for a nation to take steps that actually imperil the
safety and reliability of their nuclear weapon stockpile
would be to make changes in the design or processes by which
the untestable items are fabricated. We judge that the most
reliable stockpile can be maintained by periodic remanufac-
ture (in addition to remanufacture in case of discovered
problems), using processes that from the point of view of
the material are within the range defined in initial pro-
duction. Changing materials or processes and relying on ex-
tensive computation in order to show the equivalence (or
improvement!) seems a lot riskier, and with potential bene-
fits that are not worth the risk.(59)

However, a nation might instead try to maintain a safe and
reliable stockpile by what has been termed(60)
"custodianship" (CS) analogous to the preservation and re-
newing of precious works of art. If the U.S. maintains the
capability of remanufacture, the difference between SBSS and
CS may involve the decision in SBSS to permit somewhat dete-
riorated weapons to remain in the stockpile, in view of the
SBSS-based confidence that performance would be degraded by
no more than 5% on average-- just to take an arbitrary num-
ber. Under CS, weapons would need to be remanufactured at
an earlier stage.

That remanufacture is not an inferior option is inherent in
the Congressional testimony of the President of the Sandia
National Laboratories(61) "Ideally, we would like to train
our junior weapon design engineers alongside experienced en-
gineers, but this will not be possible during a decades-long
hiatus of no weapon development. The Russian laboratories,
by contrast, will be able to pass along their critical
weapon design skills to a new generation under their an-
nounced plans to rebuild thousands of weapons each year."

Of course, the combination of manufacture within initial
specifications, with understanding and computation would
provide still more assurance of reliability and safety, and
that is a reasonable approach if it can be afforded and if
strong management prevents changing the design or process of
the untestable parts.

[Amber G.]

Shiv saar, GP, Amber G gurus.
How expensive is it to maintain N weapons?

How frequently do they have to service the bombs?
Do they have to change the cores after a few years because they deteriorate after a time period due to decay?
How effective can old weapons be after say a decade or other similar time period?

How are bums stored? Do they need specialized Airconditioned or atmospheric controlled clean environment to store them?

Many such questions, could you add to this and answer them please?

Gagan - First thanks for lot of hard work and those maps/photos are really very nice.

From what I know/guess etc...here is my take:

The old cliche U235 is hard to get (if you already don't have it) but easy to make a bomb while Pu is easier to get (smuggle etc) but hard to make a bomb. For Paki perspective we should worry mainly for U235.. (Give more resources to monitor and be prepared for)

So short answer - For U235, there is not much to maintain.. Half life is in hundreds of million years and if the quality of maal (isotopic distribution) changes, it does not really change much. Half-life of of H3 etc is much shorter but even without a boost, fission can do lot of damage.
(Without going in details, neutron initiators, neutron reflectors ityadi, technically are no big deal (to maintain etc) for crude bum)

One should note that even in 1945, US did not think that it needed to do *any* test for it's U-bomb (they did not want to waste it on test, and were confident that it will work)

They need something like (min) 15-20Kg but rest does not need "high maintenance"

For Pu, smallest change in any of the conditions.. will make it fizzle...

[Amber G.]

This often repeated estimation that since Pakis have X amount of U/Pu, and since theoretically (or because it can be done) one can make a bum using Y amount they have X/Y number of bums made me think of an age old question ...

Take a Paki team (or 6) taking , say a math Olympiad (6 question). Now since all the contestants have a pen and paper, and all they have to do is just to write the correct answer (which the pen can do by making a contact with the paper) to get 7 points allocated to each question; and each one could get a perfect score of 42. (with a team score of 252)... I know US teams have done that (each getting a perfect score) in the past.

Yet, most (as in virtually all) get an absolute zero. (If you add all the team scores in all the years Pakis have appeared in the Olympiads they barely make a 2 digit number...

Now before one goes on and tell me not to bring math here... Here is an old post in BRF
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... cs#p912131
Let me quote it here:

Just for fun ... - One problem from recent Olympiad - Mentioned here only because there is so much interest in BRF about nuclear fission...

(Using a simple model where nucleus is thought of rigid nucleons packed together)

Fission is a nuclear process in which a nucleus splits into smaller parts (lighter nuclei). Suppose that a nucleus with A nucleons splits into only two equal parts.

a) Calculate the total kinetic energy of the fission products kin E when the centers of two lighter nuclei are separated by the distance d = 2R( where R = (A/ 2)
is their radius. The large nucleus was initially at rest.
b) Assume that d = 2R and evaluate the expression for kin E obtained in part a) for A=
100, 150, 200 and 250 (express the results in units of MeV). Estimate the values of A for
which fission is possible in the model described above?

A here is number of nucleons - for Uranium bum - it is = 235..
((Using a simple model where nucleus is thought of rigid nucleons packed together, etc...))

(Any guess what TSP team got in the above problem? )
BTW there are some nice problems in the phyzzzzx dhaga at present

[Amber G.]

Someone brought to my attention this press clip posted here because of obvious relevance ..
...NNSA (The National Nuclear Security Administration) which has awarded $25 million to the UC Berkeley to support the nation's nuclear nonproliferation mission through the training and education of experts in the nuclear security field.

The list contains a few names which people will recognize .. (including people who were admired/maligned/warned/banned in BRF ) .. From the release:

>>>It will focus on the hands-on training of undergraduate and graduate students in the fields of nuclear physics, nuclear and radiation chemistry, nuclear engineering, nuclear instrumentation and public policy. The consortium's nickname is SUCCESS PIPELINE, which stands for Seven Universities Coordinating Coursework and Experience from Student to Scientist in a Partnership for Identifying and Preparing Educated Laboratory-Integrated Nuclear Experts...

“There is a critical need to protect our nation's security by keeping nuclear materials and technology from falling into the wrong hands, particularly as more countries, including China, India and Russia, look to expand their nuclear power structure to satisfy the demand for energy,....We need to train the next generation of nuclear science and security experts to succeed the professionals in the field who are now retiring."

The researchers and students in the consortium will collaborate with four DOE laboratories: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories...
NNSA (according to them) " maintains and enhances the safety, security, reliability, and performance of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing; reduces the global danger from weapons of mass destruction; provides the U.S. Navy with safe and effective nuclear propulsion; and responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the U.S. and abroad."

Link:Here

[Vinit]

Question regarding a possible Pak response to the Arihant (this cuts across multiple threads - I thought this was the best place for this).

I assume that the Arihant and her sister ships, when on patrol, would carry active missiles, viz. ready-to-fire missiles (subject to safeguards) with mounted warheads. If not, the whole concept of boomer induced deterrence goes away.

Pak has so far insisted that their nuke weapon cores are kept separate from the weapons themselves, and those in turn are separate from the missiles.

Would the deployment of ready to use nukes on Indian nuke submarines lead Pak to prepare ready-to-use missiles, with warheads mounted? If yes, I can see changes to the entire nuclear readiness/usage/defence doctrines in the sub-continent.

[shiv]

AmberG - the need for robust maths, physics (and chemistry and engineering) for making nukes and the education that is needed to perpetuate that knowledge are good points that you make. It is not clear that the Pakis have gone very far in these areas - but there may be some training in China and some cross pollination from NoKo.

But that makes me wonder (as I alluded to earlier) how much of the Paki arsenal is bluff?

I mean I know damn well that "one must not underestimate the Pakis" and "One must not underestimate the help that the Chinese give". But we spend our entire lives "not underestimating" anything. Are we also looking at the other side of the coin? Could we perhaps be overestimating some things while we dhoti-shiver with the infallible wisdom of "do not underestimate"?

I am hardly a mathematician but I find the ratio of "Do not underestimate" versus "Do not overestimate" to be very high. Every person who thinks he is wise will advise me and say 'Do not underestimate"

For arguments' sake let us say we are overestimating the Paki nuclear arsenal. What is the evidence for this?

In a word, none.

There is plenty of circumstantial "evidence" that Pakistanis habitually bluff everyone else and each other about a huge variety of things including some vitally important things related to the survival of Pakistan as a country. Form this one might infer that there must be a degree of bluff regarding their nuclear capability as well.

As an example the Pakistan army routinely fluffs up the "India threat" to make sure that they are well funded, well armed and have the support of a scared population. Could the "US/Israel/India will de nuke us" scare be similarly based on a bluff? One wonders. There is, in my view a definite degree of bluff regarding the Paki nuclear arsenal. Just how much they are bluffing would be interesting to figure out. Is nook noodity relative, if not absolute?

[shiv]

I am certain that Pakistan maintains a set of ready warheads. But I don't think they sit around in missiles or in air bases because of the risk of theft. I think they are all in one or more central stores.

[Gagan]

Shiv, AmberG gurus,
It seems to me that we can be reasonably certain that:
1. The pakistanis don't have the scientific ability to design a N weapon, to produce the material in the requisite enrichment levels, and then to actually produce a finished product that will perform as predicted or designed, and then that design being resilient enough to be missile mounted or air delivered.
2. The question then is the extent of Chinese help in this regard, or help by North Korea, via China.

So they set up a centrifuge operation, where it is believed that they enriched 'some' Uranium. I have long suspected by what reports are and what people have written here on this forum that what they have enriched is in no way weapons grade. It might be weapons usable (lower level of enrichment). However this point is to be noted that they were given enough for two weapons (plus a little extra to allow for some wastage during manufacturing). So a number of two possible weapons come forward.

They have had a Plutonium program in parallel. They were producing fuel rods for Karachi KANUPP at Chashma-Kundian Fuel Fabrication Plant. The french were building a reprocessing facility there, and then the french pulled out, but recently the chinese have stepped in to complete it.
The Pakistanis also have a chinese built New Labs Reprocessing plant at PINSTECH at Nilore, Rawalpindi where they have been reprocessing reactor grade Pu.

Their behaviour during the weapon(s) test at Chagai was suspicious to say the least, and it appears that the weapon(s) were brought in from outside the country to test. (NoKo military transport planes at Rawalpindi, C-130 flight from Rawalpindi to Quetta or Dalbandin, and then by helo). It is possible that LK Advani had some intel that told them that the Pakistanis had tried to test one and had failed, which is why he was taunting them to 'test'. It seems that the Chinese tested one for them.

Coming to where things stand today.

They have been stated to possess over 100 bombs. They have ramped up production and are on their way to 200.
So do they have a Pu design? Do they have a U-Pu Hybrid (WTF is it anyways-semi enriched U tamper)?

My question is, what is the estimate of the numbers, and how much truth is there in these figures brandied about in the media from 'leaks'.
Are the Pakistanis sure that what they are producing will actually go off? Have the Chinese rectified things for them?
If they have reposed faith in Pu, what happened to their centrifuge program? Is it still active?

I wonder if after all this tamasha, we will find out that they were Nuke Noode after all, and all this bravardo was a fig leaf to protect sovereignty.

[Lalmohan]

it is entirely possible that the threat of puke bums is hyped up to put India off-balance and not 'get aggressive' with the TSPA. it could be one of the backdoor CBM's that unkil is scamming to appease the jarnails
if unkil was genuinely worried about active puke bums, wouldn't he have done an eye-rack by now?

[GuruPrabhu]

^^^^ I keep trying to bring the topic to the real issue. TSP has zero credibility in weapon tech. So, it makes zero sense to study bakwaas about how much Poo they have etc. Lalmohan's point is certainly more relevant than any numerical count of paki bums based on dubious data.

Paki nukes are a concept. It will help more if people analyzed the 3.5 backers of the concept. Analyzing it in technical terms is foolhardy. Remember, paki nukes are a theoretical concept and ask yourself who is unnerved by this theory.

Beyond the theory, China may have actually transferred some hardware also. That info is not available via technical analysis.

[Gagan]

What I find intriguing is.

What do these guys mean when they say that Pakistan has 100 bums and are on their way to 200 bums?

Any bum in Pakistan, that hasn't been Made in China, by chinese engineers is not going to go nuclear.

I suspect, that what these guys have is fizzles, but when they go off, they'll just contaminate the immediate area. The US, and various authors have repeatedly been talking about the threat of a dirty bomb coming into the hands of the terrorists from Pakistan. I think that reference is to Pakistan's N-bombs only.

TSP has zero credibility in weapon tech. So, it makes zero sense to study bakwaas about how much Poo they have etc.

Paki nukes are a concept.

Beyond the theory, China may have actually transferred some hardware also. That info is not available via technical analysis.

Exactly, and what technical analysis we have on open source, are full of holes. I think the intention is to obfuscate and draw a curtain on the real proceedings.
There will be suspicions based on analysis by people who understand these matters. And what appears on the media is usually untrustworthy on a subject that is this hush hush.

That 100 bums now, and onto 200, is one of those urban legends it seems.

[Gagan]

Or the real story could be something like this:

Pakistan invested in the Uranium route initially, because AQ Khan said that they could get enriched Uranium in a jiffy, and then all they needed was training in Chinese Nuclear Industry and a bomb design and they would be able to build it.

That plan fizzled out, because I suspect they couldn't get to the required enrichment levels.

But the Pu route was always there, it had met a dead end with Samar Mubarakmand's team's efforts.

So today here is what is happening:
1. Pakistan is producing enough reactor grade Pu, they are still setting up more military nuclear reactors.
2. They have two reprocessing plants in place.
3. They need technical finesse, Chinese hand holding, and eventually transfer of critical technologies, machinery from China to build a successful Pu warhead.
4. The US today again needs Pakistan like it did back in the 80s. The Pakistanis used that oppertunity to build on the Uranium route.

Point I want to make is, they might be using the US's situation today to finally become a nuclear weapons power with China's help and using the Pu route. They seem to be putting all the elements in place.
Now if the legend is maintained, that they are already a nuclear power, then attempts to clamp down on them if they try to get Pu tech too might be less intense.

Need to watch out for movements in this regard. They surely are going for that Pu route today.

The chinese might have given them a few bums as safeguard for the time being.

[Lalmohan]

^^^ or the chinese store and maintain the bums in pakistan, essentially as Pak-Delivered-Chini-Owned (PDCO) weapons

[Amber G.]

Some of us monitor PAEC (Paki Atomic Agency etc.) news..who is being trained in science (fairly easy to keep track as there are so few of them)... so like Gagangi let me also post a picture relating to this..

PACE Training in Action:



The picture, of course, is training given by PAEC about mushrooms (not mushroom clouds, just mushrooms) is something comes from this google alert I got: (NO I am not making it up, just look at the link below)
http://www.paec.gov.pk/paec-news.htm#p-ma11-news2

NIFA arranged Mushroom Cultivation Training for Ladies

Mushroom project team at PAEC's Nuclear Institute for Food and Agriculture (NIFA), Peshawar, reserved its 3 designated training of the year for household ladies which was participated by 27 individuals hailing from different socio-economic backgrounds. The participants were trained practically in all stages of mushroom cultivation encompassing layout of the farm, substrate preparation, sterilization and spawning of the compost.

The ladies appreciated this low-cost but profitable technology and vowed to adopt it in their houses. Keeping in view the utility and suitability of mushroom cultivation for women, the participants were desirous of having some more training workshops by NIFA for ladies.

You may also like to check out all those new PAEC scientists .. getting PhD in... (all in Agricultural Biotechnology.. or subjects like that)

[shiv]

The Pakis have some bums. Exactly how those bums came throws up several possibilities. "Pindigenous development" is the one that is claimed to be reaching world's fifth largest arsenal. Those numbers seem wildly exaggerated. Even the calculations of fissile material assuming that everything (centrifuges and all) have worked fine do not add up to those numbers.

There is a curious dysjunction between the "scaremongering" reports of Paki weapons and the casual manner in which most governments seem to remain unworried.

[shiv]

The picture, of course, is training given by PAEC about mushrooms (not mushroom clouds, just mushrooms) is something comes from this google alert I got: (NO I am not making it up, just look at the link below)
http://www.paec.gov.pk/paec-news.htm#p-ma11-news2

Interesting link AmberG

Chairman's Visit Abroad

Dr. Ansar Parvez, Chairman, PAEC (who is also Chairman of IAEA Board of Governors
for the term September 2010 to September 2011) proceeded to Vienna (Austria) on 20-03-2011 to chair Special Meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors held on 21 March, 2011 to discuss report of DG, IAEA related to the recent nuclear accident in Japan.

Visit of Foreigner to Pakistan

Dr. Richard William, Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de maize y trigo (CIMMYT) (USA) visited NIA, Tandojam from 6-9 March, 2011 as a member of the National Agricultural Research Center (NARC) Wheat programme team.

[GuruPrabhu]

^^^ What is it with the TFTA folks that makes them attach "USA" to enhance echandee?

Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de maize y trigo (CIMMYT) (USA) ...

This center is in Mexico, not US

[GuruPrabhu]

Or the real story could be something like this:

Pakistan invested in the Uranium route initially, because AQ Khan said that they could get enriched Uranium in a jiffy, and then all they needed was training in Chinese Nuclear Industry and a bomb design and they would be able to build it.

That plan fizzled out, because I suspect they couldn't get to the required enrichment levels.

But the Pu route was always there, it had met a dead end with Samar Mubarakmand's team's efforts.

Boss, IMVVHO, all that stuff that PAEC geniacs do is window dressing. The 3.5 have to have plausible deniability about ehre TSP nukes came from -- hence, this nautanki.

Every good criminal knows that he should own some legitimate sounding bogus business in order to explain where his income/maal came from.

[Amber G.]

This center is in Mexico, not US

This is Mexico, US just like IIT Banglore, Kerala.
(BTW, Banglore-Kerala story, which happened to be is 400% true, was originally brought to BRF by yours truly .. though credit is sometimes not given. .)

[Gerard]

The researcher is American, hence the USA

[shiv]

The researcher is American, hence the USA

Richard William/Dick Bill? I wonder if he actually exists.

[Amber G.]

The researcher is American, hence the USA

Richard William/Dick Bill? I wonder if he actually exists.

Well according to its website, CIMMYT (International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center), has offices in Islamabad (right next to NARC) and Afghanistan but not in USA.. and no Dr Richard William in its staff.. just Rick Ward in Islamabad office ...All according to the website..

Anyway I wonder, if they are interested in "nuclear" thingie .. shouldn't they be more interested in things like bananas or brazil nuts (with all its radioactivity) rather than maize and mushrooms (though mushrooms store lot of Cs)

Back to topic:
Recent story:
Iran Tests Nuclear Missile Warhead Design
The design mention above (implied as stolen from pak/china) is implosion type device using UD3 as initiator ....IIRC there was a brochure (or newspaper article) where PhotoChor was in front of a blackboard with a design with UD3 as initiator ..

[shiv]

Recent story:
Iran Tests Nuclear Missile Warhead Design
The design mention above (implied as stolen from pak/china) is implosion type device using UD3 as initiator ....IIRC there was a brochure (or newspaper article) where PhotoChor was in front of a blackboard with a design with UD3 as initiator ..

This one?

[negi]

^ Yes ; iirc Gagan had posted a better resolution image some time back .

[shiv]

^ Yes ; iirc Gagan had posted a better resolution image some time back .

Thanks
Got it

[negi]

^ What is interesting to see is the rest of the stuff on the board ; there is a mention of Thomson, Chadwick et al looks like Photochor was addressing some nanhas in lab/uty and at the same time boasting about his pilfered bomb design.

[negi]

Also fwiw armscontrol wonk guys have a picture of what they claim as first Chinese nuclear device which was again a uranium implosion type device.