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I suspect XV and XIV Corps to get additional divisions to bring them to three division structure.
Rohit : XIV Corps- yes, very likely.
XV Corps - Unlikely. It has two divs + i indep inf bde + 2 RR forces. Both the RR forces have wartime roles; in 'non-wartime', they are in any case deployed.
I suspect XV and XIV Corps to get additional divisions to bring them to three division structure.
Rohit : XIV Corps- yes, very likely.
XV Corps - Unlikely. It has two divs + i indep inf bde + 2 RR forces. Both the RR forces have wartime roles; in 'non-wartime', they are in any case deployed.
Well, lets talk in terms of force ratios.
The PA divisions in POK (leave aside FCNA) have 14 infantry brigades under them - they are all over sized with 12 ID having 6 brigades.
AFAIK, XVI and XV Corps have 16 infantry brigades between them (please correct me if I'm wrong). 39 Mountain Division is Northern Command reserve and I've not counted the same here. Yes, I know that PA C&C is going to be hell lot of difficult with only two divisions controlling the same front as our four but then, PA has always relied on the terrain to mitigate Indian superiority - plus that Haji Pir bulge gives them lot of offensive options. That, and the pressure they'll build against Akhnoor using their ARN+XXX Corps combine is expected to keep us off balance and allow them to get away with present force ratios. The beauty in PA calculation is that of the three divisions under XII Corps, one is Corps reserve.
IMO, XV Corps having three divisions means that it has ample reserves for offensive action and can achieve high attacker-defender ratios in pockets. Given the mountainous terrain, the freedom of large scale movement is as it is restricted with few axis of advance which can sustain large scale forces.
Coming to RR, well, they are going to have their hands full trying to maintain the internal lines of communication and ensuring no thuziyapanti by the piglets.
FAIK, XVI and XV Corps have 16 infantry brigades between them (please correct me if I'm wrong).
There are 7 inf bdes in 15 Corps and there are 7 inf bdes in 16 Corps; 16 Corps also has an armd bde. So, that makes it 15 bdes. I am possibly missing one bde.
39 Mountain Division is Northern Command reserve and I've not counted the same here.
OK. This is true. The traditional deployment used to be that that 39 div was sent into the 16 Corps AoR, while one of the 33 Corps divs from East Comm used to move into the 15 Corps AoR - 27 div was in the 15 Corps AoR for some time.
So, yes, 15 Corps is used to deploying three divisions. But the issue is whether a new div will be infused into 15 Corps or will a restructuring of existing forces within 15 Corps take place (or maybe an ad-hoc Div HQ will be raised in wartime)
In terms of areas of deployment, 28 will be in the Gurez valley- Bandipore and Kupwara area; 19 will be in the area from North of Poonch to Baramula; and an ad-hoc HQ will command a third div like structure composing of either just 2-3 RR Sector HQs..remember K and V Forces have about-8 sectors with approx 25-30 battalions between them..about 30% of these RR Bns will be moved ahead; this ad-hoc formation may also get the 15 Corps indep inf bde. This ad-hoc formation may then end up with about 6-7 RR Bns + 3 inf bns from the indep inf bde. So, inherently, 15 Corps will be having three divs. Hence, any extra infusion of a div will actually make it a four div formation - 28, 19, the ad-hoc HQ and the new div!
The PA divisions in POK (leave aside FCNA) have 14 infantry brigades under them - they are all over sized with 12 ID having 6 brigades.
Well, yes. But some of those Bns are what the PA calls Mujahid battalions and will be used for infiltration and soboteur ops. Plus, the PA wants to continue to have the propaganda utility of claiming that they have fewer divs in PoK compared to India in J&K. In any case, the action in Kashmir for PA from Poonch northwards will be bde level because of terrain. So, maybe they think, why put additional div HQs in PoK when all that they have to do is to defend between Uri and Poonch.
XV Corps having three divisions means that it has ample reserves for offensive action and can achieve high attacker-defender ratios in pockets. Given the mountainous terrain, the freedom of large scale movement is as it is restricted with few axis of advance which can sustain large scale forces.
There will be barely one axis of advance, maybe two at a stretch for 15 Corps. At best they may be able to put in a bde or bde+ in this axis. The going will be horrible. So, do you really want to feed a div into this meat-grinder, or would you rather send this div to reinforce 16 Corps.
Avik wrote:There are 7 inf bdes in 15 Corps and there are 7 inf bdes in 16 Corps; 16 Corps also has an armd bde. So, that makes it 15 bdes. I am possibly missing one bde.
28 ID has four brigades and if 19 ID has 3 plus one (I) Infantry bde under XV Corps makes it 8. but I doubt 19 ID has only three bdes. Nevertheless, 10 and 25 ID each are likely to have 3 bde each plus XVI Corps has one (I) Infantry bde; so we have total of 15 infantry bdes. I'm not counting the armor as it has larger meaning and for proper analysis one needs to draw in IX Corps and our siblings across the Shakargargh bulge.
OK. This is true. The traditional deployment used to be that that 39 div was sent into the 16 Corps AoR, while one of the 33 Corps divs from East Comm used to move into the 15 Corps AoR - 27 div was in the 15 Corps AoR for some time.
39 MD tends to get sucked into beefing up AOR of 10 and 25 ID. 6 MD, the AHQ reserve is triple tasked for general area Central LAC-Sambha-Kashmir. During Kargil, it was sitting at Sonamarg. During Op. Parakram, by 2002, the Shakargargh bulge had three divisions from NE and III Corps HQ. IMO, this is what allowed IA to move I Corps to between XXI and II Corps.
So, yes, 15 Corps is used to deploying three divisions. But the issue is whether a new div will be infused into 15 Corps or will a restructuring of existing forces within 15 Corps take place (or maybe an ad-hoc Div HQ will be raised in wartime)
Induction of 27 MD not-withstanding, XV Corps used to command the AOR between Dhemchok in southern Ladakh to 25 ID in Rajouri. It is only in 2005 that 25 ID went to XVI Corps.
In terms of areas of deployment, 28 will be in the Gurez valley- Bandipore and Kupwara area; 19 will be in the area from North of Poonch to Baramula; and an ad-hoc HQ will command a third div like structure composing of either just 2-3 RR Sector HQs..remember K and V Forces have about-8 sectors with approx 25-30 battalions between them..about 30% of these RR Bns will be moved ahead; this ad-hoc formation may also get the 15 Corps indep inf bde. This ad-hoc formation may then end up with about 6-7 RR Bns + 3 inf bns from the indep inf bde. So, inherently, 15 Corps will be having three divs. Hence, any extra infusion of a div will actually make it a four div formation - 28, 19, the ad-hoc HQ and the new div!
Two things - (a) Given the political sensitivity of Kashmir issue, each inch of land needs to be protected. This makes the commanders more cautious and requires heavy investment in troops. The terrain further exacerbates the situation. (b) The way terrain is, the sectors under brigades are literally silos which need to be re-inforced and maintained with max force. The reserves have to be up as lateral movement is not possible. As Ravi Rikhye wrote in his book - the situation is like a Japanese fan. All lines of communication emanate from one node - Baramula - towards forward areas but there is no lateral connectivity and no switching of forces.
The above requires heavy investment in resources and hence IMO, we need one division at the most to cater to offensive in this area. I'm not in favor of ad-hoc divisions/formations as they are good on paper only. It takes time to develop a proper coherent fighting machine. And as I said earlier, RR will be busy keeping LCs open and guarding vital assets and freeing up the regular infantry somewhat for offensive tasks.
There is another important point - Both Baramula and Gurez sit on important axis of advance. While Baramula leads to Muzaffarabd, Gurez leads to Skardu via Astore. In Op. Trident, the plan called for 6 MD assault via Kargil and 4 ID assault via Gurez on Northern Areas. An additional Division under XV Corps can be used on any of these axis. A successful attack via Gurez can outflank PA defences in Northern Areas.
In all this, Northern Command will get MSC giving it good offensive capability across the entire AoR.
19 Div indeed has three bdes. Are you sure 28 has four bdes?
Induction of 27 MD not-withstanding, XV Corps used to command the AOR between Dhemchok in southern Ladakh to 25 ID in Rajouri. It is only in 2005 that 25 ID went to XVI Corps.
This my friend is untrue. Circa 1999-2000, 15 Corps used to be valley and Ladakh, and 16 Corps used to be Pir Panjal and southwards till Gurdaspur. Now, its - Pirpanjal and Jammu- 16 Corps; North of Pirpanjal , valley , till Zoji La- 15 Corps; north of Zoji La and Ladakh- 14 Corps. 25 Div has been 16 Corps for atleast 12 years- I am quite sure on this.
In Op. Trident, the plan called for 6 MD assault via Kargil and 4 ID assault via Gurez on Northern Areas. An additional Division under XV Corps can be used on any of these axis. A successful attack via Gurez can outflank PA defences in Northern Areas.
The pattern here is that we usually try an offensive through Baramula - Muzaffarabad axis. The geography is in our favour. But, in the Gurez sector, the Pakis are at the heights. This area is also heavily forested. In this sector, the Pakis have the advantage. The plan, I think in Gurez is to keep the Pakis tied down so that they cant move to support Muzaffarabad In any case, I think the plan to assault Skardu will happen through the Kargil area, and not Gurez. We will be at a disadvantage going up the hill.
In all this, Northern Command will get MSC giving it good offensive capability across the entire AoR.
Well, I certainly hope so. My fear is, in the absence of reinforcements from East Comm, the Northen MSC will get sucked into reinforcing 16 Corps, or making shallow feints to draw away Paki XXX Corps or X Corp elements
Avik wrote:
19 Div indeed has three bdes. Are you sure 28 has four bdes?
I'll take your word on the 19 ID. On the 28 ID, the source is General VP Malik's book on Kargil. He lists the brigades as well.
On the AoR of 15 Corps, I was refering to pre-1999 days. And I stand corrected on the 25 ID thing. Thanks.
Coming to 28 ID, what we need to first bear in mind is that 28 ID agains mans a japanese fan shaped area. The northern edge of this fan is at Gurez with southern edge north of where the 19 ID's AoR starts. Each of these two locations has a brigade each and between them are two more brigades. IIRC,a brigade each is at (from north to south along LoC) Gurez, Macchal, Tangdhar and Keran. So, the AoR of 28 ID is pretty large and given the geography of the area, each sector is again like a silo. Same goes for 19 ID as well. So, whatever offensive capability XV Corps has will rely on limited reserves within these divisions as well as external inductions like 6 MD.
And to ensure that any planned MSC does not get distributed piecemeal to beef up any sector, it is important that 14/15/16 Corps can manage the show to as independent an extent as possible. This will truly allow for effective deployment of new MSC.
^^^ Rohit and Avit, is the 28th div a Infantry Div or a Mountain Div? based on my reading in this discussion it looks like an Infantry Div but my other sources indicate this has been converted into a Mountain Div some years back. Thanks in Advance.
Based on the discussion on Brigade level strengths, one thing is apparent, IA needs to be beefed up with additional Brigades along the LOC with adequate reserves, A corresponding increase in fire-power is also in order for the existing formations. Induction of LCH and Rudra would come as a short in the arm for mounting offensive operations through the multiple axis identified.
Shrinivasan wrote:^^^ Rohit and Avit, is the 28th div a Infantry Div or a Mountain Div? based on my reading in this discussion it looks like an Infantry Div but my other sources indicate this has been converted into a Mountain Div some years back. Thanks in Advance.
I'm not aware of any such development. But does not make much of a difference - the modification for mountainous warfare is in terms of equipment holding (type and quantity). Interestingly, 28 ID was raised for guarding the very frontier which 8 MD is doing today - Kargil. But was inducted into present sector after the militancy flared up in valley. Another thing - Gurez used to be the backdoor into the valley before 1947. From Northern Areas or even Ladakh, the movement would be through Skardu-Astore-Gurez.
I used to think 1 star means a brigadier and 4 stars means head of Army chief and 5 stars meant either Late Field Marshals Maneshaw or Kariappa. I have see 2 star's a few times a Chennai airport signifying a Major General's Black Amby
There is a move however, to shift to the SX4, like most other central govt depts have done for their senior afsars, includng all central ministries, IT Dept, Delhi police, etc.
I suppose it might be more comfortable. But somehow, I just dont feel an SX4 has the same... whatsit that the Amby had.
Those are extra rear view mirrors, and are pretty common after market fittings in Ambys, both military and civilian. Im not sure what purpose they serve. But since this is the army discussion thread, lets figure it out elsewhere...
Oh I get it now, they are rear view mirrors for use when brigadier saab has the rear window curtains drawn, the driver looses the functionality of in in-car rear view mirror.
There is a move however, to shift to the SX4, like most other central govt depts have done for their senior afsars, includng all central ministries, IT Dept, Delhi police, etc.
I suppose it might be more comfortable. But somehow, I just dont feel an SX4 has the same... whatsit that the Amby had.
gravitas. perhaps the new ambies that are slated to come out next year would be suitable, be modern enough with the amby feel.
Well i have had the pleasure of riding in one of them, Courtesy of a friend, and i can tell you this, its quite comfortable, especially for 5'9"+ people.. loads of head and leg room.. Sorry about OT..
Have seen plenty of these in all the colours of the forces..
In fact i had an "interesting" incident with one general's convoy once in Old airport road.
Mamata's patriotic song becomes swansong for ex-servicemen
By Quaid Najmi | IANS – Sun, Sep 18, 2011
Mumbai, Sep 18 (IANS) Former railway minister Mamata Bannerjee's patriotic song for the country's armed forces and promise of railway jobs for ex-servicemen became quite a hook for many a battle-scarred ex-soldier. But now they would like to make it their swansong.
Lured by the promise of a permanent job, ex-servicemen responded to a railway recruitment drive across its divisions earlier this year, in the chimeric hope of a rewarding new career. When they finally got their appointment letters in June, however, they were shocked to find that they had been placed as cleaners, waiters, loaders, and in other menial positions. Many claim that they were short-changed even with regard to pay and other emoluments as compared with what they got in the Army, Navy and Air Force or would have got in the private sector. One such applicant, Venkateshu Sanjiva, of Karnataka had taken part in the action in Operation Bluestar in Punjab in 1984, and also during the Kargil war. After retirement from the Indian Army as a technical-level store-keeper, he joined Reliance in Navi Mumbai, managing its labour camp on a monthly salary of around Rs.20,000. 'I responded with great hope to the Central Railway (CR) advertisement this year and quit my private job to re-join government service. But I was appointed finally only as a cleaner/sweeper in the canteen at Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST) in Mumbai,' Sanjiva told IANS.
A former Army Medical Corps store-keeper, Santosh Salvi of Thane, had a similar experience: he was placed as a cleaner-cum-loader in pantry cars of long distance trains originating in CST. 'I have served in places like Assam, Himachal Pradesh and Kerala under extremely trying circumstances. Now, I am reduced to a pantry car cleaner-cum-loader after 24 years' military service,' Salvi rued. A resident of Ahmednagar, Sunil Funde, who retired as a store-keeper (technical) in remote border areas after 25 years, is now a cleaner in the central railway canteen at CST and, at times, doubles as a waiter.
Former army subedar D.V. Bhoite said he 'feels totally let-down' after getting an appointment letter as a cleaner in the CST canteen. Originally from Kolhapur, Bhoite notched 28 years in the Army and later took up a private job. He quit that in favour of what he expected would be a better job in the CR. Incidentally, while presenting the Railway Budget-2011-12, Mamata Banerjee had sung a couple of verses of a popular patriotic number and announced over 16,000 railway jobs all over India for ex-service personnel. Of these, 1,162 vacancies came up in the CR, with a stipulation that the applicant must have put in minimum 20 years in the Indian Army, Indian Navy or Indian Air Force. 'The vacancies advertised were for Group D, without specifying the nature of the jobs. So a large number ex-servicemen like us applied, though many had better-paying jobs in the private sector,' Funde told IANS. Funde said reports from other railway divisions indicate that ex-servicemen have been given jobs unworthy of their qualification or experience. 'There are many who have seen action several times in the armed forces. Now, many have been relegated to doing field jobs like tightening nuts and bolts of railway tracks, head loaders, peons, cleaners, waiters and so on,' Funde said. Others, when they learnt of the predicament of their colleagues, did not bother to take up menial jobs and have continued with their existing jobs, he added. When contacted, a high-ranking CR official said that Group D in the central government is equal to Class IV government jobs.
The official gave an assurance he would enquire into the grievances of ex-servicemen next week.
Sanjiva, Bhoite, Funde and Salvi said they have decided to continue in their present railway jobs 'as we have no option'.
They said they had commitments like home loan EMIs, higher education for their son or marriage of their daughters, medical expenses of elderly parents, among others, which compelled them to carry on with the railway jobs. 'We have requested CR authorities to at least give us more dignified jobs considering our academic and career backgrounds, but so far there has been no response,' Funde said, adding that 42 of them are cleaners, waiters, loaders or godown hands in the CST canteen. They unanimously said that as soon as they got better options, they would quit the railways, equally both for the low payscales and the manner in which they have been treated.
(Quaid Najmi can be contacted at [email protected])
This is really too bad.
If any BRFites in that region are in a position to offer jobs to these men, please do try and do so. BRF has shown time and again that it can be a change for real good in this world. Let us try and help our veterans.
Yup. If any BRFites like, lets try and contact the reporter whose email add is given in the article. If possible, do try and help out, if you have the power to do so.
Misconceptions about Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA)
The Act, served the civil administrations in Jammu and Kashmir and the North East effectively in combating cross-border terrorism. However, it has in, recent times, become target of criticism. Demands for its withdrawal have been raised, specially from Jammu and Kashmir in the North and Manipur in the East. Are these demands justified? Or are they the product of some ignorance and confusion about the word “Power” which is part of its formal nomenclature?
In order to be impartial between sense and nonsense, it is necessary to understand that the Armed Forces Special Power Act, gives no police powers to Army. The Army cannot enforce its presence in any state for internal security purposes on its own without the civil government concerned declaring a particular area in its jurisdiction as ‘disturbed area’ and ‘requesting’ the Army to come to its aid.
The critics, however, have never lost any opportunity to indulge in Army bashing on issues of “high handedness” and “violation of human rights”. Of course such criticism is countered by others as “politically motivated” and “voice of the vested interests”. They point out that wherever the Indian Army has gone, it has taken the welfare of the local people as its first priority also, using “heart as a weapon” and Sadbhavna or goodwill as the spirit. They point out to the surrender of several militant groups in the North East and the popular Kashmir Premier League Chinar Cup project as outstanding examples.
Demands for repeal or amendment of AFSPA specially come from areas infested by separatism combined with militancy that seldom talk of senseless killing and continuous “violation of Human Rights” by terrorists and militants. If a bomb blast outside the Delhi High Court kills several innocent litigants and lawyers or innocent citizens lose their lives in Mumbai blast, no voice is heard condemning the known and unknown killers of violating human right to live. Why?
The antagonists of AFSPA are ever active and widely reported in the media. It would be fair to listen to the protagonists too.
Why AFSPA is necessary?
The proposed amendments to the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) will greatly reduce the effectiveness in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations. If battalion, company and platoon commanders of units engaged, who have been fearlessly leading from the front in such operations, start becoming apprehensive about being legally proceeded against for killing terrorists mostly externally instigated supported, then we will lose the valuable cutting edge.
This, in a nutshell, is what said by a number of serving officers currently engaged in these operations and retired officers with long standing experience of the same.
Army authorities have to be taken into confidence and their nod was necessary for amending or withdrawing the AFSPA. If Government gives weightage only to political opinion it could invite problems for it because there are fears that in the absence of any legal protection the security forces may be forced to be on the defensive which could leave a free space for militants to operate. Has any government agency or committee suggested how to deal with the contentious issue?
The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA)-1958 was enacted by the Parliament on 11 September, 1958 to provide necessary powers and legal support/protection to Armed Forces for operations against insurgents in a highly hostile environment and it has enabled them to effectively contain insurgency and establish stability in the region. AFSPA-1958 is currently applicable in Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura and Tirap and Changlang districts of Arunachal Pradesh.
Subsequently, Parliament enacted the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act 1990, effective since 5 July 1990, initially to areas falling within 20 km of the Line of Control with Rajouri, Poonch, Anantnag, Baramulla, Budgam, Kupwara, Pulwama and Srinagar districts declared as disturbed. In August 2001, it was extended to Jammu, Kathua, Udhampur, Poonch, Rajouri and Doda, when these districts were declared disturbed. What is interesting to note that people of last 6 districts have not called for it's repeal. Unlike parts of Kashmir, population of these areas is predominantly pro-Indian and actively resists terrorists which try to sneak in across LOC.
The fighting capability of terrorists in J & K and the North East and has considerably improved over the years in terms of increasingly sophisticated weapons, high tech gear and finance.. Many groups even have women cadres also.
Troops and Central constabulary forces are operating in a hostile environment, in tough terrain and weather conditions, exposing themselves to grave dangers, maintaining a high degree of operational effectiveness while they are simultaneously, required to be extremely cautious in avoiding any collateral damage and loss of innocent life or property.
For sake of an example, lets talk about tactics of terrorists in Kashmir. One of their favourite modes of attack is to blend in civilian population and attack while taking cover behind human shields or from civilian houses. Kashmiris wear a long loose robe like garment called firan which covers whole body from neck to toes. What these terrorists do is to dress in same firan and hide a few grenades and gun inside the robe which effectively hides the bulge of weapons, allowing them to walk up to security check points and ambush unsuspecting security personnel. Another tactic is to attack convoys or soldiers on patrol from civilian houses, then try to run away.
Operating in such conditions often surrounded by hostile population demands that security forces do have special powers. They need to act fast without going through the hassle of obtaining proper paperwork. Wasting time on such frivolities will do nothing except provide terrorists with a heavens sent means of escape.
Successes in operations and any violation or perceived violation attract attention of overground anti national factions / elements with vested interests and also the media, which in a democracy, they should. After some of the current exposes which including Radia tapes, Cash for Votes, ISI's Fai among many others, one should always be sure of loyalty of people who are making noises about removal of this act. Many of the people supporting removal of this act have been proven guilty of associating with ISI's spy Fai and also taking money from dubious sources.
While most of the allegations made are false and fabricated, operating under such environment requires a protective law which is not overarching as it is perceived to be.
The essence of the important Sections of AFSPA is :
(a) Section 3 empowers the Central and State Governments to declare areas as disturbed.
(b) Section 4 gives the Army powers to search premises and make arrests without warrants, to use force even to the extent of causing death, destroy arms/ammunition dumps, fortifications/ shelters/hideouts and to stop, search and seize any vehicles.
(c) Section 6 stipulates that arrested persons and seized property is to be made over to the police with least possible delay.
(d) Section 7 offers protection of personnel acting in good faith in their official capacity. Prosecution is permitted only after sanction of the Central Govt.
The mere fact that the provisions of AFSPA have to be invoked with regard to a particular area ex facie establishes that the law and order situation there had degenerated to such an extent that the State Government with the aid of police power at its disposal was unable to maintain peace and tranquility.
A natural corollary to the above would be that if the Armed Forces, who are called upon to assist the State administration in restoring normalcy, have to succeed in their task, they enjoy at least the similar powers as the Police force if not wider ones.
However, close perusal of the various powers available to the police under the provisions of the CrPC vis-a-vis those available to Armed Forces under AFSPA would reveal that the police still enjoy more encompassing and wider powers relating toarrest, search, seizure, summoning of witnesses, preventive detention etc than the Armed Forces.Adequate checks and safeguards are built in the AFSPA to prevent the Armed Forces from assuming sweeping powers. Violations of its provisions are liable for legal action/prosecution. DO’s and DONTs issued by the Army, duly approved by the Supreme Court are binding on all ranks.
Then what is wrong with AFSPA? The word “Power”? Then why not rename the Act, the Armed Forces Special Services Act.
Last edited by jamwal on 11 Oct 2011 02:03, edited 1 time in total.
Jamwal ji, that post repeats itself. Kindly edit it. The last line is "Then what is wrong with AFSPA? The word “Power”? Then why not rename the Act, the Armed Forces Special Services Act."
As I had said, the SX4 seems to be being phased in. Seen here is LtGen NC Marwah, CinC Andaman and Nicobar command. In the background, I see a black SX4 staff car.
New Delhi: The Army has pressed the panic button: it doesn’t have sufficient reserves of certain ammunition needed to secure the country in case a war is to be fought in the near future.
According to a report in a leading English daily, the Army has apprised the government in writing that some of its ammunition war reserves are currently below critical levels.
Following the development, the Defence Ministry has begun procuring ammo on an emergency basis, in some cases without adherence to the offsets policy. The policy lays down that if a foreign firm sells more than Rs 300 crore worth of ammo in a single transaction, it must re-invest 30 percent back in India.
The war reserves for certain ammunitions have declined mainly because of the blacklisting of certain firms by the government in the recent past. For example, Israel Military Industries (IMI) used to supply tank ammunition called the Armoured Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot (APFSDS). However, after the government blacklisted the firm and ordered a CBI probe against it, the number of APFSDS rounds in reserve with the Army have fallen to a critical level.
At present, the report said, the Army needs nearly 66,000 APFSDS rounds as an “immediate operational necessity”. The Army is facing a similar shortage of ammunition for the Smerch multi-barrel rocket launcher systems.
The blacklisting has forced the Army to look for fresh suppliers; however suppliers for such ammunition are few and most of them are quoting a very high price for the ammo.
The government is also reported to have floated tenders to urgently purchase Bi-Modular Charge (BMC) systems, which are critical to the upgraded 130-mm artillery guns’ operation at full capacity.
The “Sudarshan Shakti” exercise, which is being led by 21 Corps will be the test bed for a new doctriof “theaterisation” that is likely to transform the structure and deployment tactics of the Indian Army
With no sign of threat perception from northern and western borders being abated, the armed forces are putting in place an efficient system of night- landing of aircraft close to the border—many of them are in the Himalayas—for quick troop and logistics mobilisation.
The “night landing capability for airfields in the northern and western theatres” was one of the main areas of discussions at the Army commanders’ conference that began here on Monday.
Beginning of the winter will witness more night-landing by the Indian Air Force’s medium-lift troop carrier IL-76.
“Due to low temperatures at night, the carrying capacity of IL-76 would increase, thus helping in winter stocking as also for operational logistic build up,” said an officer. Addressing top commanders, Army Chief V K Singh asked them to remain vigilant on the northern and western borders.
Singh also discussed proposals for accretion of forces within a short span of time and improving border infrastructure, which includes uplifting the conditions of habitats in high-altitude areas.
The “Sudarshan Shakti” exercise, which is being led by 21 Corps will be the test bed for a new doctriof “theaterisation” that is likely to transform the structure and deployment tactics of the Indian Army
I hope by 'theaterization' we are attempting for the same level of synergy between IA+IAF as in A&N Command. This might well be the stepping stone for true-blue joint ops which is quite important for CSD to succeed
Will CSD really ever succeed without the induction of the howitzers( SP and Towed) and home made ammo( of which there seems to be a huge shortfall leading to panic buying at inflated prices as per a report posted here) for those guns?
Sum, you are talking about the tools reuired and Rohit is talkimg about the methodology, the very concept. If the concept is vetted, things MIGHT move forward! Else back to the drawing board. Arty will come, lots of gear is getting inducted, so will Arty, most probably taking the FMS route and Yehudi.
^^ Thats true but even the FMS for the light howitzers seems to be stuck and going by the way arty saga is going, doesnt seem to be too much of a chance in near future of any change...
