..
what else you can do other than getting personal?Cool it dude.Stan_Savljevic wrote:^^^ May be you should practice the gyan you (and chetak in this dhaaga) deliver at http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 8#p1199418 and stop worrying about non-Indians, their health, safety and well-being. Perhaps the irony of selective preaching may hit you, but I will have to hope for god to come down to earth for that.
Or I can hope that you may realize that Dehradun, Agra, Delhi, Bodhgaya etc. are more closer to the faultline of UP politics than to TN politics. But given the standards you have set for yourself in the past on your remarkably deep insights that display an overflow of commonsense, doubt it
chetak wrote:Take a drive in rural Tamil Nadu, Andhra to physically see what is being spoken about.Stan_Savljevic wrote: Regarding LTTE's support base in TN now, Christian missionary funding via the FCRA/non-FCRA routes, much of hot air is being blown by you, Philip and the civilizational worries expressed by chetak. Similar amusing remarks bordering on black-and-whiting were made by RajeshA when he created that dhaaga on how TN is fcked or similar nonsense. Anyway...
PS: Philip, wer art thou's mama and machan remarks, have nt seen them in a while
A lot of chaff has been mixed up in this smorgasbord of a post.joshvajohn wrote:India Srilanka friendship is fine. My question is India also told the Tamils particularly DMK regime that they will not interfere into Srilankan affairs. That is also fine. But then when International bodies are trying to bring Lankan president to justice why Indians and foreign secretaries going around and campaigning for them to vote against any motion that will bring Lankan Govt to Hague. If Indian govt wants to be neutral stay neutral! Do not support Criminal acts and terrorising Tamils in Lanka by working together with China and Russians in this regard. Secondly Indians should talk about any terror presence in their land, if they are non interfering in other soverign countries. Why Indians should talk or worry about LTTE terror in some others lands when they do not want to interfere into anyone's business. So basically the present agenda of Indian govt is very clear. Many in the congress govt hated Sikhs and so killed one man in every household. They hate Gujarat because thus people work hard to grow their state and so the nation. They hate Kashmiri Hindus because they vote BJP. It is regionalism, politics, linguistic and religious hatred spread by Congress (or at least in the name of Congress) more than BJP. They hate Tamils because they too grow. The central congress govt wants to create problems in these states communally and emotionally and they do all that they can in order to destroy people and the state. Anti Tamil campaign is part of this drive at national level.
The present govt is setting precedence that if Indians are attacked in another country in large scale the same argument is going to be made against India not to interfere into another person's business.
The Real Lessons of Sri Lanka's War: A Global Power Shift and the End of Human Rights
Read more: http://globalspin.blogs.time.com/2011/1 ... z1ecLGpeo4
Yeah, yeah, we know.joshvajohn wrote:New Report Documents Torture in Sri Lanka (Video)
Read more: http://www.care2.com/causes/new-report- ... z1edAQuFD3
Sugar coating bitter realities with laughable theatrics
http://www.sundaytimes.lk/111120/Columns/focus.html
Charity hands UN file to back Sri Lankan torture claims
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/nov/0 ... ims-tamils
When criminalisation and torture of a particular people is carried out by some in the Lankan Govt and when India supports such govt in some ways means it is part of such criminalisation and torture. While I recognise the fact that some development is carried out in the Tamil Areas by Indian govt, the game of Lankan govt is not well understood by Indian govt or even when they understand it the Indian side keeps quiet about it or India has ran out of foreign polcies in relation to Lanka.
joshvajohn ji,joshvajohn wrote:Chetak
When Indian students were attacked in Australia why India raised her voice against Australia? When Keralites and other Indians suffered in Gulf region why India sent planes to collect them?
Philip saar,Philip wrote:The "white flag" gimmick was actually alleged by some to have been the method suggested by the western patrons of the LTTE,to their top cadre as a means of identifying themselves so that they could be picked up safely and airlifted to a naval vessel.
Indian Tamils SHOULD respect the sovereign borders of lanka.joshvajohn wrote:Chetak
Are you saying that Tamils in lanka can be tortured and Indian Tamils should not do anything because according some of you guys argument looks as if Tamils are not Indians and so just get over it whether it is an attack on Fishermen or torture of Lankan Tamils in Lanka. So are you promoting a separatism in India? Tamils in India have contributed to Indian country and will be part of it and will want to raise the issue of Srilankan Tamils in India when they are attacked.
I thought that amma had more sense than to spin it this way.
India and the conduct of the war as seen by the Norway report:
With Congress coming to power in 2004, India offers Radar services to Colombo. (p54)
“More importantly, Indian opposition to the LTTE starts to translate into firmer backing for the Sri Lankan government.” (p58)
“Sri Lanka also secured an air force servicing agreement with Pakistan, improved its electronic and other surveillance with inputs from Indian and US intelligence.” (p94)
“The interception of LTTE ‘merchant’ ships with reported Indian support (and possibly US intelligence.” (p95)
“India appeared to have given the government tacit (and to some extent active) support in its military campaign and as explored further below, other regional powers (mainly China) stepped in to back the government.” (p74)
Contrary to what India was projecting to its people about China’s involvement, the Norway report testifies that it was India that encouraged Sri Lanka to bring in China.
“Delhi maintains it will not provide offensive military assets – due to the political sensitivity of Indian weapons being used against Tamils – but off the record, it does not object to Sri Lanka purchasing weaponry elsewhere.” (p59)
“We did not want Indian bullets used against Tamils,” a senior Indian diplomat explained. But it did provide intelligence and radar surveillance, and it did not oppose Sri Lanka’s military purchases in China, “so as to not alienate Rajapaksa and to avoid China and Pakistan from getting a hold,” an Indian observer said, the report cited.
“As the military offensive intensifies, it becomes increasingly clear that India will not apply pressure on the Sri Lankan government to call off the offensive. Behind the scenes, India is ‘not hesitant to support the government’s offensive against the LTTE,’ but realizes it needs to ‘manage the political fallout,’ according to a senior Indian diplomat reflecting on this period. It is considered a ‘no-brainer’ that India should ‘support the government in this offensive. In public, however, the Indian government refrains from voicing these views,” (p63)
“India meanwhile walked a fine line between showing concern for the plight of the Tamils stuck in the war zone while supporting the defeat of the LTTE and preserving its ties with the Sri Lankan government. Most observers agree that India’s most important influence on the end of the war lay not in the things it did and said, but in the things it did not do and say. ‘The war was led by Indian silence.” (p78)
“It is also doubtful India has any interest in the LTTE surviving the end of the war.” (p67)
“The Indian External Affairs establishment in fact seems to consider its handling of the end of Sri Lanka’s war a relative success.” (p79)
Norway report talks on India’s handling of the peace process:
“It identifies India and the US as the main players and gets their concurrence. In meetings in Delhi with the Indian Foreign Secretary, the National Security Advisor and the intelligence agency (RAW), it becomes clear that India will keep an arm’s length approach and will not take an active role in the process [in 2001 during BJP government].” (p33)
“To keep the discussion moving, help is sought from Satish Nambiar, a retired Indian general, who drafts a revised plan, suggesting a phased dismantling of High Security Zones matched by simultaneous dismantling of LTTE operational capacities.” (pp 41-42)
“India’s response to Norway’s role was less committal and less optimistic. India did not object since they saw Norway as non-threatening and gave them (lukewarm) support in the absence of any obvious alternatives. As one Indian informant commented: ‘the attitude was: try it and we’ll see what happens, [but] the Indians never factored Norway as a serious presence. They were respectful, but sceptical of what they could actually do.” (p73)
“The downside, according to one Indian diplomat, was ‘that Norway gave the LTTE some legitimacy which we found very uncomfortable.” (p74)
“India did not oppose Japanese involvement, but there was little enthusiasm for an overly political Japanese role. In the words of an Indian diplomat, Akashi was pretty much irrelevant.”
“The Sea Tigers and maritime shipments are vital for the LTTE, but it is difficult for the government to accept a compromise on the sea. Moreover, the navy, Kumaratunga and India are very sceptical about this issue, so the clause on this [in the CFA] is deliberately kept woolly.”
India opposed a stronger SLMM.
The report also hints that the split of Karuna found Indian support. The report says that for the first time the SL Army played an autonomous role in dealing with Karuna, against the wishes of the then President Kumaratunga, and Karuna was subsequently brought to India (p50). [Karuna found the patronage of The Hindu in Chennai]. Norway tried through UNP and PA to tell India not to recognize Karuna (p51).
“With the peace talks deadlocked, however, it becomes clear international support for the process is increasingly fragmented. India refuses to take a more overt role. (p49)
Rajapaksa rejected Norway and suggested UN, India and another regional power to facilitate peace. (p56)
“The Norwegians continue to solicit a more active Indian role in support of the talks in 2007, but Delhi continues to decline the suggestion.”
The report records the following on the rift between the approaches of Norway’s peace process and the aims of India:
“The then Norwegian ambassador in Colombo, Tore Hattrem described India as suffering from a ‘Burma syndrome’ in its Sri Lanka policy, meaning that it would not place a focus on human rights and democracy issues (as arguably had been the case in Burma in the 1990s) for fear of pushing the country into a closer relationship with China. India continued to express support for Norway’s efforts in Sri Lanka, but with the return of the UPA and the resumption of war, Delhi’s support for the Sri Lankan government (whether open or tacit) amounted to pursuing peace through the military defeat of the LTTE (see also International Crisis Group, 2011). The contradictions between this and Norway’s approach became ever wider.” (p76)
BJP and Congress governments:
The report records the difference in the outlook between the BJP and Congress governments during peace and war in the island.
India under BJP was not much interested in involving in Sri Lanka, the report revelations showed.
According to Mr. Solheim, LTTE and India secretly met at the inception of the peace process [in BJP times]. Solheim declined to say where the meeting took place and who participated.
Since Congress coming to power, India militarily and diplomatically helped Colombo, and the Indian agenda of military solution differed from the approaches of the Norwegian peace process is the observation of the report that places much of the responsibility of the ‘Asian model of conflict resolution’ with the Congress regime of India.
The report also touches on the point that there were expectations of a different end of the war, pinning hopes on a BJP victory in May 2009.
“Indian Home Minister Chidambaram contacts Prabhakaran and suggests the LTTE agrees to a pre-drafted statement that they will lay down their weapons,” the report says, but without giving citations the report continues, “The document leaks to Vaiko, a radical but marginal Eelamist politician in Tamil Nadu, who rejects it as a Congress trick and assures the LTTE that BJP will win the ongoing Indian elections and come to the Tigers’ rescue.” (pp 67-68)
There is more to this story. Will unfold as time goes by.Rajiv Gandhi assassination factor:
The report also establishes a connection between the Rajiv assassination and the military solution to the conflict:
“However, crushing the LTTE has become the overriding concern after the disasters of the Indo-Lankan Accord in 1987 and the subsequent LTTE assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991. The return to power of the Indian National Congress (now headed by his widow Sonia Gandhi) in 2004 and declining influence of Sri Lanka on Tamil Nadu politics (see chapter 7) mean that there are fewer inhibitions on a military solution to the conflict. India thus continues to advocate for the accommodation of Tamil aspirations in Sri Lanka, but does not apply any pressure against the Rajapaksa government in relation to the military option.” (p59)
Mr. Erik Solheim also extensively touched on the point in his speech and in answering questions Friday.
“Of course, the killing of Rajiv Gandhi was an enormous blunder. If you want to receive the support from the United States, would you kill an American president? I mean, who would even contemplate that? India was the main source of support for the Tamil Tigers, why then kill Rajiv Gandhi, an outstanding Indian prime minister, Solheim asked.
During the question and answer session, Mr. Solheim was asked by Mr. Pirabukkannan, a native of Tamil Nadu living in Norway that why was he always referring to the killings done by only one party while there were several Tamil leaders who were killed by the SL State.
Even on that occasion, Mr. Solheim brought out the case of Rajiv Gandhi and said: “But, for a non-state actor attacking and killing the [former] Prime Minister of India – Frankly, that is very rare. It is hard to think of any terrorist group attacking the president of America, or the president of China and the Prime Minister of India. It is immoral and is also enormously foolish. India was the main source of strength of the Tamil Tigers, why do they then kill the [former] prime minister of that land,” Solheim asked.
Many Tamil Nadu leaders who were negotiating with the New Delhi Establishment on stopping the war in the island also testify that there was a tendency in New Delhi to link Rajiv assassination with the military solution.
While concluding his remarks at the panel discussion Friday, Gunnar M. Sørbø, the leader of the team that wrote the report said: “On the role of India, there are many other points of view than is reflected in the panel here – I must say. I just ask you to read the report. We have been in Delhi and Chennai and there were many other points of view that were simply reflective.”
The key moment must have been Karuna's split.The following are excerpts from the speech as well as question and answer session of Erik Solheim at the panel discussion on Norway’s report, Friday:
“We started the peace process on the part of Norway with the belief that this could be resolved in a few months time.This will take a decade at the minimum. So, we learnt to be patient and you need to be patient with a peace process.”
“India, throughout had a veto power over the peace process. Because the Tigers did not have access to India, Milinda and myself shuttled to Delhi. I don't know how many times I have been at the Indian airport of New Delhi, meeting Indian intelligence and others and there was no major step in the peace process whatsoever was taken without informing India. Sometimes they gave tacit accept even if they may have disagreed. But, India was throughout informed. And the reason for that was very simple.”
“From Day 1, we took the view that India is by far the most important foreign influence in Sri Lanka. The United States is important. But, it is second to India. And even more so, for India, Sri Lanka is a core interest. For the United States, it is periphery interest. And the United States will never ever risk relationship with India for Sri Lanka. {for all the SLankans, you can replace US with china too, not much is going to change.} So, if India is on board, ultimately the United States will basically follow. Most important and even into the details, for instance, what nations should be acceptable in the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission – they [the Indians] gave us a list of nations that they would accept and we picked from that [smiling].”
Panel discussion
“Then, may be on the views on different roles of India, but there can be no different views on the fact that India was consulted throughout the peace process. Milinda can confirm it. I can confirm it. Every other actor can confirm it. India was much more into the peace process than most people tend to believe. There were secret meetings between the India and the LTTE. I participated in these meetings. I will not disclose who were they and where did that happen, but they did happen. There was lot more contacts. India, at every stage was consulted. They were kept informed on the smallest details and throughout they were supportive to the peace process. And, only in the final stage of 2008 onwards, top Indian officials saw there could be a military answer to the conflict. Prior to that they all said no –all that the foreign minister and all the heads of the intelligence apparatus and heads of the Foreign Service – who were the key individuals. So, the role of India was throughout.”
“I was very – I have to say Very Close – to Indian Intelligence. I met them enormous amounts of time throughout this process. Never, ever did any Indian official hint that a military victory was possible until mid 2008. Then they started, I mean I observed the change in Mr. Narayan and others, gradually shifting to the position that maybe – still may be that the government can wipe out the Tigers, militarily. Before that, no one thought it was possible. United States thought it was impossible; India thought it was impossible; Colombo thought it was impossible. So again, complete change from what we all based the peace process on, until that point.”
[Mr Solheim on Friday had to defend him against the observation of the report and the remarks of the report team leader that Norway should have quitted the peace process at an earlier opportunity in order to signal the world about the realities of the peace process turning into war. The thrust of Solheim’s speech largely blamed the LTTE, subtly shielded and defended the other players from war crime indictments and saw the end of the war not as a culmination of an intentional process but as a historical accident. “What happened was not necessarily what had to happen,” he said.]
“India supported Norway because they thought it would not work anyway. India had very clear ideas about the acceptable parameters for a settlement; it would not countenance anything that went beyond the 13th amendment in terms of devolution of power to the north-east. Also, the ‘LTTE could not be part of the solution.” (p 73)
“ISGA was not acceptable for the Muslim and Sinhala minorities, for the government and for India, all of whom are concerned that the proposed referendum after the interim period could still lead to some form of secession.” (p 47)
There have been Brahmin born kings. Ravana was born in Noida of Brahmin parents. He became jealous of Kuber so captured Lanka
JwalaMukhi wrote:The idea of creating mutilation and chaos within one's own place of existence, inspired by funding and ideology imported from elsewhere is unique among losers. Just as tutsis and hutus went hammer and tongs against their own, the misguided tamils of Srilanka jumped on the bandwagon of imported ideology and wrecked havoc by laying landmines etc., where the lived. That was one more avenue to beg for international aid, so the ideologically inspired do-gooders could descend and further fuel the chaos. That is the hallmark of typical losers, who inspired by outer ideology turn on themselves.
It is laughable, that they could not even garner support of the tamils within srilanka, where eastern based faction broke away citing reasons of disparity and disenchanment in the project which swiftly moved from being legit rights and aspirations to safeguarding of non-democractic power structure (which was pliable to outside ideology) in perpetuity. The distancing of karuna faction would have sent sobering moments, but for faction that had married and let its focus to be hijacked to outside ideology, it had little sense to take stock of the situation. Instead it turned into hutus and tutsis mode. But inspite of all that they hope that such ideologically inspired movement be supported from across India, when they couldn't get the buy in from within srilanka.
It should be a learning moment for the tamils in Srilanka to draw right lessons and effect course correction. But, letting ideologically inspired group to wag the dog is not going to fly.
A decent point, but not explored even as to what lessons can be learned in terms of COIN management for Indian context (say the maoists/NE terror outfits where very similar tactics are studied and even implemented in a good measure).The distancing of karuna faction ...
. Ah well, call it a CT if you feel the need to, but its definitely a multi-layered CT than the usual 1-d vatican-maino-world bank nonsense that is the norm of the intelligentsia of the forum.... .Not to put too fine point on it, this mumbo jumbo pseudo analyses of the rectal crevices of the so called ltte policy and ideology is just "1-dimensional nonsense peddling" from your side.Stan_Savljevic wrote:
So chetak, make that "1-dimensional nonsense peddlers" if it brings in some more khud-kushi
Continuing with the 1-dimensional process, because, if one does not even grasp things in 1D, then talking about 3D is moot except for few nulli secundus-es and know it alls.chetak wrote: Simply stated, we just do not want the ltte and its followers to gain ANY traction in India.
Tamil rebels holed up in ever-diminishing territory in northern Sri Lanka forcibly recruited children to take part in final defences against government troops, according to a former senior official. Some of the youngsters were sent to fight with just one day's basic training. A number of civilians who tried to escape to the government side were shot.
The official, who held a non-military position with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), said that in the spring of 2009, the rebels found themselves in an ever-worsening situation that led them to step up their forced recruitment of civilians between the age of 14 and 55. He said more than 300,000 civilians had intentionally been held to provide cover for the LTTE fighters.
"There was no age discrimination. One day's training and then [they would] get sent to the war front," said the former official, who said his own child had been forcibly recruited, but that he was able to escape towards government troops. Asked if he believed the rebels committed war crimes, the former official said: "There were many war crimes during that last time. The civilians knew [what was happening]. They could not move out of LTTE control. Some people who tried to leave were shot."
The testimony from the official, who asked that neither his identity nor the location of the interview be revealed, provides an important insight about the final stages of the war, which resulted in the crushing of the LTTE and the killing of most of its leaders. Earlier this year, a report by the UN said there were "credible allegations" that both the government troops and the LTTE committed war crimes in those last weeks and days. It said tens of thousands of civilians may have been killed. The Sri Lankan government has denied the allegations and repeatedly rejected calls for an independent investigation.
The official also provided an insight into how the LTTE's leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, seized on the ambitions of Tamil nationalists, including those who were opposed to violence. "He was a good leader. In all things he was adamant, he was focused. There is no chance for another uprising now. There is no leadership," he said. "The Tamil diaspora can provide some political pressure, but anything else is not possible."
Yet the official conceded that Prabhakaran's unquestioning self-belief had also led to several tactical errors, including his insistence that Tamils boycott the 2005 election. This move indirectly led to victory narrowly being secured by Mahinda Rajapaksa, who within a year would decide to launch military operations to crush the LTTE.
Asked about the later tactic of the LTTE to target civilians and even schoolchildren, the official said not everyone within the movement supported the move and were aware of the international backlash it would bring. "That was why they denied it," said the official. As to why the tactic was adopted, he said: "They wanted to create a panic among the Sinhala people."
The official, who said his involvement with the LTTE dated from 1995, a date when the organisation lost control of the city of Jaffna and moved its headquarters to Kilinochi, claimed that since the end of the war, the government had done little in terms of promoting reconciliation.
In two local elections held in the north since the conclusion of the war in May 2009, Tamil parties easily defeated the coalition of the government.
"The main thing is to find a political solution," said the official, who is due before a court next year to face charges relating to his role with the LTTE. "The war is over, the LTTE is defeated. So far there has been no signal about a political solution. They say they are having negotiations, but people are not satisfied."