shiv wrote:With due respect to this former intelligence official, I find that he has provided data, as would be expected from a person priviy to information, but has not gone far enough in data analysis.
After a quick(cursory) read, here are some quibbles:
1. What is Al Qaeda? What is Al Qaeda without the support of the Pakistan army? What is the Pakistan army without US support?
2. Splinter groups of rebels often unite when their numbers are decimated and their leaders are dispersed. All this unification of jihad groups could also be a last gasp that would work only if the Pakistani army survives as the most powerful entity
3. The history of the Pakhtun tribals has always been one of tribal factionalism. There have been numerous efforts at "unifying them" Nothing has worked so far. How can Mullah Omar suddenly reunify all of them without money and support from some powerful agent? That powerful agent has always been the Pakistan army supported by the USA
IMO the author was focusing on a narrow scope of proving information that there is a consolidation drive lead by Puki Army seemingly as a response to our strategic agreement and that consolidation of jihad factory will mean very bad for India.
However, obviously a more broader and detailed analysis will be most welcome. My little gripe with the article is in total absence of any recommendations from Indian’s perspective to negate or alleviate the negative implications of the said unification.
Here is my view
•Recognizing that Puki army’s drive to consolidate the jihadi factory is primarily in relation to gaining power back in Afghanistan, do a Najibullah on Karzai, and setting the clock back to to 1996
•This carrot of handing over power to Taliban is the leverage that Puki army has over jihadi factory to get them towards consolidation; in short it is a win-win for jihadis and Puki Army
•Obviously, the subsequent move of Puki army after the restoration of strategic depth in Afghanistan is to turn focus eastwards and bring pressure on to India and more specifically J&K
•India’s engagement with Afghanistan and strategic agreement going forward will hopefully provide leverage to prevent Taliban takeover
•As a response to the above or even to stop further arming of Afghanistan, Puki army CAN/WILL sanction series of attacks in India in coordination with fifth-column media that would bring massive pressure on Indian government to disengage from Afghanistan.
•This is just plain boring deja-vu with nary a hint that we have learnt lessons from past and are ensuring that those bad times do not come back
So, the implications of unification of jihadi factory are pretty clear to us. But what is not clear is what we are going to do to prevent it:
•If we assume today that jihadi factory is fragmented, then what is driving that fragmentation? Are those factors strong enough to resist the common cause of potential power sharing in Afghanistan under Taliban dispensation?
•How can we create opportunity of engaging with some elements of Taliban and yet maintain the supremacy of the current government in Afghanistan?
•If US exit from Afghanistan is driving the Puki Army’s consolidation of Jihadi factory, how can we engage with US and others to ensure the clock is not reverted back to 1996;
•US has direct interest in preventing it also lest another 911 perpetrated by AlQ/Taliban/Puki Army
• We further take US exit from Afghanistan is driven by Obama’s election mandate, is this necessary and sufficient reasoning for existing Afghanistan given the state that it is in?
•How can be best manage the media if events as suggested by author come to pass and continue to maintain pressure on Pukistan from both sides?
•Given the intra institutional feud going on in Pukistan, is Paki Army capable of pulling this off? If not what could be potential move of Puki army?
•How are the other insurgencies going on in Pukistan help/not help Puki army’s Afghan policy?
Various ethnic groups in Pakistan
WTF - is US President a Paki Viceroy? I mean, we know it but saying this publicly by PM?}
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protecting his bacon
