Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2012
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
Nachiket-ji,
Further to my post above
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 3#p1268173
There is another reason why India doesn't want to cross the Threshold of Collapse. The geopolitical calculus.
Looking at the whole picture, let's recognize a few things.
1) TSPA/ISI want to harm India, for their own reasons.
2) Pakistan's 3.5 Friends (US,PRC, KSA, UK) also want to harm India and keep us down, for their own reasons.
3) For 50+ years, the most cost-effective option for the 3.5 Friends to harm India was to sponsor the TSPA/ISI to do that job.
4) However, because of other factors that have become predominant since 2001, TSPA/ISI has gained huge bargaining power over the 3.5 Friends. It can, and is, charging a much higher price from them to do their jobs (including that of harming India.) The relationship has become much more costly for the 3.5 Friends.
5) In the event of Pakistani collapse, ANY entity that replaces the current State of Pakistan... whether it is pure chaos, or independent states of K-P, Sindh, Baluchistan, Pakjab... will have a much poorer bargaining position w.r.t. 3.5 Friends than TSPA/ISI has today. They will do any work for the 3.5 Friends, including that of harming India, for much cheaper or for free... because they themselves are hungry and have no leverage.
6) Therefore, assuming that 3.5 Friends will want to continue pursuing their goal of harming and containing India... collapse of the current State of Pakistan will make that goal far more cost-effective for them.
Further to my post above
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 3#p1268173
There is another reason why India doesn't want to cross the Threshold of Collapse. The geopolitical calculus.
Looking at the whole picture, let's recognize a few things.
1) TSPA/ISI want to harm India, for their own reasons.
2) Pakistan's 3.5 Friends (US,PRC, KSA, UK) also want to harm India and keep us down, for their own reasons.
3) For 50+ years, the most cost-effective option for the 3.5 Friends to harm India was to sponsor the TSPA/ISI to do that job.
4) However, because of other factors that have become predominant since 2001, TSPA/ISI has gained huge bargaining power over the 3.5 Friends. It can, and is, charging a much higher price from them to do their jobs (including that of harming India.) The relationship has become much more costly for the 3.5 Friends.
5) In the event of Pakistani collapse, ANY entity that replaces the current State of Pakistan... whether it is pure chaos, or independent states of K-P, Sindh, Baluchistan, Pakjab... will have a much poorer bargaining position w.r.t. 3.5 Friends than TSPA/ISI has today. They will do any work for the 3.5 Friends, including that of harming India, for much cheaper or for free... because they themselves are hungry and have no leverage.
6) Therefore, assuming that 3.5 Friends will want to continue pursuing their goal of harming and containing India... collapse of the current State of Pakistan will make that goal far more cost-effective for them.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
To my eyes there seems to be no other plan. There will be war ONLY if Pakis attack, but I can't (don't) see Pakistan being punished for "small"(VikasRaina wrote:Hakim al Bangalori, How is this plan if there is any plan like that in ops any different from a plan to be Dhimmi, semantics be damned.shiv wrote: that we have great strategic thinkers and we will surely succeed.
In fact the plan is openly revealed. No one likes it - at least on BRF. The plan is "peace and friendship with Pakistan". No one wants to believe that this is the plan. Get hit, stay hit and be friends. 1996 to 2012.
Make peace even when the enemy is putting you to piece.
1192 to 2012

I think many of us who started anal-ysing Pakistan after the www and BRF came probably felt that some great war action would take place to punish Pakistan "next time". I think we were wrong in anticipating that because by then GoI felt that not a lot could be done and had already gone into relationship building mode. We are action sekers by nature and looking back one or two things look really odd.
Consider this. It was Indian Intel that uncovered and made public a telephone call made by that Paki jernail to Mushy in Beijing before Kargil. Mushy's perfidy was well known. But yet, after Kargil we had the Delhi meeting where Mushy was hosted. Vajpayee did nothing in public to take him to task. Was that because, as Spinrao used to say that Vajpayee requires steel knees before he could do that? Vajpayee chose to take a relationship forward with Musharraf as he had done earlier with Nawaz Sharif Nawaz despite being aware of Musharraf's perfidy. The only question was whether Vajpayee unaware of the proclivities of the Paki army? Was that Lahore accord an error of judgement coming as it did just before Kargil? Or was it already policy to be conciliatory to Pakistan?
If you recall it was we on BRF who were telling the likes of Tim Hoyt (in the late 90s- early 2K) about the Paki army. It was well known to us - but the implications of that were probably even better known to the GoI even back then. And then Mushy came to power and he was actually hosted and feted in India after he reached some agreements. Musharraf did some conciliatory things towards India that were not liked by the Pakistanists. I think it was under his watch that the border artillery duels ended and Parakram probably did give him a jolt. But it is easy to point out that Parakram was more hot air than anything else. After all we wanted war an punishment, which did not take place. If that was not hot air, what was it?
MMS has taken that conciliatory line even further.
To me, as an observer of what is happening and after reading every single analysis of "weakness" "chankianness" etc -it just seems that the one thing we were missing was WYSIWYG. No other plan. No hidden Chankianness. What you see is what you get. Dhimmitude it is. Being angry about that is a separate issue. But perhaps dhimmitude is the only option? To the extent that Pakistan has managed to avoid military punishment by India, Pakistan has won.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
Which also means that the "winding down of RAW" in Pakistan could well have been a direct consequence of that "agreement" not to target leaders. Indian action inside Pakistan and inside Sri Lanka were wound down and gradually the capability of Indian neighbors to conduct similar internal ops against Indian leaders was wound down. After Rajiv Gandhi no Indian leader has been assassinated.brihaspati wrote:
That previous penalties meted out personally to leaders who hit back at externally sponsored terror and lost personally - has set a precedence for Gujral I, Gujral II, and Gujral III and Gujral X's to come.
But it must be said that these "agreements" are surely not trusted because Indian leaders continue to have high security, as do Pakistani, Sri Lankan, American and Israeli leaders. Then we start seeing some differences if we look at more events. The parliament attack was a direct attack on netas. So any agreement reached between RAW and ISI was clearly one sided. We stop doing things but they continue.
The lesson for the Indian neta is that they will be targeted even if they don't do anything to Pakistan, and attacks on india will continue. the fundamental message is nothing is totally safe unless you give in to Pakistani demands. It it any wonder that they are reaching out to Pakistan? Would I agree to get myself killed as a neta?
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
All this business of RAW capability, ISI covert ops, Israel, CIA covert ops etc gives me a sudden thought. It is possible for any intelligence agency to conduct some sort of covert ops almost anywhere. But not everywhere. Nations in which policing and surveillance are higher and internal security more robust allow fewer chances for such covert ops to be conducted.
On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being the best, Israeli internal security to prevent foreign covert ops in Israel probably ranks 1 or 2 . The US maybe ranks 2 or 3. India and Pakistan probably rank around 7 or 8. Internal security for India is not for this thread - it is a vast subject, but it is relevant to India only to say that while Indian intel could well conduct ops in Pakistan, it is as easy for foreign Intel agencies and other interested parties to conduct ops in India. India escapes only by "trust" - i.e by not conducting ops against others. If the US and Israel decided to conduct covert ops in India for the purpose of terrorism, I am sure that many Indians could be bought for the purpose. I am sure India could buy people in the US, but their surveillance and intel is so much more robust that the plan would probably be nipped in the bud. Looking at security through this filter gives some idea of why India behaves like it does.
On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being the best, Israeli internal security to prevent foreign covert ops in Israel probably ranks 1 or 2 . The US maybe ranks 2 or 3. India and Pakistan probably rank around 7 or 8. Internal security for India is not for this thread - it is a vast subject, but it is relevant to India only to say that while Indian intel could well conduct ops in Pakistan, it is as easy for foreign Intel agencies and other interested parties to conduct ops in India. India escapes only by "trust" - i.e by not conducting ops against others. If the US and Israel decided to conduct covert ops in India for the purpose of terrorism, I am sure that many Indians could be bought for the purpose. I am sure India could buy people in the US, but their surveillance and intel is so much more robust that the plan would probably be nipped in the bud. Looking at security through this filter gives some idea of why India behaves like it does.
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Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
>> India escapes only by "trust" - i.e by not conducting ops against others.
Trust? Rabinder Singh escaped to US. (And then there was David Headley).
Pakis surely have a robust network (SIMI, Ind. Muj etc). India does not benefit from "trusting" other countries. However, others surely benefit from our seemingly infinite "benevolence".
Trust? Rabinder Singh escaped to US. (And then there was David Headley).
Pakis surely have a robust network (SIMI, Ind. Muj etc). India does not benefit from "trusting" other countries. However, others surely benefit from our seemingly infinite "benevolence".
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
That makes me wonder what was the nature of the agreement between ISI and RAW that helped wind down Khalistani terror?abhishek_sharma wrote:>> India escapes only by "trust" - i.e by not conducting ops against others.
Trust? Rabinder Singh escaped to US. (And then there was David Headley).
Pakis surely have a robust network (SIMI, Ind. Muj etc). India does not benefit from "trusting" other countries. However, others surely benefit from our seemingly infinite "benevolence".
On another note it is interesting that Pakistani-islamist terror camps by recruiting Europeans and Americans and giving them the same training that the CIA gave to the ISI have successfully managed to conduct covert ops in Europe and the US and still have cells there. No wonder Islamists are so confident, and the US so paranoid. With the state of internal security being what it is in India, I am sure we can conduct covert ops anywhere, but they are going to do it right back to us. That is the fear that started the Gujral doctrine, Lahore accord, Musharraf in Delhi, Sharm el Sheikh etc. Yes by all means call it dhoti shivering or dhimmitude or surrender (which is what it actually is) - but it seems like the most likely reason why India behaves the way it does rather than having balls, steel knees, rigid spine etc. "Building trust" its called. Removing the "trust deficit"
India acts out of awareness of its weakness. It may be instructive (IMO) to understand that rather than imagine that there are hidden strengths. It's not hidden strength. It's open weakness.
Last edited by shiv on 12 Apr 2012 09:07, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
If it is correct that Pakistan is loosing couple of persons every week in Siachin then it would mean that Siachin has cost them around 3000 people from 1984 till date. IIRC India has invested a lot in infrastructure and reduced its losses to weather to almost nil. Siachin + Kargil = 6000 loss for Pigiis > 1971??
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
vic wrote:If it is correct that Pakistan is loosing couple of persons every week in Siachin then it would mean that Siachin has cost them around 3000 people from 1984 till date. IIRC India has invested a lot in infrastructure and reduced its losses to weather to almost nil. Siachin + Kargil = 6000 loss for Pigiis > 1971??
their total loses must be a lot greater. An army friend once said that the border firing is a lot more common than what is shown in the media. And a huge number of piglets get slaughtered . Any Indian lose is always reported to the Indian media. But pigs never report there loses for H&D reasons ..So they have been taking a lot of beating at the loc..
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
In Kargil Paki's lost close to 13k soldiers. Between NS and BB they revealed 7k to 13k figures as loss in the misadventure. A friend of mine flying bombing missions in Drass/ Kargil says they were busting bunkers/ posts atop with 10-15 Pakis in each almost by the hour towards the end on different peaks. The downhill ski and crybaby stuff in the White house didn't happen because the Paki's lost 2-3k people. Paki's got raped big time in Kargil.Siachin + Kargil = 6000 loss for Pigiis > 1971??
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
NLI got wiped out in Kargil.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
TSP has fine tuned the art of calibrating their actions well. Steve Coll writes in Ghost wars that Zia's favorite saying during the A'stan J1had was to boil the water at the right temperature in A'stan for USSR. He, apparently, repeated this phrase. It is no small wonder that USSR was literally across the border few 100 miles from I'bad, but never overtly bombed TSP.
There was one time when some over enthusiastic ISI boys did some ops in Uzbekistan from the A'stan border. They blew up a things. USSR got mad, they called up their counterparts in US and told them stop right now. A panicked CIA called Zia who took ISI to stop immediately. USSR *had* threatened to bomb TSP.
TSP has played in big league, I have to admit. They have calibrated the actions on India very well too. It is easier, because they understand us more intuitively than the A'stanis or Russians.
Parakram was not totally hot air, because it showed to them that they did not calibrate well. Amassing of forces on the border scared them and they learned they miscalculated. They probably became better at setting the temperature more correctly. Better calibration.
9/11 put the TSP'ians in a quandry. I had thought that this was the end. I think they themselves thought that end was near and the wrath of Amir Khan was going to be bad. But they found their footings (and the Emir lost its own). Finally, they could calibrate well again.
Going back further, Zia got the US embassy to burn. CIA couldn't do a thing. Calibration was pretty good.
The only country they have not been able to boil at the right temperature is PRC. PRC has made them turn of the stove off.
I am sorry, but India is not even junior mohalla league in this game.
There was one time when some over enthusiastic ISI boys did some ops in Uzbekistan from the A'stan border. They blew up a things. USSR got mad, they called up their counterparts in US and told them stop right now. A panicked CIA called Zia who took ISI to stop immediately. USSR *had* threatened to bomb TSP.
TSP has played in big league, I have to admit. They have calibrated the actions on India very well too. It is easier, because they understand us more intuitively than the A'stanis or Russians.
Parakram was not totally hot air, because it showed to them that they did not calibrate well. Amassing of forces on the border scared them and they learned they miscalculated. They probably became better at setting the temperature more correctly. Better calibration.
9/11 put the TSP'ians in a quandry. I had thought that this was the end. I think they themselves thought that end was near and the wrath of Amir Khan was going to be bad. But they found their footings (and the Emir lost its own). Finally, they could calibrate well again.
Going back further, Zia got the US embassy to burn. CIA couldn't do a thing. Calibration was pretty good.
The only country they have not been able to boil at the right temperature is PRC. PRC has made them turn of the stove off.
I am sorry, but India is not even junior mohalla league in this game.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
I don't know why Indian media invite Paki's to write this kind of crap:
AFAIK we are losing no men or women to weather for several years in a row, despite being on the peaks much above the Paki positions. Are the Editors and journo's that ill informed that they are not aware of this basic fact about IA ops in Siachen.
http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/s ... 120412.htmSiachen is equally dangerous for Hindustani and Pakistani security forces. According to an estimate each year 100 Pakistani soldiers and 200 Indian soldiers are killed by avalanches or inclement weather.
AFAIK we are losing no men or women to weather for several years in a row, despite being on the peaks much above the Paki positions. Are the Editors and journo's that ill informed that they are not aware of this basic fact about IA ops in Siachen.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
I think 13K losses in way over the TOP, NS revealed that the no. of Paki dead in Kargil was ~2700.
About Operation Parakram, one thing which is not discussed much is Paki losses and Denel Anti Material rifle performance- whose contract was cancelled by UPA as soon as they came to power in 2004. There have been many off the record quotes by Army personal that this rifle had a very good effect on Pakis on Bunkers. Also our use of artillery, anti-tank missiles was effective enough that Pakis suddenly after 13 years of giving covering fire and artillery support from 1989 to 2002 to have a change in heart and request for ceasefire which has made the IA job of shooting vermin crossing the LOC much easier.
About Operation Parakram, one thing which is not discussed much is Paki losses and Denel Anti Material rifle performance- whose contract was cancelled by UPA as soon as they came to power in 2004. There have been many off the record quotes by Army personal that this rifle had a very good effect on Pakis on Bunkers. Also our use of artillery, anti-tank missiles was effective enough that Pakis suddenly after 13 years of giving covering fire and artillery support from 1989 to 2002 to have a change in heart and request for ceasefire which has made the IA job of shooting vermin crossing the LOC much easier.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
It is so tempting to enter into this debate on the new postulate - The best solution for India, for the short to medium term, is to have Pakistan in a trishanku naraka a modern parallel to the original trishanku swarga!
However, when some very good gurus of BRF are at it, it is not proper for ramblers to intercede with ramblings, so will wait for now and assimilate these thoughts. But as usual, when there is something substantial brewing in my brain, I promise to share the rambles with the distinguished gentle rakshaks here
Till then let the flow of the thoughts by the best minds be uninterrupted!
However, when some very good gurus of BRF are at it, it is not proper for ramblers to intercede with ramblings, so will wait for now and assimilate these thoughts. But as usual, when there is something substantial brewing in my brain, I promise to share the rambles with the distinguished gentle rakshaks here

Till then let the flow of the thoughts by the best minds be uninterrupted!
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
That really keeps wondering there is no logic why GOI, Babus and Indian media never take an aggressive stand on POK and discount rubbish Paki propaganda. Somehow the west feels the Military strong and non self flagelating India is not good for them, especially US based platforms like rediff feel its their job to keep the inferiority complex among Indians.harbans wrote:I don't know why Indian media invite Paki's to write this kind of crap:
http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/s ... 120412.htmSiachen is equally dangerous for Hindustani and Pakistani security forces. According to an estimate each year 100 Pakistani soldiers and 200 Indian soldiers are killed by avalanches or inclement weather.
AFAIK we are losing no men or women to weather for several years in a row, despite being on the peaks much above the Paki positions. Are the Editors and journo's that ill informed that they are not aware of this basic fact about IA ops in Siachen.
A US citizen like say. Siddarth Vardarajan may not identify with India and may be a loyal soldier to his country.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
Why did they let him reference India in that manner? The PA relies heavily on religous themes, yet he makes no mention of that.harbans wrote:I don't know why Indian media invite Paki's to write this kind of crap:
Siachen is equally dangerous for Hindustani and Pakistani security forces. According to an estimate each year 100 Pakistani soldiers and 200 Indian soldiers are killed by avalanches or inclement weather.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
Paki losses in Kargil:
Lots of sources on the web give these figures. BB quoted much higher figures..there was the 13k figure bandied by BB too in an interview. Will post that once i locate it.Pakistan army losses have been difficult to determine, partly because Pakistan has not published an official casualties list. The US Department of State had made an early, partial estimate of close to 700 fatalities. According to numbers stated by Nawaz Sharif there were 4,000+ fatalities. His party Pakistan Muslim League (N) in its "white paper" on the war mentioned that more than 3,000 Mujahideens, officers and soldiers were killed. Another major Pakistani political party, the PPP, also says that "thousands" of soldiers and irregulars died.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
A few things.
1) Musharraf ended the artillery duels on the LoC/IB, not because he wanted to make a conciliatory gesture, but because they had become very one-sided duels in which the Pakis were getting liquified. Typically they would fire a few rounds as cover for infiltration; the Indians soon learned that the appropriate response was to return deadly accurate fire in massively disproportionate amounts. For every infiltration bid of 12-15 jihadis the Pakis were losing a border post or a village. Besides that, as our COIN capabilities improved, the rate of return on infiltration bids was also going down rapidly. It didn't make much sense for Musharraf to continue with that.
2) As for Parakram, I've made this argument before: for whatever reason, the period of Parakram marks the point in history when terrorism trends in J&K completely reversed.
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries ... alties.htm
As the above chart shows, average deaths in J&K terrorism for the 8 years 1994-2001 were 2,945 per year and rising; average deaths for the 8 years 2002-2009 were 1,490 per year and falling-- a trend that has continued through 2012.
Personally, I can't see any other reason for this change in the game, other than Parakram . It was an exercise in brinkmanship which convinced Unkil that we would go to war and destroy Unkil's Afghanistan plans rather than be a quiescent "safety valve" to absorb intensified Pakistani terrorism. It provided for a J&K state election where, for the first time since 1990, nearly 70% of the electorate felt secure enough to go to the polls. Even things like border fencing and so on were made possible because of the cease-fire following the televised GUBOing of Musharraf, whose pants were browned by Parakram.
Was Parakram "hot air"? In that we never actually went to war, I suppose you could say it was. Yet, in achieving the political goals it apparently did, this "hot air" was an infinitely more cost-effective solution than an actual military campaign (crossing the Threshold of Collapse) could possibly have been.
Naturally, everybody (including the IA) actually believed that India was preparing for action. For the "hot air" bluff to be effective, we had to believe it ourselves. Many brave folks who would have participated in a military campaign from TV rooms and internet forums were, of course, disappointed that war and punishment did not take place.
Meanwhile my first cousin was flying Chetak sorties within visual range of Kraachi, to assess the extent of PN radar coverage along the coast. His wife had given birth to their first son some months before... so when the deployment turned out to be "hot air" rather than war, I don't think he was overly disappointed.
3) All that said, I can't see any similarity between the NDA's Pakistan policy and that of the Mainovadi MMS government. Yes, Vajpayee was conciliatory to the extent that a lot of us were displeased. Yes, from the Lahore bus to the Agra breakfast he made many errors of judgment in dealing with the TSPA. However, he also presided over Pokhran II, Kargil and Parakram... did even Indira Gandhi, during any six years of her tenure, accumulate such a trifecta of landmark strategic successes? Gujral certainly didn't.
How this is supposed to be comparable to Sharm-el-Shaikh and the relentless Paper Masala Dossiers served up by Chidambaram, I fail to understand. Vajpayee may have repeatedly attempted a fundamentally misguided approach of trust and reconciliation, but at least he did the bare minimum to consolidate a few strategic advantages that India had.
The Mainovadis? Let's see... no Headley, no Dawood Ibrahim, no Hafeez Saeed, no Major Iqbal, no "voice samples" of Major Iqbal, no reciprocal MFN status, no test of a credible thermonuclear device, no consistent policy to deal with Chinese provocation, no effective policy to deal with a growing Maoist menace, no response to 26/11-Pune-Delhi-Ahmedabad-Bangalore-Jaipur-Delhi 2011-Mumbai 2011. On the "plus" side, a robust response to Saffron terrorists for Malegaon and the Samjhauta Blasts... and of course, an official declaration that dignifies Paki claims of Indian intelligence stoking rebellion in Baluchistan.
This isn't a "conciliatory approach" in the Vajpayee mold, or even in the suicidal RAW-paralyzing Gujral mold. It's something else altogether: the considered inaction of a criminal regime which does not want its robbery interrupted.
1) Musharraf ended the artillery duels on the LoC/IB, not because he wanted to make a conciliatory gesture, but because they had become very one-sided duels in which the Pakis were getting liquified. Typically they would fire a few rounds as cover for infiltration; the Indians soon learned that the appropriate response was to return deadly accurate fire in massively disproportionate amounts. For every infiltration bid of 12-15 jihadis the Pakis were losing a border post or a village. Besides that, as our COIN capabilities improved, the rate of return on infiltration bids was also going down rapidly. It didn't make much sense for Musharraf to continue with that.
2) As for Parakram, I've made this argument before: for whatever reason, the period of Parakram marks the point in history when terrorism trends in J&K completely reversed.
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries ... alties.htm
As the above chart shows, average deaths in J&K terrorism for the 8 years 1994-2001 were 2,945 per year and rising; average deaths for the 8 years 2002-2009 were 1,490 per year and falling-- a trend that has continued through 2012.
Personally, I can't see any other reason for this change in the game, other than Parakram . It was an exercise in brinkmanship which convinced Unkil that we would go to war and destroy Unkil's Afghanistan plans rather than be a quiescent "safety valve" to absorb intensified Pakistani terrorism. It provided for a J&K state election where, for the first time since 1990, nearly 70% of the electorate felt secure enough to go to the polls. Even things like border fencing and so on were made possible because of the cease-fire following the televised GUBOing of Musharraf, whose pants were browned by Parakram.
Was Parakram "hot air"? In that we never actually went to war, I suppose you could say it was. Yet, in achieving the political goals it apparently did, this "hot air" was an infinitely more cost-effective solution than an actual military campaign (crossing the Threshold of Collapse) could possibly have been.
Naturally, everybody (including the IA) actually believed that India was preparing for action. For the "hot air" bluff to be effective, we had to believe it ourselves. Many brave folks who would have participated in a military campaign from TV rooms and internet forums were, of course, disappointed that war and punishment did not take place.
Meanwhile my first cousin was flying Chetak sorties within visual range of Kraachi, to assess the extent of PN radar coverage along the coast. His wife had given birth to their first son some months before... so when the deployment turned out to be "hot air" rather than war, I don't think he was overly disappointed.
3) All that said, I can't see any similarity between the NDA's Pakistan policy and that of the Mainovadi MMS government. Yes, Vajpayee was conciliatory to the extent that a lot of us were displeased. Yes, from the Lahore bus to the Agra breakfast he made many errors of judgment in dealing with the TSPA. However, he also presided over Pokhran II, Kargil and Parakram... did even Indira Gandhi, during any six years of her tenure, accumulate such a trifecta of landmark strategic successes? Gujral certainly didn't.
How this is supposed to be comparable to Sharm-el-Shaikh and the relentless Paper Masala Dossiers served up by Chidambaram, I fail to understand. Vajpayee may have repeatedly attempted a fundamentally misguided approach of trust and reconciliation, but at least he did the bare minimum to consolidate a few strategic advantages that India had.
The Mainovadis? Let's see... no Headley, no Dawood Ibrahim, no Hafeez Saeed, no Major Iqbal, no "voice samples" of Major Iqbal, no reciprocal MFN status, no test of a credible thermonuclear device, no consistent policy to deal with Chinese provocation, no effective policy to deal with a growing Maoist menace, no response to 26/11-Pune-Delhi-Ahmedabad-Bangalore-Jaipur-Delhi 2011-Mumbai 2011. On the "plus" side, a robust response to Saffron terrorists for Malegaon and the Samjhauta Blasts... and of course, an official declaration that dignifies Paki claims of Indian intelligence stoking rebellion in Baluchistan.
This isn't a "conciliatory approach" in the Vajpayee mold, or even in the suicidal RAW-paralyzing Gujral mold. It's something else altogether: the considered inaction of a criminal regime which does not want its robbery interrupted.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
I remember reading / seeing Brajesh Mishra's interview long back where he said there were some things done during Op Parakram which cannot be revealed.
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Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
Sirji,Rudradev wrote:A few things.
The Mainovadis? Let's see... no Headley, no Dawood Ibrahim, no Hafeez Saeed, no Major Iqbal, no "voice samples" of Major Iqbal, no reciprocal MFN status, no test of a credible thermonuclear device, no consistent policy to deal with Chinese provocation, no effective policy to deal with a growing Maoist menace, no response to 26/11-Pune-Delhi-Ahmedabad-Bangalore-Jaipur-Delhi 2011-Mumbai 2011. On the "plus" side, a robust response to Saffron terrorists for Malegaon and the Samjhauta Blasts... and of course, an official declaration that dignifies Paki claims of Indian intelligence stoking rebellion in Baluchistan.
Definitely not up to scratch, yet:
- we are not playing dead in the South China Sea - we are exploring together with Vietnam despite Chinese protests. Arunachal seems to getting armed quite significantly.
- also not running away from Iran : we struck a deal to trade partly in rupees knowing fully well that all accounts dealing with Iran will be frozen by Amreekis and its attack dogs. Union Bank was "chosen" as it had no foreign operations and therefore was not possible to freeze the accounts .
- There is no loss as yet in IWT, Siachen, Sir Creek.
Of course Sirji, more can be done. The political goals have reigned supreme over national goals with this GoI. But tell me where it is not like that. The degree and depth varies. But in any case this is far better than 10% or the paranoid communists or even Belgium!
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
Rudradev ji, masala dossiers were the only option left. 26/11 was done to make sure a confrontation was set up and war took place. Talebs would have come flooding back to the J&K border, US would have said victory and left. The late KS himself said 26/11 was act of diversion.
One of KS's recommendations was to get PC as home min. He also felt that the INC should have completely cut ties with TSP and criticised UPA for not doing enough.
War and quick successes do bring election success too, so it would have been good for Congress to respond militarily. Even through war INC would have made a lot of money through arms deals.
Instead we tried to put troops in Afghanistan to brown Kayanis pants. Which he did have sleepless nights over. Unfortunately US wanted us to work under ISAF command and Iranians as well as the Russians said no.
One of KS's recommendations was to get PC as home min. He also felt that the INC should have completely cut ties with TSP and criticised UPA for not doing enough.
War and quick successes do bring election success too, so it would have been good for Congress to respond militarily. Even through war INC would have made a lot of money through arms deals.
Instead we tried to put troops in Afghanistan to brown Kayanis pants. Which he did have sleepless nights over. Unfortunately US wanted us to work under ISAF command and Iranians as well as the Russians said no.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
There are some points that need to be stated first. Most of it has already been mentioned by posters earlier. I have tried to put all of it in one place.
1. Recognition that the real enemies of India are the 3.5 fiends of papistan and that our ultimate aim is to counter them.
2. With every passing days India moves up economically and politically (Even with all its contradictions, scandals, fissures, etc.) while Papistan sink further down.
3. With its no-clear weapons, terrorists, fanatics, small arms, etc, an unruly breakup (I prefer to call it the explosion) of papistan is not in our interest. We would much rather prefer a gradual descent of papistan and its ultimate breakup (I prefer to call it the implosion where much of the structure falls on itself leaving the adjoining areas virtually unaffected).
Based on the above 3 points, it makes sense for the India government to downplay most paki provocations. If we get involved in a hot war with the pakis it will leave us vulnerable even if we flatten papistan for good. It would disrupt our economic progress and set us back considerably; perhaps never again to catch up with China for example. If papistan explodes following our action, where will it leave us wrt point 3? All of it would definitely please the 3.5 fiends of papistan for that is their main goal is it not. Also, 'the dangerous neighborhood' arguments work both ways. It allowed us to beef up our defenses citing concerns about pakis and now China. The initial short ranged Agni meant for pakis has evolved to cover China. In future a 10,000km Agni SLBM evolved to provide a robust second strike capability against China from the Bay of Bengal or Indian Ocean could one day, loaded on a robust SSBN fleet, move into the Pacific ocean. The same goes for the BMD.
Before 1991, papistan could achieve parity with us with a little help from its 3.5 fiends. That model worked and we were supposed to be eternally boxed up in south Asia. Following the economic liberalization, the game has changed.
They have already supplied the no-clear weapons and the delivery system. What other help can they provide that will counter the widening gap between India and Papistan, that will not cost too much? To counter India, papistan and its friends will have to spend so much more now and that cost will only keep on increasing. Our leaders seem to have adopted the 'wait' policy, the idea being that papistan will become too expensive for its friends to maintain. In the end all of them will withdraw and papistan will implode.
My guess is that the soft policy towards papistan will continue no matter who sits in Delhi. To some the above may appear to be a victory for pakis but our government seems to believe it worth the cost to achieve the ultimate aim of countering the 3.5 fiends. To the pakis our stance seems like victory for them. Of course, India will definitely respond if war is imposed on it by pakistan.
Personally it upset me to see our fellow countrymen slain in terrorist attacks but the pappi-jhappi, the long lost brotherly treatment, etc upsets me even more. We will have to deal with papistan so be business like and be done with it.
1. Recognition that the real enemies of India are the 3.5 fiends of papistan and that our ultimate aim is to counter them.
2. With every passing days India moves up economically and politically (Even with all its contradictions, scandals, fissures, etc.) while Papistan sink further down.
3. With its no-clear weapons, terrorists, fanatics, small arms, etc, an unruly breakup (I prefer to call it the explosion) of papistan is not in our interest. We would much rather prefer a gradual descent of papistan and its ultimate breakup (I prefer to call it the implosion where much of the structure falls on itself leaving the adjoining areas virtually unaffected).
Based on the above 3 points, it makes sense for the India government to downplay most paki provocations. If we get involved in a hot war with the pakis it will leave us vulnerable even if we flatten papistan for good. It would disrupt our economic progress and set us back considerably; perhaps never again to catch up with China for example. If papistan explodes following our action, where will it leave us wrt point 3? All of it would definitely please the 3.5 fiends of papistan for that is their main goal is it not. Also, 'the dangerous neighborhood' arguments work both ways. It allowed us to beef up our defenses citing concerns about pakis and now China. The initial short ranged Agni meant for pakis has evolved to cover China. In future a 10,000km Agni SLBM evolved to provide a robust second strike capability against China from the Bay of Bengal or Indian Ocean could one day, loaded on a robust SSBN fleet, move into the Pacific ocean. The same goes for the BMD.
Before 1991, papistan could achieve parity with us with a little help from its 3.5 fiends. That model worked and we were supposed to be eternally boxed up in south Asia. Following the economic liberalization, the game has changed.
They have already supplied the no-clear weapons and the delivery system. What other help can they provide that will counter the widening gap between India and Papistan, that will not cost too much? To counter India, papistan and its friends will have to spend so much more now and that cost will only keep on increasing. Our leaders seem to have adopted the 'wait' policy, the idea being that papistan will become too expensive for its friends to maintain. In the end all of them will withdraw and papistan will implode.
My guess is that the soft policy towards papistan will continue no matter who sits in Delhi. To some the above may appear to be a victory for pakis but our government seems to believe it worth the cost to achieve the ultimate aim of countering the 3.5 fiends. To the pakis our stance seems like victory for them. Of course, India will definitely respond if war is imposed on it by pakistan.
Personally it upset me to see our fellow countrymen slain in terrorist attacks but the pappi-jhappi, the long lost brotherly treatment, etc upsets me even more. We will have to deal with papistan so be business like and be done with it.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
Video of OBL's munnas in house arrest in Pakistan. They seem to be playing with kaafir american teddy bears.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
Confronting pakistan means confronting US and China. It's not going to happen.Rudradev wrote:Was Parakram "hot air"? In that we never actually went to war, I suppose you could say it was. Yet, in achieving the political goals it apparently did, this "hot air" was an infinitely more cost-effective solution than an actual military campaign (crossing the Threshold of Collapse) could possibly have been.
Parakram was an impulsive move. A waist of resources. Yet in the end, the BJP babus finally realized what they were up against and backed off.
India's refusal to react to the mumbai attacks came from the lessons they learned during parakram.
Pakistan is here to stay. It is a asset for us/china. Can india turn pakistan into a liability to us/china?
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
War and going against Western interests with a military in unprepared situation would have been a disaster, further ties developed between RAPE and the Delhi clicke would have also been put at strain.shyamd wrote:Rudradev ji, masala dossiers were the only option left. 26/11 was done to make sure a confrontation was set up and war took place. Talebs would have come flooding back to the J&K border, US would have said victory and left. The late KS himself said 26/11 was act of diversion.
One of KS's recommendations was to get PC as home min. He also felt that the INC should have completely cut ties with TSP and criticised UPA for not doing enough.
War and quick successes do bring election success too, so it would have been good for Congress to respond militarily. Even through war INC would have made a lot of money through arms deals.
Instead we tried to put troops in Afghanistan to brown Kayanis pants. Which he did have sleepless nights over. Unfortunately US wanted us to work under ISAF command and Iranians as well as the Russians said no.
Right now ropes have been put on our Miltary with decades of incorrect policies that is difficult to imagine a short deceive victory.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
This falling for WKK, Paki propoganda, again why did Pakis after 13 years of unprovoked shelling from 1989 to 2002 suddenly feel the need for a ceasefire on LOC?? care to think. We should always have the option of war, and I will spell it out we have to defeat Pakis we are to develop as a nation. But we need a dedicated, national military complex for that to happen over a couple of decades, the current arms agent , fifth columnists will never allow us to develop it.nvishal wrote: Parakram was an impulsive move. A waist of resources. Yet in the end, the BJP babus finally realized what they were up against and backed off.
India's refusal to react to the mumbai attacks came from the lessons they learned during parakram.
Pakistan is here to stay. It is a asset for us/china. Can india turn pakistan into a liability to us/china?
And lets not forget that during all this a convenient Godhra train burning and subsequent media coverage completly destroyed the appetite for action against the perpetrators of Parliament attack and divided this country whihc was very useful for certain politicos, US, UK, China and Pak
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
Parakram ended in mid 02Aditya_V wrote:why did Pakis after 13 years of unprovoked shelling from 1989 to 2002 suddenly feel the need for a ceasefire on LOC?? care to think.
Ceasefire began around 03 end
The US was in afghanistan. It's around the time when the pakistani army released an offensive against the north-west jihadi rebels. The ceasefire guaranteed that india would not open a front while the pakistani army was busy in the north-west.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
What were they up against, nvishal ?nvishal wrote:Yet in the end, the BJP babus finally realized what they were up against and backed off.
nvishal, a request. Please use proper punctuation and that would make your posts better and easier to read & understand. As regards your 'Pakistan is here to stay' line, I believe that it is a decision that Pakistan itself has to make. Many analysts (Pakistanis and non-Indians) are comparing the present situation in Pakistan to pre-1971 days. Once Pakistan makes the decision that it is 'here to stay', it will have to make a complete U-turn of its policies. It would have found then that its 65-year old policy of enduring and unremitting hostility is unsustainable and was hurtling it towards doom. It would have concluded that neither US nor China could turn it around and only India could. It is my contention that Pakistan has not yet made such a decision. On the contrary, it once again sees mouth-watering opportunities of inflicting a fatal attack on India within the next five years.Pakistan is here to stay. It is a asset for us/china. Can india turn pakistan into a liability to us/china?
I would say that dissolution of Pakistan would be by its own choice (not India's); India might play a role as it did in 1971 but the decision would have been made by Pakistan itself to dissolve (again, as it did in East Pakistan). If it wants to 'stay', it would be because of India.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
I could rephrase this by saying that the Pakistanis have succeeded in convincing Indian leaders that the cost to India for punishing Pakistan militarily would be far higher than allowing Pakistan to continue to accuse and provoke in various ways. Assuming this to be correct, the question that arises directly from this is what actions by India could raise the cost of provocation for Pakistan in the absence of direct military attack?pankajs wrote: Based on the above 3 points, it makes sense for the India government to downplay most paki provocations.
People have suggested (on BRF and elsewhere) covert ops - but that has been ruled out.
One theory that seems to fit is the idea that a Pakistan that is rabidly anti-India and has developed alliances with others to support its anti-India stance will be hard put to define its goals when faced with a completely benign and almost supine India. That seems to be what is being attempted - at least that is what it seems like to me. Whether it will work and how far this will go is something I cannot predict, but I would have thought that if it was failing it would be politically difficult for any Indian government to persist. Beyond a point. The point at which such a policy would unravel due to internal political opposition from within India does not seem to have been reached. It was not even reached after 26/11 and the policy seems to be moving ahead. Note that political opposition in India should be quick to lambast anything that was seen as really negative, so the opposition is either as stupid as the GoI or they are both hand in hand on this issue.
What would constitute "proof" that this pappi-jhappi policy is failing? Terrorism? Well there is continuous infiltration into Kashmir. That does not seem to be a trigger point for abandoning "let's love a Packee". The infusion of currency notes into India continues unabated (16.000 crores??) . That again is not seen as an issue big enough to stop loving Pakis. This love a Paki business must be expected to have some really big payoffs if it must continue. Or Pakistan needs to make it cheaper for India to hit them.
It may be easier to look at this from the viewpoint of the Pakis. what would Indian lovey-dovey actions be seen like by the Pakis? Why is pappi jhappi even expected to work? Is it working at all? Maybe I will leave speculation about that to some other time.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
Yes, Don't you think it would have taken 1 year to agree the modalities.nvishal wrote:Parakram ended in mid 02Aditya_V wrote:why did Pakis after 13 years of unprovoked shelling from 1989 to 2002 suddenly feel the need for a ceasefire on LOC?? care to think.
Ceasefire began around 03 end
The US was in afghanistan. It's around the time when the pakistani army released an offensive against the north-west jihadi rebels. The ceasefire guaranteed that india would not open a front while the pakistani army was busy in the north-west.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
Pakistans alliesSSridhar wrote:What were they up against, nvishal ?
The instability in the regions of balochistan and north-west has almost no bearing on the stability of punjab and sindh.SSridhar wrote:As regards your 'Pakistan is here to stay' line, I believe that it is a decision that Pakistan itself has to make. Many analysts (Pakistanis and non-Indians) are comparing the present situation in Pakistan to pre-1971 days. Once Pakistan makes the decision that it is 'here to stay', it will have to make a complete U-turn of its policies.
I would request you to ignore those regions and concentrate on the region east of the durrand line. The real leaders(elite) of pakistan do not live in the mountains of wazaristan or balochistan.
Infighting does not necessarily mean dissolution. It means that their attention will be distracted away from india. That's it.SSridhar wrote:I would say that dissolution of Pakistan would be by its own choice
The balochis and the pashtuns cannot overpower punjab and sindh because they do not have the firepower. The US and china has to conclude that the elite has become a liability(ie, the elites loss of control over jihadi foreign policy in xinjiang and the west) for it to be able to distribute overwhelming firepower to the balochis and the pashtuns to go against the pakistani state.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
Once the 1/3rd of the pakistani army returns from the north-west back to the eastern border, kashmir will go back to its old self.Aditya_V wrote:Yes, Don't you think it would have taken 1 year to agree the modalities.
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Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
That is exactly what I concluded from my talk with Bharat Karnad. We just do not have a proper plan to deal with aftermath and are afraid to change borders so as not to let anyone change ours.Rudradev wrote: Right or wrong, the Indian political class has made up its mind. We are not going to do anything that gets us anywhere near that situation. The GOI can survive regular terrorist attacks that kill scores of Indian citizens. It cannot survive anything like the aftermath of Paki collapse.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
Nvishal that will definitely happen, as a defeat in 1971 made them start antics in only 1984. Musharaf could not ask for ceasefire during or immediately after Parakram due to H&D reasons. and after 10 years of lull Pakis will be back to their old game. Regarding Afghanistan 1/3 of forces is mostly hogwash, most of the Taliban are very close to Paki Army, If Pakis feel we are weak enough they will definitely try something irrespective of whether the Americans are there in Afghanistan or not.
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Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
Honestly, I keep wondering what a Paki collapse will look like? like somalia with different factions controlling different swathes of land? Is this something we should fear?
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
Why is the pious woman reading from left to right (1:40)? Besides, who is their cleaning lady? ISI? This "safe abode" is in a much better shape than their villa in abort-e-bad.Anujan wrote:Video of OBL's munnas in house arrest in Pakistan. They seem to be playing with kaafir american teddy bears.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
My opinion:Neela wrote:Honestly, I keep wondering what a Paki collapse will look like? like somalia with different factions controlling different swathes of land? Is this something we should fear?
In retrospect, there be no collapse a la Somalia. It will be more like Beirut. Maybe thats for the better. Fear? Yes. Fear the exodus of the "educated" elite and pakjabi landed gentry with their SUVs and petrodollars into India in the name of bhai chara. The first ones to get up and desert the leaking ship will be the UP/Bihar/MP mohajirs. Plans are afoot already. My family contacts in Allahabad are talking about it (the exodus).
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
If the pakistani state(the army) looses all control and large scale ethnic fights take over, then the neighbours will start isolating pakistan to contain the instability. Iran and india already has fencing along their border with pakistan. China might do the same on its border to protect xinjiang.Neela wrote:Honestly, I keep wondering what a Paki collapse will look like?
But all the above is just wishful thinking. Give me a reason why the PA will be taken off life support?
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
So would you say that in past when India engaged in war with Pakistan and won those wars including cutting Pakistan in half, India was willing to confront US and China?nvishal wrote:
Confronting pakistan means confronting US and China. It's not going to happen.
You seem to be forgetting that one of the outcome of Parakram was that Musharaff had to commit that Pakistan territory would not be used for terrorism purpose against it's neighbors including India before the troops were actually withdrawn. Of course in true Islamic tradition it was a case of Taqqia, but what it also means that if need be India can also do a Parakram redux. [/quote]Parakram was an impulsive move. A waist of resources. Yet in the end, the BJP babus finally realized what they were up against and backed off.
very simplistic assesment, descision was much more complex than that.India's refusal to react to the mumbai attacks came from the lessons they learned during parakram.
You mean the leftover over Pakistan is here to stay? Since 1/2 of Pakistan is already gone, and I don't see why Baluchistan, Sindhudesh etc. can't be carved out of it!Pakistan is here to stay. It is a asset for us/china. Can india turn pakistan into a liability to us/china?
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Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 29 March 2
anupmisra wrote:My opinion:Neela wrote:Honestly, I keep wondering what a Paki collapse will look like? like somalia with different factions controlling different swathes of land? Is this something we should fear?
In retrospect, there be no collapse a la Somalia. It will be more like Beirut. Maybe thats for the better. Fear? Yes. Fear the exodus of the "educated" elite and pakjabi landed gentry with their SUVs and petrodollars into India in the name of bhai chara. The first ones to get up and desert the leaking ship will be the UP/Bihar/MP mohajirs. Plans are afoot already. My family contacts in Allahabad are talking about it (the exodus).
So if India attacks and dismembers the TSPA , can we expect a similar style collapse? What is the guarantee that rest of the remaining pieces will not attack once again like Rakthabeej? After all the TSP identity is in itself Islamic-anti-India-anti-kafirs all rolled into one. What _GAIN_ can we see 1 year after such an incident? A reduction in conventional hostility - but the the hostility that TSP shows is anyway unconventional today . We would have instilled a fear definately. But I do not think hostility and their intent to harm us would decrease. S