partha wrote:You might have read the 4 part series "This too was Pakistan" by NFP on dawn.com. Here is a response. Read the whole thing. It is too long to post here in full. Only selected items I have quoted.
I suggest this be included in the first post of TSP thread.
http://criticalppp.com/archives/222082
This too was Pakistan (1947-71): A response to Nadeem Paracha’s “Also Pakistan”
Nadeem F. Paracha’s (NFP) history of Pakistan in the four part series in daily Dawn suffers from an error of exclusion. It is the history of Pakistan’s upper-middle classes in an urban setting where lifestyle choices imply that somehow Pakistan was more liberal in the past. It also reduces Pakistan to a (mainly) Punjabi-Muhajir urban upper-middle class landscape – like the plays of Fatima Surayya Bajia, Hasina Moin and Ashfaque Ahmed or romantic writings of Shafique-ur-Rehman and Nasim Hijazi.
The pictures in NFP columns tell a story of an upper middle class whose “liberal” membership has shrunk. Simultaneously, it also reinforces the myth that there is a tiny bulwark of upper-middle class activists who are protecting Pakistan from complete Talibanisation - as long as their literary festivals, social media melas and fashion shows are well funded by foreign consulates and donor agencies.
In terms of strategy, “liberals” tactics are very similar to the post-9/11 strategy of General Musharaf. In the first half of the last decade, this strategy was employed to the hilt by Musharaf in trying to convince the West that he and the army under him represent the last stand against the Taliban. Of course, now the whole world knows the dual policy of Pakistan’s military establishment of officially opposing the Taliban but protecting and sponsoring them and their local Jihadi affiliates at the ground level. Plausible deniability was taken to a new level by Pakistan’s military establishment. Similarly, it is commonly known that several of Pakistan’s “noted liberals” including but not limited to Najam Sethi, Ejaz Haider and their predecessors in the past have played a questionable role in undermining democratic governments in Pakistan.
What NFP has presented in this series is only a limited remembrance of Pakistan from an elitist, upper-middle class perspective. If a narrow window of Pakistani society can be described as Pakistan, rest assured such Pakistan exists even today within its typical confines, e.g., five star hotels, private beaches, civil society melas, literary festivals, aman ki asha events etc in secluded luxury hotels or private residences.
What NFP did not describe is how the country was shaping itself right from its inception when Jinnah and his close comrades authorized military take over of Balochistan, despatch of Pashtun and Punjabi mercenaries to Kashmir, dismissal of Dr. Khan’s government in NWFP and suppression of Bangla language. In 1948 and beyond we saw a repeat of similar events, e.g., when Jinnah’s funeral was refused to be led by a Shia cleric, when Objectives Resolution was passed by Pakistan’s first legislative assembly thus formalizing the ascendancy of Sunni Islam, when anti-Ahmadiyya riots took place in streets of Lahore and other cities of Pakistan. NFP also did not mention the fact that long before General Zia’s Islamization, one of the bloodiest massacres of Shias took place in Terhi Sindh in 1963. That too was Pakistan.
Romanticizing of Pakistan from an upper-middle class lens is a great thing to write and read and we are not challenging the fact that confines of the upper-middle class lifestyle have relatively reduced in the past few decades courtesy General Zia, Zakir Naik, Farhat Hashmi, Imran Khan etc, however, that lifestyle featuring several elements of social hedonism is still available and enjoyed by the select elite.
The photos and narrative also reinforce the upper-middle class narrative that the seeds of extremism, intolerance and hypernationalism were sown during Bhutto’s time and harvested by Zia ul Haq. Unfortunately, this selective narrative excludes the role of Pakistan’s urban elites (eg Rana Liaquat Ali Khan, Qudratullah Shahab, Altaf Gauhar etc) who silently watched the destruction of a pluralist society and the resulting rampant extremism while their own socio-economic interests were taken good care of.
The seeds of extremism in Pakistan were not planted by Zia or Bhutto but were there much earlier and should be highlighted. Today, Pakistan’s Shia Muslims are undergoing a slow-motion genocide which is deliberately being misrepresented or ignored by the urban elites who have positioned themselves as the “Endangered Liberal Species”. Such elites have largely participated in inexplicable silence on the massacre of at least 19000 Shia Muslims in Pakistan in the last few decades.
1947: A country created on the basis of communal hatred and othering
Founder of a communal state is evasive about his own communal identity
The country’s founder was a Shia but it was Mr. Jinnah himself who was evasive about his Shia Muslim identity.
1947: Jinnah dismisses an elected government in NWFP Province
1948: Bacha Khan remains in intermittent house arrest from 1948 to 1964
Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (Bacha Khan) was always presented as a traitor of Pakistan and an Indian agent. Ghaffar Khan was placed under house arrest without charge from 1948 till 1954. He was re-arrested in 1958 until an illness in 1964 allowed for his release.
1948: At least 150 Pashtuns massacred in Babhara village, Charsadda
1948: State funeral for Jinnah cannot be led by a Shia cleric
1949: Islamisation of Pakistan begins. Objectives Resolution passed by PM Liaquat Ali Khan
1951: A Jihad-e-Kashmir mercenary killed PM Liaquat Ali Khan
1952: Bangla language riots in East Pakistan
1953: Anti-Ahmadiyya riots in Punjab
In 1953, a religious movement began to agitate for the removal of the Ahmadiyya Muslims from power positions, and demanded a declaration of Ahmadis as a non-Muslim minority groups. Due to government’s lack of action, mass rioting broke out in the Punjab against both the government and followers of Ahmadis. Several dozens were killed by violent mobs of Jamaat-e-Islami and other Sunni Deobandis, Wahhabi and Barelvi groups.
General Azam Khan – the first Martial Law Administrator having hard talk with Sardar Nishtar. With the government failing to contain anti-Ahmadi riots in Lahore, property of civilians being destroyed and truoble spreading to other major cities of the Punjab in 1953, Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin, an ineffective administrator while presiding over a cabinet meeting in Karachi kept saying what should I do, what should I do. Lahore was on fire and the Governor of Punjab had just confirmed the fact. Defense Secretary Iskander Mirza was asked to find out the exact situation. He went to the ante room and called GOC Lahore General Azam Khan who confirmed the reports. ‘How long will it take you to control the situation?’ Mirza asked him. ‘One hour’ quipped Azam. ‘Then go ahead’ Mirza advised him. He returned to the Cabinet room and announced that he had declared Martial Law in Lahore. True to his word Azam restored law and order, arrested Maulana Maudoodi and Maulana Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi, tried them in a summary military court, sentenced them to death and sent them to the black cell for hanging the next morning. A call from King Saud however got them a reprieve. But with the carte blanche given to Gen Azam, military supremacy had been ensured in Pakistan for all times to come. Also Saudi hegemony in protecting and sponsoring Wahhabi-Deobandis of Pakistan was also established.
Pakistan was co-opted by a powerful civil-military bureaucracy immediately after coming into existence. This establishment ensured that Deobandi clerics and organizations e.g., Shabbir Ahmed Usmani, Maulana Maududi were given a prominent place in a non-democratic setup. The Objectives Resolution followed quickly and a large scale pogrom against the Ahmadi Muslims took place in Pakistan in 1953. None of this is reflected in the pictures selected – incidentally, that is not Stewart Granger and Ava Gardner either – although both of them were here for the filming of Bhowani junction. The most abiding memory of them isn’t Ava Gardner’s ethereal beauty or Granger’s rackish charms. Rather is the pride felt by the urban elites when Stewart Granger was slapped by an army officer (Suo Moto anyone)
In terms of presenting an alternate history and point of view, it is important to appreciate some of Nadeem’s earlier anti-establishment work. However, it is also important to highlight the limitation of these views as an urban reflection which do not delve deeper into the historical roots of the problems currently facing Pakistan. Unwittingly, this presentation reinforces the selective elite narrative which works overtime to shift the blame from the establishment and the liberal class to convenient scapegoats (generals and politicians).
1955: One unit system adopted in West Pakistan
1956: Islamic name for Pakistan
1959: Baloch leaders betrayed by Pakistan army
1963: Shia massacre in Therhi, Sindh
1965: Operation Gibraltar and the Pakistan India war
1971: Bangladesh Liberation War and the genocide of pro-freedom Muslims and Hindus of East Pakistan
We cannot move forward until we reconcile with our past. For a progressive, pluralist and secular Pakistan, we cannot be selective of our either our history or our genesis. By perpetuating a selective and concocted version of history, we are doomed to repeat our follies.