Indian Interests

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 23 Sep 2011 01:08

prahaar it comes from the AIT. The theory gives two irrelevant options(Aryan?North or Dravidian/South) and ignores the relevant one of being Indian. So once you fall for that nonsense the deracination starts.

devesh · Post by **devesh** » 23 Sep 2011 01:58

was watching a video on youtube. the host of the "show" was in some village in India. the language that the locals spoke was neither Hindi nor English. the "host" was acting all "cool" and "developed" and making "sophisticated" expressions to show she wasn't like them and that she didn't understand anything they said.

there was not a hint of an interest to participate in cooking the dish (as part of the program the local women were cooking something). later on, she made some "cool" comments about bad hygiene and not wanting to touch the food. the expression on the face of the women was crestfallen. they put so much time to cook it and the b**ch was too busy being "cool".

the English education combined with regular doses of White Aryans invading India and conquering Dark Dravidians is a powerful psychological force which forms the worldview of those who fall for it.

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 23 Sep 2011 02:54

^^^Being able to share food, and drink, an attempt - however unsuccessful - to speak or use local words, is the first essential step in getting accepted. The lady did not want to be accepted - she is separate, and hi-fi - a high maintenance system most likely. Rural women especially are the best possible protectors, and I always felt I was looking at my mother, or sister. The working "class" women would be so "strong" - that I think most people are not even aware of how far they will go to protect you, once they feel that you are their son or brother.

My eyes are smarting, devesh ji. My lakhon pranaam to them, for I have been at the receiving end of their largesse so many times.

JE Menon · Post by **JE Menon** » 23 Sep 2011 14:25

devesh link please... this sort of sh1t is of particular interest to me

SandeepA · Post by **SandeepA** » 23 Sep 2011 17:46

The youtube link to Modi's interview made me hopeful for India's future again. After 60yrs we have finally found someone who deserves to lead this nation. He may yet not get that opportunity but the fact that this man will need to be taken more seriously by the English media itself is good for the nation.

devesh · Post by **devesh** » 23 Sep 2011 18:18

JEM ji,

trying to find it. i don't know the name of the program. the title was really generic. but if I find it, will post.

devesh · Post by **devesh** » 23 Sep 2011 18:43

http://satyameva-jayate.org/2010/01/16/ ... f-sinhgad/

“Game Theory & The Battle of Sinhgad”

In March of 1670, in the middle of one night, Tanaji Malusare attacked Singhad on Shivaji’s orders. He , his brother Suryaji and his maternal uncle Shelar mama, and the soldiers climbed the cliffs to enter the fort and caught the fort army by surprise. In the battle that ensued, Tanaji was killed. The soldiers started running back to the ropes they used to climb. At this time, Shelar mama ordered to cut the ropes, cutting the only retreat option of soldiers. Soldiers turned back and Maratha army won the fort.

All kids in Maharashtra read this story in history books. The story is discussed more for heroics and pride then for the excellency in military tactics and leadership.

Today Let’s do a little analysis of this battle using basics of game theory.

Explaining basics of game theory is outside the scope of this post. For those of you who do not know what is game theory, please google search game theory or visit Wikipedia article on game theory. Go ahead and read it. Trust me, game theory is fun mathematics.

In short, this relatively new branch of mathematics explores the way individuals or group of individuals evaluate their choices, prioritize and make decisions. No matter the difference in our personalities, it is surprising to find that when faced with a problem and multiple choices, almost all of us resort to some common strategies.

Let’s talk about Sinhgad battle as a game. On battlefield, there is actually a slight conflict in the objective of individual soldier and the army he/she is in. For the viewpoint of individual soldier, his/her own contribution is very insignificant. If others run away, individual cannot make any difference. But if the individual runs away, the others can still win. So seemingly there is no problem if an indivudual runs away.

But if he/she loses life, then the loss to the individual is huge. Thus the risk in running away is less than the risk in fighting. So the default choice of individual soldier is to run away.

If every individual thinks like this, that is the end of the army.

Enter a leader in the picture, Tanaji in this case. Leader will oversee the army, will enforce discipline and will punish if somebody runs away. So this fear of enforcer added to the motivation of winning the battle stops the soldier from running away. So as long as there is enforcer, there is this added risk to running away. So total risk of running away now becomes more than risk of fighting. Thus soldiers fight.

When Tanaji fell, for an individual soldier, the risk of fighting suddenly became more than risk of running away. Thus most of the soldiers started running away.

Now Shelarmama comes in picture. At this point, he had several choices. He could have continued doing he was doing, fighting and hoping soldiers could come back and follow his example. Or he could have stopped fighting and started trying to stop the soldiers who were running away.

Shelarmama did not do any of the above. He did exactly what an excellent military commander would have done in this case. He went and cut off the ropes to retreat.

Now no need of talking. The only two choices faced by soldiers were to jump off the cliff and die or to turn and fight back. The risk of running away suddenly increased to infinity, while the risk of fighting the battle remained the same. So soldiers turned back and fought.

Purely from humanitarian viewpoint, the decision made by Shelarmama is actually against humanity. Because he increased average risk to human life. However as a army commander, at that time and place, this was very right thing to do.

The chart below shows the risks in fighting and risk in running away for individual soldier at different states. When Tanaji was dead, three hypothetical choices Shelarmama are analyzed. It is clear that the choice Shelarmama made is the best choice for winning the battle.

Choice Tables:

case 1:- Tanaji Alive

Soldier’s Choice Risk
Fight ___________Medium
Run ___________High
Most rational choice for a soldier: Fight

Case 2:- Tanaji Dead

Shelarmama choice 1: Leave fight and try to convince soldiers

Soldier’s Choice Risk
Fight ___________High
Run ___________Low
Most rational choice for a soldier: Run

Shelarmama choice 2: Focus on fighting and hope soldiers follow the lead

Soldier’s Choice Risk
Fight ___________High
Run ___________None
Most rational choice for a soldier: Run

Shelarmama choice 3: Leave fight and try to threaten soldiers with punishment

Soldier’s Choice Risk
Fight ___________High
Run ___________High
Most rational choice for a soldier: Uncertain

Shelarmame choice 4: Cut off the ropes

Soldier’s Choice Risk
Fight ____________High
Run ____________Extreme
Most rational choice for a soldier: Fight

There is no question about dedication and bravery of Tanaji. However the award for excellent military tactics goes to Shelarmama. This shows why bravery is not the most important quality of a commander. General MacArthur said once “The excellent military leader has two things. Clear sight of objectives and clear understanding of his forces. Bravery is what results after that.”

The similar technique was used by General Montgomery in WW-II when fighting against German General Romel in Africa. The day Montgomery arrived to take charge, he burned all the bridges and trenches built for retreat. The same technique was used by Alexander the great in his battle against Porus. Alexander made his forces cross the river to attack Porus army. Thus, their back pressed to river, Alexandar’s forces knew that retreat was not an option.

This technique almost always has an adverse secondary effect on the opponent army. When they see that their attackers reduced to a desperate state, they expect fierce fight. So their morale goes down.

Sadly after 100 years, Maratha army lacked any Shelarmama on the battleground of Panipat. When Vishwasrao fell, Maratha army dissolved, leaving giant wound on Marathas that would take decades to heal.

May it be battleground, or may it be personal life. One thing is clear. History cannot be made unless the ropes to retreat are cut off.

there has been discussion about Game Theory recently. i'm posting in this thread b/c Game Theory analysis of history and present events can be an important tool in understanding India's "interests" and how to fight for them.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 23 Sep 2011 20:38

shiv wrote:
ramana wrote: Now I understand Gujral non reciprocity doctrine and its impact.
Can you expand on this. I am unfamiliar with any details.

Gujral when he became the Minister for External Affairs in Deva Gowda cabinet (United Front) came up with the doctrine of non-reciprocity for SAARC countries. Till then the prevailing view was, that no matter what is the size differential, each state deals with the other states on basis of reciprocity. In other words, US treats Grenada just as it treats Germany!

Gujral stated that India will not demand reciprocity from its smaller neighbors taking into view their size differential and power situation. In other words, India will give unilateral concessions to some good neighbor states without demanding similar concessions. This totally defused the animosity of BD, SL, Himalayan states etc towards India. They had feared India would be a borg and sawllow them into Greater India. He did not apply this to TSP.

Clinton in his meeting with Gujral was amused at this doctrine for it goes against the Western doctrines on Intl Relations which are based on reciprocity.

Ainslee Embree, the US scholar, said this was a hegemonistic doctrine, for if the smaller state accepts Indian non-reciprocity, it is in effect accepting Indian supremacy.

TSP wanted Gujral doctrine benefits without the implied concessions and went to PRC and got delivery systems for the nukes it earlier got and also nurtured the Taliban in their quest for "strategic depth". When they got spurned by US for the Kargil gamble they went into a blue funk and caused the Af-Pak mess.

So while all the states were playing a small game of chain store paradox, India was playing a bigger game of nations.

In retrospect, going back to kgoan's monkey trap analogy, the roles of the monkey (TSP) and 800 pound gorilla (US) got swapped while the monkey now has nukes. The poor (not really for he is harvesting the rest of the garden) mali (India) is letting them confine themselves to the jar.

The gorilla is demanding the mali intervene and let him take out his hand from the Af_Pak jar by restraining the TSP monkey's hand and let the gorilla harvest the garden as a Western God given right.

IOW the jar also got swapped from Cashmere to Af-Pak.

Note Kgoan in last para envisages the monkey trap becoming a gorilla trap where the the US is forced to clean up the Paki mess.

It has come to pass now.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 23 Sep 2011 21:03

NVS on similar lines as above post

Stay out

Stay out

There is no reason for an Indian intervention in Afghanistan, says N.V.Subramanian.

23 September 2011: A war of words has broken out between America and Pakistan after the attack on the US embassy in Kabul and the killing of the former Afghan president, Burhanuddin Rabbani. What should India do? Intervene in Afghan affairs with US assistance, as some analysts want, or stay out and manage the situation externally? This writer plumps for the second option, imperfect as it may be.

US-Pakistan relations have collapsed beyond repair. As it prepares to leave Afghanistan, the US will feel a lesser compulsion to please and placate Pakistan. Placating it has brought no change for the better in Afghanistan but worsened the situation. Pakistan has taken American money and attacked it.

The US embassy attack by the Haqqani network advertises the extreme audacity of the Pakistan terror establishment led by the ISI. The ISI is close to the Haqqani network. The network does ISI bidding in Afghanistan, attacking Indian and Western interests in the country. The 2008 and 2010 attacks in Kabul on the Indian high commission and a hotel frequented by Indian officials were carried out by the Haqqani network on the instructions of the ISI.

The US knew about these but did not act tough on Pakistan hoping it would assist it in Afghanistan against the Al-Qaeda and Taliban. That did not -- and was not expected to -- happen. The killing of Osama Bin Laden in a Pakistan garrison town destroyed the trust between America and Pakistan. US aids flows subsequently were affected.

Pakistan turned to China but its response was not generous. It was not eager to replace the US as Pakistan's principal military-aid donor. There are US-China differences on the South China Sea and American weapons' supplies to Taiwan. But it does not have the quality to bring Pakistan and China any closer than now, or to induce China to bail out Pakistan economically.

In this background, it was expected that Pakistan would lie low in Afghanistan till the US had withdrawn and then make its moves. Or, at any rate, not make moves against the US directly, which the attack on the American embassy in Kabul represents. But that is exactly what happened.

The Pakistan government pleads innocence in the matter. But since the US is acting tough, Pakistan blusters that America will lose an ally. That has been the state of play so far. But India cannot do better for itself by inserting into the Afghanistan morass, because morass is what it is.

India has been troubled by the Rabbani assassination more than the US and other countries, and predictably so. He could have been a possible figurehead around which a successful second Northern Alliance could have rallied. Rabbani's assassination is reminiscent of Ahmed Shah Masood's killing by the Al-Qaeda, which however did not weaken the Northern Alliance against the Taliban that was ousted after 9/11. Rabbani's assassination, therefore, will not weaken the spirit of a second Northern Alliance should it come about.

India should remain at the level of supporting a second Northern Alliance and not militarily intervene in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is the death of empires, and India cannot be a state in exception. The turmoil in Afghanistan has made India insecure. The troubles in Jammu and Kashmir may be directly traced to the Afghan mujahideen war. But India still has no call to intervene in Afghanistan.

Imperfect though it will be, India can manage the Afghan situation from outside. India has the skills and the assets to do so. India should not repeat the mistakes of Soviet Russia and the US by fighting in Afghanistan. Pakistan's domestic instability is the bitter fruit of its internal involvement in Afghanistan. India should stay out.

Afghans will turn against whichever foreign power tries to control their destiny, and that will include China, Pakistan and Iran. The more things change in Afghanistan, the more they remain the same. India's best bet is to revive the Northern Alliance, keep the Taliban from possessing all of Afghanistan, and spectate the destruction of Pakistan as it becomes embroiled in Afghanistan.

India has to live with instability in Afghanistan, and the sooner this is realized, the better.

Can be x-posted in multiple threads!!!!

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 23 Sep 2011 21:41

India should increase its stakes in PoK even if it amounts to a war and an alliance with Unkil.

An indian controlled PoK will deny Pakis the opportunity to push terrorists from Afghanistan thru LoC (note: LAC is sealed). Perhaps that is how India can undo the nuclear flash point over JK.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 23 Sep 2011 21:58

Ramana ji, recall I said repeatedly that India will support Northern Alliance to divert attention from LoC once Afghan comes to end. Its the cheapest way to keep J&K peaceful. But GoI is still fully pursuing plans for stationing troops in CAS - militarily support Northern Alliance - strike Pak or PRC - force PRC to divert attention from Arunachal etc to another area. Worse news for PRC, as commodities dropped today and confirmed what was being said all along on BRF - PRC is in deep trouble as US/EU sink further, PRC manufacturig data was bad. Commodities dropping further. As the economic situation gets worse for PRC, they will have to divert attention for their people and get the people behind a nationalistic cause - is that war against India?

Question for you on re-taking PoK, what would you do about the veiled threatof nuking India if it crosses LoC and takes over significant territory- or at least gets closer to Islamabad? Don't you think the crore walla's will turntheir trousers brown and pull of a stunt (nukes) to save face? Is it a price worth paying?

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 23 Sep 2011 22:05

I think it is worth taking a nuke-hit for permanent control over PoK, if it comes to that.

The JK issue already cost >40,000+ lives, hostage to Pakis and their sponsors on international stage, ~1+% premium on GDP growth. I would rather pay this price (~40-50000 lives, international pariah, 1+% GDP growth cost) with PoK in firm Indian control than otherwise.

If GoI paid this price 20-30 years ago (say in 1971-80), the alternative history could be like
- No nukes for Pakis
- No Khalistan terrorism (~20000 lives saved)
- IG/RG not assassinated - no 2G group/scam - savings ~$50B
- More cooperation between US and India. Possibility of US aligning with India than PRC.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 23 Sep 2011 22:23

I think to really answer the question, we need to delve deeper and look at the issue holistically to see if its a price worth paying today.

So for this one needs to incorporate the following into an analysis:
- Internal political scenario
- War effect on economy (we need 8% growth to keep the large youngstrs in employment or else we have a bad economic situation)
- Borders with PRC, is there a chance of it turning it into a 2 front war.
- Can we sustain war if someone cuts off a fuel source (US/KSA etc)? Do we have reserves?
- Fall out of nuclear strikes - long term effects. Political effects etc
and so on.

This is not something we can take lightly,.

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 23 Sep 2011 23:35

Defintely ShyamD garu,

What are the opportunity costs? IMO we are undermining the cost of status-quo. Once we take the long-term strategic costs (50-100+ years) into consideration, the mid-term (15-25 years) costs become less. We cannot develop national strategy in the chunks of 2-5 years, like we are doing now.

Energy Security - At the end of the Aug'2011 - our FX reserves are ~$318B. How about putting $90B (1 years consumption) of that in energy resources by building underground reserves? Since majority of our FX reserves are meant to address our energy bills, this is the right hedge.

Internal Political Scenario - I seriously doubt this is a risk when it comes to external issues.

China - Would it want to get involved in a potential nuclear skirmish?

Nuke-strike fallout - There are three kinds of targets
1. Military targets
2. Warning shorts - a medium sized town
3. Economic centers - Key metros

In all these scenarios we cannot undo the human loss. If we can learn anything from Japan and Chernobyl, it is not that difficult to rebuild the infrastructure and the environment will take care of itself.

Economic impact - Assuming this is going to be short war (< few months) there should not be any long-term impact (>2-3 years). If you see below graph you can deduce the same

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 24 Sep 2011 00:18

ShyamD garu,

Pls read this and replace US with India. You might say India is NOT== unkil. But IT IS in the sub-continent.

shiv wrote:
Rudradev wrote: 10) The wisest move for America, if it wants to retain its upper hand at all, is to seize the initiative and establish the NEW paradigm. Deterrence is dead and gone... an entire global system of belief in nuclear "deterrence" that was established by demonstrations at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and followed up with decades of brinkmanship and propaganda. Whatever the new paradigm is... if America wants to dominate the world, America must be the one to define it and establish it. For America to establish this new paradigm, more demonstrations are necessary. More examples need to be made.
+1
Rudradev's post cannot be dismissed as improbable - in fact I have read a beautiful game theory exception called the "Chain store paradox" which actually supports what he says. It is amazing. I will try and explain - it's all on Wiki so stop reading and look at Wiki if you are put off.

The Chain store game is a scenario where a large chain store group has to start stores one after another in 20 cities. There is a competitor in each city. If the local competitor cooperates both the chain group and competitor get 2 points each. If the local competitor is hostile, the chain store has the option of being aggressive and knocking the other chap out which gives both 0. Or else the local guy gets intimidated and gets 1 and the aggressive Chain Store gets 5 as the local does a downhill ski. Apparently the "correct" way of scoring this game is to reason backwards from thinking what the 20th competitor will do after seeing the chain store getting into 19 earlier cities. He will cooperate because that is his bet pay off.

If this game is applied to nuclear weapons it is like the US has nukes and so does USSR. The US and USSR cooperate not to use nukes and get 2 points each. In most situations the US and USSR cooperated and got 2 points each. The US and China have done the same thing. The US and Korea have done the same thing. It's all "cooperation". The chainstore game seems to be coming true on initial observation. With this game the US cannot dominate despite its superiority. The points and power are shared equally.

But the "chain store paradox" points out that if the chain store decides not to look for cooperation at all and goes hostile in the first few cities - even if they get zero in a few, later cities will understand that this is an aggressive player and their best bet of survival and not getting a zero is to capitulate and get 1 point, giving the aggressive chain store 5 points. That is exactly what happened in the Cuban missile crisis where the US got aggressive and the USSR blinked and backed out.

If the US uses 4-5 low yield "clean" tactical nukes on some selected targets and threatens nuclear annihilation on an adversary like Pakhanastan, the choices faced by the latter are "fight" and get zero points or capitulate and allow the US to win but earn 1 point in the process. That is what Rudradev is saying. Currently the US and Pakistan are at 2 points each with the chain store game working out as stated by game theory. The US's thousands of nuclear weapons do not earn the US any extra advantage over Pakistan with borrowed Chinese weapons.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 24 Sep 2011 00:25

Well India did use the chain store paradox early on. The princiley states were all integrated with cooperation except for three: Junagadh, Hyderabad and J&K. And here force was used as needed. Even J&K was not an issue but for wrong moves like taking it to UN and the TSP getting alliances from West and PRC. Selective application of Gujral doctrine is another instance of C-S paradox.

To me it looks like India doesn't want 90-10 victory like US but is content with 24-18 win-win vasudev kutumbam

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 24 Sep 2011 05:26

Vasant Sathe: The Congressman who always spoke his mind

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 24 Sep 2011 16:22

Just spending time thinking about it. I think that the gap will open up in the next year or 2. The West/PRC will be in depression, India will chug away as it relies on the domestic economy. TSP will be in the doldrums as usual economically (they are almost broke right now - 120 days away). So, take over of PoK is clean. If we play our cards right - manufacture the AAD/PAD in sufficient numbers. Then I think take over of PoK is not such a bad idea - risk reward is good provided we state clearly that the operation in PoK is a counter terror operation and in response to continuous terror attacks.

Then look at the impact on the US - TSPians will need US, so they will be nice - hand over AQ guys etc, provide intel on future attacks etc. So US will actually support this war, the US also wants to pull out, jihadi's will be diverted to fight the war in PoK. So Obama can leave with resounding victory - afghanistan is peaceful bla bla. So we can sell this to the US/west too! So we can tell Obama - we are fighting your war Mr President!!

RamaY ji, don't say it is short, both sides have to agree to end the fight, India can't control when to stop the war - remember what I said about Iraq invasion of Iran. So we need to be prepared for it to last even 2 or 3 years!

What do you guys think?

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 24 Sep 2011 16:52

^^^India does not have the ability to take POK - and I am talking about the "Azad Kashmir'+Northern Areas here. Unless, we have enough firepower to wrap up TSPA in plains in 15-20 days (and manage to keep of Uncle and aunties) and have a window of aleast a month to slug it out in the mountains. IMO, we are at least 5-8 years away from having this capability.

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 24 Sep 2011 17:08

Shyam D ji,

The trouble for India is that the manufacturing has been shackled by the socialist policies. Unless the power of Indian manufacturing sector can be unleashed expecting India to keep chugging along is hoping against hope.

IMO, in the absence of liberalisation of the manufacturing sector, it is only a matter of time before India finds its growth story coming to a halt.

We need jobs in the manufacturing sector, its importance cannot be over emphasised.

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 24 Sep 2011 18:35

rohitvats wrote:^^^India does not have the ability to take POK - and I am talking about the "Azad Kashmir'+Northern Areas here. Unless, we have enough firepower to wrap up TSPA in plains in 15-20 days (and manage to keep of Uncle and aunties) and have a window of aleast a month to slug it out in the mountains. IMO, we are at least 5-8 years away from having this capability.

if we have the fire power to defeat TSPA in plains and manage to keep off uncle and aunties, doesn't it make recapturing of PoK a consequence? Can you please explain?

Tia.

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 24 Sep 2011 19:44

Growing India can help the world economy: PM

In the absence of manufacturing jobs India cannot help any one. MMS thinks that without manufacturing and jobs created from it India can help the world.

He has completely lost his marbles.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 24 Sep 2011 20:31

RamaY wrote:
rohitvats wrote:^^^India does not have the ability to take POK - and I am talking about the "Azad Kashmir'+Northern Areas here. Unless, we have enough firepower to wrap up TSPA in plains in 15-20 days (and manage to keep of Uncle and aunties) and have a window of aleast a month to slug it out in the mountains. IMO, we are at least 5-8 years away from having this capability.
if we have the fire power to defeat TSPA in plains and manage to keep off uncle and aunties, doesn't it make recapturing of PoK a consequence? Can you please explain?

Tia.

Mountain warfare is a slug-fest where every advantage rests with the defender. The geography can be intelligently used to nullify /degrade the superior firepower of the attacker. A smaller force can defend against a big force. Also, the axis of advance(s) which can sustain a large enough assaulting force and attendant logistics are limited - and will be well defended by the enemy. Outflanking maneuvers are difficult, if not impossible, and options limited. All this means that the going is slow and it is a time consuming affair.

For example - if the objective is Skardu in Northern Areas, the two possible axis of advance are along the the Shyok river and from Gurez.

Please see the map here: http://wikimapia.org/#lat=34.9692497&lo ... =9&l=0&m=t

The Shyok axis is in the north and goes from Turtok to Skardu along the Shyok river. The Gurez axis (type Gurez in the search window - it is along the LoC were Kishenganga/Neelum river enters POK) follows an old route over the Burzil pass, to Astore and thence, to Skardu. If you observe, all the habitation in these areas (which can be made out by green patched in these desolate areas) and movement/roads is along steep valleys cut by one of the rivers in the area. And these habitation, like Kargil or Turtok or Skargu, are invariably the main military centers in these areas.

(Go to map-type and choose Google hybrid option - you'll see the alignment of roads along the flow of rivers)

On top of it, there are mountain ridges which are crossed using passes - like Khardung La in Ladakh Ranges between Leh and Thoise/Nubra Valley. Chorbat La along LoC in the Batalik Sector is important for this reason - there is a route over this pass which has been used historically to reach Skardu from Kargil.

The key to break the log-jam in mountain warfare is use of vertical envelopment - helicopters to by-pass the formidable mountain ranges and reach in the rear of your enemy. For example, while IA puts pressure on PA formations along the LoC, a company/battalions may be landed in rear areas or Skardu itself. But for all this to happen, we need to ensure that PA cannot reinforce Northern Areas by moving troops from plains or from Azad Kashmir. The Northern Areas need to be isolated - for that to happen, maximum pressure needs to be put in other areas south of Northern Areas.

And there is a precedence of all this - Op Brasstacks involved Indian Army mobilizing along the IB with its full might while the main objective was capture of Northern Areas. The operation to capture Northern Areas was called Operation Trident and IA had moved two divisions to the area. In case PA had tried to escalate, IA was ready while at the same time put pressure on PA so that it was not able to reinforce the Northern Areas. In the end, PA got wind of Operation Trident and reinforced the sector with addition 2-3 brigades. And then, Rajiv Gandhi got all nervous and every thing has to be rolled back.

Why I said we will need 5-8 years is because I feel that during this period we will have additional divisions apart from Mountain Strike Corps as well as strong helicopter assets - airlift and combat helicopters.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 24 Sep 2011 20:56

rohitvats ji,

a question from a non-military person, how difficult would it be for Indian Troops to capture say the Thatta District or Tharparkar District in Sindh?

You could answer it in another thread if you so wish!

TIA

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 24 Sep 2011 21:12

RajeshA wrote:rohitvats ji,

a question from a non-military person, how difficult would it be for Indian Troops to capture say the Thatta District or Tharparkar District in Sindh?

You could answer it in another thread if you so wish!

TIA

Sir, please to remore the 'ji' part...makes me feel really old

Coming to your question - I don't think IA needs additional training...only mechanized assets. And given the location of the district, the district may well be along the advance axis of IA formations.

A tid-bit for you - Chachro, along with Virawah, was raided by 10 Para(SF) in the 1971 war and the assault was led by then Lt. Col. Bhawani Singh - the erstwhile HH of Jodhpur.

Check the location of Chachro here: (http://maps.google.co.in/maps?hl=en&q=T ... a=N&tab=wl

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 24 Sep 2011 21:17

Thanks Rohitvatsji...

Highly appreciate the insight. I agree that the important factor is IA and IAF being ready to exploit an opportunity and i hope they are doing it. We cannot wait for the opportunity first and then start preparation. It will be too late by then.

My strategy is to put aside a $150b fund to build just that capability and eventuality. We have been having >$200b FX reserves for more than 5 years now. We should have started this project a while ago (may be we have), that builds enough energy reserves for 6months (that being >50% of our imports) and equipping our armed forces.

A calculated, well-prepared and well executed offense and victory in PoK will bring India immense RoI in many aspects of national power.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 24 Sep 2011 21:23

rohit,

thanks for the info. Just thinking about a scenario where IA could cut off Pakistan from the sea entirely perhaps using MQM and Baloch Nationalist forces as additional assets.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 24 Sep 2011 21:50

RamaY wrote: <SNIP>

A calculated, well-prepared and well executed offense and victory in PoK will bring India immense RoI in many aspects of national power.

I fully agree with your viewpoint.

Northern Areas are important to get a toe-hold of action in Central Asia. In case you've read, there is a road planned from Tajiskistan to Northern Areas that passes through the Wakhan Corridor - the strip of land that was created to seperate India from Russian territories. This road will planned between Ishkashim in Tajikistan and Chitral in Northern Areas. From Ishkasim, the road will connect the Northern Areas to Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan.

Please see the map here: http://wikimapia.org/#lat=36.0402159&lo ... =7&l=0&m=h

Where the cursor rests is Chitral in Northern Areas while Ishkashim can be clearly seen marked on the map.

We need Northern Areas to keep a check on the west ward expansion of China into CAR - and also, to get a toe-hold in the action in CAR.

And there is another angle to it - if the Taliban come to control Afg. we will need to ensure that Northern Alliance can mange to hold and maintain territories in North Afganistan. Which will also mean that NA controls the Wakhan Corridor, through which this road between Tajikistan and Northern Areas must pass. By controlling NA and maintaining base(s) in Tajikistan, we can ensure that NA remain a viable political force and a bulwark against expansion of Taliban. Russia and CAR States would like nothing better than India providing back-up to NA to ensure that Talibam does not expand into CAR and spread their venom.

And ofcourse, we can always continue to point a 'small' little dagger at Xinjiang and keep Chinese a bit on their feet.

PS: The news about road link between Pakistan and Tajikistan: http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=108479

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 24 Sep 2011 22:01

Indian hold over PoK would trigger the following IMO.

1. Consolidation of jihadi forces in pak-afghan-Iran-Me corridor. It will either lead to Jeehard (the peaceful internal version I mean) or consolidation of Ummah, which will be a threat to western interests.

2. Separation of PRC from Ummah. This will ensure that PRC is forced to deal with a stronger and smarter Russia in the north and india in south-west. That will reduce Chinese adventurism

3. Indian access to CAR regions and control over North-Afghanistan. Access to CAR will remove the ME energy dependency and Russia and CAR will have an alternative energy market in terms of extended Bharat. Perhaps a permanent separation North Afghanistan will allow that area to develop economically and leave southern Taliban in Jeehard.

4. West will be forced to work with india in the sub-continental affairs. This might open new opportunities for an economic alliance between extended Bharat regions including Burma and ASeAn.

5.

devesh · Post by **devesh** » 24 Sep 2011 23:22

if PoK is taken, unraveling of Pakistan won't be that hard to conceive.

1. taking PoK achieves one thing for sure: cutting off Pak from PRC.
2. also, taking PoK makes it possible to gain a foothold and later increase the presence in Afghanistan. this will give us an opportunity to see if Taliban fanaticism can be replaced with Pashtun cultural nationalism.

achieving 1 and 2 makes it highly likely that Pak will splinter. the first one to go will be the FATA and other loosely held regions on the Af-Pak border. if that happens, Balochistan will be the next one to go, with Indian support.

after that it's down to the SDRE's in Pakjab and Sindh...

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 24 Sep 2011 23:33

Thanks Rohit sir. You have added to the practical side of achieving the objective. I'd think that thePRC will probably prevent any attempt by India to get the northern areas, lately they have been building a lot of infrasructure in the area - roads into afghanistan and I think some of thier troops are actually stationed there now. I thinkour intel also got info that PLA are there disguised as waterway workers.

I think strategically, its a sound move to make - however, practically looks quite difficult to achieve at the moment. But it should certainly be an objective of a future war. Take over of PoK, will be beneficial strategicially and the economics make sense.

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 24 Sep 2011 23:36

I thought, cutting the entry to the NA from the plains would be a necessary part of wresting NA. Pindi, Tarbela dam, Kahuta, and as much damage in the general area would be necessary. Some distant action to distract the PLA too? And creating the necessary excuses?

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 25 Sep 2011 01:37

rohitvats wrote:
Why I said we will need 5-8 years is because I feel that during this period we will have additional divisions apart from Mountain Strike Corps as well as strong helicopter assets - airlift and combat helicopters.

+1.

tejas · Post by **tejas** » 25 Sep 2011 02:36

If India had a border with Afganistan Umrikah could toss away the Pukes like yesterday's newspaper. But let me ask the unpleasant question no one has addressed. Once POK is taken back what do we do with the people who infest the land there? Expelling them into Pukistan would never be done by the GOI. Does India need that many more traitors in it's midst?

devesh · Post by **devesh** » 25 Sep 2011 03:45

^^^
good question. though I wouldn't say that they are all hostile, but certain elements, if they continue to exist will certainly lead to that situation over long term. so, plans must be there to utilize the right opportunity to finish off these elements (separatists, Paki-lovers, Islamists, etc).

ironically, it might be possible to demonstrate the pros of uprooting the Mullah Maffia Complex beginning in Kashmir.

devesh · Post by **devesh** » 25 Sep 2011 06:08

^^^
RamaY ji, be careful. I'd hate for you to be the sacrificial lamb here...

a_kumar · Post by **a_kumar** » 25 Sep 2011 08:46

devesh wrote:if PoK is taken, unraveling of Pakistan won't be that hard to conceive.

1. taking PoK achieves one thing for sure: cutting off Pak from PRC.
2. also, taking PoK makes it possible to gain a foothold and later increase the presence in Afghanistan. this will give us an opportunity to see if Taliban fanaticism can be replaced with Pashtun cultural nationalism.

achieving 1 and 2 makes it highly likely that Pak will splinter. the first one to go will be the FATA and other loosely held regions on the Af-Pak border. if that happens, Balochistan will be the next one to go, with Indian support.
after that it's down to the SDRE's in Pakjab and Sindh...

Trying to get to PoK first is the path for most resistance. For one, that is most expected conventionally and what Pakistan is most prepared for. Add the Chinese interest in it now and rest of the baggage. Covert actions is another matter, but trying to do anything overtly in PoK will be like going head to head with a armored tank, and India has ZERO allies on that front.

However, if India can make a case for US to support Balochistan as an alternative to the current no-win situation it finds itself (paying ransom to ISI). That would mean, India would be using an option that has some allies, and is unconventional.

Imagine plebecite or referandom or full-on armed struggle in Balochistan. If that goes independant, that will have its effect in Sindh and Khyber pakhtunkhwa. As this radiates east ward, what comes next?

a_kumar · Post by **a_kumar** » 25 Sep 2011 08:57

If USSR (with all its nuclear arsenel) could be broken down and be left as Russia, why can't a nuclear-armed Pakistan be left as Punjab, hain ji?

I know they are not the same, but maybe this is the only way one can denuclearize Punjab!!!! The key is Balochistan!

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 25 Sep 2011 11:29

India should try to cut off Pakistan completely from the sea, and to try to break away MQM strongholds around Karachi and ultimately Balochistan from Pakistan.

This would draw Pakistani forces down to the South, with its energy supplies cut off. In 3 weeks time all the gasoline and diesel in Pakistan would be spent up. We also force the Pakis to use as much jet fuel as possible chasing around faster Indian planes in Pakistani air space. Otherwise we try to blow up their refineries and oil reservoirs.

Only then we open up the Northern front. Taking over PoK would be far easier then, as TSPA would not be able to move their forces northwards. As rohitvats explains, then Indian troops can try to land large number of troops in the rear of Northern Areas, cutting them off from Pakistan.

PoK is very important, but Pakistan's access to the sea is really its lifeline. Without access to the sea, Pakjab is a sitting duck there for Indians. One can squeeze Pakjab over time, until Pakjab sees the merit of playing by India's rules.

Once cut off from the sea, India can encourage Pakistani Pushtuns to demand their own land - Pushtunistan if Pushtuns expect to provided with fuel etc, or if the plan to continue to live in Karachi.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 25 Sep 2011 12:07

brihaspati wrote:I thought, cutting the entry to the NA from the plains would be a necessary part of wresting NA. Pindi, Tarbela dam, Kahuta, and as much damage in the general area would be necessary. Some distant action to distract the PLA too? And creating the necessary excuses?

Guruji, trust you to always go for the jugular

I deliberately did not go into the brasstacks what is required to isolate the Northern Areas - one big element of which will to control and block the Karakoram Highway. This will isolate the Northern Areas and prevent any movement northwards. This, along with maximum pressure in plains and against "Azad Kashmir", should ensure that PA has no troops - and infra - left to move to Northern Areas.