China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 27 Jun 2011 01:39

Oh well .............. forget the hydrophones and MKI bases near the Chinese border.

India gives into China at the border

Is there anyone in ND that is in charge of any thing?

I guess, found this:

PM hopes new mechanism on border with China will bear results soon

Nihat · Post by **Nihat** » 27 Jun 2011 01:59

without knowing what line of thinking is behind a particular decision, its rather foolhardy to draw conclusions

Shrinivasan · Post by **Shrinivasan** » 27 Jun 2011 03:11

NRao wrote:India gives into China at the borderIs there anyone in ND that is in charge of any thing?

Something is amiss here...we are constructing bunkers, roads, bases right on the LAC/LOC and then there is this tamasha about clearing civil structures with the MOD??? it could either be posturing or some Dhimi-Cheeni lover B'cRat in MHA, pulling out a 30 ur old circular out of his Musharaf and issuing this order.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 27 Jun 2011 05:54

Folks - I think you are getting things the opposite way here. Shallow waters off your own coast means that your own subs can be monitored there and enemy ships will be able to avoid them. If shallow waters extend 500 km from your coast - then ships could come into that zone and have a better chance of finding defending subs.

On another note, why should you not build at the border in a conflict zone? because those building will be the first to go if conflict erupts.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 27 Jun 2011 05:55

Acharya wrote: Entire IOR is not more than 4000 ft and this shallow waters cannot provide much security for any foriegn vessels.

They have to go towards the western shores of Indonasia for safety and those areas must be under IN watch

Maximum operating depth of most subs is less than 1000 feet.

bmallick · Post by **bmallick** » 27 Jun 2011 08:36

NRao, I know how hydrophones work and also I know how SOSUS works.

From you post, I got the idea that you intend to put the hydrophones in the South China Sea. Hence my questions:

1. How do you intend to provide power to the hydrophones to operate, by laying cables all the way till there?
2. How do you intend to receive information from them, by cables from there to Andaman?

If you meant the rim of Andaman Sea then my apologies and please forget about the questions?

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 28 Jun 2011 06:22

shiv wrote: Shallow waters off your own coast means that your own subs can be monitored there and enemy ships will be able to avoid them.

Extend your coastline to the edge of the IOR upto other waters and monitor the entry of vessels

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 28 Jun 2011 06:30

Acharya wrote:
shiv wrote: Shallow waters off your own coast means that your own subs can be monitored there and enemy ships will be able to avoid them.
Extend your coastline to the edge of the IOR upto other waters and monitor the entry of vessels

Acharyaji - a lot of people, including you are referring to what Indians should do. The problem does not apply to India at all and I was not referring to the Indian coastline.

My original post was to ask how the Chinese might think and act because their only coast is a Pacific coast and 90% or more of that coastline extends to waters that are not more than 150 feet (<50 meters) deep for a distance of several hundreds of km. in some places.

If you were Chinese what would be the advantages and disadvantages of such a situation? It seems to me that the Chinese policy of extending its territorial waters is based exactly on the reasoning that you have suggested.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 28 Jun 2011 07:39

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 28 Jun 2011 08:11

shiv wrote:If you were Chinese what would be the advantages and disadvantages of such a situation? It seems to me that the Chinese policy of extending its territorial waters is based exactly on the reasoning that you have suggested.

Once a submarine officer told me to fight an effective cat and mouse game you need a depth of atleast 200 m any thing less than that the submarine is vulnerable.

So if the < 50 m water theory is true then Chinese can use small ASW ship and choppers deployed in numbers to effective tackle and neutralise any submarine threat near its littoral.

If the chinese have to deploy their own submarine they would be doing it in deeper waters and most certainly all the ships of enemy would remain in deep waters due to size constrains.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 28 Jun 2011 08:23

Austin wrote:
shiv wrote:If you were Chinese what would be the advantages and disadvantages of such a situation? It seems to me that the Chinese policy of extending its territorial waters is based exactly on the reasoning that you have suggested.
Once a submarine officer told me to fight an effective cat and mouse game you need a depth of atleast 200 m any thing less than that the submarine is vulnerable.

So if the < 50 m water theory is true then Chinese can use small ASW ship and choppers deployed in numbers to effective tackle and neutralise any submarine threat near its littoral.

If the chinese have to deploy their own submarine they would be doing it in deeper waters and most certainly all the ships of enemy would remain in deep waters due to size constrains.

Yes Austin - but look at the downside. There is no use sending submarines into China's littoral for this reason. But if surface ships enter China's littoral they can't be attacked by China's own subs which will be detected and destroyed - so it is a double edged thing. Also any Chinese subs coming out of Chinese shallow water ports can be tracked for hundreds of km. by satellite if necessary.

The "less than 50 m" is not a theory. You can check it yourself using Google Earth and other articles

disha · Post by **disha** » 28 Jun 2011 08:33

Is China landlocked? Not in the classical sense, but in the following sense, without being detected from any nearest land station or sonar buouy:

1. Fielding a carrier based group outside the South China Sea
2. Sending out discrete nuclear submarine outside the South China Sea

If I look at the PDF here: http://ijgofs.whoi.edu/Time-Series/SEAT ... tation.pdf, it looks like a giant bath tub or basin.

So the only way to break out is follow deep see counters, that is egress points where the terrain drops steeply and follow that lines and the lines should be away from Japan, Phillipines, Vietnam, Indonesia. That explains the need for the spartly islands.

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 28 Jun 2011 08:35

NRao wrote:Peaceful China!!!

Chinese naval maneuvers seen as warning to Vietnam

http://pib.nic.in/release/phsmall.asp?phid=35481

The Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Nirmal Verma calling on the Deputy Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Vietnam People's Navy, Vice Admiral Nguyen Van Hien, in New Delhi on June 27, 2011.

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 28 Jun 2011 08:36

Should We Be Afraid of China's New Aircraft Carrier? Not yet.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 28 Jun 2011 08:38

I believe optical sensors on drones and LRMP a/c should be able to id submarines at shallow depths from up in air in clear water - the south china sea seems to be clearer compared to the seas near india (same applies to chinese subs lurking around the in shallow andaman sea). also the passage of such a object at 50m depth might leave a tell-tale 'wake' in the water which sensors can pick up.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 28 Jun 2011 08:43

Singha wrote:I believe optical sensors on drones and LRMP a/c should be able to id submarines at shallow depths from up in air in clear water - the south china sea seems to be clearer compared to the seas near india (same applies to chinese subs lurking around the in shallow andaman sea). also the passage of such a object at 50m depth might leave a tell-tale 'wake' in the water which sensors can pick up.

Also Singha - a sub whose hull is avoiding scraping the bottom at 50 meters will have its conning tower under just 10 -15 meters of water. On a bright day that would be clearly visible from the air or from satellites.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 28 Jun 2011 08:53

here is a paper which lists the issues in sub surface detection and current eqpt.
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/slbm/detection.pdf

not surprisingly this is an area of great funding and mil research

akimalik · Post by **akimalik** » 28 Jun 2011 09:20

shiv wrote:On a bright day that would be clearly visible from the air or from satellites.

Hi is there a reason why Sub hulls are painted black?
I mean would it not be better to have them in a blue-green kind of paint-scheme?

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 28 Jun 2011 09:42

shiv wrote: But if surface ships enter China's littoral they can't be attacked by China's own subs which will be detected and destroyed - so it is a double edged thing.

If you are talking of big conventional subs like kilo then yes , but they can use small 300-500 T subs like midget submarine to attack conventional subs , infact you dont need a sub you can use surface ships or air assets to attack enemy ship. So its not really a double edged sword as long as you play to their strength.

Also any Chinese subs coming out of Chinese shallow water ports can be tracked for hundreds of km. by satellite if necessary.

Generally sub bases are at place where the water is deep or they would accompany the subs with other assets till such time it is in deep water , its normal opsec followed during routine patrol or during war.

And I would assume unless the war is bolt from blue , they would have sufficient time to pull some percentage of subs from bases and pens out in open water , even if its a bolt from blue war with no warning some percentage of submarine will be at sea if they follow the drill well.

The "less than 50 m" is not a theory. You can check it yourself using Google Earth and other articles

I am not good at google earth so will take your word

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 28 Jun 2011 09:51

Austin wrote: Generally sub bases are at place where the water is deep or they would accompany the subs with other assets till such time it is in deep water , its normal opsec followed during routine patrol or during war.
<snip>
I am not good at google earth so will take your word

I have linked a map higher in this thread that has color coding for depth and a quote from the link associated with that Here is the link
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 2#p1117262

China has practically no access to deep water. of course you can use mini subs to take out surface ships - but heck 150 feet is seriously shallow. Does China have a fleet of mini subs for coastal defence?

All Chinese subs will have to return to base at some time or other. They can all be followed on their way out after that. And the minute the enter deep water - their probable position can be trailed - especially because they will be in international waters before the continental shelf sinks and becomes deep sea.

I am trying to say "The Chinese have a problem". I am asking "How can they solve that problem?"

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 28 Jun 2011 09:58

one way is naval bases in taiwan or philipines both of which are close to deep water in the eastern shore.

if taiwan falls into their lap, or Philipines falls into a economic crisis and becomes a economic protectorate it can be managed. I think philipines being the only american ex-colony in far east and ex-host of subic bay still retains close ties to usa.

to make best of a bad situation, hainan is their main sub base - closest to deep water.

Shrinivasan · Post by **Shrinivasan** » 28 Jun 2011 11:43

China and not Pakistan is seen as India's main threat. the MOD has prepared a 15 year plan to address the Chinese threat...
http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/news/c ... eat/203704
Good going MOD

UBanerjee · Post by **UBanerjee** » 28 Jun 2011 11:45

shiv wrote:
Austin wrote: Generally sub bases are at place where the water is deep or they would accompany the subs with other assets till such time it is in deep water , its normal opsec followed during routine patrol or during war.
<snip>
I am not good at google earth so will take your word
I have linked a map higher in this thread that has color coding for depth and a quote from the link associated with that Here is the link
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 2#p1117262

China has practically no access to deep water. of course you can use mini subs to take out surface ships - but heck 150 feet is seriously shallow. Does China have a fleet of mini subs for coastal defence?

Well enemy surface ships operating in China's littorals can of course be dealt with by air power or anti-ship missiles launched from land.

UBanerjee · Post by **UBanerjee** » 28 Jun 2011 11:49

cheenum wrote:China and not Pakistan is seen as India's main threat. the MOD has prepared a 15 year plan to address the Chinese threat...
http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/news/c ... eat/203704
Good going MOD

Why does the video mention stealth battleships? Does he mean Kolkata class DDG?

Shrinivasan · Post by **Shrinivasan** » 28 Jun 2011 12:01

UBanerjee wrote:
cheenum wrote:China and not Pakistan is seen as India's main threat. the MOD has prepared a 15 year plan to address the Chinese threat...
http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/news/c ... eat/203704
Good going MOD
Why does the video mention stealth battleships? Does he mean Kolkata class DDG?

Kolkatta, Shivalik, Project 15B and other future variants... going forward Desh would be building ships and Aeroplanes which will incorporate Stealth from the grounds up...

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 28 Jun 2011 12:09

shiv wrote: China has practically no access to deep water. of course you can use mini subs to take out surface ships - but heck 150 feet is seriously shallow. Does China have a fleet of mini subs for coastal defence? [/url]

The yellow sea is shown as depth between 40 m to 150 m with average of 40 m ,quite low for submarine warfare , they do not have any kind of midget submarine which is useful at shallow depth they do have DSRV but thats not useful for warfare

I am trying to say "The Chinese have a problem". I am asking "How can they solve that problem?"

Probably the chinese do not have to worry as long as they do not have a satellite overhead watching them
http://www.global-military.com/tag/chinese-submarines

Or they just do not deploy any key sub assets at Yellow sea but only surface assets , they can always protect the subs as it moves to deep waters with surface vessel.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 28 Jun 2011 12:57

http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiap ... ?hpt=hp_c1

check the map above - the claim lines of malaysia , vietnam and philipines in the south china sea look pretty reasonable and continguous to their own frontage.

the PRCs claim is to everything - incl all the fat oil/gas offshore.

a map of spratly islands showing who has a toehold where - for their small size the vietnamese sure are not averse to coming forward for a fight!
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... eoMaps.png

in typical creeping chinese fashion they first setup a few huts on mischief reef
http://www.france24.com/en/files/imagec ... -1-0_0.jpg

few years later it was a huge 'fortress'
http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/pics/2008112583631.jpg

the reef itself seems to be awash at high tide. not sure how it copes with heavy seas in monsoon or typhoons

navneeet · Post by **navneeet** » 28 Jun 2011 13:41

Chinese Navy Mission Reveals Secret Drone

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/06 ... ret-drone/

Six months after the Chinese air force let the first photos of its new stealth fighter leak online, Beijing’s military has “accidentally” showed off another secretive weapon system: a small drone, apparently used to scout ahead of China’s fast-growing fleet of warships.

the Chinese ‘bot could be fairly dated technology. Considering where the drone was spotted — at sea, and above warships — and its apparent size, it’s probably a rough analogue to the U.S. Navy’s RQ-2 Pioneer.

prashanth · Post by **prashanth** » 28 Jun 2011 19:02

Shrinivasan wrote:China and not Pakistan is seen as India's main threat. the MOD has prepared a 15 year plan to address the Chinese threat...
http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/news/c ... eat/203704
Good going MOD

Whats this? Not long back our raksha mantri orders DRDO to speed up Agni V. Now we have this.
Looks like something serious has happened.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 28 Jun 2011 20:46

prashanth wrote:
Shrinivasan wrote:China and not Pakistan is seen as India's main threat. the MOD has prepared a 15 year plan to address the Chinese threat...
http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/news/c ... eat/203704
Good going MOD
Whats this? Not long back our raksha mantri orders DRDO to speed up Agni V. Now we have this.
Looks like something serious has happened.

No, LTIPP (2012-2027) has been around for a while. Nothing new.

Shrinivasan · Post by **Shrinivasan** » 29 Jun 2011 01:44

ShauryaT wrote:No, LTIPP (2012-2027) has been around for a while. Nothing new.

It has been worked on for sometime, has been denied before. Now it going before CCS for approval and probably has been leaked out to Undee TV.

VinodTK · Post by **VinodTK** » 29 Jun 2011 05:51

China Has Second Thoughts About Indian Ocean Base

China is backing away from earlier interest in developing a naval base at the Pakistani port of Gwadar. Last month, some Chinese officials expressed interest (after being asked by the Pakistani government) in undertaking development of the underused Pakistani port of Gwadar, which is located near the Iranian border. The Chinese were to build a naval base, that would be used by Pakistani and Chinese warships and aircraft.

This is not the first time China has been asked to expand port facilities in Gwadar. A decade ago, China agreed to finance the construction of a deepwater port in Gwadar. China paid for 80 percent of the $250 million cost and supplied most of the key personnel. The new port facilities were to give China better access to Central Asian markets and reduce Pakistani dependence on the port of Karachi (which, being close to India, is easily blockaded in wartime). The first part of the new Gwadar port facilities were opened in 2005. Work continues on expanding Gwadar. But China was not willing to build military facilities, even if they would share them with the Pakistanis. The civilian port facilities are adequate for fueling and supplying warships, and anything more would be seen as threatening by India, and perhaps Iran as well.

The Pakistani request for military facilities was part of a Pakistani effort to increase military cooperation with China, to replace current reliance on the United States. But China is not willing to supply as much free stuff. Chinese military aid comes with a lot more strings attached. For example, while China recently pledged to speed up delivery of fifty JF-17 jets (an F-16 knock off that Pakistan helped, largely with cash, to develop), it also expects to be paid. The U.S. gives Pakistan F-16s. China, however, has pledged to be Pakistan's BFF (best friend forever.) China has long supported Pakistan as part of an effort to keep India distracted, and weakened. China and India have some serious border disputes, most of which involve China claiming ownership of Indian territory as well.

disha · Post by **disha** » 29 Jun 2011 10:28

VinodTK wrote:China Has Second Thoughts About Indian Ocean Base
...The first part of the new Gwadar port facilities were opened in 2005. Work continues on expanding Gwadar. But China was not willing to build military facilities, even if they would share them with the Pakistanis. The civilian port facilities are adequate for fueling and supplying warships, and anything more would be seen as threatening by India, and perhaps Iran as well.

What does a warship need other than fuel? Food? Shells? Gwadar is already a millitary base. I would actually welcome at least 5 Million Chineese all over pakjab and sindh, all the massage parlours and eateries that come with it.

UBanerjee · Post by **UBanerjee** » 29 Jun 2011 10:53

China wary of India's military might: US

The fleet-footed Dragon may be rapidly spreading its wings across the globe but remains a wee bit wary of the flat-footed Elephant next door.

DDM giving us its very best effort

Consequently, "to improve regional deterrence", the 2.25-million strong People's Liberation Army has moved "more advanced and survivable" solid-fuelled CCS-5 nuclear-capable ballistic missiles closer to the borders with India.
...
Satellite pictures, for instance, have long disclosed that a large area in central China, near Delingha and Da Qaidam in Qinghai province, has close to 60 launch pads for nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, which can easily target north India. Moreover, the new Chinese road-mobile DF-31A missiles, which can hit targets 11,200 km away, and the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which have a reach beyond 7,200 km, are weapons which even has the US worried.

pralay · Post by **pralay** » 29 Jun 2011 22:23

China Develops An M-1 Tank Killer

June 23, 2011: China has developed its own version of the U.S. SADARM (Search And Destroy Armor Munitions). These small (147mm diameter, 204mm long) devices weigh 10 kg (22 pounds) and are carried two per 155mm shell or 40 per CBU-105, 455 kg (thousand pound), cluster bomb. Each of these SADARMs have their own radar and heat sensor that searches for armored vehicles below and destroys them with a special shaped charge warhead. The SADARM sensors can search and attack vehicles within an area of roughly 150 x 360 meters, as they slowly descend.

SADARM, or "sensor fused munitions" were first conceived of in the 1960s, but it wasn't until the 1980s that the technology was perfected. The self-forging metal projectile used by SADARM punches through the thinner armor on the top of the vehicle (including the American M-1). If a target is not found, SADARM self-destructs.

Development was slowed by the end of the Cold War in 1991, but by the end of the 1990s, some were produced. The first use of the CBU-105 was on April 2nd, 2003, when a B-52 dropped six of them on an Iraqi army column moving south from Baghdad. Most of the vehicles were later found destroyed. The Russians have a version of their own, SPBE-D, for sale to anyone who can pay for it. This half ton cluster bomb contains only 15 SADARM type devices, and each weighs twice as much as the American version.

The problem with selling SADARMs is that, while they are an inexpensive and quick way to destroy lots of armored vehicles, there are not many nations facing that kind of threat any more. China, however, has Russia and India as potential foes. China has border disputes with both nations, and both of those countries have large armor forces. So far, China has only displayed the artillery shell version of SADARM. This indicates that China used American technology to develop their SADARM. The basic idea, and technologies, are well known. But the actual engineering data of American SADARM would be useful, as many minor engineering problems had to be solved before a reliable weapon could be produced.

zlin · Post by **zlin** » 30 Jun 2011 08:08

J20 movie

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 30 Jun 2011 16:10

zlin wrote: J20 movie

I like it. There is one view of the a/c doing a 90 deg bank.

The engines are a mystery. At 4 min 40 sec the afterburners produce the most perfect blue flame that I have only seen in the Al 31. No other engine gets that gas-cooker blue flame.

The tail chute housing is never closed. Is it meant to double up as a stall/spin chute?

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 01 Jul 2011 14:07

PLACES AND BASES: The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean
Naval War College Review

...

It can even be argued that it is no longer an issue of whether China will seek out friendly ports from which to
support its forces, because those locations are already being used by the PLAN. For example, Salalah in Oman is serving as a regular supply port for Chinese warships operating in the Gulf of Aden; every ship in the second, third, fourth,
fifth, and sixth rotations called into Salalah for resupply between June 2009 and August 2010 (see map). ...

Despite the furor it has generated, the “string of pearls” does not represent a coordinated strategy on the part of China, and there is no substantive evidence in Chinese sources or elsewhere to support the contentions of commentators, academics, and officials who use it as a baseline for explaining Beijing’s intentions in the Indian Ocean. Reality is shaping up to be quite different. The current debate in China is revolving around the establishment of what are commonly referred to
in the U.S. military as “places,” as opposed to bases. This type of strategy involves securing with friendly governments diplomatic agreements allowing access to those nations’ facilities in order to obtain essential supplies, such as fuel, food, and freshwater, for deployed forces. Such agreements can also involve reciprocal guarantees of military support in such areas as training, equipment, and education.

One example is the United States–Singapore Memorandum of Understanding, which permits the U.S. Navy access to Changi Naval Base while providing the use of Air Force bases and airspace in the continental United States for training by
the Republic of Singapore Air Force. What the Chinese are currently debating is whether deployed PLAN forces need places to which regular access is guaranteed by formal diplomatic agreements, or whether the current ad hoc system of calling
in friendly ports when necessary is sufficient for the accomplishment of current and future missions.

...

Salalah, Oman

The PLAN ships deployed to the Gulf of Aden have utilized Salalah more than any other port, with nineteen port calls through August 2010, and it can be argued that Salalah is already a “place” for the PLAN in fact if not in name.

...

Aden, Yemen

Aden was the first port utilized by PLAN ships during their ongoing deployment to the Gulf of Aden. The initial call was from 21 to 23 February 2009, during the first counterpiracy rotation, when Weishanhu loaded diesel fuel, freshwater, and
food stores with which to replenish the task force’s destroyers...

Djibouti

Unlike Salalah or even Aden, Djibouti may not be an established place for the resupply of Chinese naval forces operating in the Gulf of Aden but it still represents a significant port of call. To date, four PLAN ships engaged in counterpiracy
patrols have called into Djibouti, ...

Karachi, Pakistan

China’s investment in the construction of the port of Gwadar in western Pakistan has fueled speculation for almost a decade that Beijing’s ultimate goal is to turn the port into a Chinese version of Gibraltar or even Pearl Harbor, a shining
jewel in the “string of pearls. But the reality does not come close to matching speculation.

...

For all the hype about Gwadar, it is far more likely that Beijing would send its warships to Karachi, Pakistan’s largest port and primary naval base, if it were to seek a facility in Pakistan to support its forces. In its twenty-five years of goodwill
cruises and exercises with foreign navies, the PLAN has visited Karachi more often—seven times, including three in the past three years—than any other port. The PLAN is also now a regular participant in the Pakistani-sponsored multilateral
AMAN exercises, having sent warships to AMAN ’07 and AMAN ’09. Additionally, substantial ship construction and repair facilities, including dry docks, are available at the Pakistan Naval Dockyard and the Karachi Shipyard and Engineering
Works (KSEW). Karachi is also where the Pakistani navy bases its three Chinese-built F-22P frigates; the fourth, which will also be based at Karachi, is being built by KSEW with Chinese assistance. These warships, which most likely
enjoy some degree of parts commonality with PLAN frigates, and extensive repair facilities, make Karachi a strong candidate as a friendly port where China would seek to repair any ships damaged operating in the Indian Ocean. The possibility of PLAN ships seeking repairs at Karachi was stated as fact by Senior Captain Xie Dongpei, a staff officer at PLAN headquarters, in June 2009, while in July 2010 the Pakistani naval chief of staff, Admiral Noman Bashir, stated that Pakistan can provide ports, logistics, and maintenance to the Chinese navy. That Admiral Bashir called attention to Pakistan’s ability to provide logistics and maintenance to the PLAN indicates that he was referring to the robust dockyards of Karachi as opposed to the limited facilities of Gwadar. One final advantage offered by Karachi is its proximity to PNS Mehran , Pakistan’s primary naval aviation facility. The Pakistani navy bases at PNS Mehran six Chinese-made Z-9EC helicopters, the aircraft the PLAN primarily employs on its own destroyers and frigates. Should the helicopters of any Chinese ships operating in the Indian Ocean require significant repairs, necessary facilities and spare parts could be found at PNS Mehran. Karachi’s distance from the Gulf of Aden, over a thousand nautical miles, makes it unlikely to be utilized by the PLAN for rest and replenishment on a regular basis. However, there is no doubt that PLAN ships will continue to visit Karachi for goodwill purposes, for bilateral and multilateral exercises, and in transit to and from the Gulf of Aden, as Huangshan and Weishanhu did on their voyage home in August 2009. Given the close relationship between Beijing and Islamabad, Pakistan will likely grant PLAN ships access to the repair facilities at Karachi if needed.

Colombo, Sri Lanka

China’s relationship with Sri Lanka has received a great deal of attention recently, due to Chinese financing in the construction of the Sri Lankan port of Hambantota and military aid in the fight against the Tamil Tigers, including the early 2008 delivery of six new-build F-7G fighter aircraft. ...

On a map, a Chinese-funded naval base in Sri Lanka looks like a dagger pointed directly at India. In reality, its very proximity to India would make such a base a liability in any serious conflict without substantial air defenses, command-and control facilities, and hardened infrastructure, which Sri Lanka certainly cannot afford to provide. At the same time a robust base at Hambantota or anywhere else in Sri Lanka would represent a costly investment that would be unnecessary for the support of forces engaged in counterpiracy patrols, peacetime presence missions, or naval diplomacy and would inflame China’s already complicated relations with India.

While it is unlikely, for these reasons, that Hambantota will be developed into a naval base, the PLAN is not a stranger to Sri Lanka; Colombo, Sri Lanka’s largest port and primary naval base, is becoming a popular mid–Indian Ocean refueling
stop for Chinese warships. In 1985, Colombo was one of the ports of call during the PLAN’s first foray into the Indian Ocean. More recently, in March 2007, the two Jiangwei II–class frigates steaming to Pakistan for AMAN ’07, the first multilateral exercise in which the PLAN participated, stopped in Colombo to refuel, on the same day the Sri Lankan president was visiting China. In March 2009, Guangzhou also stopped in Colombo to refuel during its voyage to Pakistan for AMAN ’09, and again on its way back to China. Finally, in January 2010 Wenzhou (FF 526) made a three-day stop in Colombo after escorting the merchant ship Dexinhai, which had recently been freed by pirates off the coast of Somalia. The port call was highlighted by a visit to the ship by both the commander and the chief of staff of the Sri Lankan navy.

Beijing will probably not seek a formal agreement with Sri Lanka for the use of Colombo as a place to replenish its naval forces operating in the Indian Ocean. It is more likely that PLAN ships transiting the Indian Ocean will leverage Beijing’s
stable and friendly relationship with Sri Lanka to continue using Colombo as a refueling location, in order to establish a presence along key shipping lanes and help sustain positive relations with a key regional ally. Should Beijing pursue a
more general agreement with Colombo on use of Sri Lankan port facilities by the PLAN, it will probably be similar to the January 2008 arrangement between China and Singapore calling for increases in exchanges, education opportunities,
and port visits.Such an arrangement would be sufficient to support PLAN operations, with the added benefit of strengthening military relations between China and Sri Lanka without needlessly antagonizing India.

Singapore

In the speculation about future Chinese facilities in the Indian Ocean, Singapore has been largely ignored by pundits and military analysts. This is somewhat puzzling, given Singapore’s friendly relations with Beijing and its strategic position
on the Straits of Malacca, which Chinese strategists consider a critical gateway to the Indian Ocean. PLAN vessels have made five calls to Changi Naval Base, including the May 2007 participation of a South Sea Fleet Jiangwei II frigate in
the multilateral exercise IMDEX ’07, a December 2009 visit by Zhoushan (FFG 529) during its transit home from patrol duty in the Gulf of Aden, and a September 2010 port visit by Chaohu (FFG 568) and Guangzhou during their transit home from the Gulf of Aden. ...

CHINA’S GROWING PLACE IN THE WORLD

The ongoing debate in China and statements from public officials and academics regarding the need for shore-based logistics support for PLAN forces has generated a great deal of attention, as well as confusion. It is clear that China
is not seeking to establish large, American-style bases, which for Beijing would be financially and politically costly and of questionable strategic value. China’s investment in the construction of commercial port facilities in such locations as
Gwadar and Hambantota is presented as evidence that China is seeking to build naval bases in the Indian Ocean. However, converting these facilities into bases, viable in wartime, would require billions of dollars in military equipment and infrastructure.

Even then, their exposed positions would make their wartime utility dubious against an enemy equipped with long-range precision-strike capability. Nonetheless, China is developing in the Indian Ocean a network of, not bases,
but “places” in order to support forces deployed for nontraditional security missions like the counterpiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden. Most of these places will be used on an informal basis; the PLAN will continue to rely on strictly
ad hoc commercial methods to support its forces, as it has been doing for over a year. Arguably, any port along the Indian Ocean littoral where China enjoys stable and positive relations is a potential “place” in this sense, although factors
such as location, internal stability, and recreational opportunities for sailors on liberty will certainly influence decisions on whether, exactly where, and how often PLAN ships visit. The visit to Abu Dhabi by Ma’anshan and Qiandaohu, the
first by PLAN warships to the United Arab Emirates, is evidence of this sort of approach.

At the same time, ports that are important to the PLAN’s missions and overall posture in the Indian Ocean—such as Salalah, Aden, Djibouti, Singapore, and possibly Karachi—could become the subjects of formal agreements that guarantee
access and support to PLAN forces operating in and transiting the Indian Ocean, in order to provide secure and regular sources of rest and supply. As pirates operating off of the Horn of Africa expand their attacks, particularly to the
south toward the Mozambique Channel, the PLAN, like other navies engaged in counterpiracy patrols, could expand its operating areas. Such a move would likely necessitate an extension of the network of ports the PLAN visits for rest and resupply, perhaps to Mombasa in Kenya and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania.

The development of a support network by China for its naval forces operating in the Indian Ocean represents a natural outgrowth of the ongoing counterpiracy mission and the PLAN’s tentative yet very real steps away from home waters and
into the global maritime domain. Beijing’s official policy of noninterference is seemingly a stumbling block to formal agreements for logistical support to PLAN ships in the Indian Ocean. However, legal nuance probably can be written into any agreement to ensure consistency with official policy. Just as Japan is tailoring and adjusting its laws governing the employment of its military forces to a changing international dynamic, there is no reason to believe that China cannot and will not seek to achieve a balance between maintaining its policies and principles, on one hand, and on the other adjusting to its growing place in the world.

UBanerjee · Post by **UBanerjee** » 01 Jul 2011 14:11

Fake Chinese Microchips Could Have Disarmed US Missiles

Last year, the U.S. Navy bought 59,000 microchips for use in everything from missiles to transponders and all of them turned out to be counterfeits from China. Wired reports the chips weren't only low-quality fakes, they had been made with a "back-door" and could have been remotely shut down at any time. If left undiscovered the result could have rendered useless U.S. missiles and killed the signal from aircraft that tells everyone whether it's friend or foe.

wong · Post by **wong** » 03 Jul 2011 07:25

New global hawk sized joined-wing UAV