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But after that U233 is created reactors will run on that fuel and used to create even more U233 by irradiating Thorium in stage 3 of FBR
It is tougher to use it as a weapon due to technical difficulties that add to the cost...
The proliferation resistance advantages of the Thorium-based fuels are realized through:
• extended fuel burnup, which could result in the reduction of the quantity and quality of
plutonium (Pu) produced, reduction in the number of refuelings, and the number of
spent fuel assemblies, and
• significant reduction in the quantity and quality (isotopic composition) of the discharged
fuel as a result of a partial replacement of
238
U by
232
Th as a fertile component of the
fuel.
This ll answer your previous question...
Thorium-based fuel may be introduced in all reactor systems of current technology and
advanced designs. With respect to LWR’s there are two main design options: a homogeneous
mixture of ThO2 and UO2 and several heterogeneous designs, where Th and U parts of the
fuel are spatially separated. Several fuel cycle performance parameters related to the
proliferation resistance are summarized in Table XIII
Kakkadji - 20 kg is too high. The critical mass of very pure (maybe more than 90%) is just 3 kg and the usually quoted number is 9kg Pu. About 6 kg Pu per bum is what is usually quoted for SDRE nations. TFTA's may manage with just 3
agreed ... so at a reproc .. capacity of 300 tonne /year ...even if our indjineers are inefficient and need to use 20kgs as some FAS scientists believe we have more than enough plutonium capacity...
gakakkad wrote:
It is tougher to use it as a weapon due to technical difficulties that add to the cost...
The proliferation resistance advantages of the Thorium-based fuels are realized through:
• extended fuel burnup, which could result in the reduction of the quantity and quality of
plutonium (Pu) produced, reduction in the number of refuelings, and the number of
spent fuel assemblies, and
• significant reduction in the quantity and quality (isotopic composition) of the discharged
fuel as a result of a partial replacement of
238
U by
232
Th as a fertile component of the
fuel.
OK Fantastic.
Then why are Karnad (and others) complaining about the nuclear deal with the USA? Using up our Pu stocks in fast breeders actually reduces what we have left for weapons. By importing reactors we are free to use that Pu for more weapons no? Exactly what is all the fuss about? Any idea?
Then why are Karnad (and others) complaining about the nuclear deal with the USA? Using up our Pu stocks in fast breeders actually reduces what we have left for weapons. By importing reactors we are free to use that Pu for more weapons no? Exactly what is all the fuss about? Any idea?
Not sure why ...no reason to complain... unlike other SDRE nations our civillian and bum progs are separate. AFAIK no facility producing bums is safeguarded... there is no reason to complain about... even our universities will be able to set up their own reactors...
I just realized, Shiv, is rerunning the deterrence thread another another heading. BTW Thats all right with me, just saying, that is all.
On the question that Shiv raised a few pages earlier, how come US with all its nuclear power has not used it to win wars?
Well I think this is another of Shiv's little experiment on the forum since the answer seems to be pretty clear -- US has been deterred. With what? With Nukes of course.
We have clearly seen that US has absolutely no qualms against using nuclear weapons to gain even a minor advantage, even against a loosing enemy, so then arguments of morality etc are pointless (not that they were being made, but just to reiterate the same)
The reason why US has not been able to use nuclear weapons is that since WWII all its wars have essentially been either hopelessly one sided
Iraq etc...
OR
Proxy war
Korea/Vietnam/Afganistan with real backers being Soviets/China.
Yet we see US being singularly unable to use even conventional massive disproportionate force upstream where the "real" logistical and command and control nodes lay DESPITE CLEAR SUPERIORITY. Of course use of tactical and other nuclear weapons has been out of question.
So clearly, when we are trying to say that "Nuclear weapons did not give US sufficient heft" -- we are missing the point -- because what had happened is that "Nuclear weapons had given US adversaries huge heft" -- disproportionate to their size.
Thus the "failure of the US to impose its will" -- is a testimony to Soviet and Chinese Nuclear forces forming a bulwark and a fear based Lakshman Rekha that US found itself unable to cross.
So the discussion "why did US lose" appears confusing till you realize that it is the inverse question. The real question is "How was US rendered ineffective despite massive strengths"
This also explains the paranoia in western minds about "independent" minded countries like Iraq, Iran and India acquiring weapons. Because they know, that if these countries aquire Nuclear weapons, there are additional powers against whom the western machinery is rendered sub-optimal. Terrible from their perspective if you see.
Also at this point it is useful to remind ourselves of the type and kind of deterrence that is possessed by countries which have deterred US.
shiv wrote:
Then why are Karnad (and others) complaining about the nuclear deal with the USA? Using up our Pu stocks in fast breeders actually reduces what we have left for weapons. By importing reactors we are free to use that Pu for more weapons no? Exactly what is all the fuss about? Any idea?
Refocusing of the sector away from indigenous programs like 3cycle and weapon development to baby sitting expensive, accident prone, questionable and controlled LWR reactors imported at great cost.
A Air India/Boeing scam -- death by overdose of "sugar" -- "having planes is good onlee for a airline no, more capacity, economies of scale and all that no? Here have 100 more aircrafts"
pandyan wrote:Please enlighten me: we have 20kt confirmed working-reliable-bulb. what's the problem in using 10 20kt bulbs to get to 200 kt. what we have is a compact, distributed attack bulb and since we are a responsible nation, we are obligated to minimize collateral damages to our attackers.
tejas wrote:^^^^^ Because the amt. of fissile material/ kt. yield ratio is relatively high it would significantly limit the size of our deterrent. We would permanently be locked at a level below china( not to mention umrikah)
Also weight, for a given yield, TNs would be lighter, hence a smaller warhead on a missile.
Means a smaller missile doing the job, or a bigger missile carrying multiple warheads.
Also means fewer missiles needed for deterrence.
Also means that once we absorb a first strike a loose a part of our strategic stock in a counter force strike -- we are still confident that we can hit back.
These are basics btw, am not saying anything fancy.
Very well put Sanku ji. The nukes are clearly not for enforcement, but for deterrence. Didn't Sunderji say that the lesson of Gulf war I was that you need nukes to prevent being attacked by Amrika, or something to that effect? The question is, what is credible for deterrence. Therein lies the rub with some claiming 100 20 KT are enuf to others demanding India possess what anyone else does!
Kakkadji - 20 kg is too high. The critical mass of very pure (maybe more than 90%) is just 3 kg and the usually quoted number is 9kg Pu. About 6 kg Pu per bum is what is usually quoted for SDRE nations. TFTA's may manage with just 3
agreed ... so at a reproc .. capacity of 300 tonne /year ...even if our indjineers are inefficient and need to use 20kgs as some FAS scientists believe we have more than enough plutonium capacity...
How much Pu can you recover from a ton of spent fuel?
Till last year we were recovering 1 ton of reactor grade (rg) pu and 36kg of weapons grade (wg) pu per year by reprocessing 200 tonne waste...That capacity is increased this year as we reproc extra 100 tonnes. .. Once our prototype fbr does business (In a few months time) it ll make 150 kg wgpu per year (20-30 bums)...
Our reproc capacity is expected to be augmented to 800 ton per year by 2015...
To make a bum out of rg pu would need more Pu... one of the sub kt test in pokhran was believed to reactor grade Pu ... That was believed to be 1st stage of boosted fission...
Rg Pu can be purified to wg Pu ...
shiv wrote:
Then why are Karnad (and others) complaining about the nuclear deal with the USA? Using up our Pu stocks in fast breeders actually reduces what we have left for weapons. By importing reactors we are free to use that Pu for more weapons no? Exactly what is all the fuss about? Any idea?
Refocusing of the sector away from indigenous programs like 3cycle and weapon development to baby sitting expensive, accident prone, questionable and controlled LWR reactors imported at great cost.
Well I can accept this argument but not the one that Karnad made until someone explains to me two things
1. A far as I can tell the 3 stage FBR program is going to divert Pu away from weapons into reactors. So having fueld for power reactors form anywhere, safe or unsafe reactors, safeguarded or unsafeguarded fuel, we gt to keep ou fissile material stocks for bums. Correct or incorrect?
2. How can the FBR program produce endless amounts of fissile material for bums if U233 is not good for bums? We will still need Pu for whcich we will have to go the usual route - is it PHWR? Correct or incorrect?
kumarn wrote:Great, so unkil is covered. We need to answer what would deter the chinis from threatening us with nukes.
Yes, unkil is covered, but only unkil is covered.
It IS more difficult to deter a dictatorship than a democracy, so China is out.
Pakistan is a schizophrenic country, they behave in a binary mode. If they believe that you will not attack them, they behave like brazen bullies. But if they believe, really believe, that you have made up your mind to hurt them and are willing to accept loses on that account, they will immediately turn to craven servility, and become over-friendly.
So, in the first phase, they will not be detered by nukes. But in the second phase, they will be detered even by harsh language.
-------
Guess we only have to know how to deter 20 million bangaldeshis from entering our land, and we can call ourselves secure.
2. How can the FBR program produce endless amounts of fissile material for bums if U233 is not good for bums? We will still need Pu for whcich we will have to go the usual route - is it PHWR? Correct or incorrect?
Saar.. their is a minor confoosion...
Thorium based fbr's are unsuitable for weapons...
A plutonium based fbr is good for bums..
They use " mixed oxide fuel core of up to 20% plutonium dioxide (PuO2) and at least 80% uranium dioxide (UO2)."
But pu based fbr's are unsafe and expensive for large scale bijli paani sadak ...
Th reacters (including fbr , thermal breeder reactors , CHTR , PEBBLE bed etc) are bad for weapons ...but good for bijli ...
So thorium for electricity and pu for weapons seems long term goal...
But we need LWR's in the interim for bijli , because we are not yet ready to make large scale thorium elec reactors...
shiv wrote:
Then why are Karnad (and others) complaining about the nuclear deal with the USA? Using up our Pu stocks in fast breeders actually reduces what we have left for weapons. By importing reactors we are free to use that Pu for more weapons no? Exactly what is all the fuss about? Any idea?
Sanku wrote:
Refocusing of the sector away from indigenous programs like 3cycle and weapon development to baby sitting expensive, accident prone, questionable and controlled LWR reactors imported at great cost.
shiv wrote:
Well I can accept this argument but not the one that Karnad made until someone explains to me two things
1. A far as I can tell the 3 stage FBR program is going to divert Pu away from weapons into reactors. So having fueld for power reactors form anywhere, safe or unsafe reactors, safeguarded or unsafeguarded fuel, we gt to keep ou fissile material stocks for bums. Correct or incorrect?
2. How can the FBR program produce endless amounts of fissile material for bums if U233 is not good for bums? We will still need Pu for whcich we will have to go the usual route - is it PHWR? Correct or incorrect?
Would it suffice?
India's plans for thorium cycle
With about six times more thorium than uranium, India has made utilization of thorium for large-scale energy production a major goal in its nuclear power programme, utilising a three-stage concept:
* Pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWRs) fuelled by natural uranium, plus light water reactors, producing plutonium.
* Fast breeder reactors (FBRs) using plutonium-based fuel to breed U-233 from thorium. (this is critical step where India has achieved significant breakthrough)The blanket around the core will have uranium as well as thorium, so that further plutonium (particularly Pu-239) is produced as well as the U-233.
* Advanced heavy water reactors burn the U-233 and this plutonium with thorium, getting about 75% of their power from the thorium. The used fuel will then be reprocessed to recover fissile materials(weapons grade) for recycling.
With 123 , this plan is still being pursued or not is a big question mark.
Secondly , with new discoveries some adjustments would have been made.
kumarn wrote:The question is, what is credible for deterrence. Therein lies the rub with some claiming 100 20 KT are enuf to others demanding India possess what anyone else does!
I think you have got itthe wrong way round. Whatever you have - even 1,000,000 x 25 megaton weapons - if the other guys decides that he does not give a rat's ass about it and provoke you, it is up to you to use those 1 million 25 MT bums to finish him off. If you cannot get yourself to do that your bums are useless trash.
No matter how much you have the other guy may not be deterred. And, on the other hand you may be deterred by the other guy who has just 10 bums.
Deterrence is not about what you have. Its about how scared the other guy is. If he is not scared - then your deterrence is not working. At some stage a nuclear armed power must develop the guts to use their nukes. Deterrence works only because all nuclear armed states are afraid to use their nukes and no one has used them to settle any dispute for the last 66 years and counting. No weapon system in the world has been so useless in winning wars as nuclear weapons.
chaanakya wrote:The blanket around the core will have uranium as well as thorium, so that further plutonium (particularly Pu-239) is produced as well as the U-233.
(2)it is very difficult to separate 233 from the non-fissile 232.. (1)so making 233 based bums are a lot more expensive and tougher than pu based ones...the takleef with FBR program besides weapons is safety... When Bhabha visulaised the 3 staged programme , India had little known u reserves... but now more are found.. and because of N-Deal we can import more uranium... FBR's are considered to be less economical than thermal reactors for elec generation ... {Bullets 1 and 2, added by me, are discussed below}
[/quote]
Following are just my thoughts:
(1) "Expensive and tougher" may be true only in the case of non-State actors. For Governments of Sovereign Nation States, these two conditions (cost and difficulty of manufacturing high-purity U-233) should not be highly important, and should be 'overcome'able if ensuring their country's security is to be one of their primary objectives.
(2) I believe that the disadvantages of having commingled U-232 in U-233 are a bit over-emphasised, as a part of NPA strategy.
[quote]
It is also possible to use U-233 as the fission fuel of a nuclear weapon, although this has been done only occasionally. {Has been done, nevertheless!} The United States first tested U-233 as part of a bomb core in Operation Teapot in 1955. {Bolding and underlining, mine}
. . .
A nuclear explosive device based on U-233 is therefore more of a technical challenge than with plutonium, but the technological level involved is roughly the same. The main difference is the co-presence of U-232, that makes U-233 very dangerous [sic!] to work on, and quite easy to detect.
[/quote]
If the US could successfully handle U-232 in 1955, can we not do so now?
According to this blog page, the US has 1000 kg of U-233. Have they accumulated it without overcoming the hazards of radiation from the daughter products of U-232 ?
The "very dangerous" comment in the quote above, I reckon, relates to the use of glove-boxes for handling U-233 {as apparently done in the case of Pu239 -- this has been alluded to in the reference at (b.1) below. I have not quoted that portion of the text here.}
By now, India must be having several tens of thousands of fuel rods worth of experience with remote controlled, automatic, robotic, 'on-power' handling of spent fuel, discharged "garam-aa-garam" from all its PHWRs. I would tend to think that these spent fuel rods would be exhibiting several thousand times more radioactivity (alpha, beta and gamma) than the daughter products of U-232 present as an isotopic impurity in the U-233 generated from irradiation of Th-232. Don't you think those working in design, manufacture, assembly and deployment of strategic equipment and parts for the defence of our country are capable of making use of remote handling techniques and shielding methods during all stages of handling U-233 ?
(b) According to IAEA-TECDOC-1450 (page 9) when irradiating Th-232, U-232 is produced via (n,2n) reactions with Th-232, Pa-233 and U-233. U-232 in turn decays to Tl-208 which is mainly responsible for the 2.6 MeV gamma rays. As per published information, this gamma radiation from Tl-208 may impinge on the working of any electronics and the explosive lenses used in a device. Perhaps a work-around for this too can be found. .
(b.1) There could possibly be ways in which the very formation of U-232 can be minimised, one of which has been indicated in this reference published in 2001:
[quote]
However, just as it is possible to produce weapon-grade plutonium in low-burn up fuel, it is also practical to use heavy-water reactors to produce U-233 containing only a few ppm of U-232 if the thorium is segregated in “target” channels and discharged a few times more frequently than the natural-uranium “driver” fuel. . . .
[/quote]
(b.2) Also from the same reference as above:
[quote]
Occupational radiation doses are currently {2001, the year of publication of the report} limited to 5 rem/yr in the US. . . .
. . .
Unshielded working hours required to accumulate a 5 rem dose (5 kg sphere of metal at 0.5 m one year after separation)
Metal..............................................Dose Rate (rem/hr).......Hours
Weapon-grade plutonium....................0,0013.......................3800
Reactor-grade plulonium.....................0.0082.......................610
U-233 containing 1ppmU-232...............0.013........................380
U-233 containing 5ppm U-232..............0.059........................80
U-233 containing 100 ppm U-232..........1.27.........................4
U-233 containing 1 percent U-232.........127..........................0.04
Thus maximizing the contamination level of U-232 in U-233 would make it both significantly more difficult to fabricate and make it more detectable {I presume this "detectability" is mainly meant for the super-snoopers, the Safeguards Inspectors of IAEA} because of the difficulty of shielding the 2.6 MeV gamma ray. However, it would require a level of 2.4 percent U-232 before the U-233 would satisfy the IAEA's standard for reduced physical-protection requirements (>100 rem/hr al 1 meter). {I have bolded the words at 2 places. Clearly the intention is to "sell" Th use only from the point of view of its inculcated proliferation resistance}
India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has been concerned about the occupational hazards associated with the fabrication of fuel containing U-233. Its long-term ambition Is to cleanse U-233 down to "a few ppm" U-232 using laser isotope purification. In the meantime, a 1993 article from the Bhabba Atomic Research Center in Bombay reported a 6.7 person-rem summed dose incurred by workers fabricating a research reactor containing 0.6 kg "clean" U-233 containing 3 ppm U-232.
[/quote]
(b.3) Some more published information, this time from DAE:
(c) Summarising, my view is that, in the name of non-proliferation, P-5 and their NSG friends want to prevent / delay India from realising the full benefits of its plentifully available Th resources. They do not want India to pursue Th technology, for fear of U-233 in India's hands. Instead, they are hell-bent in selling their LWRs (attempting to lure India away from PHWRs with its on-power refuelling capability). Many Indians are happy to import.
@ sanatanan sir ....thank you for your explanations...you have cleared several doubts.... The most clear cut explanation I have seen on this topic till date...
But one question...I am all for using thorium as electricity reactors , especially with new design like pebble bed reactor...
But now we can easily get enough Wp Grade Plutonium from our Prototype FBR and Purex plants..In a few years time our capacity will enhance to 200 kg / year or something of that sort as per a princeton survey I posted above ..
so why should we design U 233 based weapons? In Pok 2 one of the sub kt device was u 233 based , so we have already demonstrated the capability..
kumarn wrote:Great, so unkil is covered. We need to answer what would deter the chinis from threatening us with nukes.
Arihant...
Exactly my thought. That is why I said, instead of looking just at the number of weapons and their bang, we should be concentrating more on Arihant, BMD and the likes and keep improving the designs and adding to the fissile material. I am sure an opportunity to test will present itself sooner than later.
kumarn wrote:The question is, what is credible for deterrence. Therein lies the rub with some claiming 100 20 KT are enuf to others demanding India possess what anyone else does!
I think you have got itthe wrong way round. Whatever you have - even 1,000,000 x 25 megaton weapons - if the other guys decides that he does not give a rat's ass about it and provoke you, it is up to you to use those 1 million 25 MT bums to finish him off. If you cannot get yourself to do that your bums are useless trash.
No matter how much you have the other guy may not be deterred. And, on the other hand you may be deterred by the other guy who has just 10 bums.
Deterrence is not about what you have. Its about how scared the other guy is. If he is not scared - then your deterrence is not working. At some stage a nuclear armed power must develop the guts to use their nukes. Deterrence works only because all nuclear armed states are afraid to use their nukes and no one has used them to settle any dispute for the last 66 years and counting. No weapon system in the world has been so useless in winning wars as nuclear weapons.
Since no one is using it to settle any issues and the nukes are duds as usable weapons, then why don't you extrapolate it to say that we should disarm? Then we can dare everyone to nuke us and claim we are not afraid getting nuked. There, you get your deterrence without even having a bomb! Kya baat hai saar!
kumarn wrote:we should be concentrating more on Arihant, BMD and the likes and keep improving the designs and adding to the fissile material..
As I said before (and someone sort of countered me on that too I guess) -- I do not see a focus on the indigenous programs in the Nuclear sector (major +ve developments are scarce news these days) -- we had discussions in past on issues of budgetary allocations and shortfalls.
While the BMD and SSBN related developments are more difficult to comment on, primarily due to paucity of information, we again do not know of what major steps have been taken after 2000-2002 time frame. We know that some initiatives were started/restarted in that time frame which are fructifying right now; however what after those initiatives and push run their way, is not clear.
kumarn wrote:Do you think the budgets for these items would be open to public scrutiny?
Yes and no. Some overall budgets are indeed open for scrutiny, even if detailed projects are not.
For example, DAE budget, DRDO budget etc, their various break-ups are also often given. We can look at some of these and see patterns.
It does not preclude the concept of cross-budgeting (say SSBN budget coming from captial aquisition instead of DRDO ) or black budgets. However some news does trickle through now and then. For a while there seems to be silence in terms of what govt is planning for these topics.
For example we for example know that the govt is adding extra muscle in Mountain warfare, we know various capacity augmentation projects are on the anvil. However such news are rarely heard in the mentioned pieces. (ABM is a little better) -- we used to hear more earlier (2000 time frame)
The usually tight-lipped Varma said India’s submarine fleet should have five to six nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. He said plans were afoot to build two more nuclear-powered submarines to reinforce India’s strategic deterrent force at sea.
Defence sources said while the first missile to be test-fired this month is the most sophisticated K-15 (this is for Arihant), the test of other projectiles that are in the pipeline include advanced air defence (AAD) interceptor, Agni-I, Agni-II, Prithvi air defence (PAD) interceptor, BrahMos, Prithvi, Astra and Agni-V. "The focus this year will be on the maiden test of the 5,000 km-range Agni-V, which has been scheduled to be test-fired in September. This is the first ICBM India has developed and it is considered a China-specific missile.
Well Kumarn, if that was to share the news with us, you do realize that some of this is old news, and in fact some projections were available even in 2000 of what is needed in 2010.
Whats the vision document for next 10 years is what I ask. What are the news which talk of next 10 year horizon.
kumarn wrote:
Since no one is using it to settle any issues and the nukes are duds as usable weapons, then why don't you extrapolate it to say that we should disarm? Then we can dare everyone to nuke us and claim we are not afraid getting nuked. There, you get your deterrence without even having a bomb! Kya baat hai saar!
In fact there is something more.
1. People think that if we have more bombs the other guy will be deterred. This is incorrect. The other guy may not be deterred. It may be that you are deterred from using your bombs, rendering them useless. You only feel better by keeping them under your pillow.
2. You have extrapolated that into the idea that nuclear bombs are useless and that I am talking disarmament.
No. Not at all sir. There is at least one more possibility that is neither 1 nor 2 above.
We have a world where there are multiple nuclear armed powers with no one actually using them to settle disputes. Why? Why not use them? What are they being kept for?
What is happening is that every nuclear armed power has a set of rules or a doctrine where he says "This is when we are going to use our nukes". Every time there is a major crisis, nuclear powers get their nuclear arms ready for use, but try and settle the issue without nuclear arms. What makes me chuckle at the irony of this is that when nukes first appeared, they were considered a type of weapon that would end all wars. That is nonsense. Wars are not ending and nuclear weapons are not being used.
Why are nuclear powers so reluctant to use such a powerful weapon? If you look at what is happening, only 7 or 8 countries are known or suspected to have nuclear weapons. There are over a hundred countries who don't have them. OK if you are afraid to use your weapons against other nuclear armed powers you can use them against others no? Nuke Gabon, Niger, Borneo etc and grab whatever they have as resources. Afghanistan is a fantastic country that should have been nukes long ago. Who cares about Afghanistan? USSR, USA, Pakistan, China - anyone could nuke Afghanistan. Vietnam? Who cares. Neither US nor China. Nuke Vietnam. Ok Indians are the cowards of the world whose last bold leader died with Ranjit Singh and Shivaji - but why is nobody else doing that? Apart from Indians others are TFTA no? Decidedly odd.
There are two inter-related reasons why nuclear armed powers are not using their nuclear weapons to settle disputes and it is mandatory we understand why that is happening to see what is happening between the two extremes of "disarmament" on one side and "10,000 megaton nukes " on the other side. In my view the implications for the world are serious and it may be a good idea to pay attention to what is going on.
The two reasons for not using nukes are:
1. Everyone is scared to use his nukes first simply because the minute any nation uses its nukes it lays itself open for retaliatory attacks from anyone else for being the first to break the taboo. This simplistic statement requires some explanation and I will get to that.
2. If a nuclear exchange or a war occurs between any two nations, it sends out a strong signal to all nuclear armed nations that someone, somewhere can hit them with nukes and that they should get ready to hit back. Right now there are dozens of countries in the world that are capable of building nuclear weapons within a few years if not months. They have not built weapons merely because of promises they have made not to build them and the expectation that nuclear war will "somehow" be avoided. The chances of many "have nots" joining the list of "haves" is very high after the next nuclear exchange.
So it becomes an ironic joke that until now, every country that has developed nuclear weapons is trying to find ways of NOT using them. As long as the number of countries was low. it was easy. But as the number of nuclear armed countries gets higher, this funny balance will stop working. As Rudradev pointed out (was it Rudradev?) - the presence of a military Industrial complex in any country is a signal that war will be fought by that nation eventually. Similarly, an increasing number of nuclear armed powers in the world will inevitably lead to nuclear war in future.
Never mind what this means for India, but just see what this may mean for say US, France or Germany. It means that their nuclear safety is not assured as they assumed it would be after the cold war. There is no such thing as nuclear security. They cannot possibly launch their nukes against every country that has weapons without hurting themselves or their allies with fallout and even that will not make them secure. They always assumed that the USSR was a mad country that would start nuclear war and they aimed to destroy the USSR. But the USSR did not start any nuke war. It just faded.
China uses its power and irrationality to threaten others. In Mao's China it was OK to lose 300 million because everyone was a peasant and the PLA was the main armed group that was anyway controlling the peasants or kiiling them. The China of today is wealthy on the back of the hard work of those peasants. If you kill 300 million Chinese today, China will be weaker, not stronger. The Chicom party's grip on power is related to keeping its people happy, not in a state of turmoil. So China is not going to use its nukes to settle its disputes even with its non nuclear armed neighbors.
That leaves us with countries like Pakistan and NoKo. They are nuclear armed and their people are screwed up. They are like Mao's China. Deaths of their own people do not matter to them. They are the most dangerous countries in the world because they do not hesitate to provoke other nuclear armed and non nuclear armed powers. N. Korea is not scared of US nukes and Pakistanis seem to have no qualms about making open nuclear threats against India. And even Israel. The leaders of both Pakistan and NoKo have understood that "nuclear powers" are too scared of starting nuclear war because of silly concerns like "fallout" and "welfare of citizens". That is why they are bold enough to taunt any country. They know damn well that "total destruction by nuclear attack" ain't gonna happen anytime soon and will never happen unless they use their nukes first. So they set the red lines and provoke and challenge their enemies to cross their red lines knowing fully well that "civilized" nations are too scared of the welfare of their own citizens and "environment" to start nuclear war.
Neither North Korea nor Pakistan are actually scared by the thought of "total nuclear destruction" in a nuclear war. They do not care if their enemy has 50 weapons or 1000 weapons. But the citizens of both countries are in a degree of distress. The leaders are wealthy and happy. It is those leaders who need to be targeted and scared. Their health and wealth is more valuable to them than that of their citizens. Aiming nukes at those leaders is an essential part of keeping them in check - so nuclear weapons cannot be dispensed with. Possessing them has its uses, even if using them is unlikely. But in the long term, both Pakistan and NoKo have to be controlled or dismantled without nuclear war if possible. The nukes remain as a "just in case". Just how many nukes are needed "Just in case" against a nation that does not care about its own citizens is a matter for debate.
I think the argument (that having bigger nukes doesn't necessarily make a nation all-powerful or provide a "perfect deterrent") is based on some fundamentally flawed assumptions that many people make when thinking about nukes. Mostly, these assumptions derive from a narrative- almost a mythology - that has been deliberately constructed around nuclear weapons by influential interested parties. IMHO, the term "deterrence" as applied to nukes is part of this bogus mythology, and essentially meaningless. Let me explain.
First, can we agree that a nuclear bomb, at the end of the day, is a bomb onlee?
A lot of things have been written about nuclear weapons since 1945, many of which are aimed at creating the popular perception of them as some sort of semi-divine Brahmastra, weapons of Armageddon that boast the destructive power and catastrophic environmental side-effects to end human civilization. Like Oppenheimer quoting the Gita for example. This type of rhetoric, sustained over decades, distorts our perception of nukes, and tends to irrationalize the manner in which we think about nukes.
This artificial mythology, intended to create a perceptual Laxman Rekha between the deployment of nuclear weapons vs other kinds of weapons, must be recognized for what it is. It is the propaganda purveyed by the early bird nuclear weapon states- the P5- to reinforce a political Laxman Rekha that separates them, in our minds, from states which do not possess nuclear weapons. In fact, the myth of a nuclear Brahmastra is a critical part of the image of superpowerdom with which a few select countries want to cloak themselves... to justify their disproportionate dominance over the United Nations and the global economy, among other things.
Later, these myths of mystical nuclear exceptionalism were further reinforced by the US and SU when they recognized the vast drain on resources represented by the investment and upkeep of large nuclear arsenals. They wanted to back off from maintaining such huge and costly stockpiles, making it all the more important that countries outside the P5 should not seek to compete by acquiring nukes of their own.
Thus, we end up thinking that nukes are somehow intrinsically and exceptionally different from other kinds of bombs, and conferring upon them all sorts of irrational properties... such as the capacity to wipe out entire countries, and as a corollary, to insure some perfect and magical deterrence against all hostility. This is pure BS-- the equivalent of the "invincible Unkil" myth which causes Shiv so much takleef in BRF posts.
The truth is that at the end of the day, nuclear bombs are bombs. Very powerful bombs, which release destructive energy at multiple orders of magnitude above conventional ordinance. So yes, they combine the destructive power (and the economic investment locked up in deploying) several thousand conventional devices, into a single device.
And yes, they release radiation which has profound environmental consequences, such as inducing birth defects. But conventional war is hardly free of such consequences. Firebombs killed 110,000 residents of Tokyo in a single night. Children were born congenitally maimed in Hiroshima-- but Ive read a paper about the massive polio epidemic that also maimed children in post war Germany (the children played in pools of unsanitary water that accumulated in thousands of craters formed by conventional air dropped munitions.)
So from a humanitarian or environmentalist point of view, it is all very well for us to be horrified by nuclear weapons as something exceptionally awful. But when it comes to an approach based on strategic thinking, we are obliged to shed self-inflicted distortions of perspective... and to recognize that a nuclear bomb is fundamentally a bomb. A very powerful bomb, but ultimately a bomb onlee.
If we accept this, the flaws in the concept of "deterrence" as commonly articulated become obvious. Has the possession of better sticks, bigger stones, horses, steel, or gunpowder ever absolutely ensured that the adversaries of one side will be completely and permanently deterred from attacking it? No, and even less often does it guarantee that the side with these "advantages" can impose it's absolute will over comparatively disadvantaged sides. This has not been the case with any type of military innovation in history- other than an edge in combat when combat actually takes place, military innovations confer nothing. Why should we consider nuclear weapons to be magically different? The term "nuclear deterrence" is completely and absolutely bogus. It was part of the nuke mythology, a self serving canard shoehorned into the lexicon of diplomacy by tin pot countries like the UK and France who wanted to develop nuclear weapons to wield disproportionate power. It means nothing. Ever since more than one nation on earth came to possess nuclear weapons, it has meant nothing at all.
Consider: if Shiv's country can field 10 divisions and my country can only field 2 divisions, Shiv can push my country around to some extent. But what if I have 2 divisions plus one nuclear bomb? Yes, Shiv might think a little harder about trying to impose his will on my nation. But the additional deterrence provided by my nuclear bomb is not infinite. It is quantifiable in terms of my capacity having increased, to field 2+x divisions in wartime where x is some finite number. 2 divisions may not have deterred Shiv with his 10 divisions; 2+x divisions might... but only upto a point. Ultimately if I have something Shiv wants badly enough, there is a nonzero probability that Shiv might attack me, nuke or no nuke. Argentina attacked Britain after all. It is even more ridiculous to think that the possession of a nuke should give me the ability to impose my will on Shiv's country.
Nuclear bombs don't, and never have, provided any special kind of deterrence. That is simply what the propaganda surrounding them convinces us to believe. What they do provide is the capacity to inflict greater destruction on the enemy in less time, and at less cost to us per unit damage inflicted, than any other military invention to date. That is why they are important to have- not a brahmastra that provides a magical shield or confers absolute power, but the most powerful astra that currently exists, which will confer a certain advantage (or correct a disparity of disadvantage) when conflict happens. That's all.
What is left when you take away nonsensical notions of "deterrence", is the art of military and diplomatic brinkmanship. That is what Kennedy displayed with extreme finesse during the Cuban missile crisis. That is what India's pathetic excuse for a leadership is so incapable of executing, that in spite of having nukes we still face Paki terrorism and Chinese territorial aggression with no effective response.
As a non-mathematician, I will foolishly postulate a rule of thumb. I will say that a nation's capacity to exercise brinkmanship against a given opponent in a given situation, may be calculated as
N [nation (situation, opponent)] = A*B - C*D
Where
A= the nation's political will to use nuclear weapons in the given situation, normalized on an arbitrary scale between 0 and 1
B= fraction of the opponent's comprehensive national power that the nation's nuclear arsenal is technically capable of destroying.
C= the nation's estimation of the opponent's political will to use nuclear weapons in the given situation, normalized on the same scale as A.
D= the nation's estimation of the fraction of it's own comprehensive national power, that the opponent's nuclear arsenal is technically capable of destroying.
A few things to note.
One, this N value is not meant to be a sole predictor of how a nation will behave. It is only the measure of the extent, to which a national leadership feels that it has nuclear brinkmanship as ONE available option when addressing a given situation.
Two, the value of N may or may not be the final arbiter of what the nation actually does (engages in nuclear brinkmanship or not). N does not take into account real costs associated with brinkmanship (loss of peaceful image in the world, damage to trade relationships etc.) except in so far as the national leadership's *perception* of these costs factors into its political will (term A.)
Three, terms C and D are necessarily guesstimates, and necessarily subjective on the part of the nation calculating its N value for a given situation towards a given opponent. Rational nations will use the best available intelligence to determine C and D. Less rational nations may use such inputs as "cowardly Yindoos" to determine C, or "will of Allah" to determine D.
In sum, the greater the value of N, and the less the availability of other options, the likelier it is that the nation will engage in nuclear brinkmanship to achieve its goals.
Let's take a few examples. Let's say Yemen is hiding some terrorist whom the US wants.
N[US(terrorist rendition, Yemen)] = ~0 * 1 - ? *0
A = ~0 because America's political will to use nukes against Yemen in this situation is nearly 0.
B= 1 because America can completely destroy Yemen's comprehensive national power with its nuclear arsenal.
C=? because it doesn't matter what the Yemenis' political will to use non-existent nukes is.
D=0 because the Yemenis don't have nukes and can do no damage to the US.
So N=0. USA's capacity to exercise brinkmanship in this situation, against Yemen, is 0.
However, what happens if the terrorist hiding in Yemen has recently set off a JDAM in New York City?
In this case, A may assume some non-zero value. Political will to nuke Yemen if it does not render the terrorist will exist. Then N[US(JDAM terrorist rendition, Yemen)] has some value > 0. But still the US has plenty of other options that it can explore as being more effective and less costly than threatening Yemen with nukes (for example, a Navy SEAL raid.) Not every country can credibly think about such options... and for them, nuclear brinkmanship will be an increasingly attractive option.
Similarly, during the MAD days of the Cold War,
N[US(ideological conflict, USSR)] = A *1 - C *1.
Similarly N[USSR(ideological conflict, USA)] = A*1 - C*1.
The value of N depends on only two terms: political will from the US side, vs. estimated political will from the USSR side. The capacity of both the US and the Russians to engage in nuclear brinkmanship, varied in accordance with their own political will to use nukes in a given situation and with their estimation of the other party's will to use nukes in that situation.
In this kind of a situation... where MAD makes the values of B and D equal to 1... only A and C matter. It is a self-stabilizing equilibrium. Why?
Let us say the Soviet leadership think the US president lacks political will and takes some provocative measure. For the Soviets, A (own political will) is greater than C (perceived American political will.) However, the response on the US side is to reinforce their political will with corresponding, but measured reaction... now, for the Soviets, C increases, and A also correspondingly decreases as a result of the new value of C. That is exactly what happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Note, however, that this is self-stabilizing only in the context of B and D... capacities of the arsenals to destroy each other's comprehensive national power, being equal (both 1.)
The India-China-Pakistan relationship is vastly more complex.
First of all, Pakistan is trying to enlist China onto its side of the nuclear brinkmanship equation, so that India must look at both of them (and their respective political will) when determining its own capacity to exercise the option of nuclear brinkmanship.
N[India(Boundary Dispute, Pakistan+China)] = {A(India, Pakistan)*B(India, Pakistan) + A(India,China)*B(India,China)} - {C(India,Pakistan)*D(India,Pakistan) + C(India,China)*D(India,China)}
This itself is illuminating. It shows that the confidence of Pakistan in its ability to get what it wants from India through simple, two-party nuclear brinkmanship (or "nuclear blackmail") is decreasing. Therefore it is trying to paralyse India's capacity for brinkmanship by bringing China in on its side.
In other words N[Pakistan(Kashmir,India)] = A*B -C*D was becoming <=0 for the Pakis, which is why they have felt compelled to rope in China! We can only speculate on the reasons. Maybe they have something to do with changes in the values of B and D in this statement. Or maybe something has convinced the Pakistanis that C (the political will of India to use nukes against Pakistan) has increased.
What about N[China(boundary dispute,India)]? Was this approaching 0 as well?
Secondly, the values of B and D for the three parties is non-equivalent. So it is not a self-stabilizing kind of situation where A and C for each country would eventually balance out. THIS is the real problem with being limited to scores of 20kT warheads while China has hundreds of 1 MT warheads. It is not about "we will cause you unacceptable damage anyway." Maybe you will, but in the process you will cease to exist. True of Pakistan vis a vis India. True of India vis a vis China.
The key word in here is "unacceptable damage".... a phony, bogus term along with "nuclear deterrent." All damage has some value. B and D always have some value in for each player in the I-P-C triangle.
The current value of N[India(Boundary Dispute, Pakistan+China)] is what is important to address. Bharat Karnad feels that India needs to increase its B value for China i.e. B(India,China) for this statement to become self-stabilizing; otherwise, it is overwhelmed by D(China,India) and we have no option but to cow down if confronted with Chinese-Paki brinkmanship.
Again, a disclaimer: I'm not a mathematician. I've proposed a kindergarten level model of a PhD level problem... and I'm very conscious of that. I can only offer the humble hope that it may sow the seed of something useful, as fodder for more expert minds than mine.
In physical science the first essential step in the direction of learning any subject is to find principles of numerical reckoning and practicable methods for measuring some quality connected with it. I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely in your thoughts advanced to the state of Science, whatever the matter may be. Often seen quoted in a condensed form: If you cannot measure it, then it is not science.
— Baron William Thomson Kelvin
From 'Electrical Units of Measurement', a lecture delivered at the Institution of Civil Engineers, London (3 May 1883), Popular Lectures and Addresses (1889), Vol. 1, 73. Quoted in American Association for the Advancement of Science, Science (Jan-Jun 1892), 19, 127.
You are doing fine with your little formula which shows why TSp is running into PRC arms!
No, of course it is not science. If it were, I could predict the future of nations with as much exactitude as the great Baron determined the value of absolute zero!
You are doing fine with your little formula which shows why TSp is running into PRC arms!
Actually, I have never claimed that the formula (such as it is) is by itself sufficient to explain any such thing. Indeed I've said, right off the bat, that "N" should not be considered the sole determinant of a nation's behaviour by any yardstick. It simply conveys a sense of a nation's self-perceived capacity to engage in nuclear brinkmanship to resolve an issue.
As a corollary, "N" becomes relatively important as a possible determinant of a nation's behaviour, as the other options available to the nation decrease. So Pakistan's perception of "N" for itself is more likely to influence Pakistan's behaviour, than America's perception of "N" for itself is likely to influence America's behaviour (because America has a great wealth of other options available to address any issue, other than nuclear brinkmanship.)
The Britain vs Argentina example, and the US vs Yemen examples are interesting. In fact i was going to point out the Brit-Argie thing as an example of a provocation where a non nuclear armed nation boldly provoked a nuclear armed nation that was not quite yet in the state of decline it is in now.
But the US-Yemen example tickles me because it is such a good one. In fact it adds a totally new dimension to the way the US exerts deterrence and hegemony by having a huge conventional military backed up by a huge nuclear arsenal. Since the US Yemen example was a hypothetical one I will stick to it. Imagine a JDAM on the USA that is suspected by the US to have come from Yemen. Now Yemen has no nuclear capability, but if the US says it has there is little that Yemen can do. Let us assume that the "Yemeni bomb" came from Pakistan. The US may know that, but has no intention of attacking Pakistan because of all the uncertainties that entails. But the US wants to send a signal to Pakistan and all other nations about its capability. So what the US does is to destroy Yemen totally. The US may not even need to use nuclear bombs in retaliation. Overwhelming conventional force will subjugate Yemen.
Now if the original bomb has come from Pakistan, and not Yemen, is the US safer or not?
I would argue that the US is safer after destroying innocent Yemen. Simply because the US has openly demonstrated to Pakistan and other nations what it could do to them if it suspected that the jdam had come from their country. Even if the bomb had come from Pakistan, Pakis would be dead scared of rubbing the US up the wrong way - seeing what the US is capable of doing.
In fact that is exactly what the US did after 9-11. Beat up two innocent bystanders. The method of exerting hegemony is by exerting hegemony where it is easy and not necessarily against your real rivals. That sends a strong signal to other potential rivals.
In the US-Yemen example - it is only if Pakistan was stupid enough to raise its head and threaten the US with its nuke that would cause the US to worry about having to fight Pakistan. In fact this is exactly what we are seeing now. We are seeing the pathetic spectacle of a US that will not use its nuclear weapons against Pakistan, having to deal with the real source of 9-11 after having bashed up both Afghanistan and Iraq as "examples". Two buildings. Two countries. The wrong goddam countries.
Of course the US might prevail over Pakistan and it is my hope that it will prevail without using India as an example to show Pakistan what the US can do. . But all this nonsensical talk from the US about how India needs to address Cashmere etc is sign that the US is unable to handle Pakistan on its own and is looking for scapegoats. The US did not, for one minute stop and worry about Afghanistan's national concerns or Iraq's national concerns. But the US is oh so sensitive about poor ickle Pakis and their Cashmere dream.
The US nuclear arsenal is hardly likely to be used. But the US may well encourage an India-Pakistan nuclear war that "takes care" of the Pakistan problem. But it has to be Indians who must prepare for nuclear war and its consequences. The US gets the benefit. India takes the beating and does the dirty work. Maybe that is why India is so keen to avoid war with Pakistan?
Strictly speaking, if I apply my own argument about the US bashing Afghanistan/Iraq/Yemen to scare Pakistan, then Karnad is right in a perverse way.
You see if we give the "China excuse" to make hundreds of bombs, we are sending a signal to everyone. Bombs are "fungible" in that they are usable against anyone. So we end up getting the US jittery as well. We too will be setting an "example" that others can see. Makes sense. How nice it would be if everyone worried about Indian bombs being so numerous that one or two may be "lost" or "taken over" by bad people like Hindu terrorists.
Attached is the link to the speech by BK at the IISc. Unfortunately, it is not of good quality. So, if someone with the time and resources can enhance this, it will be much appreciated. Thanks. Bharat Karnad Speech at IISc
Tip, listen to this file with a headphone and all volumes on max. It is audible.
Rudradev wrote:
Shaurya, as I understand it, the "conventional threat posture" against TSP largely derives from the fact that a lot of war materiel (everything from water-canteens to Prithvis) was moved to the IB and LOC during Parakram.
No, it is far more. Our entire force structure is largely Pakistan centric with three strike corp formations arrayed against TSP. We have three out of five commands arrayed against TSP (nitpick apart). Our entire mechanized forces is plains/desert centric. We still have Prithvi as a short range ballistic missile with at least some of it nuclear targeted at TSP. The disparity between TSP and Indian force structures is growing and will grow. With the two% that our defense effectively gets/spends, rational choices have to be made. If we are never going to use this massive force structure, due to a lack of a political strategy and other factors, the IA is better off investing in other urgent areas of need. Check the sticker shock the IA has given to arm a mountain corps. We just upgraded our doctrine against China from one of "aggressive defense" to "Deterrent Force". This will cost us. We cannot continue to do it all. It will bankrupt us or more likely it will leave gaping security holes - like a non bankable deterrent. Choices have to be made. This is what BK is saying. IMO.
In fact BK is critical of Parakram. Not only Parakram, showed the bankruptcy of Indian strategic doctrine, but it also exposed the limitations of our offensive capabilities. At that time, we did not have enough and still need to acquire significant capabilities for a shock and awe performance. Our friends who track these toys know a lot more.
Shaurya, did not see this before.
IF that is what BK is getting at... that a robust military structure organized for plains warfare is itself a "threatening" posture with respect to Pakistan and should be forsaken because it will "never be used against Pakistan"... I disagree with it.
India has a long western border made up largely of plains, desert and salt marshes. Today it is Pakistan on the far side of that border. 2, 5, or 10 years from now it may not be Pakistan. It may be anything else... expanded Iran, independent Pakjab, a chaotic circus of Tanzeems, or even a massive influx of refugees with embedded Lashkar yahoos among them.
Whatever emerges on the far side of that border, it is likely to be inimical to Indian interests for some time to come, and it is something we have to be prepared to defend against. Yes, costs have to be taken into consideration if we are to beef up against the Chinese threat, and holes already exist in our defense posture with respect to the Chinese threat while we have been focusing largely on Pakistan. But downgrading our capacity for military action on the western border as a matter of doctrine, is not an acceptable solution, and certainly not for the reason that our present political leadership lacks the political will to deploy those assets against the present state of Pakistan.
BTW Thats all right with me, just saying, that is all.
. But all this nonsensical talk from the US about how India needs to address Cashmere etc is sign that the US is unable to handle Pakistan on its own and is looking for scapegoats. The US did not, for one minute stop and worry about Afghanistan's national concerns or Iraq's national concerns. But the US is oh so sensitive about poor ickle Pakis and their Cashmere dream.