A look back at the partition

member_19686 · Post by **member_19686** » 30 Jan 2012 00:41

Okay will keep that in mind.

A_Gupta · Post by **A_Gupta** » 30 Jan 2012 01:05

I do not see in JLN. Never and ever - he takes it rather coolly, ordering shooting of Hindu mobs bent on taking revenge on Muslims, while keeping mum and even giving legalese excuses for not initiating or urging similar action against Muslim mobs - and the unpardonable statement about the feminized nation simply suffering a natural birth-pang - thereby no-one being responsible after all.

The fault that Sardar Patel saw in JLN was that he was way too emotional, losing his cool way too often. Anyone who thinks JLN "rather coolly" ordered the shooting of Hindu mobs had better reopen the books and look again.

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 30 Jan 2012 03:48

I guess the problem is a selective reading of history - rather than not opening the books. If by "not coolly" means shouting or gesturing an order to shoot - well then it was not so "cool". If by coolly means without showing any hesitation, taking impromptu and on-the spot decision, without pondering the legalese harangue that was dished out about not being able to urge or order anything in the parallel case of Muslim mobs - then it was indeed "cool".

For example such a legal brain still found it not illegal to order a posse of security accompanying him - to shoot at sight, without waiting for the legalistic pathway, as a "central representative" on a "state visit" while having posed the excuse that the "centre" could not intervene in the "states'" law and order problem when asked to intervene at Noakhali against the Muslim mobs - is rather "cool". Its the coolness of total non-chalance at total lack of integrity.

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 30 Jan 2012 03:55

I have gone through almost all of JLN's writings available publicly [of course a huge amount possibly is still classified with perhaps as the years go by - decreasing exponentially from natural causes of vanishing of papers that can destroy relations with freindly powers for millenia]. But I could still have missed something lying somewhere that shows any sign of personal remorse, or personal guilt at culpability for the victims of the Partition. If such a things exists anywhere, those who go repeatedly back to their history books, can perhaps quote or refer - so I may enrich myself with facts?

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 30 Jan 2012 04:00

By the way any update available on any other possible comment made by Mountbatten on VPM - apart from establishing the supposed fact that VPM was Sardar's "right-hand-man"? Was this the only statement made by Mountabtten on VPM being anyone's "man"?

ManuT · Post by **ManuT** » 30 Jan 2012 06:43

Bji

I am not trying to discredit Maulana Azad. I was in fact trying to gauge RCM's account when I came across the wiki article.

"When the Government of India set up an editorial Committee to author a history of the freedom struggle of India, he was its principal member. But, following a conflict with the then Education Minister Maulana Abul Kalam Azad on the Sepoy Mutiny, he left the government job and published his own book: "The Sepoy Mutiny & Revolt of 1857". According to him the origins of India's freedom struggle lie in the English-educated Indian middle-class and the freedom struggle started with the Banga Bhanga movement in 1905. His views on the freedom struggle can be gone through in detail in his book "History of the Freedom Movement in India"."

Hence my questions, because.
First, an 'attack dog' of the establishment cannot later complain of being bitten, if you were to see the contrast between point 1 & 2 of the earlier post.

Second, with Maulana writing his own book, would be a 'conflict of interest'.

Third, Maulana's differences with JLN would be political or policy related. Maulana's differneces with RCM OTOH would of a different kind i.e. of a minister trying to influence to write his version of history.

RCM, OTOH, I cannot imagine him to be on the erring side, as his works speak for themselves.

So here it is, if you are satisfied, (as it seems so) that Maulana could not be considered an 'attack dog' (as it is called in todays politics) for the establismend and also that there was no conflict of interest with him, writing a book (which again, I have difficulty imagining him, interfering just to peddle 'his' book). I would think my mind is currently at rest.

So on the third doubt, I can only hope that they were in intellectual and not control issues.

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 30 Jan 2012 08:51

Yes, it would be more likely that Maulana would oppose RCM's source/start-point analysis. For this you have to go back to the rare but still available glimpse into Maulana's ideological perspective on Indian history. From that view - he would stress the "first Indian war of independence" compared to RCM. RCM on the other hand is accused by the Thaparite brigade of downplaying the role of Muslims in the "freedom struggle". I think you can see where the fight would ensue between the Maulana and RCM. By the way, I think I was one of the few on the forum who drew attention to Maulana's vision of Islam and Islamism for the subcontinent.

But this is not relevant for what he says on the complicated dance of individual roles in Partition. That ha sto be judged on the basis of concurrent other sources and overall analysis. His judgement might be clouded/affected by what he hoped for as the role and place of the "Muslim" within "united" India - but that does not detract from his representation of individual actions leading up to the Partition.

ManuT · Post by **ManuT** » 30 Jan 2012 10:38

Sursena ji
Didn't mean to neglect you, just to close the loop.

The Patriots you mentioned in your post, need no introduction or need mine or your approval.
(editing out personal influences part)

Can we say that the 'Hindu-Muslim' unity, was (at least some of it) a reaction to the stated British policy of "divide and rule", also partly his experiences in SA?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 30 Jan 2012 22:35

BRF started this thread in August 2009 on the issue that the trauma of Bengal was not give its due respect. Finally there is book review in Pioneer (where else) on this subject.

A tale of Two Partitions

Mapmaking: Partition stories from two Bengals

Author: Debjani Sengupta

Publisher: Amaryllis

Price: 295

Partition narratives from Bengal aren’t just about anger and violence. The modernist techniques, the plaintive suggestiveness, and the understated sense of loss are unfamiliar to those brought up on stories from the western frontier, says Debraj Mookerjee

Partition (or should we say ‘partitions’) has spawned an entire genre of troubled narratives. Violence and separation will continue to shape the Indian psyche much after the tears run dry and memory finds other moulds to fill. These narratives, however, do not constitute an undifferentiated mass of writing. The Partition of 1947 was experienced differently in different parts of India. In the west it was dramatic, with the question of the separation well resolved in the minds of those who desired it; in the east, namely in Bengal, Partition was in some sense an enforced reality, fracturing the sense of linguistic unity that existed as a strong bond among Bengalis — both Muslim and Hindu.

Partition narratives from either side of the divide in Bengal, therefore, reflect a particular inflection, unattended for long for want of empathetic translation. Triumphalist narratives emanating from the immediate aftermath of Partition have been in circulation for long, but works composed a few years thereafter, reflecting the anxieties of a society trying to come to terms with the sense of loss and longing, of nostalgia and displacement, have always yearned for a wider readership. Mapmaking: Partition Stories from Two Bengals, edited by Debjani Sengupta, with an incisive foreword by Ashis Nandy, seeks to fill that void.

Nandy believes we have maintained a collective silence over the horrors of Partition by mounting an almost unconscious conspiracy of silence, for it “was one way known to South Asians to start life anew and contain bitterness, a way of repairing community life, interpersonal trust and he known moral world.” The past, however, has a way of catching up with us. It lies submerged, but can never be drowned out of our memories. “Unlike an unexamined life,” says Nandy, “which we are told is not worth living, an unexamined past has to be lived out over the succeeding generations.” Nandy makes the point that unlike contemporary communal violence that can be traced to political machinations, the violence that marked Partition was visceral, emanating from a primordial core that just cannot be explained away; it remains, therefore, as a grim reminder of what we can never wish to be.

The selection of stories presented by Sengupta, translated by both she and Prof Rani Ray (who has taught English at the University of Delhi), highlights what Nandy hints at. They are narratives suffused by the longing for the other, of another land, of another connection between one community and the other, and of the one chance to make what was wrong right all over again. The gentle and softly nuanced nostalgia that marks the narratives selected in this collection maps a terrain that is different, for example, from the dramatic overtones of the narratives of, say, a Manto. The Partition narratives of the Punjab have their special inflection. Manto’s ‘Toba Tek Singh’ is an angry and furious narrative, highlighting the madness wrought upon a people who were overrun by the precipitous reality of territorial segregation. In Bengal however, the separation was gradual, experienced not as a cataclysmic event, but as a continual tide of unresolved anxieties.

The short stories selected by Sengupta traverse a wide range. Whereas many are written in the aftermath of the 1947 riots, others capture the ongoing tide of migration and displacement that continued to define life on either side of the Bengal border for years after. What is most remarkable about the collection is the absence of any apparent division in perspective between stories from either side; both East and West Bengal seem to be crying out the same lament — about loss, nostalgia and guilt. Only by examining the name of the respective authors can the reader discern the appellation of a particular narrative. This remarkable quality anticipates the second ‘Partition’ East Pakistan underwent, when linguistic nationalism led to the creation of Bangladesh. These nuances add rich colour to the stories and help uncover a less than adequately explored aspect of the story of Partition this subcontinent has had the misfortune of enduring.

One note of advice: The book is best approached by reading first the brilliant afterword by the editor. It surveys the landscape of writing centred on the theme of Partition, delineating various perspectives, and highlighting the subtle variations that mark the specificities of the Bengal experience. Next the reader is advised to consult Nandy’s foreword, crafted with characteristic incisiveness and insights. Together, the two prose sections provide a structure that suitably inscribes the short stories put together by the selection. And, finally, a note of caution: Partition narratives from Bengal are vignettes really, not angry tale about graphic violence. The modernist techniques, the plaintive suggestiveness, and the almost understated sense of loss and disorientation are quite unique, and therefore somewhat unfamiliar to those brought up on more robust Partition stories from the western frontier. In these stories you will find few answers. But what will remain etched in the mind is the unresolved question of the division of this land.

The reviewer is associate professor, University of Delhi

RayC, Thanks for starting this thread.

ramana

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 31 Jan 2012 08:44

In fact, the partition narrative has largely focussed on the Punjab & J&K and the partition of Bengal has not got its due.

Abhi_G · Post by **Abhi_G** » 01 Feb 2012 08:20

in the east, namely in Bengal, Partition was in some sense an enforced reality, fracturing the sense of linguistic unity that existed as a strong bond among Bengalis — both Muslim and Hindu.

This is a myth propagated by historians from the Indian side. Circa 1905, when Curzon declared the first partition, Hindus from Bengal tried to nullify the divisiveness by stressing on the unity by language; in fact Tagore has some contribution in that. However, I would not believe that the Nawab of Dhaka had moved an inch. Neither was Suhrawardy moved. Noakhali happened. Sylhet happened. In some places, in a matter of a couple of weeks, Hindus were asked to either convert or leave . From Sylhet, an acquaintance who later moved to Shillong (whose family eventually migrated to Kolkata, since they were "outsiders" there as well), said that all the valuables were handed over to the ML goons to ensure some degree of safe passage for the Hindu women. At other places there was no such luck. The murders, rapes happened. So the much touted linguistic unity was fragile at best. At the call of Jinnah, Calcutta riots happened. Mymensingh happened. Where was the linguistic unity?

Even today it is a mirage. Most Indian historians would give a leftist spin saying that the partition was the result of Hindu jamidars oppressing the poor Muslim peasants - this was the Jamaat line of course!

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 02 Feb 2012 01:16

^^^Very true - because those who write about this in this vein, do not know the finer points of language use as a means of sharpening identity divides. In Bengal - Muslims deliberately choose words - avoiding some and adopting others - to distinguish and distance themselves from the Hindu.

There are many such words - like
Muslim -paani (of course used also throughout Hindi heartland but the distinction from derivations from Sanskrit have already been debated before), they will studiously avoid saying "jala" which the Bengali Hindu will use, on both sides of the border.

Muslim - Farsi for common relatives, while Hindus will use mostly Sansksrit derivatives.
Muslim - avoid any word that has "rama", "lakshmi" or what they think are Hindu god/goddess names. This goes to the extent that the common "rama-dhanu" - the word for rainbow, is studiously replaced in common bengali muslim usage as "rang-dhanu".

There are many many instances of this, and people should note that the usage is deliberate. In fact even within Muslim dominated geographical regions, the language use differs between Muslim and non-muslim Bengali sharing the same geo-social space.

These narratives of "lost unity" are carefully crafted and come from the prevalent intellectual whiskyism of India. They pretend a sense of loss of "cross-religious cultural bliss" that is actually a sense of lost youth, times, memory and parts and ways of life. This transference is needed - because only that transference is politically correct, will get approval from the regime and from the mutual back-scratching peer group claiming golden pens, and will get published. it is also a mechanism to deal with trauma - to deny its existence, or submerge it in a mythical and reconstructed golden period of oblivion.

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 15 Feb 2012 06:14

Is there any update on Mountbattens comments about VPM? Was the onlee comment that could be found was that which identified VPM as Sardar's man - and Mountbatten made no other comments about VPM being anyone else's man? Its been a long time since the issue first came up - and since the "Sardar's man" endorsement could be so easily found - but nothing else, am I to assume that no other comments exist?

After all, trawling for information like that should have yielded all those that exist?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 06 Mar 2012 04:49

The real issue is how the EIC period historians wrote the history of India during the 18th-19th centuries. The first three hundred years of Islamic rule are depicted in a particular narrative.

The first aspect is Gothic dark narrative of death, destruction and ruination in the early Islamic centuries. It didnt help that the Islamic hagiographers glorified and chronicled that aspect to show their belief in triumph of their religion based conquest. Most of the conquest turned out that way due to chance. It was a touch and go most of the time. Akbar became emperor due to a lucky arrow shot.

The second aspect is the inevitability of the loss of the conquered people. Narrative after narrative, historian after historian writes about how Hindus were only going to lose due to many factors: caste system, out-moded chivalry, ancient warfare techniques, quarreling leaders etc.

Yet the Rajputs had put up centuries of reistance (from Battle of Rajasthan to Rana Sanga, Rana Pratap etc.) and had transformed the Mughal empire into a collaborative rule. This is what tempered teh Mughal rle and made it so glorious.

The Marathas had founded their kingdom in 1680 and in less than a century had become the dominant power in India. They ignore the fact that with in fifty years of the death of Aurangazeb the Mughal Emperor was pensioner of the Marathas.

The third aspect is geographic. One vision is that of a greater India stretching from Afghainstan to Burma from Kashmir to Kanya Kumari. The other is the lesser India shorn of all the peripheral lands and peoples.

In the end it was the lesser India that the freedom struggle agreed to.

SAARC is way to get back to greater India just as EU is way to forget the Thirty year war in Middle Europe.

The unstated thesis of all these historians is that the advent of the British had lesser impact compared to the ravages of the Islamic centuries.

Islamic centuries(1200 to 1550)= very bad
Mughal rule(1550-1700) = not so bad
British (1757-1857 & 1858-1947) = good

First the British wrote such narratives and next the Indian historians followed it. Next the spun a Marxist interpretation which is a mix of the first two themes: Gothic and inevitable defeat.

We don't know the role of Protestant truimph after emerging from the Reformation era Europe in those two centuries of rise of EIC.

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 06 Mar 2012 04:54

Islamic centuries(1200 to 1550)= very bad
British (1757-1857 & 1858-1947) = good

It would be interesting to know whether Islamic rule (from 1200 to 1550) was worse than the British rule. In particular, which regime led to more deaths (due to their bad policies) per year?

This might be OT here. We should discuss it in any appropriate thread.

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 06 Mar 2012 07:24

Islamic centuries(1200 to 1550)= very bad
British (1757-1857 & 1858-1947) = good

Current Islamist behaviour at large and Lahori Poaqunshak shenanigans can be good pointer to the 1200-1500 Islamic period. And Brits have not changed a bit, they still practice perfidy with exterme fineese. Keeping in mind that both had absolute power for few centuries, i doubt if any other society experienced the dark days like Indics had.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 08 Mar 2012 02:36

X-Posted..by

"aditp"
When the dead speak

AND Haksar in Hindustan Times editorial wrote:Delhi is a city of many memories. Some of its anniversaries are still observed, some just remembered, and others fully forgotten. A grim one belonging to the last category falls on March 22. On that date, over two centuries ago, the national capital witnessed a human carnage of unparalleled intensity and scale.
This was the notorious qatle-aam of Delhi, a general massacre ordered by the invading king Nadir Shah of Persia. His soldiers slaughtered a staggering 20,000 men, women and children in the city on March 22, 1739, within a spell of six hours. It is almost unbelievable that such a large number could be killed in such a short time. It would have been a difficult feat even with modern weapons. But there are independent eye-witness accounts of this horrific happening.

There are contemporary chronicles like Tarikh-e-Hindi of Rustam Ali, Bayan-e-Waqai of Abdul Karim and Tazkira of Anand Ram Mukhlis. The Mughal empire had been weakened by wars of succession and secession in the three decades since the death of Aurangzeb. The regime was corrupt and disunited, but the country was still extremely rich and Delhi’s prosperity and prestige unblemished. Nadir Shah came in to grab a piece of the pie, like so many before and after him in India’s history.

The invaders defeated the imperial army near Karnal on February 25. Mughal emperor Muhammad Shah then twice visited the Persian king at his camp for negotiations after which both rulers headed for Delhi. The keys of the capital were surrendered to Nadir Shah who entered the city on March 20, occupying Shah Jehan’s imperial suite in the Red Fort. Coins were struck and the royal khutba read in his name in the Jama Masjid and other Delhi mosques. On the following day, he held a great durbar in the capital.

These events seemed to signify a change of government, leading to public confusion and agitation. One result was that prices shot up. The new city administrator set a price ceiling and sent a military contingent of Persian troops to the Pahar Ganj grain market to enforce the decree. The merchants refused, leading to violence which soon spread to other areas, also assuming a xenophobic anti-Persian orientation. Persians moving about the city were waylaid and killed. The underworld joined in the mayhem. Rumours spread that Nadir Shah himself had been assassinated by a woman guard in the Red Fort. The warlike Turani population of the Mughalpura area fell upon the Persian soldiery. A large number of them seem to have perished in the rioting which went on through the night of March 21.

At first incredulous, Nadir Shah was later furious when told of these casualties. Also needing to reassert power, he retaliated by ordering the qatle-aam. The next morning, March 22, he rode out in full armour from the Red Fort and took a seat at the Sunehri Masjid of Roshan-ud-dowla near the Kotwali Chabutra in the middle of Chandni Chowk. Around 9 am, he unsheathed his sword as a signal to commence the public slaughter.

Soon the pathways of areas like Chandni Chowk and Dariba Kalan, Fatehpuri and Faiz Bazar, Lahori, Ajmeri and Kabuli gates, Hauz Kazi and Johri Bazar — densely populated by Hindus and Muslims alike — were littered with bodies. Shops were looted and nobles’ mansions set ablaze. Women were ravished and abducted, many committing suicide. Even Muslim citizens were reported as resorting to jauhar, killing their own women and children.

“Here and there some opposition was offered,” says Tazkira, “but in most places people were butchered unresistingly. The Persians laid violent hands on everything and everybody. For a long time, streets remained strewn with corpses, as the walks of a garden with dead leaves and flowers. The town was reduced to ashes.”

After numerous pleas for mercy by Mughal ministers, Nadir Shah ordered the bloodshed halted around 2 pm. But the plunder continued for some days. A then enormous fine of R2 crore was extracted from the people of Delhi. The contents of the imperial treasury, including the Peacock Throne, jewels and gold were seized. “The accumulated wealth of centuries changed masters in a moment,” says a contemporary writer. The Persian ruler returned with the loot to his country where he was murdered some years later. The Mughal emperors lingered on for another century but increasingly as puppets of other powers.

Anniversaries occasion reflection besides recollection. First, disunity, corruption and weak government has always made this land a prey to foreign depredation. Second, the 1739 massacre was neither the last nor the first Delhi has suffered. Three centuries earlier it had been sacked by Timur. Later, there was the 1857 uprising and its armed suppression, the 1947 partition riots and the 1984 Sikh pogrom. The last two had very different causes but still displayed the disastrous consequences of government paralysis at critical moments. Such breakdowns have recurred in the country from time to time, though at smaller scales and levels, even in the more recent past. Third, law and order obviously depends on respect and fear for the power meant to maintain it, and to ensure them with due care is the prime business of a government.

AND Haksar is a former diplomat and occasional writer on history, literature and foreign affairs

The views expressed by the author are personal

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 08 Mar 2012 02:38

India suffered many such massacres over the last thousand years. It was mainly due to lack of central authority which enabled these massacres to happen.
The riots are small scale versions of these past massacres.

Its a shame that Bharat Karnad had type cast TSP-India battles as riots with tanks when the truth is something more.

member_19686 · Post by **member_19686** » 11 Mar 2012 07:59

'Now It Can Be Told' is a narrative of some of the events which followed the partition of India. In mainly deals with the riots which took place in West Punjab, in which Muslims attacked Sikhs and Hindus.

Now It Can Be Told (1949), A.N. Bali, The Akashvani Prakashan Ltd., Gopalnagar, Jullundur City, East Punjab

http://dharmanext.blogspot.com/2011/11/ ... nline.html

Online book.

jambudvipa · Post by **jambudvipa** » 11 Mar 2012 22:26

Surasena thanks for posting the book..

Browsed through it.Very painful read.Never knew about the mass buthcery of Sikhs and Hindus by Muslims at Sheikipura in Pakistan.

But the book is worth reading just to undertand the mass attack and deception tactics of the jehadis.The author has very clearly laid out the tactics practised by the Muslim league thugs in Lahore and surroundings,plus the conninvance of the so called "moderate" educated muslims who it seems took full part in abducting Hindu and Sikh women.

Yayavar · Post by **Yayavar** » 11 Mar 2012 23:25

Balwant Singh's "Kaale Kos" in Hindi was quite powerful. Manohar Moolgaonkar's A bend in the Ganges?

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 11 Mar 2012 23:38

But is it not "victimhood"?

Seriously how far do discussions on Partition violence by Islamists have any impact on Indian rashtryia behaviour or policy? Those in power or supposedly in the know - gloat over their contribution to promoting secret understandings between Gulf islamist powers and Indian regime in power. Others try to push for protecting the Paki regime in power and turn our anger against USA. In all of this those who apparently hold the key to power in India apparently are pushing for a line that defacto promises greater "understandings" (some of which are supposedly secret not to be shared with the larger stupid masses of Indians) with and protection or preservation of Islamist regimes in our neighbourhood.

While these very same sources try loudly to suppress any discussion on Partition violence or other past violences since in their representation it promotes "victimhood". Perhaps they realize that such discussions undermine the confidence of the ordinary non-Muslim Indian in the intentions (especially if they are secret and with an enemy whose ideology necessarily trains them to betray and ambush non-Muslims) of those who negotiate on our behalf.

I think the nature of Islamism is well known in its tradition and systematization of genocide. But the mindset and strategy of the section within Indians who collaborate and come to "understandings" with Islamists - needs to be explored more, even in the context of the Partition. The internal enemies and collaborators can do much greater damage by putting up false propaganda and preventing build up of resistance - as they did in the build up to the Partition.

If the Bengali and the Punjabi non-Muslim had not been gullible enough to be taken in by the collaborators in taqyia from the non-Muslim side in the so-called officially (British) recognized "nationalist" side - a lot more could have been saved.

By the way - its been many many days now - but I am still waiting for an answer as to whether Dickie birdie made only one statement about an Indian civil officer being an Indian politician's "man" - and never made any similar statement about that officer being any other man's "man"! There is still a thundering silence.

This is how propaganda in favour of the regime to which the Brits transferred power - works. Carefully, both loudly and silently but always shamelessly. If there is so much an all encompassing attempt at covering up Partition violence - is it not apparent that perhaps, just as now - the Indian side had strong elements of collaboration, tacit or indirect that talekd of "understanding" and discussions with the Islamists. But which at all costs prevented preparation by the non-Muslim to defend themselves? Then it was getting exclusive power and penalizing two extremes ends of the GV for not bootlicking the UP and collaborative middle GV-west coast coteries.

Now what?

ManuT · Post by **ManuT** » 17 Mar 2012 09:51

Door hato aye duniya walon Hindustan hamara hai (1943)

One of those songs that slid past British censors as a pro-war effort against the Axis powers, but really was a statement against the British rule itself which they realised later and I think was curbed for a sometime.

Belongs to the then popular culture.

rajrang · Post by **rajrang** » 24 Mar 2012 23:04

In case this link has not been posted before:

http://www.sacw.net/partition/june2004IshtiaqAhmed.pdf

Anindya · Post by **Anindya** » 25 Mar 2012 03:44

India and Pakistan: Lengthening shadows of a toxic past

A harangue on the partition by Asma Anjum who supposedly teaches English somewhere in Maharashtra

To summarize:
- Hindus are really bad - juxtaposition of Nazism thrown in
- Victimized status of Muslims
- Strong stable Pakistan myth...

Somehow, the near complete elimination of Hindus in Pakistan and Bangladesh post partition never arises. Perhaps, even if it did, this ethinic cleansing would be pointed out to be a result of the xenophobia inherent in Hindus, as Asma claims, Al Beruni pointed out.

devesh · Post by **devesh** » 25 Mar 2012 20:37

A letter written by the Bihar Provincial Hindu Maha Sabha to Acharya Kriplani (then president of INC), during the 1946 riots unleashed by the Muslim League, about the situation in Monghyr, Bihar:

ACHARYA KRIPLANI,
President, Indian National Congress.

Memorandum submitted on behalf of the Hindu Mahasabha, Monghyr with regard to the communal riots in the district.

Sir,
Monghyr, where communal riots were unknown only a year back, has witnessed a long series of them and last but not least, the most devastating present riot which staggers imagination. The All-India causes, which led to the India-wide communal riots, are not unknown. Here we propose to discuss only the local causes.

The Muslim League had been active in the district for the past few years. It was waiting for a congenial atmosphere, which was provided when a galaxy of high administrative officials all imbued with the League spirit held the reins of administration.

Thus the illegal interferences with the religious rites and festivities of the Hindus began. Sponsored by the Muslim League these interferences were connived at by the local officials and flourished under the intransigence of the Bihar Government. To illustrate this fact we propose to discuss the stages by which the communal frenzy arose and seized the whole of the district.

1. Early in the month of February last a drama which aimed at the Hindu Muslim unity was to be staged in the Zilla School on the occasion of Saraswati Puja, a festival. Some of the Muslim students protested ‘it was a caricature of the Muslim League’ and Mr Khurshaid Hussain, the then District Magistrate, on the initiative of the Muslim League leaders, curtailed it. In other schools of the town the hooligans created disturbances and on the subsequent day when the procession was to be taken out the authorities were approached for police protection, when there was an apprehension of some trouble.

The procession was heavily stoned from a mosque, the image was thrown into a gutter and defiled and a large number of Hindus sustained severe injuries.

Rowdyism was further aggravated when some League hooligans looted one shop of a nationalist Muslim to teach him a lesson. It is noteworthy that the procession was attacked under the very nose of Mr Bashiruddin, the Additional Superintendent of Police and the loot was made despite police patrols.

Mischief had already been enacted the then followed the indiscriminate arrests and house-searches of a large number of innocent and respectable Hindus, prosecution against many of whom are still pending.

The authorities resorted to all sorts of tactics to tyrannise the peace-loving Hindus but not a hand was raised against the hooligans who stoned the procession and looted the shops. Not a single arrest was made at the spot nor the mosque from where the brickbats rained was searched although the mischief continued for about an hour in the presence of the Additional Superintendent of Police, Mr Bashiruddin.

Agitation was made in the Press condemning the acts of the authorities but to them it was ineffective.

The next step was taken at Hissainabad in Sheikpura P.S., which is the land of the Nawabs. Troubles were brewing up from before and mischief was apprehended. The Ramnaswami procession, which passed peacefully along the licensed route under military escort, was heavily battered with a thick shower of brickbats that rained from a mosque. Several persons sustained serious injuries and the religious ensign was snatched and torn to pieces. All this happened in the August presence of K B Omer, the District Magistrate but not an arrest was made at the spot nor was the blessed mosque searched.

The same day the Hissainabad trouble echoed at Sheikhpura where some prominent leaguers had opened fire on some innocent citizens causing injuries to many of them.

Next day the officials exhibited vigilance and a large number of innocent Hindus were clapped behind the prison bars and many of them were prosecuted under Section 107 of Criminal Procedures Code, which prosecutions are still pending.

The Hindus of the place were subjected to numerous harassments and humiliations and even beef was exposed for sale in the outlaying skirts of the Devi temple.

Protests were made in the Press and from the platforms and Kumar Ganganand Singh, M.L.A, agitated the matter in the Assembly. From all quarters the transfers of K B Omer, the District Magistrate and Mr Bashiruddin, the Additional Superintendent of Police were demanded but the Congress Government paid no heed to it and their intransigence lulled those official to a sense of security.

3. Ceaseless were the activities of the Muslim League and boundless was the official’s patronage.

The Holi procession at Gangra in Jamui P.S., which was proceeding peacefully under military escort, was again battered by a shower of brickbats, which emanated from the mosque. The procession was dispersed and a number of Hindus were arrested and prosecuted.

Demands for the transfer of the District Magistrate and the Additional Superintendent of Police was pressed for but it did not avail with the Bihar Congress Government.
The Hindu public of Shiekhpura who were by that time groaning under the tyrannies of the Monghyr administration held a meeting, brought out a procession and made demonstration demanding the transfer of the District Magistrate. The same demand was echoed from many other platforms and in the Press but with the democratic Congress Government it was a cry in the wilderness.

4. The officials who were allowed to play with the religious sentiments of the Hindus with impunity had grown bold and police fire was opened at Chewara in Sheikpura P.S. against the Hindus who had conducted their procession strictly in terms of the licence. The subdued voice of the Hindus protested once more and demanded the transfer of the District Magistrate but the arrogance of the Bihar Ministry persisted and could not allow its vanity to be trifled with.

The Muslim League was triumphantly taking long strides and marching from success to success. Inflammatory speeches were delivered from the Muslim League platforms and hostile demonstrations were made.

They vomited venom and preached violence. There was much talk of ‘Direct Action’ and one leaguer was quoted to have said the sword of Islam was thirsty for the Hindu blood and that one Muslim was alone equal to ten Hindus.
Communal bitterness was much in evidence and persistent indifference to their religious sentiments by the local officials and the Bihar Government had driven them to desperation.

In the meantime the Muslims of Darkha in Jamui P S. brought a title suit in which they demanded the declaration of their title to slaughter cows in their village which is mainly inhabited by the Hindus.

The Calcutta carnage had strained the nerves of the Hindus and their feelings were further exasperated when leaflets containing programmes which included the abduction and ravishing of Hindu women were widely distributed throughout the district. The Police officials who were otherwise so over zealous in tyrannising the Hindus look no notice of the secret meetings held in the mosques and of so many notorious elements and implements imported from outside. The atmosphere was surcharged with communal frenzy and in that atmosphere the local Hindu Sabha took upon itself the responsibility of conducting the long drawn out Kali-Puja procession peacefully. The mammoth procession passed peacefully although stones were pelted at the procession at numerous places. Nothing untoward happened at the instance of the Hindus and the night passed off peacefully. But the Muslim League could not allow the situation to go unavailed.

Without the least provocation a Hindu was fatally stabbed and rowdyism ran
rampant throughout the town. The gun of one Hindu citizen, which was used in self-defence, was seized and ultimately the helpless Hindu citizen had to evacuate due to Muslim fear. In consonance with a pre-arranged plan the Muslim in shape of refugees centralised themselves in Muslim Mohollas and mobilised all their forces against the Hindus. Mr Yasin, the gun-dealer shifted his entire stock of arms and ammunitions to some unknown Muslim quarter and all side attacks on the Hindus began. As usual the police refused cognisance to many cases lodged by the Hindus against the Muslims and acts of lawlessness were perpetrated. The abduction of Hindu females from East Bengal and their import into the interior villages of Bihar was a great affront to the Hindu feelings, which were tingling with mortification.

Leaflet had already been distributed and when the communal frenzy ran high, a cow was slaughtered at Lakhanpur without any occasion. Muslims of Ghazipur set fire to the houses of Kayasth and it is learnt that two Kayastha girls were raped This was the last straw on the camel’s back and the conflagration that arose embraced many villages.

Pitched fights were fought among the Hindus and Muslims mainly at Tarapur, Ratanpur. Bariarpur, Seikhpura. and other places involving many murders and some arsons.

The town remained quiet but panic reached its peak. Goondas (thugs) from outside began pouring in. Following an incident at Koramaidan the A S P. went there when everything had quietened but to break vengeance it is reported that, he shot down a man.

Refugees in the centres counted one thousand near about but Mr. Sohail received daily rations for fifteen thousand refugees and this continued for days together. Evacuees were entitled to utmost protection and relief but the misadministration was highly abominable.

The surplus grain for 14,000 persons daily were either used for the consumption of a large number of bad elements who flocked to the town or was sold in the black market. The D.P H. insisted .on grounds of sanitation, the relief Commissioner suggested on grounds of emergency, eminent citizens protested to the Hindu Sabha deputation urged upon the District Magistrate to remove all the refugees to centralise all of them at one place outside the town under police protection. The District Magistrate gave no effect to it as his game could have been exposed.

The horrible carnage that has been wrought is really condemnable but we can’t help saying the officials arrogance which connived at all past happening is none the less responsible for the magnitude with which the riots tore asunder the whole district.

The very fact that Pandit Nehru who is enshrined in the Indian heart as one of the greatest epoch-making leader could be interrupted in his speech shows the extent of the despair and desperation of the Hindu Multitude.

We entirely endorse the views expressed by Pandit Nehru that Nationalism will have and must have precedence over communal affair.

We sincerely denounce the havoc and feel that communal strifes will impede our National Progress. We perfectly agree with him that the privileges of minorities must be safeguarded and the majority is responsible for the same.

We can assure Pandit Nehru and you, Sir, that Monghyr will not lack in respecting the command of their great National Leaders. One word from Mahatmajee and other accredited leader will be worshiped but the agony of Monghyr Hindu citizens has got to be properly appreciated.

We can understand the policy of appeasement advocated by the Congress
in the interest of Nationalism but fail to appreciate the colossal partiality of the
Bihar Congress Government and their total indifference to the wishes of the.
majority. Protection of the minority privileges is a responsibility of the Government but does it behave the Bihar Congress Government to have allowed the Muslim League to have transgressed on the religious sentiments of the Hindus?

The. Hindus have a creed of toleration and they never intend interfering with the religious rites and ceremonies of other communities. We can fervently hope that the Hindus will try their best to resolve normal situation.

We look upon you, Sir, for the proper diagnosis of the troubles and for remedying our longstanding grievances. For the present recall of K B Omar and Mr Bashiruddin is most needed and a change in the policy will be most welcomed.

The great panic which has enveloped the whole of the town and has completely paralysed the entire normal life of the town and the district is due to the imprudence of the official who brought a large number of dead bodies from the interior mofassil to the town and importing of still larger number of evacuees. So many dead bodies are certainly not meant for post-mortem examination and the refugees could have been sheltered conveniently and safely in the Mofassil areas

The exhibition of dead bodies and the refugees in town has greatly exasperated the communal fury and has struck terror in the heart of Hindu
people.

We sincerely trust that your arrival will save the district from ruin and wreckage.

Secretary
Town Hindu Sabha, Monghyr

I've highlighted the issues related to Congress governance/ideology and also the behavior of the local Bihar Congress govt in Blue.

sum · Post by **sum** » 02 Apr 2012 08:38

Could anyone please help me out with this?

X-post:
^^ For anyone who has read the book "Shadow of the Great game" by Shri.Narender Sarila ( i had read it but a friend has taken it and not yet returned it), could you kindly confirm that the book mentions about the Andaman islands coming to India as aquid-pro-quo for India joining the Commonwealth?

Somehow recall reading something of this sort in the book but would be great if someone could confirm it.

A_Gupta · Post by **A_Gupta** » 04 Apr 2012 17:17

Iqbal's letters to Jinnah, 1937
http://sites.google.com/site/cabinetmis ... -june-1937

ManuT · Post by **ManuT** » 07 Apr 2012 08:41

^
This is a good link, thanks for posting it here.
We can say the TSP is onlee fulfilling its vision.

excerpts from the link

Iqbal's letter to Jinnah, 28 May 1937

The problem of bread is becoming more and more acute. The Muslim has begun to feel that he has been going down and down during the last 200 years. Ordinarily he believes that his poverty is due to Hindu money-lending or capitalism. The perception that it is equally due to foreign rule has not yet fully come to him. But it is bound to come.

Happily there is a solution in the enforcement of the Law of Islam and its further development in the light of modern ideas. After a long and careful study of Islamic Law I have come to the conclusion that if this system of Law is properly understood and applied, at least the right to subsistence is secured to everybody. But the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim state or states. This has been my honest conviction for many years and I still believe this to be the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India.

Whether the fate of socialism will be the same as the fate of Buddhism in India I cannot say. But it is clear to my mind that if Hinduism accepts social democracy it must necessarily cease to be Hinduism. For Islam the acceptance [o]f social democracy in some suitable form and consistent with the legal principles of Islam is not a revolution but a return to the original purity of Islam. The modern problems therefore are far more easy to solve for the Muslims than for the Hindus. But as I have said above in order to make it possible for Muslim India to solve these problems it is necessary to redistribute the country and to provide on or more Muslim states with absolute majorities.

21 June 1937

During the last few months there has been a series of Hindu-Muslim riots in India. In North-West India alone there have been at least three riots during the last three months and at least four cases of vilification of the Prophet by Hindus and Sikhs. In each of these four cases, the vilifier has been murdered. There have also been cases of burning of the Koran in Sind. I have carefully studied the whole situation and believe that the real cause of these events is neither religious nor economic. It is purely political, i.e., the desire of the Sikhs and Hindus to initimidate Muslims even in the Muslim majority provinces. And the new constitution is such that even in the Muslim majority provinces, the Muslims are made entirely dependent on non-Muslims. The result is that the Muslim Ministry can take no proper action and are even driven to do injustice to Muslims, partly to please those on whom they depend, and partly to show that they are absolutely impartial. Thus it is clear that we have our specific reasons to reject this constitution. It seems to me that the new constitution is devised only to placate the Hindus. In the Hindu majority provinces, the Hindus have of course absolute majorities, and can ignore Muslims altogether. In Muslim majority provinces, the Muslims are entirely dependent on Hindus. I have no doubt in my mind that this constitution is calculated to do infinite harm to the Indian Muslims. Apart from this it is no solution of the economic problem which is so acute among Muslims.

To my mind the new constitution with its idea of a single Indian federation is completely hopeless. A separate federation of Muslim provinces, reformed on the lines I have suggest above, is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of non-Muslims. Why should not the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to self-determination just as other nations in India and outside India are.

Jinnah's Comment (excerpt) (Concluding paragraph of Jinnah's Foreword to Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah), 1943

It is... much to be regretted that my own replies to Iqbal are not available. During the period under reference I worked alone unassisted by the benefit of a personal staff and so did not retain duplicate copies of the numerous letters that I had to dispose of. I made enquiries from the Trustees of Iqbal's estate at Lahore and was informed that my letters were not traceable. Hence I had no alternative but to publish the letters without my replies as I think these letters are of great historical importance, particularly those which explain his views in clear and unambiguous terms on the political future of Muslim India. His views were substantially in consonance with my own and had finally led me to the same conclusions as a result of careful examination and study of the constitutional problems facing India, and found expression in due course in the united will of Muslim India as adumberated in the Lahore Resolution of the All-India Muslim League, popularly known as the "Pakistan Resolution", passed on 23rd March, 1940. M.A. Jinnah

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 19 Apr 2012 06:09

http://dawn.com/2012/04/18/blood-on-the ... f-history/
Blood on the tracks of history

Some of the initial instances of communal strife involved attacks by Muslim mobs on Sikhs in villages near Rawalpindi in March 1947, as well as clashes in the garrison town itself. There was turmoil in Lahore during the same period. It was still unclear at that point whether a Muslim-majority state called Pakistan would emerge — and the question of the shape it might take was even murkier.Many Sikhs and Hindus believed, for instance, that if a divide occurred, Lahore would be a part of India; after all, much of the city’s property belonged to non-Muslims, and it hosted crucial Sikh shrines. At the same time, quite a few Muslims in Amritsar and Jalandhar expected those cities to be assigned to a putative Pakistan, notwithstanding their non-Muslim majorities. These seemingly unrealistic notions were prodded in some cases by political leaders.Another question that the book raises is whether a division of Punjab was an inevitable consequence of the subcontinent’s partition along communal lines. The Muslim League was keen to claim the province as a whole, and entered into comprehensive negotiations with the Sikh leadership as a means of facilitating this outcome. The Sikhs were understandably wary of Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s assurances of virtual autonomy, given the focus on Islam as a determining factor for the forthcoming divide.The vast majority of witnesses, including many of those who lost most of their families in the Punjabi holocaust, testify to a broad communal harmony in the run-up to 1947. Some Muslims resented the deplorable Hindu tradition of excluding them from kitchens, but many others accepted the prohibitions on breaking bread together as a cultural norm. The extent to which class resentment might have contributed to the conflict is insufficiently explored in the testimonies, possibly because it was largely a subliminal factor.The appearances of the resolutely secular Jawaharlal Nehru are often cited as a crucial factor in quelling or pre-empting outbreaks of violence. By the same token, the instigative acts and rhetoric of the Muslim League National Guard, the RSS and the Akalis frequently figure as retrograde influences.

Advait · Post by **Advait** » 09 May 2012 22:15

A standard line peddled by psecs in India: Partition violence was equal-equal on both side i.e. Hindus/Sikhs vs. Muslims. So let's no dwell on it.

Paki line: Hindus committed all the violence, even in areas where Hindus were in a minority (typical Paki big lie stuff)

Truth: If we were like them, there would not be so many Muslims in India today. And it is not because of some political party or family that they are able to stay on.

A_Gupta · Post by **A_Gupta** » 10 May 2012 06:10

Some Musalmans had their heads screwed on right.
http://thepartitionofindia.blogspot.com ... ms-to.html
Letter from a S.M. Rahman to M.A. Jinnah, April 5, 1946.

ManuT · Post by **ManuT** » 10 May 2012 08:55

Talking with the Indians

Quoting in parts.

http://dawn.com/2012/05/08/talking-with-the-indians/

In an objective analysis, some reasons hark back to the Partition of 1947 while others attained salience in the post-independence conflicts. I propose to write two articles to focus on these deep-rooted factors.

India was divided largely because of triangular interaction involving the paramount colonial power exhausted by the Second World War, the Congress, a powerful political organisation for decades, and the Muslim League that assumed comparable leverage only after the great mobilisation of Muslims for the last general election in undivided India. For the Congress and its allies, there was already an India, united or divided, with a time-tested apparatus of the state.

Its key provinces had more democratic experience than the provinces constituting Pakistan. Its leaders had a vision, an idea, of India notwithstanding the tussle between Mahatma Gandhi and Subash Chandra Bose, the revolutionary from Bengal; and, notwithstanding the incipient conflict between the scholarly Abul Kalam Azad so emotionally attached to the civilisational symbiosis of India as to accept the trifurcating zonal scheme to prevent outright partition and others like Vallabhbhai Patel who secretly preferred a surgical division to win the battle for the soul of their postcolonial state.

The fact that India already existed made for well-considered decisions backed by force; it gave India a most advantageous time lead over Pakistan. A coalition of seasoned political leaders and a functioning executive authority guided by V.P. Menon enabled India to act strongly on issues concerning Pakistan. Having made substantive initial gains, India became a status quo power; its Pakistan diplomacy geared to defending that status quo. Frustrated by entrenched Indian positions, Pakistan occasionally resorted to dangerous actions in the vain hope of changing the pattern.

Pakistan was being shaped and configured in those fateful early years while being literally on the road. The author Philip Oldenburg (India, Pakistan and democracy) speaks of Pakistan as “an insufficiently imagined place”, a telling phrase crafted by Salman Rushdie. In reality, ‘imagining’ the new nation was not just insufficient; it was also a contested process.

I was a member of a small committee under Yahya Bakhtiar tasked in 1990 to open the Jinnah papers locked away by Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah as too personal. Jottings made by the Quaid in a loose sheaf folder, mostly at odd hours of sleepless nights, contained amazing insights. There was an entry about asking Liaquat Ali Khan to speak to Nehru about retaining common customs despite the mayhem of Partition. There was a painful record of Jinnah’s growing disappointment with the parochial politics of a number of leading Leaguers.

Ayesha Jalal’s memorable description of him as ‘the sole spokesman’ has strengthened the view that the Quaid was an unquestioned guide and decision-maker. The fact of the matter was that the grip of the terminally ill leader was progressively loosening.

A rough and ready example was Kashmir. India went through an elaborate political process to overcome the Maharaja’s procrastination and then mounted a well-planned military intervention. Pakistan’s contacts with Sheikh Abdullah and others in Kashmir were amateurish; the military component of the effort was a chaotic tribal incursion. The contrast reflected a gap not only in strategic comprehension but also in the quality of available administrative machinery.

Again, Nehru had a firmer grasp of the idea of national sovereignty and the realpolitik with which to assert it. He had not obstructed the plan for three zones, accepted briefly by both the Congress and the Muslim League. But then, in a moment that changed the course of history, he brought about its precipitous collapse by declaring that an independent and sovereign India would be free to change the arrangements then being made.

As Mountbatten rushed the transfer of power and threw his weight behind India in implementing the plan for Partition, imagining Pakistan with precision became even more difficult.

Later, when Pakistan joined western military pacts, Nehru rubbished the UN resolution for a plebiscite in Kashmir by treating the Pakistani decision as an affront to the imagined sanctity, inviolability and sovereignty of the subcontinent; he reassured Sheikh Abdullah there would be no plebiscite.

One can cavil at Nehru’s flawed political morality. The fact is that he successfully outmanoeuvred Pakistani leadership in statecraft and realpolitik and pioneered an enduring diplomatic approach to Pakistan: talk from a position of strength, create and defend new ground realities, concede nothing and impose political attrition.

Pakistan’s internal inadequacies, perceived existential threat from India and its international alliances rapidly led to a bureaucratic-military ethos. Its consequences for Pakistan’s India policy were enormous. India continues to harp on it even though Pakistan’s military establishment is *now* ready for accommodation.

A_Gupta · Post by **A_Gupta** » 11 May 2012 05:45

Talking with the Indians

Quoting in parts.

http://dawn.com/2012/05/08/talking-with-the-indians/

Its key provinces had more democratic experience than the provinces constituting Pakistan.

I disagree.

The author Philip Oldenburg (India, Pakistan and democracy) speaks of Pakistan as “an insufficiently imagined place”, a telling phrase crafted by Salman Rushdie. In reality, ‘imagining’ the new nation was not just insufficient; it was also a contested process.

No, in 1943, Jinnah told the Muslim League that absolutely nothing that would lead to debate or dissension within Muslims should be entertained, and that is why no explicit plan was laid out.

Again, Nehru had a firmer grasp of the idea of national sovereignty and the realpolitik with which to assert it. He had not obstructed the plan for three zones, accepted briefly by both the Congress and the Muslim League. But then, in a moment that changed the course of history, he brought about its precipitous collapse by declaring that an independent and sovereign India would be free to change the arrangements then being made.

This is also quite unfactual.

A_Gupta · Post by **A_Gupta** » 11 May 2012 07:23

I back up some of my assertions above with the following document, a speech by Jinnah in 1943, in secret to the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League, but recorded by a British agent.

http://thepartitionofindia.blogspot.com ... uslim.html

BTW, Jinnah was quite wrong when he said that the British would emerge as the most powerful among its allies after the war, and that the Congress was finished. Also note, his talk of imitating Afghanistan by declaring war on the British directly after the World War ended seems to be only for the benefit of Pakistan, and not for all of India.

Lastly, notice that even discussion of the "fundamental rights of citizens of Pakistan" was forbidden by Jinnah to prevent dissension.

dada · Post by **dada** » 11 May 2012 10:26

# A_Gupta
Thanks for the link. This is an absolutely amazing blog. Politics is in essence a game of perceptions not reality. Not only are we unaware of our own perceptions but also the perceptions of other players in the system. Further organizing a large body of people around a flawed perception creates the right conditions for a civil war & chaos.

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 16 May 2012 04:15

X-posting from future scenarios thread : the temptation was too strong on seeing that we do acknowledge the possibility of multiple perceptions of the same thing, not all of which need to be extra careful in preserving the attributed halo of icons.

[from Suniti Kr Ghosh : using the electronic version of abridged content of a chapter of his more well known book The Indian Big Bourgeosie: its genesis, growth and character]
part 1:

When the war in Europe ended, Viceroy Wavell released the members of the working committee of the Congress from prison and convened a conference at Simla in June-July 1945. As V.P Menon wrote, the Congress came in for co-operation without any conditions.1 The Congress leaders were eager to join the Viceroy’s Executive Council (which Wavell intended to reconstitute with representatives of Indian political parties) “on the basis that they would whole-heartedly co-operate in supporting and carrying through the war against Japan to its victorious conclusion”. (The Congress leaders’, including Gandhi’s, faith in the creed of non-violence was remarkably flexible.) Nehru felt overjoyed and said: “We feel we must succeed at Simla …I am very hopeful.”2 But the Simla Conference foundered on the rock of the League’s claim to nominate all Muslim members of the reconstituted Council.

Wavell wanted the Congress leaders to “see to it that a peaceful atmosphere is preserved in the country”. Wavell was afraid of a post-war upheaval in the country. So was Gandhi.3 The Congress president Abul Kalam Azad wrote to the Viceroy:
“… the contacts established between the Congress and the Government had largely allayed past bitterness and marked the beginning of a new chapter of confidence and goodwill.”4

As we shall see, it was that surge of “confidence and goodwill” for the British imperialists that continued to rise and yielded the transfer of power. Congress leaders had reasons to feel “confidence and goodwill” for the British imperialists. Close co-operation between the Raj on the one hand and the Indian big bourgeoisie and Congress leaders on the other had already started. The Raj regularly invited discussions with Congress leaders on constitutional issues, the future administrative set-up, “a scheme of army reorganization” and other matters like education, industry and planning. Nehru was being consulted on constitutional questions and army reorganization. In June 1944 Sir Ardeshir Dalal, a Tata director and an author of the Bombay Plan, so much lauded by Nehru, had been appointed a member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council in charge of planning and development. During the war the British Raj and the Indian big bourgeoisie were bound with close ties of collaboration, for instance, in the Eastern Group Supply Council and on various official committees.
[...]
Nehru said that India was on the “Edge of a Volcano” and that “We are sitting on the top of a Volcano”.5 P.J.Griffiths, the leader of the European group in the Central Legislative Assembly, also said: “India, in the opinion of many, was on the verge of revolution.”6

What the people were actually doing?

Quote:

India on the “verge of revolution”
Almost immediately after the end of the war, on 21 to 23 November 1945, Calcutta saw the first outburst of the pent-up fury of the people who had suffered incredibly under the fascist British Raj during the war. The immediate cause of it was the police firing on a procession of students demanding the release of the Indian National Army (INA) officers who were then on trial. A student and another youth became martyrs and several were wounded. That set Calcutta and the suburbs ablaze. The city was completely paralyzed. Trains were stopped. Barricades were set up and street battles took place. All communal considerations were forgotten and the people fought with primitive weapons the heavily armed forces of the Raj. Police and military vehicles were burnt down – about 150 of them. According to official estimates, 33 persons including an American, were killed and 200 civilians, many policemen, 70 British and 37 American soldiers were wounded.7 The whole of Bengal was surcharged with bitter anti-imperialist feeling.

Describing the mood of the people, Bengal Governor Casey wrote: “Both in North and South Calcutta a feature of the disturbances … was that the crowds when fired on largely stood their ground or at most only receded a little, to return again to the attack…. Throughout the forenoon and early afternoon of the 23rd [November], Congress and some Communist propaganda cars toured the affected areas dissuading the students from further participation.”8

Viceroy Wavell rushed to Calcutta. On 27 November he informed the Secretary of State: “Casey was impressed by the very strong anti-British feeling, behind the whole demonstration, and considered the whole situation still very explosive and dangerous.” Significantly, Commander-in-Chief Auchinleck made an appreciation of the internal situation within India on 24 November, the very day after the uprising. The Viceroy agreed generally with the appreciation. Auchinleck wrote:

“If the Indian Forces as a whole cease to be reliable, the British Armed Forces now available are not likely to be able to control the internal situation or to protect essential communications, nor would any piecemeal reinforcement of these forces be of much avail. To regain control of the situation and to restore essential communications within the country nothing short of the organized campaign for the reconquest of India is likely to suffice.”9

The lesson of the November uprising went home to the British imperialists. On 24 November itself, Auchinleck met some representatives of provincial governments about I.N.A trials. In his letter to Wavell of the same day Auchinleck wrote that the provincial representatives agreed that “the trials should be limited to those involving brutality and murder of such a nature that it could not be defended as an act committed in good faith by a combatant”. He added: “The evidence reaching us now increasingly goes to show that the general opinion in the Army … is in favour of leniency.” On 30 November – within a week of the uprising – the Indian Government issued a press communiqué which stated: “Until all investigations are complete, it is not possible to state the number who will be brought to trial but the total is unlikely to be as many as fifty and may be as few as twenty, and, as explained above, trials will be limited to those against whom brutality is alleged.”10 The charge of ‘waging war against the king’ was dropped and the sentences already passed were remitted.

It may be noted that in the meantime the British had brought home as captives tens of thousands of captured I.N.A officers and men and started court-martials of them. The original plan which had received the “gratified approval” of the Congress leaders11 had been to release some, sentence many others to imprisonment and execute 40 to 50 prisoners. As we have said, the plan was changed almost immediately after the November uprising.
[...]
As R.P. Dutt said, the example of the I.N.A and “the subsequent trials of the I.N.A leaders kindled to white heat the flame of militant patriotism and the conception of the armed conquest of power in place of the old non-violent struggle.”12 The most alarming thing to the British imperialists was the impact of the I.N.A on the British Indian armed forces.13 Nehru wrote to Commander-in-Chief Claude Auchinleck: “Within a few weeks the story of the I.N.A had percolated to the remotest villages in India and everywhere there was admiration for them and apprehension as to their possible fate … The widespread popular enthusiasm was surprising enough, but even more surprising was a similar reaction of a very large number of regular Indian army officers and men. Something had touched them deeply.”14

On 26 November 1946, Auchinleck wrote to Wavell that “there is a growing feeling of sympathy [among the men of the British Indian armed forces] for the I.N.A.”15 The loyalty of the British Indian armed forces was thoroughly shaken by the I.N.A; large numbers of them transferred their allegiance to their motherland.

Gandhi rushed to Calcutta immediately after the November uprising. He had a series of interviews with Governor Casey. He assured Casey that “our future long term relations would be good”, that he would do his utmost in bringing about a peaceful solution of India’s constitutional problem, and that he was lulling the people into the belief that “India was going to get her freedom out all right” and asking them to “work on that assumption and no other”.16 The Congress working committee met in Calcutta and reiterated its faith in non-violence “for the guidance of all concerned” and clarified that nonviolence “does not include burning of public property, …” and so on. Before and after the November upheaval, Nehru went on emphasizing “the necessity of maintaining a peaceful atmosphere…” He went on telling the people that the “British are packing up”, that “in the present day world the British empire has ceased to exist” and expatiated on “the folly of disorder and violence”. He advised students not “to take suddenly the reins of the nation in their own hands” and “to leave political leadership to those… qualified to lead”.17 On 3 December 1945 he assured Sir Stafford Cripps, an important member of the British cabinet (and through him the entire British cabinet), that he was doing his “utmost to avoid conflict and restrain the hotheads”.18 Sardar Patel advised the youth not to waste their energies in “fruitless quarrels”.

Again, on 27 January 1946, Nehru wrote a long letter to Cripps, in which he stated: “Elections have somewhat held people in check but as soon as these are over, events of their own motion, will march swiftly…. What happened in Calcutta two months ago and what is happening in Bombay now are significant signs of the fires below the surface. A single spark lights them”. He said that any delay on the part of the British to take the initiative “might well lead to disastrous consequences”. He assured Cripps (and obviously the British cabinet) that the gulf between India and Britain, which “has never been so wide”, could perhaps “be bridged even now with a great effort” and that he worked “to that end”. 19

Ignoring the Congress leaders’ sermons upholding law and order and the creed of non-violence, Calcutta rose again from 11 to 13 February 1946. The occasion was a protest demonstration by students against the rigorous imprisonment for seven years passed on Abdul Rashid of the I.N.A. The city’s life stopped because of a general strike. For two days mills and factories in Calcutta’s suburbs remained closed; trains did not run; people fought bitter street battles with the armed police and army units riding armoured cars. A marked feature, like that in November, was strong solidarity among Hindus and Muslims who together directed their attacks against Europeans. The upheaval surpassed that in November. According to official estimates, 84 persons became martyrs and 300 injured. As in November, the anti-imperialist wave in Calcutta and the suburbs sent ripples throughout Bengal. Bands of Congress, Muslim League and Communist volunteers moved along the streets of Calcutta and neighbouring areas jointly and helped in restoring order. On 13 February Swadhinata, the Bengali organ of the CPI, condemned indiscipline and disorder as the Congress president was doing.

The details of the RIN uprising and its extent and nature I am skipping - but is quoted in the scenarios thread.

The brave men of the navy refused to be cowed by any threat – not even the threat of Admiral Godfrey (who had flown in bombers) to sink the navy. They appealed to political parties to lead them, promised to hand over to them the navy which they had renamed the Indian National Navy. But no political party, not even the CPI, responded to their appeal though they could have access to the rebel men of the navy.

Jinnah’s appeal to them, especially the Muslims among them, to surrender came in the early hours of 23 February when their representatives were meeting to decide their future course of action. Dutt wrote: “… the overwhelming majority were for a fight to death and not for surrender.”29 The Naval Central Strike Committee ultimately took the decision to surrender, stating that they were surrendering not to the British Raj but to the Congress and the League. In their last message to the people, they said: “For the first time the blood of the men in the services and the people flowed together in a common cause. We in the services will never forget this. We also know that you, our brothers and sisters, will never forget. Long live our great people. Jai Hind.”30

After the surrender the man-hunt began. More than two thousands of the rebels were arrested and kept in detention camps; about five hundred were sentenced to prison terms to serve as common criminals. The top Congress leaders, who had given the pledge that “no disciplinary action” would be taken, did little to keep their pledge.31

What role did the Congress leaders play during the historic naval revolt? Sardar Patel, Abul Kalam Azad, S.K. Patil (secretary of the Bombay Provincial Congress Committee, and later, minister of the central government), Jinnah and Chundrigar of the Muslim League openly opposed the call for a strike on 22 February issued by the Naval Central Strike Committee and advised the navymen to surrender to the British. Patil had secret confabulations with the Bombay governor and the Congress and the League placed ‘volunteers’ at the service of the Raj to “assist the police” and British army units to fight the people.32 Colville wrote to Wavell that on 22 February he “saw several of these volunteers… and they did useful though limited work”.33

Bombay observed a successful general strike in the teeth of the bitter opposition of the Congress and the League leaders. Workers and students of Bombay fought pitched battles in the streets with British army units and the armed police, who were assisted by Congress and League volunteers. At a mass meeting held in Bombay with the permission of the Bombay government on 26 February, Nehru and Patel strongly condemned “the mass violence in Bombay”, that is, the resistance of the navymen and workers who had dared to raise the banner of anti-imperialist revolt. Addressing the press next day, Nehru thundered: ‘The R.I.N. Central Strike Committee had no business to issue such an appeal [to the city of Bombay to observe a sympathy strike]. I will not tolerate this kind of thing.”34 The Nehrus alone had the right to issue calls for strikes!

Gandhi, the prophet of non-violence, condemned the rebels for their thoughtless orgy of violence – not the real orgy of violence by the Raj, of which the people were victims. To him the “combination between Hindus and Muslims and others for the purpose of violent action is unholy…” 35 He went on denouncing those who disbelieved in British professions that they would grant freedom to India.

It was a country-wide anti-imperialist revolt. Wavell noted in his diary on 7 March 1946 that the victory parade that was organized in Delhi was boycotted and crowds of men burnt down the Town Hall.36

For the possible combined and convergent interests of the imperialists, Indian big biz, and the congrez centre - in suppressing the alternative, uprisings and unrest that was simultaneously targeting the power bases of each of the troika - please follow the sequence in future scenarios thread.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 21 May 2012 01:50

SSridhar wrote:I find that the following excellent article in The Telegraph by Abhijit Bhattacharyaa was not posted here.

The Turbulent History of the State Within the State
Sunday, March 18, 2012 is the 60th birthday of the 19th (the present incumbent) chief of of the Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan, Lieutenant-General Ahmad Shuja Pasha. That is also the day of his retirement. The question today is: will he or will he not retire from service to make way for the 20th ISI chief on March 18, 2012? Will Shuja Pasha get an extension once again? It is a question which cannot have any definitive answer owing to the complex nature of the subject. So one can analyse instead the process of the previous ISI chiefs’ appointments, and the development of the office from the time of its inception.

Let us analyse the importance of the ISI chief’s chair in the larger context of South-Asian realpolitik. It began with the nascent ‘religious’ State’s identity crisis as a ‘minority’, occasioned by the proximity of a neighbour with an overwhelming non-Muslim majority that had ‘ruled’ over an extensive area for several centuries in the past. The Pakistani ruling class always had a feeling of deprivation and the sense of a historic mission to reclaim the land over which their “perceived predecessors” had ruled. This gave birth to the ‘martial race’ mentality that, from the beginning, characterized the personnel of Pakistan’s army. The army was smart enough to take early control of the polity, thereby causing the rise to power of the duo comprising the ISI and the army. Colonel Syed Shahid Hamid was the first boss of the ISI. Then came Robert Cawthome,{the fact is that it was Cawthorne who raised the profile of the ISI. He eloquently argued Pakistan's case to the Western powers and sealed their unstinted support. In a speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) in c. 1948, he said “Whatever the legal position might be, from the political, economic and strategic points of view, Pakistan could not afford to have a hostile India right up to the Western borders of J[ammu] & K[ashmir] : a) It would bring Indian army within 30 miles of the military headquarters of Pakistan and right behind the vital north—south communication line; b) it would give India control over the waterworks of Chenab, Jhelum and Indus; c) it would give India direct contact with Afghanistan and Chitral and Swat in the backdrop of indications that the Indian Congress and the Young Afghan Party were jointly encouraging the Pathanistan idea; d) it would also place India in an almost direct contact with Russia.”} followed by Brigadier Hussain, whose rule began in 1959 and ended in 1966. The motto, “faith, unity, discipline”, was ingrained in the system of the institution. Mohammad Akbar Khan, who served from 1966 to 1971, was the first Indian Muslim to attain the rank of a general in the British Indian army. Major General Ghulam Jilani Khan (1971-1978) was more of a religious fanatic than a professional soldier, as he took a leave of absence from the army to volunteer as a guerrilla-war warrior in Kashmir in 1947-1948, fighting for Kashmir’s “independence and right to join Pakistan”. His posting to Washington in the 1950s as the first Pakistani military attaché and his subsequent command of the 15th Infantry Division in Sialkot, close to the Indian border, made him simultaneously pro-United States of America and rabidly anti-India, thereby sowing the seeds of a destructive, fanatic and clandestine culture in the psyche of the ISI for which it is notorious across the globe. Understandably, Ghulam Jilani Khan could not end his innings without being more virulently anti-India than ever before owing to his soldiers’ wholesale humiliation at the hands of the Indian army in Dhaka in 1971.

It was during the tenure of LieutenantGeneral Akhtar Abdur Rahman (1980-1987), however, that the ISI changed from being an intelligence agency of the State to a virtual omnipresent and omniscient ‘state within a State’. An Afghan migrant from the princely state of Rampur in Uttar Pradesh, Abdur Rahman was the mastermind behind the Afghan mujahideen’s offensive against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Thereafter, Akhtar Abdur Rahman and Afghan resistance became synonymous.

Understandably, the Sargodha-born Punjabi, Hamid Gul (1987-1989), of the Armoured Corps, found it easy to diversify further and create the political body, Islami Jamhoori Ittehad, which led the “jihad front in Kashmir” against India in 1989. If Hamid Gul is to be considered a “religious warrior” in an army man’s garb, the ISI chief, the Pashtun Lieutenant-General, Javed Nasir (1992-1993), will surely be remembered for mixing an excessive dose of ‘religious potassium cyanide’ with the action plan of the ISI. Nasir hurt India not only in Kashmir but also in other regions of South Asia. He supplied arms to the Arakanese Muslims inhabiting the Bangladesh-Myanmar borders, had direct contact with Tamil extremists and did gun-running and fund-raising in Bangkok. Amongst his other master plans was the Peshawar Accord, which successfully installed the first mujahideen government in Kabul under Sibghatullah Mojaddedi. He also took direct control of Sikh pilgrims during religious functions in Pakistan. In fact, Nasir’s strong anti-US and anti-India programmes created a fanatic following.

It took the time, labour and initiative of two ISI bosses, Javed Ashraf Qazi and Naseem Rana, to de-Islamize the outfit and put some semblance of professionalism into the order. But what happened during Nawaz Sharif’s tenure became a spectacular precedent. Ziauddin Butt, from the Corps of Engineers, a non-fighting arm, was made the ISI chief against the wishes of the army chief, Pervez Musharraf, in October 1998. To make matters worse, he ‘replaced’ the latter as the general of the Pakistani army for a few hours, till the coup by Musharraf nipped the powers of Ziauddin as well as that of his mentor, the premier of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, in the bud.

This is to the credit of the coup master, Pervez Musharraf, whose first act on assumption of the politico-professional office on October 12, 1999 was to appoint the Punjabi Lieutenant-General, Mahmud Ahmed, a confirmed Tablighi Jamaat member and Taliban sympathizer, the director general of the ISI. However, 9/11 spoilt it all, and the ISI chief had to make an inglorious exit on October 8, 2001, just before the US invasion of Afghanistan.

Understandably, a comparatively low-profile Punjabi, Ehsan ul Haq, held the ISI fort for three years thereafter (2001-2004), to be followed by another Punjabi, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani (2004-2007), a confirmed US protégé, his unquestionable professional qualifications notwithstanding. His close link with the US subsequently caused him to become the army chief as Musharraf had to hand over the baton in October 2007.

Nadeem Taj, Musharraf’s man Friday, had it good as long as Musharraf survived the turbulence of Pakistan’s politics. Musharraf’s exit in 2008 meant Nadeem Taj’s exit too in October 2008. He left to command the XXX Corps at Gujranwala. Nadeem Taj was accused of ‘double dealing’ with militants to the detriment of US interests in the AfPak sector.

In this historical setting entered the latest ISI chief, Ahmad Shuja Pasha, in 2008. Amongst other qualifications which endeared him to the Americans are Pasha’s hands-on experience of planning operations against the Taliban and al Qaida militants in the federally administered tribal areas and the North-West Frontier Province (Pakhtunkhwa), his anti-India actions in Kashmir and other parts of South Asia notwithstanding. The Kayani-Pasha duo is most useful to the Americans in one of the most dangerous areas of the world. And that is important. Did they not, directly or indirectly, help the clandestine US-led assault to hunt down Osama bin Laden and bring him out of his own lair in 2011? Critics may argue that it was a ‘one-off operation’ and not necessarily a manifestation of pro-America policy. Yet there are too many missing links and too many coincidences here to ignore this as an aberration.

For the post of the next director general of the ISI, five names have cropped up today, in case Shuja Pasha manages to retire on March 18, 2012. In the seniority list there is Lieutenant-General Rashid Masood (of the Baloch regiment like the army chief, Kayani) of the IV Corps Lahore retires on April 9, 2014. Lieutenant-General Mohammad Zahirul Islam (Punjab Regiment) of V Corps Karachi retires on October 1, 2014. Lieutenant-General Muhammad Asif, colonel commandant of the Sind Regiment, retires on April 15, 2015 and does not hold any command job. Lieutenant-General Javed Iqbal — Frontier Force — too is without a command job and retires on April 15, 2015. And finally, there is the Punjabi Major General Naushad Ahmed Kayani — Punjab Regiment — the present director general of the Military Intelligence.

Though a guessing game about the appointment of the ISI chief could be hopelessly off the mark, one feels that the two corps commanders of Lahore and Karachi could be out of the race owing to their advanced age. Moreover, Lahore and Karachi seem to be ‘peace stations’, unlike the Peshawar and Quetta postings for the army commanders at present. As for the other two staff duty lieutenant-generals, although their age could be an advantage, it could get neutralized in the absence of their experience of intelligence postings in the past. The dark horse, despite being the juniormost amongst the five contenders, however, could be Naushad Ahmed Kayani. As the director general of the Military Intelligence, he obviously is the eyes and ears of his chief from the same Kayani clan.

It is apparent that without the simultaneous nod of General Kayani and the US, none can take the chair of the ISI chief as yet, the contrary wishes of the Zardari-Gilani duo notwithstanding. Here one may recall that soon after becoming the prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani had, for two months, tried to gain control over the appointment of the director general of the ISI as well as to place the agency under the administrative, financial and operational control of the interior ministry. All that was in vain as General Kayani successfully pushed Shuja Pasha into the ISI chair. Though 2012 is no 2008, the army chief, Kayani, and his US mentors are still not to be ignored. Even if Shuja Pasha, the 19th boss of the ISI, does manage to leave on March 18, 2012, the 20th chief of the ISI could still be anyone but a chosen member of the tottering Zardari-Gilani team.

and

Ajay Sharma wrote:http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp ... 437937.ece

Gen. Cariappa led the Indian Army in Kashmir during the first war with Pakistan in 1947. The author recalls his father often being asked why the army did not evict the frontier tribesmen who, supported by the Pakistan Army, attacked India. The General used to reiterate that the government dictated policy. The Army was quite confident of clearing Kashmir. But the orders were to “cease fire midnight 31st December/1st January 1948-49.”

Later, Gen. Cariappa asked Nehru the reasons for the ceasefire. “You see, U.N. Security Council felt that if we go any further it may precipitate a war. So, in response to their request we agreed to a ceasefire,” Nehru said. But he sportily added, “Quite frankly, looking back, we should have given you ten-fifteen days more. Things would have been different then.”
This is exactly what I stated in my previous posts. No one ever holds politicians responsible for any of these f*** ups. A shame...!!

See the difference in Cawthorne's attitude and Nehru's attitude.

I think Cawthorne gives a clue as to why Nehru ordered the ceasefire to prevent the retaking of all of Jammu and Kashmir. It was a CBM to the new state of TSP.

By doing this CBM he ensured there is a fight for as long as TSP exists. he did not think the problem thru. He was giving TSP strategic frontyard.

If India was 30 miles from their Army HQ they would have been better behaved and reasonable. JLN gave up a very good pressure point to ensure TSP's future good behavior.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 21 May 2012 02:43

ramana wrote: {the fact is that it was Cawthorne who raised the profile of the ISI. He eloquently argued Pakistan's case to the Western powers and sealed their unstinted support. In a speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) in c. 1948, he said “Whatever the legal position might be, from the political, economic and strategic points of view, Pakistan could not afford to have a hostile India right up to the Western borders of J[ammu] & K[ashmir] :

a) It would bring Indian army within 30 miles of the military headquarters of Pakistan and right behind the vital north—south communication line;

b) it would give India control over the waterworks of Chenab, Jhelum and Indus;

c) it would give India direct contact with Afghanistan and Chitral and Swat in the backdrop of indications that the Indian Congress and the Young Afghan Party were jointly encouraging the Pathanistan idea;

d) it would also place India in an almost direct contact with Russia.”}
---------------------

See the difference in Cawthorne's attitude and Nehru's attitude.

I think Cawthorne gives a clue as to why Nehru ordered the ceasefire to prevent the retaking of all of Jammu and Kashmir. It was a CBM to the new state of TSP.

By doing this CBM he ensured there is a fight for as long as TSP exists. he did not think the problem thru. He was giving TSP strategic frontyard.

If India was 30 miles from their Army HQ they would have been better behaved and reasonable. JLN gave up a very good pressure point to ensure TSP's future good behavior.

From the Cawthorne statement we see that they wanted maximum distance between India and Soviet Union/Russia. This is the old rivalry of the 1800 showing up in 1947.
In the 80s when I spoke to a Russian he was mentioning that the distance between India and Russia is small.

Both sides are very much aware of this geographic proximity and this has been watched for more than 300 years.
Kashmir is considered crucial in making sure that there is geographic distance between the states.

Pakistan has been created as a military state to take care of this geo graphic proximity and state behavior is directly related to this reason to keep India out of the Russian orbit.

Keeping the Pakistan state as a viable state is a challenge and they wanted all resources to be given to it.
UN was given as a face saver to JLN so that he could keep his govt and his army taking control of Kashmir.

devesh · Post by **devesh** » 21 May 2012 04:23

ramana wrote: If India was 30 km from their Army HQ they would have been better behaved and reasonable. JLN gave up a very good pressure point to ensure TSP's future good behavior.

we need to stop sugarcoating it and say it as it is. Nehru was a fool of the first order.