Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): May 30, 2011

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 13 Jun 2011 19:32

hulaku wrote:Why are the more pious attacking banks ?

They bumped off some TFTA soldiers in Waziristan and the attack in Quetta was in the Police lines.

But a Bank in Islamabad ?

hulaku, the more pious also need money to fight the less pious. Piety alone or long beards or short shalwars alone aren't enough. Attacking banks and spiriting away ATMs have been in vogue in Karachi for a long time now by the more pious. Besides, these banks are unIslamic, you know. They charge interest instead of commissions.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 13 Jun 2011 19:37

chaanakya wrote:
Some military officers in years past were fond of saying that vegetarian Indian troops could never hold their own against their carnivorous Pakistani counterparts.
If that is so why Bhutto talked of eating grass to make nuke

If vegetarians are losers, Pakistanis who ate grass for nukes are...?

CRamS · Post by **CRamS** » 13 Jun 2011 20:21

shiv wrote:
SSridhar wrote:Dealing with India in the US-Pakistan relationship - Howard B. & Teresita C. Schaffer

Please do read.
It's a step forward. Indians have been saying this for decades. Finally a tube light flickers on.

Useless piece of clap trap IMO. Sure this is what Indians have been saying. But the whole article smacks of narrating what is essentially a paranoid, bigoted mindet, and giving it some kind of respectability. This is exactly what all these "South Asia expert" b$%^&*$s do. Come up with some hair splitting argument to explain TSP's abominable behavior, and then not so subtly indicate the need for India to make amends. I mean if one wants to hair split, you can talk about why a rapist does what he does, what are his motivations. One can hair split and look at the positive traints of Hitler and Pol Pot, the west's favority enemies. Closer to home, the US's "South Asia" mouthpieces like Sarmila Bose get grants and visiting professorships to justify TSP's TFTA army's rapes of Bangladeshis in 1971 and draw some kind of a moral equivalences with the SDRE Bangladeshis fighting Pakijabi oppression.

And TS ignores the US role in feeding that paranoia, ignoring US geo-political machinations in containing India, supplying arms to TSP, giving it parity with India etc. US is as much to blame as is TSP's attitude in the manner in which crap has been heaped on India, not to mention of course, India's own corrupt, cowardly leadership elite.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 13 Jun 2011 20:44

CRamS wrote:
Useless piece of clap trap IMO.

Your points notwithstanding - Schaffer rightly figures out that there is some piskological issue with Pakistan - and she points out these things at some length better than I have seen any other American writer do in the past. It may not have any effect - but it remains true nevertheless. Only Indian writers have tended to write this way. That has always been a minus point. And BRF saying is even more claptrap than Schaffer and ROTFL to boot.

Pakistanis believe they have been cheated and betrayed by both India and the international community. They feel that the very structure of their history and geography makes them dependent, vulnerable, and discounted. At the same time, national pride and the need to play up the ways in which they believe Pakistan is superior to India are important themes in their dealings with foreigners.

. As they argue it, Americans are taken in by the Indians and fail to recognise the overbearing, bullying policies and practices India inflicts on Pakistan and the other smaller countries of South Asia. Most Pakistanis believe that Americans are not aware of India's longstanding hegemonic goals and the dangers to Pakistani and U.S. interests that they entail. Pakistani tactics to correct these “misimpressions” and instil a “more realistic” understanding of what the Indians are up to will vary,

Pakistanis are well versed in their version of the truth

Pakistan will continue to see India as a basically hostile neighbour, and its negotiators will probably continue to believe that making India look bad is an important part of their task.

CRamS · Post by **CRamS** » 13 Jun 2011 20:56

Indeed, but if one reads the spate of BS post OBL, everybody in US is veering to the fact that TSP is a paranoid abomination. But the correction that I don't see is that there is some kind of genuine conflict TSP has with India, there is some kind of equivallence between India & TSP, and India needs to make concessions. If a rapist is rapist, the order of business is to arrest the dangerous tendencies of the rapist, first put him out of business, or in the case of TSP take its capability to rape, and then we talk about about peace process and improving relations between India & TSP and crap like that. Talking about improving the relations between India & TSP, talking about Kashmir, giving TSP India-specific military aid, lamenting India US nuke deal, and diplomtaic support etc is justifying the modeus operendi of the rapist and indicates a level of indirect collusion with the rapist.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 13 Jun 2011 21:02

"Theo_Fidel"
-------------
It is this sort of pandering that the US does that continues the problem. Just look at how insane the article is. Goes on and on about how Pakistan is India obsessed. How did they become that way. Surely Amriki weapons and money had nothing to do with it. Or that we had creeps like that Robin bird who pushed the Kashmir is TSP agenda. Or that we have Panda giving to Nuclear Weapons to 'level' the playing field. Or that it was the British who encouraged the martial races theory. Or that they created a unstable crap shoot of a country and left in 30 days flat. No, apparently they had nothing to do with it, innocent observers only.

And then it ends with India-TSP need to make peace/love in all the myriad positions. And somehow this problem is both India & TSPs fault. Stupid.

There can be no peace until TSP is fully defeated and admits it. TSP has been at war with India for 60+ years. Never stopped. Amriki would do well to demand that TSP acknowledge it has lost or further dismantling is in its future.

Dilbu wrote:In the end it comes down to the same old shyte.

Only a marked improvement in its relations with India, including significant steps toward a settlement of their Kashmir dispute, will lead Pakistan to change this policy. Until that unlikely development takes place — and it has eluded the two countries for six decades — Pakistan will continue to see India as a basically hostile neighbour, and its negotiators will probably continue to believe that making India look bad is an important part of their task.

-------------------------

If you take a long and deep view of history across the continents, we see that the rise of one power leads to another power also emerging and a competetion comes about as a natural process. This is due to the ideological underpinnings of the rise of the first power. Let me give examples. Rise of Zorastrian Persia and Greek city states, Rome and Carthage., Britain and France till the Napoleonic Wars and then Britain and Germany, US after First World War and Bolshievik Russia and Maoist China till Cold War was over.

However by and large the re-emergence of India was not seen as threat by the large and distant powers for India was a non-idelogical power. So it would not alter or change the course of History.

However nearby states like Paksitan, Bangla Desh, Nepal and Myanmar to some extent were wary. And amenable to being stoked by far away powers.

While this is broadly true the US has another doctrine to prevent the emergence of any regional power any where in the world for their balance of power dogma to ensure their dominance since World War II ended leaving them as the global hegemon. A body of thinkers since the 50s from Keenan to Kissinger have said this time and again but Indian elite think this idea is confined to only the person who articulates it. It is a broad based policy that has support regardless of who is in power. This wont chnage until US changes its zero sum game mind set of balance of power.
This doctrine propels the US to support the many regional problems to tie down the emerging regional power.
Hence the support for TSP and other irritants.

The best course is to grow the economy to such heights that such offshore balncing becomes futile.

We are in the third revolution: Industrial, Services and Knowledge power.
With our manpower and intellectual prowess we will certainly prevail if we stay the course and not get distracted with the irritants.

TSchaffer is selling the old snake oil thru Hindu newspaper. Make no mistake its the same old crap only packaged better.

Anglo Saxon West promised to argandise TSP at India's cost and they are upset that India didnt fall down and submit! Even if Kashmir is given the ideology of TSP will not be satisfied. Nor will the US goal of tieing down India be realised. So forget it.

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 13 Jun 2011 21:03

CRS,

You are not going to get a large step function type change in perceptions of TSP. This is why "claptrap" like above has its uses. Even == type people are finding out that at every level they dissect TSP, they find paranoia, lies and blackmail.

E.g. someone like a Bruce Riedel once wanted India to give Kashmir on a platter to TSP but now is saying that TSP Generals like Pasha should be arrested if they visit overseas and their assets should be seized if they keep playing games.

Lalmohan · Post by **Lalmohan** » 13 Jun 2011 21:05

unkil also suffers from loss of face problems... that is why they cannot openly do a 180 deg turn on paquistan
they have to allow enough time for paquistan to become a festering boil that has to be lanced

sum · Post by **sum** » 13 Jun 2011 21:16

hulaku, the more pious also need money to fight the less pious. Piety alone or long beards or short shalwars alone aren't enough. Attacking banks and spiriting away ATMs have been in vogue in Karachi for a long time now by the more pious. Besides, these banks are unIslamic, you know. They charge interest instead of commissions.

If i recall, 2 earlier soosai's in Rawalpindi 2 years back had targeted banks where TSPA folks were drawing salary from. maybe, this was also a attack to target some faujis loitering around the bank?

harbans · Post by **harbans** » 13 Jun 2011 21:19

Indeed Unkil too has an echandee problem here. Actually TS's article reflects that. The old cold warrior type foggies in the SD are reflecting there analysis and thinking on Pukes was bumkum all along..but IF India could do somehow, something on Kore issue eechandee could be salvaged a bit. TS is also im[plying that though it's clear she sucked up most time to the Paki's in her career. But imagine now a SD or think tank expert doing a Dan Burton today..he'd be laughed off. Things indeed are changing rapidly..realization the tube light moment is dawning on a lot of foggy head types in SD. It's a bit pathetic that 10 years into the WOT they are saying Paki paranoia is due to K. Both Paki and US echandee is being attempted to be salvaged through some Indian concessions on K. India should harden it's stance and demand POK complete and exit of Chinese from parts of J & K, just to create some more palpitations amongst the lot. Thurra and papad time for me..

Dilbu · Post by **Dilbu** » 13 Jun 2011 21:35

Even if SD foggies had realised that their TSP policy is heading down Pakistan, what were their options? The only path left for them to save face is some how 'broker' a piss deal (favourable to their munna ofcourse) between India and TSP. The other more practical and permanent solution will be to call the spade a spade but we can trust unkil to seek the easy way out.

pgbhat · Post by **pgbhat** » 13 Jun 2011 21:52

CRamS wrote: Useless piece of clap trap IMO.

Actually Sir-ji it is still a HUGE improvement compared to the "regular" == and "give cashmere" away stuff which is churned out by other "objective" western analysts. There is hope that Schaffer madam might eventually come around.

hulaku · Post by **hulaku** » 13 Jun 2011 21:56

SSridhar wrote:
hulaku wrote:Why are the more pious attacking banks ?

They bumped off some TFTA soldiers in Waziristan and the attack in Quetta was in the Police lines.

But a Bank in Islamabad ?
hulaku, the more pious also need money to fight the less pious. Piety alone or long beards or short shalwars alone aren't enough. Attacking banks and spiriting away ATMs have been in vogue in Karachi for a long time now by the more pious. Besides, these banks are unIslamic, you know. They charge interest instead of commissions.

I agree but would not the more pious just go and rob the bank instead of blowing himself in there.

Anyways banks are Kuffar places and hence Wajib-ul-sosaai bumed with full guarantee of 72+28 I guess.

Shrinivasan · Post by **Shrinivasan** » 13 Jun 2011 22:11

pgbhat wrote:Well they seriously believe unkil is completely out of options, they might as well be upfront about it.

Pakis are holding out for bigger carrots, they think with 2012 elections looming, they can extract goodies from the US. they don't realize that they are biting the hand that feeds them... you never know... the owner of the bit hand might treat it as an affection and shower loving care...

CRamS · Post by **CRamS** » 13 Jun 2011 22:19

More than expecting US to change track, it would be more realistic to expect a good section of Indian body politick: people like GP, BC etc start disseminating the truth that TSP probelm is because of US's need to use it to tie India down. Not mind numbing US bashing, but just a cool articulation of facts to put US on notice for whatever ist worth.

R-man. Question for you. Imagine Paasha or Kiyani reading TS, and I know its not easy for a decent bloke like you to put youself in the shoes of those Mofos

, don't you think they would actually come out thinking, jee, we are glad Amrikis know what ails us, and they also know what the solutuon is?

Cosmo_R · Post by **Cosmo_R** » 13 Jun 2011 22:25

Rangudu wrote:CRS,

You are not going to get a large step function type change in perceptions of TSP. This is why "claptrap" like above has its uses. Even == type people are finding out that at every level they dissect TSP, they find paranoia, lies and blackmail.

E.g. someone like a Bruce Riedel once wanted India to give Kashmir on a platter to TSP but now is saying that TSP Generals like Pasha should be arrested if they visit overseas and their assets should be seized if they keep playing games.

+1

anupmisra · Post by **anupmisra** » 13 Jun 2011 23:30

chaanakya wrote:If that is so why Bhutto talked of eating grass to make nuke

It makes perfect sense. A cow eats grass. Pakis eat cows. The pakis just wanted to cut the middleman out.

anupmisra · Post by **anupmisra** » 13 Jun 2011 23:33

CRamS wrote:Useless piece of clap trap IMO.

CRS, you sure do have a way with words. Just enough to rub others the wrong way.

devesh · Post by **devesh** » 13 Jun 2011 23:37

CRamS:

who are GP and BC?

anupmisra · Post by **anupmisra** » 13 Jun 2011 23:37

Here's an invitation to beat all other invites that the newly wed royal couple has probably received: William and Kate invited to Shandur. AoA.

Provincial Minister for Sports Syed Aqil Shah Sunday said on Sunday that Chief Minister Amir Haider Khan Hoti had formally invited the newly-wed royal couple Prince William and Princess Kate (Duke & Duchess of Cambridge) to witness the final of Shandur Polo.

Shandur Pass which is one of the most peaceful and serene areas of Pakistan is situated near the border of Gilgit-Baltistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces

CRamS · Post by **CRamS** » 13 Jun 2011 23:40

devesh wrote:CRamS:

who are GP and BC?

GP: G. Parthasarty
BC: Brahma Chellaney

Two guys I can think of who are not shy of articulating Indian interests.

Cosmo_R · Post by **Cosmo_R** » 14 Jun 2011 01:25

anupmisra wrote:
CRamS wrote:Useless piece of clap trap IMO.
CRS, you sure do have a way with words. Just enough to rub others the wrong way.

It's the DC (Dale Carnegie) training..

anupmisra · Post by **anupmisra** » 14 Jun 2011 01:28

A fresh blow to paki H&D: Won’t go back to Pakistan: Sami
A paki's view.

Everyone knows how crudely Pakistani artists and singers are treated in India but this makes no difference to Pakistani singer Adnan Sami who is bent upon living in India, Geo News reported.

But, Adnan Sami is still insisting on showing his association with India. “I will manage to live in a tent in India but can’t imagine going to back to Pakistan,” he said.

Wasn't Sami's dad a PAF afsar?

BijuShet · Post by **BijuShet** » 14 Jun 2011 01:38

Looks like Ummah brothers are not providing cheap oil discounts to TSP. From The News posting in full.

IPPs threaten to suspend 825MW power supply

Updated 11 hours ago
KARACHI: Four independent power producers have threatened the government to suspend power supply of 825MW if their dues were not cleared today, Geo News reported.

The IPPs sent a letter on 13th May to the Pakistan Electric Power Company (Private) Limited (Pepco) giving a 30-day deadline to clear Rs 16.5 billion dues.

BijuShet · Post by **BijuShet** » 14 Jun 2011 01:47

^^^ More bad news from The News (posting in full)

Petrol crisis persists in Punjab

Updated 15 hours ago
LAHORE: Fuel shortage continued on Monday in different cities of Punjab, including Muzzaffabad, Geo News reported.

People in different cities including Multan, Sargodha, Jhang and Faisalabad are facing severe difficulty in obtaining petrol for day-to-day commuting and are bound to buy fuel at high prices of Rs115-120 per litre. Some fuel stations in Multan are also reported to be selling petrol at Rs150 per litre.

Several filling stations in various cities of the Punjab remained closed as oil companies could not arrange fuel supplies for them. Traffic on the roads of Lodhran, Khaewal, Vehari, Muzzaffargarh and other major cities of Southern Punjab remained thin whereas the election campaign in Azad Kashmir is also affected by the shortage and no fervor is seen in the area. Public servants and students had to face hardships to reach their destinations as private transporters wrapped up their services due to shortage of fuel.

At some filling stations where supplies were delivered, long queues of vehicles and motorcycles were seen waiting for hours and even then were supplied at much lower scale in order to cater to the needs of maximum motorists.

Earlier, a representative of the Petrol Dealers Association Abdul Sami Khan told the media the crisis had resulted due to stoppage of supply of fuel from an oil refinery, which was closed for annual maintenance. He said government and concerned authorities were informed in advance that Attock Oil Refinery would remain closed from June 01, but no alternate arrangements were made.

Citizens have expressed grave concern over the shortage of petrol and said that despite notice and directives of President Zardari and Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani, the Oil Marketing Companies could not fully meet the demand of petrol pumps. Many motorists wanted a thorough probe into the artificial shortage and said the sole purpose was to black market the commodity.

Just to compare apples to apples for folks in India and US.
Yahoo currency calculator
1 Indian Rupee (INR) = 1.91 Pakistani Rupee (PKR) (approx 2 times) so mango TSPian is now paying 62.83 INR/liter for petrol (@ 120 PKR / liter)
or
1 USD = 85.7 PKR so mango TSPian is now paying 5.42 USD/gallon for petrol (@ 120 PKR / liter)

BijuShet · Post by **BijuShet** » 14 Jun 2011 01:53

^^^and the bad news keeps pouring in like the monsoon rains. From The News (posting in full). This fiscal TSPians will see such an increase in inflation that they will realize the long cherished dream of Bhutto to eat grass in liu of (begged/borrowed/stolen) chipanda nukes.

Govt allocates Rs.147b for energy sector subsidy

Updated 23 hours ago

LAHORE: The government has allocated Rs 147 billion for energy sector subsidy for 2011-12 as against the subsidy of Rs 343 billion in FY11, down 57 percent.

Based on the prevalent oil prices, it is estimated that actual subsidy may reach at Rs 150 billion even if 2 percent power tariff hike is continued every month.

The buoying fiscal deficit would more certainly forced the government to curtail its developmental spending, thus reducing imputes for growth. Furthermore, with higher reliance on the domestic sources, it will either induce above expectation inflation (SBP borrowing) or would create a crowding out effect (commercial bank borrowing).

Either way it would advocate the central bank to keep the interest rate at elevated levels. Thus, fiscal discipline would be the chief determinant of future monetary policy stance.

In Federal Budget FY12, the government aims to curtail the fiscal deficit at 4.0 percent of the GDP (or Rs 851b), with major reliance (84 percent) on the domestic resources to bridge the deficit.

It is believed two imminent threats i.e. ambitious tax revenue target and lower electricity subsidy, may escalate the deficit above the target level. Subject to external flows, buoying fiscal deficit may in turn strain the domestic interest rate environment. Therefore, with external account faced with adverse prices shock (subdued cotton prices-inflated oil prices) and limited inflows, we believe interest rates would now depend on the fiscal discipline of the government.

The government has envisioned total tax collection target of Rs2.07tn, up 23 percent from revised target of Rs 1.68tn last year. Despite new tax measures announced in the budget, experts believe the target is on the higher side.

Firstly, it is expected government to collect Rs 70b instead of targeted Rs 120b in lieu of PL(Petroleum Levy). Secondly, ambitious target growth of 19 percent and 28 percent in income and sales tax collection, respectively, would solely be dependent on the implementation of the tax rationalization measures.(PPI)

Mahendra · Post by **Mahendra** » 14 Jun 2011 01:54

Why does mango Pawki need petrol when he has access to R-D-X?

A_Gupta · Post by **A_Gupta** » 14 Jun 2011 02:02

More from Teresita Schaffer, et. al.

http://www.usip.org/questions-and-answers-0

3. What factors shape Pakistan’s approach to negotiating with the United States?

Pakistan’s approach to negotiations with Americans is shaped chiefly by three factors.

1. The first and most important is Pakistanis’ concept of their country’s place in the world, including their perception of the United States and the volatile history of U.S.-Pakistan relations. This is especially important because so many of their key negotiations with the United States are intended to set the broad terms of the bilateral relationship and in that context to define what kind of support the U.S. will provide.

2. The second major influence is Pakistan’s culture. Pakistan’s operating style and expectations are shaped by a society in which the most important bonds are personal, relationships both inside and outside the government are hierarchical and the less powerful often try to turn their weakness into strength.

3. Finally, Pakistan’s negotiations with Americans reflect the structures of their government and political system, notably its divided authority and the outsized role the military has historically played. Taken together, these elements produce an approach in which negotiators cultivate what one might call “the art of the guilt trip.” Important negotiations usually involve a major effort to create a sense of obligation on the part of the United States or to nurture and intensify the fear that failure to honor Pakistan’s requests will lead to disastrous consequences for U.S. interests.

BijuShet · Post by **BijuShet** » 14 Jun 2011 02:07

From Indian Express interview of UK's Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Mark Sedwill, who was in Delhi last week.(posting in full)

‘Pakistan’s capabilities are very severely stretched

The United Kingdom’s new Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Mark Sedwill, was in Delhi last week. Sedwill, who was earlier the British Ambassador to Afghanistan, was in Pakistan two weeks ago for a similar visit. He spoke to Pranab Dhal Samanta and Manu Pubby:

There have been fresh efforts to reach out to top Taliban leaders in Afghanistan. Are we reaching a point of meaningful talks and how do you address Indian concerns?
There are channels of communication being explored. But I don’t think any of this has reached the point of being substantive talks of any kind. To reconcile what President Karzai calls his disaffected compatriots has to be a settlement that Afghanistan works out itself. This outreach to the senior leaders is still in the very early stages. And we don’t know how serious they are, whether they really want to accept the offer that President Karzai has made to them or whether actually they seek to gain in tactical terms.

Are other countries also involved in this outreach to the Taliban leadership?
It is Afghan-led but that doesn’t mean that others are not involved. Others are involved. All initiatives are with Afghan consent and on their behalf.

In the context of the intended drawdown of troops in Afghanistan by 2014, what kind of a role do you see Pakistan playing in the country? More so, when most terror groups are operating from Pakistan?
Our aim is to end our combat role by 2014. We want to continue a presence after that in a training and support role for the Afghan force. In terms of Pakistan, clearly they have a tremendous function. They have lost more people than any of us. We have to keep in mind the burden they are already tackling and the scale of threat they are dealing with. We will provide whatever support we can and whatever the Pakistanis are willing to accept. We have to understand that their capability to tackle all threats together is very severely stretched.

Given the current threat that Pakistan faces from within, do you think Pakistan has moved beyond the India factor?
It would be unrealistic to expect that Pakistan will ever move beyond the India factor. But interestingly when I was there 10 days ago I had long meetings with several Pakistani leaders. The foreign secretary, senior military officials and people on their national security apparatus. In terms of proportion of time spent talking on a range of subjects, we spent very little time talking about India. I think the leadership of Pakistan recognises that the immediate threat to Pakistan’s stability lies within and comes from these militants.

Is this a recent trend?
No, I don’t think so. If you look at the actions they have taken, they have withdrawn a substantial amount of troops from the India border, where they have been traditionally stationed, in order to be able to carry out their own counter-insurgency operations. Now, I don’t know the exact number, but we are talking about substantial [figures]. Given the traditional tensions between the two countries, they would only do so if they are confident that the forces remaining are enough to deal with any threat. At the moment, the relationship between the two countries has been on a positive track so they feel that they can do so [reduce troops].

Prime Minister Singh was recently in Afghanistan and offered to expand the basket of assistance. How do you see India’s role in Afghanistan, including getting involved in training security forces?
India plays a very positive role in Afghan. A big and very effective aid program has gone into significant parts of Afghan infrastructure. The political support that PM Manmohan Singh offered to Karzai on the Afghan reconciliation process was very important. On security, the Afghans also understand that his is a very delicate issue. So far Indian support has been focused on the police. Helping to create a professional police is a critical role. India’s experience in policing a large, rural, uneducated and fragmented population is more relevant to Afghanistan than what other police forces of Europe or the US can bring in.

Lately, the emphasis has returned on improvement in Indo-Pak ties as a key driver to stability in Afghanistan? Does London perceive playing any role?
We don’t want to be involved in that. Of course, we have a strategic interest in improving relations between India and Pakistan. My own view is that while, of course, better relations between India and Pakistan would have a dramatically stabilising impact on the whole region, including Afghanistan, we cannot allow our effort in Afghanistan to depend on that.

BijuShet · Post by **BijuShet** » 14 Jun 2011 02:13

An interesting inteview. (apologies if already posted but posting in full)
Pakistan nuclear terror: an interview with Stanford's Scott Sagan

A leading expert on South Asian nuclear security discusses the risks of terrorists seizing materials from Pakistan's arsenal.

David Case June 13, 2011 15:52
Editor’s note: this article is part of "Too Dangerous to Fail," an occasional series on nuclear security issues in Pakistan and beyond.

U.S. relations with Pakistan have worsened rapidly in recent weeks.

Osama bin Laden’s hideout in the garrison town of Abbottabad raised suspicions that Pakistani security officials might have been sheltering America’s most wanted. On the other hand, after the U.S. killed the terror chief, officials in Islamabad expressed outrage over President Barack Obama’s decision to violate their sovereignty.

Last weekend CIA director Leon Panetta flew to Pakistan to confront officials with evidence that military insiders had tipped off Taliban fighters to an imminent U.S.-backed raid on camps where they make bombs for use against U.S. troops in Afghanistan. These tensions are worrisome given that Pakistan has one of the world’s biggest and fastest-growing nuclear arsenals.

To get a better sense of the risks that the arsenal could fall into terrorist hands, GlobalPost spoke with Scott D. Sagan, one of the world’s leading authorities on Pakistan’s nuclear program.

Professor Sagan is the co-director of Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, and the co-chair of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences' Global Nuclear Future Initiative. Before joining the Stanford faculty, he served as a special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon. He has served as a consultant to the office of the Secretary of Defense and at the Sandia National Laboratory and the Los Alamos National Laboratory. He is the editor of Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford University Press, 2009.)

The interview was edited and condensed by GlobalPost.

To what extent should we worry about the security of Pakistan's weapons or fissionable material will end up in the hands of terrorists?
I think that the security of both Pakistani nuclear weapons and Pakistani fissionable will remain a serious concern for the United States and all international actors.
We invaded Iraq with the goal of seizing weapons of mass destruction, and we're engaged in a standoff with North Korea and Iran over their nuclear weapons initiative. Pakistan has a bigger and more aggressive program, and before 9/11 it was actually the target of U.S. sanctions because of its arsenal.

Why has the U.S. chosen to engage Pakistan over its nuclear program, and does this policy still make sense 10 years after 9/11?
Pakistan is in a different category than the cheating regimes under the non-proliferation treaty — that is Iraq, Iran and North Korea — for two reasons. One is that Pakistan never signed the non-proliferation treaty, so its pursuit of nuclear weapons was something the United States did not want, but it had no legal standing to say that Pakistan was violating an international agreement that it had signed.

That's not the case with Iraq, Iran and North Korea, all of whom were caught violating the non-proliferation treaty, which they had voluntarily signed and ratified. Pakistan's actions were unfortunate, but they were not illegal.

The second reason is that the United States has strong geo-strategic reasons to seek Pakistani assistance with respect to the conflict in Afghanistan, and the long-standing war with Al Qaeda and other groups.

Pakistan has very much been both an ally and adversary. They have not been fully supportive of all U.S. goals, but have been supportive of some U.S. goals. And given Pakistan's position and its longstanding use of its own terrorist-supported activities against India, they've been playing a double game with respect to the war on terrorism — fighting some terrorist organizations groups that threaten the regime, but using others as a surrogate in the conflict against India.

Washington has an unusual relationship with Islamabad in that we provide billions in aid and we sell F-16s that could be used for nuclear weapons delivery. At the same time, we currently have a Pakistani executive from a Maryland trading company in custody on suspicion of supplying materials for Islamabad's nuclear program. So we’re trying to stop Pakistan from growing its program at the same time we're trying to safeguard it. And we're also taking steps that —perhaps unintentionally — help them use the arsenal. Is this policy working?
The U.S. government has had a longstanding internal debate about whether to isolate Pakistan and punish it for its nuclear weapons program, or to engage Pakistan to try to contain the program and reduce its size and growth. The policy has been of mixed success.

Before 9/11 the United States government had minimal ties to the group within the Pakistani military that had responsibility for nuclear weapons. According to many press reports, after 9/11 the United States government cooperated by selling some technology and providing some training, not for the delivery of nuclear weapons, but rather for the safety and security of nuclear weapons, fearing an Al Qaeda or related group's attack. What the U.S. government doesn't know, because Pakistan is so secretive in this area, is what Pakistan has done with those technologies and training programs.

It is believed — and I think this is accurate — that under normal peacetime circumstances, the Pakistani military keeps all or virtually all of the weaponry inside well-armed and guarded Pakistani military bases. That doesn't mean that those weapons are entirely safe, but it means that they are relatively safe from terrorist seizure. The greatest danger there would be an inside threat of some sort.

The real danger, I believe, comes if the Pakistani military fears an attack, by either India or the United States. Under those circumstances — whether they're fearful of a raid against their nuclear weaponry, or a military attack using missiles or bombers — they have every incentive for the sake of deterrence, to take the weapons out of their bases and move them to the countryside where they will be less vulnerable to an attack from India or the U.S.

The danger is that makes the weapons more vulnerable to a terrorist seizure, either from an insider or from a terrorist organization. Such a seizure would not require penetrating the defenses of a military base to get to a weapon. Rather, terrorists could simply attack a convoy with nuclear weapons in the countryside.

So as contorted as the current U.S. policy seems, maintaining some level of trust between the U.S. and Pakistan is critical.

It is very much in the United States' interest to persuade the Pakistanis that, despite the Osama bin Laden raid, the United States has no desire for any kind of raid against Pakistan's nuclear forces. If they fear that we're going to do that, that will actually make matters worse, because they would have the incentive to hide the weapons in the countryside, or to place them on the mobile launch systems that they've created, and that makes them more vulnerable to a terrorist attack.

Some experts say the recent attack against the PNS Mehran naval base in Karachi and in 2009 against the Army’s General Headquarters amount to a virtual blueprint on nuclear assets. Would you agree?

I wouldn't state that it's a virtual blueprint, but it shows that there's a serious risk of an Al Qaeda or Pakistani Taliban attack on a military base and the Pakistani military must train and take that mission very seriously. It's all the more reason that we want India-Pakistani relations to stay calm, so we can keep the Pakistani weapons in a well guarded and protected storage site inside the bases.

What about the scenario of a radicalized insider helping to seize nuclear materials for terrorists? With 8,000 to 12,000 people in the Pakistani nuclear program, how likely do you think this scenario is?

I don't think anyone can provide an accurate estimate in terms of the probability of insider threats. What we do know is that the Pakistanis have learned about the personnel reliability programs that the United States has put into place at our nuclear weapons facilities. Indeed, a number of years ago, after the Pakistani foreign minister was briefed on such programs by an American academic team from Stanford University, the Pakistani military responded by saying that they're going to study and develop such personnel reliability programs [which are essentially screening operations to ensure the stability and trustworthiness of people working at nuclear facilities]. He also said they would develop emergency search teams to get a weapon back if they're ever stolen.

So they're aware of these problems, and they're very sensitive to them, but how effective those systems are in a radicalized country? We don't know the details, and we have to hope that the Pakistanis are taking it very seriously.

Clearly in the past, they had many more radical jihadi sympathizers within the ranks of the military. After 9/11, when President Pervez Musharraf decided to support the United States, many of those people were purged from the ISI [Pakistan's spy service] and the military. Those people were called long-beards — they were they guys who didn't shave, they didn't have the British clean-shaven with a mustache look that the Pakistani military often has. These days, you can't recognize a long-beard ideological sympathizer because they can shave their beards. So we presume there are ongoing personnel reliability programs to identify who might be susceptible to bribery or ideological empathy inside the Pakistani military.

But clearly some in the Pakistani [security forces] still maintain interest in and connections to jihadis, because they are utilizing some of them for [Pakistan’s] conflict with India. Whether that could become the Frankenstein monster that turns on the doctors who think they’re controlling it remains to be seen.

Should the latest attack in Karachi make us more concerned about the possibility of extremists trying to seize a nuclear device?
It and the attack on the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi show that terrorist groups can mount a serious military operation, not just suicide bombings. So it is very disturbing. This should increase what's called the design basis threat, used by the Pakistani military. All organizations trying to protect sensitive technology have to develop the threat against which to measure their security. The reasonable level of security depends on the threat. And clearly those attacks demonstrated that Pakistani Taliban are capable of launching a significant attack.

According to a recent Newsweek report, Pakistanis are working on a fourth nuclear reactor, enabling the country's weapons program to grow at an even faster pace than it currently is. Does this add to the threat of a security breach?
Yes. More sites and more materials mean that there are more individuals who could be potential insider threats. And more sites that have to be protected.

In addition to the possibility of new materials at an additional reactor, the Paksitani military has reportedly started flight tests of a new missile, the NASR, or the HATF-9, which the Pakistani military has announced will be a short-range missile that could carry nuclear warheads. According to retired Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, the director of the strategic plans division, the HAFT-9 is a quick-response system — necessary, he said, to deter evolving threats. I think what he's referring to here is India's "cold start doctrine," which is an Indian conventional military option to respond to a Pakistani provocation, like another Mumbai attack, by sending conventional forces quickly into Pakistani territory.

General Kidwai's statement suggests that these short-range missiles would carry nuclear warheads and could be used to try to deter the Indians from launching such an attack and having such an attack go deeply inside Pakistan and create vulnerabilities.

The danger here is partly that both sides might misunderstand each other and that escalation could occur. It is also that this kind of short-range system must be put on a missile launcher outside military bases. These are mobile trucks carrying the missile with a nuclear warhead. If the Pakistanis are trying to deter India from crossing the border or the international line of control in Kashmir by deploying those kinds of nuclear forces, the HAFT-9 might have some deterrent effect on the Indian military, but that's exactly the kind of Pakistani nuclear force operation that raises the risks of a terrorist seizing a weapon, either through a direct attack or through an insider cooperating with militants.

Pakistan can already destroy major Indian cities. Why isn't that enough? Why does it need to grow its weapons capacity so quickly?

Do I think Pakistan needs to expand their nuclear forces to provide a credible deterrent? My answer would be, no. But it really doesn't matter what Americans or Western officials think. What matters is what the Pakistani military believes is necessary for the sake of deterrence. They seem to be indicating by their behavior that they believe expanding their arsenal is necessary.

And finally, what should the U.S. be doing that it's not doing already?
I believe that we should continue to engage the Pakistani military authorities and especially civilian authorities including those in the Atomic Energy Commission of Pakistan about what are the best practices that we and others in the international community use to protect fissile materials.

There are threats of terrorist attacks not just in Pakistan but around the world, and the international community has developed — through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Institute for Nuclear Security — sets of best practices that can be useful for Pakistan and for us. I think it can be useful to continue and heighten the dialogues about what we've done and others have done to protect our own nuclear materials from potential terrorist seizure, and learn therefore what Pakistan might be able to do themselves.

It has some very unusual aspects to its security challenge because of their own use of terrorists against India, but Pakistan is not alone in facing this threat. We need to share our best practices with each other, and we could learn from each other in that regard.

Cosmo_R · Post by **Cosmo_R** » 14 Jun 2011 03:08

The Sagan interview ^^^: I think we are very close to tipping point in the US debate on how to handle Pakistan. reading between the lines, everyone is making very anodyne statements that do not diverge from statements made in the past. But then if you (Pentagon) have a contingency plan are you going to signal it? They did not in the OBL raid and this is even bigger.

IMVVHO, the slight re-emphasis in Sagan's tone relates to "insider threats". And, that is because they realize even the brigadiers are closet jihadis now. Reread the personnel screening bit.

MurthyB · Post by **MurthyB** » 14 Jun 2011 03:21

Interview with that killed guy's mother:

[youtube]j9Y4LB5BcZM&NR[/youtube]

I am struck by how much even the aam abduls are concious of their status as "musalmans". There is repeated agony that musalmans are doing this to other musalmans, or that even being a musalman isn't enough save the bacon in the land of the pure.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 14 Jun 2011 03:24

That is the basic problem in Islamic society. So they resort to W-ul-K and declaring apostates so they can do their deeds. It led to the first schism.

Baikul · Post by **Baikul** » 14 Jun 2011 03:46

MurthyB wrote:Interview with that killed guy's mother:
.............
I am struck by how much even the aam abduls are concious of their status as "musalmans". There is repeated agony that musalmans are doing this to other musalmans, or that even being a musalman isn't enough save the bacon in the land of the pure.

Remember Shahid Afridi proudly claiming a cousin as a 'martyr' who died in Kashmir? Recall Ilyas Kashmiri's brother who says of him that "....he veered towards jihad. He truly loved Pakistan"? Or watch this teenager's mother in the video you quoted.

They tell me the same thing saar. That the basic world view of most Pakistanis is so fundamentalist that it negates all else, that they have no other way of viewing the world, and that they probably don't even know any different.

That saar, is the reason I despair whenever someone opines that India and Pakistan can/ should "be one", or that we can absorb those peoples into an "indic fold".

It ain't happening.

One more thing. Yesterday I was watching youtube clips of the 4 Man show, a Pakistani satire program that I had begun to enjoy. Then I came across a clip that - ostensibly funny - was so racist towards Hindus that it took my breath away (I'll try and find it again, and quote it here if I can) . And these are the 'sophisticated', 'cultured' elites of that society.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 14 Jun 2011 03:48

Baikul wrote: And these are the 'sophisticated', 'cultured' elites of that society.

Racism and not being racist has nothing to with 'cultured' elites. Goras have that too

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 14 Jun 2011 04:00

Here is a superb analyis in tne New Statseman's cover story, May 16th issue,"Pak's dirty secret"-"The enemy's enemy",by Anatol Lieven,about the chicanery of its military and the role of the ISI.Here are some titbits.Read it in full.

Choice quote:
"Asked to describe an average Pakistani officer today, the retired lieutenant general Tanveer Naqvi told me: "He has no doubt in his mind that the adversary is India - and that the raison d'être of the army is to defend [the country] against India. His image of Indians is of an anti-Pakistan, anti-Muslim and treacherous people. So he feels that he must be always ready to fight against India."

Inside Pakistan's spy network
Anatol Lieven
Published 12 May 2011

The ISI gorged on US money during the 1980s. Now that Osama Bin Laden is dead, can the west still buy its loyalty?

The ISI was established by a British army officer of Australian extraction, Major General William Cawthorne, during that curious period after independence when, even after Pakistan and India had in effect gone to war over Kashmir, Britain continued to provide many of the senior officers of the Pakistani military.

The ISI was set up to gather and co-ordinate military intelligence, supplanting Military Intelligence (MI), which had performed poorly in the first conflict with India and had been relegated largely to combating subversion and mutiny in the armed forces. MI, an organisation so secretive that itmakes the ISI look like a bunch of blabbermouths, continues to do this with what seems to be considerable success. But one thing is certain about MI: while it can monitor the regular armed forces, it is not allowed to supervise the ISI. Pakistan's third intelligence service is the civilian Intelligence Bureau (IB), which comes under the ministry of the interior. The ISI regards it, in the words of one officer, as "no better than policemen. And you know what our police are like."

The underfunded and poorly staffed IB loathes the ISI and some of the most vicious stories I have heard about the ISI's involvement in terrorism come from the IB. Needless to say, the lack of co-ordination between the three services has often been the despair of western counterterrorism officers.

The ISI's growth from a British-model intelligence organisation to a "state within a state" was the result of three processes. The first was the conflict with India, which, in one form or another, has been dragging on since both countries gained independence. This conflict and the acute paranoia it has created have profoundly shaped the Pakistani state and the ethos of its military.

The second was fear of internal revolt in Pakistan, which led the state to give the ISI a vital role in domestic intelligence. In 1989-90, the ISI used this power in Operation Midnight Jackal, a plot to undermine parliamentary support for Benazir Bhutto, which helped to bring down her government. It also wields much influence within the bureaucracy because it is in charge of giving security clearance to senior officials. A negative assessment will ruin a career.

The third factor was the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. General Zia-ul-Haq used the ISI to channel US and Arab aid to the Afghan mujahedin. A good deal of this money stuck to the ISI's fingers, giving it secret sources of funding independent of the Pakistani military, let alone the state.

So, where does this history leave the ISI today, especially in the context of the Bin Laden affair? It goes without saying that the ISI is not under any sort of control by the Pakistani government. When I was asked on US television recently how President Asif Ali Zardari could not have known what his intelligence service might have been up to, I let out a hoot of incredulous laughter. The interviewer had clearly not been following Pakistan very closely. Contempt for civilian politicians and ministers is strong in the military and stronger still among the retired ISI officers to whom I have spoken - in part because they know so much about these politicians' corruption, murders, sexual behaviour and family lives.

A much more difficult question is whether the ISI is even under the full control of the Pakistani military or whether it, and groups within it, are following their own agenda. This is of crucial importance in relation to Bin Laden's death and Pakistan-based terrorism more generally; for not only does it raise the possibility of the ISI's complicity in terrorism against the west (as opposed to the Taliban revolt in Afghanistan), it suggests the possibility of Islamist subversion within the Pakistani military. That points towards the threat of mutiny within the army, the collapse of the state and loss of control over Pakistan's nuclear stockpiles. This possibility still seems pretty remote to me unless Washington were to attack Pakistan directly (for example, following a terrorist attack on the US).

By the nature of their work, their secrecy, their extremely compartmentalised organisation and their professionally fostered paranoia, secret services generate conspiratorial groups with separate and sometimes wild agendas. Nonetheless, the high command of the ISI is part of the high command of the military. The present army chief of staff, Ashfaq Kayani, was formerly head of the ISI under Musharraf. Formidably intelligent and self-disciplined, General Kayani is very much a Pakistani officer of the post-Zia era. His rise demonstrates the meritocracy of the military; his father was a non-commissioned officer.

Kayani is known to be a pious Muslim and is conservative in his personal life but has no reputation of sympathy for Islamist politics. Had he been an Islamist, he could not possibly have risen to the top under Musharraf, who was secular in his beliefs and behaviour.
Similarly, the present director of the ISI, Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, is known to be hostile to the militants and was appointed because he had long been close to Kayani; according to rumour, the US also urged Islamabad to appoint him.
Like the commanders, most of the senior and middle-ranking staff of the ISI are not intelligence professionals but regular officers, temporarily seconded. At the top level, therefore, the ISI is part of the military high command and follows its orders.

The ISI does, however, see itself as an elite within the military. As a Pakistani journalist close to the intelligence service told me, "The ISI is the intellectual core and centre of gravity of the army. Without the ISI, the army is just an elephant without eyes and ears." This phrase caused extreme annoyance among some military friends to whom I repeated it.

What mindset has shaped the behaviour of Pakistan's generals, including those of the ISI? By far the most important aspect of a Pakistani senior soldier's identity is that he (or, very occasionally, she) is an officer. The Pakistani military is a profoundly shaping influence. It would be hard to find a more different group of men than the generals Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia, Mirza Aslam Beg, Asif Nawaz, Jehangir Karamat, Musharraf and Kayani in terms of social origin, character and attitude to religion. Yet all have been first and foremost military men.

This in turn means that their ideology was, or is, rooted primarily in Pakistani Muslim nationalism. As institutions, the military and the ISI are tied to Pakistan, not the universal Muslim caliphate of Islamists' dreams. If it is true, as so many officers have told me, to say that "No army, no Pakistan", it is equally true to say that "No Pakistan, no army".

Nationalism can be a positive and even indispensable force for the development of a country. Modern Turkey, so often held up to the rest of the world as a model, was founded on an ardent and ruthless nationalism.

The problem is that it may be wrapped up with particular differences and enmities. Pakistan's existential hostility is to India. Just as the US national security state was shaped by the cold war, so the Pakistani national security state (vastly more powerful in its own country) was born chiefly out of fear of, and hostility to, India. This is felt most strongly in the military and, in the ISI, it is a raging monomania.

Asked to describe an average Pakistani officer today, the retired lieutenant general Tanveer Naqvi told me: "He has no doubt in his mind that the adversary is India - and that the raison d'être of the army is to defend [the country] against India. His image of Indians is of an anti-Pakistan, anti-Muslim and treacherous people. So he feels that he must be always ready to fight against India."

The shelter given by the Pakistani military to the Afghan Taliban and its allies is based on a belief that the US is sure to fail in Afghanistan and that civil war will follow the US's withdrawal. In that civil war, India will use its allies to encircle Pakistan strategically.

Thus, Pakistan, too, must have allies - and the only one available is the Taliban. That stands even though senior officers know very well that, in the 1990s, despite all the help Pakistan had given the Taliban, it repeatedly kicked the country in the teeth.

On the whole, Pakistan has given shelter, not support, to the Taliban. But the ISI - perhaps through a notorious, ultra-secret branch, the "S wing" - has given some direct help to its Haqqani network (in its 2008 and 2009 attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul, for example).

As for LeT and the other anti-Indian militant groups, the Pakistani military and the ISI insist that they must keep them close in order to restrain them from attacking India, as well as making sure that they do not launch or help in terrorist assaults on the west.

ll of this is true enough, but doubts remain about the motives and future intentions of the ISI. In 2009, I had a horrifying conversation with the journalist and analyst Zaid Hamid, who had been recommended to me by a senior ISI officer as an interesting person to meet.
Hamid is a self-described Pakistani neoconservative and, like some neocons of my acquaintance in Washington, his favourite word seemed to be "ruthless".

“We say that if India tries to break up Pakistan by supporting insurgents such as the Baloch nationalists, then our response should be to break up India," he told me. "India is not nearly as strong as it looks. The fault lines of the Indian federation are much deeper than those of Pakistan: Kashmir, the Naxalites, Khalistan, Nagaland, all kinds of conflicts between upper and lower castes, tribals, Hindus and other religions, and so on. If we were to support these insurgencies, India would cease to exist."

Kashmir aside, there is no evidence that the ISI is supporting any of these insurgencies within India. But Hamid's apparent closeness to the ISI makes these views deeply alarming - although, to be fair, they are also quite widely shared in Pakistani society and attract a mass audience to his television programme.

If Hamid's views are representative of elements within the ISI, we must conclude that the service remains determined to strike India again at some point in future, using Islamist militants. And given that the US is increasingly seen in Pakistan as an ally of India, there is a good chance that Americans will be among the victims of any attack on high-profile targets in India. That is what happened in 2008 in Mumbai, when the gunmen searched for those with US and British passports.

One thing is clear: the ISI should be brought under much greater state control. This will require a détente between India and Pakistan that would reduce the anti-Indian paranoia in Pakistani society which gives the military and the ISI their legitimacy. But this is not going to happen any time soon and, in the meantime, we are doomed to try to co-operate with the ISI - without trusting it an inch.

Anatol Lieven is professor of war studies at King's College London. His most recent book, "Pakistan: a Hard Country", is newly published by Allen Lane (£30). Samira Shackle reviews the book in this week's New Statesman

Thus,we can safe but sadly conclude that with the ISI's "monomania" againt India and the rapid Islamisation of its uniformed tribes,with the ISI at the very epi-centre of Pak's military strategy,further even more grievous and devastating attacks against the Indian state (as the author hs also concluded) is inevitable ,which will in the future most likely escalate into another full blown war.Has our nation's leadership understood this fact? Certainly not "snake-oil" S.I. Singh with his "peace in our time" parleys with the enemy!

Baikul · Post by **Baikul** » 14 Jun 2011 04:00

Acharya wrote:
Baikul wrote: And these are the 'sophisticated', 'cultured' elites of that society.
Racism and not being racist has nothing to with 'cultured' elites. Goras have that too

But in theory it does.

And the 'Goras' may have them but not in a spiraling proportion like the Pakistanis, IMO. My point was to highlight that the 'best' of them had views that belonged to the 'worst'.

This is all OT, though, so I won't go down this path any further.

MurthyB · Post by **MurthyB** » 14 Jun 2011 04:21

Baikul wrote:They tell me the same thing saar. That the basic world view of most Pakistanis is so fundamentalist that it negates all else, that they have no other way of viewing the world, and that they probably don't even know any different.

That saar, is the reason I despair whenever someone opines that India and Pakistan can/ should "be one", or that we can absorb those peoples into an "indic fold".

It ain't happening.

Pakistan will have to be destroyed and rebuilt before anything sensible can happen. Just as Hitler came along and showed the racist Churchill et. al. the logical conclusion of their racist delusions, and there was a bloody savage battle where the victory was Phyrric at best (loss of empire etc. etc.), we see the same more pure on less pure action in pakiland. Let there be a savage civil war with millions dead and 10s of millions more wounded. Some side will win, but will be so bloodied and weak hopefully, that they will also eventually do a 180 degree u turn as the Euros have done since their days of white man burden and supremacy attitudes (at least in their own multi-culti societies now).

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 14 Jun 2011 05:21

CRamS wrote: R-man. Question for you. Imagine Paasha or Kiyani reading TS, and I know its not easy for a decent bloke like you to put youself in the shoes of those Mofos , don't you think they would actually come out thinking, jee, we are glad Amrikis know what ails us, and they also know what the solutuon is?

How come you, of all people, seem to believe that "better people" are now running TSP and that Kayani and Pasha will be able think and do different from the rest of the mofos?

g.sarkar · Post by **g.sarkar** » 14 Jun 2011 05:49

Sirjis,
I have the book, "How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster" by Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer" It is an excellent book, and I wish I had enough time to review it. It is not a book about India and Pakistan, though there is one chapter out of 9 that deals with "India-Pakistan Negotiations", but that is not the core issue of the book. This book is trying to show how to do US Ullu Sidha in plain English while dealing with Pakistan. It discusses Ayub Khan, Zia ul-Haq and Musharraf and compares and contrasts them. It talks about the rupture between the US and Pakistan, when US arms were used in the 1965 war. Some how Bangladesh war has not been discussed in detail. It talks about the Kargill war, and Mian Shahib's trip to the US. It talks about the Pakistani habit to establishing personal relationship with the Americans and their ways of taking liberty with truth. This book makes it very clear that the Pakistani perfidy is quite known to the US interlocutors, like Goebbles' club foot. But they chose to ignore it for their own short term benefit. The book gives a clear picture of how the US sees the Pakistani leadership as well as negotiators.
Gautam