Managing Chinese Threat
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Things are hotting up in the Pacific for the Peopre's Lepubric!
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wa ... 77720.html
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wa ... 77720.html
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
dangerous portents - Beijing hasn't denied plans to divert Brahmaputra flow: Expert
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 869329.cmsWhat is making matters worse for India is that China rejects the very notion of any water-sharing arrangement or treaty, like Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan, with any riparian neighbour. "The terms -- water sharing, shared water resources, treaty and common norms and rules -- are anathema to it. China is one of the only three countries that voted against the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. This international convention lays down norms and rules which China rejects,'' Chellaney said.
Chinese experts, led by Chinese Academy of Sciences academician Wang Guangqian, have come up with a proposal to divert water from the upper reaches towards Xinjiang. The proposal seems to have originated in 2001 but could not be acted upon apparently because of the heavy costs involved. According to a report by the Beijing based China Dialogue, Wang Guangqian's team is understood to be working with government's South-North Water Transfer office to organise a feasibility study for their proposal.
While India has water sharing treaties with upstream neighbours like Nepal and Bhutan, there is no such treaty with China which, as the dominant riparian power in the region, refuses to enter into formal water sharing deals with any of its neighbours. India also has water sharing treaties with its downstream neighbours like Bangladesh and Pakistan. Nearly all important international rivers in China originate in ethnic-minority homelands which, as Chellaney said, were forcibly seized after the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
No. the real issue is price. allies want 'cold war' prices.We are maxed out.
the shipyards want payment for "quality".
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
While the Israelis are ready to sell Chiuna high-tech weaponry now,with Barak on a visit there,pledging support (http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001 ... 10317.html),
....the Chinese concern over its internal situation grows.Here is Raman's report.
http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2011/06 ... ation.html
....the Chinese concern over its internal situation grows.Here is Raman's report.
http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2011/06 ... ation.html
Chinese concern over internal situation
Uploaded by admin B.Raman, China, Tibet, worldview 7:52:00 AM
Reuters Pictures :
Workers hold a billboard of the "Constitution of Chinese Communist Party Book" and a picture of Karl Marx as they prepare an exhibition about the history of China's Communist Party at the Shanghai Exhibition Center, June 14, 2011. China's Communist Party will celebrate its 90th anniversary on July 1.
by B.Raman
(June 15, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) The authorities of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security, who are responsible for internal intelligence, internal security and law and order, seem to be increasingly concerned over the tendencies of sections of the population to defy the measures taken by the authorities to enforce law and order.
2. Instances of such defiance have come since the beginning of this month from the Tibetan areas of the Sichuan Province and from Guangdong on the sea coast from where the Chinese economic miracle started in the early 1980s and then spread to other parts of China.
3. Buddhist monks in the Sichuan province continue to protest in public over the illegal detention of about 300 monks of the Kirti monastery in a military detention centre to subject them to what the Chinese call “legal education” following their demonstration of their solidarity with a 16-year-old monk who committed self-immolation in March to protest against the continued Chinese rule of the Tibetan areas. The protest has since spread to other Tibetan areas.
4. Tibetan monks and nuns in Kardze, also in the Sichuan province, have stepped up protests against Chinese rule despite being beaten up and detained in military camps by the authorities.
5.The Chinese authorities are going ahead with their plans for a major celebration in July in the Tibetan areas to mark the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China and the 60th anniversary of the occupation of the Tibetan areas by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
6. In view of the continuing protest movement of the monks, the Chinese authorities apprehend that attempts could be made to disrupt the special events planned to be held in July to mark the two anniversaries. They have, therefore, stopped issuing visas to foreign nationals for visiting Tibet till the end of July. However, there will be no restrictions on the visit of Chinese nationals to Tibet for domestic tourism.
7. The unrest in the Guangdong province has been over what is alleged as the unfair treatment meted out to migrant Chinese workers from other parts of China, who have been allowed to work in the manufacturing industries of the province.
8. Through strict control of the Internet, the Chinese authorities have sought to prevent details of the protest movement of the monks from reaching the outside world. However, they have not been able to prevent the details of the unrest of the migrant workers of the Guangdong Province from spreading to other parts of China and the outside world.
9. Protesting migrant workers are managing to send out messages through Chinese blogging sites, but the use of the blogging sites to spread messages of the protest has not been as extensive as during the Jasmine Revolution earlier this year in Tunisia and Egypt.
10. One message thus sent out through a Chinese blogging site reads as follows: “As far as the police and army are concerned, they may crush the current rioting, but the fundamental problems will not have been addressed. As China’s income gap has grown, many people are forced to live in remote cities year-round to make ends meet as migrant workers. But they suffer discrimination and maltreatment from everyone around them: their bosses, landlords, and even local residents. They are treated as second or third class citizens. The ‘iron fist’ policy is not the way to deal with them. You can quell the riot in Xintang, but it will just happen somewhere else.”
11. Xintang has been the epi-centre of the protest movement of the migrant workers. Security troops of the Ministry of Public Security, backed by armored vehicles, fired tear gas shells at thousands of rioters on the streets of Xintang township in the Zengcheng prefecture on June 23.Scenes of the firing of tear-gas shells have appeared on many blogging sites. Xintang is about 40 kilometers east of the provincial capital of Guangzhou.The protest movement began spontaneously on June 10.
12.In an incident reminiscent of what happened in Tunisia, the protest movement was triggered off by a dispute between security guards and a migrant couple, including a pregnant woman, who had set up a stall at the entrance of a supermarket. When the security guards tried to confiscate their earnings on the ground that they were running the stall without prior permission, a tussle ensued and the security guards allegedly pushed the pregnant woman who fell on the ground. The security guards arrested the couple, but other migrant workers prevented them from taking the couple to the Police Station. The riots started and it has been continuing off and on since then despite the arrival of security reinforcements. The migrant workers are demanding the arrest and prosecution of the security guards who pushed the pregnant woman to the ground.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Moving it here from Army thread.
The point is these logistical challenges will be overcome or minimized in significant measure. The disadvantage of PLA/AF in terms of qualities and capabilities that they can bring to bear due to the western technology embargoes and a strained vendor relationship with Russia will be overcome one way or the other. They are desperately trying to make progress and putting their monies, where their inner heart is (since I cannot understand their words
).
Also, we all know what happens to a nation that has been sanctioned and denied technology. They figure a way out in the long term. It is this long term that most worries me. Their round about progress in indigenous arms, even as we mock them, is admirable. While we spend $$ on imports, they spend the same and many times more in indigenous development and have been doing so for over a decade now. How long do you think we can bank on the fact that their efforts will not succeed and will continue to produce "junk"?
This is not directed at you but it is logic such as the one you have written that allows the MoD and the political masters to be lazy about infrastructure investments and other procurement of materials along with necessary reforms for indigenous development of an MIC.
I am glad to be corrected.rohitvats wrote: You have read my comment on the article by BK in a wrong way.
Understand why this can be frustrating. But most of the over the top comments are by folks who just do not know ANY details and BK is not in that category. Also, anyone who says that they can move 30+ divisions in a month, that too over mountains and high plateau - using a single railway line, is smoking some weird stuff. I do not think BK is saying that though.I'm not questioning the threat from PLA but the series of articles which seem to parrot the same line without giving any sanity check on what they are writing. This example of ~30 odd divisions in a month using example of a single railway line is prime example of that. Now, ask yourself this question - the IA has same number of divisions and some more. Can the entire IA move 1000+kms using a single railway line in a month? And what about logistics to support at least 300K soldiers in the region?
It is this oft-repeated cliches that I have problem with. All it does is create a scare scenario and then the same inflicts everyone who reads it and then forms a opinion on how PLA is going to simply over-run the Indians.
No one has said that we have clarity and/or credibility for the actual numbers and materials moved by the PLA in their exercise. Also, I do not think anyone is saying this was accomplished as a single lift - it clearly was not. Just a cursory knowledge of PLAAF lift capabilities will confirm this. The reference to that example was simply to point out that the PLA is not sitting idle and India cannot "hope" that PLA will always have logistical issues, which cannot be overcome.All the above is the prime example of oft-repeated phrases becoming the truth - and something which gets parroted by Indian media as well - including the like of BK. All one has is some article here and there and thats it - suddenly PLA is going to emerge from behind every rock along the LAC.
Everyone seems to take the Chinese reports at face value - have you tried questioning that 50K number and how is it possible to achieve that? Airlifting 50K soldiers@150 soldiers per airplane will require 333 aircraft? You think China/PLAAF has that many aircraft? And BTW, that 150 troops per a/c is for A320 type a/c...military transporters are bad at these numbers. So, number of a/c will be still more. Even uncle will be stretched to achieve these numbers with his huge airlift fleet.
The best assessment that I'm aware of is PLA's ability to move one infantry division at one go....which itself is a formidable capability and which IMO, will stretch them. They still lack true strategic airlift capability.
The point is these logistical challenges will be overcome or minimized in significant measure. The disadvantage of PLA/AF in terms of qualities and capabilities that they can bring to bear due to the western technology embargoes and a strained vendor relationship with Russia will be overcome one way or the other. They are desperately trying to make progress and putting their monies, where their inner heart is (since I cannot understand their words

Also, we all know what happens to a nation that has been sanctioned and denied technology. They figure a way out in the long term. It is this long term that most worries me. Their round about progress in indigenous arms, even as we mock them, is admirable. While we spend $$ on imports, they spend the same and many times more in indigenous development and have been doing so for over a decade now. How long do you think we can bank on the fact that their efforts will not succeed and will continue to produce "junk"?
No disagreement. That is exactly the thrust of BK's article that you may have misread. He has long been a proponent of about 10 additional mountain divisions to be inducted in the IA and build a capability to take the battle to the Tibetan plateau. It is capabilities that translate to "guts" in great measure.As for PLA getting capacity to move 30-divisions in a month - I'm sure in due course of time they can do that. But not by using one single railway line. And they are not going to surprise India - if that is the import of the one-month figure. Chinese could take 6months to build up forces in Tibet and it will not matter. Unless,we have guts to pre-empt any build-up by taking unlilateral action.
No there is not but thinking that PLA has no answer to this logistical challenge is also a folly. The railway line is only one of the answers along with improved and more roads and increasing air capabilities. This is exactly the type of arguments that keeps the IA more focused on the western front and IA's war fighting capabilities best optimized for a war in the plains. BK seeks to change this focus.We mobilized the entire IA in less than that period and had them sitting on western border in Operation Parakram. The bigger deal is to sustain these troops in forward areas and prepare logistics to fight a full scale war once these formations land up in their respective locations. And here, for the Chinese, they will have to forward store everything in Tibet - there is no short-cut to this part.
This is not directed at you but it is logic such as the one you have written that allows the MoD and the political masters to be lazy about infrastructure investments and other procurement of materials along with necessary reforms for indigenous development of an MIC.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
No it was not. The information is a simple search away, here.rajrang wrote:Do you know how many days it took China to move 50,000 men over 1600 miles. Was altitude a factor?
Also, rajrang ji: Please chill. As of today, at the Tibet border, who is the hunter and who is the hunted, between PRC and India is not always clear. India's strategic air lift position as of today and likely for this decade (C130 and C17) would be better than PRC. This is good for India. BK's article has a whole other purpose. I will respond to Rohitvats on it. His angst at the alarmists is justified. All these scenarios of the PLA digging a hole through Burma to attack India or the PLAN sending its fleet of subs to the Indian Ocean are quite frankly ridiculous. This is a long term game. In this game, there shall be no repeat of 1962. The IA will ensure that.
However, the way this game pans out 10, 20, 30 years from today will be based on in part, decisions and preparations made today.
The war of 1962, was in part decided in 1947 - even before PRC was born and its seed was sown in 1914, based on the machinations and interests of a colonial power - in hindsight.
This is about PRC being able to exploit India's weaknesses at the hour and place of its choosing or we having a capability to do the same. It is not like PRC is itching for a war with India. They have their own issues and making the Chinese people as the eternal enemies of India would be counter productive to Indian interests.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13796958
China sends patrol ship into disputed South China Sea The Haixun-31 is one of China's most advanced maritime patrol vessels .China has sent one of it largest patrol ships through the South China Sea amid heightened tension over the disputed waters.
China sends patrol ship into disputed South China Sea The Haixun-31 is one of China's most advanced maritime patrol vessels .China has sent one of it largest patrol ships through the South China Sea amid heightened tension over the disputed waters.
The Haixun-31 sailed on Wednesday and will monitor shipping and "protect maritime security" on its way to Singapore, state media said.A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman described the trip as routine.Several Asian nations claim territory in the waters that include shipping lanes and may contain oil and gas.The Philippines and Vietnam recently accused Chinese vessels of aggressive actions in the South China Sea.On Monday Vietnam staged a live-fire exercise in the area which Chinese state media denounced as a military show of force.The 3,000-tonne Haixun-31, operated by the Chinese Maritime Safety Administration, will pass near the Paracel and Spratly island groups. officials said. The islands are at the heart of disputes with other governments
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Chinese dam in Tibet diverting course of Brahmaputra. TIMES NOW's Editor-in-Chief Arnab Goswami debates the issue with Maroof Raza, TIMES NOW Startegic Affairs Expert; Alka Acharya, Former Member of National Security Advisory Board; M K Bhadrakumar, Fmr Deputy High Commissioner to Pakistan and Leela Ponappa, Former Deputy National Security Advisor.
DEBATE 1
DEBATE 2
DEBATE 1
DEBATE 2
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
strategic airlift apart, we still have the problem of getting men aclimatised to the altitude, that takes days if not weeks
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Don't know if it was posted earlier:
Published on Dec 16, 2010
By Nishikant Khajuria
Chinese airwaves invading Ladakh; SOS to PMO: J&K Newspoint
Since the news is about 6 months old, would somebody be in the know, as to what kind of steps GoI has already taken in this regard?
Published on Dec 16, 2010
By Nishikant Khajuria
Chinese airwaves invading Ladakh; SOS to PMO: J&K Newspoint
Now why the hell Doordarshan Kendra Ladakh officials cannot understand the local languages. What do the Chinese have to do with all these peoples, none of which live within China's borders.The militancy infested and trouble torn Jammu & Kashmir is facing a new threat from across the border.
This time the threat is not from India’s arch rival Pakistan but China, which has waged a cultural invasion in the cold desert of Ladakh through its electronic media.
As the cultural invasion is feared to contain anti-India propaganda also, the matter is being taken up with the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) for necessary action plan to counter the same.According to official sources, the neighbouring country China has recently installed several high frequency television and radio reception transmitters along the border with Ladakh and is airing a number of programmes in the local languages, which include Ladakhi, Shina, Purgi, Shina etc. Because of high frequency reception transmitters, the Chinese radio and television signals are caught in approximately one lakh square kilometer area of Ladakh thus exposing the people there to cultural and ideological invasion from across the border, sources explained. As the officials in Doordarshan Kendra Ladakh and local radio station are unable to understand Shina, Purgi and other local languages, there are apprehensions that the Chinese programmes being aired by their television and radio stations may contain some anti-India propaganda also, sources said adding that some unofficial agencies have even confirmed that a hidden anti-India propaganda has been launched by the Chinese media. On the other hand, the Indian official media, Doordarshan and All India Radio, are finding it difficult to counter the Chinese invasion because of technical as well as resources weaknesses.
Signal of the HPTs (High Power Transmitters) and LPTs (Low Power Transmitters) of DD and AIR stations, installed in Ladakh area, is poor as compared to the Chinese transmitters with the result a number of people prefer to tune in the stations being operated from across the border. Further, non-availability of local language experts with Doordarshan and AIR stations is making it difficult for Indian official media to have effective counter propaganda.
Sensitivity of the matter can be gauged from the fact that the issue is being taken up by the concerned authorities with PMO for necessary action, disclosed highly placed official sources. The decision to take up the matter with PMO, which is directly monitoring media in J&K through a special cell, was taken up during a high-level Inter-media Coordination Committee meeting, held here today. The meeting was attended by heads of various official media in J&K and chaired by Director Doordarshan Kendra Srinagar, Rafiq Masoodi.
In the meeting, which was also attended by Director DD Kendra Leh Harjit Singh, the issue was discussed for immediate attention of the higher ups and emergency measures to counter the new challenge in trouble-torn state.
So far, Indian official media in J&K was concerned only about anti-India propaganda by Pakistan through its television and radio stations. However, the latest reports have revealed that China too has waged a hidden invasion in the India territories through its electronic media.
Since the news is about 6 months old, would somebody be in the know, as to what kind of steps GoI has already taken in this regard?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Indian Satellites Confirm China Not Diverting River
India's government says it is not concerned that China will divert or reduce the flow from a major river it shares with India. That assessment comes in large part from Indian surveillance satellites deployed over Chinese territory, which are said to have world-class capabilities.
Indian government sources say "extremely high caliber" satellite technology is able to produce "superb" imagery of what China is doing just over its northeastern border. Primarily for that reason, the sources said New Delhi has no concerns whatsoever at this time that China is seeking to curb the flow of a major river that flows into India from Chinese-controlled Tibet.
India's External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna hosted the chief minister of India's northeastern Assam state, Tarun Gogoi, in New Delhi on Thursday. Gogoi had publicly expressed concern over renewed media speculation that a dam China is constructing upstream along a shared river would result in reduced water flows. India's Brahmaputra river, known in China as the Yarlung Tsangpo, is a lifeline that provides irrigation and hydroelectric power for several Indian states and Bangladesh.
Minister Krishna said assurances from China, along with information that India is able to verify on its own, indicate the planned Chinese dam project poses no threat to India's river access.
"The question of diversion, or the question of any storage of water, doesn't arise," said Krishna.
China and India describe the Chinese dam as a run-of-the-river hydroelectric project that does not actually block the river's flow, but instead uses the natural flow of the river to generate energy.
Gogoi emerged from his meeting with Krishna apparently reassured. "I am convinced there is no shortage of water... since there is no diversion of water, there is no cause for worry," said Gogoi.
No formal agreement exists between India and China for the sharing of water from the Brahmaputra river. However, Indian government sources say the two countries, in their words, "discuss what we need to discuss" via working groups on water that meet frequently.
One of the Indian states served by the river, Arunachal Pradesh, is not formally recognized by Beijing as part of India. It shows up on Chinese maps as "Southern Tibet." For that and other reasons, issues regarding India's Himalayan border with China come with an inherent, if minor, element of tension.
Indian government sources say they will continue to monitor Chinese activity along the Brahmaputra using satellite capabilities, which have dramatically improved over the past two years. Those same capabilities, the sources point out, also allow India to keep an eye on China's military deployments along the border.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
History repeats itself for those who do not learn from it. And especially for those, who do not learn from history of others.ShauryaT wrote:No it was not. The information is a simple search away, here.rajrang wrote:Do you know how many days it took China to move 50,000 men over 1600 miles. Was altitude a factor?
Also, rajrang ji: Please chill. As of today, at the Tibet border, who is the hunter and who is the hunted, between PRC and India is not always clear. India's strategic air lift position as of today and likely for this decade (C130 and C17) would be better than PRC. This is good for India. BK's article has a whole other purpose. I will respond to Rohitvats on it. His angst at the alarmists is justified. All these scenarios of the PLA digging a hole through Burma to attack India or the PLAN sending its fleet of subs to the Indian Ocean are quite frankly ridiculous. This is a long term game. In this game, there shall be no repeat of 1962. The IA will ensure that.
In final months of WWII, over a period of 3 months, soviets doubled their division strength from 40 to 80 divisions in Russian far east. The material/equipment strength of existing 40 divisions was enhanced first by transferring tanks, fuel and other items from Western Europe to Far East. Then the equipment/fuel/material for 40 fresh divisions was moved and finally the men were moved. The distances involved were just shy of 12,000 kms.
The total number of men moved or redeployed were about 1 million men. The time frame was 3 months, May-1945 till july-1945. If we include the material also then the deployment happened over a period of April-1945 till July-1945 with the peak being May-1945 to June-1945. In fact by 25-July-1945 the soviets deployment were over and in August-1945 the fabled soviet offensive of Manchuria got under way.
So good were the Soviets in masking the scale and breath of deployment that the Japanese thought the soviets would be able to launch an attack in Q4 of 1945 or Q1 of 1946 and when Soviets attacked, in August-1945 the Manchurian Army was in the process of re-deployment.
If we take the deployment period of 4 months, number of men moved at 1 million and the equipment for 40 divisions is added to it, then on an average, each month 2.5 lakh personnel and equipment of about 10 divisions was moved over distance averaging 10,000 kms. Here is the the truly remarkable part of this, this deployment was done over a railway track which was single gauge, the trans-Siberian railway track. It was not dual gauge railway track.
It is also instructive to note that the railway line was not used much after the hostilities commenced. But by the time Soviets launched their attack, they had all the men and material to carry out their task of capturing an area which would rival western Europe. But the beauty of the railway line was that it could carry more men and material, in a more economical and faster means than any road transport system can.
This was in 1945. The year is 2011. Acclimatization applies to humans, not to equipment, fuel and material. And the current, railway line, is just the first among the two other proposed lines, which are on drawing board. The most worrisome is going to be the proposed Lhasa-Chengdu, Sichuan railway line, because by all indications it will run parallel to a significant portion of the Arunachal-Tibet border.
In the year 2000, Chinese started building up its missiles against Taiwan, everybody said that there is nothing to worry. By the year 2008, they had built up so many missiles that US generals/Admirals were saying openly that Chinese missiles will cripple Taiwan's ability to defend itself. Do we plan to be in such a situation by belittling this railway line?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/news ... wsid=14909
so who is exporting more? $60b to $100b and having to suffer all through strategic losses is pathetic.. perhaps, we look at flooding chinese market with cheapo made for china ones from desh, and make sure china plays this on a level playing field.
so who is exporting more? $60b to $100b and having to suffer all through strategic losses is pathetic.. perhaps, we look at flooding chinese market with cheapo made for china ones from desh, and make sure china plays this on a level playing field.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
ShauryaT wrote:No it was not. The information is a simple search away, here.rajrang wrote:Do you know how many days it took China to move 50,000 men over 1600 miles. Was altitude a factor?
Also, rajrang ji: Please chill. As of today, at the Tibet border, who is the hunter and who is the hunted, between PRC and India is not always clear. India's strategic air lift position as of today and likely for this decade (C130 and C17) would be better than PRC. This is good for India. BK's article has a whole other purpose. I will respond to Rohitvats on it. His angst at the alarmists is justified. All these scenarios of the PLA digging a hole through Burma to attack India or the PLAN sending its fleet of subs to the Indian Ocean are quite frankly ridiculous. This is a long term game. In this game, there shall be no repeat of 1962. The IA will ensure that.
However, the way this game pans out 10, 20, 30 years from today will be based on in part, decisions and preparations made today.
The war of 1962, was in part decided in 1947 - even before PRC was born and its seed was sown in 1914, based on the machinations and interests of a colonial power - in hindsight.
This is about PRC being able to exploit India's weaknesses at the hour and place of its choosing or we having a capability to do the same. It is not like PRC is itching for a war with India. They have their own issues and making the Chinese people as the eternal enemies of India would be counter productive to Indian interests.
You have made some very good arguments especially in your exchanges with rohitvats. Regarding my own thoughts I was not suggesting something outrageous such as China digging a hole through Burma or sending subs to the Indian ocean or even the 30 divisions that has been suggested in the press. (Maybe they can dig a hole through POK?) I was trying to grapple with the possibility of China being able to deploy a large force at a particular location on India's borders, capturing several hundred square km of territory to "teach India a lesson." However, altitude is such an overpowering factor that makes comprehension of such a scenario difficult especially combined with a projection of future technological and infrastructural capabilities. So to quantify the time it will take and the size of a force that they can bring to bear at a particular location will require a more detailed careful analysis. Maybe someone in the public domain should do a Ph.D. thesis on this! I think we can safely assume that the Indian Army already has confidential studies of this nature. In this context, I hope politicians simply listen to the men in uniform and give them what they ask.
I agree with you strongly that making the Chinese people eternal enemies will be a poor choice for India. I have known many excellent people of China. However, since 1949 the government of China has largely followed a policy of treating India with hositility - from 1962 to military help to Pakis.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
The Russians moved 250,000 men in a month over a vast distance. It is not clear to me by how much this figure will be reduced by acclimatization.Christopher Sidor wrote:History repeats itself for those who do not learn from it. And especially for those, who do not learn from history of others.
In final months of WWII, over a period of 3 months, soviets doubled their division strength from 40 to 80 divisions in Russian far east. The material/equipment strength of existing 40 divisions was enhanced first by transferring tanks, fuel and other items from Western Europe to Far East. Then the equipment/fuel/material for 40 fresh divisions was moved and finally the men were moved. The distances involved were just shy of 12,000 kms.
The total number of men moved or redeployed were about 1 million men. The time frame was 3 months, May-1945 till july-1945. If we include the material also then the deployment happened over a period of April-1945 till July-1945 with the peak being May-1945 to June-1945. In fact by 25-July-1945 the soviets deployment were over and in August-1945 the fabled soviet offensive of Manchuria got under way.
So good were the Soviets in masking the scale and breath of deployment that the Japanese thought the soviets would be able to launch an attack in Q4 of 1945 or Q1 of 1946 and when Soviets attacked, in August-1945 the Manchurian Army was in the process of re-deployment.
If we take the deployment period of 4 months, number of men moved at 1 million and the equipment for 40 divisions is added to it, then on an average, each month 2.5 lakh personnel and equipment of about 10 divisions was moved over distance averaging 10,000 kms. Here is the the truly remarkable part of this, this deployment was done over a railway track which was single gauge, the trans-Siberian railway track. It was not dual gauge railway track.
It is also instructive to note that the railway line was not used much after the hostilities commenced. But by the time Soviets launched their attack, they had all the men and material to carry out their task of capturing an area which would rival western Europe. But the beauty of the railway line was that it could carry more men and material, in a more economical and faster means than any road transport system can.
This was in 1945. The year is 2011. Acclimatization applies to humans, not to equipment, fuel and material. And the current, railway line, is just the first among the two other proposed lines, which are on drawing board. The most worrisome is going to be the proposed Lhasa-Chengdu, Sichuan railway line, because by all indications it will run parallel to a significant portion of the Arunachal-Tibet border.
In the year 2000, Chinese started building up its missiles against Taiwan, everybody said that there is nothing to worry. By the year 2008, they had built up so many missiles that US generals/Admirals were saying openly that Chinese missiles will cripple Taiwan's ability to defend itself. Do we plan to be in such a situation by belittling this railway line?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
One of our BR colleagues arrived at an estimate of how much time it will take to transport men to Tibet (Lhasa I assume). He assumed 2500 men per train (at the rate of 25 bogies per train and 100 men per bogie). It was assumed that an additional 5 trains will be needed for equipment. Therefore 6 trains can transport 2500 men including equipment. To transport 250,000 men will take 600 train loads. If there are 10 trains per day then, the 250,000 men can be transported in 60 days. This is twice the time it took for the Russians who transported 250,000 men every 30 days.Christopher Sidor wrote:History repeats itself for those who do not learn from it. And especially for those, who do not learn from history of others.ShauryaT wrote:No it was not. The information is a simple search away, here.
Also, rajrang ji: Please chill. As of today, at the Tibet border, who is the hunter and who is the hunted, between PRC and India is not always clear. India's strategic air lift position as of today and likely for this decade (C130 and C17) would be better than PRC. This is good for India. BK's article has a whole other purpose. I will respond to Rohitvats on it. His angst at the alarmists is justified. All these scenarios of the PLA digging a hole through Burma to attack India or the PLAN sending its fleet of subs to the Indian Ocean are quite frankly ridiculous. This is a long term game. In this game, there shall be no repeat of 1962. The IA will ensure that.
In final months of WWII, over a period of 3 months, soviets doubled their division strength from 40 to 80 divisions in Russian far east. The material/equipment strength of existing 40 divisions was enhanced first by transferring tanks, fuel and other items from Western Europe to Far East. Then the equipment/fuel/material for 40 fresh divisions was moved and finally the men were moved. The distances involved were just shy of 12,000 kms.
The total number of men moved or redeployed were about 1 million men. The time frame was 3 months, May-1945 till july-1945. If we include the material also then the deployment happened over a period of April-1945 till July-1945 with the peak being May-1945 to June-1945. In fact by 25-July-1945 the soviets deployment were over and in August-1945 the fabled soviet offensive of Manchuria got under way.
So good were the Soviets in masking the scale and breath of deployment that the Japanese thought the soviets would be able to launch an attack in Q4 of 1945 or Q1 of 1946 and when Soviets attacked, in August-1945 the Manchurian Army was in the process of re-deployment.
If we take the deployment period of 4 months, number of men moved at 1 million and the equipment for 40 divisions is added to it, then on an average, each month 2.5 lakh personnel and equipment of about 10 divisions was moved over distance averaging 10,000 kms. Here is the the truly remarkable part of this, this deployment was done over a railway track which was single gauge, the trans-Siberian railway track. It was not dual gauge railway track.
It is also instructive to note that the railway line was not used much after the hostilities commenced. But by the time Soviets launched their attack, they had all the men and material to carry out their task of capturing an area which would rival western Europe. But the beauty of the railway line was that it could carry more men and material, in a more economical and faster means than any road transport system can.
This was in 1945. The year is 2011. Acclimatization applies to humans, not to equipment, fuel and material. And the current, railway line, is just the first among the two other proposed lines, which are on drawing board. The most worrisome is going to be the proposed Lhasa-Chengdu, Sichuan railway line, because by all indications it will run parallel to a significant portion of the Arunachal-Tibet border.
In the year 2000, Chinese started building up its missiles against Taiwan, everybody said that there is nothing to worry. By the year 2008, they had built up so many missiles that US generals/Admirals were saying openly that Chinese missiles will cripple Taiwan's ability to defend itself. Do we plan to be in such a situation by belittling this railway line?
However, the matter of acclimatization needs to added to the above "calculus." I don't know if one can simply add 3 weeks to the above figure. Is it possible that some of these men are already acclimatized elsewhere in China?
Also the time it would take for the men to be transported from Lhasa to points on the Indian border should also be added to this. Is this of the order of one or two weeks?
If one were to consider a much smaller figure of 50,000 men, the above logic will indicate 12 days for transportation to Lhasa, plus the acclimatization factor, plus the time it would take for further transportation to the Indian border. Even a rapid Indian response could also be faced with the need for acclimatization.
To the above "calculus" one should also factor in today's air transport and road capabilities as well as additional capabilities in rail, road and air transport 5 or 10 years from today.
One could argue that the IAF could knock out some bridges on the Lhasa railway bringing to a halt the above rapid transfer of men to Tibet. But this will likely be prior to outbreak of hostilities. Is India going to have the air superiority and the will power to do that?
That said, can we still dismiss the possibility of 50,000 men arriving at a certain location on the Indian border within 6 or 7 weeks as alarmist? (By the way a only a fraction of these 50,000 men would be shooting soldiers.) Certainly Indian satellites would have detected all of this, but will India have the ability to counter it?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Vietnam now to allow foreign vessels to use its ports.Opportunity for India.Other reports of India helping Vietnam in sub operations excellent news.Apartf rom Vietnam,Indonesia is another country afraid of China whom we must establish strong defence ties.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Dangerous Misperceptions: Chinese Views of India’s Rise
However, India’s rise has met with far more ambivalent response inside China. At the mass level, ignorance, stereotyping, and latent hostility characterize the views of India held by a large segment of Chinese society. At the elite level, while interest in India is growing rapidly, the discourse on India is heavily polarized and politicized. As a result, the quality of analysis of India’s ongoing transformation is relatively low. Most worrisome, while elites affiliated with the government tend to discount India’s potential as a great power, they obsessively worry about India’s role as a strategic counterweight that could be used by the West in containing China. The combination of under-appreciation of India’s achievement and exaggeration of India’s role as a geopolitical rival could generate dangerous self-reinforcing dynamics that may make strategic competition between India and China more likely in the future.
Several reasons explain the ignorance and lack of interest in India among ordinary Chinese people. Aside from skimpy coverage in the press, the average Chinese citizen is fixated on the West as a model and, if he thinks about India at all, his image of India is not that of a dynamic, fast-growing country, but of an impoverished, chaotic, and backward society. Such ignorance and stereotyping are further reinforced by the lack of extensive social and cultural exchanges between the two societies.
http://casi.ssc.upenn.edu/iit/peiThe fiercest battle within China over India’s rise, however, is being fought in the realm of ideas, specifically whether India’s democratic and entrepreneurial model of development is a viable alternative to China’s autocratic statist model. The opinions on this debate are polarized within the Chinese elite communities on ideological lines. Predictably, liberals endorse the Indian model while the nationalists reject and belittle it. Interestingly, official commentators are relatively restrained in their criticisms of the India model even as they constantly use some of the well-known socioeconomic problems in India – poverty, poor infrastructure, and the caste system – as proof of the superiority of the Chinese system.
In other words, the discussion of India’s rise among China’s elites is less about India than about China itself. For Chinese liberals, India’s democratic resilience, economic dynamism, social and cultural pluralism, and protection of the poor and the vulnerable are in stark contrast with China’s one-party rule, statist economic policies, and official abuse of power. They use India’s rise as an example to reject the China Model and stress India’s fundamental stability and political accountability as a key source of the durability of the India Model.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142 ... 34844.html
China: U.S. Should Stay Out of Regional Disputes
China: U.S. Should Stay Out of Regional Disputes
Cui Tiankai, vice minister of foreign affairs, blamed other countries in the region—and later singled out Vietnam—for provocation in recent incidents that have rekindled longstanding acrimony over control of areas in the vast stretch of water between them. And he dismissed calls from Vietnam and the Philippines for the U.S. to play a role in resolving those tensions, admonishing that Washington should "approach such issues in a very prudent way.""I believe some countries now are playing with fire," Mr. Cui told a small group of reporters Wednesday. "And I hope the U.S. won't be burned by this fire."The fresh warning highlights the difficult issues that dog ties between Beijing and Washington despite efforts to smooth relations after serious strains last year. The resurgent tension in the South China Sea is likely to feature in Mr. Cui's talks Saturday in Hawaii with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, who oversees Asia-Pacific affairs, intended to be the first in a regular series of bilateral consultations on Asia-Pacific issues.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
X-posted....
Chinese naval maneuvers seen as warning to Vietnam

Chinese naval maneuvers seen as warning to Vietnam
It's interesting to look at this so-called "9-dash" map they useThe Chinese navy conducted three days of exercises — including live fire drills — in the disputed waters of the South China Sea this week, escalating tensions over a potentially resource-rich area also claimed by some neighboring countries in Southeast Asia.
The display of naval might hundreds of miles from China's southernmost border was widely seen as a warning to Vietnam, which this week conducted its own live fire drills near the Spratly Islands. Several countries claim sovereignty over the string of uninhabited volcanic rocks, which are ringed by jagged reefs and crusted with bird droppings but rendered attractive by virtue of the surrounding waters that are fertile fishing grounds and may cover significant reserves of oil and natural gas.
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei all claim jurisdiction over some of the territory. But China contends its sovereignty dates from ancient national maps that show the islands to be an integral part of its territory.


Re: Managing Chinese Threat
I say Vietnam needs nuclear weapons and long-distance missiles, asap!
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
I say Vietnam be included into Indian Union as 30th Province.....One Nation 2 System....RajeshA wrote:I say Vietnam needs nuclear weapons and long-distance missiles, asap!

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Times Now Newshour today, June 24, carried a debate on entry of Huawei and its impending signing of an MoU with IISC on some kind of R&D, in spite of an IB report advising against any such contacts citing national security.
What was of interest and surprise were the comments and body language of Mohandas Pai, Dir, Infy.-
While one SDRE strategist and a former telecom sec (IIRC) were advocating caution, Sri. Pai was laughing from his belly and trying hard not to fall off from his chair. But, when a Chinese strategist started off, he was all ears and nodded in agreement to every word and praise on the chinese company. Later on, Sri. Pai did an == to Western telecom cos, saying that they can indulge in spying too, and china is just a bogeyman for masking loopholes in Indian system! Anyway, towards the end of the debate, his laughter had died down a bit, thanks to some good rebuttals by the anchor and others.
Jai Hu!
What was of interest and surprise were the comments and body language of Mohandas Pai, Dir, Infy.-
While one SDRE strategist and a former telecom sec (IIRC) were advocating caution, Sri. Pai was laughing from his belly and trying hard not to fall off from his chair. But, when a Chinese strategist started off, he was all ears and nodded in agreement to every word and praise on the chinese company. Later on, Sri. Pai did an == to Western telecom cos, saying that they can indulge in spying too, and china is just a bogeyman for masking loopholes in Indian system! Anyway, towards the end of the debate, his laughter had died down a bit, thanks to some good rebuttals by the anchor and others.
Jai Hu!
Last edited by ravar on 25 Jun 2011 09:43, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Samudragupta ji,Samudragupta wrote:I say Vietnam be included into Indian Union as 30th Province.....One Nation 2 System....RajeshA wrote:I say Vietnam needs nuclear weapons and long-distance missiles, asap!
I will never say something like that. Vietnam is a friendly country towards India.
Vietnam is not in our immediate neighborhood nor is it as if it was part of some Indian Empire, that we should consider something like this. I know there was some Hindu influence there, but it is not the Indian Subcontinent. Vietnamese are a very proud people who have handed out the arses of two of the world's superpowers in their hands!
One cannot make a comment like this and expect that it would not be extremely insulting to the other party.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Watching the Infy exec insulting the other panel members' views through laughter for more than 50% of the debate was distracting and irritating. I think other than the 'independent Chinese analyst' to whom he attentively listened, views from the former MEA secretary and an editor (Anil Kumar?) were dismissed through contemptous sniggering and laughing.ravar wrote:Times Now Newshour today, June 24, carried a debate on entry of Huawei and its impending signing of an MoU with IISC on some kind of R&D, in spite of an IB report advising against any such contacts citing national security.
What was of interest and surprise were the comments and body language of Mohandas Pai, Dir, Infy.-
While one SDRE strategist and a former telecom sec (IIRC) were advocating caution, Sri. Pai was laughing from his belly and trying hard not to fall off from his chair. But, when a Chinese strategist started off, he was all ears and nodded in agreement to every word and all the eulogy on the chinese company. Later on, Sri. Pai did an == to Western telecom cos, saying that they can indulge in spying too, and china is just a bogeyman for masking loopholes in Indian system! Anyway, towards the end of the debate, his laughter had died down a bit, thanks to some good rebuttals by the anchor and others.
Jai Hu!
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
China’s water war with India
(DDM at it again)Sometimes news found in the mainstream Indian media can be flabbergasting. Take the case of the purported ‘diversion’ of the Yarlung Tsangpo. A ‘serious’ national newspaper spoke of the “Yarlang Tsangpo, it is what the Brahmaputra river is called in Mandarin”. Yarlung (not Yarlang) Tsangpo is the Tibetan name for the river originating near Mt Kailash. It has nothing to do with Mandarin.
Great news, but the NRSC scientists are wasting their time looking for structures near the Grand Bend of the Brahmaputra. In reality, the diversion is planned a few hundred kilometres upstream, near the city of Tsetang in Central Tibet.
It seems the Ministry hasn’t done its homework before sending a request to NRSC. Also, External Affairs Minister SM Krishna is not a good student. He mixes the ‘diversion scheme’ with the dams being built on the Brahmaputra. While answering a question on the diversion, he affirms that Zangmu Dam “is no cause of concern to India as it is a ‘run off the river’ dam”.
In fact, Beijing is planning a string of six dams in this area — Lengda, Zhongda, Langzhen, Jiexu, Jiacha and Zangmu.
Fast developing China has less and less water and Beijing has to locate possible sources of water to survive. Scientists are looking in the only two possible directions — the sea (the Bohai Sea) or the mountains (the Tibetan plateau).
Three important factors need to be understood. One, China’s hydropower lobbies have a financial interest in ‘concretising’ the project as soon as possible. Last week, an article in The Financial Times affirmed: “China’s Three Gorges Project Corporation has proposed a $15 billion hydropower scheme to Pakistan to dam the Indus river valley at several points, in a project aimed at controlling floods and tackling electricity shortages.” Dams, whether in Pakistan or Tibet, mean big business and the large Chinese corporations will continue to lobby hard to get these projects through.
The second crucial factor is the cost-benefit perspective. The Chinese leadership has mostly been pragmatic. A friend who worked on the issue told me: “If the price of transferring water is cheaper than conservation or getting water from the sea, China will go ahead.” Why to divert the Yarlung Tsangpo and risk a conflict with India, if there is a possibility to avoid it?
Three, China badly needs water and can’t import it. The diversion of the Brahmaputra is in competition with another diversion: From the Bohai Sea, the innermost gulf of the Yellow Sea on the coast of northeastern China and push it up to Xinjiang.
But, why does China need water?
It’s due to three reasons:
To stop the desertification in Xinjiang, Gansu and Inner Mongolia.
To help the dry and polluted Yellow river flow again.
To feed its people, for which large amounts of water are required for agriculture.
will the lizard do a water treaty with India?In the long run, whether it will be by adopting such a convention or by signing a bilateral treaty like the Indus Waters Treaty (1960) between India and Pakistan, Beijing has no choice but to collaborate with its downstream neighbours on a crucial issue like water on which the future of Asia depends. The current ‘imperialist’ attitude does not tally with the status of ‘responsible power’ that China is striving for.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
^ Why would they? Any treaty only ties their hands, whereas currently they can make soothing noises while doing whatever.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
The manner in which Pai behaved on Tv debate is gross insulting to the experts who attended the debate. I feel it only represent the arragence the Infosis people have to others. Same behaviour is not shown by most of the industry leaders ( at least not on Tv) of other sectors. It only shows how much we need to educate our softees on the cyber threat posed by China
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
A REAL CAUSE OF CONCERN
Divisions within China about the future course of the nation’s foreign policy are starker than ever before. It is now being suggested that much like young Japanese officers of the 1930s, young Chinese military officers are increasingly taking charge of strategy, with the result that concerns about rapid military growth are shaping the nation’s broader foreign policy objectives. Civil-military relations in China are under stress with the PLA asserting its pride more forcefully than even before and demanding respect from other States. Not surprisingly, China has been more aggressive in asserting its interests not only vis-à-vis India but also vis-à-vis the United States of America, the European Union, Japan and the Southeast Asian countries.
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But India’s own defence modernization programme is faltering. This year, the Indian government has allocated only 1.8 per cent of its gross domestic product to defence, although, ostensibly, military expenditure has gone up by 11.58 per cent. This is only the second time in over three decades that the defence to GDP ratio has fallen below 2 per cent of the GDP. This is happening at a time when India is expected to spend $112 billion on capital defence acquisitions over the next five years in what is being described as “one of the largest procurement cycles in the world”. Indian military planners are shifting their focus away from Pakistan as China takes centre-stage in future strategic planning.
Over the last two decades, the military expenditure of India has been around 2.75 per cent. But since India has been experiencing significantly higher rates of economic growth over the last decade compared to any other time in its history, the overall resources it has been able to allocate to its defence needs have grown significantly. The armed forces, for long, have been asking for an allocation of 3 per cent of the nation’s GDP to defence. This has received broad political support in recent years. The Indian prime minister has been explicit about this, suggesting that “if our economy grows at about 8 per cent per annum, it will not be difficult for [the Indian government] to allocate about 3 per cent of GDP for national defence”.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
The real threat from China is its amazing ability to get things done...and hats off to the PRC for that.It's prowess in industry,engineering,manufacturing is staggering.It shows that there is a tremendous will in the PRC leadership to stay focussed and deliver the goods,-unlike the impotent PM we have ,who whimpered and whined at the press yesterday,begging them to sweep up all the dirt of his (mal) administration under the carpet and conceal it from the public eye-shocking!
Just look at this stupendus feat of engineering,the world's longest sea bridge,built in just 4 years (!) plus China has 7 of the world's 10 longest bridges.Globally,the ability of China to deliver the goods is being increasingly acknowledged and the PRC now are bidding to build in California the US's first high-speed rail network and fund the same too! JUst compare how long such jobs take in India and how poorly we do the job,CWG and Kalmadi anyone? He would've been executed had he been a Chinaman!
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldne ... ridge.html
Xcpt:
Just look at this stupendus feat of engineering,the world's longest sea bridge,built in just 4 years (!) plus China has 7 of the world's 10 longest bridges.Globally,the ability of China to deliver the goods is being increasingly acknowledged and the PRC now are bidding to build in California the US's first high-speed rail network and fund the same too! JUst compare how long such jobs take in India and how poorly we do the job,CWG and Kalmadi anyone? He would've been executed had he been a Chinaman!
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldne ... ridge.html
Xcpt:
China opens world's longest sea bridge
The 26.4 mile-long Qingdao Haiwan Bridge - the world's longest bridge over sea water - opens to traffic in China.
The marathon-length Qingdao Haiwan Bridge would easily span the English Channel and is almost three miles longer than the previous record-holder, the Lake Pontchartrain Causeway in the American state of Louisiana.
The vast structure links the centre of the booming port city of Qingdao in eastern China's Shandong Province with the suburb of Huangdao, spanning the wide blue waters of Jiaozhou Bay.
The bridge is expected to carry over 30,000 cars a day and will cut the commute between the city of Qingdao and the sprawling suburb of Huangdao by between 20 and 30 minutes.
Built in just four years at a cost of £55.5 billion, the sheer scale of the bridge reveals further recent advances made by Chinese engineering.
China is already home to seven of the world's 10 lengthiest bridges, including the world's longest, the 102-mile Danyang-Kunshan rail bridge, which runs over land and water near Shanghai.
World's longest bridges
102.4 miles: Danyang–Kunshan Grand Bridge, China (rail)
70.6 miles: Tianjin Grand Bridge, China (rail)
49.5 miles: Weinan Weihe Grand Bridge, China (rail)
33.5 miles: Bang Na Expressway, Thailand (road)
29.9 miles: Beijing Grand Bridge, China (rail)
26.4 miles: Qingdao Haiwan Bridge, China (road) - longest bridge over water
23.8 miles: Lake Pontchartrain Causeway, USA (road)
22.8 miles: Manchac Swamp bridge, USA (road)
22.2 miles: Yangcun Bridge, China (rail)
22.1 miles: Hangzhou Bay Bridge, China (road)
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
conflict in the South China Sea
Burns said the US saw trouble coming not from the Hu Jintao generation but the more nationalistic generation that was soon to take power. ''I think there is a consensus that China is a potential threat ... and that if China should rise, with its extraordinarily big military modernisation, and find disarray in Asia ... a declining or receding United States ... an alliance system that was withering, then China might be tempted to seek military domination.''
On the other hand, if the US ''is able to maintain its position in Asia, retains its predominant military power through its alliance system, and also includes India in a new strategic partnership in the Indian Ocean and western Pacific, it is much more likely that, when China rises into a democratic sea filled with democratic powers, that will be peaceful.''
The US Pacific command has held training exercises in the South China Sea with the Philippines and several other South-East Asian countries. Meanwhile, the US has buttressed strategic ties with Vietnam. The US has also agreed with Japan to bring India into a trilateral security dialogue soon, on the basis that India has increasing trade and naval interests in the busy sea lanes that traverse the South China Sea and that India is concerned that Chinese behaviour there is a sign of how China will act in Sino-Indian border disputes unless checked.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Originally posted by ShauryaT
Published on Jul 07, 2011
By Bharat Karnad
Good morning, ’Nam: The Asian Age
This is the best news I have a heard since a long time from the Indian Establishment!
The next stop would be digging a Kra Canal in Thailand, through which Indian warships can travel to Vietnam without any opposition from any other Southeast Asian countries.
South China Sea, I mean Southeast Asia Sea, here comes India.
Published on Jul 07, 2011
By Bharat Karnad
Good morning, ’Nam: The Asian Age
in 1979, even as its regular divisions were held in reserve, its militia of hastily armed and trained villagers in the border provinces proved more than adequate to kill 25,000 and injure 75,000 of an invading force of 100,000 People’s Liberation Army troops chairman Deng Xiaoping had ordered into action to teach Vietnam “a lesson”, much as Mao Zedong had launched his “self-defence counter-attack” against India.
Except, it were the Chinese who were taught a brutal lesson in offensive guerrilla resistance and faced humiliation they cannot easily forget. The thrashing China received at the hands of the Vietnamese 32 years ago has resulted in the respect Beijing shows Hanoi that Delhi can only dream of. Thus, in the latest clash last month in the South China Sea over the disputed Spratly Islands chain, after Chinese ships cut the cables of a PetroVietnam oil exploration vessel, Vietnam responded with strong words backed by naval live-fire drills. Fearing the situation was sliding into loss of face, this time on sea, the Chinese quickly asked for talks.
Vietnam has ever since viewed a meaty presence of an out-of-area friendly naval power in waters offshore as an insurance to ward off the danger from the Chinese Navy. Russia today, much reduced, cannot perform that role, and the United States is unreliable. Hanoi’s hopes, therefore, rest on the Indian government mustering the strategic will to fill the void. A Vietnamese military delegation headed by its Naval Chief, Vice-Admiral Ngyuyen Van Hien, visiting Delhi a fortnight ago, explored ways of developing mutual confidence and trust.
The more significant thing was Vice-Adm. Hien’s offer of the port of Nha Trang on the South China Sea for the Indian Navy’s use. Nha Trang shares virtually the same longitude as the Sanya base on Hainan, but, latitude-wise, is located a few degrees south. An Indian naval flotilla voyaging frequently between the Andamans and Nha Trang, and sustained by a basing and provisioning arrangement on the central Vietnamese coast, will amount to a near permanent Indian presence in the South China Sea, signalling Indian intent and forward positioning that can mess up the Chinese naval and strategic calculus and push Beijing planners, for once, onto the back foot.
Khush Khabri, Badhaai ho. PMO men lardka hua hai! I can almost see his balls!Even though Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his national security adviser (NSA) Shiv Shankar Menon are reportedly for an Indian naval presence in the Vietnamese seas and want India to be a staunch strategic partner of Vietnam

The next stop would be digging a Kra Canal in Thailand, through which Indian warships can travel to Vietnam without any opposition from any other Southeast Asian countries.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
A base is in the offing in SE Asia. Has been for a while. But we need to become a bit more aggressive in our FP and protect our interests. From what I am informed, we shouldn't expect people to come to us, we need to go to them and say we want xyz. Particularly in the IOR.
Also read IA chiefs recent comments about expansion of A&N with troops, fighter jets, transport fleet, tanks etc. This is for out of area ops probably. Things look good for india in the long run particularly in South east asia where everyone feels the PRC threat.
Also read IA chiefs recent comments about expansion of A&N with troops, fighter jets, transport fleet, tanks etc. This is for out of area ops probably. Things look good for india in the long run particularly in South east asia where everyone feels the PRC threat.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
A single skirmish between Chinese Navy and Vietnam Navy would push the Vietnamese to go nuclear. India should get our thermonuclear bombs tested and retested in Vietnam.
In my opinion, in this big wide world, Vietnam is the only country, where India can get her nuclear arsenal tested!
In my opinion, in this big wide world, Vietnam is the only country, where India can get her nuclear arsenal tested!
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Probably not TN's, as it gives too much capability for Viets.
Viets should be able to take care of its adversary quite easily, if the grapevines are to be believed.
Viets should be able to take care of its adversary quite easily, if the grapevines are to be believed.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
I have a point with respect to this basing of Naval contingent in Vietnam (and which also covers the proposed basing in Ayni)
What will this basing achieve for India? What is the objective?
--Answering my own question, I have the US example of basing naval/air/land assets in Japan and Philippines. From what I understand, the US had a very clear strategy - Pacific was their backyard and any and all Naval engagements will be to the west of general line Japan-Philippines. they ensured that the USSR did not have free run of the pacific and China was kept in check with respect to Taiwan. Apart from that, they needed to protect their allies in Japan/Philippines/Australia/South Korea.
In case of any assault on any of US Ships in this area or any hostilities, the entire weight of US Navy would have been brought to bear on the adversary. The war would have been fought in enemies backyard and not Americans - they had ensured that their is no Peal Harbour.
Now, coming to India.
What do we gain by basing vessels in Vietnam? What might be the size of this contingent?
(a) Are we trying to ensure that the next PLAAN-IN battle happens to the eastof Malacca Strait and in South China Sea? That is, take the battle to the Chinese. The classic USN approach.
(b) Or are we going to use the base monitor the movement in Malacca Straits and in case of any conflict, strangle the movement on the east side of strait and draw the PLAAN down for a fight there.
(c) Use the base as a classic monitoring station for traffic onlee and in case of conflict, keep tab on the movement of PLAAN. During peace time, the IN ships can be berthed off and on here during their sojourn in the South China Sea and farther east.
If, the answer to basing in Vietnam is (a) or (b), then, what is size of force required? Can a single base in Vietnam sustain such a operation in wartime? After all, it will become fair target for the Chinese. Also, what happens if the PLAAN plays games like it did with the Vietnam vessel? Will GOI have the balls to reply back in same coin - either on the high seas or at a place of its choosing? How do you impress on the Chinese that any act of aggression against IN vessels, will be treated as assault on India and no hanky-panky will be tolerated?
Unless, we can clearly define the role for IN base or any other troop deployment, lungi dance is premature. Here, it also important to understand that while the Vietnam gave bloody nose to PLA in 1979, the real objective of that assault was to show to the world that Soviet promise to come to aid of its freinds (like the treaty it had with Vietnam) was hollow - and that is what it achieved. What will GOI do if PLAAN attacks one of IN ships in the area in a manufactured incident with overwhelming force?
What will this basing achieve for India? What is the objective?
--Answering my own question, I have the US example of basing naval/air/land assets in Japan and Philippines. From what I understand, the US had a very clear strategy - Pacific was their backyard and any and all Naval engagements will be to the west of general line Japan-Philippines. they ensured that the USSR did not have free run of the pacific and China was kept in check with respect to Taiwan. Apart from that, they needed to protect their allies in Japan/Philippines/Australia/South Korea.
In case of any assault on any of US Ships in this area or any hostilities, the entire weight of US Navy would have been brought to bear on the adversary. The war would have been fought in enemies backyard and not Americans - they had ensured that their is no Peal Harbour.
Now, coming to India.
What do we gain by basing vessels in Vietnam? What might be the size of this contingent?
(a) Are we trying to ensure that the next PLAAN-IN battle happens to the eastof Malacca Strait and in South China Sea? That is, take the battle to the Chinese. The classic USN approach.
(b) Or are we going to use the base monitor the movement in Malacca Straits and in case of any conflict, strangle the movement on the east side of strait and draw the PLAAN down for a fight there.
(c) Use the base as a classic monitoring station for traffic onlee and in case of conflict, keep tab on the movement of PLAAN. During peace time, the IN ships can be berthed off and on here during their sojourn in the South China Sea and farther east.
If, the answer to basing in Vietnam is (a) or (b), then, what is size of force required? Can a single base in Vietnam sustain such a operation in wartime? After all, it will become fair target for the Chinese. Also, what happens if the PLAAN plays games like it did with the Vietnam vessel? Will GOI have the balls to reply back in same coin - either on the high seas or at a place of its choosing? How do you impress on the Chinese that any act of aggression against IN vessels, will be treated as assault on India and no hanky-panky will be tolerated?
Unless, we can clearly define the role for IN base or any other troop deployment, lungi dance is premature. Here, it also important to understand that while the Vietnam gave bloody nose to PLA in 1979, the real objective of that assault was to show to the world that Soviet promise to come to aid of its freinds (like the treaty it had with Vietnam) was hollow - and that is what it achieved. What will GOI do if PLAAN attacks one of IN ships in the area in a manufactured incident with overwhelming force?
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- BRFite
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Tracking the PLAAN SSBN and SSN in the shallow waters of SCS is a good enough objective....IN will be no match to fight the PLAAN in the SCS...and PLAAN will be using overwelming force on any IN assets in the area....
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
rohitvats wrote:(b) Or are we going to use the base monitor the movement in Malacca Straits and in case of any conflict, strangle the movement on the east side of strait and draw the PLAAN down for a fight there.
It is a tripwire, to stop all Chinese traffic through Malacca straits and elsewhere, attacking Chinese ships from our bases in A&N, perhaps from Mauritius also.rohitvats wrote:What will GOI do if PLAAN attacks one of IN ships in the area in a manufactured incident with overwhelming force?
Would the Chinese have the gumption of giving India a reason to choke off their whole traffic in the Indian Ocean!
The way to deal with the Chinese is to set up our red lines, our trip wires further away from the Indian Mainland, and should them be violated, to choke them where we are strong!
On the other hand, if the Chinese get into a fight with us, say in PoK or in Arunachal Pradesh, and they start showering us with missiles on the mainland from Tibet, we will have a Navy much closer to the Chinese mainland to deliver the bombs too.
In fact, it would also help to have a naval base in Philippines and a presence on the Kra Canal, that we help build. In time, we could have say a quarter of our Navy in South Pacific.
Can I do the lung dance now?
