Please, oh please IAEA has safeguards when ore is enriched to fuel and you want to say they dont have safeguard when ore is enriched to weapon grade Uranium?gakakkad wrote: safeguards are only placed for processing and fabricating fuel...the safeguards are in place because the fuel is processed and as per the third paragraph of the iaea i have posted above they have to be safeguarded...
Read what you posted
India is NOT a nonnuclear-weapon state under NPT. What you posted DOES NOT APPLY to India. India has a special Trisanku status in Iaea. Neither here nor there. Lose-lose reallyWhen any material containing uranium or thorium which has
not reached the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle described
in paragraph (c) is directly or indirectly exported to a nonnuclear-weapon State
In fact the same document posted has the following summary
Read thisSafeguards obligations related to mining and
ore processing are limited but the information
to be provided is important
Efficient and effective control of mining and ore
processing activities is
• in the interest of the State
• essential for the non-proliferation regime
Provision of the required information is
indispensable for an effective and efficient
Agency safeguards
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf12.html
None of the material, NONE, supplied to a safeguarded facility can be withdrawn & any and all material is under safeguards, in fact unofficially Man mohan made the DAE forsake testing as well (refer above)In December 2006 the US Congress passed legislation to enable moves towards nuclear trade with India. Then in July 2007 a nuclear cooperation agreement with India was finalized, opening the way for India's participation in international commerce in nuclear fuel and equipment and requiring India to put most of the country's nuclear power reactors under IAEA safeguards and close down the Cirus research reactor by 2010. It would allow India to reprocess US-origin and other foreign-sourced nuclear fuel at a new national plant under IAEA safeguards. This would be used fuel arising from those 14 reactors designated as unambiguously civilian and under full IAEA safeguards.
The IAEA greeted the deal as being "a creative break with the past" - where India was excluded from the NPT. After much delay in India's parliament, it then set up a new and comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, plus an Additional Protocol. The IAEA board approved this in July 2008, after the agreement had threatened to bring down the Indian government. The agreement is similar to those between IAEA and non nuclear weapons states, notably Infcirc-66, the IAEA's information circular that lays out procedures for applying facility-specific safeguards, hence much more restrictive than many in India's parliament wanted.
The next step in bringing India into the fold was the consensus resolution of the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in September 2008 to exempt India from its rule of prohibiting trade with non members of the NPT. A bilateral trade agreement then went to US Congress for final approval. Similar agreements followed with Russia and France. The ultimate objective is to put India on the same footing as China in respect to responsibilities and trade opportunities, though it has had to accept much tighter international controls than other nuclear-armed countries.
The introduction to India's safeguards agreement with IAEA says that India's access to assured supplies of fresh fuel is an "essential basis" for New Delhi's acceptance of IAEA safeguards on some of its reactors and that India has a right to take "corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies." But the introduction also says that India will "provide assurance against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time." In the course of NSG deliberations India also gave assurances regarding weapons testing.