...And I suppose Katare you were right there with the various officals at the signing of these various deals for which you give chronology !
No offence meant,jokes apart,there is a wealth of information available upon which I'm basing my opinions in my osts,from my "information boundary".I've always when asked to "prove" myself given instances.I have the right to my opinions and if others disagree,they can do so without malice. We haven't descended into the proposed cyber-space dictatorial regime of Herr "Goebells" Sibal as yet!
For one,I don't know where dear old Hugo Chavez and the other "macho men" crept into the naval discussion debate! Those personally aimed comments betray the lawyer's trait of "desk thumping" when the argument is weak.
If the armed forces are fed up with supplier "X" or "Y",who doesn't deliver on time or deliver at all,penalise him! What is legendary Indian babudom for? I have said many a time that we need to give the same urgency to decision-making with all deals instead of only recent deals with the US which have been done in record time.Instances have been given by others as to how we paid a lot more for Harpoon missiles than Oz through FMS.
Secondly,I have not ever recommended that the services buy only from Russia or from any other nation.The hard fact is that during the Cold War it was the USSR that was willing to sell us advanced weaponry when the west refused and sold its wares to Pak.It is why we have so much of legacy Russian eqpt.What was available to us when Pak bought Ukranian T-80UDs on the cheap? Only the T-90.Arjun hadn't been perfected then.Look at the chronology of all Indian acquisitions and ask why they were bought.Furthermore there would have been no ATV without Russian assistance and no arriving Akula too.Granted both arrived/are arriving late,but better a little late than never! Let us be gracious to "old friends" who have helped us where others refused.
I have always said that "horses for courses" should be our way forward in military acquisitions which shoud be transparent,but it is no secret that in the MMS years there has been a huge concerted effort by the US to "acquire" the Indian armed forces into its sphere of operations and integrate it into its group of allies ,with a view to fighting future conflicts,esp. with China (the three-nation US,Oz,Japan mtg. in Oz soon one example),an integrating India requires that the Indian armed forces have key weapon systems that are US/western.MMS has made some peculiar foreign policy gaffes in meetings with the Pakis giving wide susicion that they were made at the behest of Washington.Fortunately,the rump of the Congress seems to follow "traditional",perhaps they could be described as "Nehruvian" attitudes in such matters and the resistance by the stablishment against yeilding the to the US totally in def. and for.policy has been strong.
We have had US officials openly saying that the military hardare acquisitions and MMRCA should've been given to the US for its help in the N-deal.Whatever I've posted earlier has been based upon official of published sources not from any blinkered imagination as suggested.
True,we are buying a lot of eqpt. from Russia,the EU,Israel and others and not from the US of A.Why? Indo-US relations are hampered by a variety of stumbling blocks,particularly its long-time relationship with Pak and inability tio "give generously" defence eqpt. without an assortment of strings atached to such deals.Here is a quote from a recent conference giving both Indian and US points of view about the realtionship:
http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/us ... 23773.html
'US, India should co-develop weapons tech'
Describing defense cooperation as an important element to bridge long and short-term differences, both Cohen and Dasgupta were of the view that the nuclear deal has bought greater freedom for Washington on its Pakistan policy and could serve this role again as the United States tries to extricate itself from the region.
"For this to happen, both said Washington must hold out the large carrot of technology and weapons transfers, which are politically problematic for many reasons, specifically the restrictive domestic legislation on defense hardware.
They said one solution lies in the United States co-developing technology with India, as it does with Israel. Since new technology is not yet developed, it cannot be subjected to restrictive US laws.
Dr Cohen and Professor Dasgupta said India is hedging all around.
From New Delhi’s perspective, in matters of defense Washington is the best possible partner, but Washington is perceived as being unwilling to fulfill the role. India continues to buy Russian equipment due to prices and a misplaced sense of autonomy.
They predicted that there could be a major Indo-Russian rupture very soon, but added that India will buy what it really needs, such as fighter jets, from both Europeans and Russians, who are less likely than the United States to attach conditions to such purchases.
They also said that India will continue to buy from the United States items unrelated to immediate threats, such as power projection equipment etc.
"Now that India has the money to buy and build, it must decide on its priorities and with whom to partner. In this, the United States remains a contender, but not the obvious or automatic first choice," both said.
Recently India rejected offers from two US firms to compete for a medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) contract worth over 10 billion dollars. This was followed by the resignation of US Ambassador to India Timothy Roemer, which some thought was related to the bidding.
However, Cohen and Dasgupta said that Ambassador Roemer’s departure from New Delhi was unrelated to the MMRCA decision.
"The MMRCA decision is said to have been made on technical grounds, though we also know that “technical” superiority can mask other motivations. The Indian defense establishment is uneasy about using an American airplane on missions potentially involving combat with Pakistan, a formal US ally. There may also be US laws limiting the planes from carrying nuclear weapons. In the end, we believe, the decision was mostly political, as India intended to preserve supply reliability," they said.
"The United States continues to have a poor reputation as a military supplier. The current problems India is having with the Nuclear Suppliers Group have been attributed to US," they added.
On the issue of American technology-transfer restrictions on potential defense cooperation, both Cohen and Dasgupta said: "US legislation traditionally sees India as a technology risk and a problem state. On the Indian side, there are bloated expectations. The Indian attitude tends to be, “We have been neglected, and we are important; therefore, we have a claim to your technology to make up for past neglect.”
"Americans see India as a risky state that overemphasizes technology as a route to military modernization. This is seen in the case of India’s nuclear weapons, which serve as a powerful deterrent but are no substitute for a modern conventional military. Somewhere between these attitudes there is an opportunity for a realistic, hardheaded exchange of technology. The relationship is short of an alliance, but more than a friendship," they added.
They also said that the Indian state has failed to develop a timely, transparent, and legitimate military procurement system.
They claimed that the defense acquisition system in India is heavily bureaucratized, and this is a detriment to force capability and readiness.
"India’s political system obsesses over high profile items and neglects the increasing competency in the armed forces and defense production facilities. The introduction of private companies into the process may shake things up, although this is widely opposed for fear of corruption, the government’s inability to enforce contracts against private parties, and secrecy," both Cohen and Dasgupta said.
Just one report after the MMRCA deal was lost and US reaction,linking MMRCA to N-deal quid-pro-quo:
Asia Sentinel 1/5/11
John Elliot
Decision stuns US, the front-runner because of its intensive efforts to woo India's defense establishment
India used to be a proud leader of the old Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), standing notionally between the US and Soviet blocs, but always tilting towards Moscow.
It is therefore both apt and heartening to hear today reports that the government is taking a truly NAM-style route on an $11bn contract for fighter jets by rejecting bids from both America's Lockheed Martin F-16s and Boeing F-18s and Russia's MiG-35s.
This is a diplomatically brave decision that most observers never expected after India signed its nuclear power deal with the US in 2008. Numerous US officials from President Barack Obama downwards have lobbied hard for the $11bn multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) contract, indicating that it was expected as a nuclear thank-you. What seemed most likely therefore was that Lockheed or Boeing would be included – even though, as India knows, its supplies are unreliable – until the end of the process. Then the US would not give up until it had driven other bidders out of the contest.
Curiously the US ambassador to India, Timothy Roemer, chose today to announce his resignation – "for personal, professional and family considerations". That is being widely interpreted as a reaction to the loss of the MRCA contract, as well as the failure of the India-US nuclear deal to generate increased defence co-operation between the two countries, plus nuclear power plant contracts for US companies.
One can go on for aeons debating the issue.Facts speak for themselves.Let's return to discussing naval matters shall we?
PS:As to integrating India into the US military orbit,here is "Blackwill" former US envoy to India on the subject.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m ... n15786857/
The India imperative: a conversation with Robert D. Blackwill
Of course we should sell advanced weaponry to India. The million-man Indian army actually fights, unlike the post-modern militaries of many of our European allies. Given the strategic challenges ahead, the United States should want the Indian armed forces to be equipped with the best weapons systems, and that often means buying American. To make this happen, the United States must become a reliable long-term supplier through co-production and licensed-manufacture arrangements and end its previous inclination to interrupt defense supplies to India in a crisis.