On the lines of Shiv garu's piskology excerpts from article posted by Charlie garu in islamic thread. Thought the analysis is also suitable here wrt TSP and it's dealing with India and other countries. Replace muslims with TSP as appropriate, we find what the author says is something BRF gurus have been saying for many years:
My Muslim clients saw these normal Western social tools for negotiation during social conflicts as signs of weakness.They saw the lack of readiness to use threats and engage in a physical fight as a sign of fear.
Muslim clients mainly see the sources for their suffering as outer factors: An unfair society and non-Islamic authorities are the general scapegoats.
While Westerners tend to ask themselves "What did I do wrong?" when experiencing problems, Muslims tend to ask "Who did this to me?" The tendency to develop a victim mentality is therefore another natural consequence of having an outer locus of control:
the reason TSPians stink up any place they live:
Among my 150 Muslim clients, at most a handful felt they were Danish. Most of them saw themselves as Moroccans, Somalis and Pakistanis, etc. living in another country - in this case Denmark. ....This strong experience of "us" and "them" (Muslims and non-Muslims) has very concrete consequences – most of all to non-Muslims: Most of the Muslim inmates had been charged with some kind of violence – violence, robbery and attempted murder.
So many times we heard about Islam being ROP and it's only few bad apples, right?
It seems that the Muslim group does not identify itself in terms of skin and hair colour. The group identified itself in accordance with its religion.
This surprised me, because most of the Muslim inmates were not practising their religion in daily life. Many of them enjoyed alcohol and had had premarital sex. They also did not pray five times per day, and a majority knew little or nothing about the content of the Quran.
No wonder Jinnah was one of them.
And then the infamous pass time of our Paki birathers, why they do, what they do:
In many cases, the suppression of women causes Muslim men to develop homosexual behaviour. Research conducted in Pakistan shows that "At least 95 percent of truck drivers in Pakistan consider indulging in sexual activities during their rest time as their main entertainment." A US military report from Afghanistan concludes that ”homosexual behaviour is unusually common among men in the large ethnic group known as Pashtuns. ... Pashtun men commonly have sex with other men, admire other men physically, have sexual relationships with boys and shun women both socially and sexually". Learning to not like women and still having a sex drive naturally drives the men to find other solutions.
And about those google searches:
When it comes to sodomy, paedophilia and rape sex, it is. According to research conducted using the internet's largest search engine, Google, "Pakistan is top dog in searches per-person for 'horse sex' since 2004, 'donkey sex' since 2007, 'rape pictures' between 2004 and 2009, 'rape sex' since 2004, 'child sex' between 2004 and 2007 and since 2009, 'animal sex' since 2004 and 'dog sex' since 2005. ... The country also tops - or has been No. 1 - in searches for 'sex', 'camel sex', 'rape video,' 'child sex video' and some other searches that can't be printed here".
And about TSP negotiation style and how to deal with it:
These psychological insights should be used on a wider scale. One important example is that Western Indian diplomacy and foreign policy must take such cultural differences into account. There is no doubt that when we meet extreme Islamic governments and organizations with suggestions of compromise and dialogue, the average Muslim voter on their streets expect their Islamic leaders to exploit such Western weaknesses to the maximum.
For all the importance Obama claims to place on Pakistan, he has taken a back seat in directing the sinking partnership with Islamabad. In the extensively sourced Wall Street Journal report, the president is missing from the narrative. The internal administration debate on whether to apologize to Pakistan seems to be one among principals, deputies, and senior aides. But the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is too important for Obama to delegate. Contrast that with his behavior at the NATO summit: Initially, the White House told reporters the president would not meet with Zardari, a clear snub. But this clashed with the administration's strategy of enhancing and maintaining support with Pakistan's civilian democrats while taking the military to task. By summit's end, the administration backtracked -- realizing that a complete snub of Zardari could hurt Pakistan's fragile democratic transition -- and Obama held two "brief" meetings with the Pakistani president. The White House highlighted these interactions, yet emphasized that they were not especially substantive. Obama then awkwardly avoided mentioning Pakistan in his press conference at the summit's close. (He referred to NATO's commitment to bringing "peace and stability to South Asia, including Afghanistan's neighbors," but Pakistan is the only South Asian state that borders Afghanistan.) Finally, Obama gave an extensive response to the first question from the media, which was on Pakistan, giving the impression that his discussions with Zardari were wide in scope. The Obama administration's behavior was not carefully calibrated diplomatic messaging, but tactical maneuvering that was imprecise, difficult to decipher, and verging on passive aggression. It was amateur hour. The president's refusal to apologize has kept U.S.-Pakistan relations frozen at last winter's nadir, and the spring has seen no thaw. Relations could have been back on track had the president swallowed his pride and allowed his diplomatic team to bring Pakistan on board to secure a lasting peace in Afghanistan.