Deterrence

[shyamd]

^^ Ramanaji, NFU was just to play to an audience. GoI source said "Do you think we trust crazies across the border?!"

[ramana]

X-post...

Indian Official Touts Work On Nuclear Deterrent

Indian Official Touts Work On Nuclear Deterrent
Jun 17, 2011
By Jay Menon
NEW DELHI

India is well on its way to creating a minimum credible nuclear deterrent, a senior defense official says.

“There is a huge amount of work going on toward creating a credible minimal deterrence to ensure our adversaries don’t take us by surprise. We are way up and ahead of what we need to do in protecting the country,” says Air Vice Marshal K.J. Mathews, commander-in-chief of Strategic Forces Command.

SFC, established in 2003, operates independently and is responsible for India’s nuclear arsenal from preparation to delivery to the armed forces.

The Command also is tasked with the use of nuclear weapons under the eight-point nuclear doctrine,
which is committed to No-First Strike or Use of Nuclear Weapons against Non-Nuclear Nations.

Note bolded part about applicability of NFU.

[RajeshA]

Best Deterrence is Reincarnation. Pakis & Chinkis should think we are crazy, even crazier than them, so they better not mess up with us.

[SSridhar]

X-post...

Indian Official Touts Work On Nuclear Deterrent

Indian Official Touts Work On Nuclear Deterrent

The Command also is tasked with the use of nuclear weapons under the eight-point nuclear doctrine,
which is committed to No-First Strike or Use of Nuclear Weapons against Non-Nuclear Nations.

Note bolded part about applicability of NFU.

I quote from my own post here earlier

Apart from the 'no guarantee' to NNWS who align with NWS (thereby partially withdrawing the Negative Security Assurance to NNWS) and nuclear retaliation if chemical/biological weapons are used against India (even if nukes per se were not used), the 2003 ND also referred to 'massive' punitive retaliation which is a refinement since the 1999 DND.

[abhishek_sharma]

An article on deterrence by a U.S. Navy officer is available here.

[shiv]

Cross post

Game Theoretic Understanding of India-Pakistan Relations - IDSA Comment by Arvind Gupta

Now let us consider a game where the consequences of following a hard strategy all the time are very severe. The game of Chicken (the name was given by Bertrand Russell) models brinkmanship. The two players are on a collision course. Who will blink first, swerve (i.e. blink, compromise, or give in) and leave the arena? Or will they go for an ultimate clash, conflict, or even war? Pay off matrix for an essential Chicken game is shown at Figure 2.

Here, the pay offs are such that there is a very heavy price if both players continue on the collision course. One or both must give in to avoid a collision. There is no Nash equilibrium, i.e. no dominant strategy, in this game unlike in prisoners’ dilemma. The players will have to consider the consequences of a collision course which could even be a war.

The Cuban missile crisis was an example of the game of Chicken. The US and USSR initially adopted tough stances but eventually the USSR had to give in.

In 2002, India mobilized its army along the India-Pakistan border for ten months in response to a terror attack on the Indian parliament. The attack was carried out by a terrorist group based in Pakistan. Both countries were in a situation of rising tension and fears of nuclear war raised their head. General Musharraf, the President of Pakistan, felt the heat and gave an open statement that Pakistan would not allow its territory to be used for supporting terrorism. The Indian government which was finding it difficult to sustain a large scale mobilization for such a long time, began to relax its posture after the assurance was given. The international community also did some deft diplomacy to avoid war. Operation Parakram had elements of the game of Chicken in it although it is not known whether the two sides actually used Game theory to model their responses. The Operation was eventually called off and war averted.

Interestingly (to me) I had used the same game model in my post near the beginning of this thread
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 61#p745561

Nuclear deterrence is based on a game called "chicken"

Imagine two drivers heading towards each other on the same lane of a road at 100 kmph. To swerve is to "lose", and to "stay" is to win

The consequences of not swerving are very costly to both, so either both will swerve or one (the "chicken) will swerve first. If both don't swerve both are destroyed. The "points" for this game can be seen in this picture



A policy of NFU changes the game from "chicken" to a much simpler and easily predictable game of tit for tat.

[ramana]

Excellent shiv. Very good job. Your understanding is even better than the expert's.

[shiv]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eb_Z1JfZ6xI


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xtP81gHItwg

[shiv]

There are many videos on the subject of deterrence - and the man in the videos above, Ward Wilson says a few of the things I have believed and stated on here and he says more. The two videos above fascinated me. The interesting thing is that there are a lot of people who say that there is no such thing as nuclear deterrence. That statement certainly strikes a resonant chord in my mind for various reasons. It makes me think at the very least.

One of the things Wilson says is that no political leader has ever been cowed down or defeated by civilian casualties. He says that they capitulate only when the military is defeated. He argues that this was true even of the Japanese surrender, which he says was not caused by the nuclear bombs.

The other interesting point he goes on to make is that he draws a graph that plots destructive power of bomb with usefulness and claims that if you look at all conflict and plot this graph starting with hand grenades and then going up the scale in destructive power, the usefulness of the bomb goes up with size of bomb up to a point and then it starts to fall. He says that usefulness of bomb peaks with bombs that are approximately big enough to destroy a building. Beyond that their usefulness only decreases.

[ramana]

Unstated assumption is lots of fizzul material.

[ShauryaT]

Shiv: For every Ward Wilson, you will find two dozen, who say the opposite. The reality is governments the world over have rejected this message and do believe in counter value and counter force. Not saying, we need to duplicate the west and its doctrines of deterrence, lock and stock.

The above person, can make the claims he does simply because of lack of sufficient data on, what breaks deterrence down.

In the India-China context, fortunately, our history and attitudes do not treat the other like an "evil" force to be eliminated. There is no ideological conflict that borders on paranoia of the other. Nor is there any great evidence of a history of brutal wars. India's deterrence can take that into account to decipher likely Chinese intent, however the safer route would be to match Chinese capability, within means.

[shiv]

Unstated assumption is lots of fizzul material.

ramana some of this man's statements sound absurd sounding but "scientifically demonstrable". Unfortunately it's difficult to decide exactly where to tell "scientific data" to get off. For example if you plot a graph of battles won versus weapons used in the years 1901 to 2000 I suspect "artillery" will win hands down as the most effective weapon and nuclear weapons come way down. Better than bows and arrows I guess.

I don't know if you watched the videos, but the man claims ( i have no way of verifying) that the Japanese were more concerned about the Russian invasion of Japan that coincided with the nuke attack than Hiroshima.

Now here is a very interesting take about deterrence, from Robert McNamara no less. Just 2 min 40 seconds. I post the description of the video as well

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara passed away on Monday, July 6, 2009. He was 93.

In this excerpt from March 2005, McNamara discusses the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. McNamara implies that, due to their lethality, small stockpiles of nuclear weapons are just as effective as large-scale arsenals in deterring military action by an enemy state.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zwb2wU-5aJQ

[shiv]

Shiv: For every Ward Wilson, you will find two dozen, who say the opposite. The reality is governments the world over have rejected this message and do believe in counter value and counter force. Not saying, we need to duplicate the west and its doctrines of deterrence, lock and stock.

Oh of course Shaurya. No doubt about that. But there are other takes on the issue. I for one believe that if a leader has access to nukes and does not give a damn about getting nuked, deterrence will fail.

Deterrence will fail sooner or later. I am sure of that. There will be nuclear war. It is only a matter of time.

[ShauryaT]

I think what is interesting in the China context is, the US just assumes that those 20 long range missiles were intended for the US. Of course, they very conveniently forget the 100's of other SRBM's and tactical war heads that could be air delivered. What is their worry if a Japan or S. Korea or India get nuked. Not blaming them for not worrying about others, but the point is, reporting from the US will have a US only lens.

At the end of the day, it is about ROI against risks. In the cuba crisis, the risks to escalate to a first strike, were high against the potential ROI of a first strike. The deal made to take out these nuclear weapons out of Cuba was quid pro quo for similar missiles out of Turkey.

[shiv]

Shaurya, I ask you, and in fact everyone to watch this video of a very clear thinking young Henry Kissinger in 1968, propounding a blasphemous new theory (for the USA of 1958). 27 minutes. Not short. But iit is instructive of how much thought and debate has gone into the question of nuclear war in the past. Thought and debate that are a.b.s.e.n.t in India.

Note that I am not attempting to push any particular agenda. I limit myself to posting my own thoughts as I learn.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8SJikzUwwOY

[ShauryaT]

I recently completed Kissinger's book on China. It was an instructive read and do recommend that those interested in China should read it. I have tried to get a hold all of Kissinger's works over the past dozen or so years. I like his clear headed thinking and the relentless pursuit of his national interests.

Thanks for posting the various view points.

[NRao]

Interestingly (to me) I had used the same game model in my post near the beginning of this thread
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 61#p745561

Nuclear deterrence is based on a game called "chicken"

Imagine two drivers heading towards each other on the same lane of a road at 100 kmph. To swerve is to "lose", and to "stay" is to win

The consequences of not swerving are very costly to both, so either both will swerve or one (the "chicken) will swerve first. If both don't swerve both are destroyed. The "points" for this game can be seen in this picture



A policy of NFU changes the game from "chicken" to a much simpler and easily predictable game of tit for tat.

If and when you see the Paki elite move to SA, then you know that the time has come.

Forget PakiLand, blast SA.

[NRao]

[quote]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eb_Z1JfZ6xI


Late into this game, but he made a great case for a tactical nuclear weapon. Kill people in the army!

He also makes a very bad case about Egypt being at peace, etc. It was at peace because there was no Egyptian king that wanted to invade someone else's territory and no one else outside who wanted to invade Egypt. For whatever reason.

Just BTW, there is a huge correlation between great architecture and wars. As students of architecture are taught, when there is no war civilizations build great civilizations - a great part of it is architecture!!!

Simply put money goes to either wars or civilizations.

Re-phrased:

Peace - as he thinks is NOT peace.

When the Egyptian pharaohs were not at war (getting land to fulfill their egos) they were building monuments on the backs of labor - a fight unto itself. There was no peace for these people who built monuments to satisfy the ego of the Pharaoh!!

Peace - then - was relative. To whom was there peace? To the elite. THAT is NO peace. Peace HAS to be for everyone, irrespective of caste or Creed.

Emperors have a pot of funds. They use that pot to fulfill their egos: they either go to war and get more land or build monuments. BOTH are the same. Someone else does the donkey work. THIS was taught to us as architects in the early 70's - giving my age.

This Ward guy is a fraud.

[Rudradev]

Cross posting from Af-Pak thread because it is relevant here too:

These killings, though essentially local and apparently of minor players in the global scheme, will have worldwide implications.

A very rough and crude message is being sent by the Pakistani state. Everybody who has half a nut knows this. It is only a question of what the next moves are, and where it will lead. It's an unpredictable clusterfu(k really...

The Pakistani state thinks it is on the verge of defeating the Americans in Afghanistan. They are playing what they assess to be the end-game, and afterwards they will expose in dribs and drabs more and more of their dangerous strategic agenda.

We cannot, for instance, entirely ignore the almost casual bravado with which Erdogan ups the ante in the Middle East and East Mediterranean, while noting that the Turkish state has been getting very cosy with Pakistan over the past few years; even those who prefer conservative analyses of the situation, will have to acknowledge that this has to be seen in the backdrop of Pakistan's nuclear capabilities.

It is America's move.

A very perceptive post, JEM.

I have often wondered at the cosiness between the Turks and the TSPA, and all that it implies. To be fair, we haven't seen the Paki policy of nuclear-suicide-bomber blackmail being mirrored by Turkey until recently... but as you say, that is what seems to be happening today. Perhaps it is a wonder that it hadn't happened before today.

After all, contrary to all the bluster, Pakistan ISN'T the first Muslim country in the world to have nuclear weapons.

See this: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_sharing

Nuclear sharing is a concept in NATO's policy of nuclear deterrence, which involves member countries without nuclear weapons of their own in the planning for the use of nuclear weapons by NATO, and in particular provides for the armed forces of these countries to be involved in delivering these weapons in the event of their use.

As part of nuclear sharing, the participating countries carry out consultations and take common decisions on nuclear weapons policy, maintain technical equipment required for the use of nuclear weapons (including warplanes capable of delivering them), and store nuclear weapons on their territory.

Of the three nuclear powers in NATO (France, the United Kingdom and the United States), only the United States has provided weapons for nuclear sharing. As of November 2009, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey are still hosting U.S. nuclear weapons as part of NATO's nuclear sharing policy.[1][2] Canada hosted weapons until 1984,[3] and Greece until 2001.[1][4] The United Kingdom also received U.S. tactical nuclear weapons such as nuclear artillery and Lance missiles until 1992, despite the UK being a nuclear weapons state in its own right; these were mainly deployed in Germany.

Both the Non-Aligned Movement and critics inside NATO believe that NATO's nuclear sharing violates Articles I and II of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibit the transfer and acceptance, respectively, of direct or indirect control over nuclear weapons.

...

The US insists that its forces control the weapons, and that no transfer of the nuclear bombs or control over them is intended "unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which the NPT treaty would no longer be controlling", so there is no breach of the NPT.[6] However, the pilots and other staff of the "non-nuclear" NATO countries practice handling and delivering the US nuclear bombs, and non-US warplanes have been adapted to deliver US nuclear bombs which involved the transfer of some technical nuclear weapons information. Even if the US argument is considered legally correct, some argue such peacetime operations appear to contravene both the objective and the spirit of the NPT. Essentially, all preparations for waging nuclear war have already been made by supposedly non-nuclear weapon states.

At the time the NPT was being negotiated, the NATO nuclear sharing agreements were secret. These agreements were disclosed to some of the states, including the Soviet Union, negotiating the treaty along with the NATO arguments for not treating them as proliferation. Most of the states that signed the NPT in 1968 would not have known about these agreements and interpretations at that time.[7]

Results we may deduce, if the above is true:

1) Turkey has been in possession of nuclear weapons, as well as the equipment and know-how to maintain and deliver them, for a long time. As such its nuclear arsenal is likely to be in better shape for actual use than Pakistan's ever was.

2) On the other hand, since Nuclear Sharing was a policy evolved in secret, no one has any way of knowing the exact extent to which Turkey's nukes are under US control. Between absolute control (de-mated warheads and/or PAL locks to which the codes reside only in Washington) to nominal control (Erdogan simply has to phone the White House to inform them his birds are in the air) there is a vast range of possibilities.

3) Turkey has been the "dark horse" of America's Middle East policy for a long time. I believe this is because Turkey is in fact, the world's undeclared nuclear weapons state.

At one point, it became common knowledge that Israel possessed a functioning nuclear arsenal (thanks to US proliferation.) Do we really imagine that the Arabs, even the relatively pro-US Arab regimes like Egypt, Jordan or KSA would have simply put up with this? Some quid pro quo must have been given by Washington to Riyadh, Amman and Cairo for their acquiescence to Israel's nuclearization.

4) What was that "quid pro quo"? Most likely compromise: some Muslim nation, which the US already implicitly trusted with nuclear weapons, would be discreetly presented before Amman-Cairo_Riyadh as a Washington-approved Islamic nuclear "balancer" against Israel. I am sure the minutiae of this deal were hammered out in great detail, behind closed doors. Very likely, as part of it, Amman-Cairo-Riyadh were assured that Istanbul would be given *greater* autonomy over its nukes than it enjoyed under NATO nuclear sharing, so that it could act as an independent balance/deterrent against Israel.

5) The US would then have covered up the whole deal, publicizing an impression of friendly Israel-Turkey relations, sweeping this instance of proliferation neatly under the carpet (as they managed to do with German-Dutch-Chinese proliferation to Pakistan for over two decades.) The Israelis would have agreed to this compromise (what choice would they have?) in the belief that nukes in the hands of a "secular", NATO-allied Turkish army were better than nukes in the hands of any other Middle Eastern Muslim nation. Besides, if KSA/Jordan/Egypt were not "given" a nuclear Turkey as an Islamic balancer to Israel, there was always the danger that they might throw their weight behind the nuclear weaponisation of then-Saddam's Iraq, or Libya, or even Iran. To Israel, a nuclear Turkey was the price they were prepared to pay to have nukes of their own.

6) Like the Pakistan calculus in the East, the Turkey calculus in the West relied on one assumption: that the US would be able to "manage" jihadi radicalization in "friendly" Islamic states to which nukes had been proliferated by Washington, or by other powers with Washington's tacit approval. During the time all this began to be negotiated... during the closing years of the Soviet-Afghan war, I surmise... that must have seemed a cakewalk to the CIA's modern-day T.E. Lawrences.

7) As we know, events from 1996 to the present day blew giant holes in that comfortable assumption. First in Af-Pak, of course. But today, it is likely that Erdogan has taken a leaf from the Paki book and is trying it on for size. Both nuclear-armed Islamic nations (Turkey to a far lesser extent so far, but to some extent nonetheless) are making a mockery of what used to be known, in 20th-century parlance, as "nuclear deterrence." They are in fact using their arsenals as "nuclear insurance" to underwrite their regional, even global adventurism.

End result: "Deterrence", as the concept we knew it in the 20th century, is DEAD. This would be true even if I am completely wrong about Turkey, SOLELY on the basis of Pakistan's behaviour. Nuclear INSURANCE for military and political adventurism, cannot survive side by side with nuclear DETERRENCE, which by definition, was aimed exclusively at curbing adventurism. Using the possession of nukes to back up one's attempts to ALTER the status quo, makes nonsense of any doctrine where possession of nukes was used to MAINTAIN the status quo. It cannot be any other way.

9) Therefore: yes, it is America's move, and further, America had better make it fast. America, as the possessor of the world's largest nuclear arsenal and its oldest nuclear arsenal, wrote the rulebook on which 20th-century "Deterrence" and brinkmanship were wholly and entirely predicated.

Today Deterrence as a paradigm is dead and completely irrelevant. All that remains is a hollow shell maintained by pure inertia; it is only a matter of time before somebody uses nukes and then the breakdown of Deterrence becomes public spectacle, but even as things are, Deterrence for all intents and purposes has already broken down in the international system. We have Pakistan, and possibly Turkey, to thank.

10) The wisest move for America, if it wants to retain its upper hand at all, is to seize the initiative and establish the NEW paradigm. Deterrence is dead and gone... an entire global system of belief in nuclear "deterrence" that was established by demonstrations at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and followed up with decades of brinkmanship and propaganda. Whatever the new paradigm is... if America wants to dominate the world, America must be the one to define it and establish it. For America to establish this new paradigm, more demonstrations are necessary. More examples need to be made.

11) America cannot keep fighting the Afghan war by conventional means for a variety of political and economic reasons. With the Chinook shoot-down, the Kabul attack and the Rabbani murder... Pakistan has signaled that no matter what inducements America offers, Islamabad's proxies are only going to up the ante and escalate in response. Erdogan is quite possibly sending the same sort of signals in West Asia and the Med.

Muslims with nukes are using those nukes as insurance to do the Quranic thing and swing their severely truncated pen1ses in the civilized world's face.

The only solution for the Americans is to show that it can, and will, engage in controlled escalation beyond the nuclear threshold (as currently understood in terms of lame-duck "Deterrence." ) "Deterrence" is dead. Political leaderships around the world know very well that "Deterrence" is a sham. The only question now is, who will call out the Emperor's New Clothes? Who will show that Deterrence is a sham by breaking it openly in full public view?

America cannot afford for China, or Pakistan, or Turkey or Iran to be the one who breaks the sham of Deterrence in full public view. America must break the sham ITSELF, because the power who publicly destroys the pretense that "Deterrence" exists, is the power best positioned to shape the paradigm of nuclear weapon use that evolves as a 21st-century successor to "Deterrence."

America must deliver a TNW strike against the Haqqani network's assets in NW Pakistan. No more NAVY Seal snatch-n-grabs: that only provokes more blackmail, more recalcitrance, more revenge attacks. America must show once and for all that it means business... that it is not constrained in achieving its interests by the existence of nuclear Saif-ul-Islams, because it is WILLING TO USE the Saif-ul-Unkil. Pakistanis will then remember that Saif-ul-Unkil utterly dwarfs even the most powerful "insurance" that Allah can bring to bear.

The TSPA must see, feel and experience the joy of a thermonuclear airburst over North Waziristan. This will do two things. First, it will take the initiative of "nuclear insurance" away from the TSPA and leave them with exactly two options in response: use a nuclear weapon in retaliation (directly or via "non state actors"), or grovel in complete and abject surrender.

The second thing a thermonuclear airburst over North Waziristan will do is to convince the Pakis, like nothing else, that if they even make a move that arouses the slightest suspicion of using nuclear weapons in retaliation...America will have no hesitation in providing more airbursts and groundbursts much closer to their manicured front lawns. There will be no more bribing, no more bleeding, no more dying by a thousand cuts, no more patrols to be ambushed, no more tankers to be burned. There will be maximum retaliation, guaranteed, against everything the Pakis hold dearest of all.

This is the only way America can win in Af-Pak, as far as I can see. It is also the only way America can regain oversight of the world's nuclear security architecture, get rid of the Deterrence tree that has been eaten hollow by the Chini-Paki-Turki termites of "nuclear Insurance"... and establish a new paradigm of which they are, once more, in primary control.

[RajeshA]

Rudradev ji,

Going Thermonuclear is going up the escalation ladder. It would be the first time use of a nuclear bomb on Muslims, and that too very pious Muslims, not the Pindi variety. USA may be able to establish its domination for the time being, but would be naked for the future, as Muslims unlike Japanese are not going to forgive this, and they will attack even if they have to wait a hundred years.

There will be no going back. Every group in the Ummah would use it as an example to go radical, and all those Islamists who manage to work with USA even tactically would be delegitimized.

Duality of enmity and cooperation in the world from the irredentist parties in the world have ensured that Deterrence does not work against them.

The way to go is the break up of Pakistan into many smaller entities. Thus even if USA attacks one entity, not everybody feels that their H&D has been trampled under foot. It contains the fallout.

[shiv]

I have been watching a series of videos of talks by various people on deterrence. Of course George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn (I think) and others have now boarded the "zero nuclear weapons" bus.

But no matter who talks - it is clear that the US is totally stuck with its relationship with Russia and her nukes. The US and Russia are both talking and both intend to reduce their arsenals, but both arsenals are so huge that nothing else counts. And there are problems. Apparently the US has something like several thousand deployed weapons and a few more thousands in storage. the US is not building new warheads any more.

On the other hand Russia has a "hot" manufacturing line and are continuously manufacturing new warheads even as they dismantle old ones as per agreements. The US seems to have two problems apart from this. The first is that the number of nuclear warheads that the US has cannot be reduced below a critical number because - below that number their "nuclear triad" becomes inoperative. The nuclear triad is in turn linked to guarantees of nuclear weapon cover to Japan and Australia and one US concern is that unless the US can continue to provide nuclear guarantees to Australia and Japan. If they feel insecure, both those countries will, at short notice, be able to produce nuclear weapons of their own.

The overall thrust of the grand old nuclear men like Kissinger and Schultz seems to be that "We are in this mess with so many weapons that we can destroy ourselves even as we destroy an enemy. For that reason we really don't want anyone, ourselves included, to have such weapons. But we have all these obligations that make us keep our weapons and if we renege on those agreements, our own allies will go nuclear because of all the insecurity they face from Korea and or China. So the goal of reducing nukes to zero is nowhere in sight"

I don't think Ward Wilson is stupid. He is IMO prescient. He says absolutely accurately that history has had random periods of peace and that the last 60 odd nuclear war free years does not prove that deterrence has worked. So reaching conclusions that "deterrence worked" for XYZ reasons - eg concluding that MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) can lead to a nuclear war free world is mistaken. In fact Kissinger in his 1958 interview linked above said pretty much what Ward indicates. He says that as long as one party is deterred by the fear of MAD, the other party can keep on pushing little by little while the deterred party will keep on giving, little by liitle. Kissinger's answer to that in 1958 was not fighting nuclear war, but by being ready to fight conventional war and being ready and able to thwart the other nuclear armed party's aims by conventional means. Kissinger plainly states that he feels that the USSR too would then not have the guts to go for a nuclear response that would end up damaging them more. It's a gamble but an informed gamble. There are game theory models that seem to apply here - I will post them in a separate post.

These are great men and great thinkers. I am myself not sure what lessons there may be for India - if any - but they lay open so many possibilities and lines of thought that it would be silly of us to remain in our boxes and imagine that we know all there is to know and have all the information required

[shiv]

Rudradev ji,

Going Thermonuclear is going up the escalation ladder. It would be the first time use of a nuclear bomb on Muslims, and that too very pious Muslims, not the Pindi variety. USA may be able to establish its domination for the time being, but would be naked for the future, as Muslims unlike Japanese are not going to forgive this, and they will attack even if they have to wait a hundred years.

There will be no going back. Every group in the Ummah would use it as an example to go radical, and all those Islamists who manage to work with USA even tactically would be delegitimized.

Duality of enmity and cooperation in the world from the irredentist parties in the world have ensured that Deterrence does not work against them.

The way to go is the break up of Pakistan into many smaller entities. Thus even if USA attacks one entity, not everybody feels that their H&D has been trampled under foot. It contains the fallout.

I think the thing that is needed is to encourage and get a a Pakistani nuclear bomb to go off somewhere in the world - preferably in Pakistan itself - proving that irrational people now have the bomb. That would give every power in the world the best excuse to take the crap out of Paki nukes. The problem here may be that Pakis also understand this.

[SSridhar]

I think the thing that is needed is to encourage and get a Pakistani nuclear bomb to go off somewhere in the world - preferably in Pakistan itself - proving that irrational people now have the bomb. That would give every power in the world the best excuse to take the crap out of Paki nukes. The problem here may be that Pakis also understand this.

I envisage two scenarios for such a situation to happen. One a TNW against an advancing Indian column after a horrendous terror strike that even a pacific India could not tolerate. And two, a green-on-green situation when a field commander in possession of a TNW decides to use it against, most probably, somebody who does not support his worldview.

The former is an authorized use and the latter an unauthorized use that would be a gross misuse of some pre-delegated authority. While we certainly do not want the former, we may encourage the latter. But, the trouble here would be that we may never be sure if anything escaped scrutiny and did indeed fall into the hands of the more-pious. That would be the danger of introducing TNWs in an army that is radicalized, in a society that is leaning towards extremism, in a country that is severely unstable and is under threat of being overrun by virulent jihadi forces.

But, the world may not wait for that to happen. It was some kind of ultimatum by the Americans that eventually forced the PA to act against Sufi Mohammed, his son-in-law and the band of Taliban who overran Swat valley in 2008 and were about 150 miles from Islamabad at one point. I think if a similar kind of situation develops again, even the Chinese may cooperate in defanging the Pakistanis.

[ramana]

Gen Sunderji's writings are very appropriate for Indian situation of low numbers. He did think very clearly about nukes and their relevance.

Some US thinker was also echoing similar views.

[shiv]

10) The wisest move for America, if it wants to retain its upper hand at all, is to seize the initiative and establish the NEW paradigm. Deterrence is dead and gone... an entire global system of belief in nuclear "deterrence" that was established by demonstrations at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and followed up with decades of brinkmanship and propaganda. Whatever the new paradigm is... if America wants to dominate the world, America must be the one to define it and establish it. For America to establish this new paradigm, more demonstrations are necessary. More examples need to be made.

+1
Rudradev's post cannot be dismissed as improbable - in fact I have read a beautiful game theory exception called the "Chain store paradox" which actually supports what he says. It is amazing. I will try and explain - it's all on Wiki so stop reading and look at Wiki if you are put off.

The Chain store game is a scenario where a large chain store group has to start stores one after another in 20 cities. There is a competitor in each city. If the local competitor cooperates both the chain group and competitor get 2 points each. If the local competitor is hostile, the chain store has the option of being aggressive and knocking the other chap out which gives both 0. Or else the local guy gets intimidated and gets 1 and the aggressive Chain Store gets 5 as the local does a downhill ski. Apparently the "correct" way of scoring this game is to reason backwards from thinking what the 20th competitor will do after seeing the chain store getting into 19 earlier cities. He will cooperate because that is his bet pay off.

If this game is applied to nuclear weapons it is like the US has nukes and so does USSR. The US and USSR cooperate not to use nukes and get 2 points each. In most situations the US and USSR cooperated and got 2 points each. The US and China have done the same thing. The US and Korea have done the same thing. It's all "cooperation". The chainstore game seems to be coming true on initial observation. With this game the US cannot dominate despite its superiority. The points and power are shared equally.

But the "chain store paradox" points out that if the chain store decides not to look for cooperation at all and goes hostile in the first few cities - even if they get zero in a few, later cities will understand that this is an aggressive player and their best bet of survival and not getting a zero is to capitulate and get 1 point, giving the aggressive chain store 5 points. That is exactly what happened in the Cuban missile crisis where the US got aggressive and the USSR blinked and backed out.

If the US uses 4-5 low yield "clean" tactical nukes on some selected targets and threatens nuclear annihilation on an adversary like Pakhanastan, the choices faced by the latter are "fight" and get zero points or capitulate and allow the US to win but earn 1 point in the process. That is what Rudradev is saying. Currently the US and Pakistan are at 2 points each with the chain store game working out as stated by game theory. The US's thousands of nuclear weapons do not earn the US any extra advantage over Pakistan with borrowed Chinese weapons.

[ramana]

Shiv, Brilliant!

Can you do a little bit more research on the Chain store game and apply it to current world order vis a vis deterrence and then later on to other aspects of geopolitics. And write it up as an article. I think its a new way of thinking in the post Cold War, demise of FSU and 911 meltdown. You hit upon a key problem of the era: zillionos of nukes dont get you respect if there are others willing to lend theirs to troublemakers!

[ramana]

BTW, the "Chain Store paradox " is the way Indian kingdoms built power thru history!

[Prem]

If RD andDoc combo good for making nectar of wisdom flow , they can both take a bow. Now find a way to drill the theory into Massa Man's mind and extend the co-operation in such breakthrough. As sign for partnership, lob few of our own 30-80Kt ones from Pathankot and Jullundar. But do this only in summer times so our Aryan brothers in the West get the residual gift. This will solve Parasitic Poak- Peculiar Persian -Paradox-Problem.

[shiv]

Thanks ramana. I'll take your request seriously but I must give it time so I don't end up writing trash. I am still learning.

[ramana]

No rush, Will get you help once it gets written.I think you are into something quite interesting in studying behavior of nations and empires.

Once you get your template ready we can have Bji and or Atri look at Indian history and see if the pattern fits.


LINK:
www2.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/wt1/research/2003/reputation.pdf

and theory applied to British relations before WWI

http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_ ... 0500001698

GWU Article on
Reciprocity and International Relations

Now I understand Gujral Doctrine evoked such curiosity/amusement from Clinton for he knew the game theory says something else. However C-S paradox deals with similar nations, entities. By invoking non-reciprocity Gujral changed the paradigm and shook the Pakis and their backers up leading to the events of late 90s.

[Rudradev]

Shiv, thanks for an extremely informative post. Yes, that is essentially what I was trying to say, and I am very intrigued that a game theoretical model already exists to describe it.

When I think about it, the US knew the rewards of playing the aggressive Chain Store (getting 5 points against 1) rather than a cooperative big brother (2 against 2) right from the end of the Cold War. The US actually tried to do this at various places and times of their own choosing. US aggression continued unabated, in the first Gulf War, the Balkan Wars, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the current situation in Libya (where some of its subsidiary franchises are being encouraged to take the lead.) In this way the US has stayed ahead of China, which has behaved as an aggressive Chain Store in its own immediate neighbourhood for the 5-1 game, but behaved more cooperatively further afield. Only the US is capable of playing the aggressive Chain Store game on other continents, and it has pressed that advantage over China while it still has it.

Note that I do not include AfPak in the list of US' aggressive wars... ironically, that was a war that the Americans would probably not have chosen to fight, and with Pakistan they are still trying to play the 2-points-each cooperative game, though they may soon be compelled to choose another angle.

Rajesh A ji: let us see. I think the "way to go" is a luxury that is not available even to hyperpowers in the current state of affairs; so the best option for the US may be to disown its own prior model of Deterrence (which has already been made a mockery of by the Pakis with Nuclear Insurance.) You mention that for the US to nuke the Haqqanis would be going all the way to the top of the "escalation ladder", but we should ask ourselves, does it still make sense to think in terms of an "escalation ladder" which was essentially a model of Deterrence-based brinkmanship during the Cold War? Many mechanisms were invented by the US as safety-valves during brinkmanship exercises, including clearly publicized signals (the much bandied about DEFCON 5, 4, 3, 2, 1) which were in fact signals that they stood (n-5, n-4, n-3...) rungs away from the top of the escalation ladder. The Pakis have made nonsense of this by using nukes as Insurance to back up their adventurism. They don't HAVE any rungs on their "escalation ladder" lower than, maybe n-1! For them... everything is an existential threat... so they can either climb up to the "nth" rung and use a nuke, or they can be exposed as bluffers. They have painted themselves into the top few rungs of that "ladder", which is something the Soviets never did... the Soviets and Americans always left themselves plenty of room to climb back down. Now it's America's move... and I don't think they can realistically hope to break up Pakistan into smaller states, at least not in the time frame which compels them to respond.

Ramana garu: I had not thought about the Gujral Doctrine in relevance to C-S paradox, but triggered by your post, here is my take on it. Pakistan was a small local store, India a medium-sized local store. India kept reaching out to Pakistan for the "cooperation game" (2 points each) but Pakistan, despite being smaller, insisted on irrational hostility (maybe they actually thought they could achieve a 5-1 win.)

What Gujral did was to take a third option: India, the medium-sized local store, neither gets aggressive nor offers cooperation... but steps out of the way so that the smaller local store (Pakistan) eventually finds itself in direct conflict with the mega-Wal-Mart Chain Store (USA!) THIS was the true point of "non-reciprocity"... to induce overreach in the opponent. Had Gujral not done this, Pakistan's refusal to cooperate and insistence on hostility would have caused attrition (lose-lose) between the Pakistani local store and the Indian local store... ultimately benefiting the Chain Store. This way, even though India has to pay a cost of failing to secure cooperation or retaliate against hostility... the way is clear for the smaller local store and the big Chain Store to come into conflict. Which enables a C-S paradox to take effect.

Intended endgame of the Gujral doctrine: Pakistan capitulates before the US and gets 1 point. India cooperates with the US and gets 2 points. US is forced into playing the aggressive chain store with Pakistan and gets 5 points there, plus 2 points by cooperating with India. However, the net balance of interests precludes US getting aggressive with India for a 5-1 victory, at least until India gets a chance to develop her strength further. Or so we hope.

This also reminds me of an article I read once (wish I could find the link) about Neville Chamberlain's much criticized "capitulation" before Hitler. The author suggested that by doing this, Chamberlain essentially pulled a "Gujral Doctrine" and made it almost inevitable that Germany would come into conflict with the United States (which had been fiercely isolationist under Wilson and his successors.)

Clinton was amused because, why would a PM of India willingly play a Chamberlain before the leaders of a smaller and less powerful country? But today the Americans know why. The irrational party will claim victory over the medium-sized party and go all out to provoke conflict with the Chain Store.

There are huge problems with the Gujral Doctrine approach, of course. Costs have to be borne, and the protagonist (Chamberlain, Gujral) often goes down in history a despised man. Britain ended up fighting Germany anyway, and lost its empire. India too has suffered costs as a result of Gujral Doctrine... Indian intelligence assets in Pakistan, had they not been rolled up, might have at least provided forewarning of Paki terrorist attacks like Parliament 2001 and Mumbai 2008 (if not actually the capacity to retaliate covertly.) The gamble is that, given the irrationality of the opposition and the inevitability of conflict anyway... the costs will eventually prove to have been worth paying.

[NRao]

Shiv,

Perhaps the best in the field of game theory: http://www.predictioneersgame.com/

He has written a book (The Predictioneer’s Game: Using the Logic of Brazen Self-Interest to See and Shape the Future?) after great success. Read just the forward if you get a chance - he first applied it to Indian politics. Everyone predicted IG to become the PM, out came Jagjivan Ram - as predicted by his model - an unknown then. And his carrier took off.

Modeling the future is complex (done it). But when the forces are well understood then it becomes rather tame. For the modeller the key is not to publicise the effort. For the players, computing risk is of paramount importance.

And, be wary of "peace". Egypt did not have years of peace as Ward seems to imply. One cannot have "peace" when there are nukes being pointed at you. Nor can one have peace when kings have their forces pointing at you. And, never can one have peace when the leaders are self centered.

[svinayak]

Shiv,

Perhaps the best in the field of game theory: http://www.predictioneersgame.com/

He has written a book (The Predictioneer’s Game: Using the Logic of Brazen Self-Interest to See and Shape the Future?) after great success. Read just the forward if you get a chance - he first applied it to Indian politics. Everyone predicted IG to become the PM, out came Jagjivan Ram - as predicted by his model - an unknown then. And his carrier took off.

Why did he apply it to Indian politics. There could be many reasons and one IMO is the social engineering effect of news reporting in western newspapers. During those times the there was a great value in India (of name recognition)being reported in the west.
Indian politics is not a model for testing any theories.
Lot of experiments on done on the Indian politics using media and reporting inside India and western english newspapers.

[ramana]

The writer was a doctoral student at Uty of Michigan, Ann Arbor specialising in Indian politics. He used his theory to predict the outcome of the cabinet formation issues after Morarji Desai quit. He predicted Charan Singh. Its there in the foreward of his book.

NRao, His approach is only one way in the many ways of game theory. His technique is based on mutually acceptable compromise if force is ruled out. But I agree his appraoch is most easily understood one without going into the many nuances of higher math. Unfortunately he took off his program off line to prevent misuse. His program costs mcuho $ for institutional use.

Some people have used the program to model T situation and it coming out per the predictions.

It also shows the correctness of Telugu saying"Mondivade raju kante balwantudu!"
The stubborn or inflexible is more powerful than the King or State.
Hence the need for fourth option of dand (force)

[NRao]

Ramana,

True. I agree.

However, the point I would like to make, before I slide out, is that numbers are only indicators - at best. Models that deal with numbers are great - not meant to be discarded.

However, models that are based on concepts are far better. They give one range, shades and perhaps most importantly allow capture of fluidity. Numbers really cannot do that and therefore cannot reach the level of granularity that one (may?) need/s.

The other very important thing is pre and post analysis. Most articles are post analysis - what I like to call the Nostradamus syndrome - we are very good at correlating a Nostradamus quatrain only after an event occurs. The value of a system should be the other way around, help us predict the future. As outsiders this is not easy, we just do not have enough info to plug or assign values - that is understandable. But, based on experience, the challenge is always to deal with ever changing situations - fluidity. Under the circumstance since assigning values is so difficult, the numbers game becomes a better option. But the numbers game lacks granularity.

Any ways........................



Acharya,

Predictive modelling cannot (like any modeling) be emotions based. Not possible. Else it will skew towards ones emotions and thus fail in being a good model. Emotions and politics need to be kept out of such things. And, I think Bruce has done a great job of it. As far as I know his models have been very precise. But, politicians and precision do not go together. I guess the only thing his model has not been able to capture is the Laws of Karma - prarabdha, etc.

[ramana]

NRaogaru, Yes analysis has to be tight and explore all the myriad paths and explore the alternatives. However that is a chore many dont like for they want the 100k foot level view right away. All models are models afterall. Not reality. Yet they give us an understanding.

I like to think of it as exploring the options or paths and exhausting the nooks and cranies to look for the frogs hiding under the rocks and ensuring they are not toads (poisonous)!

Legal profession does this quite well.

Mesquita is very approachable. Have been in tocuh with him.

[ShauryaT]

Building trust in Asia through cooperative retirement of obsolete missiles

From India's stand point this is important, so that maneuver for conventional operations is not misread.

Nuclear deterrence is growing roots in South Asia. India and Pakistan have both incorporated nuclear capabilities into their defence planning. Both are guided by a philosophy of minimum credible deterrence, although within this context modest growth is expected to achieve desired force postures. It is natural that asymmetries exist in the forces held by India and Pakistan. These will persist along with different perceptions of strategy and tactics. Despite these differences, we believe India and Pakistan have both reached a point where they should share perceptions about deterrence and nuclear stability in the region.

The time is right for India and Pakistan to expand shared understandings through cooperative exchanges of information about their respective deterrence postures. Such understanding could be critical in a crisis

The time is right for India and Pakistan to expand shared understandings through cooperative exchanges of information about their respective deterrence postures. Such understanding could be critical in a crisis. Both India and Pakistan have mutually resolved to enhance strategic stability in our region, as affirmed in the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in February 1999. One possibility for furthering this goal is to consider retiring their oldest, first generation, nuclear capable, short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), which are at the end of their natural lifespan. Pakistan's HATF 1 & 2 and India's Prithvi 1 & 2 have served their purpose and will be eventually retired unilaterally according to each nation's normal decommissioning process. We propose a plan of mutual transparency measures that would share information about the retirement of these missiles on a reciprocal, bilateral basis - without impinging on the continuing modernization of both sides' strategic forces. The retirement of other nuclear capable, obsolescent ballistic missiles can then follow in the same cooperative spirit.

We have participated in an in-depth study and also recently in a mock exercise to explore how information exchanges between our two countries could be conducted. We are confident that such an exchange could be achieved with minimal risk and costs yet would provide important reassurance about significant changes in deterrence postures.

Pakistan's HATF 1 & 2 and India's Prithvi 1 & 2 have served their purpose and will be eventually retired unilaterally according to each nation's normal decommissioning process. We propose a plan of mutual transparency measures that would share information about the retirement of these missiles on a reciprocal, bilateral basis

The Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan have recently reaffirmed their commitment to pursue confidence building measures (CBM) in connection with their ongoing Composite Dialogue. A working group on peace and security matters is charged with exploring CBMs in the security area. One candidate CBM would be to conduct a Joint Transparency Exercise (JTE) to exchange information about retired missiles. With the voluntary retirement of these obsolete missiles already imminent, New Delhi and Islamabad could make a virtue of a necessity by adding reciprocal transparency to the retirement process. Our studies show such a joint CBM is ripe for consideration and could be conducted in the near term. A first step might be to declare these nuclear capable missiles to be non-nuclear delivery systems. Then, as these missiles are removed from the nuclear arsenal, our two countries can build trust and understanding as our respective experts expand cooperation in the drawdown of obsolete forces.

This is a small step. It has been endorsed by several prestigious expert groups. We have studied the practical details of how such ideas could be implemented. We concluded that such exchanges could be powerful tools in enhancing mutual confidence and signal maturity as responsible nuclear powers. The costs and risks for India and Pakistan are small, but the potential benefits are great. It is a step whose time has come.

Feroz Khan and Gurmeet Kanwal, both retired Brigadiers, are with the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA, and the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi, respectively. Views are personal

[JE Menon]

>>Views are personal

Clearly. Almost certainly will stay that way.

[sivab]

http://business-standard.com/india/news ... ca/451876/

The DRDO predicts a highly accurate missile, which will strike within a few hundred metres of the designated target, even after travelling 5,000 km. This would allow the operational version of the Agni-5 to carry a smaller nuclear warhead. “Megaton warheads were used when accuracies were low. Now we talk of (accuracy of) a few hundred metres. That allows a smaller warhead, perhaps 150-250 kilotons, to cause substantial damage. We don’t want to cause wanton damage (with megaton warheads),” says Chander.

[Christopher Sidor]

^^^^
Makes sense. After all we are not mass murderers. Accuracy will always win over brute large scale destruction.

But I certainly hope that this would not be an end of the missiles that we are developing. We need a missile which can be fired from the jungles of Karnataka/TN/Kerala and which can reach each and every corner of Manchuria. We also need a SLBM which can be fired from the Indian Ocean Mid Ridge and target Bejing, China. This also would require Missiles greater than 5000 kms range. In simpler words IGMDP should be carried out to its logical conclusion, the development of Surya.

These missiles and the forth coming ABM systems that we are developing need to form the core of our deterrence against PLA/PRC.