US Policy on Jammu and Kashmir

[devesh]

there is no question of "going easy on PA" so that "US can put pressure on TSP/TSPA". any "proposal" which requires India to give increased legitimacy to Pak's Terrorist/State complex is a loose-loose for India. this is why bringing in Kashmir is a bad idea in the first place. we are unnecessarily capitulating before the conflict even begins. bringing in Kashmir legitimizes Pak propaganda on Kashmir. and secondly, it also gives the illusion of US doing "something for India" under the convenient explanation of "Pak backed down from Kashmir".

India's goal is not to get involved in long debates about Kashmir. Kashmir is a part and parcel of India. every part of it.

any "proposal" which distracts India from the goal of destroying Pakjab is loose-loose for India. our ultimate goal is to destroy Pak's power base and also to exterminate the mullah-mafia-Islamist networks from Pakjab plains. bringing in Kashmir into the US-Pak-India or US-Pak-India-PRC discussions distracts, or worse yet, undermines India's efforts in the former direction.

[shiv]

. this is why bringing in Kashmir is a bad idea in the first place. we are unnecessarily capitulating before the conflict even begins.

Well this is a BRF special because of the firm belief that Kashmir is about to be given away held by many in a "join the dots" conclusion starting from "not enough nationalism" - to "weak government" to "desire for friendship" to "give away Kashmir for lasting peace". In fact Pakistan's victory IMO has been to bring up Kashmir so often that self styled Indian patriots are now concerned about India "giving Kashmir away" or "losing it at the negotiating table" by Indians who are not perceived to have a certain degree of nationalism.

What is the proof that it will not happen? None whatsoever. So that is what is going to happen. One morning we will all wake up to find Kashmir with Pakistan and then we will rue the fact that we didn't see it coming till it happened. But er.. we are seeing it coming. Right on here. I would prepare for life after Kashmir.

Can anything be done about it? <insert favorite rant about bzz bzzzn bzz bzzz bzz bzzz bzzz bzzz bzzzz bzz bzzzz bzzzz bzzzz bzzzzz> It over and done with. Kashmir is going, if it hasn't been done while I was typing this out. Better get used to the idea.

[shivajisisodia]

^^^^^^^

Sonia Gandhi and the entire Gandhi family could not have found a better PR pitch than this anywhere in the world for any amount of money in the world.

[PrasadZ]

India US cooperation on Pakistan benefits both India and the US more than any of the other options. No matter what China or Pakistan do their own scores cannot be raised much by India US cooperation. But I still need to check for faults in this last statement, especially the fallout of China accommodating India which I have not thought about.

It is easy to game all this out. But does the US understand? And have Indians figured this out? I think India has figured it out, but I am less sure about the US.

This is a commonsensical view. Would it be right to add that american attention is not infinite either?
Indo-US co operation (and time/energy consuming negotiation) on India's western borders reduces american ability to co operate with India on SEA. By removing a competitor in SEA, this benefits China.
Indo-US co operation in SEA threatens China and causes it to increase its support to Pakistan, in a bid to draw attention away from its pond.

This view does not need China or US to have a final end game in mind on Kashmir. So, if we wish to draw attention away from there, we must do two things - reduce Kashmir's conflict potential and increase the potential for a three way attention grabber elsewhere.

[shiv]

India US cooperation on Pakistan benefits both India and the US more than any of the other options. No matter what China or Pakistan do their own scores cannot be raised much by India US cooperation. But I still need to check for faults in this last statement, especially the fallout of China accommodating India which I have not thought about.

It is easy to game all this out. But does the US understand? And have Indians figured this out? I think India has figured it out, but I am less sure about the US.

This is a commonsensical view. Would it be right to add that american attention is not infinite either?
Indo-US co operation (and time/energy consuming negotiation) on India's western borders reduces american ability to co operate with India on SEA. By removing a competitor in SEA, this benefits China.
Indo-US co operation in SEA threatens China and causes it to increase its support to Pakistan, in a bid to draw attention away from its pond.

This view does not need China or US to have a final end game in mind on Kashmir. So, if we wish to draw attention away from there, we must do two things - reduce Kashmir's conflict potential and increase the potential for a three way attention grabber elsewhere.

Sounds about right to me, but could you explain the part highlighted in red. Why do you say that?

[devesh]

there is no "Indo-US Cooperation on Sea". it doesn't exist. period. US will never "cooperate" in the rise of naval power of a country that can challenge it in the future. PRC for all its bluster faces a very potent Japanese Navy, and also the American PACCOM.

IOR also has heavy US presence, apart from India. PRC's reach into IOR is limited and US realizes this. the only competitor US can *possibly* have in IOR is India. as long as India remains locked in b/c of Pakjab, IOR is open for US.

PRC's reach into IOR is through a very small window which can easily be "blocked". in IOR, PLAN will always be a paper Tiger. there is no reason for US to "tango" with India in the IOR to "pacify" PRC. on the contrary, US has and will continue to meddle in Af-Pak to keep India off balance and make sure there can never be enough security for India to venture more strongly into the seas.

[PrasadZ]

Indo-US co operation (and time/energy consuming negotiation) on India's western borders reduces american ability to co operate with India on SEA.
Sounds about right to me, but could you explain the part highlighted in red. Why do you say that?

@shiv, I should rephrase it as "reduces american NEED to co operate with India on other fronts (incl SEA)".
American co operation on Kashmir will be at a price. Since the value to india of this co operation is high, america will need to exert itself less elsewhere.

@devesh, you are right when it comes to war, but even america needs allies to keep the peace, isnt it?
american navy cannot intercede on behalf of vietnam, philippines, taiwan, japan AND korea in the south china seas. it makes sense for them to get a few alliances doing the policing so they can concentrate their forces on the heavy lifting (if and when needed). australia, japan and now india are getting allied with various stake holders in here - its likely there is american backing to all of these.
presuming the above, can american backing on kashmir require a quid pro quo of india taking on some of the policing in SCS/ IOR ?

i think america has no end game in mind on kashmir - its support to either protagonist is relatively cheap to provide, so its support is likely available as a bargaining chip to both.

[A_Gupta]

But there is a reason for my talking about Aksai Chin. Aksai Chin has always been shown in Indian maps as Indian territory. But it was not shown in Indian maps prior to 1950. How it made its way in is mostly unknown and never discussed. But Aksai Chin has played a big role in our 1962 military defeat, the "hypersensitive Indian" and has been linked with our "love of our holy land".

One of the drawback of a democracy. It may be acceptable to yield on Aksai Chin to get an unequivocally favorable settlement in the North east, but if one reveals one's hand, one may have already missed that chance.

Further, all the facts you've pointed to show that China has as minimal a claim to Aksai Chin as India does.

[ShauryaT]

My point is that now the time has come for the US to show its hand in no uncertain terms. China is establishing a presence in POK and NA. This has gone beyond anything that could even theoretically be resolved bilaterally under the Simla Agreement. The US has gained absolutely nothing by dangling Cashmere as a "carrot" before the Pakis. It must now put up or shut up. If it wants a relationship with India to secure its geopolitical goals in South Asia or the Indian Ocean or the Pacific it cannot afford to show ambivalence on the J&K question any longer... far less continue to use it as a "balancer" to stroke Pakistani egos because it thinks "the Indians won't mind." It cannot pull this $hit year after year... insisting that its relationship between India and Pakistan is "not zero-sum" while repeatedly bringing up the one issue that makes it zero-sum in the modern world. It must support us in a matter of vital national interest if it wants any support from us in matters of its vital national interest... and it must do so now.

Why Ji? What has the US to do with PRC in NA and why does the US care about it at this stage? Has India asked the US not to enterntain the Generals - threatening consequences? Are we investing in a capability to disrupt US plans. Have we put our men and money on the line, to demand the US show its hand? What can India offer to even align with US Geopolitical goals?

The word is Geo --- means access to land/sea/air corridors. The other is political, meaning the ability of another power to align or be subservient - from a US perspective.

I am sorry. There is absoloutely no reason I see the US cannot continue to shed Indian blood as a consequence of its geopolitical actions in the region, driven from their geopolitical interests. What benefits are on offer that would otherwise not be, for the US to show its hand?

[Rudradev]

Rudra ji,

How many of the Pakhtun factions that are now deeply hateful of Pakistan, might instead have been turned into primary enemies of India (and co-opted as friends of Islamabad) had we actually gone into AfPak?

There is no way those Pashtuns who are anti-Pakistan could be simply redirected against us, because our stated position would be restoration of Afghanistan and lapse of the Durand Line, along with removal of malign Paki interference in Afghanistan. Today India may be seen by anti-Pak Pashtuns as well as struggling Baluchis as an unreliable partner who will not get its hands wet to help their cause. Meanwhile Pak continues to work hard shooting them down or radicalizing their poor kids. More direct involvement in Afghanistan could have developed much closer links with Pashtun factions. Right now India is seen as a friend of the NA, which many Pashtuns resent anyway. But by using interference in Afghanistan as leverage against Pakistan we could have done more.

Yes, Carl-ji, but there are a lot more Pashtuns who are anti-Pakistan now than there were in 2001 (when our military involvement in AfPak was first solicited by the US.) At that time, if India had been on the forefront of US' AfPak war, would as many of them have turned their ire on the Paki govt? Or would some (most?) of them have been successfully diverted by the TSPA/ISI to perceive India as the primary enemy?

There are a certain number of Pashtuns (and Baluchis) who were anti-Pak anyway. They are not a lost cause for India in spite of India's inaction in AfPak because they have always been primarily anti-Pakistan; at some point they can always be an asset for a more assertive India. However, there were a larger number of Pashtun (and Deobandi Pakjabi) groups who were fodder for ISI's Kashmir jihad in the 1990s, but since 2001, have come to perceive the TSPA/ISI's "betrayal" as greater haraam than anythng the Yindoos are doing in J&K... hence, they are now primarily anti-Pakistan. Had India been involved militarily in Af-Pak, this might not have been the case. In fact, it probably wouldn't have been the case.

By all accounts the US today is consciously ceding control of PoK and Afghanistan to increasing Chinese influence. We have not been able to create a situation where the US would be coaxed or coerced to engage us. We are not seen as a strong or even willing hand that would inspire others to ask for help, except in doing some building contractor work.

This is an interesting question. What did the Chinese do, exactly, to make the US cede control of Afghanistan and PoK to them? (I'm not sure about "ceding control", because that implies the US actually HAD substantial control over either Afghanistan OR POK to begin with... but nonetheless.) Anyway, how did the Chinese accomplish this? Their involvement in both Afghanistan and POK has been exactly that... doing building contractor work, laying highways, digging mines. It has been their involvement with Pakistan proper that has won them the key leverage in both theatres... they haven't sent troops to Afghanistan or got themselves involved in the AfPak war militarily.

I don't think it is correct to compare India as "not being seen as a strong or willing hand" because India did not send troops to support the US' effort in AfPak... as against China which certainly hasn't done that either, yet the "strength of its hand" is apparently not doubted.

The fact is, these same people who have been fighting the US "as if they had nothing to lose" from 2001-present in AfPak, were also coming into J&K and fighting India "as if they had nothing to lose" since the early 1990s. The fanaticism/mystical-motivation didn't enable them to change a thing about India's possession of J&K;

Even the demographics of J&K? Or the amount we spend? Or the radicalization and alienation of the valley?

Again, I think we're confusing many issues here.

The demographics of J&K changed most dramatically in the very early '90s with the Pandit exodus. At this point there had been minimal influx of foreign jihadis into the valley. ISI involvement was certainly there, but it was in terms of training, arming and financing Kashmiri muslim groups like the HM and JKLF.

The big influx of Afghan-war veterans and global jihadis only happened later, from around '93 onward. By this time there were relatively few Hindus left in the valley in any case. Whether or not this influx aided the "radicalization and alienation of the valley"... we must not lose sight of the fact that such radicalization and alienation as existed even in 1989-90, was enough to make the Pandits feel unsafe and abandon their homes and lives.

The fact is, it was not Af-Pak jihadis but Kashmiri Muslims (many of them Sufis) who organized the systematic pogroms and ethnic cleansing that drove Hindus out of the Kashmir valley. This is an inconvenient truth the "secularists" often choose to overlook. A minority community will not abandon everything they own and flee for their lives in huge numbers, even in the face of targeted terrorism from purely external/foreign sources, as long as they believe that their neighbours of the majority community will still stand by them and support their continued residence. This has played out in any number of situations in India involving sectarian terrorism or communal violence. To the Pandits it wasn't just the attacks coming from Pakistan trained terrorists, but the fact that their Muslim neighbours were just waiting to seize their property and hound them out in the wake of those attacks, which proved the last straw and convinced them that they had to leave any cost.

Hence, I disagree with the idea that India (by not going into AfPak militarily) contributed to the demographic change. The ethnic cleansing of Hindus from the KV was "homegrown" to a very large extent. Accordingly, India getting militarily involved in AfPak would not have changed or reversed this. It will not be easily reversible even if, tomorrow, Pakistan stops all support for J&K jihad in its tracks.

To the extent that AfPak jihadis started pouring into J&K over the 1993-200x period, this could actually have promoted an alienation of the secessionist Kashmiri Muslims away from *Pakistan*. After all, by the late '90s there were so few Hindus left that much of the terrorist violence by AfPak jihadis ended up killing Kashmiri Muslims. "Moderate" secessionist leaders who did not toe the ISI's line were not spared either.

So again, what would India have gained by fighting those guys in AfPak? We fought them in India and killed a large number of them on our own soil; meanwhile, the US and TSPA fought them in AfPak and a large part of their wrath was thus turned against the TSPA. Why mess with a good thing?

As for the "money spent"... I really can't imagine a situation where we would have spent less money and enjoyed more success by becoming militarily involved in AfPak, as opposed to the policy of focused counter-insurgency in Kashmir itself.

[shiv]

But there is a reason for my talking about Aksai Chin. Aksai Chin has always been shown in Indian maps as Indian territory. But it was not shown in Indian maps prior to 1950. How it made its way in is mostly unknown and never discussed. But Aksai Chin has played a big role in our 1962 military defeat, the "hypersensitive Indian" and has been linked with our "love of our holy land".

One of the drawback of a democracy. It may be acceptable to yield on Aksai Chin to get an unequivocally favorable settlement in the North east, but if one reveals one's hand, one may have already missed that chance.

Further, all the facts you've pointed to show that China has as minimal a claim to Aksai Chin as India does.

In fact after digging into all that detail, I believe it is beneficial to stay opposed to China and keep them on edge. Retain an ability to cut off China's route from Uighuristan to Tibet.

[ShauryaT]

The demographics of J&K changed most dramatically in the very early '90s with the Pandit exodus. At this point there had been minimal influx of foreign jihadis into the valley. ISI involvement was certainly there, but it was in terms of training, arming and financing Kashmiri muslim groups like the HM and JKLF.

RD: Do not think it was as much a demographic change for the Hindu/Sikh population of the valley was small and got decimated. What it did show was the gross incompetency and criminal negligence of the Indian state to protect its own people, in its own lands against machinations of a foreign power. It also showed the Hindu:Muslim divide was fresh as ever and showed that the Indian version of secularism had failed spectacularly. This horrific expulsion was second only to the horrors of the partition and in many ways many times more shameful.

[ramana]

Rd, i agree with ShauryaT. OTH, unkil will do more than needful to reassure PRC that Indian capabilities in what eve field that threaten them will be made less capable or less threatening to PRC.

For example there is lot of heat and dust about India in Cam Ranh Bay which is an euphemism for deterrent patrols in SCS area. So wouldnt put it past them to hinder them in some way or the other in the whole supply chain from processing all the way to the sea legs.

All other Indian capability is one level and this is another.

[Rudradev]

My point is that now the time has come for the US to show its hand in no uncertain terms. China is establishing a presence in POK and NA. This has gone beyond anything that could even theoretically be resolved bilaterally under the Simla Agreement. The US has gained absolutely nothing by dangling Cashmere as a "carrot" before the Pakis. It must now put up or shut up. If it wants a relationship with India to secure its geopolitical goals in South Asia or the Indian Ocean or the Pacific it cannot afford to show ambivalence on the J&K question any longer... far less continue to use it as a "balancer" to stroke Pakistani egos because it thinks "the Indians won't mind." It cannot pull this $hit year after year... insisting that its relationship between India and Pakistan is "not zero-sum" while repeatedly bringing up the one issue that makes it zero-sum in the modern world. It must support us in a matter of vital national interest if it wants any support from us in matters of its vital national interest... and it must do so now.

Why Ji?

Let me explain ji.

There seems to be a view among some on the forum that the US never really needed India for any sort of strategic partnership, and never saw India of being either capable or willing to be a reliable strategic partner. I believe this view is dead wrong.

Cases in point:

1) October 2001, Dennis Blair asked the ABV govt. to send troops to Afghanistan. This has been recently revealed. But the fact is, trial balloons kept being raised and we even had a thread on BRF about the possibility that 100,000 Indian troops would go to Afghanistan.

Ultimately this didn't happen. ABV gave the reason that the mission was not under a UN mandate.

2) 2002-2003. No firm report to hand, but the US was at this time asking every country from Palau to Norway for troops to send against Iraq. We can be 400% sure Delhi was asked, and 400% sure that Delhi refused.

3) Efforts over the last 5-6 years by the US, to get India to sign EULA/CISMOA have been rejected by India. From the Indian POV, this is because we want to retain our freedom of action and not have future US sanctions possibly crippling our military options. From the US POV, this is because India does not trust the US (in spite of US offers of sophisticated military equipment and greater engagement with US military alliances). Both are correct (I will explain why later.)

4) The IUCNCA was heralded as a "breakthrough, landmark deal" for India-US cooperation in civil nuclear energy. US apparently pulled strings to get India an NSG waiver. In exchange, US expected India to open its markets for US nuclear energy firms. However, we stuck to our guns on nuclear liability. End result, Russia and France are benefiting from the post-IUCNCA regime while US hasn't got anything out of it.

Again, the US sees this as evidence that India doesn't trust them, and cannot be relied on. Of course they are right (and we are right not to trust them.) But that, once again, comes to the point that I will explain later.

5) Reportedly, India was being coaxed by the US to join a formalized defense alliance between the US, Japan and Australia to confront China's maritime expansionism over the last two years. It seems that AK Anthony, once again, demurred. This again is related to all sorts of EULA/CISMOA stuff that we would have to sign, as well as commitments we would have to make, in order to join the alliance formally.

6) The US, stupidly, offered old wine in new bottles (F-16, F/A-18E) to India under our MMRCA RFP. India could have quietly pushed back behind the scenes and told the US... look, JSF is the minimum we need from you guys to seriously consider your offer. But India did not do that; India simply rejected the two American fighters in full public view. MMRCA would have been a "gift that keeps on giving"... TOT, future upgrades, and an entire development path for the IAF built around the aircraft we chose. Instead of that the US got C-17 and C-130J deals as a one-time consolation prize.

Yet again there were good reasons for India to rebuff the F-16s and Hornets for MMRCA. In and of themselves, very good reasons.

But looked at AS A WHOLE, the entire history of India-US relations since 2001 keeps reverting to a central theme... which is also the "point" that I have been promising to explain!

That point is that a substantial trust deficit exists between the US and India. Because of this trust deficit, India has not been comfortable going the extra mile to accommodate the US... on not one, but many US overtures over the last decade.

Yet the US keeps making the overtures. It is clear that they want (if not exactly "need") our cooperation, our allegiance, our support on many issues. There are many ways in which we could make life easier for them, if we were only ready to entertain their overtures. And in fact, the opportunities for India to make life easier for the US are increasing with every year.

What is this trust deficit? Frankly, it has historically revolved around three things:

(a) India's nuclear status, which was seen by New Delhi as a necessary hedge against China. India always saw the US' non-proliferation b@lltalks as essentially coming from an ultimately pro-China angle. This one thing the US has taken some pains to address... first by progressively dropping Indian entities from the post-Pokhran sanctions list; and second, by offering the IUCNCA.

(b) The US' turning a blind eye to aggression/terrorism against India from Pakistan, as well as China-Pakistan proliferation that enables Pakistan to back up its terrorism with nuclear blackmail. This has been a thornier situation with the US' "alliance" with TSPA/ISI in its war on terror, which has included huge financial and military aid from Washington to Islamabad. Yet, that situation too has slowly and inexorably set the US and Pakistan on a collision course. Today the US hardly pretends to ignore Pakistan's support of terrorists, or its involvement in nuclear proliferation, any longer. Various events, including the Headley Trial, Bin Laden Raid, Mullen Testimony etc. are evidence that the "blind" eye is slowly beginning to see everything.

(c) The last issue, which is also the most intractable, is J&K. This is the one issue where the US has done *NOTHING* to ensure India that it sees things India's way. It is the one issue which the US continues to wield as a potential diplomatic and political weapon against India. Even if Washington is currently not giving India much grief over Kashmir... they retain the "capability" even while they are not showing the "intent", by maintaining an ambivalent political and diplomatic stance on the J&K issue.

Washington has climbed down on the nuclear impasse; and with the events in AfPak, Washington has been forced to see Pakistani terrorism as a fact of life. On these two components of the trust deficit, the US is visibly coming around to a view of national interest that is consonant with India. But on Kashmir, the US remains ambivalent.

As long as this third issue, Kashmir, is not addressed by the US in a manner that is expressly and completely supportive of India's territorial integrity and sovereignty... the trust deficit will not close. THAT is my point.

What has the US to do with PRC in NA and why does the US care about it at this stage? Has India asked the US not to enterntain the Generals - threatening consequences? Are we investing in a capability to disrupt US plans. Have we put our men and money on the line, to demand the US show its hand? What can India offer to even align with US Geopolitical goals?

Many questions here, will answer one at a time.

What has the US to do with PRC in NA and why does the US care about it at this stage?

The US has EVERYTHING to be concerned about with PRC in NA. If you study the origins of the Kashmir dispute, it was about who would control a piece of territory with paramount strategic importance that affords subcontinental access to Central Asia. The US and UK wanted Pakistan, not India, to have it.

This was based on a US/UK calculation that Pakistan was and forever would be a reliable "subsidiary ally" and client state. Pakistan having J&K's access to Central Asia == US/UK having proxy access to Central Asia from the Indian Ocean.

In the Cold War context PRC-Pakistan relations were not a problem, nor was the 1963 ceding of territory in the NA by Pakistan to China. After all everybody was against the Soviets. US-UK could continue their policy of tacitly supporting secession of J&K away from India (and possibly accession of J&K to Pakistan.)

Today everything is different. Over the last 10 years Pakistan has shown itself to be the furthest thing from a "reliable ally" for the US. To make matters worse it has allowed PRC... the number one strategic competitor of the US... access into POK/NA.

Geopolitically this is an absolute disaster for the US (already stymied by relying so heavily on Pakistan for access to Afghanistan.) A Pak-Iran-China-Turkey alliance dominating Afghanistan AND J&K effectively shuts the US out of the Central Asian Heartland.

Losing POK/NA to China is a huge blow to the US' geopolitical interest. India is the one power that can prevent this from happening. But for this we need the full and unconditional support of the US for our position on J&K.

Has India asked the US not to enterntain the Generals - threatening consequences?

You want to go all the way to "danda" ...when saam and daam are not fully exploitable as a result of the trust deficit between India and the United States!!

We should ask, what will the US lose if it unconditionally recognizes Indian sovereignty over the whole of J&K?

Mainly it will lose a critical point of leverage... a "dangling carrot"... with the TSPA. The TSPA is obsessed with J&K. To some extent, a vague promise that the US will "help Pakistan get J&K" has always been a motivating factor in everything that the TSPA Generals have done to support the US.

But the weight of this "promise" as a motivating factor for the TSPA to do US' bidding, is something that comes increasingly into question with each successive wave of events in AfPak. The TSPA collaborates more and more openly and defiantly with the anti-US forces in AfPak, cedes more and more geopolitical space to PRC in the region with every passing month. This correlates with a "trust deficit" that is growing wider and wider, between the US and Pakistan. From the Pakistan POV this "trust deficit" has exactly ONE cornerstone... will the USA help Pakistan get Kashmir or not?

To all available evidence, it seems that the Pakistani Generals have given up on the US having either the will or the ability to secure Kashmir for them. Ambivalence on Kashmir is the US' primary leverage over TSPA... but TSPA itself is proving to be a very rapidly diminishing source of returns. The logical conclusion is that sooner or later, US will find the TSPA 100% unreliable and untrustworthy, as well as hostile.

In that situation, the Kashmir dangling-carrot has exactly zero value for the US in terms of being able to manipulate TSPA.

In the meantime, as we have established, US ambivalence on Kashmir is the one remaining cornerstone of the trust deficit between the US and India!

So sooner rather than later... it makes sense for the US to cut its losses with TSPA, and correct an important factor in the failure of its overtures to India. i.e. to openly state that it fully supports the Indian stand on J&K.

Are we investing in a capability to disrupt US plans.

Again, why go straight to "danda"? Pakistan is disrupting US plans. China is taking advantage of the situation, positioning itself to edge the US out of Central Asia in the long term. As against this, India has stayed its hand in terms of coming forward to help the US.

Why does India need to further disrupt US plans? Their plans will go for a toss anyway, thanks to China and Pakistan...unless India steps in to help improve their situation. India will not step in (as we have seen) because of an existing trust deficit. The US can only make that trust deficit go away by fully supporting India's position on J&K.

Have we put our men and money on the line, to demand the US show its hand?

Boss, as a business person do you put your money down first without a signed contract in hand? Are you saying we should first send troops to Af-Pak/ join the Australia-Japan-US naval alliance and THEN trust the US to keep its word on J&K?

What can India offer to even align with US Geopolitical goals?

Go back to the beginning of my post for this. The US knows what we have to offer and have asked us for it, with repeated overtures on multiple occasions. We have never taken up the overture because they have to first recognize our national imperatives of territorial integrity, and support it without condition. Otherwise, why would we trust them?

[ShauryaT]

Further, all the facts you've pointed to show that China has as minimal a claim to Aksai Chin as India does.

Why just Aksai Chin, one can easily stretch this argument to China's claims on Tibet (inner and outer), Xinjiang, Mongolia and other areas. The issue of Chinese "sovereignty" on these lands is a mix of the machinations of European powers in the region, the transposition of Westphalian constructs over Asia, the old systems of Chinese suzerainty on these kingdoms and power exercised through the barrel of the gun.

The question to ask is, Why should the Chinese accept the Macmahon line as the line between India and China - a line drawn post British conquest of Tibet in 1904? India has claimed inheritance from the British empire for its borders. China rejects that premise and specifically rejects the borders as laid down by the British. They claim the entire plateau as sovereign Chinese territory. The art of taking the constructs of civilization and transposing them on to modern nation states for maximum benefit is something, we should learn from the Chinese.

[PrasadZ]

The US knows what we have to offer and have asked us for it, with repeated overtures on multiple occasions. We have never taken up the overture because they have to first recognize our national imperatives of territorial integrity, and support it without condition. Otherwise, why would we trust them?

I think you suggest we can offer
- alliance so US retains operational flexibility in south asia- central asia
- market access (nuclear power, fighter jets as you mention, maybe also access to india's banking industry and retail markets)
- anti china hedge

In typical negotiations, might we set a different price for each? The situation may not be as simple as "recognise Kashmir as Indian" and we offer alliance+market access+anti china hedge. I think lengthy negotiations may hint at some of these complexities.

[Rudradev]

Rd, i agree with ShauryaT. OTH, unkil will do more than needful to reassure PRC that Indian capabilities in what eve field that threaten them will be made less capable or less threatening to PRC.

Ramana,

What is the quid pro quo that US will ask from PRC, in exchange for US restricting India's capabilities/naval presence in SCS ?

Does the US think that in exchange, PRC will use its leverage with Islamabad to force TSPA/ISI into going along with US goals in Af Pak? Would PRC be willing/able to convince TSPA/ISI to conduct ops in N Waziristan against the Hackanys, for example?

[Rudradev]

The US knows what we have to offer and have asked us for it, with repeated overtures on multiple occasions. We have never taken up the overture because they have to first recognize our national imperatives of territorial integrity, and support it without condition. Otherwise, why would we trust them?

I think you suggest we can offer
- alliance so US retains operational flexibility in south asia- central asia
- market access (nuclear power, fighter jets as you mention, maybe also access to india's banking industry and retail markets)
- anti china hedge

In typical negotiations, might we set a different price for each? The situation may not be as simple as "recognise Kashmir as Indian" and we offer alliance+market access+anti china hedge. I think lengthy negotiations may hint at some of these complexities.

Of course, a different price for each!

US recognizing Kashmir as Indian doesn't get them everything. It is, simply, an absolutely necessary starting point for us to even bring that other stuff to the table. Without that the trust deficit will persist... and no business of any meaningful importance can be conducted.

[ramana]

The US already made a choice in 1971. It was PRC. All this is shadow boxing to psyche Indians.

There is no sale, only advertisement.

RD, Just saw your questions. US will aks PRC to keep the economic tango in place.
No PRC wont do any such thing and US will be fine with that. There is no dialog between them about India nor will there be. The 1971 overture was the culmination of US policies towards China since 1980s. They wont let go of such extended efforts.

[Rudradev]

The US already made a choice in 1971. It was PRC. All this is shadow boxing to psyche Indians.

There is no sale, only advertisement.

RD, Just saw your questions. US will aks PRC to keep the economic tango in place.
No PRC wont do any such thing and US will be fine with that. There is no dialog between them about India nor will there be. The 1971 overture was the culmination of US policies towards China since 1980s. They wont let go of such extended efforts.

Ramana, you are very correct in alluding to the 1971 choice, and the program in effect since the previous century.

Powerful factions of the Hamiltonians as well as Wilsonians are still very much on board with that program; I had alluded to it years before in a post comparing US-PRC relationship to the Zargasso Treaty, of Spanish-Portuguese co-dominum over the world with the Catholic Church as witness.

Still, there is the potential for change. The US is currently poised for perhaps its most major internal upheaval since 1929-39. It will not lose its primacy (as the Pakis have gambled) but the system which brought the Hamiltonians and Wilsonians into positions of supremacy in determining economic and foreign policy is vulnerable as it has never been. We cannot say what will take the place of the old order, yet.

Add to this the fact that *everything* about the US' current predicament in AfPak, and Asia in general, goes back to that choice they made in 1971.

Today the US can't compel the Pakis beyond a point, because the Pakis have nukes. US deliberately allowed China to proliferate the nukes to Pakistan. Reason: ultimately, 1971.

Today the Pakis are a jihadi ulcer for the US. Jihadis came into being as a result of US plans to stymie the Soviets in Afghanistan, and were maintained in accordance with Pakistani/Chinese plans to bleed India. Reason: ultimately, 1971.

Today the GOTUS is on the verge of default and the biggest holder of its debt, as well as the biggest hijacker of employment opportunities that are now closed to the US working and middle classes, is PRC. Reason: ultimately, 1971.

Even the expansion of China into the SCS is not strictly as per the "Zargasso Treaty". US was prepared to give PRC dominion over "Asia"... but it drew the line at the edge of the Western Pacific, maintaining Taiwan as an aircraft carrier for insurance. PRC is now probing how much further East it can go.

Some day, some people in Washington are going to start asking whether 1971 was worth it. If the upheaval ends up with the present political system more or less as it is, they may be told to shut up and/or ignored. If not... well, India must be ready in a more sensible way than the Pakis are.

[shiv]

Further, all the facts you've pointed to show that China has as minimal a claim to Aksai Chin as India does.

Why just Aksai Chin, one can easily stretch this argument to China's claims on Tibet (inner and outer), Xinjiang, Mongolia and other areas. The issue of Chinese "sovereignty" on these lands is a mix of the machinations of European powers in the region, the transposition of Westphalian constructs over Asia, the old systems of Chinese suzerainty on these kingdoms and power exercised through the barrel of the gun.

The question to ask is, Why should the Chinese accept the Macmahon line as the line between India and China - a line drawn post British conquest of Tibet in 1904? India has claimed inheritance from the British empire for its borders. China rejects that premise and specifically rejects the borders as laid down by the British. They claim the entire plateau as sovereign Chinese territory. The art of taking the constructs of civilization and transposing them on to modern nation states for maximum benefit is something, we should learn from the Chinese.

Shaurya my personal belief is that we do not recognise Chinese legitimacy over Tibet in addition to its claim on Aksai Chin and ready ourselves to keep the dispute running. This is a tit for tat in response to China using Pakistan, and as the Pakistan problem morphs there is no need IMO to be conciliatory in any way towards China.

[ShauryaT]

RD: I will stick to your main points and thanks for taking the effort to explain the context in detail, I could go into the details as there are some points there on which I do have some different views but then we will be all lost.

>>There seems to be a view among some on the forum that the US never really needed India for any sort of strategic partnership, and never saw India of being either capable or willing to be a reliable strategic partner. I believe this view is dead wrong.

Speaking for myself, IMO US wants India to be a larger partner, however, Indian ability to deliver, both in terms of capabilities and political will is lacking. However, this does not mean, they want to suppress TSP or PRC, they see us as a potential hedge and hence do not mind working with us, if interests converge.

>>As long as this third issue, Kashmir, is not addressed by the US in a manner that is expressly and completely supportive of India's territorial integrity and sovereignty... the trust deficit will not close. THAT is my point.

Trust in international relations is borne from common interests and common values, along with a history of being able to work with each other. Trust is a result of a shared journey. When we have not eaten lunch together or shed blood together, where is the question of trust at all. They went on a journey with TSP, they are learning lessons from the journey. Lessons, I believe will bring India and the US closer and create new opportunities, provided India can deliver.

>>We should ask, what will the US lose if it unconditionally recognizes Indian sovereignty over the whole of J&K?

As of today the risks to American interests, do not justify such a venture. Their life lines in Afghanistan depend on access to TSP and with the 9/11 venture, no American President will have the option to leave this region alone for a very long time to come. IOW: Their presence in the region is assured for our life times, unless an alternative route is found or other geopolitical realities are formed.

>>Are you saying we should first send troops to Af-Pak/ join the Australia-Japan-US naval alliance and THEN trust the US to keep its word on J&K?

No, nothing of the sort. I am saying, what blood and monies are we putting on the line to reclaim our sovereign territory of PoK and NA?

>>The US knows what we have to offer and have asked us for it, with repeated overtures on multiple occasions. We have never taken up the overture because they have to first recognize our national imperatives of territorial integrity, and support it without condition. Otherwise, why would we trust them?

When we become serious about this national imperative is the day the US will reconsider its options, not a day before.

[ShauryaT]

Shaurya my personal belief is that we do not recognise Chinese legitimacy over Tibet in addition to its claim on Aksai Chin and ready ourselves to keep the dispute running. This is a tit for tat in response to China using Pakistan, and as the Pakistan problem morphs there is no need IMO to be conciliatory in any way towards China.

Do not disagree, but it does mean, our 2% on defense will not suffice. One has to prepare for such a move. The way to settle this issue with the Chinese has to be on the basis of comprehensive national strength and resolve on the matter and not legalese.

[ramana]

Shaurya, We need to recognize when the argument is on our side. Shiv is saying what we all want to be said "no need to be conciliatory to PRC" and the corollary "no need to be conciliatory to US wishes"

[Sanku]

I think you suggest we can offer
- alliance so US retains operational flexibility in south asia- central asia
- market access (nuclear power, fighter jets as you mention, maybe also access to india's banking industry and retail markets)
- anti china hedge

In typical negotiations, might we set a different price for each? The situation may not be as simple as "recognise Kashmir as Indian" and we offer alliance+market access+anti china hedge. I think lengthy negotiations may hint at some of these complexities.

My humble take, there is no reason for India to offer something positive in return for US agreeing to be less negative.

That is black mail.

We can offer something +ve ONLY after US offers something +ve.

That in turn can happen ONLY after US stops UNILATERALLY -- ALL the negatives it offers India.

Till then we should say that US should be happy -- India has been remarkably neutral and has not offered NEGATIVE for US's NEGATIVE.

The blow backs for US are all of its own making -- not Indian doing.

[vishvak]

Till then we US should be happy -- India has been remarkably neutral and has not offered NEGATIVE for US's NEGATIVE.

The blow backs for US are all of its own making -- not Indian doing.

The entire Kashmir issue should be thrown out of UN and the J&K should be united with India completely. Unless this happens, Europe won't know what hit it if Egypt &/or Turkey become another Afghanistan and Indians will be dismayed on what is takes for this to sink in.

[Rudradev]

Speaking for myself, IMO US wants India to be a larger partner, however, Indian ability to deliver, both in terms of capabilities and political will is lacking. However, this does not mean, they want to suppress TSP or PRC, they see us as a potential hedge and hence do not mind working with us, if interests converge.

Shaurya, appreciate the response.

I agree that US wants India to be a larger partner. In terms of Indian ability to deliver: depending on the task, capabilities can be secured if political will is there. So the key is political will.

But India's political will to deliver anything to the US, depends on US overcoming the trust deficit with India, of which US policy on J&K is a critical part.

I also agree that working with India doesn't necessarily mean the US wants to suppress PRC or TSP. Yet, there is something to consider: interests invariably converge around the actions of the party that is actively involved in seeking its political goals. Right now India is peacefully sitting on its hands; but US is actively pursuing its geopolitical goals in AfPak, NE Asia and to a lesser extent SE Asia. The events that have accrued in response to the US' activities, especially in AfPak, have set TSP (and potentially PRC) towards an adversarial course w.r.t. the US. Barring any major diplomatic coups by the US, this trend will continue.

IF this leads to a situation where the TSP and/or PRC are in a state of conflict with the US, the main imperative of the US will be to suppress them, and it is in this light that the US will seek to activate a partnership with India.

>>As long as this third issue, Kashmir, is not addressed by the US in a manner that is expressly and completely supportive of India's territorial integrity and sovereignty... the trust deficit will not close. THAT is my point.

Trust in international relations is borne from common interests and common values, along with a history of being able to work with each other. Trust is a result of a shared journey. When we have not eaten lunch together or shed blood together, where is the question of trust at all. They went on a journey with TSP, they are learning lessons from the journey. Lessons, I believe will bring India and the US closer and create new opportunities, provided India can deliver.

That's the whole thing. Will I sit down to lunch with somebody (let alone shed blood together with him), if he has a history of saying that my wife is not legitimately married to me... that she might in fact be married to my neighbour? What if he is still quietly saying these things today, or nodding and winking at others who say them? Can I trust this person enough to go on a journey with him? I don't think so, unless he publicly comes clean on his position regarding my marriage!

Again, I'm not sure about India's capability to deliver being an issue here. If you look at any of the US' trusted allies: UK, Israel, Australia, Japan: their military capability is the direct result of massive military and financial aid from the United States. NATO nations were direct beneficiaries of the Marshall Plan. If the US provides India with that level of access to military tech, on those kinds of terms... then capability can be acquired very quickly.

That really depends on whether India is willing to trust the US to be the sole under-writer of its military capabilities, as UK/Israel/Australia/Japan have. Right now we are not, for reasons I have discussed.

I don't want to go into an argument (on this thread) about whether this is a right or wrong approach for India to take in the long run. Under the present circumstances, being independent and self-sufficient in our development of military capabilities is the only sensible approach... let's leave it at that.

>>We should ask, what will the US lose if it unconditionally recognizes Indian sovereignty over the whole of J&K?

As of today the risks to American interests, do not justify such a venture. Their life lines in Afghanistan depend on access to TSP and with the 9/11 venture, no American President will have the option to leave this region alone for a very long time to come. IOW: Their presence in the region is assured for our life times, unless an alternative route is found or other geopolitical realities are formed.

As of today, you are undoubtedly correct. However, given today's geopolitical equations, US relies heavily on TSP to secure their interests in this region. In return, what does the TSPA get?

1) Money (2) Military Aid (3) Vague promise of US delivering "Kashmir"

Even the money and military aid, after TSPA/ISI and political bosses eat their fill, is directed by Pakistan towards that ultimate goal of "getting Kashmir."

Yet the fact remains. No amount of money and military aid from the US, is going to empower Pakistan to take Kashmir away from India, by either conventional or sub-conventional military means.

Nothing the US can do for Pakistan can possibly "get" Kashmir for Pakistan. Short of USA teaming up with China and Pakistan to impose a massive conventional (and potentially nuclear) war on India, Pakistan is not going to get Kashmir... and even then it will be dauntingly expensive for the US and PRC. That isn't a realistic proposition IMO.

For a variety of reasons AfPak has set TSP and US interests on a collision course. Many attempts to swerve away from open conflict will be made by both sides. But ultimately one thing is for sure; the US will not achieve its goals in AfPak unless it either destroys TSP or wins the complete cooperation of TSP. And, the US cannot win the complete cooperation of TSP when it cannot deliver Kashmir (or the guaranteed means to grab Kashmir) to TSP. Everybody already knows that today.

The net result of this is that TSP support to US' goals is bound to be two-faced, because TSP knows America cannot secure Kashmir for it. TSP will at best take money and arms from the US, and still continue to play its other games (even games that are directly at odds with US interests) for as long as possible.

IOW: the "promise of Kashmir" to TSP by the United States, carries little (if any) weight as a point of leverage today. It does not help the US to hold out this promise (which TSP knows America can't/won't keep) in exchange for TSP "cooperation." Other incentives provided by the US... arms, money... are being swallowed by TSP without adequate cooperation in exchange.

In this case the value of "Kashmir" to the US is only to the extent that supporting India's stand on J&K can be used to secure Indian cooperation. We may not have reached that point today but it will invariably come to that. The sooner the US realizes this, the sooner India will find the political will to be a more actively contributing partner to the US' efforts in the region (which, as you say, are assured to last at least through our lifetimes.)

>>Are you saying we should first send troops to Af-Pak/ join the Australia-Japan-US naval alliance and THEN trust the US to keep its word on J&K?

No, nothing of the sort. I am saying, what blood and monies are we putting on the line to reclaim our sovereign territory of PoK and NA?

None beyond what is needed to defend the territory we currently hold. The main reason: at present there is no alternative.

Assume we spent the resources on building up the capability to fight a two-front offensive war against PRC and TSP (that is what it will require at this stage.) Assume we had 100% political will and launched a military campaign to take back POK and NA. Assume that we somehow managed to succeed in taking the territory with minimal losses, in a short period of time and yet managed to prevent the war from escalating to nuclear conflict. What then?

Would we be able to hold what we took back from PRC and TSP? At what cost? Not just financial and military, but diplomatic cost as well.

India would be in violation of UNMOGIP-mandated cease fire lines. A border issue that has practically been discarded by the UNSC as irrelevant, would be in the full glare of the spotlight once again, this time with India as the "aggressor". China would demand UNSC-mandated military action to take back the territory and restore status-quo ante bellum. China and its allies would call for economic sanctions against India as well. Additionally, PRC would use all its economic muscle to pressure other nations into condemning, sanctioning and diplomatically isolating India. All these things would bring immense pressure on India to withdraw. Apart from China, many Islamic countries (KSA, Turkey, Jordan, possibly UAE, possibly Iran) will be on board with the PRC agenda.

Will anyone veto such measures on India's behalf, and/or run the blockade of sanctions placed on India? Will our old friends the Rooskies help us, and if so, how much clout could they bring to bear?

Forget the small things (such as our attack interrupting the civil jihad of disintegration in TSP.) How would we manage the big things? Who in the UN Security Council would speak up on our behalf and settle the issue at post-bellum disposition? At the end of the day there has to be strong diplomatic backing for India, to legitimize the borders as we have redrawn them by force, no?

This is where US' diplomatic policy stance on J&K comes in. If the US states that J&K is an integral part of India, that the Instrument of Accession is sound beyond contest, that India has a right to ALL of J&K as its sovereign territory... then we have a chance of holding on to it. If the US vetoes all Chinese calls for sanctions/UNSC military action against India... and rallies its allies to defy any PRC-sponsored calls for a sanctions regime against India... then China may have to fold.

Over and above this, if the US armed India to the teeth ahead of the conflict... it would perhaps be an easier conflict for us to win. But at the very least, I think, their unstinting diplomatic support would be necessary if we really plan to take back NA and POK. I don't think Russia, or the UK or EU would stick their neck out for us against PRC's economic muscle. Only the US could pull that off for us, in today's world.

I might be missing something, and therefore I might be wrong. If there is some other scenario whereby India could retake and keep POK/NA without US support (diplomatic if not military), please suggest it.

>>The US knows what we have to offer and have asked us for it, with repeated overtures on multiple occasions. We have never taken up the overture because they have to first recognize our national imperatives of territorial integrity, and support it without condition. Otherwise, why would we trust them?

When we become serious about this national imperative is the day the US will reconsider its options, not a day before.

What do you mean by "serious" in real terms?

[Sanku]

When we become serious about this national imperative is the day the US will reconsider its options, not a day before.

What do you mean by "serious" in real terms?

I agree, US is likely to "toe our line" when it becomes clear that we have all the prerequisites (military, political) to make such a move, and possibly hang on against post war international pressure.

US has never helped any other country reach its national goals EVER, it is a singularly selfish country, its help even when for US self interest, is hardly quid pro quo, its support always comes with unacceptable costs.

The only way of dealing with US and getting "more" in the bargain is the Pakistan way (which is to be such habitual total and completely unethical and liar that the person themselves lying don't know the truth any more)

We should NOT make any plans around US support adding anything +ve to our plans especially long term. Short term +ve/+ve transactions is the best we can hope for; for a long long time to come.

Right now lets get over neutral/-ve interaction with them.

=======================

IMVHO "lets use US as a +ve factor while planning" will come ONLY after US is relegated to 2nd/3rd rung power. 100 years or so.

[shiv]

Shaurya my personal belief is that we do not recognise Chinese legitimacy over Tibet in addition to its claim on Aksai Chin and ready ourselves to keep the dispute running. This is a tit for tat in response to China using Pakistan, and as the Pakistan problem morphs there is no need IMO to be conciliatory in any way towards China.

Do not disagree, but it does mean, our 2% on defense will not suffice. One has to prepare for such a move. The way to settle this issue with the Chinese has to be on the basis of comprehensive national strength and resolve on the matter and not legalese.

Shaurya you know the act of "not being conciliatory" or being "recalcitrant", "showing defiance" etc stem from two basic factors
1. Real strength
2. Chutzpah

Those who have real strength need not be defiant or aggressive, but those who are aggressive need not have real strength either. Chutzpah is enough. Pakistan is good at that . Although I would classify Pakistan as showing chooth-zpah

The problem about "hesitation" and "diffidence" in showing defiance and lack of conciliation is that it sends all the wrong signals. A nation that is defiant makes the other one sit and think whether the defiance comes from empty chutzpah or national strength. So when it is necessary to be defiant, that defiance should be shown anyway without worrying about national strength. If the Chinese got the signal that we were willing to nuke and get nuked back, they would not send their bean counters to check whether we are spending 2% or 1% or 10%. That chutzpah is what is needed. Not a demonstration of anxieties.

[Agnimitra]

Geopolitically this is an absolute disaster for the US (already stymied by relying so heavily on Pakistan for access to Afghanistan.) A Pak-Iran-China-Turkey alliance dominating Afghanistan AND J&K effectively shuts the US out of the Central Asian Heartland.

Rudra ji, I appreciate your points. But the US has many other levers to consider in diluting a China-Pak-Iran-Turkey "alliance". For one, Iran is unlikely to play second fiddle to Turkey's leadership pretensions in the Middle-East, and vice versa. Iran would be effectively bracketed and its strategic ambitions contained within such an "alliance". Moreover, in spite of Chinese annexations of territory from Kyrghyzstan, Kasakhstan and of course the Uighur issue, Turkey still has decent relations with PRC, which suggests that the US has again winked at China increasing its footprint in post-Soviet Asia. Turkey-Pakistan relations as better than Pak-Iran or Iran-Turkey relations also. Lastly, US influence with Saudi and Turkey is not small.

What I was saying earlier was that India's perceived unwillingness to get its hands wet is shown even by the flight of Pundits from Indian-controlled J&K - what to speak of Pashtuns and poor Baluchis. So again, India needs to prove that it has the appetite to project its power not just in J&K but further afield in our short north, west and east. If you're saying that this is beginning to happen, then I agree that it is likely that some in the US establishment may be likely to re-assess the calculations, weights and measures that have determined their China policy (and Pakistan policy) for all these decades. Strategic calculations are influenced by the weights and measures on the table. India needs to throw its 'weight' around a little first rather than depend purely on the configuration of other weights.

[ShauryaT]

What do you mean by "serious" in real terms?

Taking back PoK and NA is no mean feat, as we all know, there are military, political, economic strengths needed to undertake such a venture.

Being serious, would be reflected in the money we spend on our defense, needs to be at 3% levels for upwards of a decade and corresponding changes in policy, doctrine and force structure and levels. It will be reflected in our actions and the type of investments we make in Afghanistan - with a pronounced military stand (The agreement signed today, should have been done 10 years back, but it is a start, we shall see what happens on the ground in Afghanistan for every agreement between the US and TSP has a clause in it - India shall not be involved in Afghanistan). It means making investments to destabilize TSP in their backyard with the help of Pashtuns. It means we take opportunities towards salami slicing into NA, such as during Kargil. It means raising at least additional 10 mountain divisions and build capabilities, so that when opportunities present themselves, they can be used. It means investing in light artillery, light tanks and other lift assets and obscene fire power ratios (which will work as I do not believe the stakes for India and TSP for NA/PoK are asymmetric, like between Vietnam and the US)

It means, roping in a country like Iran and bringing Iran under our strategic ambit for mutual resources and security guarantees and routes into Afghanistan and CA. It also means we declare not once in 20 years, but every 3 months, that the entire J&K is sovereign Indian territory and open "discussions" with TSP for its return.
It means telling the world, that India is clear on getting this territory back and will not stop at anything. It means providing active support to the dissident groups inside NA (there are four prominent ones, do not remember names now). It means, tightening our diplomatic and economic noose around TSP. Execute upon the military and covert response options that are available today to respond to TSP's sub conventional threat. It means, solving the Kashmir issue through a demographic change in the composition of the valley.

My read on most of the above, is either we are not there, unlikely to get there or have not exercised even those which are feasible today. When we see these aspects changing, we shall become "serious" about this national imperative to reclaim this sovereign territory.

Mao told Kissinger, in the 70's that that they could wait for 100 years for reunification with Taiwan. After the Taiwan straits crisis in 1996, Kissinger asked Jiang Zemin, if they stand by that statement, Jiang said no, for only 77 years are now left. These are not empty statements. This resolve shows through in all diplomatic and geopolitical actions of China and its message to one and all is clear and unambiguous and backed with action. The One China message is the result of this resolve. This resolve is something, I have not detected in India's handling of PoK and NA.

I kid you not, I did not "know" till I left my country that part of J&K are occupied, call me ignorant but I meet many such ignorant Indians.

[svinayak]

Mao told Kissinger, in the 70's that that they could wait for 100 years for reunification with Taiwan. After the Taiwan straits crisis in 1996, Kissinger asked Jiang Zemin, if they stand by that statement, Jiang said no, for only 77 years are now left. These are not empty statements. This resolve shows through in all diplomatic and geopolitical actions of China and its message to one and all is clear and unambiguous and backed with action. The One China message is the result of this resolve. This resolve is something, I have not detected in India's handling of PoK and NA.

Totalitarian countries can afford this kind of commitment.
India uses different measures. Indian historical capital which includes all the Indic regions are its natural area of influence.
India has democracy which is the real weapon against the dictatorship.

[ShauryaT]

Totalitarian countries can afford this kind of commitment.
India uses different measures. Indian historical capital which includes all the Indic regions are its natural area of influence.
India has democracy which is the real weapon against the dictatorship.

Always count on someone to give the democracy excuse, when it comes to China. Was America democratic enough to resolve and fight the cold war? Does being democratic mean that we cannot be committed? India has resolved, IMO to defend our current borders that we control, no matter who is against us. I am not sure, why are you saying this. Every time, there is China is mentioned in ANY context, someone will come and say but.....they are not democratic, do not have freedom....

Acharya ji: You of all people, should know very well, that democracy is a huge canard, when it comes to international relations. Are you teasing me

[shiv]

Mao told Kissinger, in the 70's that that they could wait for 100 years for reunification with Taiwan. After the Taiwan straits crisis in 1996, Kissinger asked Jiang Zemin, if they stand by that statement, Jiang said no, for only 77 years are now left. These are not empty statements.

Shaurya let me ask you a hypothetical question.

If Narendra Modi said today that Indian can wait 100 years to take back PoK what would you feel about that?

Although I am unable to find cites many Paki and Brit articles claim that early Indian leaders including Nehru expected Pakistan to fail. What do you think of such a sentiment?

[shivajisisodia]

Taking back PoK and NA is no mean feat, as we all know, there are military, political, economic strengths needed to undertake such a venture.

Being serious, would be reflected in the money we spend on our defense, needs to be at 3% levels for upwards of a decade and corresponding changes in policy, doctrine and force structure and levels. It will be reflected in our actions and the type of investments we make in Afghanistan - with a pronounced military stand (The agreement signed today, should have been done 10 years back, but it is a start, we shall see what happens on the ground in Afghanistan for every agreement between the US and TSP has a clause in it - India shall not be involved in Afghanistan). It means making investments to destabilize TSP in their backyard with the help of Pashtuns. It means we take opportunities towards salami slicing into NA, such as during Kargil. It means raising at least additional 10 mountain divisions and build capabilities, so that when opportunities present themselves, they can be used. It means investing in light artillery, light tanks and other lift assets and obscene fire power ratios (which will work as I do not believe the stakes for India and TSP for NA/PoK are asymmetric, like between Vietnam and the US)

It means, roping in a country like Iran and bringing Iran under our strategic ambit for mutual resources and security guarantees and routes into Afghanistan and CA. It also means we declare not once in 20 years, but every 3 months, that the entire J&K is sovereign Indian territory and open "discussions" with TSP for its return.
It means telling the world, that India is clear on getting this territory back and will not stop at anything. It means providing active support to the dissident groups inside NA (there are four prominent ones, do not remember names now). It means, tightening our diplomatic and economic noose around TSP. Execute upon the military and covert response options that are available today to respond to TSP's sub conventional threat. It means, solving the Kashmir issue through a demographic change in the composition of the valley.

My read on most of the above, is either we are not there, unlikely to get there or have not exercised even those which are feasible today. When we see these aspects changing, we shall become "serious" about this national imperative to reclaim this sovereign territory.

Mao told Kissinger, in the 70's that that they could wait for 100 years for reunification with Taiwan. After the Taiwan straits crisis in 1996, Kissinger asked Jiang Zemin, if they stand by that statement, Jiang said no, for only 77 years are now left. These are not empty statements. This resolve shows through in all diplomatic and geopolitical actions of China and its message to one and all is clear and unambiguous and backed with action. The One China message is the result of this resolve. This resolve is something, I have not detected in India's handling of PoK and NA.

I kid you not, I did not "know" till I left my country that part of J&K are occupied, call me ignorant but I meet many such ignorant Indians.

Sir,

One of the clearest and best posts I have read on this forum.

But Sir, this post is not just very uncharacteristically BRF, but also very uncharacteristically "modern day Indian". Why ? Because your post talks about ALL THT INDIA HAS TO DO PROACTIVELY, ON ITS OWN. In your post you dont rely even an iota on "Pakistan failing under its own weight" prayer, which will result in its territories AUTOMATICALLY falling in Indian hands, without India making any proactive effort of its own. In your post, you also dont curse or accuse the West, which is the favorite whipping boy of this forum and the Indian Babudom (which by the way is till plagued with the "Red" disease) and expect like some people for the West and the US to "make amends to India", but somehow dropping POK in India's lap. I am not saying here by any means that the West is not to blame for India's Kashmir problems, but some of us Indians actually seriously believe that the West will first "acknowledge its responsibility" and then go on to "atone for it by giving us POK on a platter". If I were a betting man, I would say that India is far more likely to follow what you prescribe in this post than anyone else just "handing POK on a platter" to India, and there is not much chance of this rotten to the core Indian system of governence that we have today, following any of your prescriptions.

I love this post, because for once, someone has been an adult, talked about how India can determine her own destiny vis-a-vis POK, a clear path to POK liberation even if it is not likely to be followed by this corrupt Indian dispensation and given a sense that it is only through our own pure, honest and herculean efforts and not by relying on or cursing others or by flights of fancy, that we will be able to get back our land.

Now that at least you and I agree, that India carries its destiny, at least when it comes to POK, in its own hands, it begs this question. What can we do to move the Indian system of governance towards doing the things that are prescribed in your post ?

As regards, you not knowing that POK was occupied by PAk, Sir, it is as much a reflection on Indian Government which has tried its best to keep such things "under wraps", so to speak, so as to avoid embarrasment and questioning by the populace as to what the government is doing about it. Pak controlling POK suits the Indian government fine. If you have lived outside India, particularly in a Muslim country, you will realize that almost no other govt other than our own, suppresses injustices perpetrated on it by "others". In fact, all others create a frenzied drumbeat of demonization of the country or a party that has victimized it. Muslim countries actually go as far as to demonize even percieved or imagined victimizers. They see themselves as a victim of everyone and have a grievance against everybody. This, by the way, is a major technique they use to be able to spead the word of Allah to Kafir lands, by always painting the "other guy" as an aggressor or a victimizer of the muslims. I am not suggesting that the Indian government goes that far, but it certainly can be "normal" and keep the issue of POK on the "front burner" internall and in external forums. But does it do it ?

[ShauryaT]

Mao told Kissinger, in the 70's that that they could wait for 100 years for reunification with Taiwan. After the Taiwan straits crisis in 1996, Kissinger asked Jiang Zemin, if they stand by that statement, Jiang said no, for only 77 years are now left. These are not empty statements.

Shaurya let me ask you a hypothetical question.

If Narendra Modi said today that Indian can wait 100 years to take back PoK what would you feel about that?

Although I am unable to find cites many Paki and Brit articles claim that early Indian leaders including Nehru expected Pakistan to fail. What do you think of such a sentiment?

I seriously do not know what does that Modi question mean? He is a CM of a state of India, so as such his pronouncements on the issue do not have much relevance. If he were to become the PM and still say this, then he should be watched to ensure that these pronouncements are serious and there is overall capacity building and actions visible to one and all. Does it matter, who says it, as long as actions follow.

It was widely expected soon after partition that TSP would not survive and that the two nation theory would not be feasible. This was partly due to the impracticality of two geographical units separated by time and space among other things. So, at least part of their prediction came true in 1971.

However, another part of it was predicated upon the impracticality of populations moving from one part to another and Islam being only a subset of Indian peoples identity.

While the above was true, this is where they went wrong. They underestimated the capacity of a state to steer the demographics in a certain way, if it so desired, strengthening Islamic identities. Result is both TSP and BD are Islamic republics and have decimated their non Islamic populations - BD is well on its way, with 1971, pushing out about 9 million+. They underestimated the power of a state to steer attitudes and postures in a certain direction. This was essentially the critique of Jaswant Singh in his book that the Congress leaders in their eagerness to get to power never really understood the drive and vision of the other party to make something happen along with the interests of colonial powers.

In their eagerness to build a just and humane society, as any good Hindu would, their deracinated minds (and they were certifiably deracinated for over 70% of them were well versed with English law and systems) forgot that Artha - the pursuit of wealth and power, though pursued by all, does not always serve the same Dharma for Vasudeva Kutmbakam is not the message of all.

IOW: I think they were naive, led by JLN at the helm. (Yes, this is all hindsight, but if you get to a leadership position then history and progeny shall judge you and ask, if your decisions served us well).

Not sure, where you are trying to go with all this though.

[Y I Patel]

rudradev

I started reading this thread all fired up to respond, until I came to your posts. You said everything I would have liked to say, only a lot more comprehensively and articulately. I feel like quoting entire posts form you and adding at the end "+400%"

[shiv]

I seriously do not know what does that Modi question mean? He is a CM of a state of India, so as such his pronouncements on the issue do not have much relevance.

<snip>

Not sure, where you are trying to go with all this though.

Well it's like this Shaurya. Mao said
1. We are willing to lose 300 million people in nuclear war
2. We are willing to wait 100 years for Taiwan.

This is expansive bluster of the type that Western leaders do not get away with except under some circumstances. When such bluster and such threats come from the leader of a nation they are taken more seriously even if it is basically a lie. But the reputation of the leader counts a great deal.

I initially thought I would use the name "Manmohan Singh" in asking the same question. I suspected that if MMS had said "We are willing to wait 100 years to retake PoK" the reactions of this forum would have been cynical "Hah, this napunsak Sonia bhakt is saying things that will happen 100 years after he is dead and conveniently trying to talk big and escape responsibility.

The image a leader has created for himself is used by observers to judge his statements. The statements can be complete nonsense, but they are taken seriously if the leader has acquired an image. In fact talking of what is 100 years away or 77 years away sounds like bullshit to me. Why is it that we mourn and howl at an LCA that is due to appear in 18 months rather than 12 months but "respect" a man who says something is "77 years away"? If someone says "LCA will be in service in 2020" - the statement is actually credible but we don't want to respect that guy like we respect Mao for saying something is 100 years away. The thing is we want to see things happen in our lifetime. When Mao says something will happen in 100 years - it is clear that he will be dead by that time and cannot be held accountable. How does that make him a "seer'? It is only his reputation, the larger than life image he built up for himself by being ruthless that made people respect him and fear his words long after he died.

Nehru had no such image. His image in India, right or wrong, was that of a benign leader who had a vision for India. When he predicted the end of Pakistan it was not given much attention. But it was taken very seriously in Pakistan. Nehru's words caused a lot of takleef to Pakistanis because they saw Nehru as a scheming high caste Indian Hindu who was out to hoodwink Muslims the way he cheated Jinnah and Pakistan out of their "rightful leadership of India. The importance of a leaders words is often more related to how he is perceived rather than whether those words are true or not.

Apply that to Dubya. he was the one who was instrumental in
1. Taking two countries in exchange for two buildings
2. Making Pakistan a "major non-NATO ally" in the war against terror.

Bush was wrong - it can be seen in his lifetime. Nehru was right, but he did not live to see it. Mao said things that even his grandchildren will not stay alive to be told that he was right or wrong.

[Prem]

It was not Dubiya of first term Presidency but SOS Co-Lin Bowel who was the architect of Mush My Munna , Mush My Friend policy. Same goes for the airlift from Kunduz. He was firmly against NA taking Kabul to mark their military victory over Taliban. IMHO, President Bush was betrayed or initially misled regarding the real nature of Poakobras.

[ShauryaT]

Shiv ji: I am really not sure, where you are trying to go. A leaders words need to be credible and carry the weight to have the desired effect. Mao's words of 100 years were in context, please do not take that as a literal commitment of 100 years, it was not meant that way and no one takes it that way. Everything has context. I feel you are stretching these out of context. If a JLN proclaims Hindi-Chini as bhai bhai and then has egg on his face or worse blood on this hands, the leader has to take the responsibility for it.

The 300 million comment by Mao was at a communist conference, where he thought he was trying to impress all, of his commitment to the commune, still thinking as if he was in the Stalin era. It back fired. It was not indicative of the actual policy but was to indicate a willingness to fight. It is another matter that after looking at his actions in subsequent years, it becomes clear that Mao never really wanted a nuclear war. But, this is all OT.