Indian Army: News & Discussion

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 16 Oct 2011 01:28

Fair and balanced usually ends up meaning only the army can do wrong, while DRDO, OFB, etc are hard working, honest civil servants onlee. Sounds like a rotten fish to me. As does the unfair leap of faith made (in absence of any proof at all) by all those who have quickly said that its an Army hit job.

Army procurement body's role ends at stating that the following set of weapon systems meet technical requirements. After that, contract negotiation, TOT, and even final selection of the system is in MOD's hands, and Army has no role.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 16 Oct 2011 01:37

Who cares who makes the gun of which design, as long as it is locally made, has local vendors involved, is locally sustainable and meets IA requirements. Arguably though, a build to print, even with modifications will teach less. But order of the day is guns, and more guns.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 16 Oct 2011 01:43

pandyan wrote: <SNIP> fair and balanced explanation. Army procurement body was involved for the last quarter century and they know in & out of the contract.

Can you please tell me what is Army procurement body? And how it would know in and out of the same?

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 16 Oct 2011 01:44

@KaranM: EXACTLY!

@Rohitvats: The Army's "procurement body" is ostensibly DGWE. However, branch stakeholders are obviously involved. Furthermore, as I say, their role ends at stating what panel of systems is acceptable. After that financial, political and other considerations take over, and the matter is totally out of the armed forces hands.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 16 Oct 2011 01:46

vic wrote:<SNIP> I believe that Army is trying to kill DRDO project by asking OFB to use Bofors tech. After wasting a couple of years BAe will/may be asked to step in Garb of JV

Did you think twice before writing the above bull sh*t?

IA is trying to kill DRDO project, you say? Which DRDO project? Who has sanctioned it? And what stage is it on? Just because BF is world leading company in forging business qualifies it to become howitzer maker? Are you out of your mind when you write nonsense as above?

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 16 Oct 2011 01:51

ASPuar wrote:@KaranM: EXACTLY!

@Rohitvats: The Army's "procurement body" is ostensibly DGWE. However, branch stakeholders are obviously involved. Furthermore, as I say, their role ends at stating what panel of systems is acceptable. After that financial, political and other considerations take over, and the matter is totally out of the armed forces hands.

ASPaur sahab, I know that. Courtsey the stupid higher defence management system, Services simply tell what they want. And MOD, like the good old father, goes and buys for them. How many people know that the original choice of the IA was Sofma gun but Bofors was finally chosen by the GOI? And people say, IA knows in and out of the system

How the fvck does it matter even if the IA knows? Can IA ask OFB to do this and that? The IA has been led up the garden path by the successive congress governments - 'ab le denge, tab le denge'. All that IA can do is hold trials after trials and thats it...the dumbfvcks sitting in the MOD and GOI simply twiddle their thumb.

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 16 Oct 2011 02:06

I dont care if Bharat Forge, Tata, Birla or even Uncle Chips makes a gun. If it meets the armys requirements its fine.

chaanakya · Post by **chaanakya** » 16 Oct 2011 12:04

rohitvats wrote:
pandyan wrote: <SNIP> fair and balanced explanation. Army procurement body was involved for the last quarter century and they know in & out of the contract.
Can you please tell me what is Army procurement body? And how it would know in and out of the same?

Defence Procurement Council headed by RM
Defence Procurement Board headed by Defence Secy
Defense Procurement Wing headed by Spl Secy (Acquisition)

The process of procurement is Governed by DPM with its latest amendment in 2011.

DDOs – Direct Demanding Officers ( The officer who is authoried to sign and send Purchase orders after all approvals are received)
• Indenting Agency ( Agency authorised to send requirement of items and receives the items after supply is cleared by Inspectorate, DGQA)
• Procurement Agency ( Army/Air Force/Navy/Coast Guard etc)

• GSQRs/ JSQRs /NSQRs/AFSQRs ( Qualification requirements to be finalised by concerned agency also included required numbers and justification, usually follows from Defense Planning Board or wings in respective organisations)

Items which are specified by MOD are to be sent or DPC and are called Specified Items ( such as Guns, Fighter Planes, submarines and all big ticket items.)

Please go through this link though I am sure you would be knowing it.

http://mod.nic.in/dpm/welcome.html
http://mod.nic.in/dpm/DPM2009.pdf

Quality Specifications , Quantity requirement, Selection process, Financial approvals, Inspections and acceptance are all entrusted to separate agencies/Officers and none is subordinate to the others and are independent functioning.

ASPuar , as you can see , DG&SD is one of the supply source without going through tender routes.

akimalik · Post by **akimalik** » 16 Oct 2011 12:14

ASPuar wrote:If it meets the armys requirements its fine.

Dear Sir, sometimes even that becomes an issue ... right?
I read a couple of pages ago, that even that we lack the numbers of 155/52 we are "okay" w.r.t the numbers of other guns. At least we have the ability to shoot (or shoot back).
However, haven't we seen that sometimes the defence forces demand the absolute gold-standard in equipment.
I think that was one of the issues over which many BRF pages have been spent discussing, both in the LCA thread and also in the Armoured Vehicles' thread.
Thus, would the IA be willing to agree to procure a gun system with slightly lesser capability (range/ rate-of-fire etc) whilst allowing the DRDO/BF combine to provide them with a gun system?

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 16 Oct 2011 13:46

Maj Gen Krishnan is the New GOC Andhra Sub Area, Secunderabad

Aaryan · Post by **Aaryan** » 16 Oct 2011 23:03

I really dunno where to post it.. after my last ficaso i hope this post will set things right...
http://www.facebook.com/video/video.php?v=1561486692906

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 17 Oct 2011 01:13

Interesting perspective, do not know, if these are transition pains for the mules part or something more seriously to be pondered upon.
Back to the Basics: Foot and Hoof Mobilty in the Mountains

Conclusion

Mobility in mountains and high altitudes demands a very high degree of physical fitness. This is the reason why local populations in these regions are so tough and adaptable. Though the Indian Army is raising local ‘home and hearth’ battalions, the numbers of such troops are limited. Therefore, troops hailing from other parts of the country need to be made as fit as the locals. The general fitness level of the soldier has already been
Back to the Basics: Foot and Hoof Mobilty in the Mountains adversely affected by current lifestyles. The growing reliance on technology at the cost of physical fitness has probably crept into the policy making process as well. This trend needs to be arrested because a tired soldier is easily demoralized when faced with difficult conditions, which is a common experience in high altitude terrain. Well trained and equipped soldiers will be required and they need to be provided with the necessary mobility to take the battle into enemy territory. Here, Animal Transport will be an indispensable element that will be required in considerable numbers. India has enough resources in the form of breeding centres, technical know-how and trained human resources to meet the increased requirement. The need is to first assess the actual requirement and then coordinate with the state and central government agencies. An endeavour must be made to harness local animals which will necessarily perform better. The famous saying that ‘victory is still measured by foot’ is very true in high altitudes.

sivab · Post by **sivab** » 17 Oct 2011 07:40

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/china ... al/860799/

China flexing muscles, Govt clears Brahmos for Arunachal

Pressing ahead with the second phase of military expansion along the China front, the government has given the go-ahead to deployment of Brahmos cruise missiles in Arunachal Pradesh. This will be India’s first offensive tactical missile deployment against China, sources said.

The three Brahmos missile regiments raised so far have been deployed in the western sector to counter the Pakistan threat. This will be the fourth regiment.

With a range of 290 km, these cruise missiles are being deployed to improve India’s military reach into the Tibet Autonomous Region and counter China’s elaborate missile deployment along the Sino-Indian border.

This, sources said, dovetails with India’s second expansion plan but is being fast-tracked because of urgency shown by the armed forces.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has also cleared the five-year expansion plan for which he had given the green signal earlier. The plan involves fresh accretion of 89,000 troops, with 400 officers.

This is estimated to cost over Rs 65,000 crore, making it one of India’s biggest one-time military expansion effort. The proposal is now with the Finance Ministry, and will be put up before the Cabinet Committee on Security.
...

Two Army brigades are also being lined up for the Andamans while a battalion-strength presence is being considered for Lakshadweep alongside the Navy. Air Force assets are also being increased in these island territories, the sources said.

The second Army expansion on the China border will include setting up a corps headquarter in Panagarh, West Bengal, along with two more divisions. An independent armoured brigade along with an artillery division will be part of the set-up.

Paging rohitvats...

Lots of details being leaked in this article. 89,000 troops is ~4 divisions & 65k crores is more than what was quoted in other articles before. Seems like one division is going to Northern command and ~3 divisions to east. This is in addition to 2 divisions being raised in north east.

Prasad · Post by **Prasad** » 17 Oct 2011 09:07

This includes the two mountain divisions that were going to be raised according to earlier reports?

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 17 Oct 2011 09:29

Deadlier war doctrine

Top government sources said learning the brutal lesson from Kargil war of fighting within Indian territory, the new doctrine is actually a step ahead of 'Cold War Start' concept, with scope only for aggression and not passive resistance.

The Cold Start concept was developed post Operation Parakram in 2002, with designated groups prepared to go into war theater from the word go without long drawn out preparations.

Just an independent corroboration of what Rohit has been saying on the thread.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 17 Oct 2011 10:27

^^^That article is a keeper. Please save it for posterity and read it in detail. This one for the first time spells out (in watever detail) the overall military strategy of which CS is an element.

ramdas · Post by **ramdas** » 17 Oct 2011 10:38

Rohitji,

But right now, arent we in the middle of a window of vulnerability during which a joint TSP-PRC attack can humiliate us like in 1962 ?

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 17 Oct 2011 10:51

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 17 Oct 2011 10:53

Ministry of Home Affairs investigations reveal that allegations against Assam Rifles chief Lieutenant General Rameshwar Roy are fraud, and malafide, made by contractors whose attempts to manipulate contracts were thwarted by him.

http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-Tbxx-M6Ex0Q/T ... 746458.jpg

Apparently MHA has more backbone to protect an honest officer than MOD or Army HQ does.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 17 Oct 2011 10:55

^^^Could it be a simple reason that MHA controls the Assam Rifles and hence, is the right authority to comment and take on this case?

Marut · Post by **Marut** » 17 Oct 2011 12:12

ASP made that comment in the context that IA wanted to recall Roy back to army due to the allegations rather than verify if a case can be made and charges framed before proceeding with that step. From press reports, MHA did that & IA didn't.

sum · Post by **sum** » 17 Oct 2011 12:52

Lots of details being leaked in this article. 89,000 troops is ~4 divisions & 65k crores is more than what was quoted in other articles before. Seems like one division is going to Northern command and ~3 divisions to east. This is in addition to 2 divisions being raised in north east.

Damn IE not opening again...could anyone please re-post whole article?

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 17 Oct 2011 13:48

rohitvats wrote:^^^Could it be a simple reason that MHA controls the Assam Rifles and hence, is the right authority to comment and take on this case?

IA's and MODs handling of its senior generals has been harsh in the past couple of years. In some cases maybe it was deserved, but the individual can be punished without the dignity of the office being called into question.

To summarily recall LtGen Roy simply on the basis of allegations would lead to tremendous loss of face (and accomplishment of the purposes of the persons who cooked up this story about him).

MHA's response has been far more measured and appropriate that simply sacking General Roy from the post of DG, Assam Rifles, like Army HQ wanted to do, and bring him back to the army, without giving the facts of the case any thought.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 17 Oct 2011 15:43

ASPuar wrote: IA's and MODs handling of its senior generals has been harsh in the past couple of years. In some cases maybe it was deserved, but the individual can be punished without the dignity of the office being called into question.

To summarily recall LtGen Roy simply on the basis of allegations would lead to tremendous loss of face (and accomplishment of the purposes of the persons who cooked up this story about him).

MHA's response has been far more measured and appropriate that simply sacking General Roy from the post of DG, Assam Rifles, like Army HQ wanted to do, and bring him back to the army, without giving the facts of the case any thought.

Thanks. I get the point.

I have been witness to the vendetta of contractors and their shenanighans; with dropping of anonymous complaint/letter against officers being the most common tactic.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 17 Oct 2011 19:27

Pratyush wrote:
Top government sources said learning the brutal lesson from Kargil war of fighting within Indian territory, the new doctrine is actually a step ahead of 'Cold War Start' concept, with scope only for aggression and not passive resistance.

The Cold Start concept was developed post Operation Parakram in 2002, with designated groups prepared to go into war theater from the word go without long drawn out preparations.
Just an independent corroboration of what Rohit has been saying on the thread.

When was ever the war fighting doctrine against TSP passive? The concept of total mobilization, as advocated by Gen. K. Sundarji, was anything but passive. Long drawn out preparations was considered a liability, only after the political establishment made it to be so. There are other independent good reasons to reduce the preparation time. But, until the policy objectives are not aligned with the military doctrine, capability and organization structure, even cold start will find an excuse, not to be employed.

The IA has to really challenge and understand the policy objectives as prescribed by policy makers and if these objectives align with cold start or an aggressive form of it, then well and good. If not, it is a waste of resources and capabilities.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 18 Oct 2011 07:25

ShauryaT wrote: <SNIP> When was ever the war fighting doctrine against TSP passive? The concept of total mobilization, as advocated by Gen. K. Sundarji, was anything but passive. Long drawn out preparations was considered a liability, only after the political establishment made it to be so.

I think what we're witness to is the transition from Offensive-Defence to Offensive-Offense - where the task of offense rest not only with the Strike Corps but with the Pivot Corps as well. While the Pivot Corps had the offensive capability earlier as well, this time around, the crucial factor is the overall integration of these Corps with Strike Corps in a seamless fashion where Strike Corps build on the gains by Pivot Corps.

Apart from the political agnle, we've the international pressure angle as well. And, from a pure military POV, it is advantageous if you can strike before he has had the time to fully mobilize and is yet off-balance.

But, until the policy objectives are not aligned with the military doctrine, capability and organization structure, even cold start will find an excuse, not to be employed.

Because the hand that wields the Sword is weak does not mean that Sword needs to be discarded for a knife - a logical solution is to get the hand to become strong.

The IA has to really challenge and understand the policy objectives as prescribed by policy makers and if these objectives align with cold start or an aggressive form of it, then well and good. If not, it is a waste of resources and capabilities.

Policy objectives are just one side of the coin. What about the capability and intentions of your enemies? For example, people say that in spite of Indian conventional superiority, the Kargil episode happened and argue for ‘somehow’ altering the force structure. I have a counter question for such geniuses – if, in spite of Indian superiority the PA felt emboldened to do Kargil on India, what would have it done if we did not have military superiority? 1965 is a classic example of the PA psyche. PA, which had qualitative superiority as compared to India and quantitative superiority in critical areas as well, did Operation Grand Slam. Shastri took the fateful decision and rest is history. Question is what if we don’t have the means to enforce decisions like in 1965? Or, the action we took in 1987 at Samdrong Chu? TSPA would have overrun Kashmir by now if it could. The big stick is necessary to ensure that others keep their counsel.

What the Indian Army and other Services have done by formulating CSD (for lack of better way to describe the strategy) is to orient themselves deal with the vagaries of the international environment while addressing the military aspects of war fighting. By developing the CSD, India has the potential to call the nuclear bluff and fight the ‘limited war’ under nuclear overhang. It has provided the Political leaders with options – should they choose to exercise the same. This is a remarkable transformation and we sure have come a long way.

So, to consider these developments as wastage of resources is to look at the issue from only one angle. Services have developed the means – the political leaders can choose to employ what suits them, and the situation, best

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 18 Oct 2011 13:42

MOD's Department of Ex Servicemen Welfare turns into Department of Ex Servicemen WARFARE.

Found to have lied to Supreme Court, in order to deny Honourary Naib Subedars pension benefits.

http://epaper.hindustantimes.com/PUBLIC ... tml?Mode=1

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 18 Oct 2011 13:45

Border Roads Organisation officers put their egos above national security:

Tardy pace of road work along China border

Ajay Banerjee
Tribune News Service

New Delhi, October 17
In brazen slackness on the part of the Indian establishment vis-à-vis China, work on the strategically vital roads in the Himalayas is tottering way behind schedule and in some cases, has totally stopped. As a result, only 25 per cent of the road-building work that was allocated for this financial year has been completed so far, even as half the fiscal is over.

With winter having set in as far as the Himalayas are concerned, progress on the road-building will be even slower than in the first half of the fiscal that ended on September 30. So far, only Rs 1337 crore have been spent by the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) out of its budget of Rs 4962 crore for the year 2011-12.

Sources said at this rate, work will suffer badly. They also estimate that the lag this year will be worse than last year, when the BRO could not utilise its Rs 5427 crore budget and returned Rs 946 crore that was meant for building strategic roads.

A reported clash of egos and divergence of priorities between two groups of officials within the BRO, who have put their ‘false prestige’ ahead of national interest, is one of the prime reasons for the scenario, sources across the BRO and the Ministry of Defence said.

Some of the roads are of such strategic importance that the Army is paying out of its own budget and some roads had been recommended by the all-powerful China Study Group (CSG) headed by the Cabinet Secretary.

A very senior functionary in the Ministry of Defence admitted there was a ‘fight’ between two groups and it was being sorted out. Just two weeks ago, the Minister of State for Defence MM Pallam Raju visited Jammu and Kashmir and asked the BRO to put all roads on priority.

The slackness in road-building has occurred even as PM Manmohan Singh and Defence Minister AK Antony have been assuring that the work to build infrastructure alongside the Chinese frontier is progressing well.

Data of the Border Roads Organisation accessed by The Tribune shows that work on roads in Jammu and Kashmir (largely in Ladakh), Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand is way behind schedule. Here are a few examples. The Chusumle-Demchok road in Eastern Ladakh was to be completed in 2012. The revised schedule has pushed the year of completion to 2015.

The Ministry of Defence wants an all-weather road across the sensitive 18,634-feet-high Marsimik-la near the Line of Actual Control with China in Eastern Ladakh. So far, only 1.43 km of the 43-km stretch is metalled. The project was to be completed last year, but the completion has now been scheduled for 2014.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 18 Oct 2011 14:39

To put every bit of blame in terms of delay in road building in borders on infighting in BRO seems more like a hi job than anything else.

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 18 Oct 2011 14:41

You dont know the depths of perversity sarkaari types can go to for their 'ego'.

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 18 Oct 2011 15:25

C4I2 Summit-2011 inaugurated, focus on security of defence networks

merlin · Post by **merlin** » 19 Oct 2011 10:53

rohitvats wrote:To put every bit of blame in terms of delay in road building in borders on infighting in BRO seems more like a hi job than anything else.

Why? Do you have any other info?

I have absolutely no doubt that China border roads will be in a pathetic condition judging by some roads I saw that were in pathetic condition.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 19 Oct 2011 11:56

merlin wrote:Why? Do you have any other info? I have absolutely no doubt that China border roads will be in a pathetic condition judging by some roads I saw that were in pathetic condition.

I'm not doubting the conditions of the roads; I've seen some of them myself. My point was with respect to the entire blame being placed at the doors of BRO for the state of affairs.

merlin · Post by **merlin** » 19 Oct 2011 13:25

rohitvats wrote:
merlin wrote:Why? Do you have any other info? I have absolutely no doubt that China border roads will be in a pathetic condition judging by some roads I saw that were in pathetic condition.
I'm not doubting the conditions of the roads; I've seen some of them myself. My point was with respect to the entire blame being placed at the doors of BRO for the state of affairs.

If you place the entire blame on BRO, who does it let off the hook?

sum · Post by **sum** » 19 Oct 2011 14:01

X-post:

sum wrote:Very good article on RR by NDTV's Nitin Gokhale:
Unsung and unheard, the Rashtriya Rifles plays a critical role

For a counter-insurgency force that is largest of its kind in the world, the Rashtriya Rifles receives very little attention in discussions and writings on India's endless war in Kashmir.

Staying out of the limelight, however, does not take away in any way the immense contribution made by this force in the past two decades in India's fight against Pakistan's proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir.

It is important to remember that officially the Rashtriya Rifles is still a 'temporary force', since clearance to raise the force was given under the provisions of Union Composite Table, Part II.

So, theoretically, if the Union government wants, it can disband the 80,000-strong force with an executive order.

However, given the relentless attempts by Pakistan to send highly-trained and heavily-armed terrorists into Kashmir, the chances of such an eventuality in the near future remain low.

Moreover, like the Assam Rifles in the north-east, the Rashtriya Rifles in J&K has emerged as a force that now has unmatched knowledge of the terrain, the people, local dynamics and most importantly, intelligence.

It is now the spearhead of the Indian Army's sub-conventional war doctrine.

In many ways, the Rashtriya Rifles remains a unique experiment in the army's glorious history, mainly because never in the past has such an 'all-arms', polyglot composition worked in tandem to produce such magnificent results.

After all, this is the only force where infantry soldiers work shoulder to shoulder with personnel drawn from other arms and services.

The beginning was not easy though. The Rashtriya Rifles was born under very difficult circumstances.

The initial proposal was to have a new para-military force under the home ministry's control and made up of superannuating soldiers, regular army volunteers on deputation, ex-servicemen and lateral inductees from various para-military forces and central police organisations.

Although good on paper, this proposal never took off and the since the situation in the Kashmir valley was deteriorating swiftly, the army had to find quick answers. So the top brass under then Army Chief General S F Rodrigues decided to make the Rashtriya Rifles an all-army force.

The government was still reluctant to put its full weight behind the idea. Old timers recall that the dominant thought process in 1990 at the highest levels in government was still to push in two divisions of the army -- the 39th and 6th -- into counter-insurgency operations.

The army brass resisted fiercely and insisted on a specialised counter-insurgency force.

Looking back, that decision not to deploy the 39th and 6th division (the latter army HQ reserve) was perhaps the most crucial advice that the army gave to the government.

Under General Rodgrigues, a crack, proven CI formation -- the 8th Mountain Division -- raised and then continuously based in Nagaland for over two decades was shifted to the valley. But even that was not enough.

So as General Rodgrigues made way for General B C Joshi as Chief Of the Army Staff, he simply bulldozed his way through both the military and civil bureaucracy to raise more Rashtriya Rifles units during his short tenure.

General Joshi's view was: India was going to be involved in an extended counter-insurgency similar to the prolonged deployment in Nagaland and Manipur in the north-east. So a new force -- like the Assam Rifles in that region -- was needed which could be permanently located in Kashmir to counter the insurgents.

So General Joshi demanded and got 10 more Rashtriya Rifles sector HQs or 30 battalions equivalent to three divisions. His logic: In the bargain the army would have three additional battle-hardened divisions, ready for rearguard action during any future war.

In nearly 20 years since then, General Joshi's prediction has come true! The Rashtriya Rifles units are now as battle-hardened, seasoned and effective as any infantry formation.

The early Rashtriya Rifles units have been described as 'transit camps', with troops coming and going at regular intervals. The camaraderie and cohesion usually evident in regular army units was missing among diverse troops.

There were also numerous problems of administration and even of indiscipline. However, because of the highest quality of leadership displayed by army officers, those initial hiccups were overcome gradually.

It also helped that under the next COAS, General Shankar Roy Chowdhury, a new formula was evolved on the basic composition of Rashtriya Rifles units. Each regiment was told to raise two Rashtriya Rifles battalions and provide 60 per cent of the strength for each unit. The rest 40 per cent were drawn from all services and arms.

Additionally, the Commanding Officer and his No 2 were drawn from the same regiment. This ensured basic cohesion and discipline. The new formula also engendered a sense of ownership amongst the regiments.

Now as a matter of routine one finds a Rashtriya Rifles battalion proudly displaying its parent regiment's name on display boards and sign posts.

So, across Jammu and Kashmir it is now common to see boards proudly displaying signs such as 36 RR (Garhwal) or 40 RR (Dogra)!

Today the Rashtriya Rifles has a separate directorate in the army HQs and is spread over five CI Force HQs, equivalent to a division.

While two are in the Kashmir valley -- CI Force (K), CI Force (V) -- the other three, CI Force (U), CI Force (D) and CI Force (R) are located south of Pir Panjal.

These 63 battalions of Rashtriya Rifles form the main CI grid in Jammu and Kashmir, thereby relieving regular army units for training and deployment in their original conventional role.

Aware of the potential of these battle-hardened Rashtriya Rifles battalions, the top military leadership in the Northern Command is now gradually thinking of assigning a new role to these formations.

Accordingly, Rashtriya Rifles battalions deployed in Kashmir's hinterland where militancy is at low ebb in the past few years are now being assigned a role along the Line of Control. By doing this, the top brass is readying the Rashtriya Rifles units for multi-tasking in the future.

If militancy remains confined to encounters along the LoC, as has been happening over the past few months, several Rashtriya Rifles units located in the hinterland may find themselves without much of a job.

If these units are slowly given the experience of guarding the LoC, many more infantry battalions can be freed from LoC deployment and can then be trained or redeployed in high altitude areas along the Line of Actual Control with China in Ladakh or in Arunachal Pradesh.

After all, India is planning to raise a full-fledged Mountain Strike Corps in addition to two mountain divisions already under raising in the north-east.

All these plans will fructify quickly once the government decides to regularise the Rashtriya Rifles and not keep a sword hanging on the army's head by giving piecemeal extension.

Avik · Post by **Avik** » 19 Oct 2011 14:04

Hopefully this will complement the border roads infrastructure...

http://www.business-standard.com/india/ ... on/453022/

The railway projects include the 125-km Rishikesh-Karanprayag railway line involving a project cost of Rs 4,295 crore, the 154-km Rs 2,791-crore Tanakpur-Bageshwar line (both in Uttarakhand), the Rs 13,631-crore Jammu-Akhnoor-Poonch railway link covering 233 km in Jammu and Kashmir, the 498-km Bilaspur-Mandi railway link in Himachal Pradesh and the 110-km Rupai-Parasuramkund railway link in Arunachal Pradesh.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 19 Oct 2011 14:10

Well, to set the record straingt, 39th MD was inducted for extended period in the CI Ops.

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 20 Oct 2011 10:12

http://www.aftdelhi.nic.in/benches/chan ... 202011.pdf

nits · Post by **nits** » 20 Oct 2011 13:46

IAF goofs, reveals Army border sites in tender

The Indian Air Force has revealed allegedly sensitive information in a tender document posted on its website, giving the exact coordinates (latitude and longitude) of a number of Army helipads in the vital northern and eastern sectors bordering Pakistan and China.

The revealing of such information in public by the Indian Air Force has caused some concern as it is felt in some quarters that providing of coordinates of helipads, including some near the LoC (border with Pakistan-occupied Kashmir), could provide an advantage to Pakistan in the event of a conflict. Similarly, the coordinates of helipads in Arunachal near the LAC (border with China) could provide an advantage to the Chinese side.

Ankit Desai · Post by **Ankit Desai** » 20 Oct 2011 22:10

Army converts one infantry division into RAMFOR

The Hyderabad-based 54 Infantry Division has been converted into an amphibious formation to bolster capabilities to carry out amphibious operations, Army sources told PTI here.

The Indian Army has converted one of its infantry divisions with over 10,000 troops into a Reorganised Amphibious Formation (RAMFOR).

-Ankit