Then there is the matter of djinns. Several aides arrested in recent weeks have been charged with evoking djinns, or secret spirits, and dabbling in other dark arts. Traditionalist clerics abhor the president.
As long as India does not solve our Pakistani problem for once and for all, we cannot influence Asia. Pakistan neutralizes our whole outreach into the Muslim world. Pakistan is a big hole in our fuel tanks. Without patching the whole we will not come far in terms of geostrategic influence.Acharya wrote:Which ever country where India has a strong bond with the country and its people - they have been targeting and India seems to lose influence.
Is this seems to be happening in a systematic manner. It is part of a larger plan of change in world order.
You know every country in the region thinks that they are being singled out and targeted. Whether its true or not is a different matter.Acharya wrote:Which ever country where India has a strong bond with the country and its people - they have been targeting and India seems to lose influence.
Is this seems to be happening in a systematic manner. It is part of a larger plan of change in world order.
It is true and there are enough info around it from the 1960s. These are the cold war days. But India has been taken care in a special way due to its size and influence from historical times. IMO they are trying to change the historical relations between peoples which existed long ago into a new one which is beneficial to the west. Iraq and Af Pak are some examplesshyamd wrote:You know every country in the region thinks that they are being singled out and targeted. Whether its true or not is a different matter.Acharya wrote:Which ever country where India has a strong bond with the country and its people - they have been targeting and India seems to lose influence.
Is this seems to be happening in a systematic manner. It is part of a larger plan of change in world order.
(AFP) – 6 days ago
RIYADH — Gulf troops sent to back Bahraini security forces in their crackdown on Shiite-led protests are to be "redeployed" but will not withdraw completely, a Saudi official said on Tuesday.
"It is normal to redeploy the Peninsula Shield force but the danger is not over yet and these forces will not return to their bases or entirely withdraw," the official told AFP.
The official, speaking on condition of anonymity, refused to give any further details on the movements of the joint force, which is mainly made up of Saudi and Emirati troops.
Kuwait also took part in the Bahrain operation by sending naval forces.
In mid-March, the troops from Bahrain's Arab neighbours in the Gulf freed up the security forces of the Shiite-majority, Sunni-ruled kingdom to crush pro-reform protests on the streets that had broken out a month earlier.
The redeployment comes ahead of a national dialogue proposed by Bahrain's King Hamad, set to begin on Saturday.
The king ordered the lifting on June 1 of a state of emergency that went into effect on March 15 during the crackdown.
Shiite Iran strongly opposed the military intervention by Bahrain's fellow Sunni monarchies, leading to a further degradation of already tense ties with its neighbours across the Gulf.
There are many scenarios for what might happen in Syria. Lebanese should pay attention to one in particular. As it dawns on the Assads that their days in power are numbered, we should consider the option that they and the minority Alawite community will move to an alternate plan. Unable to subdue Syria, the regime may contemplate falling back on an Alawite-dominated statelet in northwest Syria.
In recent weeks the army and security services have been active in Idlib province along the Turkish border, after their assault near the Lebanese border, particularly in Talkalakh – accompanied by an ongoing campaign to pacify the Homs to Aleppo axis. Even if the Assads’ priority is to reimpose their writ over Syria in its entirety, the actions in these areas may, simultaneously, serve another purpose: to consolidate Alawite control over the margins of a future mini-state.
However, the terror tactics adopted by the Syrian army, security forces and irregular pro-regime militias are disturbingly similar to those of the Serb-dominated army and Serb paramilitaries during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Is the aim to cause permanent population displacement? That’s unclear. However, there is a geographical rationale behind the Assads’ strategy, and its repercussions cannot but affect sectarian relations.
[...]
As Lebanese watch developments next door, how might they react? If the Assads manage to retreat to an Alawite fortress, the repercussions in Lebanon (not to say Iraq) could be frightening. Attention would be drawn to Lebanon’s Shiites, but also Christians, to see if they might envisage a similar route toward communal self-preservation.
The Shiites are far less likely to be tempted by the idea of forming a communal statelet than are the Christians, for obvious reasons. The areas of Shiite concentration are not contiguous. Dispersed among the northern Bekaa Valley, the western Bekaa, southern Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburbs, the Shiite community would be unable to bind these regions together into any sort of cohesive whole.
In reality, the hazards lie elsewhere. If the Assad regime were to collapse, this would represent, potentially, an existential setback, for Hezbollah. The party would strive to defend itself, and its options are limited. Some have speculated that Hezbollah might try to tighten its grip on the state and weaken its adversaries decisively, perhaps through a military strike broader than that of May 2008. However, that would almost certainly fail, instead provoking civil war.
[...]
The ensuing deadlock could push Hezbollah to do two apparently contradictory things: maintain its presence in state institutions at all costs in order to protect its interests; but also, facing an invigorated Lebanese Sunni community bolstered by an invigorated Syrian Sunni community, further separate territories under its influence from the rest of Lebanon, both physically and psychologically. In other words, even as it rejects a Lebanese sectarian breakup, Hezbollah may be compelled to pursue that very path to survive. And this could be accompanied by an impulse, even a political need, to collaborate with other friendly sectarian entities, an Alawite entity above all.
Which leads us to the Lebanese Christians. There is profound alienation among many Christians from post-Taif Lebanon, and from the idea of coexistence with the country’s Muslim communities in the context of the centralized state that emerged after independence in 1943. This has been debilitating for Christians, accelerating the community’s isolation and sense of decline. Yet virtually all mainstream Christian political groupings deep down aspire to a Lebanese state – federal, confederal or otherwise – that allows a majority of Christians to govern themselves and live among their own.
He added that the mayor of Taji, security officials from the city and tribal leaders were in a meeting on Tuesday at the provincial council offices when the bombers struck. There was no immediate word on who the casualties were
Residents of Hama mobilise to keep the Syrian army out of the cityThe violence came after June saw the highest monthly death toll for Iraqis so far this year. A total of 271 were killed in attacks, according to government figures.
Fourteen US soldiers were also killed in attacks in June, making it the bloodiest month in three years for American troops, who are due to pull out by the end of the year under the terms of a bilateral security pact.
The spike in violence comes as US officials have repeatedly asked Baghdad if it wants some troops to stay beyond the scheduled pullout deadline.
Baghdad has blamed al-Qaeda for the increased death toll for Iraqis, which was up 34 per cent on May.
But the US military holds Iranian-backed Shi'ite militias responsible for the deadly attacks on its troops.
State minister for reconciliation, Amir al-Khuzai, said on Monday that Iraq would not reconcile with members of al-Qaeda or anyone who had killed Iraqis, but suggested it was open to talks with those who had fought American forces.
US officials have recently accused Iran of smuggling more lethal weapons to Shi'ite militias in Iraq, a charge Tehran denies.
"Tanks are now posted at access routes to the city except for the northern entrance," said Rami Abdel Rahman, head of the London-based Syrian Observatory.
"Residents have mobilised. They're prepared to die to defend the city if need be rather than allow the army to enter," he told AFP.
"Residents have been sleeping on the streets and put up sand barriers and tyres to block any assault."
Another activist insisted that Hama, where as many as 500,000 people took to the streets for a demonstration on Friday against President Bashar al-Assad's regime, was putting up a "100 per cent peaceful" resistance.
On Monday, more than 20 people were arrested on the fringes of the city, the Observatory said, adding angry residents countered by burning tyres and hurling stones.
Apart from the three killed including 12-year-old Omar Khalluf, between 20 and 25 other people were shot and wounded during the sweep which rounded up as many as 300 people, according to a resident contacted from Nicosia.
There was no independent confirmation of the reports from activists as Syrian authorities have curbed foreign media coverage.
In the capital, about 70 serving and former MPs held a meeting on Tuesday to discuss the crisis in Syria, in the third such gathering in a week.
Meanwhile, pro-democracy activists on their Facebook site, Syrian Revolution 2011, called for a nationwide general strikes on Thursday.
Assad, faced with a revolt since mid-March, sacked the governor of Hama province on Saturday, a day after the massive rally during which security forces kept out of sight.
Since security forces gunned down 48 protesters in the city on June 3, Hama has escaped the clutches of the regime, according to activists. The next day, more than 100,000 mourners were reported to have taken part in their funerals.
If growing numbers of Muslims in Egypt have an intrinsic hatred for all things Christian—most recently demonstrated by the torching of eight Christian homes on the rumor that a church was being built—let us not forget that this hate has instrumental, that is, economic benefits: the extortion of money from the non-believer—tribute from the conquered infidels to their Islamic overlords—otherwise known as jizya.
Consider: on June 24, hundreds of Muslims surrounded a Coptic church in Egypt, vowing to kill its priest—who was locked inside serving morning mass to several parishioners. The Muslims cried “We will kill the priest, we will kill him and no one will prevent us,” adding that they would “cut him to pieces.”
As usual, police and security forces gave the terrorists ample time to terrorize—appearing a full five hours after the incident began; and when they escorted the priest out, it “looked as if he was the criminal, leaving his church in a police car.”
What, exactly, did the rioting Muslims want this time? Why were they threatening to kill the priest?
The official story is that they were livid that the priest had earlier tried to make renovations to the 100-year old church—Islam forbids building new or repairing old churches. After forcing renovations to cease on threats that they would demolish the church, they also tried to banish the priest, giving him 50 days to quit the region. The priest’s time was up, yet he refused to abandon his flock. Hence, the wild attack.
However, Arabic news sources like El-Bashayer reveal a different, more practical, motivation: the desire to extort money from the Christians—echoed in an earlier report as a desire for a “donation” from the church:
'Security forces succeeded in rescuing the life of the priest of St. George Church in Beni Ahmad, west of al-Minya, from being killed at the hands of the Salafists because of his refusal to pay them jizya money, according to sources…. [T]he church’s priest had declared that the Copts would not pay jizya, in any way, shape, or form. This is what caused the Salafists to want to banish him from the region, so they could collect jizya from the Copts.'
This is not surprising; anyone following the growing Islamization of Egypt knows that increasing numbers of Muslims—called “Salafists,” that is, those who seek only to emulate Muhammad and the early generations of Islam—have been eying their Christian neighbors as easy sources for quick cash.
For instance, who could forget Egyptian preacher Abu Ishaq al-Huwaini’s recent lament that Muslims would alleviate their economic woes if only they would return to the good old days of Islam, when abducting and selling or ransoming infidels was a great way of making a living. (Accordingly, weeks later, two teenage Christian girls in Egypt were reported as kidnapped, held ransom, and then “sold” to another group.)
Nor is this outlook limited to self-professed “Salafists”: Earlier, Dr. Amani Tawfiq, a female professor at Egypt’s Mansoura University, said, “If Egypt wants to slowly but surely get out of its economic situation and address poverty in the country, the jizya has to be imposed on the Copts.” And days ago, Hazim Abu Isma’il, who is running for Egypt’s presidency, vowed he would impose the jizya on Egypt’s Christians.
Indeed, Al Azhar—Egypt’s, if not the Islamic world’s, top authority, often accused of being too “moderate” by Salafists—recently made Islam’s official position clear when its grand leader, Imam Ahmad Tayeb, defying history and reality, proclaimed that “the Copts have been living in Egypt for over 14 centuries in safety, and there is no need for all this artificial concern over them,” adding that “true terrorism was created by the West.”
Added Later: Syria accuses US of meddling.Hama has been a symbol of opposition since the 1982 crackdown on a revolt by the banned Muslim Brotherhood against then-president Hafez al-Assad, father of the present leader, in which some 20,000 people were killed.
The newspaper Al-Watan, which is close to the regime, said on Thursday the situation in Hama was calm and barricades erected in the streets by protesters had been dismantled.
It reported that the authorities had told demonstrators to avoid any confrontations and clear the streets so residents could go to work and to avoid what it called a "last resort" military operation.
It also said protesters were calling for the former governor to be reinstated, for detained demonstrators to be freed, for a pledge that the security forces would not intervene and for a guarantee of freedom to demonstrate.
Last Friday, an anti-regime rally brought out half a million people in Hama, according to pro-democracy activists. The security services did not intervene and Assad fired the city's governor the next day.
Not just India, but mainly China - Sudan and Libya fall in this category.Acharya wrote:Which ever country where India has a strong bond with the country and its people - they have been targeting and India seems to lose influence.
Is this seems to be happening in a systematic manner. It is part of a larger plan of change in world order.
In a development fraught with significance for Turkish-U.S. relations, Iran has become Turkey's leading provider of crude oil.
[...]
During the period January-March, EPDK reported that Iran exported more than 1.8 million tons of crude oil to Turkey, accounting for 30 percent of Turkey's crude imports.
During the first two months of 2011, bilateral trade between Iran and Turkey surpassed $2.1 billion, while in 2010 bilateral trade value was worth $10.6 billion in 2010, a 97 percent increase over 2009 statistics.
The Turkish Statistical Institute reported that bilateral trade value will surpass $15 billion in 2011 under the terms of a preferential trade agreement.
Egypt
Egyptian Foreign minister Nabil Al Arabi appears to have been sacked due to favouring closer relations with Iran. It is likely that GCC may have put Egypt under pressure to withdraw this policy. We are aware that Murad Muwaifi (The head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate) had met with his KSA counterpart and explained to him Egypt's decision to build up relations with Iran. Since this meeting, Egypt appears to have withdrawn from a brief flirt with Tehran. UAE and KSA continue to provide aid to Egypt.
The current Foreign Minister of Egypt made this statement in Bahrain: "The GCC security is an integral part of the collective Arab security and a strategic depth to Egypt’s national security".
Syria
The Syrian regime appears to have sustained serious damage in the recent protests. Protests are still continuing in the Hama region. There appears to be a lot of defections from the lower rank sunni dominated parts of the military. The 76th Battallion appears to have suffered the most with over 100 defections (So bad that Maher Assad controlled troop had to move in to back up the 76th battalion). The air force appears to be pre-dominantly a sunni force and the Assad regime has sent out strong warnings to sunni commanders that defections should not be tolerated.
We continue to believe that with further sanctions targetting Assad supporters, key Syrian businessmen and with vast open/unpoliced/unfenced borders, it is likely that the regime will collapse. Therefore expect the worst in Syria.
Also reports from Lebanon suggest that black market prices for weapons have increased significantly due to Syrian demand. This also suggests that some countries are financing rebels in Syria.
Turkey has decided to use diplomacy and refrained from a military response yet.
We have learned that the Turkish intelligence agencies have sent warnings to Syrian and Iranian counterparts, not to harm Syrian refugees and expatriate Syrians in Turkey. This has raised the tension with Iran recently.
Shahab 3 Range
It is likely that the threat of joint US and Turkish intervention in Syria, led to Iran announcing the Great Prophet 6 military exercise. This exercise took place in the Northern borders close to Turkey and showcased the nuclear capable Shahab 3 missile (capable of striking targets in Europe).
Iraq/Iran
Iran is developing the Mahdi army and Badr Brigade (part of the supreme Islamic Council) into a professional militia/force, that is an alternate to Hezbollah (or as powerful as Hezbollah).
The IRGC told them the plan is to reorganise the militia and arm them. So intructors will be giving them training in weapons handling and Missile launching. So the aim is to develop a force that can intervene in Syria, Lebanon - in support of Hezbollah and augment hezbollah operations in setting up covert cells in Kuwait, Bahrain, KSA. So if Hezbollah can't, the Mahdi army will take over setting up cells in GCC.
Tensions are rising again as Iran wants to make sure that the US does not retain any presence in Afghanistan and in Iraq. In order to achieve this, Iran has partnered with Pakistan and Iraq. Therefore, Iran has delivered more weapons to be used against the US troops in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Sadr has issued more threats and has even permitted suicide attacks against the US troops.
The US has wanted to change its role from a force that is currently policing the streets into a pure counter terror role and support Iraqi forces or Afghan National Army operations against insurgents. We can expect this to occur over the next few months.
"The current discussions cover both, and there are very clear capability gaps that the Iraqi security forces are going to have," Mullen said, citing air defense, aviation and elements of intelligence.
Iran
We understand that western intelligence agencies have concluded that Iran has now produced its first nuclear bomb prototype that is ready to be tested. Iran took advantage of the chaos during the "Arab Spring" to accelerate its program. Recently announcing that Iran will send a monkey into space. Any military analyst will point out that being able to put a payload into space will demonstrate ICBM capability. Rumours are circulating that a blame game has begun within western intelligence agencies.
It is likely that KSA and Turkey will come out with a plan to test nuclear weapons. Prince Turki has been the most vocal in this. Pakistan meanwhile has been expanding its nuclear weapons stockpile significantly and is likely to transfer the weapons technology. We have already reported in a previous article on GCC - Pakistan relations, of Saudi nuclear scientists receiving training in Pakistan. The GCC nuclear program is likely to be based in Khamis Mushayt and we believe that the program has been running for some years.
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Pyongyang has relaunched North Korea’s enriched uranium production, a move that has coincided with Iran’s stocks growing.
In recent months, several European security services including the DGSE and MI6 have been swapping notes about intelligence from U.S. sources that Tehran has been receiving deliveries of UF6, uranium hexafluoride, used in centrifugation enrichment processes. This news comes at a time when Pyongyang is known to have relaunched its production of nuclear fuel.
The existence of a secret supply source from North Korea, if it turns out to be true, would strengthen the case for tougher sanctions against Iran. A report into secret technological exchange between the two countries, written by the United Nations’ panel of experts that monitors compliance with UN sanctions imposed on Pyongyang, was submitted to the Security Council in May. The report, which has not yet been published on China’s request, covers bilateral cooperation on ballistic missiles. On June 10th, the U.N renewed the panel of experts’ mandate.
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KSA
KSA and the US have partnered together on anti-AQAP operations. Leon Panetta and Gen. Petraeus have both told lawmakers that GCC will put "maximum" pressure on the AQAP. Prince Turki Al-Faisal and Prince Bandar bin Sultan were said to have lobbied the senior KSA leaders to allow a construction of an airbase for CIA/JSOC to operate drones from KSA. It appears that this base may not be operational yet and it is likely that some missions that began in May are operating from a neighbouring country as well as KSA.
The reason behind KSA okay'ing the plan was to prevent AQAP being given a free hand to operate in Yemen as this could affect the survival of the Kingdom.
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Thank you for reading! Feel free to email us your comments at "eye.on.middleeast" at gmail dot com
---------------------Pranay Sharma
In Riyadh’s exclusive club of royals and business tycoons, among whom rank some of the world’s wealthiest, frowns and sneers appear on the faces of its members at the mention of three words—India, Reliance Industries Ltd (RIL) and Mukesh Ambani. Aware of Ambani’s political and economic clout, Riyadh has come around to believe, rightly or otherwise, that it was at his company’s behest that New Delhi has invoked the anti-dumping law against Saudi companies that want to sell polypropylene (aka PP), an important ingredient in making plastic and other items, in the Indian market. Such is the anger and dismay in Riyadh that the anti-dumping controversy threatens to cast a shadow on the strategic partnership that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the Saudi king, Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud, fostered through the signing of the Riyadh Declaration last February.
India called the anti-dumping law into use after a complaint was filed against the Saudi companies by RIL, Asia’s largest PP producer which has carved out a 70 per cent stranglehold on the Indian market. Bengal-based Haldia Petrochemicals Ltd subsequently signed on to RIL’s complaint, but its comparatively small share of the market has convinced the Saudi firms of the hand played by Ambani in fanning the PP controversy. India, sources say, has been informed by the Saudi Arabian leadership that it would not “expect such an unprecedented, economically harmful and WTO (World Trade Organisation)-inconsistent approach to be applied to a strategic partner with which one seeks to expand trade and improve relations overall”.
But what exactly is the anti-dumping controversy between India and Saudi Arabia? Employed in the context of international trade, the term anti-dumping has gained much currency after the accession of most countries, including both India and Saudi Arabia, to the WTO agreements. The anti-dumping law is often invoked against a foreign manufacturer for exporting a product to another country at a price much lower than that prevailing in the receiving country’s market. The low price of the product in the manufacturer-exporter’s country is achieved because of the government subsidising the costs involved in its production. Occasionally, it is also initiated against a foreign manufacturer that tries to flood the market of another country in order to bring about a steep decline in prices, consequently muscling out rivals unable to cope with the resultant sustained low prices and losses. Obviously, the lowered prices are good news for the domestic consumers.
RIL MD Mukesh Ambani
India has resorted to invoking the anti-dumping law because it perceives Riyadh as having subsidised the Saudi companies’ manufacture of PP, couching this perception in the euphemistic phrase of “particular market situation”. This is what the Saudis oppose—on the basis of “principle”. Indian officials dealing with the anti-dumping case say the Saudi supply of propane, used in the production of PP, isn’t transparent. In other words, it is being supplied to Saudi manufacturers at a price lower than the existing market rate. An Indian official told Outlook, “The 30 per cent (consequent) offset that the Saudi government gives its industry affects the market and creates unfair conditions.”
India accuses Riyadh of subsidising production of polypropylene. Saudi Arabia fears others will make similar charges.
Saudi officials, however, dismiss these charges, arguing that the country’s vast reservoir of gas (propane is a byproduct of natural gas processing and petroleum refining) and the location of its processing facilities help reduce the costs substantially, particularly the expenses incurred on transporation. Countries that are not oil and gas producers do not enjoy such advantages. Saudi Arabia also claims that gas is supplied to its manufacturing companies at the commercial rate prevailing in the international market. The PP controversy has gathered such momentum that it has reached even King Abdullah, who has duly appointed a task force chaired by the Saudi deputy minister for petroleum affairs, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, to resolve the contentious issue.
Riyadh has given such salience to the PP issue because the prestigious Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) is, willy nilly, implicated in the controversy. Describing itself as one of the world’s “leading manufacturers of chemicals, fertilisers, plastics and metals” that are supplied to other manufacturing companies, SABIC is the showpiece of Saudi Arabia’s diversification efforts in sectors other than oil. Not only are Saudi elites invested heavily in SABIC, Riyadh fears India’s anti-dumping case could lead to “copycat” actions in Turkey and the European Union, which are potentially much larger markets than India. The Saudis’ attempt at seeking redressal is to essentially ensure such cases do not dog it elsewhere.
The origin of this controversy dates back to 2009, when RIL lodged a complaint against the Saudis. As is the procedure, the Indian government sent a team to Saudi Arabia to investigate; its report prompted the government to issue notices to Saudi companies declaring that duties would be levied on their PP exports to India. It’s only now that the issue has begun to loom large, what with Riyadh sending a series of senior-level delegations to Delhi. The PP issue is also expected to pop up in a Joint Commission meeting scheduled between India and Saudi Arabia in the coming months. Faisal H. Trad, Saudi ambassador to Delhi, told Outlook, “I can assure you that unless the anti-dumping case is resolved by then, it will be on the top of the meeting’s agenda.”
Indian officials are vehement in their denials of Saudi Arabia’s insinuations against RIL, which told Outlook it had no comment to offer. A senior mea official, aware of the controversy, told Outlook, “We are not in the business of favouring any particular Indian business group. We have filed the case against Saudi Arabia on merit. India deeply values its relationship with Saudi Arabia, but unfair trade practices can’t be justified.”
A strained relationship with Riyadh has inimical implications for New Delhi. Not only is Saudi Arabia India’s main source of oil, it is also where more than two million Indians work and remit home $15 billion. Riyadh has also begun to look to India as an important destination for investment; the Saudi market too provides a potentially huge market for Indian investors and companies.
This is precisely why serious efforts are afoot to ensure the PP issue is resolved without dragging it to the WTO. As Trad says, “You wouldn’t want to go to court against your strategic partner.” Ultimately, the two countries will weigh their gains and losses before fashioning their strategies on the PP controversy.
Plz to saar.shyamd wrote:Spoke to an advisor to the GCC and Kuwaits interior ministry about relations with India. Will talk about it if people are interested.
Atul Aneja
Talmiz Ahmad, Indian Ambassador to the Saudi Arabia. File Photo: V. Ganesan.
The Hindu Talmiz Ahmad, Indian Ambassador to the Saudi Arabia. File Photo: V. Ganesan.
India's Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Talmiz Ahmad has become the first Indian diplomat to be conferred the King Abdulaziz Medal of First Class for his contribution towards elevating Indo-Saudi ties.
The honour was bestowed upon him at Jeddah on Sunday by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal. Mr. Ahmad said he had made a “modest” contribution towards the improvement of Indo-Saudi ties.
However, analysts say Mr. Ahmad has been honoured because of the key role he has played in raising Indo-Saudi level to a “strategic” level — a landmark that was achieved during the visit to Riyadh by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh last year.
A diplomat who did not wish to be named said Mr. Ahmad was quick to grasp that Saudi perception of India was changing fundamentally, following the assassination of the former Pakistani Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, the Lal Masjid incident in Islamabad and the Mumbai attacks of November 2008. “There was a sea change of perception about India, which the Saudis began to realise, was a victim of terrorism and with whom the Kingdom now shared a deep collaborative interest to counter terrorism.” Consequently, “security cooperation” became the foundation of a much evolved Saudi-India relationship which was anchored in the Riyadh declaration, signed during the Prime Minister's visit.
“Out of all the elements of Indo-Saudi relationship, which include energy and investments as some of the other pillars, it is in the arena of security cooperation that greatest progress has so far been achieved,” the diplomat observed.
The award conferred on Mr. Ahmad comprises a decorative badge and a certificate signed by the Saudi monarch, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz.
Mr. Ahmad, who has earlier served in several West Asian destinations including Iraq, Yemen, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, said that he was “surprised, overjoyed and humbled” by the honour. “The foundations of a strategic partnership with the Kingdom have been established but a superstructure is yet to be constructed,” he observed.
shyamd wrote:This will be my last post for a while.
Pramu garu, That is in bad taste.paramu wrote:shyamd wrote:This will be my last post for a while.
mm..... Interesting take by Yossi Guru. A bit of positive spin, but Israel did get a bloody nose and Hezbollah has improved its armory even more and can hit Israel harder today as a result of that war. Hezbollah managed a big PR win in the muslim world (even sunni's began to side with them). So not sure if its a resounding victory of the israeli's. Nevertheless, Nasrallah and Hamas will think twice before they conduct anything major. Iran appears on a strategic retreat, consolidating its position in Iraq.It has been five years since the Second Lebanon War - the third war, after the Sinai Campaign and the first Lebanon war, that Israel initiated. For any country, and certainly for Israel, war should be the last option, a decision made in the absence of other choices. For that reason, the abduction of two soldiers should not have been enough to justify the hasty decision to go to war in July 2006. Nevertheless, and with all due regret over the 121 soldiers who died and the hundreds more wounded, and the failures as exposed by the Winograd Committee, the war did bring Israel some gains.
Most of the missteps and failures of the Second Lebanon War were on the tactical level: careless deployment of forces, unprepared soldiers, lack of communication between field units and the high command and an overreliance on the air force. And of course, the failure to protect the home front. On the whole, however, Israel came out of the war with significant strategic and political assets.
The northern border has been quiet for five years. Contrary to Hezbollah's wishes, the Lebanese Army deployed in the south and an international force was stationed along the border, creating a barrier against the Shi'ite organization. Its fortification line along the border was destroyed, and its members can no longer carry unconcealed weapons.
All these limitations make it much harder for Hezbollah to operate near the border. Its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, has in effect been in hiding for five years, for fear of being assassinated by Israel if he shows his face in public. The Israel Defense Forces' deterrent power has been restored. True, Hezbollah has tripled its stores of missiles since the war, and upgraded them, but it presumably would have done so in any event.
But the war's most important consequence, arguably, was the disclosure of the extent of the connection between Hezbollah and Iran. It was Jordan's King Abdullah who coined the term "Shi'ite Crescent" to stress Iran's expansion into Lebanon via Iraq and Syria. In the years before the war, Arab leaders expressed their concerns about Iran's expansionist policy. However, they did so behind closed doors, as shown in WikiLeaks cables. They didn't dare talk openly about their fears. But the Second Lebanon War changed their attitude. The Arab Sunnis, represented by their leaders - Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states - wanted Israel to hurt Hezbollah to damage Iranian prestige.
At the height of the war and afterward, most local media commentators argued that the conflict was a resounding failure for Israel. They focused on the tactical flaws and refused to see the strategic picture. In their narrow-minded interpretation, they set the war's narrative: Israeli defeat.
The proof that the Second Lebanon War was not a failure lies in the response of Iran itself. Immediately after the war, senior Revolutionary Guard commanders, in particular the Al-Quds force commanded by Gen. Qassem Suleimani, rebuked Nasrallah for the abduction that provoked Israeli retaliation. That response, according to the Iranians, hurt Iranian interests and assets in Lebanon and the wider Middle East.
But even more important are the public remarks of Nasrallah himself. In a rare moment of candor after the war, he admitted being surprised by the force of Israel's response and said that had he known how events would unfold he would not have chosen his course of action.
Even if this wasn't a zero-sum game in which one side's defeat is the other side's victory, if Nasrallah and Iran are dissatisfied with the war's results, Israel's situation has improved.
Published: Thursday, July 21, 2011 12:12 AM CDT
For a good in-depth report on the roles of oil and arms sales in the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, I recommend reading The King’s Messenger by David B. Ottaway.
Ottaway was a reporter in Africa and the Middle East for the Washington Post for over 30 years. He also served as the Post’s national security correspondent in Washington for five years.
The messenger in Ottaway’s book is Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the son of a powerful Saudi prince by a dark-skinned 16-year-old household servant of Yemeni descent.
Bandar grew up alienated from the Saudi royal family. Yet he had a driving desire to prove himself.
He trained to be a fighter pilot and excelled at it, making his way to the United States for further training.
During the administration of President Jimmy Carter, Bandar found his way to Washington, D.C., and made his name as a brilliant advocate for the sale of F-15 fighter planes by the U.S. to Saudi Arabia. Carter put himself solidly behind the sale.
The deal left Carter in a strong position with the Saudi royal family. “They cannot refuse the president anything now because of the stand he has taken,” Bandar told John West, the American ambassador to Riyadh, the Saudi capital.
In return for these and other weapons sales, the Saudis quietly promised to provide this country will all the oil it might need. Although this “special relationship” was tested during the Arab oil crisis of 1979, the Saudis eventually kept it by successfully pressing OPEC, the organization of petroleum exporting countries, to pump more oil.
Hailed back in Riyadh, Bandar became the unofficial message carrier between heads of the Saudi royal family and five presidents of the United States. As he used his personal skills to slip around ambassadors in both capitals, however, Bandar gained a reputation for expanding the importance of his role. As Nicholas Veliotes, an assistant secretary of state under President Ronald Reagan, put it, “You were never quite sure you were talking to Bandar the wing commander or Bandar the Saudi prince who was representing the royal apparatus.”
Ottaway interviewed Bandar many times and does not hesitate in the book to question the prince’s credibility.
Bandar’s reputation as almost a “member of the Bush family” rested on his relationship with President George H.W. Bush. But as President George W. Bush put off trying to revive the peace process between Israel and Palestine, Crown Prince Abdullah “went bananas,” as Bandar put it, and the special relationship faltered badly.
That relationship flourished again for a time when Bandar joined Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and others to urge an American invasion of Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein. That war, however, was never popular in Saudi Arabia; the eyes of the Sunni royal house were always on Shi’ite Iran, which had tried to export its Islamic revolution to Mecca during annual pilgrimages there, and which the Saudis feared would gain influence in Iraq — as they have.
As the special relationship between Washington and Riyadh deteriorated, King Adbullah and his cabinet turned to Britain, and later China, for arms. The share of Saudi oil flowing to the United States dropped to about 7 percent of total U.S. consumption. Saudi Arabia no longer relied on the United States as the guarantor of its security.
This turn of events helped send Bandar, who had become the Saudi ambassador to Washington, into a long period of escape to his posh retreats in this country and Europe.
As part of the history he relates, Ottaway writes candidly about the export of Wahhabi Islam, the Saudis’ “soft power,” with the support of the House of Saud, which since 1747 has allied itself with the Wahhabi family of al-Sheikh. Wahhabi Islam is Riyadh’s counter to the influence of Iran’s Shi'ite revolution.
As Ottaway emphasizes, however, the Saudi leadership, while sometimes divided, has been quick to put down any radical violence at home carried out by Wahhabi extremists — or others.
The Saudi royal family does not have reason to fear its own people, according to Ottaway. Saudi Arabia’s traditional culture, influenced by Bedouin behavior and Wahhabi Islam, changes slowly. The House of Saud has in fact been an agent of change, as Badar told his American friends, but it had not made the mistakes made by the Shah of Iran, whose harsh westernizing ways brought him down.
Among the eye-opening episodes Ottaway reports are several occasions when Saudi oil exports were increased to help an American president hold on to the White House. Another is the close relationship between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which has provided Muslim troops to protect Saudi Arabia’s border with Yemen.
As for Osama bin Laden, a Saudi, Ottaway points out the Saudi government has joined the U.S., with some success, to fund the reform of madrassas in Pakistan where anti-western, anti-American Islamist extremism was being taught.
The Saudi government again showed its fear of Shi’ite revolution when it sent troops to put down protesters in Bahrain. As Saudi Arabia continues to make its own national security decisions independent of Washington, we may see more of this kind of action from Riyadh. And we may see Saudi royals showing up more often in Bejing as their search for a source of arms and a new security partner unfolds.
By Nidhi Verma
NEW DELHI | Tue Jul 26, 2011 5:25am EDT
NEW DELHI (Reuters) - Top exporter Saudi Arabia has struck deals to sell 3 million barrels more oil to India in August, stepping into the vacuum created by regional rival Iran after it cut supply to New Delhi.
The sale could stoke simmering tension between Riyadh and Tehran over oil policy. Saudi sources say the kingdom is not actively seeking to wrest market share from the Islamic Republic, but with Brent at over $100 a barrel Riyadh has taken a $300 million slice of Iran's oil sales to India.
"If Iran can't get the payment issues resolved with India we will send them supplies and we have already alerted them to that," said a Saudi government advisor.
Iran has already criticized Saudi Arabia for boosting oil supply unilaterally after Tehran-led opposition defeated a Saudi proposal for a coordinated supply increase at an OPEC meeting in June.
Iran told Indian refiners last week it would cut oil shipments amounting to about 400,000 barrels per day (bpd) in August. Tehran aims to pressure the refiners into settling $5 billion in debts for crude already supplied and to find a way around U.S. and UN sanctions that make trade with Iran difficult.
Iranian oil normally meets about 12 percent of India's total demand of 3.46 million bpd.
Saudi Arabia approved the extra sales for August, sources with direct knowledge of the deal said on Tuesday. The amount covers a quarter of what Iran exported on a daily basis to India before the halt.
The sources at Indian refiners Hindustan Petroleum Corp (HPCL), Bharat Petroleum Corp (BPCL) and Essar Oil said that state oil giant Saudi Aramco had confirmed it would supply each of them with an additional 1 million barrels of crude in August.
The crude would be a mix of Arab Light, Arab Heavy and Arab Medium, another source said.
"By purchasing crude from the Saudis, India is sending out a strong message to Iran that it can diversify away from Iran if the need arises," Praveen Kumar at FACTS Global Energy said.
SAUDI SALES
Buyers in Asia's third-largest oil consumer reached out to Aramco last week to request additional crude to plug the gap from Iran. They have also sought more crude from the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Iraq.
Iran sent refiners a letter on June 27 threatening to halt supplies and has followed through on its threat. Tehran had previously tolerated unpaid shipments as the price it had to pay to defend its crude market share.
"It is of course a relief to India that the gap can be readily plugged," said Victor Shum, an analyst at Purvin & Gertz. "It also indicates that there are alternative sources. Nobody really can have a monopoly in the oil markets."
India's oil minister S. Jaipal Reddy said last week New Delhi had a back-up plan to cope with a halt in oil supplies, but he did not elaborate.
U.S., IRAN, CHINA
India and Iran have failed since December to find ways for New Delhi to pay for imports, after India's central bank stopped payments through the Asian Clearing Union (ACU) mechanism. There is no ban against buying Iranian crude, but sanctions have made financing trade with Iran tough.
The central bank's move won praise from Washington and came close on the heels of a visit to India by U.S. President Barack Obama last year. Obama has endorsed India's bid for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council.
The U.S. and its allies aim to isolate Iran to halt its nuclear program, which they say is to develop weapons. Iran says it needs nuclear power supplies.
For Iran, the next step would be to find alternative markets for its oil that it will not sell to India. Analysts expect China to be a possible buyer if the oil is sold at a price attractive to its refiners.
Iran is selling crude to China without any problems, an Iranian government spokesman said on Tuesday, dismissing reports Tehran may not be getting paid by its biggest buyer.
Iran is China's third-largest crude supplier, behind Saudi Arabia and Angola, shipping around 540,000 bpd in the first six months of the year, or more than 10 percent of Beijing's 5.1 million bpd of imports.
(Additional reporting by Amena Bakr in DUBAI; Writing by Manash Goswami; Editing by Simon Webb)
The recent oil deal underlines the growing relations between India and Saudi Arabia
A week ago Indian ambassador in Riyadh Talmiz Ahmad said that the dispute between Riyadh and Delhi over anti-dumping duties imposed by his government on Saudi polypropylene would not affect the developing relationship between the two. That view has proved spot on. Yesterday, it was announced in Delhi that following Iran’s decision to halt oil shipments to India, Saudi Arabia has stepped into the breech and will provide an extra 3 million barrels next month; other GCC producers are also helping. For the moment it is a temporary arrangement until India’s problems with Iran are resolved, one way or another. Iran had been providing it with 400,000 barrels a day, 12 percent of its requirements.
This is clearly not simply a commercial deal. Saudi Arabia and India have become firm friends. Given that relationship, it would have been inconceivable, notwithstanding the dispute over anti-dumping measures, for the Kingdom to watch India to suffer the potentially devastating consequences of such a massive drop in its oil needs.
Whether the extra supplies are made permanent will presumably depend on what settlement India can reach with Iran over the five billion dollars it owes for oil already delivered. There is no doubt as to India’s willingness to pay but it is caught in a diplomatic impasse, prevented from doing so by UN sanctions that effectively block any financial deals with Tehran.
Iran’s decision is incomprehensible. It is bound to backfire, designed as it is to force India into spurning international law, something that no Indian government would do or could afford to do. Tehran ought to have realized that. Cutting off supplies when Delhi was trying its best to resolve the issue is an unfriendly act and will inevitably result in India shying away from future deals with Iran.
The Kingdom’s burgeoning relationship with India that this deal underlines is certainly not intended to be at the expense of the longstanding and, in many ways, unique one with Pakistan. Saudi Arabia sets great store by it and the hope is that it will continue to flourish.
Nonetheless, it would be foolish to pretend that there is not concern among people in Saudi Arabia at the developing relationship between Islamabad and Tehran and, to a lesser extent, Beijing. Last week, President Asif Ali Zardari was in Jeddah to explain Pakistan’s geopolitical policies and allay such concerns but it has not removed the view that Pakistan, Iran and China appear to be forming an axis.
It is not the only potential Tehran axis causing concern. By coincidence yesterday, it was also announced that Iran has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Iraq and Syria for a $10-billion pipeline to carry Iranian gas to the Mediterranean. Had the grandly-entitled “Islamic Gas Pipeline” gone through Turkey instead, it would have been viewed as a purely commercial deal. Given Iran’s relationship with Syria and Iraq, it has to be seen in political terms. Indeed, Tehran admits as much. Its acting Oil Minister Mohammad Aliabadi is quoted in the Iranian media saying the agreement is a sign of “strengthening and deepening trilateral relations.”
Saudis always try to support their friends and allies when they can. Others, of course, do the same. But the Saudis will not take kindly to relationships that could be seen as excluding them, or even as a threat.
Article X of NPT statesshyamd wrote: - Israel is backing the opposition in Syria lately because of Iran. Iran wants to use a war with Israel to go nuclear - there is some clause in the NPT that says that in the event of a war, the state has 90days to withdraw the "head" of the nuke and mate it - or something like that and withdraw from the NPT to face the enemy and deter an attack.
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
This is extremely interesting thing.shyamd wrote:Editorial in the KSA press.
Editorial: Consolidating tiesThe recent oil deal underlines the growing relations between India and Saudi Arabia
<snip>
It is not the only potential Tehran axis causing concern. By coincidence yesterday, it was also announced that Iran has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Iraq and Syria for a $10-billion pipeline to carry Iranian gas to the Mediterranean. Had the grandly-entitled “Islamic Gas Pipeline” gone through Turkey instead, it would have been viewed as a purely commercial deal. Given Iran’s relationship with Syria and Iraq, it has to be seen in political terms. Indeed, Tehran admits as much. Its acting Oil Minister Mohammad Aliabadi is quoted in the Iranian media saying the agreement is a sign of “strengthening and deepening trilateral relations.”
Excellent. Thank you very much for this.Virupaksha wrote:Article X of NPT statesshyamd wrote: - Israel is backing the opposition in Syria lately because of Iran. Iran wants to use a war with Israel to go nuclear - there is some clause in the NPT that says that in the event of a war, the state has 90days to withdraw the "head" of the nuke and mate it - or something like that and withdraw from the NPT to face the enemy and deter an attack.
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.