Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 12 Sep 2011 08:33

Austin wrote: Page-2

No mention of air conditioning system for desert conditions

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 12 Sep 2011 08:38

shiv wrote:
Austin wrote: Page-2
No mention of air conditioning system for desert conditions

Shiv i believe the brochure broadly covers the key area of upgrade , certainly it does not cover every stuff gone in the upgrade like Laser Warning Receiver or Chrome Plating of Barrel that increased life by 70 % etc

As far as air conditioning goes i think what we see out there the black grill in the picture of commander turret is an air condition system.

http://i1083.photobucket.com/albums/j39 ... 33/5-3.jpg

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 12 Sep 2011 08:58

Displayed by UVZ at the expo the coloured shaded area points weak zone of tanks M1A2SEP,Leopard 2 ,T-90S,T-90MS

Weak Zones

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 12 Sep 2011 09:21

Narayana Rao wrote:My understanding is Avadi has capacity 150 units per year <SNIP>

150 units of what? The numbers that I've quoted for Arjun are from Ajai Shukla's blog.

Also, it takes time to set-up a production line - one simply cannot switch from one product type to another.

Although, if the IA places large confirmed order for Arjun post the user trials of Mk-II variant, then DPSU may have incentive to put together another production line and ramp up the numbers. But, I don't forsee that happening before 2015-2016 period. IMO, IA will first take delivery of first batch of Mk-II and then decide on the final numbers and what annual intake it wants.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 12 Sep 2011 12:02

rohitvats wrote:So, the number is 1,647 T-90, 1,200 T-72 and ~750 odd Arjuns. That makes it ~3,600 MBTs. We need another ~1,000 units and here, I have a feeling that more T-90 are going to sneak in.

If you have a qualitatively better and superior tanks which also means expensive ones then you really do not need a large tank fleet constituting 3500-4500 tank fleet.

I think a tank fleet constituting of top tier of Arjun Mk1/Mk2 and Bhishma and middle tier constituting upgraded T-72 with numbers ranging from 1800 - 2200 should more than suffice. If Arjun and Bhishma can have BMS capability then it would give it a first look , first kill advantage. A fleet of 400 - 600 Arjun Mk2/Mk1 , 1500 Bhishma Mk1/Mk2 and 300 deeply upgraded T-72 should suffice.

While the eastern front would need a new type of Light Battle Tank with similar fire power but lower protection.

Top turret view of T-90MS http://model-forum.ucoz.ru/_fr/71/s7558182.jpg

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 12 Sep 2011 12:06

A new variant of Kornet , Kornet-EM was displayed at recent MAKS and Nizhny Tagil

Kornet-EM

pralay · Post by **pralay** » 12 Sep 2011 12:45

Austin wrote: Top turret view of T-90MS http://model-forum.ucoz.ru/_fr/71/s7558182.jpg

What is that huge beast on right side of t-90MS?
I thought its prototype of Nona SVK due to similar shape of gun mount, but the gun seems too big than 120mm gun, and the chasis is quiet different.
Anyone have idea what is it ?

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 12 Sep 2011 13:04

sameer_shelavale wrote:What is that huge beast on right side of t-90MS?

MSTA-S SPH link

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 12 Sep 2011 13:08

Austin wrote: If you have a qualitatively better and superior tanks which also means expensive ones then you really do not need a large tank fleet constituting 3500-4500 tank fleet.

I think a tank fleet constituting of top tier of Arjun Mk1/Mk2 and Bhishma and middle tier constituting upgraded T-72 with numbers ranging from 1800 - 2200 should more than suffice. If Arjun and Bhishma can have BMS capability then it would give it a first look , first kill advantage. A fleet of 400 - 600 Arjun Mk2/Mk1 , 1500 Bhishma Mk1/Mk2 and 300 deeply upgraded T-72 should suffice.

<SNIP>

Hmmm....I have heard of that argument before from whose-name-shall-not-be-taken

Quite funny, if you see the expansion plans of the IA.

Austin, that is not how it works out. While quality is good, quantity is a must. Tanks and mechanized formations are not some nimble fighters which can be switched between sectors. And there is no replacement of MBT in any army.

Any how, IA is well on its way of requiring 71 Armored Regiments from the present level. Where the numbers can be reduced with advancement in technology is the estimate of ware-wastage reserve...which in case of Arjun stands at 17 units..that is why each block is of 62 units (45+17).

This is what the IA's tank fleet requirement is going to look like:

3 x Armored Divison = 18 regiments
7 x (I) Armored Brigades - 21 regiments
7 x RAPIDs - 14 regiments
2 x (I) Mech. Brigades - 2 regiments
10 x Infantry Division Tank regiments - 10 regiments
2 x (I) Armored Bdes (authorized and to be raised) - 6 regiments

Total - 71 Regiments - this is for plans that we know today. God forbid, if sanity actually dawns on DGMF, and we go for higher level of mechanization in IA, we may well see close to 90 regiments.

45 units per regiment is minimum number. Therefore, we have requirement of 3,200 tanks at the minimum as of now. Even if you add 10 tanks for WWR per regiment, you have close to 4,000 units.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 12 Sep 2011 15:07

Rohit , If what you say is true then what impact does RMA have on Indian Army and its fighting ability , since it bestows it with a qualitatively much better capability then it has it right now , with far superior situational awareness and is very expensive to implement.

For eg the Armoured Division , Regiment equation would have still remain the same had we been a only T-72 force or say operated most type of it, what impact does qualitatively better systems like Arjun Mk2/Mk1 or even T-90 have on the number and force structure since you can achieve much more with much less due to much superior awareness and combat potential.

Lets say at the cost of Arjun Mk2 $8million you can purchase 4 T-72 , yet whats the point in maintaining the same number as T-72 when you have a qualitatively better force , some would argue number is itself a quality but lets leave that part since you can achieve much more with much less and the trend globally has been to downsize with much better capability , which is to say quality and SA some what compensating for numbers.

Now with integration of BMS on Tanks , Attack Chopper and UAV ability to ID targets at much greater distance and much better Tactical Awarness you have in effect a force multiplier which was not available before and where number played a compensatory role for lack of Force Multiplier and Tactical Awarness or lack of it.

What are your views on this ? Thanks

ParGha · Post by **ParGha** » 12 Sep 2011 18:40

Austin wrote:For eg the Armoured Division , Regiment equation would have still remain the same had we been a only T-72 force or say operated most type of it, what impact does qualitatively better systems like Arjun Mk2/Mk1 or even T-90 have on the number and force structure since you can achieve much more with much less due to much superior awareness and combat potential.

The impact is unclear in peace-time. On one hand, yes, you have increased situational awareness and incremental increase in firepower+accuracy. On the other hand, the threat is also evolving (not necessarily symmetrically, ex PA A-100s), and that diminishes the net impact of your progress.

Avik · Post by **Avik** » 12 Sep 2011 20:17

Austin wrote:
For eg the Armoured Division , Regiment equation would have still remain the same had we been a only T-72 force or say operated most type of it, what impact does qualitatively better systems like Arjun Mk2/Mk1 or even T-90 have on the number and force structure since you can achieve much more with much less due to much superior awareness and combat potential.

The impact is unclear in peace-time. On one hand, yes, you have increased situational awareness and incremental increase in firepower+accuracy. On the other hand, the threat is also evolving (not necessarily symmetrically, ex PA A-100s), and that diminishes the net impact of your progress.

Isnt the impact more in terms of a capability upgrade, as in, a 'contemporary' armoured division would be able to have the same impact as a Corp of 20 years back?
From what I understand, I see two advantages- the first is that a smaller unit is now capable of accomplishing what earlier (say 15 or 20 years back) required a much larger unit. For instance, an IA armoured division with the right amount of engineering and artillery support would be able to accomplish the task that 20 years back would have required the whole Corps. If one were to consider the US, a US Army armoured division in Gulf War II pretty much accomplished what had required a corps during Gulf War-I, of course with the usual caveats about the degraded capability of the Iraqi Army.

The other advantage I visualize in the Indian context is the reduction in the size of a typical mechanized corps - currently the strike corps have 1 armoured div + 1 indep armd bde + 1 RAPID + 1 Inf Div. If the quantum of mechanization is increased, the RAPID can be converted into a mech. div, then, the third division (the infantry div) can be sent to a different formation. Even without the third div, the 'new' mechanized corps will have awesome capability with 7-8 mech/armd bdes. Finally, since the degree of mobility of such a formation would increase, the 'frontage' available to a fully mechanized corps would have to be more than for a partially mechanized corps, thereby, freeing up more divisions for deployment elsewhere. The caveat again is increased artillery, engineering and ASC support.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 12 Sep 2011 20:51

ParGha wrote:The impact is unclear in peace-time. On one hand, yes, you have increased situational awareness and incremental increase in firepower+accuracy. On the other hand, the threat is also evolving (not necessarily symmetrically, ex PA A-100s), and that diminishes the net impact of your progress.

If you ask me I do not consider PA armour threat any serious challenge to IA armour might and technology superiority , I would rate their Al-Khalid as roughly approaching our upgraded T-72 , the T-80UD represent the only serious armour capability which can be taken care by Arjun/T-90 duo, the rest are just crap and wont stand against the combined might of Arjun and T-90 , if you look at the upgrade path for Arjun it would vastly over whelm any thing that PA has or will have. When combined with other force multiplier in firepower and Information Dominance that we would have they do not stand much chance against us even against a decent force of 2000 plus odd tanks which are qualitatively superior and have netcentricity at their core.

Perhaps it is just an old mind set and the inertia in the organisation that would put premium on numbers not withstanding the quality advantage.

ParGha · Post by **ParGha** » 12 Sep 2011 21:24

Avik wrote:From what I understand, I see two advantages- the first is that a smaller unit is now capable of accomplishing what earlier (say 15 or 20 years back) required a much larger unit. For instance, an IA armoured division with the right amount of engineering and artillery support would be able to accomplish the task that 20 years back would have required the whole Corps.

What can a Corps accomplish? An Indian Strike Corps can theoretically isolate and destroy a Pakistani armored division in detail (a complete functional-kill, not a mission-kill on paper). Keeping this in mind, are you sure an Indian armored division can do the same to a Pakistani armored division? I am skeptical...

jai · Post by **jai** » 12 Sep 2011 22:16

Austin wrote:
sameer_shelavale wrote:What is that huge beast on right side of t-90MS?
MSTA-S SPH link

Hmm. The site mentions India as a user of the MSTA-S SPH. I am not aware of India ordering/using any.

Does anyone know better ?

Avik · Post by **Avik** » 12 Sep 2011 23:38

What can a Corps accomplish? An Indian Strike Corps can theoretically isolate and destroy a Pakistani armored division in detail (a complete functional-kill, not a mission-kill on paper). Keeping this in mind, are you sure an Indian armored division can do the same to a Pakistani armored division? I am skeptical...

Agreed. All I'm saying is that the capability of an armoured division and an indep armd bde together, provided they have the required support assets today, is probably similar to the capabilities of a Corps of twenty years back.

Essentially, what would require a corps to accomplish 20-25 years back, can perhaps be accomplished by an armd div + indep armd bde today, provided they have the required arty and engg support...

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 13 Sep 2011 08:30

jai wrote:Hmm. The site mentions India as a user of the MSTA-S SPH. I am not aware of India ordering/using any. Does anyone know better ?

No we dont , a 155 mm NATO caliber of MSTA-S was trialled in India but nothing happened after that

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 13 Sep 2011 09:08

^^^I'll come to detailed explanation on the rationality of armored formations/number of tanks later, but before that, it would be advisable to look into the structure of US Army Brigade Combat Team (Heavy). It will give an idea about how US Army, which is at the cutting edge of RMA in all fields, especially C4SIR, equips its armor heavy formation.

You can go through these links:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Sta ... st_century
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brigade_combat_team

US Army has all the assets that we tallk about and then, some more and yet, please see the amount of MBTs and IFVs in the structure.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 13 Sep 2011 10:07

rohitvats wrote:US Army has all the assets that we tallk about and then, some more and yet, please see the amount of MBTs and IFVs in the structure.

Not a fair comparison , the US Army has global commitments it is at self created war at any point in time , it has NATO commitments which has an impact on its force structure though it has trimmed down after cold war and rationalised its say tank fleet and much of it is in reserve.

The only reason i could think IA thinks it needs a huge fleet of tank disproportional to threat it faces is organisational inertia since its a huge force and things take time to move , had only T-72 been available to them they would have kept the same number and with Arjun/T-90 the number does not change much.

Eventually it would realise that new weapons cost a lot and a lot means a lot and it cannot sustain those numbers in the backdrop of steep cost of procuring it weapon and would correct its direction and that would take a decade , till such time we would see some fantastic numbers like 3500 - 4000 tank against Pakistan that even NATO will envy to have it.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 13 Sep 2011 14:03

I’m going to use an example of thought process, which says that going forward lesser number of tanks will be required by IA, to show the flaw in the argument.

Now, this argument was made by one-who-shall-not-be-named aka CG, as reply to one of the queries on his blog. And guess what, he uses my post on BRF about number of tanks going to be required by IA (a page back), to show how such thinking is incorrect.

Now, I’m not using BRF as a medium for proxy-war or shadow boxing with Mr. CG, but as means to rebut a thought process, and show how deeply flawed it is. If the moderators find this approach as unbecoming of BRF, they are free to delete/alter the post.

Here is the argument:

It's like fighting a future war with yesterday's mindset. Like a nerd from some other forum who had recently said this: "So, the number is 1,647 T-90, 1,200 T-72 and ~750 odd Arjun. That makes it ~3,600 MBTs. We need another ~1,000 units and here, I have a feeling that more T-90 are going to sneak in".

For the benefit of mango BRFites, the nerd in the above paragraph refers to yours truly. There, eat your heart out! My fame spreads far and wide…

So, for all the love and affection, Mr. CG does follow BRF. How quaint…

Now, coming to more pertinent point, please see one of the arguments below:

What's the use of having 4,000+ MBTs when in all the previous all-out wars fought in the subcontinent the biggest tank-versus-tank engagements were only at the isolated brigade-level and most of the decisive engagements--be it at Longewala or Chawinda or Asal Uttar or Khem Karan or Husseiniwala--involved only regimental-sized armored thrusts?

You know, this is really funny, and stupid at the same time. Very few people can achieve the same at same time. But we digress.

We need to look at couple of points:

- The last war when armor went head-to-head was in 1971. India during this war had grand total of 1 armored division (raising of 2nd had been delayed, even though the need for same had been projected) and couple of independent armored brigades. Pakistan was a bit better, they had two armored division and some (I) armored brigades. So, there were not very many tanks to go around in the first place. If all I have is an armored brigade, that is what I’m going to commit – how does one wish to see large tank battles without having large number of tanks?

- Also, to use 1971 or 1965 as template in 2011 and beyond is nonsense, to say the least. One area, where there could have been a large scale battle was south of Punjab, but there were no tanks in that area for such actions. Both the protagonists were busy preserving H&D in Punjab and J&K.

- Now coming to engagement part – I guess, people have been raised on the stories of massed armor clashes on steppes between the German and Russian armor in WW2 or, as may have happened in case of WW3. Well, the biggest requirement for that level of warfare to happen is space. Unless, you have real estate to park couple of Tank Armies or Groups (if you have them in first place), there are not going to be any such large scale battles.

- In case of India and Pakistan, the tank engagements are always going to happen at regiment level. And there is a simple explanation for that.

- Consider the following simple explanation: 1 Corps is given an objective, say Sialkot. Under 1 Corps we have 31 Armored Division, (I) Armored Brigade and 4 RAPID. And it is backed by a Pivot Corps – IX Corps in this case with two infantry Divisons and two (I) armored brigades.

- Opposing 1 Corps is PA XXX Corps with two infantry divisions, (I) Armored Brigade plus reinforcements. ARN would be lurking somewhere with armored division of its own+mechanized infantry divison.

- Now, how does it play out broadly – I Corps decides on multiple axis of advance and allocates resources. Say, (I) Armored Brigade teams up with 4 RAPID to form an IBG1 for one axis while Armored Division on another axis (IBG 2). These two formations will further break down the axis of advance into sub-axis and allocate resources. It is not as if the IA will drive to Sialkot and face the PA there. There will be series of important objectives to be met before IA reaches on outskirts of Sialkot.

- Therefore, depending upon the sub-objectives before Sialkot and planned axis of advance, IBG 1 may deploy two Combat Groups (mix of armor and mechanized infantry + support elements) upfront with one CG as reserve. Now, depending on the strength of adversary guarding an objective, the entire CG may be deployed or elements from with-in CG may be used.

- So, at a final level the engagement will at best be limited to brigade level – for a simple reason that there is no real estate for large maneuver warfare in this part or indeed, requirement.

- One place where one can see large scale tank engagement is in south of Punjab – but here again, it will depend on how many axis of advance we can develop and how the enemy holds it or vice versa.

On the contrary, one can argue that if the level of mechanization was high in IA, we could throw more armor at PA and, have the large scale tank battles (albiet one sided) that we wish for.

Wouldn't it be better instead to do a rightsizing of MBT fleet strength, for instance, and balance it with the deployment of say 40 armed aeroscout helicopters, up to 24 attack helicopters, and six MALE-UAVs (like the Heron) equipped with belly-mounted synthetic aperture radars for locating both static and moving ground targets in support of each armored division of the Indian Army?

Now, if you come to think of it, IA intends to equip its Strike Corps with an aviation brigade with mix of heavy and light combat helicopters. So, not only does the IA intend to have a fully function armored divison, it intends to beef it up with support elements like attack helicopters and other C4ISR assets.

What people do not realize is that there are three factors which have not been commented upon -

(a) have we reached a level before implementations of RMA (and changes accordingly) actually starts making sense? Or, are we yet to reach that level and developments in the C4ISR domain are only going to make the present structure more powerful and efficient and attain the minimum required maturity?

(b) The transition in terms of induction of new systems and phasing put of old systems has yet to take place fully, before the IA matures into right frame and we start seeing RMA implemented across the board.

(c) The requirement to win war against TSPA in double quick time. If anything, it will require more firepower and more mobility - to ensure that we land the biggest and heaviest punch in shortest possible timeframe.

Will add more to above later.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 13 Sep 2011 14:51

Dont have the actual janes link hence a link to translated version of it

India makes the most expensive tank in the world

British source Jane's Defense Weekly published an article which says that the new Indian Arjun Mk2 tank would have cost 8.02 million U.S. dollars, while the Russian T-90S has a cost of $ 2.5 million price of Indian tanks even more value American M1A1, which is to "predatory price" comes to Iraq (6.95 million dollars).

It is reported that India's ground forces are armed with a limited number of tanks the previous modification Arjun Mk1 worth 3.68 million dollars per unit. This tank has 60% of the components of foreign production. An unnamed Indian official said the new version has received more than 93 "improvements", including 13 "large." The most important program of modernization was equipped with a tank guided missiles, are run from the gun barrel. The Indian military does not intend to buy 250 new tanks. The tanks will be produced in 2015 at a plant in Avadi (South India).

India imported from Russia, 647 T-90S tanks, and intends to make additional licenses for 1,000 combat vehicles. This decision is connected with the high cost of Indian tanks. Sensational value Arjun Mk2 can lead to the fact that India refuses to produce it. American M1A1 tank has a normal value of about 4 million dollars and the cost of the Iraqi "Abrams" at 6.95 million dollars in the press was called the "predatory." The author of Jane's Defense Weekly claims that fabulous price Arjun Mk2 completely overturns approval of the Indian authorities that the tank will consist of 90% of domestic components and assemblies.

Jane's Defense Weekly ironically on the program as a tank Arjun longest in the history of the development program of military equipment. The development of the tank is from 1972. International practice shows that since the beginning of the development and production of tanks is usually 8 years. It is reported that the program was too ambitious and in fact "wrong." The article says that while the Arjun is a thorny path of development, Pakistan with China has successfully modernize tanks and Type 59 Type 69, and now the country has mastered the production of the tank of the third generation Al-Khalid (from the Arabic is translated as "immortal" .)

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 13 Sep 2011 15:16

a indian armour div can do as much as a old corps only if its equipped with:
105mm and 155mm mobile SP guns in large nos
MLRS of pinaka/grad-2/smerch types
good uav support
good CAS / gunship support
good BMS to enable "do more with less hulls"

in short it will have to be equipped like a american or german armour div.

we are woefully short on the line item concerning SP guns. we are getting there in 5-10 yrs for LCH/WSI, BMS, CAS, UAV, MLRS fronts...right now nos are not adequate.

american armour formations deployed to iraq did a lot of damage using their embarked artillery and MLRS esp at night when tanks would halt for rest n refit and iraq formations were pounded by massed artillery and CAS sorties.

equip to those orbat levels and it should be able to slap around a PA armour corps too.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 13 Sep 2011 15:41

^^^And please remember, one crawls, walks and then runs.

People are talking about Attack Heptr for Armored Divisons when we don't have these assets at Corps level. At charitable price levels, any half-decent attack helicopter is likely to cost around USD 20million....24 would cost USD 480million. now, multiply that by 4/5 and what is the dollar tab that you have? If people think USD 8million Arjun Mk-2 is expensive, what about this cost? And while one can argue that attack helicopter is more versatile plastform than a MBT, what happens to other formations in IA?

Let us first have assets at Corps level before people have wet dreams of Armored Divisons with organic 2 Attack helicopter squadrons and other such fancy toys. You have a situation where IA is w/o a single air-assault brigade and people want integral attack helicopters to a divison.

And however well one may be disposed, one does not send an armored divison to take on a Corps. Because, at the end of the day, there are only that many tanks and IFV and artillery guns; and your enemy is not some rag-tag militia of warlords high on khaat.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 13 Sep 2011 19:48

Expanding the earlier argument on requirement of tanks:

(1) Tank/Regiment numbers:

It is widely believed that CSD envisages development of 8 IBGs with Pivot Corps, so that these can go in and strike the moment word 'GO' is given. Now, no one knows what an IBG is going to look like, but the closest estimate is pairing up of a RAPID with an (I) Armored Brigade. Please remember, the Armored Divisons with Strike Corps stay as such.

So, if we intend to have 8 IBGs, we need 8 RAPIDs and 8(I) Armored Brigades. Which translates into 8x2 - 16 tank regiments for RAPIDs and 8x3 - 24 tank regiments for (I) Armored Bdes. Total of 40 regiment. If you add 18 regiments with Armored Divisions, that brings the total to 58. We've not yet counted the armored regiments with infantry divisions or proposed new (I) armored brigades for Ladakh and Sikkim. And, as I said earlier, if we go for large scale mechanization of infantry, we will need more. So, the requirement in terms of regiments is fixed.

Now, there are two ways in which you can lower the number of tanks in the inventory: (a) reduce the number of tanks per regiment from present level of 45/regiment (b) alter the number of regiment per Armored Divison or (I) Armored Bde or RAPID.

Now, can anyone with certainty say that, with all the planned induction of various C4SIR assets and limited induction of attack helicopters, IA will feel confident to field 2 armored regiment per (I) Armored Bde than present level of three? Or, an Armored Division can make do with lesser lesser number of regiments, say 5 or 4 instead or 6? Can anyone quantify the advantages incurred with induction of the proposed C4ISR systems and say that, the efficacy of a tank goes up by X% and hence, we can reduce the number of tanks per regiment by a certain margin? Or, regiments per armored divison/bde can be reduced because we have X or Y assets?

Are we sure that the capability of an asset earlier in IA's service was being utilized to its 100% potential which now will go up to 100%+Delta and hence, we can reduce the 'Delta' from our holdings of an asset type, in this case, Main Battle Tanks? Or, will be able to, fist time, manage to extract the maximum from our current holding of assets?

(2) RMA - Revolution in Military Affairs:

Is all the capability which we seem to be inducting - UAVs, more C4I assets, satellite based communication, fibe-optic cables etc actually RMA in strict sense? Or, are we catching up with all that which has already happened across the globe in more advanced armies, and to some extent in PLA, and it is RMA only in our perspective?

And has anyone done any calculation on the timeframe for the induction of these assets across the board, IA's ability to absorb and maximize its potential and for them to become commonstance? It is one thing to have a system and quite another to be able to master it. Every system inducted needs to be verified in exercises to see how things actually work out in field, as part of larger system and what advantage they give to the Army.

Even by liberal standards, IA will require a 8-10 years to be able to induct all the systems and equipment to reach the level it wants to become a complete and well rounded fighting machine. Just consider these:

(a) Artillery - well, even if we ink the deal next year (for all types) and first system comes in by 2013, it will take IA at least 10 years to absorb ~3,000 units - mind you, 300 units/annum is no joke.
(b) MLRS - well, as of 2009, IA had authorized strength of 10 MLRS regiments, yes, 10 regiments for an army the size of IA. Of these, 5 were the GRAD BM-21, 3 Smerch and 2 Pinaka (which were inducted in 2010). So, even in we consider planned induction of two Pinaka Regiments per year, one has 23 MLRS regiments before the decade is out. You think an army commander will surrender its tanks because it has 23 MLRS Regiments?
(c) Attack helicopter - Heavy ones are to go to IAF. As per an article I read, IA had projected requirement of 145 Heavy Attack Helicopters for AAC. But I guess, the same will be stuck in turf war. The requirement from AAC for LCH is supposed to be 114. Somehow, if the two requirements were to materialize for IA, the same will not see full induction before end of this decade.
(d) Mechanization - the main protagonist in this whole drama-T-90- is yet to be fully inducted while Arjun will start seeing service not before 2015.

With the IA yet to induct the above, you think IA will decrease the holding of tanks in its arsenal? And mind you, these things are decided after they are extensively war-gamed and exercised in the field and lessons learned. It is quite funny to see reccomendations of reducing tank strength in an army, where its premier Strike Corps are not fully mechanized.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 15 Sep 2011 22:58

US Army is developing a new IFV

US army to develop next-generation combat vehicle

The US Army has said it had awarded nearly $900 million in contracts to British arms manufacturer BAE Systems and US firm General Dynamics to develop its next-generation ground combat vehicle.

The Pentagon said it had given $450 million to BAE and $440 million to General Dynamics to develop "competitive, affordable and executable designs for a new Army Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV)" over the next two years.

The vehicle, which is expected to be able to transport nine infantrymen, is due to be operational by 2018, replacing the aging Bradleys and Strykers, it said in a statement.

The Pentagon, whose budget has doubled since the September 11, 2001 attacks, is bracing for drastic cuts in the coming years as the United States attempts to rein in the spiraling deficit.

The launch of the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program before the severity of the cuts is known allows the Army to ensure it will not die on the chopping block.

"Given the economic environment the nation currently faces, the Army recognizes that it is imperative to continually address requirements as we build a versatile, yet affordable, next-generation infantry fighting vehicle," Secretary of the Army John McHugh said, according to the statement.

"This is an important milestone in our Army's modernization program," said Army Chief of Staff Gen. Martin E. Dempsey.

"GCV is the first combat vehicle designed from inception for an IED (improvised explosive device) environment. It will provide armor protection and the capability to maneuver cross-country with the nine-man infantry squad."

vaibhav.n · Post by **vaibhav.n** » 16 Sep 2011 01:18

The GCV is a 50 Tons+ concept, I seriously doubt the IA has the appetite for such a heavy Mechanized Vehicle. That said the vehicle is surely to encompass all the present and future threats the Amerikhan planners can come up with.

I had a chat yesterday with a chaiwallah who was part of a team which informally inspected the Patria AMV last year. For all the porponent that i am of a cheaper wheeled IFV concept especially in light of our current mechanization levels, the officer and others have all looked more favourably at tracked IFV's. He said there has been a convergence of both wheeled and tracked vehicles and it is unfair for a traditionalist view of a wheeled IFV as a "Battle-Field Taxi'. Most modern vehicles either sides of the category are armed and protected about the same except some more robustly protected Puma and CV90 models. This negated the 'Cheaper' argument.

Another intresting view, he said the mechanization of the IA cannot continue until some regiments are releived as standard line Infantry and that cannot happen until the COIN Ops in Kashmir and North East can releive the commited infantry units. Anyways OT so will shut up.

@Rohit: Is 25 Battalions the higher limit within each Infantry Regiment.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 16 Sep 2011 10:30

vaibhav.n wrote: <SNIP>.

@Rohit: Is 25 Battalions the higher limit within each Infantry Regiment.

No idea..never thought on these lines. But with IA planned for net increase in numbers, more battalions are sure to be added. May be, regiments with lesser battalions will see more increment.

On the wheeled IFV thing, you argument is quite true. The reason being, the western armies do not see tracked and wheeled IFVs as expensive and cheap, respectively. All their IFVs are equipped and armed to same standard. And the modern wheeled IFVs to enter service are really on heavy side in terms of tonnage.

The idea that I had (and me dear freind Surya) was to have IA equivalent of Motorized Infantry Regiments. May be, we can go for wheeled IFV w/o all the bells and whistles and keep the cost below tracked full-bloodied IFV. That said, IA has not been very keen in the past to operate wheeled APCs.

On the requirement of conversion of couple of Infantry Regiments to Mechanized Infatry - that is bang on target. But I don't buy the argument about RR deployment sapping the strength to an extent that it will have effect on conversion. We'll need at the minimum two regiments to be converted to mechanized role.

vaibhav.n · Post by **vaibhav.n** » 16 Sep 2011 14:07

^^
True, even a basic APC would work much better in a div rearguard action in addition to carrying more troops and providing the mobility, but the IA has operated Wheeled APC's before and have reverted to Tracked only except the BRDM's (those too are on their way out) perhaps they know better!!

If the RR and AR are not a constraint then I donot understand the argument of not having sufficient mechanized units. Take the example of the Guards Regiment, They are being made to work in four very different modes as a Standard Line Infantry, Specialist Recce, Mechanized Infantry and AT roles.

I also think it's high time we had a specialist RSTA Battalion with unmanned assets integral atleast at a Div level, and the Guards could very well be converted to this role. Kind of akin to a SATA battery.

But alas these are jingo dreams!!

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 16 Sep 2011 15:03

vaibhav.n wrote:^^

True, even a basic APC would work much better in a div rearguard action in addition to carrying more troops and providing the mobility, but the IA has operated Wheeled APC's before and have reverted to Tracked only except the BRDM's (those too are on their way out) perhaps they know better!!

What I had in mind was to use wheeled APC as cheaper options to acheive larger mechanization.

For example, only one of the three bdes in a RAPID are mechanized - the balance two can be mechanized using wheeled APCs. Similarly, the infantry division of Strike Corps can be motorized - this will solve the biggest drawback - the partial mechanization of Strike Corps. But I have no idea why the IA has not chosen this route.

If the RR and AR are not a constraint then I donot understand the argument of not having sufficient mechanized units. Take the example of the Guards Regiment, They are being made to work in four very different modes as a Standard Line Infantry, Specialist Recce, Mechanized Infantry and AT roles.

Again, now idea. But it surely be cannot due to committment of troops in RR duties.

If you see the planned number of modern IFVs to replace BMP-2 (2,600), it represents an increment of only 10 odd regiments - the present requirement is around 40 regiments and 2,600 new IFV will be good enough for ~50 odd regiments. So, in case IA plans for higher level of mechanization.

I also think it's high time we had a specialist RSTA Battalion with unmanned assets integral atleast at a Div level, and the Guards could very well be converted to this role. Kind of akin to a SATA battery.

Very true. That is the first thing we should do - but the present situation is that SATA Regiments are being created at Corps level. No one knows when these assets will percolate down to divison level and we'll have RSTA Battalions.

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 16 Sep 2011 15:11

WRT the wheeled and tracked APC discussion. What are the advantages and disadvantages of following the red army approach.

They had a family of dedicated Tracked vehickes in BMP1,2&3. At the same time they had the BTR family. Why has the IA shied away from having a similar approach while mechanizing the Infantry.

I am also looking at the German Army approach to mechanizing. They have the Marder at the high end and the Boxer at the low end.

What is it that is prevented the IA from following a similar approach?

nrshah · Post by **nrshah** » 16 Sep 2011 15:41

To add to Rohit's point, we are forgetting the use of C4ISR and network centric systems were used by Khans against adversaries which were of no match. Khan dominated battlefield in every aspect whether technology or numbers. It establised absolute air supremacy under which all such systems could work round the clock in a seamless manner providing SA to ground troops and increasing there efficiency.

Our adversaries are not the same poor guys having few hundreds of RPG rounds and couple of squadrons of out dated fighters. We neither have the kind of disparity in terms of numbers or technology as khan had. Under such circumstance it is very dubious that we will be having air dominance over hostile space and even if we achieve one, whether it would be available round the clock. Two front war as we say now a days will only complicate the issue where we will face crucial shortage of resources.

Under such scenario, the battle will be fought by the Tanks and armoured vehicles and numbers will have major role to play. Also, as we say fire power of tanks have increased compared to say 70s or 80s, but so are defense against the same. Our Arjun will not face Patton wherein a single round will make it a thing of past. They will face tanks with ERA and other defensive aids (both active and passive). So although fire power increase in absolute terms, what is the actual increase in relative terms needs to be seen and Khan fighting afghan type example may not suit us.

Ofcourse, I dont have ability of putting numbers like many others, so a general post with generalised facts... Please pardon in case there is lack of sync with actual state and enlighten.

vaibhav.n · Post by **vaibhav.n** » 16 Sep 2011 15:58

Pratyush,

AFAIK, In the Soviet Army, a first-line MR division (as part of the OMG) usually had two regiments equipped with the wheeled APC and one with the tracked BMP IFV. The motorized regiments were intended to make dismounted attacks on the division's flanks while the BMP-equipped mechanized regiment remained mounted and supported the OMG's tank div on the major axis of advance.

This is a graph of a soviet MR regiment formation for a meeting engagement. Hope this helps: http://www.1-33rdar.org/Numbered_Blocks.jpg

Cheers!!

@Rohit: You have Mail.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 16 Sep 2011 16:22

vaibhav.n wrote:<SNIP>
@Rohit: You have Mail.

Thanks for the link. Also, have sent you a mail.

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 16 Sep 2011 17:26

wheeled IFVs\APCs have come a long way and now can operate on a pretty high percentage of the areas the tracked ones were previously needed -

I would like to see the IAs reasoning if they are still saying wheeled IFVs are not suitable (something I doubt).

I would still think wheeled is cheaper and easier to maintain but even pared down is better than lorries

D Roy · Post by **D Roy** » 16 Sep 2011 17:51

Just as a ready reckoner.

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land ... eels98.pdf

Takes a somewhat empirical look at the tracked versus wheeled debate.

Enthusiasts would like to read it.

ParGha · Post by **ParGha** » 16 Sep 2011 20:26

rohitvats wrote:For example, only one of the three bdes in a RAPID are mechanized - the balance two can be mechanized using wheeled APCs. Similarly, the infantry division of Strike Corps can be motorized - this will solve the biggest drawback - the partial mechanization of Strike Corps. But I have no idea why the IA has not chosen this route.

1:3 is the minimum effective ratio of mech-inf to mech-cav, so it looks like the the IA is maintaining them at the very skeletal bare minimum. At first it may have been an economic decision (fall of SU, fuel costs), and later a strategic decision (overt nuclear weaponization of the sub-continent, uncertainty after 9/11/01).

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 17 Sep 2011 09:57

D Roy wrote:Just as a ready reckoner.
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land ... eels98.pdf

Nice one indeed and the conclusion sums it up

Wheeled and tracked vehicles each exhibit advantages that can be optimized for the 21st century battlefield, provided the platform’s combat mission, terrain profile and specific characteristics are carefully assessed. For combat vehicles, vice combat support or combat service support vehicles, Army studies unanimously conclude that a tracked configuration is the optimal solution for tactical,high-mobility roles (off-road usage greater than 60 percent), gross vehicle weights in excess of 20 tons, and missions requiring unrestricted terrain movement, continuous all-weather operations, smaller silhouettes/dimensional envelopes, and greater survivability.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 17 Sep 2011 10:26

Video: Mine Plow in Action on T-72

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 18 Sep 2011 09:44

T-90MS - Protection
T-90MS - Official Press Release

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 24 Sep 2011 20:53

T-90MS - Fire Control System "Kalina"
http://gurkhan.blogspot.com/2011/09/t-9 ... l-fcs.html