Klaus wrote:Bji, we would like to hear your thoughts on Dr Bharat Karnad's recent speech, the audio and transcripts of which have been posted in multiple threads.
Klaus ji, another dear friend has also asked about this. I was absorbed in the Partition model.
I do not have the original transcript, but I am using the summaries of PratikDas. I will not comment on his military tech comments right now - which to say the least is "radioactive".
Briefly : I would summarize his positions strategically as :
(1) China is a greater threat than Pakistan. Do everything possible to keep Pak neutral while you deal with the China threat.
(2) Pak is not permanently toxic as a separate entity. It is possible to detoxify Pak at least to the extent that it loses its India-specific hatred. Further Pak can be used as a buffer to absorb Islamic shocks from further to the west.
This line of perception is not new. But we need to understand why this perspective, where from, and why now. I feel that it is a long term perception in the congrez core from before the Partition - where, the preservation of a strong centre based in the northern plains - especially around the beginning of the GV, is the first priority. That strong centre would preserve a basis of personal and associated network dominance over the primary demographic and economic strength and flows over most of India.
In this, the perception continues that in areas like Punjab and Bengal are troublesome and unruly regions best kept out of the "centre". Muslims cannot be trusted where they happen to be the majority, and should not be kept close to or inside the centre. At the same time an independent cultural identity based on the non-Muslim sectors of Sikh and Hindus gives away too much power to networks far from the centre - since these identities are spread around all over the country and distant subregions. Hence a small minority Muslim inside serves as an effective balancing tool to be encouraged to keep the basis of personal power strong as a claim of a mediator.
The utility of a "managed" Muslim population is too ingrained into this type of thinking. This leads to visualizing a Paki population with emasculated military - a good utility option. To be preserved outside and far from the comfort zone of the "centre", while serving as a useful check to other sources of threat. The military aspect of Islam is feared - but the hoped for herd-behaviour and retrogressive tendencies of the social theological organization is seen as useful. For the congrez mentality - Paki muslim populations should never be allowed to come into the "central fold", where they may threaten the base for personal power - both directly as well as mobilizing counter-Islamic reaction - making the mediator role irrelevant.
Focusing attention on China in a public way is a good way out - especially if no real war is intended. Nothing concrete will be said or even done in preparation for Tibet because, congrez never intended to do anything seriously about it. It always used the Tibetans as a kind of hostage for good Chinese behaviour - not always with success.
The main thrust of this thinking is about preserving and defending the base of personal power in the north-central plains between Punjab and Bihar. The periphery is all "troublesome" and needs to be kept on an uncertain animated suspension mode.
At the moment this public focus is to take away attention from the western borders - where the pre-Partition hesitation still holds, and is reflected in the hesitant explorations about KV. Because KV is predominantly Muslim and the rest of the region predominantly non-Muslim - congrez is secretly in a state of permanent vacillation and indecision. Just as it was about Punjab and Bengal. For very similar reasons about the lack of clarity and deeply hidden anxiety/distrust of the Muslim. Moreover they know that now is a good time to make this a public issue - to score many points at the same time. A kind of diplomatic overture to the west that India would be aligned to western interests vis-a-vis China and hence flexing muscle, to take the edge off criticism about the apparent weakness towards Paki Islamism, and finally to hang the threat of "nationalist sentiments" against domestic opposition.
What BK is doing perhaps unknowingly, is playing into this gameplan. He is in such a position that he can be "over-convinced" - too much of intel inputs can be carefully arranged to sway thinkings of experts in certain directions.
