Pakistan arms sales, ops, doctrine, etc

[sum]

Saar, could you pls clarify as to what "less spectacular" means ( am assuming doesn't mean less DDM coverage)?

[Shrinivasan]

Saar, could you pls clarify as to what "less spectacular" means ( am assuming doesn't mean less DDM coverage)?

Sum, are you refering to this statement

Either the beards have achieved spectacular success

? if so then i'll explain..
I meant that the Taliban (Beards here) have achieved some "Spectacular Success" against the Pakistani Army and that the PA is now forced to respond to the Taliban, I also mentioned another line of thought after this...

[rohitvats]

Rohitvats,

Some orbat for you.

Kyani's Gamble

Hey, thanks...will need some time to read the fine print and will then comment.

[sum]

Shrinivasan-avare, Sorry for confusion but my doubt was on:

Did anyone notice that our summer exercises this year have been less spectacular than before??

[Shrinivasan]

Hey, thanks...will need some time to read the fine print and will then comment.

There is a series of deployment notes in the article... it is more like a Pakee "intent of purpose" deposition to Sher Khan saying, your GUBO worked I am moving troops onto the western sector...
Also with a begging bowl for more equipment, more helos etc. I also shows some peacetime deployment stations for some formations (which I am cross checking with my Paki ORBAT)..
one thing stands out... "After moving so many formations onto western border, how come PA has deployed less than 200K troops there" what is the strength of these formations? Are Paki divisions the size of Indian Brigades?

[Shrinivasan]

Shrinivasan-avare, Sorry for confusion but my doubt was on:

Did anyone notice that our summer exercises this year have been less spectacular than before??

Vijayee Bhave was initially touted as a multi Corps exercise to validate a 48Hr mobilization, it turned out to be less than a Corps, only 20K troops involved.
Pine Prahaar ended before anyone knew about it, I am not aware of any other exercise this summer. Also Navy and Air Force seem to be really quite on the exercise front?
Hence my statement!!!
Added Later: Hip-Hip Hooray - My 500th Post.

[rohitvats]

The whole of a Corps never mobilizes for an exercise....multi-Corps exercise will involve elements from different Corps, like may be, Strike and Pivot Corps of a particular Command. The lessons are learnt by simulating larger forces (with forces in being smaller in size) and applied to larger formations. Just imagine the scare it would create if whole of 2 Corps were to move to Rajasthan for exercise! Last time it did we had Prakaram and before that, Operation Brasstacks (which by the way was termed as largest "exercise" in the world ever - larger than even NATO annual exercises). It is both not feasible nor practical for a whole Corps to move into exercise area - provided you can find big enough exercise areas for a whole Corps.

[rajanb]

Thanks Rohit.

For a moment I almost fell into the we are "SRDE" only mood!

In the meantime, "The Love Story" between USA and Pak.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-0 ... order.html

Pakistan’s army started an offensive against Taliban guerrillas in its borderlands with Afghanistan, its chief spokesman said.

Troops moved into the mountains of Kurram Agency, a tribal district that Taliban factions have used as a base, according to Major General Athar Abbas. While Abbas declined to give details, the newspaper Dawn and other Pakistani media cited residents and officials as saying thousands of troops were involved, some flown in by helicopter.

Read the full thing.

To me, it seems the Good and Bad Taliban theory being the guiding element for choosing the Kurram Agency.

That too by the Ugly part of the Good, Bad and Ugly. The Pakistan Army.

[chackojoseph]

To me, it seems the Good and Bad Taliban theory being the guiding element for choosing the Kurram Agency.

That too by the Ugly part of the Good, Bad and Ugly. The Pakistan Army.

Some terrorist dead are better than no terrorist dead. Let them kill those. Then world can decide with the rest of the so called good terrorist.

[rajanb]

To me, it seems the Good and Bad Taliban theory being the guiding element for choosing the Kurram Agency.

That too by the Ugly part of the Good, Bad and Ugly. The Pakistan Army.

Some terrorist dead are better than no terrorist dead. Let them kill those. Then world can decide with the rest of the so called good terrorist.

A good terrorist is a dead terrorist my friend CJ!

+1 for bad terrorist
+2 for good terrorist

What I am trying to imply is that they are running with the hares and hunting with the hounds. It will end up badly for the pakis ultimately. That is a +3

[Shrinivasan]

The whole of a Corps never mobilizes for an exercise....multi-Corps exercise will involve elements from different Corps, like may be, Strike and Pivot Corps of a particular Command. The lessons are learnt by simulating larger forces (with forces in being smaller in size) and applied to larger formations.

I agree with you...but originally touted as a major exercise... far larger than what it eventually turned out to be.. Which is still huge. If (a big IF) IA has exercised with one whole Corps it would have been spectacular, instead we performed a smaller one with small units from many elements of two Corps.

[Y I Patel]

Cross posted from Pakistan News and Discussion thread, since this is the core of Pakistani doctrine

---------------

The biggest importance of Prof. Fair's article is that it serves the dictum "Know Thy Enemy". LeT is a known entity in India for almost two decades, yet our homegrown understanding and articulation of this threat has been at a superficial level - we, of course, found out early enough who the founders were and how they were (fianancially) supported. From bitter experience, we found out how LeT operates. And the terrorists, dead and alive, told us where they came from. Yet, we have never connected the dots to come up with a holistic and fine-grained portrait of the most potent terrorist institution we are threatened by. Because Prof. Fair finally gives us that understanding, we should be in her debt.

The picture Prof. Fair paints is of Pakistan's finest creation. Each country has a genius, and Pakistan's is for creating terrorist organizations. The learning experience began right at birth, and in creating LeT, Pakistan got all the elements right.

First, and foremost, LeT has a clarity of doctrine that would make any institution proud - and the doctrine itself is finely honed to be an organic extension of the vision of Pakistani establishment. LeT, as Prof. Fair explains so lucidly, is created with the purpose of fighting the number one threat to Islam in Pakistan. Pakistan itself was created, in the words of it's founders, to provide refuge for and to empower the Muslims of the Indian Subcontinent. Therefore, the very act of Pakistan's creation defines the number one threat to Pakistan and its foundational relegion - a secular, non-believing India. Equally important, the LeT doctrine also gives the Pakistani establishment wide latitude in how Islam is supported and how it interprets and responds to threats to Islam - any inherent hypocricy in siding with non-belivers in killing sons of Islam is considered a lesser and even necessary evil to the larger purpose of fighting the external and existential threat. No wonder, then, that while lesser creations such as Taliban as well as other jehadi organizations have turned against Pakistan, while LeT remains in disciplined lockstep with its creators.

Secondly, the article highlights the resons why LeT is so effective in execution and in maintaining organizational discipline. The recruits come from the heartland of modern Pakistan, and are unencumbered by conflicting loyalties to tribe or ethnicity. They do not put Kashmiriyat before Islam, nor do they chase after a Greater Pakhtunistan. They are relegious soldiers who fight for and with the approval of their mothers and motherland, which ironically is a trait they share with another subcontinental instution associated with a different hue of green. They are also chosen from a much more educated and skilled pool, and are trained to the standard of special forces. Prof. Fair talks in passing about their training, which for the chosen few can last for six months. While more details are not available, it is useful to put this in context that Special Forces troops in the Indian Army also have a "probation" or initial training period of six months. Equally important in this context, only a few of those that have had this high level of training are finally chosen for missions in India or elsewhere. The operatives that India faces, then, are not mindless drones programmed to explode, but highly commited and indoctrinated special forces operatives. Looked at this way, the semantics of them not being suicide bombers but operatives that volunteer for high risk missions takes on subtle but significant importance.

But the most important insight gleaned from Prof. Fairs painstaking research may be the reason why such an organization geared to take on external threats has not yet carried out a single attack at America or American interests in Pakistan. Put simply, America is not and has never been the foremost threat to Pakistan. If Pakistan is forced to make transactional compromises with America to serve the larger purpose of diminishing India, then cooperation with America and tolerating American presence become a necessary evil. A disciplined and indoctrinated force like LeT can be relied on to not strike out against US in blind anger. And this probably is part of Prof. Fairs motivation in understanding LeT. America, as a superpower, has a number of choices in how it addresses potential threats, including the option of coopting the threat or buying it off. If America can continue to chart a course in Afghanistan and Pakistan where its motives and goals are seen as being malleable to Pakistan's larger objectives, then LeT can be free to focus on operations in India, and if need be, on Afghanistan. However, if the interests of US and Pakistan clash to an extent that US becomes more a threat and less a gullible mark, LeT will find its strategic priorities being reoriented.

From an Indian point of view, then, Prof. Fair's work should be an object lesson in how to go about confronting the threat posed by LeT and its brother organizations. The Indian response has been to increase armed capability to shield its citizens from the next blow, but none of these capabilities, including those that would target LeT's higher leadership, will have any effect in diminishing the potency of this particular threat. Indian security forces can, at best, uproot weeds they see and keep at it as the next set of weeds pops up. A more lasting solution is a lot more complicated and beyond my ability to prescribe, but the general idea would be to make India to be NOT seen as the primary or existential threat to Pakistan or Pakistani Islam. This does not mean acceeding to Pakistani demands in Kashmir, but may be a more cynical approach which softens India's image in Pakistan to a point where some other threat is seen to be more predominant. Before the Second World War, Britain and France on one side and Soviet Union on the other vied with each other to make Facist Germany the greater enemy of the other side. If India cannot make itself a lesser enemy of Pakistan, it could strive to make someone else a bigger enemy.

[Craig Alpert]

'Pak has 14,000 Kashmiris in reserve for war against India'

[arun]

X Posted from the TSP thread.

New York Times reports that that “two senior administration officials” of the Obama Administration have said that classified intelligence showed that senior officials of the spy agency of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI / ISID) directed the attack that killed journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad in an effort to silence criticism.

Pakistan’s Spies Tied to Slaying of a Journalist

New classified intelligence obtained before the May 29 disappearance of the journalist, Saleem Shahzad, 40, from the capital, Islamabad, and after the discovery of his mortally wounded body, showed that senior officials of the spy agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, directed the attack on him in an effort to silence criticism, two senior administration officials said.

The intelligence, which several administration officials said they believed was reliable and conclusive, showed that the actions of the ISI, as it is known, were “barbaric and unacceptable,” one of the officials said. They would not disclose further details about the intelligence.

Particularly embarrassing for the military, Mr. Shahzad described negotiations before the raid between the navy and a Qaeda representative, Abdul Samad Mansoor. The navy refused to release the detainees, Mr. Shahzad wrote. The Pakistani military maintains that it does not negotiate with militants.

It was possible that Mr. Shahzad had become too cavalier, said Ayesha Siddiqa, a Pakistani columnist and author.

“The rules of the game are not completely well defined,” she said. “Sometimes friendly elements cross an imaginary threshold and it is felt they must be taught a lesson.”

The efforts by the ISI to constrain the Pakistani news media have, to a degree, worked in recent days. The virulent criticism after Mr. Shahzad’s death has tempered a bit.

A Pakistani reporter, Waqar Kiani, who works for the British newspaper The Guardian, was beaten in the capital after Mr. Shahzad’s death with wooden batons and a rubber whip, by men who said: “You want to be a hero. We’ll make you a hero,” the newspaper reported. Mr. Kiani had just published an account of his abduction two years earlier at the hands of intelligence agents.

[arun]

'Pak has 14,000 Kashmiris in reserve for war against India'

X Posting the link to the New York Times article titled “Pakistani Military Still Cultivates Militant Groups, a Former Fighter Says” on which the Times of India article is based:

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/04/world ... ml?_r=1&hp

Only natural that an organisation such as the Army of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan that sports the very steeped in Islam motto of “Iman, Taqwa, Jihad fi Sabilillah” or translated from Urdu, “Faith, Piety and Jihad in the Way of Allah”, will take its motto seriously and succumb to the charms of Jihadi Islamic Terrorism.

[nits]

ISI asks CIA to sign formal accord ruling out future attacks inside Pak

Pakistan’s premier spy agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has asked the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to sign a written contract ruling out future attacks inside Pakistani territory. A senior security official said that the ISI wanted a formal agreement on paper - ruling out future attacks on Pakistani soil, for example - in order to restart the relationship, The Scotsman reports. "Rather than word of mouth or a handshake, we have got to have things written down," he said. "We need to formalise things, saying this is what we will do and this is what you will do."

And what if after writing contract they still attack on Pakistani soil... what will Pak do - attack US

[svinayak]

Cross posted from Pakistan News and Discussion thread, since this is the core of Pakistani doctrine

---------------

The biggest importance of Prof. Fair's article is that it serves the dictum "Know Thy Enemy". LeT is a known entity in India for almost two decades, yet our homegrown understanding and articulation of this threat has been at a superficial level - we, of course, found out early enough who the founders were and how they were (fianancially) supported.
First, and foremost, LeT has a clarity of doctrine that would make any institution proud - and the doctrine itself is finely honed to be an organic extension of the vision of Pakistani establishment. LeT, as Prof. Fair explains so lucidly, is created with the purpose of fighting the number one threat to Islam in Pakistan.


But the most important insight gleaned from Prof. Fairs painstaking research may be the reason why such an organization geared to take on external threats has not yet carried out a single attack at America or American interests in Pakistan. Put simply, America is not and has never been the foremost threat to Pakistan. If Pakistan is forced to make transactional compromises with America to serve the larger purpose of diminishing India, then cooperation with America and tolerating American presence become a necessary evil. A disciplined and indoctrinated force like LeT can be relied on to not strike out against US in blind anger. And this probably is part of Prof. Fairs motivation in understanding LeT. America, as a superpower, has a number of choices in how it addresses potential threats, including the option of coopting the threat or buying it off. If America can continue to chart a course in Afghanistan and Pakistan where its motives and goals are seen as being malleable to Pakistan's larger objectives, then LeT can be free to focus on operations in India, and if need be, on Afghanistan. However, if the interests of US and Pakistan clash to an extent that US becomes more a threat and less a gullible mark, LeT will find its strategic priorities being reoriented.

Very good analysis
One thing to note is the level of understanding between US establishment and Pak army over this LeT. This understanding was to allow Pak to operate it based on certain rules such as Kashmir only etc from 1985. This is a total understanding between these two over how it will be concealed and when the world should know. The training as described came from the US special forces in the 80s.
India is not part of this relationship at all but it is a target and victim of this understanding. With CF exposing this it means this long term understanding is breaking down now and Pak Mil is getting exposed for control. US has used this leverage for a long time and also after 911 to control Musharaf and his regime. Threat of a terrorist state has been effective. But now the yield is diminished and it is time to open it up for total exposure.

It also means that CF knew about this long before but was allowed now to expose it as part of the current state of the relationship. Indian analysis has been inconsequential by making sure that Indian view is taken as biased against Pakistan. They have made sure Indians dont get the full picture and global view of this secret deal. They have designed this system over 30 years very successfully.

[Chinmayanand]

And what if after writing contract they still attack on Pakistani soil... what will Pak do - attack US

Another 9/11 by non-state actors.

[Samay]

Cross posted from Pakistan News and Discussion thread, since this is the core of Pakistani doctrine

---------------

The biggest importance of Prof. Fair's article is that it serves the dictum "Know Thy Enemy". LeT is a known entity in India for almost two decades,
From an Indian point of view, then, Prof. Fair's work should be an object lesson in how to go about confronting the threat posed by LeT and its brother organizations. The Indian response has been to increase armed capability to shield its citizens from the next blow, but none of these capabilities, including those that would target LeT's higher leadership, will have any effect in diminishing the potency of this particular threat. Indian security forces can, at best, uproot weeds they see and keep at it as the next set of weeds pops up. A more lasting solution is a lot more complicated and beyond my ability to prescribe, but the general idea would be to make India to be NOT seen as the primary or existential threat to Pakistan or Pakistani Islam. This does not mean acceeding to Pakistani demands in Kashmir, but may be a more cynical approach which softens India's image in Pakistan to a point where some other threat is seen to be more predominant. Before the Second World War, Britain and France on one side and Soviet Union on the other vied with each other to make Facist Germany the greater enemy of the other side. If India cannot make itself a lesser enemy of Pakistan, it could strive to make someone else a bigger enemy.

Analysis is good ,but the suggestions are wrong.Here Prof. Fair is like an observer,but with a western(particularly American) pov.

Perhaps he should like to tell us why there is a rapid decrease in cross border infiltration of these highly motivated special terrorists since 2002, when there is continuous disturbance in this region? Also if we look at the number of terror attacks in Pakistan,they are huge. The Mumbai massacre only tells us that these zombies are out there ,waiting for a chance to sneak in,then what is preventing them from coming in large numbers ?

The answer is ,since operation Parakram and in subsequent years of dialogue ,Pakistan knows that the Indian grip is tightening day by day,both militarily and politically .
Terrorism in Pakistan is an institutional policy and only its institutions like isi/pak army could reduce it ,provided some other country doesn't obliterates this terror infrastructure. Since the infrastructure is still there ,terrorists are and will always be there. So we know whom to engage.

It is the radical and the money making arm of pakistani army that should be engaged and stopped from doing this. We do this politically and on operational level . Other thing is the role of USA and other baksheesh giving nations like ksa. If they give loan on the T&C of cross border terrorism reports from India ,Pakistan will be bound to listen. Also the incentives for the Americans are there.

But , for God's sake we cannot depend upon aman ki asha philosophy to stop these radicals,as these radicals are no longer normal human beings to understand such things.And they are continuously provided with such explanations to believe so.

There wont be any bigger threat for pakis than India, because we are presented everywhere as the biggest threat to their integrity ,pakistani Islam and pakistani army ie, in their history books, media, Govt. policies, local politics, foreign affairs, water,land and biggest of them the pakistani army itself is a self proclaimed India hater .

Things like aman ki asha only gives these radicals confidence on their gun-on-the-head suicidal philosophy.

So the problem is and will always be institutional, whether army rules or the pakjabi taliban .
Pakistani institutions should be forced to cut down what they have sown.

The actions of paki army in fata region is good as long as it is directed in the right direction, but we know that they are playing good taliban-bad taliban. While their strategic assets are no longer bunnies in afpak ,but those in-house, ie Punjab-PoK.

So who will be the ultimate winner between the war on terror and Pakistan's perfidy?
None.

Longer they take to realize that their own institutions are in a mess and in turn making that whole country ,longer will be the days of darkness. So, public angle is also there .If pakistani people rise against these institutions then these institutions could be dismantled if not disrupted. But that is what the thief also knows when he commits a theft that he has to point somewhere else where when he gets caught, so does the paki army.

Almost similar condition is in India with the politicians ,who point somewhere else when they are caught .

What hurts them hurts us as well . We are also in a mess because of our own institutions. So, the problem lies in self correction than obsession. Its there we can help them to do so . But that is going to happen when we have such institutions guided by leaders who want to correct themselves,in turn correction is made elsewhere as well .

So as long as we have don't have an answerable,honest,just system we are not eligible to solve this terror problem . Neither are they .

Pakistan's dilemma is ,they think this could turn as their own Perestroika

[arun]

X Posted from the ISI History and Discussions thread.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is passing through an infrequent period of civilian administration albeit “under seen” by the Military rather than the more frequent periods of outright Military Dictatorship, political freedom is nonetheless circumscribed.

Journalist Omar Waraich in Time Magazine on the deadly consequences of annoying the ISI / ISID, the intelligence agency of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Read it all:

Risky Business: When Pakistani Journalists Take On the ISI

[prithvi]

North Korea Bribed Top Pakistan Military Officials For Nuclear Secrets, Says Founder Of Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb Program


http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/0 ... 91923.html

[prithvi]

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/0 ... 92424.html


Pakistan Sanctioned Death Of Pakistan Journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad, Mike Mullen Claims

[Airavat]

50 killed in air/ground operations in Kurram

[abhishek_sharma]

PROSPECTS FOR INDIAN AND PAKISTANI ARMS CONTROL AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.

Brigadier Feroz Hassan, Pakistan Army
Naval War College Review, Summer 2010

One of themore onerous issues is a perception that has come to be known as the “string of pearls.” To provide a frame of reference, Pakistan’s Makran Coast has strategic importance, in that it offers Pakistan options to counter India’s projection of power in the Indian Ocean. ...

This is important because India is geographically restricted in its access to both the east and west, due to the physical presence of Bangladesh and Pakistan, and in the north by the Himalayas ...

This strategic handicap, taken as a whole, forces India to rely on its maritime capabilities in order to maintain trade routes and logistics between its continental shores and the rest of the world. ...

As a part of this expanded naval presence, India has launched ballistic-missile submarines and produced other naval capabilities that can act as an extended security arm for its various trade routes, as well as a third strike capability (that
is, in addition to its land-based and air assets). ...

The ultimate nightmare for Pakistan would be to live between two hostile neighbors, India in the east and Afghanistan in the west....

Overarching these regional issues is Pakistan’s fear that its long-term ally the United States may eventually turn against it, under Indian influence....

Yet if India’s strategy to use dam construction and water diversion as leverage against Pakistan persists, it could well lead to the eventual collapse of the Indus Waters Treaty altogether...

The Lahore MOU came about at the famous summit between the prime ministers of India and Pakistan in February 1999. The agreement was a result of an intense eight-month process, beginning after the nuclear test in May 1998, in which American diplomats led by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot were actively involved....In fact, many ideas flowed between Indian and Pakistani diplomats during this period. India and Pakistan decided to “triangulate” their bilateral dialogues, making the United States a third party. Theoretically, this was a good way forward,with each side speaking separately to the United States; however, suspicion ensued. Another entanglement was that the United States approached the issue based on its experience in Europe; that did not necessarily conform to the strategic realities of South Asia. For example,most CBMs and agreements of the Cold War had been fashioned for a bipolar world, but the Lahore agreements happened after the East-West conflict had ended. Despite these incongruities, “strategic restraint” became the term du jour. The American expert team presented Pakistan a paper called “Minimum Deterrence Posture,” offering such recommendations as geographical separation of major components of nuclear arsenals and their delivery means; segregation of delivery systems from warhead locations; declaration of nonnuclear delivery systems, with their specific locations (e.g., which squadrons of aircraft, at given locations, would be nuclear or nonnuclear); establishment of finite ceilings for fissile-material production and monitoring of nuclear testing; and last, limitation of production and ballistic flight tests. All this was meant to produce what was referred to as a “strategic pause.”

Subsequently, Pakistan transformed these U.S. proposals into its own, regionally based concept, the SRR. The SRR was conceptually based upon the principle of nuclear restraint, with conventional force restraint as well—hence, it was a strategic CBM. It was simply not practical for a small country like Pakistan to “segregate” delivery systems, as suggested by the United States. That was unacceptable, because it undercut the necessary ambiguity of Pakistan’s strategic deterrence, while allowing India to wage conventional war against it. What Pakistan proposed was a comprehensive conventional-force restraint agreement. This proposal had three major elements: identification of the offensive forces of each country, with their locations and postures; designation of geographical border areas as Low Force Zones (LFZs), from which offensive forces would be kept away; and a long-term mutually balanced force reduction, as conflict resolution and peace prevailed in the region. The Pakistani side produced several alternative proposals and designated each side’s offensive forces.

Identifying forces that are dangerous to each other would allow measures to separate them geographically in order to prevent tension and armed conflict. The LFZs would be the hallmark of this intended policy. The border areas and
the towns close by would be defensive only, the sizes of forces in their garrisons to be agreed upon by both sides. In the event of changes, each side would notify the other. The proposed eventual force reduction would be “mutually balanced” because India has a much larger military structure; conventional force reductions would be proportional, involving equal ratios.

On the question of “nonmating” nuclear weapons from their delivery systems, Pakistan acknowledged this to be an existential issue of nuclear posture. Pakistan was amenable to formalizing regional nondeployment of nuclear weapons in conjunction with conflict resolution and conventional force restraints. The SRR also proposed mutual missile restraints, including range and payload ceilings, flight-testing notification, and prohibition of destabilizing modernization, such as missile defense or submarine-launched ballistic missiles. However, the United States accepted India’s position in not agreeing to these terms. This derailed the whole process. The dialogue lost its energy, as the United States began to mirror India’s position, and Pakistan lost interest. Pakistan’s fundamental problem was India’s conventional threat, which remained unaddressed in every proposal by the United States. Any CBMs not related to conventional force would be irrelevant. The failure of SSR to be accepted in South Asia set the tone of U.S. policy toward the region, and a new strategic competition between India and Pakistan began. American ignorance of the SSR was a historic failure; a general peace and stability framework could have been produced, as against a trajectory of competition and conflict.

Technological innovation would be focused on the acquisition or deployment of missile defenses,with the transfer of such technologies as the Israeli Arrow antiballistic missile. China may not deploy its strategic arsenal, but Pakistan
cannot be expected to remain nondeployed if it does. In response, India would deploy a strategic arsenal made more robust by nuclear submarines, or a mix of strategic weapons. If a situation of this sort happens, the possibility of hot pursuit
across the LoC by Indian ground or special forces, cross-border attacks by the Indian Air Force, or Indian naval coercive deployment in the Arabian Sea to exploit Pakistan’s vulnerabilities cannot be ruled out. Alternatively, the Cold Start deployment organization—involving “integrated battle groups”—could be implemented. This would be a clear fortification
of the border and a flagrant attempt to escalate. In response, Pakistan would break loose from all arms-control discussions. This could lead to a general meltdown of the regional situation, with the United States no longer in a position to
intervene positively. ...

India should also revise its current security doctrine of coercion (Cold Start), exploitation (e.g., backing away from a perceived negative role in Afghanistan), and aggressive diplomatic isolation of Pakistan, which is in vogue at the time of this writing. The best course for India is to pick up the threads of the Lahore MOU and Islamabad Accord. If India takes up the Lahore framework and gives fair consideration to the SSR (through the lens of strategic CBMs) that Pakistan offered, progress can be made. ...

Finally, though it may appear premature, India and Pakistan must conduct a sober analysis of their ballistic-missile inventories. As widely reported and understood, their shortest-range ballistic missiles—the Prithvi-I in the case of India,
the HATF-I for Pakistan—have little strategic utility and pose technical problems. It may be wise for India and Pakistan to eliminate these two capabilities as a first step. This would be symbolic, not impacting military stature or capabilities for various contingencies. In the long term, however, there may be a realization that the next category of ballistic missiles, Prithvi-II and HATF-II, may also be of less military utility. (The technical and strategic aspects are left
for further analysis at a later time.) ...

[abhishek_sharma]

From the article posted above:

As widely reported and understood, their shortest-range ballistic missiles—the Prithvi-I in the case of India,
the HATF-I for Pakistan—have little strategic utility and pose technical problems. It may be wise for India and Pakistan to eliminate these two capabilities as a first step.

What is the real reason behind this offer? hain jee?

[pgbhat]

^ Pacquiness is overflowing in that farticle. He mentions "Hindu extremists" threatening Pacquis playing kirket but not a single word about talibs from his quam.

[Anujan]

I 400% support the elimination of Prithvi and going in for cannesterized Shaurya and Prahaar instead

[Suhas H]

I 400% support the elimination of Prithvi and going in for cannesterized Shaurya and Prahaar instead

I second that as well, should have something along the lines US ATACMS. Highly mobile and can launch several missiles per system.

[Shrinivasan]

As widely reported and understood, their shortest-range ballistic missiles—the Prithvi-I in the case of India, the HATF-I for Pakistan—have little strategic utility and pose technical problems. It may be wise for India and Pakistan to eliminate these two capabilities as a first step.
What is the real reason behind this offer? hain jee?

For Pakees, even their tanks are Strategic weapon... they sort of applied the same logic to Yindia... not realizing that we play a slightly more sophisticated game...what our hero is saying is as follows..
1) our Hatf missile is a dud, we had great hope for it..
2) SDRE Prithvi posses our biggest threat, you guys have made the max # of these, deployed them close to our Pak-jab and would not hesitate to use it (as it is conventional onlee) and we are nanga against it..
so be a good boy and eliminate these.. we will tickle you once a week...
we should just show them the ungli!!!

[Shrinivasan]

I 400% support the elimination of Prithvi and going in for cannesterized Shaurya and Prahaar instead

Why, because of the long time to fuel. yada yada yada... don't you think Desh would have solved those issues. currently they are having Prithvi on road mobile launchers FUELLED.. no need to fill-em up on the frontlines.. i am not sure about warhead but then we don't have to go into details..
Shaurya and Prahaar ARE ALSO NEEDED. Prithvi is for the 150-350km range...Prahaar lower and Shaurya higher wrt range... apart from these we need more Brahmos variants too... don't forget the Agni variants.

[Shrinivasan]

Man this Feroz Khan guy is on a roll... the only thing he has not asked is to hand over cashmere... let us see some of his wet dreams...

India is geographically restricted in its access to both the east and west, due to the physical presence of Bangladesh and Pakistan

India has has major ports in Mumbai, Goa, Mangalore, Kochi, Tuticorin, Chennai, Vizag, Kandla and Kolkatta. Which of these can Pak even dream of attacking. Probably some of those ports in Gujarat, which is why Desh has some of the densest AD network in Gujarat region. Remember Atlantique!!!

India constructing new dams in Kashmir, diverting water resources authorized for Pakistan; ...violation of the Indus Waters Treaty. Yet if India’s strategy to use dam construction and water diversion as leverage against Pakistan persists, it could well lead to the eventual collapse of the IndusWaters Treaty altogether.

Water is becoming a major irritant for Poaks, both Baglihar and Kishanganga will impact water flow into Pak, Also Desh seems to be using some loopholes in Indus Water treaty to heavily Dam Jhelum and Chenab in multiple locations. The next step is to layout canals / pipelines but we haven't done it yet. THIS DIRECTLY IMPACTS PAKJABIS, hence the thakleef.

The best course for India is to pick up the threads of the Lahore MOU and Islamabad Accord. If India takes up the Lahore framework and gives fair consideration to the SSR (through the lens of strategic CBMs) that Pakistan offered, progress can be made. .

We all know what Pak offered India after Lahore MOU, Kargil. let them shove all these accords up their Mush...India went out of the way to offer an olive branch and Pakees decided to stab us, so we should say **** OFF. MMS for all his Pappi-Jappi seems to say this...
To be contd...

[Shrinivasan]

Continuing my analysis of this Feroz Khan's paper...
His next prescription is

India should also revise its current security doctrine of coercion (Cold Start), exploitation (e.g., backing away from a perceived negative role in Afghanistan), and aggressive diplomatic isolation of Pakistan, which is in vogue at the time of this writing.

Cold Start is at best a reactive doctrine, a response to any Paki misadventure in Pak. it looks like it has had an unintended good effect on these Pakis "COERCION", since the pukes know they don't have a viable riposte to CS (inspite of all the brave Marda-giri), they term it as a coercive doctrine to make them curb their support for Jehadis and restrain them... the three items listed are all very Chankiyan...
1) Cold Start
2) Desi influence/involvement in Afghanistan
3) Aggressive Diplomatic maneuvers by Yevil Yindoos.
Here is the Clincher

The ultimate nightmare for Pakistan would be to live between two hostile neighbors, India in the east and Afghanistan in the west.

We have to move heaven and Earth to make this dream come true...

[chackojoseph]

I 400% support the elimination of Prithvi and going in for cannesterized Shaurya and Prahaar instead

Prithvi MLU's have effected. Its time that, its eased out to areas on Himalayan borders where it can be spread along with newer gen systems.

[Ravi Karumanchiri]

US to 'defer military aid' to Pakistan
A total of $800m in aid and equipment could be either suspended or outright cancelled, The New York Times says.
Last Modified: 10 Jul 2011 05:04

The United States is suspending about one-third of its aid to Pakistan’s military in the wake of increased tensions between the two countries, The New York Times has reported.

A total of $800m in aid and equipment could be either suspended or outright cancelled, according to three unnamed US officials quoted by the newspaper on Saturday.

...

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/ ... 74792.html

[svinayak]

Man this Feroz Khan guy is on a roll... the only thing he has not asked is to hand over cashmere... let us see some of his wet dreams...

India is geographically restricted in its access to both the east and west, due to the physical presence of Bangladesh and Pakistan

India has has major ports in Mumbai, Goa, Mangalore, Kochi, Tuticorin, Chennai, Vizag, Kandla and Kolkatta. Which of these can Pak even dream of attacking. Probably some of those ports in Gujarat, which is why Desh has some of the densest AD network in Gujarat region. Remember Atlantique!!!

They have been taught to think this way that India is geo graphically constrained. This is a view propagated by the British - Caroe. We see this with PRC analyst also. They look at India as geo graphically smaller and easy to manipulate. The map of the world shows as skewed area for INDIA which is squeezed and does not give the actual size relative to China and other countries.
Some uncle people also told that India is so small that its opinion does not matter to the world.

The best course for India is to pick up the threads of the Lahore MOU and Islamabad Accord. If India takes up the Lahore framework and gives fair consideration to the SSR (through the lens of strategic CBMs) that Pakistan offered, progress can be made. .

This is trying to tell in public what they are willing to negotiate and get going. Their position for stability and aid fund for the economy depends on the creation of CBM and stability with INDIA>
All the donors have been made aware of India's requirement and if Pakistan does not comply then they would hesitate to give aid.

[svinayak]

Brigadier Feroz Hassan, Pakistan Army
Naval War College Review, Summer 2010

One of themore onerous issues is a perception that has come to be known as the “string of pearls.” To provide a frame of reference, Pakistan’s Makran Coast has strategic importance, in that it offers Pakistan options to counter India’s projection of power in the Indian Ocean. ...

This is important because India is geographically restricted in its access to both the east and west, due to the physical presence of Bangladesh and Pakistan, and in the north by the Himalayas ...

This strategic handicap, taken as a whole, forces India to rely on its maritime capabilities in order to maintain trade routes and logistics between its continental shores and the rest of the world. ...

THis is funny coming from a Pak analyst. Instead of looking at India only from India Pakistan border and defense of Paki borders and coast they are viewing India as a containment strategy. This is as if Pak is a superpower and it has the capability to constrain India from all sides including the east. Unless this is a joint strategy along with the ally super power bulit over the last 4 decades.

See similar languages from Bangladesh, some analyst in Nepal and PRC.

[Guddu]

US to 'defer military aid' to Pakistan
A total of $800m in aid and equipment could be either suspended or outright cancelled, The New York Times says.
Last Modified: 10 Jul 2011 05:04

The United States is suspending about one-third of its aid to Pakistan’s military in the wake of increased tensions between the two countries, The New York Times has reported.

A total of $800m in aid and equipment could be either suspended or outright cancelled, according to three unnamed US officials quoted by the newspaper on Saturday.

What Kiyani has said is that the aid should be diverted to the civilian govt, This will allow Kiyani to obtain the same from the paki govt....a zero sum game. It would only work if the US denied aid both to the army and the civilian sector.

[NRao]

There are bean counters to monitor the civilian aid. New system. Since the past year or two.

The military aid they get is for use against (supposedly) the terrorists. I suspect Pakis will bring that to a halt.

[Shrinivasan]

Prithvi MLU's have effected. Its time that, its eased out to areas on Himalayan borders where it can be spread along with newer gen systems.

I didn't understand, care to explain - in a post of by email.

[Guddu]

There are bean counters to monitor the civilian aid. New system. Since the past year or two.

The military aid they get is for use against (supposedly) the terrorists. I suspect Pakis will bring that to a halt.

Yes, the bean counters will monitor where US civilian aid goes, but the GOPak will now have a few hundred million $ extra, that was not previously available. The PA can legitimately ask the GOPak that their budget be increased in view of reduction in US funding and extra monies with GOpak. This is analogous to the advantage India enjoys with uranium supplies, after the 123 agreement. Since we can now import uranium (under tight monitoring), it frees up our own meagre supplies for weapons applications.