Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -II

[ramana]

So what do you have to say about Bji's reservations on the merchants and how to coopt them in the state building process?

[V_Raman]

if i understand the discussion correctly, indian military has to become that -- a true offensive force that can protect the mercantile interests.

[svinayak]

So what do you have to say about Bji's reservations on the merchants and how to coopt them in the state building process?

Naitonal interest determines the marchant interest atleast in the strategic areas
But transborder trade needs other protection which are controlled by policies. No legislation can favor external entities. Indian entities must be dominant in the domestic sector
Indian entities will have the protection and incentives for capital formation in the domestic sector.

Indian capital formation will create a world class financial center which can compete with other global financial centers. Indian capital center need protection - physical and monetary basis

[brihaspati]

I think a very long time ago I had proposed that we turn these foreign-tradist's attention outward. That we come to an agreement with them that the state will help them expand outside and spread the net, but in return they collaborate in the states own military-political enterprise, and they don't intervene internally or collaborate on the sly with foreign imperialists.

Since then I have had a slight rethink - in the sense, that the existing houses are so deeply interlinked with the global successor to Brit imperialist-mercantile network - they are more likely to betray [perhaps unwillingly or unknowingly] any attempt for India to change direction.

Alternative, we come to an understanding with those internal merchant groups that are kept away from the foreign "sphere" by the current compradors - that if they come on board, we will help them take up the space left vacant by the existing compradors whom we will replace. In return they help us in expansion.

This is the Brit merchant+pirate+adventurer+state/army model of global expansion. Where I hesitate is that this requires us to become pseudo-Brits, my trans-life anathema.

[svinayak]

Since then I have had a slight rethink - in the sense, that the existing houses are so deeply interlinked with the global successor to Brit imperialist-mercantile network - they are more likely to betray [perhaps unwillingly or unknowingly] any attempt for India to change direction.

Alternative, we come to an understanding with those internal merchant groups that are kept away from the foreign "sphere" by the current compradors - that if they come on board, we will help them take up the space left vacant by the existing compradors whom we will replace. In return they help us in expansion.

Indian independence did not reset this mercantile network from the colonial British financial and trading network. It has to be done if India has to become one of the financial center of the world. It is time now.

[brihaspati]

Since then I have had a slight rethink - in the sense, that the existing houses are so deeply interlinked with the global successor to Brit imperialist-mercantile network - they are more likely to betray [perhaps unwillingly or unknowingly] any attempt for India to change direction.

Alternative, we come to an understanding with those internal merchant groups that are kept away from the foreign "sphere" by the current compradors - that if they come on board, we will help them take up the space left vacant by the existing compradors whom we will replace. In return they help us in expansion.

Indian independence did not reset this mercantile network from the colonial British financial and trading network. It has to be done if India has to become one of the financial center of the world. It is time now.

The question is - how will you start doing it? Not through elections - because the whole legislative and representative machinery, and all existing politically dominant institutions have evolved through such comprador collaboration. There are well entrenched group interests that see to it that the elections remain expensive for candidates [its a mechanism to ensure redistribution of black money within a concentric but small circles of courtiers and dependents], which in turn ensure that only those candidates come through who will not disrupt this financial flow even if they are personally honest. The commons have no alternative, and see no promise of any alternative that can break this vicious cycle - and hence they take the less risky road of getting on without too much confrontation with the existing machinery.

The machinery is itself therefore well integrated with the global financial interests, and any attempt at targeting their key nodes within the system - for a start the large compradors - will immediately be sought to be crushed with the full force of the rashtryia machinery.

[svinayak]

Very good question and needs long answer. Will do it later.

[RamaY]

First Post - Toon trouble: Why Dalits prefer the Ambedkar myth to reality

Dalit writer Kancha Ilaiah– who usually makes it a point to provoke caste war at the drop of a hat – made the same point. “Ambedkar is to Dalits what the prophet is to Muslims. He should not be seen only as a constitution-maker, which the authors of the textbook seem to have presented him as; he is fast acquiring the status of prophet for the scheduled castes of the country,” The Indian Express quoted him as saying.

Yes, he’s right. The conditions for converting Ambedkar from just an extraordinary human being and social reformer to prophet seem just right.

Several conditions must exist for a social or political icon to be elevated to the status of near-god or prophet. Four, in particular, are important.

First, the political conditions must be right. There must be sufficiently large numbers that feel excluded and are in search of the right way to empower themselves.

Second, the sense of alienation from the dominant culture must be acute and widely felt across the community. If the dominant culture somehow conveys the impression of superiority, the task of elevating a leader to saint becomes easier.

Third, the dominant culture should be in decline and seized with self-doubt.

Fourth, elevation to prophethood does not depend on what the prophet may actually have said or done; it depends on the will of his followers and their need for political power.

My blog post on this topic: Dalitism – Creation of a new Abrahamic faith in India

[brihaspati]

The discussion above about the past and future role of the "foreign-trade" external-financial-flow component of Indian politics reminded me that we typically analyze information provided by only a certain faction of the so-called nationalist movement - primarily that coming from either the victorious side within the INC, or their lost out, but still INC origin critics - like that represented by Bose.

There is a third critic that comes from what we now dub the leftist position. However the leftist critique is actually divided into two opposite camps - the nationalist left and the pro-British communists [who took the pro-British position in August 1942, after possible prompting by Moscow as part of allied war effort].

The leftist anti-British critique in what follows should be taken for what it is revealing as to possible role of the mercantile class and its dual alliance with the congrez centre as well as the imperialists. The author is sometimes taken as an anticipator ideologue for what would become the non-USSR communist movement in India - but we should not hold that against what he is actually giving as data points.

For me the communists represent an internal factional fight within ruling traditional elite of India - who are looking for a disgruntled section of wider society to win against their class and network brethren to come to power themselves. If that internal fight helps to reveal more about the weaknesses and alliances of the ruling regimes - all the best.

[from Suniti Kr Ghosh : using the electronic version of abridged content of a chapter of his more well known book The Indian Big Bourgeosie: its genesis, growth and character]
part 1:

When the war in Europe ended, Viceroy Wavell released the members of the working committee of the Congress from prison and convened a conference at Simla in June-July 1945. As V.P Menon wrote, the Congress came in for co-operation without any conditions.1 The Congress leaders were eager to join the Viceroy’s Executive Council (which Wavell intended to reconstitute with representatives of Indian political parties) “on the basis that they would whole-heartedly co-operate in supporting and carrying through the war against Japan to its victorious conclusion”. (The Congress leaders’, including Gandhi’s, faith in the creed of non-violence was remarkably flexible.) Nehru felt overjoyed and said: “We feel we must succeed at Simla …I am very hopeful.”2 But the Simla Conference foundered on the rock of the League’s claim to nominate all Muslim members of the reconstituted Council.

Wavell wanted the Congress leaders to “see to it that a peaceful atmosphere is preserved in the country”. Wavell was afraid of a post-war upheaval in the country. So was Gandhi.3 The Congress president Abul Kalam Azad wrote to the Viceroy:
“… the contacts established between the Congress and the Government had largely allayed past bitterness and marked the beginning of a new chapter of confidence and goodwill.”4

As we shall see, it was that surge of “confidence and goodwill” for the British imperialists that continued to rise and yielded the transfer of power. Congress leaders had reasons to feel “confidence and goodwill” for the British imperialists. Close co-operation between the Raj on the one hand and the Indian big bourgeoisie and Congress leaders on the other had already started. The Raj regularly invited discussions with Congress leaders on constitutional issues, the future administrative set-up, “a scheme of army reorganization” and other matters like education, industry and planning. Nehru was being consulted on constitutional questions and army reorganization. In June 1944 Sir Ardeshir Dalal, a Tata director and an author of the Bombay Plan, so much lauded by Nehru, had been appointed a member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council in charge of planning and development. During the war the British Raj and the Indian big bourgeoisie were bound with close ties of collaboration, for instance, in the Eastern Group Supply Council and on various official committees.
[...]
Nehru said that India was on the “Edge of a Volcano” and that “We are sitting on the top of a Volcano”.5 P.J.Griffiths, the leader of the European group in the Central Legislative Assembly, also said: “India, in the opinion of many, was on the verge of revolution.”6

What the people were actually doing?

India on the “verge of revolution”
Almost immediately after the end of the war, on 21 to 23 November 1945, Calcutta saw the first outburst of the pent-up fury of the people who had suffered incredibly under the fascist British Raj during the war. The immediate cause of it was the police firing on a procession of students demanding the release of the Indian National Army (INA) officers who were then on trial. A student and another youth became martyrs and several were wounded. That set Calcutta and the suburbs ablaze. The city was completely paralyzed. Trains were stopped. Barricades were set up and street battles took place. All communal considerations were forgotten and the people fought with primitive weapons the heavily armed forces of the Raj. Police and military vehicles were burnt down – about 150 of them. According to official estimates, 33 persons including an American, were killed and 200 civilians, many policemen, 70 British and 37 American soldiers were wounded.7 The whole of Bengal was surcharged with bitter anti-imperialist feeling.

Describing the mood of the people, Bengal Governor Casey wrote: “Both in North and South Calcutta a feature of the disturbances … was that the crowds when fired on largely stood their ground or at most only receded a little, to return again to the attack…. Throughout the forenoon and early afternoon of the 23rd [November], Congress and some Communist propaganda cars toured the affected areas dissuading the students from further participation.”8

Viceroy Wavell rushed to Calcutta. On 27 November he informed the Secretary of State: “Casey was impressed by the very strong anti-British feeling, behind the whole demonstration, and considered the whole situation still very explosive and dangerous.” Significantly, Commander-in-Chief Auchinleck made an appreciation of the internal situation within India on 24 November, the very day after the uprising. The Viceroy agreed generally with the appreciation. Auchinleck wrote:

“If the Indian Forces as a whole cease to be reliable, the British Armed Forces now available are not likely to be able to control the internal situation or to protect essential communications, nor would any piecemeal reinforcement of these forces be of much avail. To regain control of the situation and to restore essential communications within the country nothing short of the organized campaign for the reconquest of India is likely to suffice.”9

The lesson of the November uprising went home to the British imperialists. On 24 November itself, Auchinleck met some representatives of provincial governments about I.N.A trials. In his letter to Wavell of the same day Auchinleck wrote that the provincial representatives agreed that “the trials should be limited to those involving brutality and murder of such a nature that it could not be defended as an act committed in good faith by a combatant”. He added: “The evidence reaching us now increasingly goes to show that the general opinion in the Army … is in favour of leniency.” On 30 November – within a week of the uprising – the Indian Government issued a press communiqué which stated: “Until all investigations are complete, it is not possible to state the number who will be brought to trial but the total is unlikely to be as many as fifty and may be as few as twenty, and, as explained above, trials will be limited to those against whom brutality is alleged.”10 The charge of ‘waging war against the king’ was dropped and the sentences already passed were remitted.

It may be noted that in the meantime the British had brought home as captives tens of thousands of captured I.N.A officers and men and started court-martials of them. The original plan which had received the “gratified approval” of the Congress leaders11 had been to release some, sentence many others to imprisonment and execute 40 to 50 prisoners. As we have said, the plan was changed almost immediately after the November uprising.

As stories of Subhas Bose and the I.N.A, who had founded the provisional government of Free India in Southeast Asia and planted the flag of Indian freedom in Kohima, spread, they sent a thrill from one end of the subcontinent to another. As R.P. Dutt said, the example of the I.N.A and “the subsequent trials of the I.N.A leaders kindled to white heat the flame of militant patriotism and the conception of the armed conquest of power in place of the old non-violent struggle.”12 The most alarming thing to the British imperialists was the impact of the I.N.A on the British Indian armed forces.13 Nehru wrote to Commander-in-Chief Claude Auchinleck: “Within a few weeks the story of the I.N.A had percolated to the remotest villages in India and everywhere there was admiration for them and apprehension as to their possible fate … The widespread popular enthusiasm was surprising enough, but even more surprising was a similar reaction of a very large number of regular Indian army officers and men. Something had touched them deeply.”14

On 26 November 1946, Auchinleck wrote to Wavell that “there is a growing feeling of sympathy [among the men of the British Indian armed forces] for the I.N.A.”15 The loyalty of the British Indian armed forces was thoroughly shaken by the I.N.A; large numbers of them transferred their allegiance to their motherland.

Gandhi rushed to Calcutta immediately after the November uprising. He had a series of interviews with Governor Casey. He assured Casey that “our future long term relations would be good”, that he would do his utmost in bringing about a peaceful solution of India’s constitutional problem, and that he was lulling the people into the belief that “India was going to get her freedom out all right” and asking them to “work on that assumption and no other”.16 The Congress working committee met in Calcutta and reiterated its faith in non-violence “for the guidance of all concerned” and clarified that nonviolence “does not include burning of public property, …” and so on. Before and after the November upheaval, Nehru went on emphasizing “the necessity of maintaining a peaceful atmosphere…” He went on telling the people that the “British are packing up”, that “in the present day world the British empire has ceased to exist” and expatiated on “the folly of disorder and violence”. He advised students not “to take suddenly the reins of the nation in their own hands” and “to leave political leadership to those… qualified to lead”.17 On 3 December 1945 he assured Sir Stafford Cripps, an important member of the British cabinet (and through him the entire British cabinet), that he was doing his “utmost to avoid conflict and restrain the hotheads”.18 Sardar Patel advised the youth not to waste their energies in “fruitless quarrels”.

Again, on 27 January 1946, Nehru wrote a long letter to Cripps, in which he stated: “Elections have somewhat held people in check but as soon as these are over, events of their own motion, will march swiftly…. What happened in Calcutta two months ago and what is happening in Bombay now are significant signs of the fires below the surface. A single spark lights them”. He said that any delay on the part of the British to take the initiative “might well lead to disastrous consequences”. He assured Cripps (and obviously the British cabinet) that the gulf between India and Britain, which “has never been so wide”, could perhaps “be bridged even now with a great effort” and that he worked “to that end”. 19

Ignoring the Congress leaders’ sermons upholding law and order and the creed of non-violence, Calcutta rose again from 11 to 13 February 1946. The occasion was a protest demonstration by students against the rigorous imprisonment for seven years passed on Abdul Rashid of the I.N.A. The city’s life stopped because of a general strike. For two days mills and factories in Calcutta’s suburbs remained closed; trains did not run; people fought bitter street battles with the armed police and army units riding armoured cars. A marked feature, like that in November, was strong solidarity among Hindus and Muslims who together directed their attacks against Europeans. The upheaval surpassed that in November. According to official estimates, 84 persons became martyrs and 300 injured. As in November, the anti-imperialist wave in Calcutta and the suburbs sent ripples throughout Bengal. Bands of Congress, Muslim League and Communist volunteers moved along the streets of Calcutta and neighbouring areas jointly and helped in restoring order. On 13 February Swadhinata, the Bengali organ of the CPI, condemned indiscipline and disorder as the Congress president was doing.

1. Mansergh, N. (Editor-in-Chief), Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power (TOP), XII , pp.790-1; S.Gopal (ed.), Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (SWJN), XIV, p. 47. (back)
2. Ibid, p.27; also p.37. (back)
3. TOP, IV, pp.333-8; 340-4, 365-9; V,pp.1-2, 127, 424, 431; Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (CWGM), LXXX, pp. 444-5; H.M. Seervai, Partition of India, p.32 and fn 15.TOP, IV, pp.333-8; 340-4, 365-9; V,pp.1-2, 127, 424, 431; Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (CWGM), LXXX, pp. 444-5; H.M. Seervai, Partition of India, p.32 and fn 15. (back)
4. TOP, VI; p. 455; SWJN, XIV, p.497 – emphasis added. (back)
5. TOP, VI, p. 1117. (back)
6. Cited in R.P.Dutt, Freedom for India, London, 1946, front cover page. (back)
7. TOP, VI, p. 713. (back)
8. Ibid, p. 725. (back)
9. Ibid, pp. 543, 582. (back)
10. Ibid, pp. 531-3, 588. (back)
11. Philip Mason (Joint Secretary to the War Department of the Govt of India, who drew up the plan), “Foreword” to Hugh Toye, Subhas Chandra Bose, p. IX; Hugh Toye, ibid, p.188; John Connell, Auchinleck, London, 1959, p.799. (back)
12. R.P. Dutt, Freedom for India. (back)
13. TOP, VI, pp.382-3, 507-8, 530-3, 536, 542-3, 807. (back)
14. SWJN, XV, p.92 – emphasis added. (back)
15. TOP, VI, pp. 382-3. (back)
16. Ibid, pp. 589, 599, 633, 679; CWMG, LXXXII, p.452. (back)
17. See SWJN, XIV, pp. 195, 207, 229, 231, 241, 252, 254, 491, 493, passim. Emphasis added. (back)
18. Cited in R.J. Moore, Escape from Empire, p. 76. (back)
19. SWJN, XIV, pp. 141-2, 146, 147. (back)

To be continued:

[brihaspati]

Part 2 : why would the congrez centre, the Brits and the big mercantilists come together?

This would be illustrated by the uprising of the Naval Ratings:

The most spectacular and most significant among them was the uprising in Bombay which began on 18 February 1946. The ratings of the Royal Indian Navy (R.I.N.) rose in revolt first in Bombay and then in Karachi, Calcutta and Madras. The rebel navymen, who had various grievances – bad food, racial discrimination, insults meted out by British officers and so on – were inspired by the deeds of Subhas and the example of the I.N.A.20

By 22 February 1946 the rebel sailors were in control of about 22 vessels in Bombay, including the flagship of the British Vice-Admiral. A total of 78 ships of the R.I.N., 20 shore establishments and 20,000 ratings were involved in the struggle. Over a thousand men in the Royal Indian Air Force camps in Bombay came out on a sympathy strike. When ordered, Indian soldiers refused to fire on the R.I.N. ratings in Bombay as well as in Karachi. On 21 February the strike by the navymen developed into a pitched battle between them and British troops who had been called in as Indian soldiers refused to fire.21 And Bombay’s workers and youth, irrespective of the community to which they belonged, stood by the heroic men of the navy, carried food to them, erected barricades and fought pitched battles with armed policemen and several British battalions equipped with armoured cars and tanks. On 22 February, Bombay observed a general strike in the teeth of the opposition from big Congress and Muslim League leaders.

Ignoring the Congress and League leaders, the entire working class of Bombay came out at the call of the Naval Central Strike Committee, which was supported by the CPI. For two days there were pitched battles on the city’s streets, in which, according to official estimates, there were about 1,500 casualties including more than 200 dead. “The British tanks could clear the streets”, wrote B. C. Dutt, one of the leaders of the revolt, “only after hundreds had been shot down. This was the first time in the turbulent history of India’s freedom movement that the rulers were forced to use tanks to battle with unarmed and leaderless people…. February 21 had been the ratings’ day. February 22 belonged to the workers of Bombay.”22

In his ‘Foreword’ to Dutt’s book, S. Natarajan wrote: “What was impressive among the ratings was their complete freedom from communal or sectarian prejudices and their staunch loyalty to each other.”23 To quote Dutt, “The R.I.N. mutiny was the one conspiracy against the crown in which there was no king’s witness. They tried their best. They drew blank”.24

Besides Bombay, Karachi was the scene of actual fighting between navymen and British soldiers. Gurkha soldiers refused to obey orders to fire on the Hindustan, an old sloop, which put up a brave fight. The Gurkha soldiers had to be replaced by British soldiers. Not only did the Indian army units refuse to obey orders to fight the navymen, they went on strike in several places in sympathy with the rebel navymen. We have noted that one thousand men of the Indian Air Force went on sympathy strike in Bombay. So did the men of the Air Force in Poona, Calcutta, Madras and Ambala. To quote Dutt, “An R.I.A.F. squadron, which had been ordered to proceed to Bombay, was grounded at Jodhpur; every aircraft had mysteriously developed engine trouble.”25 Hallett, then Governor of the U.P., informed Wavell on 19 November 1945 that soldiers of the Air Force stationed in Allahabad, Bamrauli and Cawnpore had sent their contributions to the I.N.A. Defence Fund.26 The Indian Air Force stationed in Calcutta opposed the court martial of the I.N.A. men. It sent its subscription to the I.N.A. Defence fund with the words: “for the defence of the brave and patriotic sons of India.”27 Penderel Moon noted: “There was also unrest at this time in the R.I.A.F. and in some of the technical units of the Indian Army.”28 Not only was there unrest in some technical units of the army but army units, as pointed out before, disobeyed orders in Bombay and Karachi. In the Jubbalpur cantonment soldiers staged a revolt in March 1946 and in Dehra Dun Gurkha soldiers went on strike. In some places the police also rose in revolt. In March 1946 the police in Allahabad and Delhi went on hunger-strike. In April 10,000 policemen struck work. In September the military police went on strike in Patna and Begusarai. There was a widespread strike by policemen in Bihar in March 1947. The wall sedulously erected by the British Raj to segregrate the armed forces from the people crumbled down. At no time since the First War of Indian Independence in 1857-8 did the regular armed forces come out to defend the cause of freedom as they did now.

The brave men of the navy refused to be cowed by any threat – not even the threat of Admiral Godfrey (who had flown in bombers) to sink the navy. They appealed to political parties to lead them, promised to hand over to them the navy which they had renamed the Indian National Navy. But no political party, not even the CPI, responded to their appeal though they could have access to the rebel men of the navy.

Jinnah’s appeal to them, especially the Muslims among them, to surrender came in the early hours of 23 February when their representatives were meeting to decide their future course of action. Dutt wrote: “… the overwhelming majority were for a fight to death and not for surrender.”29 The Naval Central Strike Committee ultimately took the decision to surrender, stating that they were surrendering not to the British Raj but to the Congress and the League. In their last message to the people, they said: “For the first time the blood of the men in the services and the people flowed together in a common cause. We in the services will never forget this. We also know that you, our brothers and sisters, will never forget. Long live our great people. Jai Hind.”30

After the surrender the man-hunt began. More than two thousands of the rebels were arrested and kept in detention camps; about five hundred were sentenced to prison terms to serve as common criminals. The top Congress leaders, who had given the pledge that “no disciplinary action” would be taken, did little to keep their pledge.31

What role did the Congress leaders play during the historic naval revolt? Sardar Patel, Abul Kalam Azad, S.K. Patil (secretary of the Bombay Provincial Congress Committee, and later, minister of the central government), Jinnah and Chundrigar of the Muslim League openly opposed the call for a strike on 22 February issued by the Naval Central Strike Committee and advised the navymen to surrender to the British. Patil had secret confabulations with the Bombay governor and the Congress and the League placed ‘volunteers’ at the service of the Raj to “assist the police” and British army units to fight the people.32 Colville wrote to Wavell that on 22 February he “saw several of these volunteers… and they did useful though limited work”.33

Bombay observed a successful general strike in the teeth of the bitter opposition of the Congress and the League leaders. Workers and students of Bombay fought pitched battles in the streets with British army units and the armed police, who were assisted by Congress and League volunteers. At a mass meeting held in Bombay with the permission of the Bombay government on 26 February, Nehru and Patel strongly condemned “the mass violence in Bombay”, that is, the resistance of the navymen and workers who had dared to raise the banner of anti-imperialist revolt. Addressing the press next day, Nehru thundered: ‘The R.I.N. Central Strike Committee had no business to issue such an appeal [to the city of Bombay to observe a sympathy strike]. I will not tolerate this kind of thing.”34 The Nehrus alone had the right to issue calls for strikes!

Gandhi, the prophet of non-violence, condemned the rebels for their thoughtless orgy of violence – not the real orgy of violence by the Raj, of which the people were victims. To him the “combination between Hindus and Muslims and others for the purpose of violent action is unholy…” 35 He went on denouncing those who disbelieved in British professions that they would grant freedom to India.

It was a country-wide anti-imperialist revolt. Wavell noted in his diary on 7 March 1946 that the victory parade that was organized in Delhi was boycotted and crowds of men burnt down the Town Hall.36

Workers were on the march everywhere despite the opposition of Congress and League leaders. The number of workers who went on strike in 1946 was 1,961,984 and in 1947, 1,840,784. There was an unprecedented upsurge of anti-imperialist struggle throughout the country, in which workers, peasants, students, other youths, office employees, navymen and sections of the Indian army, air force and police and lower rungs of the bureaucracy took part, and armed confrontations were frequent.37

Peasant revolts took place in different parts of India. In the Thana district in Maharashtra the struggle of the Warlis broke out. In the Alleppey district of the native state of Travancore (now a part of Kerala) peasants and workers launched a united struggle. In several districts of Bengal, especially in North Bengal, the Tebhaga struggle broke out under the leadership of the Communist Party. It was a struggle of the peasantry, mainly sharecroppers (who bore the expenses of cultivation) for a two-thirds share of the produce. Peasants fought heroically. In the undivided district of Dinajpur, forty peasants became martyrs. In 1946 began the historic struggles of the peasants in Telangana districts of the native state of Hyderabad (Telangana, now a part of Andhra Pradesh) under the leadership of the Andhra State Committee of the CPI. It developed into a struggle for land and power. Large areas were liberated. The struggle continued even after the march of troops of the Indian government in 1948 to suppress it, until it was withdrawn unconditionally by the CPI leadership in 1951. In several other native states ruled by princes, puppets of the British Indian government, there were revolts of the people, especially in Travancore and Kashmir.

Suniti Ghosh shows of course his "communist" lens in looking at "Kashmir", and does not discuss here the reasons behind CPI's unconditional withdrawal [the beginning of the split within the communist movement].

But we see, that he does place the CPI, League and Congrez based on ground evidence as a bloc in alliance with the Brits.

The convergence of worker's strikes, general strikes, peasant non-cooperation and lower command level army - independent of the personal dominance of the congrez centre - would tick the fire alarm for the mercantiles. Big biz would have to be as alarmed as the politically ambitious elite coopted into the British moves and the Brits themselves, keen to maintain a political toehold even after they might be forced to leave.

[brihaspati]

Part 3:

On 19 February 1946, Wavell recorded in his diary that he had seen Porter, Secretary, Home Department, who was all for capitulation to the I.N.A; that he had discussed with Bewoor, Secretary, Posts and Air Department, about a postal strike; that he had talks with Carr, A.O.C-in-C, about R.I.A.F mutiny; with Griffin, Chief Commissioner of Railways and Conran Smith, Secretary, War Transport Department, about a railway strike; and “finally the C-in-C, most gloomy of all, about R.I.N. mutiny in Bombay and the I.N.A trials; What a cheerful day – prospect or reality of three mutinies and two strikes”, commented Wavell.38

After referring to the “serious rioting in Bombay”, “a mutiny in the R.I.N., much indiscipline in the R.I.A.F., some unrest in the Indian Army” and “threatened strikes on the Railways, and in the Post and Telegraphs”, Wavell wrote to King George VI on 22 March 1946: “Perhaps the best way to look at it is that India is in the birth-pangs of a new order…”39

When in late March 1946, the Cabinet Mission with Secretary of State Pethick- Lawrence, Stafford Cripps and A.V. Alexander came to India to negotiate, mainly with Congress and League leaders, a settlement of the constitutional issues and met the Viceroy’s Executive Council, Edward Benthall said on behalf of it that “ the Council was unanimous that a change of Government at the Centre was imperative... It [ the Council’s lack of confidence] is due to the uncertainty of Indian troops and police to whom they must look for defence and support in the future.”40

The role of ‘the big boys of Congress and League’
Towards the end of March 1946, Turnbull, Secretary to the Cabinet Mission, wrote: “The only hope is that the big boys of Congress and League are said to be much alarmed lest their followers break loose and of Russia.”41
[...]
much to the satisfaction of the Raj and the Indian reactionaries. “Amidst these ‘summit talks’,” wrote Michael Brecher, “the poison of communalism penetrated deeper into the body politic of India.”42

[...]Later, on 24 January 1947, the director of the Intelligence Bureau, Government of India, noted for the benefit of the policy-makers:

“The game so far has been well played, in that (a) both Congress and the League have been brought into the Central Government; (b) the Indian problem has been thrust into its appropriate plane of communalism; … Grave communal disorder must not disturb us into action which would reproduce anti-British agitation.” 43 After the communal carnage in Calcutta, Gandhi told Wavell “that if a blood-bath was necessary, it would come about inspite of non-violence.”44

On 21 July 1946 he wrote to Vallabhbhai Patel: “A great many things seem to be slipping out of the hands of the Congress. The postmen do not listen to it, nor does Ahmedabad, nor do the Harijans, nor Muslims. This is a strange situation indeed.”45

Again, writing to Patel on 24 July, Gandhi lamented: “There are other strikes on top of the postal strike. All this looks significant…. The Congress position may seem strong on the surface but it appears to have lost its hold on the people. Or it may be that the Congress itself is involved in these troubles if only from a distance. This must be clarified; otherwise the battle which we are on the point of winning will be lost.”46

The Mahatma released a torrent of denunciation of strikes and strikers, especially political and ‘sympathetic strikes’, and asked Patel to do the same.47 Nehru condemned the all-India strike of one lakh extremely low-paid postal employees as “against the interests of the common people”. But the fact is, the common people went on ‘sympathetic strikes’ throughout India on 29 July to give the postal employees their support. Those who opposed these strikes were the imperialists and the Gandhis and Nehrus. These were not adversaries but allies and they were on the same side of the barricade and the people on the other. The waves of struggle continued to rise. The situation in India was growing alarming for the British Raj and the Congress leadership. At the end of July the India and Burma Committee of the British cabinet concluded that if “some positive action” was not taken “without delay”, “the initiative might pass from His Majesty’s Government. The postal strike and the threatened [all-India] railway strike were symptoms of a serious situation which might rapidly deteriorate.” Wavell agreed and wired to Pethick-Lawrence on 31 July: “Widespread labour trouble exists and general situation is most unsatisfactory. The most urgent need is for a Central Government with popular support. If Congress will take responsibility they will realise that firm control of unruly elements is necessary and they may put down the Communists and try to curb their own left wing.” Wavell added that he disliked “intensely the idea of having an interim Government dominated by one party [Congress] but I feel that I must try to get the Congress in as soon as possible.”48

From U.P. Governor Wylie reported: “This strike business, for instance, is most unsettling…. With all this strike fever about, it would be too much to expect that the police would remain totally unaffected …”49

The director of the Intelligence Bureau, Government of India, warned: “… the labour situation is becoming increasingly dangerous…. I am satisfied that a responsible government, if one can be achieved, will deal more decisively with Labour than is at present possible.”50 On 6 August Wavell again wired to the Secretary of State: “I think it is quite likely that Congress [if it joins the government at the centre] would decide to take steps fairly soon against the communists, or otherwise the labour situation will get even worse.’51

[...] In an undated note Attlee wrote: “In the event of a breakdown of the administration or a general alignment of the political parties against us are we prepared to go back on our policy and seek to re-establish British rule as against the political parties and maintain it for 18 years? The answer must clearly be No.” Among the reasons he cited was the lack of the necessary military force.52 In a “top secret” message to the Viceroy on 25 November 1946, the Secretary of State informed him that “We could not contemplate anything in the nature of reconquest and retention of India by force against the nationally organised opposition, and quite apart from the desirability of such a decision we do not believe that it would be practicable from a political, military or economic point of view”.53 In a footnote it has been stated that “the terms of this reply [to Wavell’s letters] were agreed at a meeting” between Attlee, Pethick-Lawrence, Cripps and officials of the India Office.54

[brihaspati]

Part 4:

In August the Congress Working Committee adopted a resolution condemning the growing lack of discipline and disregard of obligations on the part of workers.55 On 5 August Wavell reported to Pethick-Lawrence that, according to an unimpeachable source, “Patel… was convinced that the Congress must enter the Government to prevent chaos spreading in the country as the result of labour unrest.”56 The British cabinet had decided on 1 August that ‘if the Muslim League were unwilling to come in [on Congress terms], it would be necessary to proceed with the formation of an Interim Government with Congress only”.57

So Congress president Nehru was invited to form an ‘interim’ government with himself as vice-president under Wavell. [...] On 9 October 1946 Nehru informed Wavell that “A short while ago the [U.P. Congress] Government issued an ordinance of the kind we have been issuing here to tide over the period from 1st October…” The U.P. ordinance “provided for the maintenance of public order and essential services through preventive detention, imposition of collective fines, and the control of meetings and processions.”59

On 21 January 1947 Wavell informed Pethick-Lawrence that searches, still then incomplete, had been conducted, that “the Madras [Congress] Government appear to have taken action against communists and are contemplating a conspiracy case [conspiracy against the King–Emperor] against leading members of the party…. The Bombay [Congress] Government have also written strongly for Central action or a Central directive against the party and indicating that they propose, in the absence of either of these, themselves to take strong action for detention of Communist agitators who constitute a great threat to public tranquillity in that Province.”
[...]
Wavell’s message added that Home Member Patel deprecated the idea of any discussion in British Parliament of the action taken against Communists “as it can only impede the efforts of Congress to deal with the revolutionary element in the country.”60


The country-wide search of the offices of the CPI, trade unions, Kisan Sabha, Students Federation, Friends of the Soviet Union, etc., was carried out “under the direction of the Government of India”, of which Patel was Home Member. But in reply to R.P. Dutt’s cable, Nehru unhesitatingly wired back: “The police raids on the Communists took place without the authority or knowledge of the Ministers.” A similar reply he sent to Harry Pollitt.61 Even Wavell was amused. Communicating to Pethick-Lawrence on 29 January 1947 that “the Congress Government in Bombay had decided that the only way to deal with the Communists was to resort to detention without trial”, Wavell had a dig at the Labour Party minister: “it may come as a shock to you if they should resort to such ‘imperialistic’ methods”.62

On 27 February the Bombay Governor reported to Wavell that Bombay’s Congress ministry “are determined to handle the communist and other extreme Left Wing elements firmly, and are bringing forward this session a new Public Safety Measures Bill which re-enacts all our Ordinances in full…”63 The Bombay Governor also wrote on 2 April to Viceroy Mountbatten that the Congress ministers of Bombay felt that “their real opponents are the Congress Socialists and the Communists”64 – not the British imperialists.


At its twenty–second session held in Calcutta from 13 to 19 February 1947, the All India Trade Union Congress expressed its concern at the “indiscriminate firing by the police on workers” and stated in a resolution: “Firing was resorted to in Coimbatore, Golden Rock, Kolar Gold Fields, Ratlam, Amalner and Kanpur, resulting in the death of more than 50 persons including women and children and injury to more than 400.”

After referring to “the suppression of civil liberties”, ban on workers’ meetings, arrests and internment of trade union workers, destruction of union properties and so on, the resolution added: “In Madras alone, hundreds of labour workers are in jail, and in some places, Section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code has been applied demanding security of good behaviour from labour leaders.”

The AITUC also protested against “the recent amendments to the Bombay District Police Act and the enactment of ordinances in the provinces of Punjab, Madras, Bengal, United Provinces and the Central Provinces under which persons can be arrested, externed or detained without trial.” It also condemned the governments of Madras, Bombay and the Central Provinces [all Congress-ruled provinces] for detaining trade unionists in jail without trial and for externing some of them.65
[...]
At the Meerut session of the Congress presided over by Kripalani and addressed by Nehru among others, held in November 1946, Sardar Mota Singh, a delegate, “thundered that the British were using Pandit Nehru and his colleagues as ‘political cows’ to prevent the masses from attacking the British power, standing behind the cows.”66
[...] On 12 August 1946 the CWC adopted a resolution drafted by Nehru to organize the Hindustan Mazdoor Sevak Sangh on an all-India basis67 This organization had been functioning in Ahmedabad under another name on Gandhian lines as a stooge organization of Ahmedabad’s textile magnates. When militant working class struggles threatened the very foundations of British imperialism and the Indian big bourgeoisie, the Nehrus took upon themselves the mission of splitting the working class.

And at its meeting in Calcutta on 7 December 1945 the CWC took disciplinary action against the communist members of the AICC and asked all subordinate committees to purge the Congress of all communists.[...] they accused the communists of having cooperated with the government in order to isolate them from the people. The irony was that when they themselves were acting as willing agents of the Raj to war against the people they accused the communists of having cooperated with the Raj after Nazi Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union – which they did for ideological reasons. And what about Gandhi who pledged cooperation with British war efforts in 1944 and 1945 – and people like Rajagopalachari?

Gandhi’s disciple D.G. Tendulkar observed that Gandhi “was aware of the deep hatred of the British rulers that was in the people’s heart. To forestall and prevent the conflagration of the deep-seated hatred was his constant concern.”68

On 4 December 1946, Nehru said:
“There was a great urge among the masses of India for political progress. The Congress leaders had tried with some success to restrain that urge and keep it behind the Government.” 69


Though essentially true, it is an understatement. Throughout the twenties and the thirties and the Second World War years and after, the Congress leaders acted as the enemy within (of all the top Congress leaders, Subhas Chandra Bose alone was a patriot and that is why he was hounded out of the Congress in 1939). The others did not hesitate to stoop to any falsehood and deception and occasional, atrocious attacks on the people (as when they held ministerial offices in eight provinces between 1937 and 1940 and again from 1946) to kill their “great urge” to become free.

Nor did the CPI emerge as a rallying point for nationalists. Its leadership strengthened the people’s illusions about the Congress leaders instead of shattering them. To cite only one instance here, P.C. Joshi, then general secretary of the CPI, wrote in Congress and Communists (1944): “To us the Congress is our parent organization, its leaders our political fathers…” He described his own party men as “Communist Congressmen”.70 Individual communists and groups of communists stood by the people bravely and selflessly and led many of their struggles.

But in the absence of an organized revolutionary party – the crucial subjective factor – the objectively revolutionary situation gave rise not to revolution but to counter-revolution: the most unnatural partition of India on communal lines costing enormous blood-baths and close integration of the two new states into the capitalist-imperialist system, which preserved all the structural barriers to her development. A telegram from London to Campbell-Johnson, Viceroy Mountbatten’s press attaché, dated 3 June 1947, said: “A packed House of Commons listened with intense interest to Prime Minister’s announcement [ of the agreement between the British Raj and the leaders of the Congress and the League to create two new states on the basis of partition of India and dominion status] this afternoon. Proposals and first reaction from India undoubtedly created profound gratification among all Parties. Sense of unity and recognition of tremendous issues and possibilities involved were comparable only with most historic moments during war.... This has been a great day for us all.”71

India was regarded by the British imperialists as “the essential linchpin in the structure of the Commonwealth”.72 They devoutly wished that India would remain within the British Commonwealth. As early as 16 April 1943, when World War II raged, the Secretary of State, L. Amery, wrote to Prime Minister Winston Churchill: “To keep India within the Commonwealth during the next ten years is much the biggest thing before us… [ and ] should be the supreme goal of the British policy.”73 He wrote to British Foreign Secretary Eden in a similar vein on 9 May 1943.74 The goal of the British imperialists was to have a self-governing India within the British Commonwealth and to enmesh her with Commonwealth ties – economic, political and military.
[...]
The Nehrus assured the British Raj that “in their view Hindustan would not ultimately leave the Commonwealth, once Dominion Status had been accepted”. But they emphasized “the need for secrecy on this matter because if it became known that Congress leaders had privately encouraged the idea, the possibility of their being able to bring their party round to it would be serious[ly] jeopardized.”76

[brihaspati]

Part 5:

Nehru assured the British capitalists in December 1946 that they would have full freedom to flourish here.77[...] An official memorandum of the Indian government in September 1949 declared: “The policy of the Government of India was to allow foreign capital to come in to operate freely in the industrial field…. Every attempt must be made to secure the maximum possible influx of foreign capital in the shortest possible time.”78

The Birlas’ Eastern Economist wrote in a leading article: “India for many years to come will need foreign capital and technical skill which must come mainly from the United States and Great Britain… it is clear from the Eastern Economist’s recent calculations so far as India is concerned that without foreign investment, it is quite impossible now to maintain our standard of life [already quite abominable]… India’s hunger for food this year is great but her hunger for capital – if less evident – is nearly as deep.”79

Some Indian magnates such as Tata and Birla had been negotiating with British and U.S. monopolies for the establishment of joint enterprises in India even before the ‘transfer of power’ and some deals were already concluded. On 2 May 1945, Manu Subedar, a small industrialist and leader of an anti-collaborationist group in the Indian Merchants’ Chamber, Bombay, denounced in the Central Legislative Assembly the collaboration between foreign monopolies and Indian big capital as “illegitimate marriage”.80
[...]
For some years after the transfer of power the Indian rupee was tied to British sterling. When in September 1949, Britain was forced to devalue the pound in relation to the dollar by 30.5 per cent, India had to devalue the rupee in the same proportion. Announcing the devaluation, John Matthai, India’s then Finance Minister, said that he “had to act, not on conviction born of logical necessity but, so to speak, by the compulsion of events; since sterling was devalued, there was no other course open to us.” As a result, India’s exports became cheaper and imports dearer and the people became poorer. [But the mercantiles would benefit because export profits would still increase and accrue privately.]

The sterling debts – between Rs 1,700 crore and Rs 1,800 crore in 1946 – tied the Indian economy to the metropolitan economy. These sterling balances, which Britain owed to India, represented the value of goods and services compulsorily taken away from India during World War II and in the months following it. Indian food, raw materials, textiles and other finished products were taken away not only for the army but for the civil population of England and other countries when the Indian people were victims of acute scarcity, steep inflation, sky-kissing prices, black markets and famine. The goods were taken by Britain at controlled or negotiated prices at which Indians could not get them. “The price paid by India”, to quote Subedar, “runs into millions of lives.”81 The British government refused to give any assurance that it would not scale down the debts: it even refused to enter into any negotiations about them. The Anglo-U.S. Financial Agreement of December 1945 made it mandatory on the U.K to scale down the debts. In his memorandum on Indian Sterling Balances, dated 5 August 1947, Hugh Dalton, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, wrote like a super-imperialist: “The Indians have asked for releases of £48.5 millions [out of £1,160 millions estimated by him] from the blocked account for the remainder of 1947. On my instructions the request has been rejected… No commitment for further releases after the end of 1947 has been made in the present negotiations, nor are we committed to recognize the total, without further cancellation or adjustment …. More than three quarters of them earn only one-half per cent [as interest].”82
[...]
In a note on India’s sterling balances, Subedar wrote: “There is no reason why assets, at least those who [which] belong to Britishers non-resident in India, should not be mobilized by the British Government with a view to reducing the outstanding balance.”83 He wrote to Patel, “It is most extraordinary that three Cabinet ministers [ members of the British Cabinet Mission, who came to India in March 1946] should have come here and not a word was said to them by any Indian in regard to the sterling balances.”84

On 7 July 1950, Nehru said that, “our economy is obviously tied to England and other allied powers.”85

In November 1951, G.D.Birla proposed the formation of an Indo-American Development Corporation with business magnates and officials of the two countries – a kind of “supertrust directing the future of Indian economy.”86 And in January 1952, B.R.Sen, then India’s Ambassador to the U.S.A, “recommended an investment company in which both American and Indian private capital would participate initially on a 70:30 per cent basis”.87 Both the representative of the Indian government and an outstanding leader of the Indian big bourgeoisie were keen that the future of the Indian economy should be directed not by the Indians but chiefly by U.S. big capital. Were these the voices of an independent, sovereign India or of a client state?

[...] The long-cherished aim of the alien rulers to have India within the British Commonwealth was fulfilled. The British imperialists of all hues celebrated the transfer of power on the basis of partition and dominion status as a “great triumph”, as a gain not a loss.88 They were sure that those to whom they had entrusted the subcontinent would defend and preserve their long-term interests in India and in the Indian Ocean region. And this is how they resolved their bitter contradiction with the Indian people. Indian ‘independence’ was the new face of British imperialism in India – a manoeuvre very deceitful and very successful.

India’s ‘freedom’ was ushered in with the playing of ‘God Save the King’ followed by Jana Gana Mana Adhinayaka.89 Nehru toasted the health of the British king and Mountbatten toasted the health of the Dominion government.90 It was symbolical that Union Jack was not lowered; it flew proudly when the Indian flag was unfurled.91

The last Viceroy and Governor-General of India became the head of the new Indian state and Nehru and Patel “wanted him to stay on as long as he would”.92 H.V. Hodson, a former Reforms Commissioner of India, observed: “By a strange paradox Lord Mountbatten as constitutional governor-general of independent [!] India exercised more direct executive authority in certain spheres than he had enjoyed as autocratic viceroy.”93 Nehru and his colleagues sought Mountbatten’s advice about the composition of the cabinet for post-colonial India, “tore up the list of cabinet” they had prepared and changed four members of the old list.94 The trust that the top Congress leaders, quite astute men, reposed in Mountbatten reflected their trust in – and their closeness to – British imperialism. Gandhi had said earlier: “The sole referee of what is or is not in the interest of India as a whole will be Mountbatten in his personal capacity.”95 Leonard Mosley wrote that “from that moment on” – Nehru’s first meeting with Mountbatten in India – Nehru became “Mountbatten’s man”.96 We shall not refer here to Patel’s effusive expressions of gratitude to Mountbatten. These were the persons who, with the complementary role played by the leaders of the CPI – P.C. Joshi and his associates – left a profound influence on the course of Indian history.

Invited by the Congress leaders, Sir John Colville and Sir Archibald Nye (who became next year U.K High Commissioner in New Delhi) remained as governors of the two largest provinces – Bombay and Madras. While in ‘free’ India, they flew Union Jack on the bonnets of their cars. Campbell-Johnson commented that the invitation to Colville and Nye to continue as governors “gets our relations with the new India off to a start good beyond all expectations”.97

As President of the Indian Constituent Assembly Rajendra Prasad requested Lord Mountbatten, the head of the new State, to convey “a message of loyal greetings from this House” to the British King. It said: “That message [ the King’s message to the new dominion] will serve as an inspiration to the great work on which we launch today, and I have no doubt that we anticipate with great pleasure association with Great Britain of a different kind. I hope and trust that the interest and sympathy and the kindness which have always inspired His Majesty, will continue in favour of India and we shall be worthy of them.”98

As the Congress leaders had assured the British imperialists, the Indian Union joined the British Commonwealth of Nations, which recognized the British sovereign as head of the Commonwealth, to whom all dominions had to swear allegiance. It may be noted that on 2 May 1949, almost immediately after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in London, Attlee declared in the House of Commons “with reference to the London agreement that no distinction should be drawn between the use of the terms ‘Commonwealth’, ‘British Commonwealth’ or ‘British Empire’, all of which should be regarded as interchangeable”.99 Appreciating Nehru’s role in the 1949 London Conference, Attlee said: “Mr. Nehru for India showed high statesmanship in accepting a new relationship whereby in respect for India the [British] monarch was recognized as Head of the Commonwealth.”100

Both Nehru and Jinnah agreed that India and Pakistan would fly the Union Jack on twelve days in the year but wanted that this should not be publicized. “In fact,” Mountbatten wrote, “they are worried about their extremists agitating against over-stressing the British connection although they are quite willing to retain it [ the Union Jack in the upper canton of the Indian flag, as designed by Mountbatten] themselves.”101

[svinayak]

Very good. Thank you for the post.
We will discuss each point from these posts.

[ramana]

I always said INC was the brown East India Company.

[ramana]

By E-mail:


http://www.asianage.com/books/all-ameri ... -s-way-371

THE ASIAN AGE

The all-American way is not India’s way

May 13, 2012 - Sreeram Chaulia

When nation states have the potential of breaking into the elite league of great powers, the paths they tread become topics of universal discussion. We have just come out of intense deliberation about one such transition, as China rose over the last decade to take its place as a genuine superpower. With India now attempting its own push for global recognition, international strategic commentaries on its strengths, and bets on whether it can really “make it” or not, are proliferating.

Former American diplomat William Avery’s new book, China’s Nightmare, America’s Dream. India as the Next Global Power, joins this crowding genre of India-watching. It contends that India can be a world power like China and the US, but for the “timidity of its political leadership”. It is a call to action for India to convert its increasing wealth into more power through “the right policies and leadership”, which have been scarce commodities.

Avery argues that Indian leaders have shown “courage and speed of action” only twice in the last two decades, viz. in 1991, via the economic reforms which spurred remarkable growth, and in 1998, when they tested the atomic bomb and ended a long spell of strategic irrelevance. On the converse side, India’s leadership has been found wanting in acting forcefully against foreign enemies perpetrating acts of terrorism on Indian soil.

The author’s recipes for overcoming this “timidity” are, however, quite jejune. His wish that India should have militarily re-intervened in Sri Lanka right after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi reveals a stunning lack of basic cost-benefit analysis or means-end matching. His prescription for India to “strong-arm resource-rich countries of Africa” is another over-the-top idea with complete disregard for the backlash that would generate (a heat which the Chinese are already feeling in Africa now). Avery keeps paying lip service to the ideal of India engineering its ascent through its unique ways, but his policy recommendations are imitative of what other great powers, past and present, have done.

The author sounds more credible in the portions of the book that address the challenge of taking India’s economic growth to higher levels. For achieving “great power growth”, India’s private-sector enterprises will have to globalise their footprints. In the game of mergers and acquisitions (M&A), Avery advises them to “look at tomorrow’s markets (China, Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America), not yesterday’s (the US, Europe and Japan)”, since the former promise more cost savings and sales growth.

Avery stresses that Indian corporations must urgently move up the value chain, shedding low-margin services like business process outsourcing (BPO) in favour of innovation-based technology products and brands.

It is time, he says, to “stop selling India’s talent short” and to convert our cyber-coolies into patent-bagging nerds. A world-class non-profit university system is essential to nurture this transformation into a high-tech economy. Avery aptly pinpoints to the imperative of Indian corporations and the state investing heavily in university infrastructure and professorial pay packets to “draw some of its academic diaspora back from Western institutions”, the way China has done successfully.

China is already a university powerhouse and India has to close this “minds race gap” as much as the arms race gap and the intelligence agency funding gap with its giant northern neighbour.

Avery identifies a core flaw in India’s military investment for being “strong on people, weak on equipment and technology”, and pleads for rectifying this imbalance. He also contrasts China — which has a long-term strategy for turning the renminbi into a global currency — with India, which lacks “an activist government with the vision and confidence to promote the rupee as one of the leading currencies in the world.”

The most problematic aspect of Avery’s book lies in his foreign policy blueprint for India to gallop to great-power status. Recapping the views of Robert Kaplan of Stratfor, Avery believes that India must agree to act as an offshore counter-balancer of China to serve American interests. He does not pause to consider whether American interests and Indian interests are not always identical. India’s geography and geopolitical setting demand that it decide its own strategy, which may coincide with the needs of the great powers at particular historic junctures. But Avery goes for overkill, where India is expected to become a useful pawn for the US grand strategy.

The author’s conviction that India must enter into an alliance with the US “to stop the spread of tyranny” and to uphold shared “values of the British crown” is quaint. His exhortation to India to resurrect a “new British empire” in partnership with the US is literally a form of linguistic violence. The less slavish India remains — be it to the US or to China — the better its chances of evolving as a great power. Avery’s odious analogy of the “Indo-American alliance” with the US-Britain special relationship sidesteps the total asymmetry of the latter dyad. He should know better that India will never agree to become anyone’s poodle or junior partner.

The author’s convoluted point that the US “successfully persuaded” India not to avenge Pakistan-sponsored terrorist acts, and his satisfaction that “India complied” for its own good, exposes his American big brotherly intentions. His admonition of India for maintaining relations with “pariah states Cuba, North Korea and Venezuela” again imposes American choices on a sovereign India, allegedly for India’s welfare. His vision of India “committing to a common foreign policy framework” with the US and its allies, wherein New Delhi no longer “cultivates relationships with regimes such as Iran”, is barely disguised neo-imperialism to restrict India’s choices.

Should Washington decide for Delhi who it should consort with? Avery’s unabashed suggestion that India “act as America’s eyes and ears in a region far from Washington” is an insult to Indian self-esteem. Other glaring examples of misguided policy counsel in the book include assertions that India’s “restraint” vis-à-vis terrorism unleashed by Pakistan is admirable, and that this passivity is turning Delhi into a closer ally of Washington. India’s failure to force a change in Pakistan’s behaviour is actually a telling indicator of why the former cannot be rated as a great power.

Is it preferable for India to become a great power with a distinct quality or to win brownie points from the US? Avery never poses such a question, since his core assumption is that India has no option but to concede a trajectory of dependent rise, where it becomes a loyal member of the American global alliance system.

This book is agreeably impatient about short-sightedness in India’s political class and corporations, but it falls pitifully short on how Indian foreign policy should proceed towards the goal of great power stature. If Avery were to decide, India would be yoked to one superpower and offered some wages in return for being pliable. While we can rubbish this fanciful scenario from ever materialising, it is important to read books like these (and works by Robert Kaplan) to stay alert against strategic entrapment and to chart our own
destiny.

Sreeram Chaulia is dean of the Jindal School of International Affairs and the author of International Organizations and Civilian Protection: Power, Ideas and Humanitarian Aid in Conflict Zones

Sreeram Chaulia is right and he sounds like a BRF person.

[brihaspati]

Transgressions NOT == intrusions.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 178547.cms

NEW DELHI: Needling India all along the unresolved 4,057-km Line of Actual Control (LAC), Chinese troops have crossed over into Indian territory over 500 times since January, 2010.

But much more than the sheer number of these "transgressions" - the government refuses to call them "intrusions" - it's the increasingly aggressive behaviour of the 2.5-million-strong People's Liberation Army (PLA) along the LAC that remains a major worry.

Many experts feel China, after building massive military infrastructure in Tibet Autonomous Region with five airbases, an extensive rail network and over 58,000-km of roads, is now resorting to "a slow but steady cartographic aggression" to keep India under pressure.

The government, as always, played down the issue by holding the transgressions took place due to "differing perceptions" about where the LAC actually lies. "Our security forces also continue to patrol all areas that fall within the Indian perception of the LAC," said defence minister A K Antony in Rajya Sabha on Wednesday. Union minister of state for home Mullappally Ramachandran, however, did admit the number of transgressions by PLA troops stood at 228 in 2010, 213 in 2011 and 64 till April.

Similar figures, if not more, have been recorded in earlier years. The number of Chinese transgressions, as Antony said, have "generally been as per established pattern" during the last five years.

Transgressions are routine friendly walk-ins patrolled by IA as an established friendly custom for the last 5 years.

[RamaY]

^ If anyone perceives that Red Fort is part of their country, they can transgress up to Delhi. It is lack of faith and capacity of our enemies, that is stopping them from perceiving certain things.

Indian security depends upon others inability to transgress.

[svinayak]

The discussion above about the past and future role of the "foreign-trade" external-financial-flow component of Indian politics reminded me that we typically analyze information provided by only a certain faction of the so-called nationalist movement - primarily that coming from either the victorious side within the INC, or their lost out, but still INC origin critics - like that represented by Bose.

There is a third critic that comes from what we now dub the leftist position. However the leftist critique is actually divided into two opposite camps - the nationalist left and the pro-British communists [who took the pro-British position in August 1942, after possible prompting by Moscow as part of allied war effort].

The leftist anti-British critique in what follows should be taken for what it is revealing as to possible role of the mercantile class and its dual alliance with the congrez centre as well as the imperialists. The author is sometimes taken as an anticipator ideologue for what would become the non-USSR communist movement in India - but we should not hold that against what he is actually giving as data points.

For me the communists represent an internal factional fight within ruling traditional elite of India - who are looking for a disgruntled section of wider society to win against their class and network brethren to come to power themselves. If that internal fight helps to reveal more about the weaknesses and alliances of the ruling regimes - all the best.

Indian communist movement was also a imperialists project.
But they figured out that Indian mercantile was working with both INC and outsiders.

But they had no idea that financial center had a deep history in london

[abhischekcc]

I have mentioned earlier that if the nationalist movement is really serious about capturing power in the forseeable future, then they have to take control of the labour movement in India.

This will not only help build a strong nationalist identity in the working class, it will bring under control all industrialists who are currently aligned with foreign financial interests.

[svinayak]

I have mentioned earlier that if the nationalist movement is really serious about capturing power in the forseeable future, then they have to take control of the labour movement in India.

This will not only help build a strong nationalist identity in the working class, it will bring under control all industrialists who are currently aligned with foreign financial interests.

This will be our last step in the final independence and freedom for India.
BMS was the first step in this direction. I have met personally Dattopantji Thengde ji in 1993 when the economic reform was being done and had a long conversation with him regarding his views on opening the economy.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bharatiya_Mazdoor_Sangh
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dattopantji_Thengdi

[harbans]

Actually the scenario i posted in TSP thread is sort of incorrect. Yes not a blade of grass grows in Mansarover, Shiva is Chinese (myth or person), but 50 years hence, Nepal probably is history given it's choice for flirting with Maoists and Islamists. So news will probably read like this:

The Shahi Imam of the Islamic Republic of Uttar Mughalistan (formerly known as Uttar Pradesh) announced the taller than oceans and deeper than mountains relationship with China on the 20th anniversary of Chinese reclamation of Bodh Gaya. The announcement came from the rebuilt ramparts of the Grand Babri Masjid destroyed by Hindu fanatics decades ago. 20 subversive Nepalese leaders were handed to Chinese police at a border checkpost highlighting close anti terrorist cooperation between China and Uttar Mughalistan.

The President of UM endorsed the controversial move of handing over Mukteshwar, Ramgarh and upper reaches of Uttaranchal to the Chinese in a deal done several decades ago. India's aggressive takeover of Noida in a pre-emptive military maneuver prior to formation of Mughalistan and subsequent fencing is one of several major disputes with Uttar Mughalistan. Britain and US have condemned India's aggression over the territory. China endorses a peaceful resolution of the dispute. Both countries claim that territory.

The President also opposed the electrified fencing off Jharkhand, Chattisgarh with Mughalistan by India and requested China to supply 300 J XX fighters to help maintain the balance of power in the region. Many parts of Chattisgarh, MP and Rajasthan borders are disputed. Artillery firing over several sectors has made life for local villagers unbearable. Roy in Guardian mentions increased defense spending on both sides to be a major cause of poverty in both feuding nations.

Reports also mentioned the Chinese leadership displayed disappointment with Indian leadership over misuse of Chinese myths by Indian citizens, specially naming people and places after Shiva and Vishnu. Prof Guha, PhD in China studies has argued credibly that the Chinese have a point. Just like companies in China are not allowed to brand products as Apple, or Appal or Appel, brand equity for Chinese ownership over the Myths of Shiva and Vishnu is diluted. The Indian Foreign Minister Krishna says constructive talks with Chinese leaders are on this issue. WHen pressed by reporters on Chinese issuing staple Visas to those whose names are are Vishnu, Shiva, Gautam he was emphatic that India has taken a strong stance and even in the past had issued a Demarche to the Chinese Ambassador in the Capital city of Bangalore.

Foreign Minister Krishna urged the visiting Chinese Minister to use his good offices to request Uttar Mughalistan to issue visas to pilgrims for the Kumbh Mela at Allahabad, a practice discontinued for several decades. Last year Mughalistan executed 7 Indians who crossed illegally to take a dip in the Ganges. The Minister said India had strongly protested the outrage and also given a demarche to the Mughalistan Ambassador.

Mani Aiyer since has made several trips on track 2 diplomacy and says the hospitality received is over whelming and the people are just like us. We need to engage with the peace lobby in Mughalistan. Religion and politics must not come in the way of brotherly relations between the two nations.

Meanwhile India has received a loan from IMF to put storage tankers at sea and produce much needed fresh water. Under the Ganges Yamuna Treaty Mughalistan India gets 5% of waters which are not enough for it's need. Even that Indians claim is being violated. Indian Foreign Minister Krishna thanked China for helping secure the IMF loan. There were no negative votes for India. Even Mughalistan did not vote against the loan for India. A sign many in the Indian media and establishment say point to the fact that despite our differences, we can work together to solve our problems.

Hardline Hindu nationalists demanded in the Indian parliament taxing the Mughalistan-Pakistan Road corridor in lieu of more water rights. India which had acknowledged the demand and provided a transit fee free corridor between Mughalistan and Pakistan decades ago said there was no question it would dishonor the treaty of free transit. Talks were on also between Islamabad, Allahabad, Bangalore on the question of illegal immigrants misusing the free tranist corridor. Both Pakistan and Mughalistan maintain there were no illegal migration and misuse. They blame India for blocking the passage of 40 Tanks and 136 heavy artillery vehicles from Islamabad to Mughalistan. The case has been taken to the International courts. Indian sources say they have a strong case of blocking the artillery and tanks. The ruling they say will probably be restricted to 2 tanks and 20 heavy artillery pieces as a face saving gesture for Islamabad at the most every week.

Indian Hindu nationalists also created an uproar in parliament on news that the Indian PM decided to de link talks and terror. Coming soon after the massive attacks in Chennai, Vizag, Cochin the leadership stressed that we will have to continue to live as neighbors and terror affects both countries. Roy in landmark article in the Guardian had earlier stressed that Saffron terror and misuse of Chinese symbols was a major cause of distrust between these neighboring nations. Many Indians have stopped naming Children after Shiva and Vishnu. Noted leftist Mr Bannerjee in the Hindu even suggested making a list of names and seeking approval from Chinese authorities which ones would be acceptable. Mr Guha approves of such venture and talks as they will bring trust and show China, that India is sensitive about Chinese legacy issues on misuse of names like Gautama and Shiva.

[brihaspati]

harbans ji,
I will not discourage your scenario building! I will be glad if they believe that this is what we believe will happen, and that we have given up and surrendered already.

To a certain extent we need to allow part of the above to happen. Resisting prematurely will not expose the real forces, and who will side with whom in the ultimate stage. Rather it will waste the energy that will be needed to be concentrated with overwhelming superiority at one weak point after another. Also we need the excuses to do what we have to do as reaction against something rather than as an initiative or first strike.

I have my faith in the green and white external leadership to do the needful.

[Atri]

Harbans ji...

[Advait]

Harbans ji,

An excellent scenario. We need more of such negative/worst outcome scenarios to make our ppl more 'jagrut'.

We are kindred spirits onlee

[brihaspati]

On the other hand - if the mainstream gets such scenarios - it can be used in exactly the opposite direction too. Such negative scenarios will be pointed out as all the more reason to concede more earlier! The theory is that if you meet your enemy halfway with their demands before they make it - there is a hope - that they will stop at that and not demand the remaining half.

So to prevent such negative scenarios more of the demand from mullahcracy has to be accommodated. This will be the mainstream mercantile line.

[Advait]

I doubt it B ji. The scenarios are so outrageous that if told to most ppl, then they would be outraged and demand more from our gov and elites. That is why, such scenarios will be suppressed.

Harbans ji, maybe you can include in your scenario what happens to BRFites in this dhimmistan .

In fact, I was planning on writing such a negative scenario myself, in which all of India would have fallen.

[brihaspati]

Try it out on existing mouthpieces of the regime! See what the general tone will be. It will be "islamophobia", saffronist paranoia aimed at drumming up support for fascism. Actually more should be done to see to it that Muslims do not feel so frightened that they take up such extreme measures in panic - which means reassuring them in the only way their mullahcracy demand that muslims will be reassured - ever increasing state guarantees of the unchallengeability of the theologians and their institutions.

[harbans]

Chandra, Advait, B Ji thanks. But the reason why i posted that is in a way it has already happened. Us not realizing it has is cognitive dissonance. We signed an IWT that gave 80% waters to Pakistan. Whereas the treaty between US-Mexico on sharing Colorado river waters gives Mexico rights to just 10%. We fight over a ridge here and there all along our Northern borders, when we never had to do that in the entire History before Han aggression of Tibet. We abandoned Shiva to China in the process and recognize the spot where Shiva meditates and his abode as legitimate Chinese territory. That also is the area where all major river systems in SE Asia and East India originate. What is rightfully ours is ceded by what possible principle? Instead of giving stapled Visas to Tibetans we talk over Chinese stapled visas to Kashmiri's and non issuance of visas to Indians from ArP.

Today Nepal is succumbing to the Islamist and Maoist. How long can it survive. Many Nepalese are migrating to the NE, places like Nagaland and converting en masse to Christianity. UP is 30% Mohammedan today with poor education levels. Western UP is over run by crime and one sees only mosques and Madrassas sprouting along the Ganges and other holy spots. Nepal does not have a way out i can see. Chinese plan is to usurp the Buddhist heritage as their own. The coup is that they have usurped one of the Trinity too in Kailash and Mansarover. By usurping Buddhist heritage as there own only then Tibet can ever be a complete integral of China. Till then they too know deep inside they don't have legitimacy over Tibet. The Chinese are galled that the next Dalai Lama may be an Indian citizen. Hence ArP, Nepal and take over of Bodh Gaya are extremely important steps for the PRC in the next 40-50 years.

They know their plan, we don't. Pakistan knows it's strategic plan, we don't. So we are reactive, they are pro active. They know when to troll us on staple visa issues, water rights etc. We have not got got it as yet. Till then we have to maybe make people realize the irony to get them to see.

[brihaspati]

harbans ji,
if we are only reactive, did you write the piece to elicit reaction? But the thing is we are not reactive. Contrary to impression, Indians are very proactive. The ruling regimes or entrenched power interests are even more proactive. The problem is we are failing to realize the system of values and priorities based on which these regimes think or decide.

The most likely cause is the way the power was transferred from formal british hands to a section of Indian elite. All parties involved to any significant extent in the process, the Brits+Americans, Russians, congrez centre around JLN+Sardar, big biz - each of them had blackmail points on each other and their solution was the optimal for them in the sense that no one would have gained by moving away from this solution. I have tried to give an outline of the factors involved in the Partition thread.

These blackmail points perhaps still hold to the extent that they may affect the cozy political and financial arrangements that have grown around that initial arrangement - if they are exposed. [The value of a blackmail lies in how unacceptable the secret is to continuation of privileges in the blackmailee because of social/national/wider group values].

From persistent and repeated behaviour through many different situations, you can safely assume that the entrenched Indian biz+pol+crim have these priorities:
(1) British links and alliances are sacrosanct
(2) Russia can never be abandoned or disconnected from
(3) America to be used depending on the Anglo-India network priorities
(4) behaviour towards China depends on the Anglo-India network priorities and secondarily by Russian interests. [Russia and Britain may have deeper underlying links than it is usually given out]
(5) both major contesting branches of Christianity to be protected in their operations within India. The Anglican group was given a slight edge for a long time, but US manipulations and use of Catholicism for its own intra-European, intra-Anglo-Saxon competition and obstructing Russia [using the traditional Catholic-Orthodox rivalry] means that over the last 30-35 years the relative weights given within India has changed. [Look at IG-SG transition as reflection of this struggle to move control away from Russia].

(6) Islam and islamism to be protected at any and every cost. This comes out of again the British connection in the foundational stages, as well as the "allies" pressure to keep the indigenous majority system from asserting itself. The Brits blamed the "Hindu" for ultimately losing their crown jewel, and know very well that its reassertion will fatally weaken the control and influence that they have - or seal off the slow evangelization process by which the Anglo-Saxon world seeks to retrieve control over the subcontinent.

The entrenched elite has been made to fear that Hindu resurgence too and know that their best chance is in preserving a base for islamism so that they can themselves pretend to be the arbitrator and threaten leaning over to the other side to keep each side subdued while their own financial and power exploitation continues unchallenged.

Tibet, Buddhism, and everything else you write about will fit smoothly within the above brief outline.

All I am pointing out is that - this is not happening through reaction - but its a very calculated proactive and pre-emptive sequence of actions by this "allied" system.

[brihaspati]

PS: cancellation of the fighter order from Brit connection is not a contradiction to what I proposed. Wait for under the radar compensations to be made. The India side is now having to balance other aggressive allies too. But the underlying closeness to the Brits will hold.

[harbans]

Contrary to impression, Indians are very proactive. The ruling regimes or entrenched power interests are even more proactive. The problem is we are failing to realize the system of values and priorities based on which these regimes think or decide.

I think most people even in ruling juntas are completely unaware of which doctrine's clutches they are in. When partition took place there were many Hindu's in Lahore who refused to believe that they will be hurt till the mobs burnt them and their family alive. It didn't help much them saying they supported Pakistan. The same with many who unwittingly joined the South Asia groups for peace that the ISI sponsored Fai initiated. Many leaders in India come from such backgrounds. Many have extremely good connections in the media and play up such articles. When in power the trappings of arrogance prevent any further exploration of which doctrine they are influenced by. I was amused to read Yoginders Sikand's backtracking.

But when i write that piece i intend to shake out of slumber more Sikands. We do hear talk about making borders irrelevant, but one basic question arises is when do borders become irrelevant? They become irrelevant if and only if the core value systems of both the neighbours are similar. So India and Tibet never had a border problem in millenia. India and Nepal don't have one and it is completely unfenced. Neither we have a fence with Bhutan. US-Canada don't need one for the same reason, neither do Belgium and Holland. But with the imperialist Han or Islamist Pakistan we will have to fence, put division strengths across and invest in them.

So we will never make borders irrelevant by appeasing neighborhoods with opposing doctrines. Most Indians don't share the Han imperialist doctrine and neither want an Islamist one to govern them. So it is impossible to make borders irrelevant. Now in the quest for peaceful borders, we acknowledge an LAC, LOC whatever. Talk about ridges, mountains and features of control to demarcate. India and Indians have yet to realize that living with a neighbor with a completely opposite doctrine is a tough task. South Korea knows it. Germany's neighbors before WW 2 know this. West Germany knew it till it's reunification decades later. The only way out is to change them or change yourself. That requires a doctrinal assault, money and yes military power. If not, we will most probably witness the situation i described 40 years hence.

[brihaspati]

harbans ji,
I do think that the top echelons of regimes understand pretty well under what values they are operating, and under what ideology's clutches they are. They are very very aware of their own opportunities, advantages or profits and targets. They have a very high degree of awareness of their ideological preferences.

I have pretty regular interactions with people - some of whom are spokespersons for the regime. I have seen the left and left of centre from inside for many many years. Have seen those who walk the darkened corridors of power in capital first hand. I have to pretend. Something which I hate from childhood. But, pretension is tactical now as age teaches one to be less emotional. Information. Gauging moods and psychological profiles and estimating how they will react to what. That gives insight into how things will evolve and what can be done to subtly change directions.

My estimate has hardened over the years. I think the whole bunch needs to be swept out with a broom. These are not merely self-delusional, but self-aware criminally unethical and immoral crooks.

The scenario you paint may or may not turn around more Sikands. Those who are turning around will do so anyway based on their own realization of what their hoped for "revolutions" and "deliverance" or "salvation" means in reality. But the real question is - at least personally for me - the dilemma of agony at realizing the inevitable slide towards ideologically covered imperialism and the impetuous headlong rush to try and do something immediately - while on the other hand the lessons of history and perhaps to an extent a translife lesson of how impetuosity and over-radical reactions ultimately destroy the intended goal.

The march towards that goal has to be taken without emotion, without kindness, without barbarity, without bitterness or joy, without impatience, with a single minded and very cold focused purpose. It cannot be genocide, cannot be senseless or meaningless violence, cannot be rash and spectacular acts in the hope of catching popular imagination, cannot be senseless and meaningless kindness or forgiveness either, cannot be blind defence of any particular ideology or method either. Each of those are deviations and distractions that destroy the ultimate objective.

[devesh]

The march towards that goal has to be taken without emotion, without kindness, without barbarity, without bitterness or joy, without impatience, with a single minded and very cold focused purpose. It cannot be genocide, cannot be senseless or meaningless violence, cannot be rash and spectacular acts in the hope of catching popular imagination, cannot be senseless and meaningless kindness or forgiveness either, cannot be blind defence of any particular ideology or method either. Each of those are deviations and distractions that destroy the ultimate objective.

brihaspati ji,

what you say is very hard to do. from a purely analytical viewpoint, that methodology might be useful in picking and choosing the targets. but eventually, if you want to channel a big enough group against that target, then you have to use emotion, sentiment, and grand imagery to appeal to the peoples' sense of grandeur and purpose in life. any "revolution" or mass movement will require that.

[brihaspati]

devesh ji,
I hold the high point of MKG as the decision to take to Dandi march. Neither before, nor afterwards did he ever match that point - not even in 42. Was Dandi march spectacular? Not really. Was it rash, not really.

The lesson to be taken from Dandi march is that when a ruling system, a regime, the rashtryia superstructure that sits on top of the foundational base of the jaati - has detached itself from the foundations, then that has to be exposed. The best exposure is to show to the jaaiti that detachment - by forcing the regime/rashtra to choose sides over an issue where the jaati's common interests are concerned, and against the jaati.

The Indo-Brit regime that effectively controlled India at the time [no British regime would have succeeded if no Indian collaborators were available] fell into the trap nicely. The issue was also so - which showed the fundamental interests of the rulers - personal and exclusive minority group's profit at the cost of the people. This is what thec urrent trends are heading towards.

You need to alienate the people from the setup on issues of core importance and interests before an outdated or corrupt and self-serving regime can be replaced. It does not always have to be violent - as one would have expected for USSR in 1990, but the bulk of the people did not feel sufficiently attached to the existing system anymore and remained disconnected, and the regime toppled almost overnight without any significant degree of violence.

In India of course it will not be entirely without violence - because no regime in India has really relinquished power without imposing violence in one way or the other on the people. [By regime change I do not mean change of cabinets or viceroys - but the entire political class that periodically changes its figureheads out of internal factional fights, yet remains in power as a group]. But that violence will be rashtra unleashed - and not by the people.

[harbans]

B ji, i may agree with you that many do know what doctrines they swear allegiance to, but the adage that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. I am not sure most muslims are aware of the tenets of Islamism, or that most people in fascist countries like NK are evil. The problem with these systems is they churn out people at the top brainwashed seeing all issues through the prism of a fascist or an Islamist book or hadith. Once they look through that prism of idealism of their doctrine, they tend to overlook rights issues in favor of maintaining the doctrinal status quo that keeps going to the extremes. Even the people at the top are victims of the doctrine. Once they get there it doesn't help much if they realize..hell. They just continue with the motions. These doctrines are a trap. Sikand realized that it seems.

[Manish_Sharma]

There is a table of Hindu population in Bharatvarsh statewise on this page in you scroll down a little bit, wonder how correct it is:

http://www.indiaonlinepages.com/populat ... india.html

[Virupaksha]

Wth, some thing is wrong with those figures.

Note the sex ratios

Arunachal Pradesh - 749
Nagaland - 582
Manipur - 974
Mizoram - 341

[brihaspati]

Not sure if this has been posted. I track the neo-Maoists of China, and thought that the following needs highlighting. I have been proposing for quite a while now that we should prepare for an eventual factional split within both the CPC and PLA and the corresponding tactical choices left before the party - that in a distant way does have consequences for India.

http://chinhdangvu.blogspot.ie/2012/04/ ... es-as.html

BEIJING — China’s Communist Party censors on Friday closed several “new left” Web sites, and a fourth, pro-reform site run by the Carter Center went off-line, as the country’s rulers sought to stifle divergent voices and muffle signs of an ideological struggle ahead of a crucial leadership change this fall. The Web sites Maoflag.net, Jinbushe.org (or “Progress Society”) and wyzxsx.com, the Internet home of Utopia, a neo-Maoist group, were among those closed to Internet users in China.

All three have been outspoken in their support of the popular and charismatic former Chongqing Party chief Bo Xilai, who was fired March 15.
They were also cheerleaders for Bo’s “Chongqing model” of development, which emphasized a strong state-centered economy and social welfare policies to address income inequality.

The crackdown was the latest step in an ongoing tightening of Internet controls since Bo’s dismissal, as top Party officials seek to contain the public fallout from China’s most serious political crisis in decades.

Web search terms have been blocked and other sites shut down, and some of Bo’s past associates have been removed from their posts and placed under investigation.
On Friday, the Maoflag and Utopia Web sites initially carried an identical message saying they had been shut down for a month by the State Council Information Office and the Public Security Bureau for “posting articles and information that are anti-constitution, maliciously attacking national officials, and spreading rumors about 18th Party Congress.”

Until his ignominious firing last month, Bo — the son of revolutionary hero Bo Yibo — was widely considered to be in line for one of the nine Standing Committee positions.
His removal has not been officially explained, leaving an information vacuum that is being filled with Internet-fueled rumors, including unsubstantiated claims that he is under investigation for corruption or that his popular following unnerved a leadership that favors faceless, collective decision-making. The Internet closures suggest that three weeks after Bo’s ouster, the ideological struggle continues, with the government and ruling party on edge about any suggestion of dissension in the top ranks.

In a telling sign of the mood, the daily newspaper of the People’s Liberation Army on Friday ran the latest of several recent editorials calling for unity and reiterating the military’s allegiance to President Hu Jintao.

The editorial mentioned the upcoming 18th Party Congress as a major event for China.
“Whenever the party and nation are facing big events, whenever the process of reform and development is reaching a crucial point, the ideological battle becomes sharper and more complicated,[...] “We must unswervingly adhere to the system and principle of the absolute leadership of the party over the army. We must unswervingly resist all kinds of wrong thoughts, not be disturbed by noise, not be confused by rumors, not be moved by dark currents, and ensure the troops listen to the command of the Central Military Commission and the Party Central Committee and Chairman Hu, at any time and under any circumstances.” The editorial appeared to be a direct response to unsubstantiated talk of a military coup in the making following Bo’s ouster.

On March 30, government censors announced a half-dozen arrests and the closing of 16 Web sites for “fabricating or disseminating online rumors,” including tales of tanks in the streets of Beijing. Bo Xilai had become a hero to China’s relatively small but outspoken circle of far-left academics, writers, bloggers and students for his emphasis on social welfare and his unabashed imitation of Mao Zedong’s “mass mobilization” style of politics.

In Chongqing, Bo instituted a “red revival” campaign that included organized singing of revolutionary songs. In other throwbacks to the Mao era, he also ordered Chongqing satellite television to replace prime-time sitcoms and game shows with “patriotic” programming and directed students and government workers to spend time in rural areas.
But it was Bo’s economic policies in Chongqing that most endeared him to the “new leftists,” as they are known here.

For example, Bo invested heavily in the construction of subsidized housing for low-income residents, [...]But in a March 14 news conference, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, considered the leading if lonely voice of Chinese “reformists” calling for more economic and political openness, seemed to directly challenge Bo’s vision for China’s future. Without continued opening and reform, Wen warned, “historic tragedies like the Cultural Revolution may happen again.”

Wen has kept up his calls for Western-style economic liberalization since Bo’s ouster, angering the new leftists. On Tuesday, he urged a breakup of China’s powerful banking monopoly, saying the large state-run banks mostly benefit powerful state-owned corporations at the expense of small- and medium-size private businesses. The new leftists, in response, posted articles on their Web sites calling for preservation of the state monopolies and praising Bo’s Chongqing model.

[brihaspati]

Isnt it strange that BR's open presence with AH is drawing no flak this time around - and no sensation?