LCH and other Helicopters Discussion Thread

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 08 Jul 2011 00:24

that's the strangest analysis of attack helo capability I have ever read.

prithvi · Post by **prithvi** » 08 Jul 2011 00:26

Rahul M wrote:that's the strangest analysis of attack helo capability I have ever read.

really.. give one example of attack helicopters being used in conventional warfare..Iraq, Afganisthan..Palestine... Chechnya...

are you going to use Helos in vast open landscape of Rajasthan Deserts..? or Highlands of Kashmir where chances of having an anti-tank warfare is slim..?.. or Northern Highlands of Arunachal..? Considering the number 22 .. it is more relevant for fight against Maoists then .. a regular decent army

rajsunder · Post by **rajsunder** » 08 Jul 2011 00:26

VinodTK wrote:Indian Air Force conducting trials for attack helicopters
.........................

The Chinook, which has contra-rotating twin-rotors to withstand rough weather, is being used extensively in Afghanistan to maintain steady supplies to the troops. It can also carry artillery guns slung under its belly to be dropped off at inaccessible locations.

Is there any design flaw in Mi-26 that does not let it carry artillery guns under its belly?? or is it just some lifafa journalism trying to push amirkhan products???

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 08 Jul 2011 00:45

prithvi, start with the desert storm. show me a post attack helo conventional war that didn't use attack helo's.

>> are you going to use Helos in vast open landscape of Rajasthan Deserts..? or Highlands of Kashmir where chances of having an anti-tank warfare is slim..?.. or Northern Highlands of Arunachal..?

all of the above. LCH f.e is specifically built to operate in the high altitudes, in case you didn't know.

>> Is there any design flaw in Mi-26 that does not let it carry artillery guns under its belly?? or is it just some lifafa journalism trying to push amirkhan products???

if it can carry the chinook, it can carry arty guns.

nachiket · Post by **nachiket** » 08 Jul 2011 00:56

Why even look elsewhere? In the Kargil war, as we all know, the IAF used Mi-17s jury rigged with rocket pods. If they had access to an LCH like helo in those days, they would have certainly welcomed it.

prithvi · Post by **prithvi** » 08 Jul 2011 00:59

Rahul M wrote:prithvi, start with the desert storm. show me a post attack helo conventional war that didn't use attack helo's.

>> are you going to use Helos in vast open landscape of Rajasthan Deserts..? or Highlands of Kashmir where chances of having an anti-tank warfare is slim..?.. or Northern Highlands of Arunachal..?

all of the above. LCH f.e is specifically built to operate in the high altitudes, in case you didn't know.
.

Not to harp on anymore.. Attack helicopters are more useful by a superior force against a vastly inferior one.. in Desert Storm .. the Attack helo came into action after the capitulation of Iraqi forces and anti-air asset .. and when ground troops moved in an invasionary mode...chances of India being an occupying force is slim ...we really dont have the kind of support or scale to support attack helo operations.. .. like post crash rescue of crew for example... having 22 helos on the rooster is not .going to bring any strategic value .. that what I was talking about.. .

in reply to Nachiketa..
I dont think Kargil was a conventional warfare... with ever sophisticated shoulder fired weapons.. the chances of success against a well beefed ground troops even with Apache is slim... countless apaches have crashed due to ground fire.. which gets overlooked..

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 08 Jul 2011 01:10

in DS-1 the ah-64 was the first aircraft to punch holes through iraqi AD net, that allowed other aircraft to move in. as I said please read more before opining.

again, in our case the job of attack helo's is primarily anti-tank and CAS, I don't see what occupying force has to do with it.

we really dont have the kind of support or scale to support attack helo operations

is a statement that's neither here nor there. it sounds substantial but has zero info content. what do you think is the garud force for ?

this is true for any aircraft btw, not just helo's. so what do you say, we should dissolve the air force ?

having 22 helos on the rooster is not .going to bring any strategic value

this is another platitude. an attack helo is not meant to bring 'strategic value' but destroy tanks (which is a tactical objective per some). that is usually enough to achieve the strategic objectives.

the word is roster, rooster means a male chicken.

prithvi · Post by **prithvi** » 08 Jul 2011 01:16

Rahul M wrote:in DS-1 the ah-64 was the first aircraft to punch holes through iraqi AD net, that allowed other aircraft to move in. as I said please read more before opining.

again, in our case the job of attack helo's is primarily anti-tank and CAS, I don't see what occupying force has to do with it.
we really dont have the kind of support or scale to support attack helo operations
is a statement that's neither here nor there. it sounds substantial but has zero info content. what do you think is the garud force for ?

this is true for any aircraft btw, not just helo's. so what do you say, we should dissolve the air force ?
having 22 helos on the rooster is not .going to bring any strategic value
this is another platitude. an attack helo is not meant to bring 'strategic value' but destroy tanks (which is a tactical objective per some). that is usually enough to achieve the strategic objectives.

the word is roster, rooster means a male chicken.

now we are starting to nit pick on typos to prove a point..? brilliant..

....

Yes I stand corrected on the role of Apache on air-defence demolition.. during DS-1..

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 08 Jul 2011 01:26

trying to sidestep the post are we ?

what 'point' do you think I tried to 'prove' by pointing out a typo in a discussion about helo's ?!

(which is normal for BR, given that a certain level of correct language is expected)

Q. how many apache's were lost to enemy fire in iraq ?
Q. how many choppers did we lose in kargil, an environment that was crawling with MANPADS in terrain absolutely ideal for their use ?

John · Post by **John** » 08 Jul 2011 03:14

prithvi wrote:
Rahul M wrote:that's the strangest analysis of attack helo capability I have ever read.
really.. give one example of attack helicopters being used in conventional warfare..Iraq, Afganisthan..Palestine... Chechnya...

are you going to use Helos in vast open landscape of Rajasthan Deserts..? or Highlands of Kashmir where chances of having an anti-tank warfare is slim..?.. or Northern Highlands of Arunachal..? Considering the number 22 .. it is more relevant for fight against Maoists then .. a regular decent army

Don't want to jump in middle of the argument but fyi Apache was used to end the hotel stand off in Kabul last week, when the insurgents were regrouping in the roof of the hotel an apache took them out with a hellfire.

Also Apache/UAVs have been used to with great success by IDF since they can quickly respond to any mortar or rocket fire and them out, before they are moved back into a building.

Anujan · Post by **Anujan** » 08 Jul 2011 06:19

prithvi wrote: not sure 22 or even 50 attack helo will be of relevance under constant threat of nuclear weapons...

I agree to this subtle and well made point. Also India should disband its infantry, humans are very susceptible to Nuclear weapons. Tanks can stay if they have NBC protection. Regular artillery should be disbanded. SP arty with NBC protection can stay. India should invest more on Missiles. Ships are susceptible and should go. Submarines can stay.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 08 Jul 2011 06:38

apache's and cobras were used heavily in both wars in iraq. in GW1 they used wire guided TOWs , in GW2 they used Hellfires. very few were lost to enemy fire.

in afghanistan, both apaches and A-10s have been used to rush to the site of insurgent attacks and hunt down any fleeing remnants of the war party if located. they were also used on anti-insurgent patrols at night - there are videos in liveleak of apache TV camera recording some insurgents meeting in a field with weapons and finally being cut down with the chain gun.

so one should ask - name anything major where gunships have NOT been used.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 08 Jul 2011 06:42

>> LCH would take a minimum of 2 years to get inducted and another year or two to mature to an optimum platform.

a very optimistic POV imo given we will need to import/glue-together a lot of bits and pieces from diverse sources and being our first gunship project. there are no ready solns to problems encountered. remember people were all ga-ga about HAL designing and flying IJT-1 in 18 months. folks were expecting IOC real soon - well now it optimistic IOC is winter-2011 , maybe later...a lot less avionics-heavy vs a LCH.

Suhas H · Post by **Suhas H** » 08 Jul 2011 07:17

US has used gunships since the Vietnam war and other smaller conflicts such as Grenada to provide close support for troops and also for anti tank roles. So they have vast experience in using them against guerrilla fighters in Vietnam, regular forces in both gulf wars and also recently against insurgents in Afghanistan.

So they can be used against various enemy forces and different conflict zones such as desert, urban and mountainous regions. This shows how versatile they really are and effective.

John · Post by **John** » 08 Jul 2011 07:26

Singha wrote:>> LCH would take a minimum of 2 years to get inducted and another year or two to mature to an optimum platform.

a very optimistic POV imo given we will need to import/glue-together a lot of bits and pieces from diverse sources and being our first gunship project. there are no ready solns to problems encountered. remember people were all ga-ga about HAL designing and flying IJT-1 in 18 months. folks were expecting IOC real soon - well now it optimistic IOC is winter-2011 , maybe later...a lot less avionics-heavy vs a LCH.

Hmm not sure how you can compare it with IJT delays' which had lot to do with re-engining with AL-55, prototype crashes and lack of interest.

prithvi · Post by **prithvi** » 08 Jul 2011 08:03

Singha wrote:apache's and cobras were used heavily in both wars in iraq. in GW1 they used wire guided TOWs , in GW2 they used Hellfires. very few were lost to enemy fire.

in afghanistan, both apaches and A-10s have been used to rush to the site of insurgent attacks and hunt down any fleeing remnants of the war party if located. they were also used on anti-insurgent patrols at night - there are videos in liveleak of apache TV camera recording some insurgents meeting in a field with weapons and finally being cut down with the chain gun.

so one should ask - name anything major where gunships have NOT been used.

agree with all the gurus points... but are we just not looking at the end and not the means here?
1. So the Apaches did not have vast intelligence input before they went to the strike?
2. What is the critical mass of an Apache squadron so that you can dedicate a swarm formation to take out second generation air defense radars?
3. How do you rotate the limited numbers across multiple fronts?
4. How do prevent enemies from taking them out in a first strike?

I never doubted the attack helo roles in asymmetric operation.. I commented in a conventional warfare its utility might not have been proved.. giving example Unkil is rather mis-leading as lot goes behind to achieve success of point solutions...

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 08 Jul 2011 08:46

50 (or 22) obviously is not enough to cover all places and needs. just the US 1st airborne has similar number of apaches so at best we can hope a single mountain strike corps will get all these birds for force concentration effect...preferably the strike corp which is best located for a breakout into open territory in tibet.

Anujan · Post by **Anujan** » 08 Jul 2011 08:59

prithvi wrote: 4. How do prevent enemies from taking them out in a first strike?

I think we should house them in Silos and in mobile transporters and have a national doctrine of helicopter strikes. We should threaten to strike and inflict unacceptable damages on enemy's helicopters if our helicopters are victims of first strike.

Bala Vignesh · Post by **Bala Vignesh** » 08 Jul 2011 09:19

Sorry for OT,
Singhaji, do you mean the 101st airborne???
/OT

prithvi wrote:2. What is the critical mass of an Apache squadron so that you can dedicate a swarm formation to take out second generation air defense radars?

Well going be precedent at least 10-12 per squadron. so that 2/3 of the squadron can be deployed to take out the Radar. IN GW1, 8 Apaches took out 2 iraqi radars and also were the first shots to be fired by US.

vasu_ray · Post by **vasu_ray** » 08 Jul 2011 09:22

Anujan wrote:prithvi wrote:
4. How do prevent enemies from taking them out in a first strike?

I think we should house them in Silos and in mobile transporters and have a national doctrine of helicopter strikes. We should threaten to strike and inflict unacceptable damages on enemy's helicopters if our helicopters are victims of first strike.

they could build some limited and smaller Hardened Aircraft Shelters using tank armor strength material placed right on the tarmac with these benefits,

1) it protects from close detonations and hence safe unless a direct hit happens

2) exploits the CEP of enemy's cruise and ballistic missiles

3) safe from RPG's of fifth column ala PNS Mehran

4) EMP, NBC shield can be included

5) protects the aircraft from the vagaries of the weather

6) one could shift these mobile shelters within the base so preprogramming of enemy missiles will not be accurate

7) a surge at the base can be supported

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 08 Jul 2011 09:29

prithvi wrote: 2. What is the critical mass of an Apache squadron so that you can dedicate a swarm formation to take out second generation air defense radars?
3. How do you rotate the limited numbers across multiple fronts?
4. How do prevent enemies from taking them out in a first strike?

What is a second generation air defence radar?

Would a swarm formation be the best way to take such radars out?

Many American weapons and tactics were designed to work against a foe with intense air defence - such as the Soviets. Most countries in the world do not have that density of defences uniformly in all areas. Where exactly would Indian forces anticipate a dense air defence environment where a swarm of Apaches would need to be used for suppressing radar as opposed to some other means such as jamming/anti-radar missile/Physical destruction by saturation Pinaka/SMERCH fire.

Anujan · Post by **Anujan** » 08 Jul 2011 09:34

In a swarm formation, the mass of moving helicopters overwhelm the second generation (the ones which have improved upon the first-gen) RADARs which cant fire back. Then the helicopters following behind identify the location of these RADARs and neutralize them. Being a swarm, a few losses can also be taken without a problem.

Most troubling though is as prithvi-ji pointed out, the danger of a helicopter first strike. We need to have a published helicopter doctrine of unacceptable retaliation to enemy's helicopters. In fact - we should give no guarantee that we wont escalate and take their aircraft out for any first strike on our helicopters. We can guarantee no-first strike on air assets of countries which dont have helicopters.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 08 Jul 2011 09:35

pic of 101st airborne preparing to enter iraq in OIF...note the mix of vanilla and longbow models.
http://img89.exs.cx/img89/7616/a226ey.jpg

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 08 Jul 2011 09:42

We can't have helo ops or deployment in certain areas to take the first or terror strikes. Safe distance is the cheapest option and workable option in the first place.

dummies in air field can actually take up the first strike.. (not paki type (inflated dummy)

, but it should be real decoy).

There are other better options that can do air strikes from a distance, quick and return to base.

Without superior air cover, we can't move in with helos. Of course, I am not thinking about pakis at all.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 08 Jul 2011 09:52

http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Attack_h ... of_Karbala

Battle of Karbala

In the 2003 invasion of Iraq, one of the major differences from 1991 was that the ground campaign did not wait for an extensive preparation by the Central Command air components. In part because there was no viable Iraqi Air Force, Army and Marine aviation were used extensively, with Air Force and Navy high-performance aircraft in close air support and battlefield air interdiction rather than extensive strike operations. The operation described here was, strictly, an independent attack helicopter operation rather than an air assault, but the experience gives strong lessons on the environments in which air assault can, and cannot, succeed.

While there had been limited use of attack helicopters in BAI in 1991, with the literal first strike of that war by Special Operations helicopters on a critical early warning radar, the 2003 plan expected to use the AH-64 Apache extensively in the BAI role.

An example of this role was a pair of raids on Iraqi armor in Karbala, Iraq. From those raids, a good lesson was that the AH-64 is, indeed, highly survivable even when damaged. A bad lesson was that attack helicopters, without coordinated SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defense), cannot fight through an alerted defense and complete the BAI mission.

In the first raid, on March 24, 2003, US V Corps sent 32 Apache helicopters, against Medina Division armor in Karbala.[2] The corps commander told reporters that post-strike analysis revealed that Iraqi observers had seen the preparation of assembly areas in the desert, and had alerted the defense using cellular telephones. During the approach to Karbala, Iraq shut the power grid to darken the night, and aggressively directed ground-based air defense at the helicopters. While no crew were killed, one helicopter was destroyed, and enough damaged to force the raid to be stopped before its objective.

Two days later, the Army again used Apaches to carry out another nighttime deep attack. Tactics used, however, were quite different than those on March 24.[2] This attack had no helicopter losses, destroyed some enemy targets, and degraded the defense well enough for the 3rd U.S.Infantry Division to have little difficulty moving through the Iraqi Medina Division, as the 3rd moved to Baghdad.

On March 26, other air and ground resources supported the attack, beginning with a four-minute artillery bombardment to distract the gunners. As the helicopters moved through the Najaf area, the lights again went off, and the intensity of antiaircraft fire increased as they approached the target.

The Apaches themselves used different tactics, and also operated in combination with other forces. First, the helicopters accepted reduced accuracy to shoot missiles while moving, rather than hovering and thus becoming better targets. Fixed-wing fighter-bombers initially destroyed some Iraqi air defenses, then attacked additional ones spotted by the helicopters. The idea of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft cooperating to take out air defense as well as tanks and artillery had long been a NATO concept.

No final determination has been made if the Apache can, or cannot, carry out deep attack, or be adequate to escort deep air assault. In the short term, the AH-64s went back to a primary CAS role.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 08 Jul 2011 10:02

looking at the failure of AH64 in deep strike strategic role and crawling back to CAS, it seems the inter-service politics has a role to play in this deal.

its no secret IA wants to own and operate all the transport and attack helicopter assets (just as us mil does among many others).
its also no secret IAF is not willing to let go of either
so IA goes ahead and orders lots of Dhruv, WSI for itself and will likely order LCH also - in large numbers.
meantime the Mi35 fleet is nearing end of life and so IAF instead of ordering == LCH for itself, wants to have a bigger and premium role in this play and goes for the baddest stick around AH64/Mi28N which it can use as a 'strategic reserve' should IA call for CAS help that its own gunships run short for.

once the IA gets enough LCH, I feel they are going to take the next step which is escalate the issue up the food chain to attain ownership of atleast all attack heli assets

Mi35 is a lumbering truck compared to the LCH which can run rings around it..and with far superior sensors and stealth to boot. so soldiering on with them (even if they have long lives) is just not going to give bragging rights once IA gets WSI/LCH and no longer has to depend on IAF for CAS.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 08 Jul 2011 10:05

Anujan wrote:Being a swarm, a few losses can also be taken without a problem.

Anujangaru - I don't think that is correct. For someone to send Apaches in a swarm and be ready to accept losses - it means that those Apaches are available in large numbers and pilot life is cheap. The only situation in which that was assumed to be true was a Soviet invasion across Europe. This suicidal tactic, the (expensive) helicopter equivalent of Chinese "human waves" was designed for that.

Swarms of Apaches sound to me like the worst possible method for SEAD. The only situation in which it can be useful is when an enemy armored column is advancing into your territory with lots of tanks, APC and SAMs and you have no other way of taking them out.

In the Indian context
1) Where would China be able to use such an attacking tank force against us?
2) Does Pakistan have the necessary force levels (mobile radars and SAMs along with armored vehicles and tanks) to make such attacks in J&K, Punjab or Rajasthan? Can they do it across a broad front/multiple fronts like the Soviets were capable of doing?

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 08 Jul 2011 10:09

Perhaps Arjun & LCH with nags can be 1-1 buddies satisfying various roles IA could be planning. Such a combo also has limitations for deep strike role without IAF support to do the preliminary shock & awe cleansing, and weaken the conventional forces down.

range matters.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 08 Jul 2011 10:51

Singha wrote: <SNIP> Mi35 is a lumbering truck compared to the LCH which can run rings around it......<SNIP>

Hmmm........while I have not seen LCH in flight, I have had the pleasure of seeing Mi-35s in flight - and over a long period. And from what I have seen them do in air, I don't think it is a 'lumbering truck'!

That aside, IAF has also ordered LCH. So, part of IA's requirement for attack helo will be made up for by organic assets and part by IAF assets. But it is matter of time that IA gets its hand on heavy attack helicopters.

akimalik · Post by **akimalik** » 08 Jul 2011 11:09

SaiK wrote:Perhaps Arjun & LCH with nags can be 1-1 buddies

I was just wondering ... has any enterprising engineer thought of a solution to have the LCH be truck-transportable (perhaps a dedicated container sort of arrangement)? That way the helis move with the unit.
Plus there is an automatic hangar available. Spares and support could similarly be modularized.

from Wiki the LCH dimensions are:
Length: 15.8 m (51ft 8in)
Rotor diameter: 13.3 m (43 ft 6 in)
Height: 4.7 m (15 ft 4 in)

Shrinivasan · Post by **Shrinivasan** » 08 Jul 2011 11:22

A tank attack in TSP would be preceded by a saturation attack in the sector and LR arty attack! Arjun columns are not going to 300 KM inside pak and being 100 KM inside pak is well within range of Arjun! Ditto for LCH. By then either support infra would have caught up with them or pikes would have sued for peace or nukes out. So range is hardly an issue WRT pukes.

Shrinivasan · Post by **Shrinivasan** » 08 Jul 2011 11:25

akimalik wrote:I was just wondering ... has any enterprising engineer thought of a solution to have the LCH be truck-transportable (perhaps a dedicated container sort of arrangement)? in)

an excellent idea, very novel, nobody seems to have thought of it, very novel.

hnair · Post by **hnair** » 08 Jul 2011 12:34

shiv wrote:
Anujan wrote:Being a swarm, a few losses can also be taken without a problem.
Anujangaru - I don't think that is correct. For someone to send Apaches in a swarm and be ready to accept losses - it means that those Apaches are available in large numbers and pilot life is cheap. The only situation in which that was assumed to be true was a Soviet invasion across Europe. This suicidal tactic, the (expensive) helicopter equivalent of Chinese "human waves" was designed for that.

er, Doc-saar.... mubarak-ho

Anujan-saar is talking about military tactics from the future, as expounded by 24-star jernail, Zapp Brannigan.

[Zapp Brannigan is briefing Fry, Leela, Bender and his crew on his plan to destroy an alien mothership]
Captain Zapp Brannigan: If we hit that bullseye, the rest of the dominoes should fall like a house of cards. Checkmate.
[Kif groans]
Captain Zapp Brannigan: Now, like all great plans, my strategy is so simple an idiot could have devised it. On my command all ships will line up and fly directly into the alien death cannons, clogging them with wreckage.
[Fry raises his hand]
Fry: W-Wouldn't it make more sense to send the robots in first a - ?
[Bender starts to choke him à la Homer Simpson to Bart in "The Simpsons". His antenna flashes again and he stops choking Fry and salutes]
Bender: Sir, I volunteer for a suicide mission.
[Bender's antenna stops flashing and he bangs his head with his knuckles]
Bender: Cut it out!
Captain Zapp Brannigan: You're a brave robot, son. But when I'm in command every mission's a suicide mission.

basically drape Apache upon Apache over the second generation radar and make it stop whirling with their sheer weight.... Then step out and throw a cycle chain over the power transformer to shut the power down.... or something.

Anujan · Post by **Anujan** » 08 Jul 2011 14:19

^^^
What did you think of my mutually assured helicopter destruction doctrine to prevent first strikes on helicopters?

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 08 Jul 2011 15:56

can we skip the OT bvr sniping please?

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 08 Jul 2011 16:40

Shrinivasan wrote:
akimalik wrote:I was just wondering ... has any enterprising engineer thought of a solution to have the LCH be truck-transportable (perhaps a dedicated container sort of arrangement)? in)
an excellent idea, very novel, nobody seems to have thought of it, very novel.

Such doctrines if exists, will be classified.. perhaps declassified in the future leaks.

No body in the world would tell you about exact logistics to provide an engineering solution.

If we can think and appreciate Arjun and LCH as buddies, then we can appreciate IA-IAF as buddies., that is what I was trying to point at EoD analysis.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 08 Jul 2011 16:51

if we are planning on a 2000km penetration through all of tibet to arrive in Urumqi , and the place being austere, such truck mounted folding rotor mad-max/james-bond helicopter force might be useful.

if the idea is only 100-200km depth battle, then the regular fwd operating base of helis is enough.

Avid · Post by **Avid** » 08 Jul 2011 17:01

Anujan wrote:^^^
What did you think of my mutually assured helicopter destruction doctrine to prevent first strikes on helicopters?

Mutually assured doctrine works for mass scale destruction with economic and human losses being at an unacceptable threshold. Not for assets such as heli/fighter etc.

There is a certain probability of destruction of all equipment in any war. For americans the acceptable threshold is pretty low because it has enough other assets to bring the threshold down to below the acceptable level, but for India/Pak or India/China scenarios such MAD doctrine would be of no consequence, other than ensuring that the sides then engage in numeric superiority as means to get around total destruction of all assets. Sort of like 1:1 destruction is known -- you have 25 attack helis, and I have 25 (+5 hidden away to bring out when all 25 are destroyed and you have none left).

There are easier ways to overwhelm radars than swarming a large number of helis. Ever consider the idea of drones? Whole lot cheaper for projecting what looks like swarming, overwhelming the enemy radar, and confusing the hell out of the enemy.

And pray tell me why would you invest so much in a strategy that can be easily defeated by upgrading the radars to next generation?

Truck containers with LCH? What is the purpose? LCH can fly, you know? If your purpose is to create a portable helipad, why do you want to connect it to a truck that would struggle to get to forward points and be slower? Why couldn't you take the so called "container" and transport using a heli. That is what the transport helis are for

Too much sci-fi and military movies IMHO

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 08 Jul 2011 18:22

I think that this debate should concentrate on who should operate the attack hlos instead of the cacophony of "Injun warcries"! The inter-service rivalry between the IAF and IA on ownership of helos is forcing the IA to demand extra attack helos/armed helos for its own use.I personally would advocate handing over all dedicated attack/armed helos to the IA as they need the helos totally integrated with their land froces,part of the Army's battleplans and doctrineThe IA whines about lack of CAS from the IAF who allegedly look down upon such a menial task.Therefore,let all helos being used for logistic support belong to the IAF,as a "limb" of its transport fleet (like MI-26s,MI-8/17s,utility Dhruvs),while all attack/armed helos meant for an offensive role belong to the IA (MI-35s and new attack helos,LCHs,armed Dhruvs,LUHs,etc.) along with light aircraft for AO duties.COIN aircraft is one unfulfilled requirement for anti-insurgency duties.The IAF should acquire a few squadrons of these very economical turbo-props,which will also prove to be invaluable in any connflict.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 08 Jul 2011 19:44

akimalik wrote:
SaiK wrote:Perhaps Arjun & LCH with nags can be 1-1 buddies
I was just wondering ... has any enterprising engineer thought of a solution to have the LCH be truck-transportable (perhaps a dedicated container sort of arrangement)? That way the helis move with the unit.
Plus there is an automatic hangar available. Spares and support could similarly be modularized.

Helos don't need to move with the unit. They can operate off semi-prepared areas 25 to 50 km behind the lines and still be as effective and less vulnerable and will not need a dedicated number of men to protect them and maintain them and lug them around in the front lines. They can also be used exactly where needed and if they are not needed immediately for the unit that is lugging them around in a truck. It does not make sense to treat helos like mortar or tanks.